The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Free Speech

Free Speech and Respect for Student Autonomy

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In my book, in defense of considerably more constitutional protection for student speech, I make an autonomy-enhancing argument, relying not only on the importance of respect for student autonomy on the part of school authorities, implying that in almost all circumstances, students should be able to say what they want to say and how they want to say it, without fear of being punished. I also underscore the extent to which the exercise of free speech rights over time can help students develop their autonomous capacities, as speakers, listeners, and thinkers. That is not to say that other free speech arguments are bad. I just happen to think that an autonomy-enhancing one, coupled with the inability of school officials to censor competently or impartially, is particularly well-suited for the context of secondary education.

Although I'm not a libertarian, I am very libertarian about some things, including free speech. I might be even more of a free speech absolutist than Professor Volokh is (if that is logically possible, ha ha). I detest paternalism, that is, justifications for restrictions on free speech that maintain that not being allowed to speak or be exposed to the ideas of others is for the good of the speaker or the listener. I would prefer to live in a society where normally, lawmakers do not tell people what to do, as if they are wiser or know a person better than that person knows him/herself. I find it arrogant for anyone to assume that they know what is better for me than I do and to think they should be able to use political power to coerce me for my own well-being.

For similar reasons, paternalistic defenses of censorship of student speech do not work. Respect for the autonomy of each student on the part of school authorities requires a very strong presumption in favor of letting students express themselves, even when they express false, offensive, or stupid ideas. By "autonomy," I mean the right to make personal choices about the most important aspects of one's life and to be responsible for the consequences. People are supposed to be persuaded, not manipulated, threatened, or coerced, and that includes giving them access to the information and ideas that enable them to exercise their autonomous capacities. That way, each agent can evaluate, as carefully as possible, the considerations for and against life decisions, especially the most important ones concerning which ends to pursue, how to pursue them, and when (or whether) to revise them.

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The Unusual Denial in Reinink v. Hart

After 8 relists, the petition is denied, but Justices Thomas and Alito would have SumRev'd "for essentially the reasons given in Judge Larsen’s separate opinion"

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Reinink v. Hart presented an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment. The case was rescheduled three times and relisted after eight conferences. On May 26, the Court finally denied certiorari. But there was an unusual notation:

Petition DENIED. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito would grant the petition and summarily reverse for essentially the reasons given in Judge Larsen's separate opinion. See Hart v. Grand Rapids, 138 F. 4th 409, 426–428 (CA6 2025).

It is not uncommon for a Justice to dissent from the denial of certiorari, and maintain they would have summarily reversed the lower court. I found eleven such cases since 2012. But in each such case, the dissenting Justice authored an opinion explaining why he or she would have SumRev'd.

But here, Justices Thomas and Alito jointly voted to summarily reverse the lower court opinion without writing separately. And they did so "for essentially the reasons given" by Judge Larsen's separate opinion. Larsen's opinion, which concurs in part and dissents in part stretches about three pages.

I suppose this dissent is a compliment. The Justices didn't even feel compelled to write separately. They just adopted a lower court judge's opinion. But the word "essentially" is a hedge. They apparently disagree with something, but do not tell us what.

What happened here? Thomas and Alito kept the case alive for five months, hoping to find another two votes for cert, but were unable to do so. They could have written a dissental, but it is the end of the term, and more important work is on the docket, so they just let Judge Larsen speak for them.

Free Speech

Defamation Claim Against University-Owned Public Radio Station Dismissed on State Sovereign Immunity Grounds

"Eby alleged an anonymous group of KWMU's staffers published an article on Medium.com [in 2020] accusing him of upholding 'white supremacy at the station by remaining complacent with the status quo.'"

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From Eby v. Bd. of Curators, decided today by the Missouri Court of Appeals (Chief Judge John P. Torbitzky, joined by Judges Angela Turner Quigless and Thomas C. Clark II); the opinion doesn't preclude a defamation lawsuit against the actual authors of the articles, though presumably they don't have much money to compensate the plaintiff even if he prevails:

St. Louis Public Radio ("KWMU") is owned and operated by the University. KWMU hired Eby in 2009. He eventually became KWMU's general manager. In September 2020, KWMU removed Eby as general manager after he was accused of racism.

In the wake of his termination, Eby filed a defamation action alleging the University repeated and/or republished defamatory statements. Eby alleged an anonymous group of KWMU's staffers published an article on Medium.com accusing him of upholding "white supremacy at the station by remaining complacent with the status quo." KWMU published two online articles that quoted and hyperlinked the Medium.com article's accusations. Eby also alleged KWMU falsely reported that he mismanaged KWMU's finances.

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American Can't Sue Iraq and Lebanon for Allegedly Anti-Gay Policies

"Plaintiff claims that these policies and laws 'have been exported to the United States through their nationals' and 'have directly caused catastrophic harm to Plaintiff, a gay United States citizen residing in Wayne County, Michigan.'"

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From Alshara v. Republic of Iraq, decided today by Judge Linda Parker (E.D. Mich.):

Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to sua sponte dismiss a complaint filed [in forma pauperis, i.e., as an indigent litigant who can't afford a filing fee -EV] before service on a defendant if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief….

In the Complaint, Plaintiff states that he is seeking to hold Iraq and Lebanon liable for their anti-LGBTQ+ policies, legislation, and systematic state-sponsored persecution. Plaintiff claims that these policies and laws "have been exported to the United States through their nationals" and "have directly caused catastrophic harm to Plaintiff, a gay United States citizen residing in Wayne County, Michigan." Plaintiff's family members, who are nationals and persons of Iraqi and Lebanese origin, have allegedly subjected Plaintiff to physical harm and threats of harm and death—behavior Plaintiff claims is "motivated exclusively by anti-gay animus rooted in the official state ideologies and legal frameworks of Iraq and Lebanon." Plaintiff indicates that he has modeled this lawsuit on the jurisdictional and substantive framework established in Doe v. Deutsche Lufthansa (9th Cir. 2025).

In that case, however, the Ninth Circuit considered only whether there was personal jurisdiction over the defendant-airline in California and whether there was federal subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity jurisdiction. The court did not discuss whether the plaintiffs stated a viable cause of action against the defendant-airline. Moreover, the plaintiffs there were not suing a foreign country based on its laws and policies; instead, they were suing the defendant-airline for its own alleged misconduct.

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First Amendment Likely Precludes Trump Administration's Canceling DEI-Promoting Contracts, Ninth Circuit Rules

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There's a lot happening in today's decision in Thakur v. Trump, by Ninth Circuit Judges Richard Paez, Morgan Christen, and Roopali Desai, but I thought I'd focus on the First Amendment analysis. To oversimplify, the Trump Administration canceled a wide range of academic grants "because of the recipients' perceived expression of DEI, DEIA [diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility], or environmental justice viewpoints." The grant recipients sued, arguing that such viewpoint-based cancellations are unconstitutional.

The law related to viewpoint-based conditions attached to government subsidies is complicated. On one hand, as the Court noted in Rust v. Sullivan (1991), "When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism." Likewise, the government can fund a program for promoting military enlistment, or recycling, or racial equality, without having to give grants for contrary views.

On the other hand, as the Court noted in cases such as Rosenberger v. Rector (1995), the government can't set up a generally available funding program and then exclude recipients based on viewpoint. For instance, it can't exclude religious newspapers from a funding program for student newspapers at the University of Virginia, or excluding anti-government or racist or pro-Israel groups from the 501(c)(3) charitable tax deduction program.

Where should the line be drawn? Here's what Thakur says:

[T]here is a critical distinction between creating or ceasing a particular program (or subsidy, or forum), on one hand, and discriminating against disfavored speaker viewpoints within a program (or subsidy, or forum), on the other. The government may impose restrictions on subsidies "to define the limits and purposes of [that] program."  But it cannot "leverage its power to award subsidies … into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints." Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed "the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the Government's provision of financial benefits." Rosenberger.

And here's a short excerpt from the panel's long elaboration of the matter:

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Free Speech

The Importance of Free Speech in American Public Junior High and High Schools

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When I was in college, liberals, not conservatives, were more zealous in defending free speech, when it came to issues like whether pornography ought to be constitutionally protected. In 1990, when I was in law school, and my first-year constitutional law class discussed Texas v. Johnson, the famous flag burning case, only the more conservative students thought that what Gregory Johnson did should not be constitutionally protected expressive conduct. At that time, a decade before I took Professor Volokh's free speech class when I was a graduate student in the political science department at UCLA, I hoped that someday, free speech would be a principle that would transcend partisanship. After all, it can be hard to predict what political party will control your school board, city council, state legislature, or Congress. If you give lawmakers the authority to censor an idea that you despise at one moment, whether you realize it, you also are giving them the authority to censor ideas that you find valuable in the future. No doubt, it can be very hard to stomach ideas that you find repulsive but inevitability, others will feel the same way about your ideas. In a society committed to free speech, the government must be neutral; it may not discriminate against viewpoints, including deeply offensive and even racist, sexist, and homophobic ones. No real human government will be able to censor "bad" viewpoints competently or fairly, even if we agreed which ones were bad most of the time. Equally importantly, the people who live in that society must be willing to allow others to speak their minds. The quality of their arguments ought to be beside the point.

These days in this country, it seems like a bad situation is becoming worse. On both the left and the right, of the American political spectrum, the natural tendency to censor disagreeable ideas seems increasingly more difficult to resist, including young adults. As someone who teaches at an undergraduate institution and has been doing so for more than twenty years, my impression is that college students are not nearly willing to countenance the expression of ideas, which they despise, as they used to be. Unlike concerns about censorship on college campuses, which have received a lot of media attention, when guest speakers are disinvited or shouted down, few people care much about the extent to which school authorities may suppress student speech in a public junior high or high school. The assumption is that due to their age and relative immaturity, most of what they contribute to the marketplace of ideas at their school will have little, if any, value. Furthermore, the primary mission of a school is to educate its students, and student speech can be disruptive or distracting.

As such, it may appear to be obvious that teenagers should not be able to exercise the same free speech rights that college students may exercise. However, position strikes me as harder to defend than most people acknowledge. After all, it is almost self-evident that if tweens and teenagers, who are impressionable, go to schools that are hostile to free speech, will absorb the wrong lessons, regardless of what they might read in their civics class. They can be punished for saying this, writing that, or wearing a tee short that expresses a view about abortion, guns, same-sex sex, or whatever, they could get detention, be suspended, or even expelled. Sooner rather than later, they will learn how to self-censor.

My new book, Democracy in Education: The Importance of Free Speech in American Public Schools, is about the importance of the free speech of junior high school and high school students in a country like our own; it calls into question the double standard as well, where public schools are treated so differently than colleges for free speech purposes. There are many ways to defend free speech, and my focus is on how educational the experience can be, when students not only are challenged to formulate their own views but are exposed to those of their classmates. Indeed, an important part of becoming a citizen in a democracy calls for learning how to deal with difference and disagreement in political life.

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Free Speech

Prof. Ronald Den Otter Guest-Blogging on "Education in Democracy: The Importance of Free Speech in American Public Schools"

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I'm delighted to report that Prof. Ronald Den Otter (Cal Poly) will be guest-blogging this week about this new book. The publisher's summary:

In contrast to recent efforts to restrict students by putting more power in the hands of parents and school officials, Ronald C. Den Otter makes a bold and rigorously argued case for respecting the autonomy of students and expanding their free-speech rights.

In recent years, the debate over student speech has roiled college campuses and elicited a wave of books and articles, from both the Right and the Left, over what speech is permissible and who should receive a platform to speak. What has largely been overlooked in this debate is the freedom of speech—or lack thereof—enjoyed by junior high and high school students in American public schools.

Education in Democracy makes a powerful case for why free speech is just as important, if not even more so, for secondary education students as it is for those in higher education. As Ronald C. Den Otter shows, US Supreme Court jurisprudence on this topic lacks consistency and clarity, tending to restrict freedom for these students while giving school officials almost complete control, as in Justice Clarence Thomas's concurrence in Morse v. Frederick. Den Otter argues instead for a stricter version of the Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District substantial disruption test, proposing that public junior high and high school students should be treated the same as students at public universities.

Without ignoring the challenges of hate speech, Den Otter makes a bold and impassioned argument for respecting the autonomy of all students and developing their autonomous capacities. Paternalistic treatment of students in the form of censorship by school authorities is morally and constitutionally unacceptable, according to Den Otter. Instead, American society should see public schools as laboratories in pluralism and democracy, places where students cultivate the civic virtue of tolerance and learn how to disagree in a responsible way. Doing so requires the bedrock foundation of free speech.

And the jacket blurbs:

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AI in Court

AI Prompts Used by Expert Are Subject to Compelled Discovery

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From Judge Thomas O. Farrish (D. Conn.) last Monday in Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co.:

The defendants, Shell Oil Company and others ("Defendants"), have moved the Court for an order compelling the plaintiff, Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. ("CLF"), to produce materials on which its expert witness, Dr. Naomi Oreskes, relied upon in producing her expert witness report…. The parties … had resolved all issues identified in the letter briefs except for "their dispute concerning Defendants' request for the prompts Dr. Oreskes used in conducting her AI analysis and outputs." …

CLF first protests that artificial intelligence prompts used by an expert witness are not within the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b), but the Court disagrees. An expert witness's methodology is fair ground for discovery, and under the facts of this case, the process by which Dr. Oreskes culled down the defendants' document production into a subset to be worked with is an aspect of that methodology.

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Free Speech

The First Amendment and Off-Duty Police Officer's Counterprotest of Anti-ICE Student Protest

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Some excerpts from the long opinion in Mullen v. Giordano, decided Thursday by Judge Susan Brnovich (D. Ariz.):

The Ninth Circuit has distilled Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) into a five-step inquiry to determine whether a government employer retaliated against a public employee in violation of the First Amendment:

(1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee; (3) whether the plaintiff's protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action; (4) whether the state had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from other members of the general public; and (5) whether the state would have taken the adverse employment action even absent the protected speech….

[1.] Sgt. Mullen Was Engaged in Protected Activity

First, Plaintiffs can show Sgt. Mullen acted as a private citizen engaged in First Amendment protected activity. Although Sgt. Mullen initially went to Hamilton High School to check on his son, he stayed to counter protest the anti-ICE student protest. Sgt. Mullen was off duty, not in uniform, and did not identify himself as a police officer. Phoenix PD's internal investigation acknowledges that Sgt. Mullen was engaging as a counter-protestor. Chandler PD officers at the scene also considered Sgt. Mullen to be a counter-protestor.

Additionally, Sgt. Mullen wore a face covering and a T-shirt that said, "Trump 2024." … There is no question the anti-ICE student protestors understood Sgt. Mullen's Trump T-shirt to express a message favoring immigration enforcement given their vehement cursing and yelling at him.

Moreover, "there is a First Amendment right to film matters of public interest." "This includes the right to record law enforcement officers engaged in the exercise of their official duties in public places." Sgt. Mullen filmed much of his interactions with the officers and student protestors for his safety and to document the events.

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Politics

Today in Supreme Court History: May 26, 1868

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5/26/1868: Senate acquitted President Andrew Johnson and adjourned as court of impeachment. Chief Justice Chase presided over that trial. Johnson is one of four presidents that did not appoint any Supreme Court Justices. The others are William Henry Harrison, Zachary Taylor, and Jimmy Carter.

President Andrew Johnson

Second Amendment Roundup: Virginia Bans "Assault Firearms"

The General Assembly tests the courts to see what it can get away with.

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Just last year, Justice Elana Kagan wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court in Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos that "the AR–15 is the most popular rifle in the country," adding that such rifles are "both widely legal and bought by many ordinary consumers."  And while at the same time the Court denied cert in Snope v. Brown, Justice Brett Kavanaugh issued a statement that the Fourth Circuit "erred by holding that Maryland's ban on AR–15s complies with the Second Amendment" and predicted that "this Court should and presumably will address the AR–15 issue soon, in the next Term or two."

The Virginia General Assembly apparently doesn't want to be outdone by California and the few other outlier states testing the Supreme Court to see if it really means it, as it stated in Heller, that the Second Amendment protects (at a minimum) "arms 'in common use at the time' for lawful purposes like self-defense." Virginia enacted HB 217/SB 749, effective July 1, making the transfer or purchase of an "assault firearm" (defined to include popular semiauto firearms) and magazines holding over 15 rounds a Class 1 misdemeanor, punishable by incarceration for one year.  A second offense makes it unlawful to possess any firearm for three years.

In signing the bill on May 14, Governor Abigail Spanberger stated: "While the General Assembly chose not to adopt my amendment that specifically carves out certain firearms frequently used for hunting, I will work with the patrons to clarify this language."  The governor is correct to concede a point that will be used in litigation challenging the new law, as the Virginia Constitution protects the right to hunt.  I explain the origins of that recognition in "The Constitutional Right to Hunt: New Recognition of an Old Liberty in Virginia," published in William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal (2010).

But the governor ignores that the banned firearms are also "frequently used" for training, target practice, and self-defense.  Besides being protected by the federal Second Amendment, the banned firearms are guaranteed under the Virginia Constitution, Art. I, § 13, which provides in part: "That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state, therefore, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed…."

The Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 included the above language without the final "keep and bear arms" clause, although Virginia demanded language similar to what became the Second Amendment when it ratified the U.S. Constitution in 1788.  As I show in "St. George Tucker's Second Amendment," Tenn. J. of L. & Pol'y (2007), the arms right was considered fundamental by Tucker, who was Virginia's finest jurist at the Founding.

In 1964, the Virginia Senate, the House concurring, declared that the Second Amendment right is "an inalienable part of our citizens' heritage in this State," adding "that any action taken by the General Assembly of Virginia to interfere with this right would strike at the basic liberty of our citizens; that no agency of this State or of any political subdivision should be given any power or seek any power which would prohibit the purchase or possession of firearms by any citizen of standing for the purpose of personal defense, sport, recreation or other noncriminal activities…."  In 1970, that statement was relied upon by proponents in the legislature for amending the Virginia Constitution to add the "keep and bear arms" clause, which was overwhelmingly approved by the voters in 1971.  I trace this history in "The Right to Bear Arms in the Virginia Constitution and the Second Amendment," Liberty U. L. Rev. (2014).  See also [now Justice, Va. Supreme Court] Stephen R. McCullough, "Article I Section 13 of the Virginia Constitution: Of Militias and an Individual Right to Bear Arms," U. Richmond L. Rev. (2013).

As an aside, unlike the redistricting amendment that the Virginia Supreme Court found to be illegal on May 8 in Scott v. McDougle, the 1971 amendment had been voted for in two separate legislative sessions, with an intervening election in between.  And fully two-thirds of Virginia's voters approved it.

In DiGiacinto v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason University (2011), the Virginia Supreme Court held that "the protection of the right to bear arms expressed in Article I, § 13 of the Constitution of Virginia is co-extensive with the rights provided by the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution" concerning the "sensitive place" issues in that case.  Pertinent to the gun-ban issue here, the Court repeated Heller's dictum: "Individual self-defense is 'the central component of the right itself.'"

In 2020, bills that would have made it a five-year felony to possess an "assault firearm" failed to pass the General Assembly.  The proposals sparked a prairie fire by almost all Virginia counties, which passed resolutions reaffirming Second Amendment rights and refusing to enforce the unconstitutional proposals.  The Virginia Attorney General opined that these resolutions were meaningless, disregarding that priorities in law enforcement are left to local sheriffs and police and that prosecution is in the discretion of the Commonwealth Attorneys.  I addressed that issue in "Virginia's Second Amendment Sanctuaries: Do They Have Legal Effect?" Regent U. L. Rev. (2020-2021).

And now it's déjà vu all over again.  Scores of Virginia jurisdictions, covering most of the state's land mass, have again passed Second Amendment Sanctuary resolutions.  It's the population center of Northern Virginia that dominates the legislature and has the power to rule the rest of the Commonwealth.  But don't hold your breath waiting for local sheriffs or prosecutors to ferret out who may have committed the crime of transferring a semiauto rifle with an adjustable shoulder stock.  To exemplify the situation, Rob Cerullo, Commonwealth Attorney for Powhatan County, issued a directive stating that "my office will decline prosecution of criminal cases arising from violations of these sweeping bans until a court of competent jurisdiction rules on their legality."

Three lawsuits have already been filed seeking to have the gun ban declared unconstitutional and enjoined.  McDonald v. Katz, filed in the U.S. district court for the Eastern District of Virginia, bases its challenge only on the Second Amendment.  The other two rely on both the Second Amendment and Virginia's Art. I , § 13 – Black v. Hook, filed in Fauquier County circuit court, and Crump v. Katz, filed in Lancaster County circuit court.

Look for another challenge to be filed by the United States.  On April 10, Assistant Attorney General Harmeet Dhillon wrote Governor Spanberger about the pending bills: "This letter provides formal notice that the Civil Rights Division will commence litigation in the event the Commonwealth of Virginia enacts certain bills that unconstitutionally limit law-abiding Americans' individual right to bear arms."

14th Amendment

Video of Cato Institute Online Event on the Supreme Court Birthright Citizenship Case

I participated, along with prominent legal scholars Gabriel Chin and Paul Finkelman.

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Milla74/Dreamstime

Last week, I participated in a Cato Institute an online event on "Trump v. Barbara: Birthright Citizenship at the Supreme Court." The other participants were prominent immigration law scholar Prof. Gabriel Chin (UC Irvine) and leading legal historian Paul Finkelman (Univ. of Toledo). Dan Greenberg of the Cato Institute moderated. I have embedded the video of the event below:

 

Part of my presentation for the online event was based on my recent article in Lawfare, where I explained why all the Trump Administration's rationales for denying birthright citizenship to children of undocumented immigrants would, if applied consistently, also have had the effect of denying it to large numbers of freed slaves and their children and other Black Americans, thereby undermining the central objective of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This issue was raised by Justice Amy Coney Barrett in the Supreme Court oral argument last month.

I also touched on my Volokh Conspiracy blog post where I explained why, although I believe birthright citizenship is superior to currently available alternatives, it is actually a "second-best" policy, not the optimal way to handle issues of migration and citizenship.

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