The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Religion and the Law

Religious Discrimination Claims Related to Ex-Employee's Objecting to Participating in "LGBTQ+" Events Can Go Forward

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From Pumariega v. Basis Global Technologies, Inc., decided Monday by Judge Lindsay Jenkins (N.D. Ill.):

{The following factual allegations are taken from Pumariega's Second Amended Complaint and are accepted as true for the purposes of the motion. In setting forth the facts at the pleading stage, the Court does not vouch for their accuracy.}

Pumariega worked remotely from Florida for an Illinois-based company, Basis. In November 2022, Pumariega received an email from Basis's Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) Department announcing an upcoming virtual, mandatory training on December 6, 2022. The email laid out the agenda which included (1) reviewing "LGBTQ+ terminology related to sexual orientation, gender identity, and expression – including words to avoid;" (2) discussing "a variety of gender-expansive pronouns that [one] may encounter in the workplace;" and (3) considering "a variety of ways that [one] can demonstrate … allyship to folks who are transgender and/or nonbinary, as well as resources to help … learn more." Pumariega, who is a devout Christian, did not request a religious accommodation to be excused from the event and attended the DEI training.

During the training presenters discussed gender identity, sexuality, sexual orientation as a scale, use of inclusive language, and preferred pronouns. Employees were instructed to use inclusive language when referring to groups in the workplace, and to consider where they fell on the sexual orientation scale—presented as a continuum stretching from "straight" to "gay/lesbian." In Pumariega's view, these concepts conflict with his Christian ideology, specifically the belief that there is no "sexuality scale" and that romantic relationships should only be between a man and a woman.

In approximately February 2023, Pumariega submitted anonymous feedback to the DEI team about the December training. Without disclosing his religious beliefs or indicating a religious objection to the training, Pumariega explained that, in his opinion, the topics discussed were inappropriate for the workplace.

In a May 2023 meeting with his supervisor, Drew Schuch, Pumariega revealed his Christian beliefs, expressed that the mandatory training conflicted with those beliefs, and requested an accommodation to skip future mandatory DEI trainings. Schuch assured Pumariega that Basis could not fire him on account of his religious beliefs and directed him to discuss the issue with Cassie Clark, Basis's Manager of Talent Partners.

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Free Speech

From Prof. Michael McConnell: Meta Oversight Board Steps Up To Protect Conservative Political Speech

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I'm delighted to pass along this item from my Hoover Institution colleague Michael McConnell, who is also a professor at Stanford Law School and the co-chair of the Facebook Oversight Board:

Increasingly, the most significant gatekeepers for political speech are not elected governments or courts, but the social media companies that control Facebook, Instagram, Threads, YouTube, X, and the like. That is why I signed on to co-chair Meta's independent Oversight Board, which handles appeals from users and referrals from the company in high-profile cases from all over the world. Necessarily, the Board cannot take a large number of cases; it decided just over 50 last year and is on track to decide a few more this year. The hope (and I think to some extent the reality) is that these high-profile cases, most of which have reversed Meta's original decision, will have an impact on the content moderation system as a whole.

Conservatives in the United States have long complained that the social media companies discriminate against right-of-center speech. It is hard to know how systemic this problem might be, because there are no good data—but there certainly are disturbing examples. Even Mark Zuckerburg has admitted that, in hindsight, the censorship of, for example, the Hunter Biden Laptop story, was wrong, and that the company has been too ready to comply with Administration demands to take down posts based on claims about misinformation and disinformation. In all likelihood, this ideological discrimination, to the extent it exists, is a product less of deliberate company policy than the tendency of on-the-ground content moderators (who are typically drawn from the Bay Area technocracy, which is not evenly divided between the parties) to make close calls in a way that skews left.

People wonder why, then, there have been relatively few interventions by the Oversight Board to protect right-of-center users from suppression of their speech on the platform. Based on my experience, there are at least two reasons. First, when users point out obvious errors in taking down legitimate posts, Meta's internal system often corrects the decision within a few days or a week. A few days or a week is long enough to do the harm; speech on political issues is usually stale after that time has passed. But if errors are corrected in that time frame, the case will never come to the Oversight Board.

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Criminal Justice

Public Defender Disqualified from Case for Race-Related Statement in Plea Bargain Negotiations

A California appellate panel interprets California's Racial Justice Act.

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From Sanchez v. Superior Court, decided yesterday by California Court of Appeal Justice Richard Fields, joined by Justice Manuel Ramirez:

In this writ proceeding, defendant and petitioner Enrique Sanchez seeks a writ of mandate ordering respondent superior court to vacate its order directing the San Bernardino County Public Defender (public defender) to assign a new attorney from its office to represent petitioner in his criminal proceedings. The trial court issued the order after receiving evidence that the deputy public defender currently assigned to represent him made remarks invoking defendant's race as a factor to consider during plea negotiations, potentially in violation of the Racial Justice Act (RJA). We conclude that petitioner has failed to establish an abuse of discretion warranting reversal of the trial court's order under the circumstances presented in this case. As such, we deny the petition….

In October 2023, the People filed an information alleging petitioner committed multiple criminal offenses arising out of an incident that occurred on January 7, 2023. {[From the dissent: -EV] Sanchez was charged with kidnapping to commit rape, rape by force or fear, infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant, forcible oral copulation, and assault with a deadly weapon. Kidnapping to commit rape carries a sentence of life without parole.}

The public defender was appointed as defendant's counsel and a specific deputy public defender from its office (deputy public defender) was assigned to handle defendant's case. On December 4, 2023, the prosecutor … stat[ed] that she engaged in a plea negotiation with the deputy public defender and, in the course of that negotiation, the deputy public defender became frustrated and stated: "'I really don't care.' … [R]ead between the lines …. I am a white man. What do I care? It's not my people we are incarcerating.'"

When the prosecutor asked for clarification about the remarks, the deputy public defender stated that he expected the prosecutor to show more leniency because the prosecutor and defendant appeared to be the same race, stating: "'[Y]ou are part of the problem. Look around you, all the people being incarcerated are your people. I will just look like a mean defense attorney. You should be part of the solution.'"

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Politics

2024 Ron Rotunda Memorial Webinar: Profiles in Courage in the Legal Profession

A discussion with Erin Murphy.

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I had Professor Ron Rotunda for Constitutional Law in 2007. But for Ron, I doubt I would have become a constitutional law professor. He inspired me in ways I still think about to this day. In 2018, Ron suddenly passed away, far too young. The following year, I wrote a remembrance about Ron in the Chapman Law Review.

The Federalist Society has created a new annual webinar in Ron's memory. Last year, I interviewed Greg Jacob, who served as a counselor to Vice President Pence on January 6, 2021. This year, I interviewed Erin Murphy. The theme was "Profiles in Courage in the Legal Profession." Erin and I spoke about the two occasions in which she left a firm, that was unwilling to stand up for a client. Erin's story is an important one that all aspiring lawyers should learn.

Second Amendment Roundup: Supreme Court Grants Cert in Mexico v. Smith & Wesson

A cartel-dominated state blames America’s lawful gun industry for its violence.

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On October 4, the Supreme Court granted cert in Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos.  It involves Mexico's suit against the American firearms industry, which alleges that the industry enables the drug cartels to empower their stranglehold over Mexican society.  The First Circuit upheld the claim by reversing the dismissal of the case granted by the District Court in Massachusetts.

The absurdity of Mexico's lawsuit is illuminated by action in another case just days later. On October 16, U.S. District Judge Brian Cogan in Brooklyn sentenced Genaro Garcia Luna to 460 months imprisonment for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, international cocaine distribution conspiracy, conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and conspiracy to import cocaine. But Luna wasn't just another El Chapo, whom Judge Cogan sent to the big house five years ago.

For over a decade, Luna was the head of Mexico's Federal Investigative Agency, and then became Secretary of Public Security.  According to the U.S. Department of Justice, Luna "used his official positions to assist the violent Sinaloa Cartel (the Cartel) in exchange for millions of dollars in bribes."  That included "facilitating safe passage of the drug shipments, providing sensitive law enforcement information about investigations into the Cartel and helping the Cartel attack rival drug cartels…."  He thereby enabled over a million kilograms (over 2.2 million pounds) of cocaine to be imported into the United States.

But corruption-ridden Mexico wants to blame America's lawful gun industry for its status as a failed state.  In the cert petition, the petitioners describe the background to the question presented as follows:

The Mexican Government has sued leading members of the American firearms industry, seeking to hold them liable for harms inflicted by Mexican drug cartels. According to Mexico, America's firearms companies have engaged in a series of business practices for decades—from selling semi-automatic rifles, to making magazines that hold over ten rounds, to failing to impose various sales restrictions—that have created a supply of firearms later smuggled across the border and ultimately used by the cartels to commit crimes. Mexico asks for billions of dollars in damages, plus extensive injunctive relief imposing new gun-control measures in the United States.

The district court dismissed the case under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which generally bars suits against firearms companies based on criminals misusing their products. But the First Circuit reversed. It held that PLCAA does not bar this suit because Mexico stated a claim that defendants' business practices have aided and abetted firearms trafficking to the cartels, proximately harming the Mexican government.

The petition states that the following two legal issues under PLCAA require resolution by the Court:

    1. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States is the "proximate cause" of alleged injuries to the Mexican government stemming from violence committed by drug cartels in Mexico.
    2. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States amounts to "aiding and abetting" illegal firearms trafficking because firearms companies allegedly know that some of their products are unlawfully trafficked.

PLCAA was enacted to require dismissal at the inception of lawsuits like this.  Other courts have recognized that.  The First Circuit's decision creates a circuit split.

Back in the 1980s, unable to convince legislatures to ban handguns, the anti-gun movement began filing lawsuits against the industry for crimes committed by third parties.  It didn't matter that the courts disagreed with the theory of liability, because the industry could be bankrupted by legal fees.  Over time, municipalities became plaintiffs in such suits, only to be rebuffed by the courts.  Congress finally stepped in by passing PLCAA to stop these abusive lawsuits.

The anti-gun movement continues to pursue the same strategy.  One of Mexico' lawyers listed on the complaint is Jonathan Lowy, counsel for BRADY (formerly Handgun Control, Inc.). BRADY supports repeal of PLCAA, but resorts to the courts to undermine the law since Congress has not done so.

Mexico's complaint parrots the same kinds of allegations which PLCAA was designed to bar.  As summarized by the First Circuit, Mexico alleges that "by passing along guns knowing that the purchasers include unlawful buyers, and making design and marketing decisions targeted towards those exact individuals, the manufacturer is aiding and abetting illegal sales."  As everyone knows, the manufacturers sell to distributors, which sell to dealers.  Each of these entities is licensed under the Gun Control Act and is subject to ATF inspection and oversight. The complaint includes no allegation that any of the defendants violated U.S. laws or knew that others with whom they did business did so.

While there is thus no proximate harm from America's lawful firearms industry to Mexico, the First Circuit proposes the following incredible analogy:

Imagine that a U.S. company sent a mercenary unit of combat troops to attack people in Mexico City. Such an attack would directly cause Mexico itself the expense of paying soldiers to defend the city. Proximate cause would be quite clear. So, too, here, where the defendants are alleged to have armed the attackers for their continuing assaults.

The Mexican government itself, through bad actors such as Genaro Garcia Luna, has facilitated the ability of the cartels to attack people in Mexico.  We frequently read stories of Mexican villages that form militias to protect themselves from the drug gangs. The Mexican government has failed at the most fundamental duty of any government: protecting the population under its rule.

While allowing, and being bribed to allow, the cartels to run rampant over the country, the government has only a single gun store in the entire country to allow law-abiding citizens to purchase firearms – and it's run by the military in Mexico City.

As it colludes with American actors to destroy the Second Amendment – after all, that's the point of the whole exercise of bringing its lawsuit – the Mexican government reinforces its own contempt for civil liberties, such as the fundamental human right to defend life.

Mexico's 1857 constitution (Art. 10) provided: "Every man has the right to have and to carry arms for his security and legitimate defense. The law will indicate which arms are prohibited and the penalty for those that will carry prohibited arms."  That was whittled down in the same article of its 1917 constitution to say that the inhabitants have "a right to arms in their homes, for security and legitimate defense, with the exception of arms prohibited by federal law and those reserved for the exclusive use of the [military]. Federal law will determine the cases, conditions, requirements, and places in which the carrying of arms will be authorized to the inhabitants."

In other words, Mexican citizen have a "right" to arms only as granted by the government.  For further insights on the topic, see David Kopel's article "Mexico's Gun Control Laws: A Model for the United States?"

After the briefs were filed, Mexico made a last-minute attempt to scuttle the case. Smith & Wesson notified the Supreme Court that, just recently, six manufacturers had been dismissed by the district court for lack of personal jurisdiction.  However, the suit remained live against Smith & Wesson and Interstate Arms.  Mexico responded that the dismissals undermined the petitioners' arguments about the importance of the case.  The Court ignored Mexico's filing and granted cert.

Understanding the issues in Mexico v. S&W requires a deep dive into PLCAA.  While not framed as a Second Amendment case, the issues profoundly affect whether that right will be protected.  PLCAA itself begins with a reaffirmation of Second Amendment rights and how lawsuits have been brought against the industry for crimes committed by third parties.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7901 et seq.  It declares that a "qualified civil liability action," defined as an action against a federal firearms licensee for damages or other relief resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a firearm, "may not be brought in any Federal or State court."

There is a predicate exception from the ban on such lawsuits if the manufacturer or seller of a firearm "knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product [firearm], and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought…."  That exception includes false entries in required records and conspiracy to sell a firearm knowing that the actual buyer is a prohibited person.  Ignoring that the plain meaning of the exception encompasses violations only of specific firearm statutes, the First Circuit decided that Mexico's common-law claims qualified and that Mexico sufficiently alleged that the defendants' actions were the proximate cause of harm.

The survival of America's gun industry, and thus the Second Amendment, depends on the resolution of those claims.  The Supreme Court should dispose of the case with an order pursuant to § 7902 of PLCAA: "A qualified civil liability action … shall be immediately dismissed by the court in which the action was brought or is currently pending."

Immigration

Institute of Economic Affairs Paper on Immigration and the Economic Liberty of Natives

The paper explains how immigration restrictions severely undermine both the "negative" and "positive" economic liberty of receiving-country natives. It also adapts my analysis of this topic for a British audience.

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The Institute of Economic Affairs, a prominent UK think thank, has published my paper on "Immigration and the Economic Freedom of Natives." Here is a summary of the main points:

• Immigration restrictions severely undermine the economic freedom of receiving-country citizens, as well as that of potential migrants.

• This impact affects both the 'negative' economic freedom valued by libertarians, classical liberals and many conservatives, and the 'positive' freedom most valued by many on the political left.

• Immigration restrictions harm negative economic freedom by depriving UK citizens of the opportunity to engage in valuable transactions with migrants, such as employing them, renting property to them, buying goods and services they produce, working for businesses established by immigrants, and more.

• Restrictions harm natives' positive freedom by depriving citizens of the production and innovation created by migrants, and especially their contributions to advances in technology and health care.

• These effects are exacerbated by the fact that immigrants disproportionately contribute to entrepreneurship and scientific innovation.

• When it comes to both positive and negative freedom, the effects of immigration restrictions are enormous – undermining both to a greater extent than virtually any other government policies adopted by liberal democracies such as the UK and US.

• Some argue that immigration actually threatens the economic freedom of natives. These concerns are largely overblown. Where valid, they can be addressed by 'keyhole solutions' less onerous than large-scale migration restrictions.

The paper expands on arguments developed in my 2023 Public Affairs Quarterly article on the same topic, and adapts them for a British audience.

IEA has also published a substack post (currently available only to subscribers) in which I summarize  the key themes of the paper. In July, I published an article in the Spectator on the economic benefits of immigration for Britain.

Free Speech

No Pseudonymity for Israeli Suing Intel Over Layoff Allegedly Prompted by Complaints Over Boss's Allegedly Pro-Hamas Statements

"Plaintiff's allegations are emotionally and politically charged, and ... Plaintiff is a member of certain groups subject to discrimination. That, however, is true of a plethora of cases in the federal courts and has generally not been understood to authorize anonymous pleading."

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From Doe v. Intel Corp., decided today by Judge Paul Oetken (S.D.N.Y.):

The Complaint alleges the following facts [which at this point are of course only allegations -EV]. Plaintiff John Doe is a "Jewish Israeli citizen who proudly served with the Israel Defense Forces," and who has family members currently living in Israel. Plaintiff first moved to the United States to "establish [a] U.S. market presence" for a "Startup" he was working for at the time. Shortly thereafter, Intel acquired the company and Plaintiff "began working for Intel as an Engineering Lead." In the ensuing years, Plaintiff had a successful career at Intel and was ultimately promoted to "Vice President of Engineering."

Following the October 7, 2023 attack on Israel by Hamas, Defendant Badr, "the Vice President of Customer Success at Intel," allegedly made a number of statements and interacted with a number of social media posts supporting Hamas's actions and "advocat[ing] for and celebrat[ing] the murder of Israelis like [Plaintiff] and the members of his family." On January 29, 2024, Badr became Plaintiff's direct manager. Plaintiff complained, but Intel "did not respond." Subsequently, Badr took actions to "mak[e] [Plaintiff's] professional life as intolerable as possible because of his Jewish and Israeli heritage," including acting "frigid and isolating" toward Plaintiff, asking Plaintiff which of his fellow employees were Israeli and making disparaging comments about them, refusing to approve Plaintiff's expense requests, interrupting Plaintiff in meetings, and interfering with Plaintiff's job responsibilities.

Plaintiff again complained and Intel conducted an investigation. Following the investigation, "Intel took no corrective action against Badr," but, on April 2, 2024, Plaintiff was "laid-off." When Plaintiff complained, "Intel then created a new job" for him, albeit "with a significant pay cut." Badr allegedly replaced Plaintiff in his old position with a new employee, "Ahmed," who "shared the same anti-Israel sentiments as Badr."

On July 3, 2024, Intel's Human Resources department informed Plaintiff "that his retention bonus was being cancelled." Plaintiff claims that this was done as "punish[ment] for protesting discrimination."

The court concluded that plaintiff, like other plaintiffs, had to sue under his own name:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires that "all the parties" be named in the title of the complaint. "This requirement, though seemingly pedestrian, serves the vital purpose of facilitating public scrutiny of judicial proceedings and therefore cannot be set aside lightly." … Plaintiff has "invoked the public forum of litigation in which there is a strong presumption of public access." "[P]seudonyms are the exception and not the rule, and in order to receive the protections of anonymity, a party must make a case rebutting that presumption."

And the court concluded that the strong presumption against pseudonymity wasn't rebutted here:

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Free Speech

Fifth Circuit Stays Broad Discovery Regarding Media Matters Donors in X v. Media Matters

The court concludes that X's requested discovery is broader than necessary, though it leaves open the door to some considerably narrower discovery.

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From an opinion issued Sunday by Fifth Circuit Judges Jerry Smith, Graves, and Engelhardt in X Corp. v. Media Matters for America:

In November 2023, X Corp. sued Media Matters, Inc., Eric Hananoki, and Angelo Carusone (collectively, "Media Matters") for (1) interfering with X Corp.'s contract, (2) disparaging X Corp's business, and (3) interfering with X Corp.'s prospective economic advantage. X Corp. alleges that Media Matters "knowingly and maliciously" manipulated images to "portray X Corp. as a social media platform dominated by neo-Nazism and anti-Semitism," which "alienate[d] major advertisers, publishers, and users from X."

In discovery, X Corp. requested that Media Matters produce the identity of donors, their addresses, and its communications with them. Relevant to this appeal are X Corp.'s Requests for Production 17, 18, 21, and 35:

Request for Production 17. Documents sufficient to show the identity of all Your donors or any others who provide financial support of any kind, their residence, the time and place of their donation or provision of financial support, and the amount of their donations or other financial support.

Request for Production 18. Any document or communication reflecting Your attempts to solicit donations or financial support of any kind, including but not limited to any discussions with any donors or any others who provided, considered providing, or were asked to provide financial support of any kind.

Request for Production 21. All documents and communications regarding Your sources of funding for research, investigation, reporting, publication, or any other work related to X, the Platform, Elon Musk, or Linda Yaccarino.

Request for Production 35. All materials regarding or communications with any donor or potential donor to Media Matters mentioning or regarding in any way this Matter, Elon Musk, Linda Yaccarino, X, Twitter, or the Platform, including misinformation, brand safety, or ad pairing on the Platform.

The panel granted a stay of the district court's order enforcing the subpoenas:

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Kelo

Supreme Court Refuses to Hear "Passive Park" Public Use Property Rights Case

While I am eager for the Court to take another public use case, I am actually happy the justices chose to reject this one. Its unusual facts made it a poor vehicle for revisiting Kelo v. City of New London.

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Today, the Supreme Court refused to review the case of Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, which raised an unusual and extremely difficult issue about the meaning of "public use" in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Three justices (Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh) wanted to take the case, but four votes are necessary to grant a petition for writ of certiorari. I summarized the key issue in the case in a previous post about it (in part by quoting takings litigator Robert Thomas):

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment says the government may only "take" private property for a "public use." In cases like Berman v. Parker and Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court has ruled (wrongly, in my view) that almost any potential benefit to the public qualifies as a "public use." Thus, in Kelo the Court upheld the condemnation of homes for purposes of promoting privately owned "economic development…"

But the Kelo majority also indicated that a taking can still be invalidated if the government tries to "take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit…."

How do courts determine whether a taking is pretextual? Since Kelo, lower-court decisions on that issue have been all over the map. In Chapter 7 of my book The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent DomainI identified at least five different approaches to this issue adopted by state and lower federal courts since Kelo….

Most pretextual takings cases deal with situations where the government condemns property for transfer to a private party. But in Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed a case where a condemnation for transfer to public ownership might still be pretextual, because the official rationale was a pretty obvious smokescreen for a different motive….

[what follows is excerpted from Robert Thomas's summary of the case and lower court rulings:]

The Brinkmanns wanted to build a big box hardware store on a 1.7 acre vacant parcel. The usual objections from area residents and the Town itself appeared…  Even a failed attempt by the Town to buy the property itself before the Brinkmanns closed their purchase.

When all those didn't succeed in stopping the development, the Town began proceedings to forcibly acquire the land by eminent domain. What for, you ask? A public park. More precisely, a "passive use park." What's that, you ask? It isn't what you might think make a typical public park. Things like public facilities, art installations, walking trails, recreational and entertainment spots…. No, this was to have none of those things, it was to be "a park with no significant facilities or improvements," also known as a big open, empty field….

Next step was a federal court section 1983 action by the Brinkmanns, "alleging a pretextual taking in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment…." The Town may have claimed that the taking was for a "classic" public use…., but the Town's actual reason, the Brinkmanns alleged, was what we call a "spite taking"—the Town didn't like the use we're making or going to make of our property, so decided to take it from us. This was the real motivation to take our property, and that's not a public use, according to the complaint. The district court wasn't having any of it, and dismissed for failure to state a claim.

A divided panel of the Second Circuit affirmed…..

As the opinion put it, "Plaintiffs have not pointed to any Town purpose that violates the Takings Clause…"

In short (and this is our characterization, not the court's), the Fifth Amendment contains a Public Use Clause, not a "Good Motivation Clause…"

I would very much like the Supreme Court to take another public use case, and overrule Kelo and Berman, or at least cut back on those badly flawed precedents. But, for reasons noted in my earlier post, I think this case would have been a bad vehicle for reviewing these issues:

Having written a book and numerous articles on public use issues, I rarely run across a public use case where I'm unsure what the right outcome should be. But this is one of those rare times.

Pretextual takings doctrine is a mess generally. But I think it can legitimately be used to strike down a variety of takings for transfer to private parties; indeed, I believe most such takings are unconstitutional even aside from the pretextual motives, because I support the "narrow" view of "public use" under which the government may only take property for publicly owned facilities or private ones that have a legal duty to serve the entire public.

In most situations, the narrow view is satisfied when the government takes property for public ownership…. But this case is different from most takings for public ownership because the government isn't actually using the condemned property for anything. As Judge Menashi puts it [in his dissenting opinion], the supposed "public park" is actually "fake."

This opens up the possibility there can be public ownership without public use. To be sure, there can sometimes be "use" even if the government doesn't build anything on the land it takes…. But there is no such use here, not even a "passive" one. The only goal is to block the Brinkmanns' plan to build a hardware store, not to use the land for any affirmative purpose.

Perhaps such blocking can still be a "use." But the issue is a difficult and murky one…..

Pretextual takings jurisprudence has long been a mess, and at least four Supreme Court justices have expressed interest in clearing it up, and perhaps overruling or limiting Kelo in the process.

I very much hope the Supreme Court does clean up the mess and—better still—overrules Kelo. But this case is not a good vehicle for that.

Unlike Kelo, it does not address the issue of condemnations for transfer to private parties.vIt instead deals with the unusual situation where the government retains the condemned property but has no desire to do anything with it other than block a private use it objects to.  The issue is an extremely difficult one. And even if the Court resolves this hard question correctly, doing so would not do much to improve public use doctrine more generally.

Legal issues aside, I think the Brinkmanns were victims of an egregious abuse of government power here. Even if it doesn't violate the Public Use Clause to do so, local governments shouldn't use the "despotic power" of eminent domain merely to eliminate uses of property neighbors dislike. It's even worse if they end up turning a potentially valuable land use into an empty lot of no value to anyone. Calling it a "passive park" doesn't make that right. But not every injustice makes a good Supreme Court case. Sadly, this is one of the many that doesn't.

NOTE: The Brinkmanns represented by the Institute for Justice, with which I have worked on other property rights issues over the years. I have no involvement in this case.

Free Speech

Journal of Free Speech Law: "The Connected City of Ideas," by Robert Mark Simpson

A new article from the Daedalus (Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences) Future of Free Speech Symposium.

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The article is here; an excerpt:

I think we need to update the metaphors we use around free speech. Everyone can see that our communication tools and practices are evolving fast, with a mix of welcome and unwelcome results. But there is an aspect of this evolution that is seriously under­appreciated. Our communication tools and practices are increasingly subject to standardizing and homogenizing pressures. We are being corralled into a narrower range of devices and methods for talking to each other. We need to actively strategize about how to deal with the threat that this homogenization poses to our abilities as creative, reflective, thinking beings. But first, we need to recognize it as a threat.

The dominant moral metaphor in free speech discourse—namely, the marketplace of ideas—inadvertently desensitizes us to this threat. This metaphor invites us to worry, primarily, about authorities controlling the ideological content of public communication. At the same time, it analogically portrays homogenization in our methods of communication as something benign or even good. We need another metaphor that frames this homogenization as something to worry about.

Cities are more liveable when they are connected, when they have an integrated mix of trains, cars, buses, cycle paths, and walking paths, which provide a diverse array of locomotive affordances. Similarly, societies are more liveable if they enable us to use a variety of idea-transmission media with diverse communicative affordances with respect to expressive formats (text, voice), stylistic options, breadths of audience, and tempos of exchange. We should be able to freely exchange ideas and information, subject to reasonable caveats. But we should not be content with this measure of freedom. We should also be free to exchange ideas using a heterogeneous repertoire of media and methods, suited to various communicative purposes. We should have a connected city of ideas.

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Administrative Law

Supreme Court to Tackle Who Can Sue Agencies Where and for What

With today's cert grants, the Court now has four cases that address the issue of where suits can be filed against federal agencies and who can file them.

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This morning the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case asking the justices to revisit Humphrey's Executor. Do not think for a moment that this means we are not in for a significant administrative law term. There are some potentially big cases in the pipeline, and the Court has quite a few cases this term that deal with important, if not headline-grabbing, administrative law questions.

In today's order list the Court accepted certiorari in multiple cases concerning the interpretation and application of the Clean Air Act's venue provisions. This means the Court now has four administrative law cases this term concerning where certain types of claims against federal agencies can be filed, and who can file them. Here's a quick rundown.

First, in Nuclear Regualtory Commission v. Texas the Court will consider whether parties who did not participate in the relevant administrative proceeding may challenge an agency order for exceeding the agency's statutory authority under the Hobbs Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said yes (and subsequently held that the NRC lacks the delegated authority to permit temporary off-site storage of nuclear waste).

Next, in FDA v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. the Court will consider the question "Whether a manufacturer may file a petition for review in a circuit (other than the D.C. Circuit) where it neither resides nor has its principal place of business, if the petition is joined by a seller of the manufacturer's products that is located within that circuit." Here again the Fifth Circuit answered the question in the affirmative. The FDA's position, as you might expect, is that the manufacturer plaintiff was engaged in an impermissible form of forum shopping by adding a local retailer to the case.

Today, the Court added more cases in this vein, all concerning the interpretation and application of the Clean Air Act's venue provisions. These provisions seek to channel petitions challenging EPA regulations of nationwide scope and application to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit while allowing challenges to more localized agency decisions to be filed regionally. Drawing that line is easier in some cases than in others.

In EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C the Court will consider whether challenges to the EPA's denial of petitions for exemptions from renewable fuel regulations must be filed in the D.C. Circuit. Here, again, the Fifth Circuit did not think so and denied the government's motion to transfer challenges filed by six refineries.

In Oklahoma v. EPA and PacifiCorp v. EPA (consolidated) the Court will consider a similar question, but where it is the EPA that is arguably engaged in venue shopping. Normally, challenges to state implementation plans (SIPs) under the Clean Air Act are filed in the regional circuit in which the state is located. Here, however, the EPA issued a single Federal Register notice finalizing actions with regard to multiple SIPs across multiple states, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that challenges to portions of that EPA action had to be filed in the D.C. Circuit. Thus the question presented, as one of the petitioners put it, is "Whether the Environmental Protection Agency's disapproval of a State Implementation Plan may only be challenged in the D.C. Circuit under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) if EPA packages that disapproval with disapprovals of other States' SIPs and purports to use a consistent method in evaluating the state-specific determinations in those SIPs."

In combination, these cases have significance beyond their rather narrow particulars. In decided these cases it is likely the justices will speak to some of the broader concerns about forum shopping in challenges to federal agency actions and give lower courts more guidance about how they should consider innovative efforts to bring such challenges in favorable jurisdictions. (Thus it may be no coincidence that several of these cases came out of the Fifth Circuit.) Put another way, each of these cases may concern narrow, technical questions of administrative law, but when taken together they could be quite significant.

Free Speech

Journal of Free Speech Law: "Academic Freedom & the Politics of the University," by Joan Wallach Scott

A new article from the Daedalus (Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences) Future of Free Speech Symposium.

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The article is here; the Introduction:

The United States is in a difficult moment: what basic faith there was in the institutions of democracy has been eroded, constitutional protections have been undermined by the Supreme Court's radical right-wing majority, and reason is no barrier against the libidinal release enabled by former president Donald Trump. In the wild proliferation of paranoia, accusation, retribution, and hate speech that flourishes on the internet and translates into dangerous, sometimes lethal activism in "real life," education in general and the university in particular have been singled out for attack.

The attack on education is itself not new—right-wing think tanks and politicians have been at it for decades. But this moment seems somehow more dangerous, as Republican lawmakers and militant activists use their power to send censors directly into classrooms and libraries, promising conservative parents they will regain control of their children against the specter of "woke" indoctrination.

In one of those inversions of meaning so adroitly practiced by the right, censorship is being enacted in the name of free speech and/or academic freedom. The terms themselves seem to have lost their purchase: once weapons of the weak, they now have been seized as legal instruments by the powerful, who censor what they take to be unacceptable criticism—of state policy, of inequality, of injustice—in the name of freedom.

And, perhaps most hypocritical of all, the censors claim they are ridding the university of "politics." Heightened politicization, in the name of the purging of "politics," is the stunning result. The two are not the same. Politics (as I want to use the term) refers to contests about meaning and power in which outcomes are not predetermined; those who politicize—or, better, rely on partisanship—know in advance the outcomes they want to impose, the enemies they want to defeat. In theory, politics is at the heart of the free inquiry associated with democratic education, partisanship is its antithesis. In fact, the relationship between the two is never as simple as that opposition suggests.

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Election 2024

Pildes on the Election's Guardrails

Rick Pildes offers cautionary notes about specualtive fear-mongering about the administration of the 2024 election.

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Multiple political commentators and media outlets have spun narratives of potential election disasters, including efforts to overturn the results. Over at Lawfare, Rick Pildes explains why many of these scenarios ignore the legal guardrails that are in place that are likely to prevent such scenarios from taking place.

As Election Day draws near, anxieties are running high among Democrats about how partisan actors backing Donald Trump might seek to steal the 2024 election. Trump himself has commented that "the only way we're gonna lose" is "if they cheat," raising the specter of another attempt to upend the election results like the country saw in 2020. The danger is real, but much of the speculation about mechanisms Trump or his allies might use to overturn election results risks unnecessarily raising the anxiety level of voters. To be sure, partisan actors might well try various ploys to manipulate the outcome, particularly if the election hinges on one or two states. But there are significant legal, institutional, and political guardrails already in place to thwart these partisan efforts.

A recent essay Neal Katyal authored in the New York Times is a good illustration of these anxieties. Katyal raised several nightmare scenarios for "a potential election crisis" under which, in his view, corrupt partisan actors could seek to deprive Vice President Kamala Harris of a lawful victory, if in fact she wins the election. But in each of the scenarios Katyal raises, the guardrails that are already in place should temper these concerns.

Some of these guardrails are longstanding. Others were enacted as part of the Electoral Count Reform Act. Together, the various guardrails protect against most of the common nightmare scenarios put forward about rogue governors, electors, or state legislatures. And what about Congress? Pildes writes:

Would Congress nonetheless defy the ECRA and act illegally? To reject a state's electoral votes would require a majority in each house of the newly elected Congress. No matter which party controls the House and Senate, its margin is expected to be thin. Sen. Susan Collins was the leader oncr the Republican side in the bipartisan Senate group that drafted the ECRA. Other Republicans in that group who will still be in the Senate in January 2025 include Lisa Murkowski, Todd Young, and Shelley Moore Capito. Let's assume for the sake of analysis Republicans control the House and have 51 or 52 Senators. It would still take only one or maybe two Republicans to abide by the terms of the ECRA that they themselves drafted to defeat any plot in Congress to steal the election

None of this means the election will be free of trouble or dispute, only that these particular concerns—that the election will be stolen or the legitimate results subverted—fail to account for the legal and other safeguards that are in place.

The piece concludes:

There is no way to make the system entirely failsafe against all risks. I'm particularly worried that Pennsylvania and Wisconsin will have long delays in getting to a definitive result, given that their laws still – unconscionably – refuse to permit their election officials to start processing absentee ballots until election day. If the results of the election cannot be known for several days, this will almost inevitably spawn suspicion and distrust, fueled by social-media conspiracy theories, and might lead to major efforts to disrupt the vote-counting process. In advance of the 2020 election, I wrote that this dynamic of late vote counts would likely be a major focal point of efforts to delegitimize the outcome. I fear the situation is even worse this time around. Too many voters are already primed in advance this time around to believe the election is "being stolen" if the numbers change dramatically overnight and in the days after the election.

Post-voting partisan efforts to manipulate the process could undermine public confidence, be disruptive, and even lead to civil unrest. But there are many more mechanisms in place than a lot of anxious public commentary recognizes to ensure the lawful outcome of the 2024 election.

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