A majority of judges concluded the plain language of the statute does not apply to bump stocks, but they also would have denied Chevron deference had they found the statute ambiguous.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett and Neil Gorsuch are disagreeing more than you might think, but Justice Barrett appears to have the upper hand.
A state court rules that bumble bees may qualify as "fish" under the California Endangered Species Act
A proposal from Justice Kagan.
In Wooden v. United States, the justices were unanimous in the judgment, but expressed disagreement over the role of statutory history and the rule of lenity.
A partially divided panel concludes the Environmental Protection Agency may not regulate trailers as “motor vehicles.”
on the proper role of legal corpus linguistics, by C'Zar Bernstein
The Supreme Court's 6-3 decision in Niz-Chavez v. Garland is not what you might have expected, but it may be a sign of things to come.
The Case Western Reserve Law Review has published Judge Barrett's 2019 Sumner Canary Memorial Lecture
Both sides in the landmark employment discrimination decision agree that laws should generally be interpreted based on the "ordinary meaning" of their words. But they differ on what that entails.
The decision in Bostock v. Clayton County is well-justified from the standpoint of textualism (a theory associated with conservatives), but less clearly so from the standpoint of purposivism (often associated with liberals).
How the FDA lost, and gained, jurisdiction over cigarettes -- to a Newfoundland fishing-boat tune
The Supreme Court's dueling opinions in Apple, Inc. v. Pepper raise interesting questions about textualist statutory interpretation.
If a statute imposes strict liability for dog bites, does that extend to a herding dog nipping at a cow that then trampled the plaintiff?