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Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002
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The consequences are serious, but the merits are strong.
In 2020, during the early days of the pandemic, the House of Representatives adopted a rule that would allow absent members to cast a vote by proxy. At the time, there were ample warnings that this process had constitutional infirmities, but the House pressed ahead. Indeed, the House of Representatives continued to use the proxy rule through the end of 2022. One such bill was the Consolidation Appropriations Act of 2023. At this time, the justification for social distancing had passed. The new House assembled in January 2023. I see no masks. Members of Congress are walking around with their families.
At the 2023 State of the Union Address in March 2023, every every seat was filled. Look at this picture. I don't see many members wearing masks.
Don't tell me there was some actual need to bypass the quorum rule at this point.
The pandemic was only a few years ago, but it is important to remember how many brazen violations of the Constitution there were in short order. As Justice Gorsuch wrote in Roman Catholic Diocese v. Brooklyn v. Cuomo, "Even if the Constitution has taken a holiday during this pandemic, it cannot become a sabbatical." The proxy rule was one such sabbatical.
In 2023, Texas challenged the constitutionality of one provision of the appropriations bill, the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act. In 2024, Judge Hendrix of the Northern District of Texas wrote a magisterial opinion that stretched more than one-hundred pages. He explained in depth why the enrolled bill doctrine does not block review and why the proxy rule violates the quorum clause. At the time, I read the opinion and thought Judge Hendrix put forward an extremely justification. The House tried to take a shortcut and got caught. A panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed, but now the en banc Fifth Circuit has affirmed Judge Hendrix's decision.
I'll admit, the immediate reaction to this decision is "it can't be right!" This intuition, I submit, is based more on the consequences than the merits. If every bill passed during the COVID period is now subject to a constitutional challenge, the consequences could be serious. But I encourage you to back off the consequentialism. Far too many judges and lawyers start with the consequences and work their way backwards. If the House of Representatives decided to take a shortcut and ignored a constitutional requirement, then the members of that body should bear the consequences of their decision.
The en banc Fifth Circuit split (as if often does) by a 9-8 vote. Thankfully, there were no senior judges on the three-judge panel. Judge Wilson wrote the majority opinion and Judge Graves wrote the dissent. Judge Haynes continues her unusual practice where she doesn't join any opinion, reducing her thoughts to a single footnote.
* Judge Haynes states that she does not think it is appropriate to throw out the Federal House of Representatives in this arena, so she dissents. She also appreciates Judge Graves's dissent.
Judge Haynes might think she is being clever, but I doubt anyone else agrees. Indeed, in a number of recent cases, Judge Haynes simply writes that she affirms for the reasons stated by the district court--as if nothing that her colleagues wrote made a difference. I think it shows a lack of respect to her colleagues who spend considerable time preparing opinions and she doesn't even bother explaining where she disagrees. She is capable of writing reasoned opinions, but just shrugs at the en banc stage.
Judges Wilson and Judge Graves agree that Texas has standing. They further agree that the enrolled bill rule does not preclude review. The disagreement is purely a legal question about whether the proxy rule violates the Quorum Clause. Having read both the majority and dissenting opinions, I don't think the issue is even close. The strongest argument for the dissent is the "Unanimous Consent" rule, and the majority demolishes that argument.
What happens next? It's complicated.
I am fairly certain that the new Attorney General opposes this case and will do everything in his power to scuttle the suit, as well as the Fifth Circuit's en banc precedent. In recent days, the Texas Attorney General has been dismissing and settling many cases. The reason, I suspect, is to avoid giving the new Attorney General a vehicle to enter into binding consent decrees. I suppose it is conceivable that Texas will try to enter into some kind of settlement with the United States. Or maybe Texas just moves to dismiss the case with prejudice before January 1. That would end the case, but leave the Fifth Circuit's precedent in place.
I suppose another state with a similar Article III injury could intervene. I am not certain about the timing as there is a final judgment in place--although a judgment is not really final until a cert petition is disposed of.
If this case stays alive past January, the United States will almost certainly file a cert petition. The new Texas Attorney General will not oppose certiorari and may ask for a summary reversal. I suspect the new AG could even argue that since there is no adversity, there is no longer a live Article III case, and the Fifth Circuit decision should be vacated under Musingwear. I am not entirely sure how Munsingwear applies when the Attorney General switches sides, but we may soon find out. Then again, the Supreme Court routinely decides cases in which there is no adversity, so the case might continue.
Indeed, the Supreme Court might also think it prudent to settle this matter. These challenges can arise in other contexts, and the longer this issue festers, the worse it will be. If so, the Court could appoint an amicus to defend the Fifth Circuit's judgment.
At that point, what will happen? Again, all members of the Fifth Circuit agreed that Texas has standing and the enrolled bill rule doesn't bar review. I suppose the Supreme Court could reject those holdings, but that would be rather transparent.
Once you get to the merits, the Court will have to do some work. I've seen some commentators lead of with a discussion of how many laws might be at risk. One of those statutes is the Electoral Count Reform Act of 2022. I'll close where I started. The meaning of the Constitution should not change based on the consequences. Either the House had a quorum or it didn't.
Do I have faith that a majority of the Supreme Court will follow that original meaning of the Constitution? No, I don't. Maybe three votes, at the most--which is often how the Fifth Circuit fares. But don't pretend the Supreme Court is making its ruling based on law.
Some excerpts from the longish decision Friday by Judge Benjamin Beaton (E.D. Ky.) in Woodcock v. Capilouto:
This opinion addresses the latest chapter in the ongoing saga concerning Professor Ramsi Woodcock, his commentary regarding Israel and Palestine, and the University of Kentucky's investigation into whether he violated Title VI or the school's technology or conduct policies….
Earlier this month, this Court denied law professor Ramsi Woodcock's request to halt the University of Kentucky's ongoing investigation into several comments he made related to his views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and his 2025 "Petition for Military Action Against Israel." Woodcock's initial submissions had not persuasively shown that the investigation was retaliatory in its origin or chilling in its ongoing effect.
But the order set an evidentiary hearing two weeks later to address these fact-dependent questions and Woodcock's request for a preliminary injunction. The investigation—which had lasted more than a year and whose report was already overdue—could not "last forever" without threatening Woodcock's First Amendment rights. And the University of Kentucky's corresponding "reassignment" of Woodcock from teaching duties throughout the investigation was increasingly hard to justify, particularly given the absence of any articulated suspicion of classroom disruption….
Then, one week after the TRO decision, the outside investigator's 134-page sealed (for now) report finally landed. {That report is provisionally under seal pending the resolution of a motion to seal, which will be referred to a Magistrate Judge.} …
[Now], the Dean of the law school could decide whether to lift Woodcock's reassignment from teaching and restore him to the classroom for the spring semester. This could happen as late as mid-December, according to counsel, without prejudicing Woodcock's ability to teach…. [And] the University President could decide, based on the investigative report, whether (in his view) Woodcock violated any laws or policies….
The report and Woodcock's response have been published by the Kentucky Lantern (McKenna Horsley); Woodcock reports that this is because they were publicly filed in a parallel state case. The court had this to say about Woodcock's request for a temporary injunction to block any findings by the University President:
During previous hearings, this Court observed that Woodcock's effort to end his reassignment from teaching stood on firmer ground that his request to halt the investigation itself. That view rested largely on caselaw that contemplated speech-related investigations consistent with the First Amendment yet considered whether any attendant consequences of such investigations abridged those rights based on a retaliatory purpose, chilled speech, or both. {See generally, e.g., Sensabaugh v. Halliburton (6th Cir. 2019) (no adverse action based on "letter of guidance" and reprimand in the context of a "independent law firm" investigation involving "scores of documents and text messages" and "seventeen different witnesses"); Moore v. Garnand (9th Cir. 2023) ("[W]e never held that a retaliatory investigation alone could violate the First Amendment, as our holding rested on much more than just a retaliatory investigation[.]").} …
Rep. Max Miller (R-OH) lost more than his bid for re-election.
I may not live in Ohio anymore, but there are some Ohio legal news stories I continue to follow. Here's one.
Soon-to-be-former Rep. Max Miller (R-OH) sued his ex-wife, Emily Moreno (daughter of Ohio Senator Bernie Moreno), for defamation. Now that suit has been dismissed, and arguably in the worst way for Miller: The court concluded that the core underlying allegation is "substantially true."
Miller filed the suit after the Daily Mail published a story reporting that Miller "hurled a pot of boiling water" at Moreno during an argument, and later wrote a note apologizing for the incident. As the court notes, an audio recording (that Miller released somehow thinking it would exonerate him) confirms the core of the claim. From the opinion:
An audio recording of the parties discussing the incident supports Defendant Moreno's contention of truth. Defendant Moreno confronted Plaintiff about pouring "bowling hot water on me." Although Plaintiff denies pouring hot water on her neck, he further admits the incident occurred. Plaintiff specifically stated "it was never done to hurt you with intent." Plaintiffs intent is irrelevant to the basic fact of whether the incident occurred, which addresses the element of falsity.
Plaintiff maintains that the gist or sting of hurling a pot of boiling water is "categorically different" than the actions Plaintiff states actually occurred. It is Plaintiffs burden to support his claims with credible, admissible evidence. Plaintiff has not shown that the statement about dousing Defendant Moreno with boiling hot water are false. The imputation that Plaintiff poured or doused Defendant Moreno with hot water is substantially true.
The court also noted the lack of any evidence that Moreno was responsible for the Daily Mail's publication of the claims.
The court dismissed Miller's suit with prejudice and awarded costs and attorney fees. Additional litigation arising out of the Miller-Moreno divorce is pending, and it's always possible Miller will appeal. Moreno is not the first woman to accuse Miller of abuse.
More background from the Washington Post here.
[Note: As initially posted, I referred to Miller as "Former Rep. Miller." OF course, he is not yet a former representative, as his term has not yet ended, so I have updated the post accordingly.
11/21/1926: Justice Joseph McKenna died.

What’s on your mind?
While purporting to offer narrow relief confined to a limited portion of the bill in Texas, the court places a bullseye on broad legislation.
Today, in Texas v. Blanche, the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the proxy voting rule adopted by the House of Representatives during the COVID-19 pandemic violated the Quorum Clause.
The opinion, by Judge Wilson, joined by Chief Judge Elrod and Judges Jones, Smith, Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, and Oldham begins:
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the House of Representatives adopted a rule allowing Members to record their presence by proxy for purposes of establishing a quorum. The House used this rule when passing the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 (the Act), having mustered a quorum by counting hundreds of otherwise absent Members as present by proxy. The Senate then passed the bill, and the President signed it into law.
The State of Texas argues that the House's proxy-presence rule is inconsistent with the Constitution's Quorum Clause, which would mean that the House did not validly pass the Act. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. Based on that proposition, Texas seeks injunctive relief against just one portion of the Act: The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA). The federal Government responds that the enrolled-bill rule, which instructs that a bill's passage through the legislature is conclusive proof of its authenticity, precludes judicial review of whether the Act's passage complied with the Quorum Clause. Alternatively, the Government argues that the Quorum Clause permits proxy presence.
The district court held that the enrolled-bill rule did not apply and that the House's passage of the Act—through use of the proxy-presence rule —violated the Quorum Clause. Accordingly, the district court enjoined the Government from enforcing the PWFA against Texas.
We conclude that the enrolled-bill rule does not bar our review because Texas's constitutional challenge does not implicate a dispute of fact regarding the Act's passage. We further conclude that the Act's passage was unconstitutional because the Quorum Clause does not allow proxies to be included when establishing a quorum. The Clause's text, context, original understanding, and unbroken historical application all indicate that Members of Congress must be present for quorum purposes—as the Supreme Court expressly held over 125 years ago, and as Congress has done ever since the Founding. "Proxy presence" does not count. While the chambers of the legislature have much discretion regarding their rules of procedure, the Quorum Clause's constraints on congressional power cannot be circumvented by congressional fiat. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
And from its closing portions:
From Fifth Circuit Judges James Ho and Andrew Oldham in an unsigned opinion filed yesterday in U.S. v. Deare:
Jeremiah Deare was indicted for conspiracy to engage in the business of dealing firearms without a federal firearms license in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) and for making false statements with respect to records of licensed firearms dealers. Deare then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, broadly challenging the constitutionality of § 922(a)(1)'s licensure requirement and related record-keeping requirements.
The district court denied his motion to dismiss, holding that federal licensing and record-keeping requirements are not implicated by the Second Amendment because such requirements do not affect an individual's right to keep or bear arms. The court further held that, even if federal licensing requirements are implicated by the Second Amendment, such requirements are consistent with our Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation….
Deare primarily challenges the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Specifically, he argues that the Second Amendment's plain text covers firearm sales, and that § 922(a)(1)'s licensure requirement and related record-keeping requirements are inconsistent with our Nation's history of firearm regulation.
The plain text of the Second Amendment covers the sale of firearms. As we noted in Reese v. BATFE (5th Cir. 2025), "the right to 'keep and bear arms' surely implies the right to purchase them." During oral argument, the government conceded that the Second Amendment applies to the commercial sale of firearms.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order denying Deare's motion to dismiss the indictment and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
(As I read the opinion, it doesn't affect the false statements charge.)
Judge Ho concurred:
It's gratifying that our court today reaffirms what we should have long understood—that the Second Amendment right to "keep and bear Arms" plainly encompasses the sale of arms as well. It seems obvious that constitutional rights are meaningless if the Government can simply prohibit the means by which citizens are able to exercise those rights.

Some excerpts from the longish opinion today in Shilling v. County of San Diego, decided today by Ninth Circuit Judge Patrick Bumatay, joined by Judges Kenneth Lee and Jennifer Sung:
The San Diego County Sheriff revoked Kenneth Shilling's concealed-carry weapon ("CCW") license over his affiliation with the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club…. [We conclude, among other things, that] the district court improperly dismissed his First Amendment [freedom of association] claim….
Kenneth Charles Shilling resides in San Diego, California. He's a member of the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club, which, according to Shilling, was founded in 1946 by World War II veterans. In his view, it's not like some other motorcycle clubs, which are known for criminal and gang activity. Instead, the Boozefighters focus on charitable work and the "core values of family, work, and community." Shilling's record is clean; he has no criminal history.
In June 2022, when the "good moral character" requirement [for getting a concealed carry license] still existed [under California law], Shilling applied for and received a CCW license from then-San Diego County Sheriff Anthony Ray. This was short lived. Less than a year and a half later, in December 2023, a different San Diego County Sheriff, Kelly Martinez, used the "good moral character" requirement to revoke Shilling's CCW license. In a letter notifying Shilling of the revocation, Sheriff Martinez explained that the "San Diego Sheriff's Department['s] good moral character definition" excludes a person who:
Has a pattern of or propensity for criminal conduct, as demonstrated by anything in the application or investigation for a license. This includes, but is not limited to, evidence of criminal behavior or a close nexus to a criminal gang. In making this determination, the Sheriff's Department shall use an objective inquiry, considering the facts and circumstances known at the time of the application or through the investigation.
The letter said that Shilling's license was revoked due to his association with the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club, which the Sheriff described as a "criminal street gang." Shilling was not given the opportunity to contest the allegations before his license was revoked, but he could request reconsideration of the decision. The new CCW regime with the "dangerousness" requirement took effect on January 1, 2024, shortly after Shilling's license was revoked….
Here's the court's analysis allowing Shilling's First Amendment freedom of association claim to go forward:
Uncontrolled burns, false claims, and federal highway funds.
Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.
Victory! Millions of Americans want and need low-FODMAP foods, which are low in certain sugars that can cause debilitating stomach issues, aggravate irritable bowels, and worse. Fortunately, this week (following the Ninth Circuit's revival of our First Amendment challenge), the FDA lifted its ban on producers truthfully labelling their products "Low-FODMAP." Says IJ client Michelle Przybocki, who abides by a strict low-FODMAP diet after nearly dying from digestive complications, "I'm thrilled that the federal government is going to allow companies to start labeling their products as 'Low-FODMAP,' because this makes it easier for me to find foods that I know will not cause me digestive issues." Click here to learn more.
New on the Short Circuit podcast: Fancy some Elevenses? Serving up Eleventh Circuit refreshments in our #12Months12Circuits series. There's excessive bail in Alabama and excessive bar fees in Florida.
From Chief Judge James Boasberg (D.C.C.) today in Doe v. Trump:
Plaintiff Michael Doe is an American citizen whose wife and daughter reside in Kyiv, Ukraine. In March 2025, his wife and daughter were almost killed in a drone strike. On behalf of himself and a class of Ukrainian refugees, Doe sues President Trump, Secretary Rubio, and Elon Musk for violating, inter alia, a federal statute that imposes sanctions on Russia, the Take Care Clause, and the First Amendment. [The claims are apparently related to the Trump Administration's actions related to sanctions on Russia Musk's actions related to Ukraine and Starlink. -EV]
According to a Foundation for Individual Rights in Education survey, 9% of Americans have full confidence that the Democratic Party will protect their free speech rights, and a statistically indistinguishable 10% have full confidence that the Republican Party will do so. Assuming no overlap between the two groups, that means 80% of Americans do not have full confidence in either party on this, which of course is the right answer.
I've got to say that I'm skeptical about the people who said "quite a lot of confidence" to each (17% as to the Democratic Party, 12% as to the Republican Party), but at least they don't have full confidence, so there's that.
From Judge Steven Merryday (M.D. Fla.) yesterday in Trump v. N.Y. Times Co.:
Times v. Sullivan states that the First Amendment "prohibits a public official's recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." … {[N]otwithstanding the ordinary meaning and usage of "actual malice," "allegations of ill-will, improper motive or personal animosity play no role in determining whether a defendant acted with actual malice," which "does not concern ill-will, improper motive, or personal animosity," a conclusion which appears correct, in law if not elsewhere in the English language or in the common understanding. In sum, "actual malice is not about whether the speaker had evil intent or a motive arising from ill-will."} "[F]ailure to investigate before publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person would have done so, is not sufficient to establish reckless disregard[.]" Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton (1989).
[But] "reckless disregard may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his report." "Although failure to investigate will not alone support a finding of actual malice, the purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category." …
The court concluded that a large set of statements that Trump alleges to be libelous aren't actionable, "for one or more of the many and varied reasons amply and ably explained by the defendants in the motion to dismiss." But it concludes that several statements may be actionable, even given the "actual malice" requirement:
[A]s alleged in the complaint, the book, Lucky Loser, includes these statements: (1) "Donald Trump had received the equivalent of more than $400 million from his father, much of it through fraudulent tax evasion schemes"; (2) "In the language of the tax code, Fred had given his son taxable gifts masquerading as loans, a likely tax fraud that went unnoticed"; (3) "A plan was soon devised to funnel some of Fred's cash to Donald and his three siblings. They would accomplish that goal by adding a sham layer to Fred's business, one designed to evade the gift and estate taxes"; (4) "So the Trumps began submitting the padded bills to request rent increases from state officials. Part of the cost of Donld Trump's off-the-books inheritance would be passed along to this father's middle-income tenants"; (5) "Between the trust funds, the invoice-padding operation, and other devices created to siphon off his father's wealth outside the gift and estate tax system, Donald was already collecting almost $2 million a year from his father companies. His own business failures meant he kept that money tax-free"; and (6) "Donald Trump had faced these moments before, periods when it seemed his failures could not be saved only by aggressive tax maneuvers or not paying his debts". As described in the complaint, the second article includes the statement (7) "Federal, state and local authorities looked into his ties with the Mafia, found violations of money laundering rules and penalized him for skirting stock trade rules."
Plus an interesting discussion of implied facts, and Virginia libel law on the requirement that a statement sufficiently tend to damage reputation.
From Judge Norman Moon (W.D. Va.) Wednesday in Smith v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.:
The University of Virginia's ("UVA") Post-Baccalaureate Pre-Medical Program is a one-year curriculum designed for pre-med students who did not complete all prerequisites during their undergraduate study…. The Program … boasts a 94% medical-school placement rate and, accordingly, is highly selective ….
Plaintiff … did exceptionally well [in the Program], earning a "near-perfect" GPA and a 96th-percentile score on the Medical College Admission Test …. [After finishing the Program,] Plaintiff applied to thirty medical schools …. Plaintiff asked the [Post-Baccalaureate Pre-Medical Program Committee] for a letter of recommendation. These "Committee Letters" reflect "the Program's collective institutional assessment of the applicant," scaled on a score of 1 (unable to recommend at this time) to 5 (recommended with enthusiasm)…
Plaintiff alleges that he received "highly favorable" letters from his individual recommenders, who praised his intellect, work ethic, personality, and overall potential to succeed in medical school. In contrast to these letters, however, the Committee allegedly wrote a "materially adverse" letter and assigned Plaintiff a score of 2 (recommended with reservations)….
Plaintiff was rejected by all thirty medical schools he applied to, twenty-eight rejecting him without an interview. Given his otherwise strong qualifications, Plaintiff identifies the Committee letter as the clear explanation for this failure. But not only did the letter devastate these thirty applications, Plaintiff maintains—it also "derail[ed] his entire future and eradicate[ed] his chances of pursuing a career in medicine." …
Plaintiff sued for, among other things, defamation, based on these statements from the Committee Letter:
- Plaintiff "would benefit from some maturing years before heading to medical school."
- Plaintiff "was not as consistent with keeping his shadowing assignments … as expected."
- Plaintiff "was not as consistent with … communicating his intended class absences as expected."
- Plaintiff "at times had difficulty following the flow of conversation in class."
- "[M]any social interactions with" Plaintiff "felt awkward or disjointed." …
The court held that "Statements 1, 4, and 5 are pure expressions of opinion":
The article outlines an agenda for reform.

Today, Just Security published my article "How Congress Should Constrain Emergency Powers," which outlines an agenda for reforms curbing the dangerous growth of executive emergency powers. Here is an excerpt:
Emergency powers are special authorities that are supposed to be reserved for extraordinary, unexpected crises. But all too often, U.S. presidents have sought to turn them into blank checks they can use whenever they want. As conservative Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch recently put it, "Everything is an emergency" now. "Through delegations of authority, through emergency legislation of all stripes," he warned, power has increasingly moved "over to the executive branch"—a development he described as "not a recipe for a healthy democracy over the long term." A recent report by the progressive Brennan Center for Justice similarly warns that "presidents of both parties have stretched the meaning of 'emergency' far beyond reason, enabling them to draw from a growing stockpile of statutory authorities with few real safeguards." Both Gorsuch and the Brennan Center are right.
In his second term, President Donald Trump has engaged in especially grave abuse of emergency powers. But the problem predates his return to power, and is likely to outlast his departure from the political scene. The Democrats' massive victory in the 2026 midterm election gives Congress an opportunity to begin enacting much-needed constraints on executive emergency powers. Some of those authorities should be abolished completely. Others need tighter constraints to ensure they are limited in duration, confined to genuine emergency situations, and subject to strong, nondeferential judicial review enforcing these restrictions.
Some of the powers in question arise from the National Emergencies Act of 1976, which has been particularly prone to abuse. But others involve different legislation, such as the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Alien Enemies Act, laws governing domestic use of the military, and various statutes delegating tariff authority to the executive.
While Trump's abuses of power can provide an initial impetus for reform, there is room for potential cross-ideological cooperation here. Some of the necessary reforms have previously been advocated by conservative Republicans. Given the significant likelihood that a Democratic president might be elected in 2028, conservatives might want to take the opportunity to constrain a future administration's use of these authorities.
The rest of the article outlines reform proposals for specific statutes.
I'm serializing my new Notre Dame Law Review article, "Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press: Some Illustrative Examples"; here's the second Part:
Let me turn now to a different question, as to which the evidence is intriguing but scant: Was freedom of expression understood as including expression that created resentment that risked provoking riots? (This question has of course arisen often more recently, in cases such as Terminiello v. Chicago (1949) and Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement (1992).) In fact, I hadn't seen any evidence until I came across one early case, which has been apparently virtually undiscussed during the last fifty years, perhaps because it's not on Westlaw or Lexis.
The case is Commonwealth v. Haines (1824), a decision by Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice John Gibson (later the Chief Justice), apparently sitting alone as a trial judge. Haines had been accused of intentionally causing a riot by "erecting and fixing, a certain figure, resembling a man, commonly called a Paddy, as and for the effigy of St. Patrick … with the accompaniment of a rum bottle and a string of potatoes," in "a neighborhood inhabited principally by emigrants from Ireland." "[T]he exhibition of a Paddy was resented as an insult upon the Catholic portion of the Irish …."
11/20/1910: Justice William Henry Moody retired.

What’s on your mind?
New from Reason: a look into what Javier Milei has accomplished and what it will take to make the most of Argentina’s window for real change. Out now for subscribers.