[Note: I'm working on a book chapter with a similar theme, here is an attempt to distill it into blog post-size.]
As South Africa hosts its first ever G20 Summit, its continued pursuit of Israel under the false guise of genocide is resulting in growing diplomatic pushback. The United States and Argentina have announced they will not be attending, yet Pretoria continues to weaponize the very term "genocide" to suit its political objectives.
South Africa's pursuit of phony genocide charges forms part of a broader campaign aimed at delegitimizing and constraining Israel as it fights a multi-front war against actors openly committed to its destruction. Some are motivated by hostility to Israel, but others see an opportunity: by capitalizing on intense antagonism toward Israel within academic and NGO circles, they can advance a long-standing project of sharply restricting democracies' ability to fight non-state actors, and particularly terrorist organizations and militias. Israel thus becomes the canary in the coal mine for efforts to effectively outlaw military operations against terrorist groups embedded among civilians.
At the heart of these efforts is a misuse of international humanitarian law, a body of rules created not to restrain whichever side one dislikes, but to impose neutral, equal obligations on all parties to a conflict. IHL was never intended as a political weapon or a pacifistic tool, but as a universal framework meant to protect civilians while recognizing the realities of warfare. This neutrality is its core strength: once the framework is selectively wielded against only one side, incentives for compliance collapse.
The 1948 Genocide Convention sought to establish clear, objective standards for the crime of genocide—above all the requirement of a specific intent to destroy a protected group. Standards like this were crafted to prevent future atrocities like the Holocaust, not to be repurposed for partisan advocacy, whether rooted in intense anti-Zionism or in a strong presumption against the use of military force by Western democracies.
The current effort to redefine these standards is nowhere more visible than in South Africa's case against Israel at the International Court of Justice. The legal theory advanced by South Africa and its supporters drains the term "genocide" of its established meaning, creating dangerous precedents for future conflicts.
The Convention requires evidence of special intent — demonstrated through direct proof, or, absent that, inference only when such intent is the only reasonable conclusion. But Israel's decidedly non-genocidal stated goals in the war – to release the hostages and destroy Hamas – are supported by its conduct throughout the war.
Israel's actions, including its acceptance of ceasefire terms, its prior openness to negotiated political arrangements, and its extensive facilitation of humanitarian access to Gaza all support this goal and contradict the notion of genocidal intent. No State that facilitates vital humanitarian corridors and extensive aid entry (to date well over two million tons) or engages in sustained efforts to limit civilian harm could be, as the only reasonable conclusion, pursuing the physical destruction of a population.
One element of the Convention that South Africa emphasizes is the alleged deliberate infliction of conditions calculated to destroy the Palestinian population. The humanitarian situation in Gaza is unquestionably tragic—but Hamas, not Israel, bears primary responsibility.
And crucially, contrary to certain claims, international law does not oblige a State to provide goods it knows will be seized by enemy fighters, so long as good-faith efforts are taken to ensure civilians can receive help through alternative channels that actually reach them.
Nevertheless, Israel continued to enable massive flows of aid into Gaza throughout the conflict, even as Hamas repeatedly looted, diverted, or resold that aid, including stealing from UN warehouses. By mid-2025, UN data showed tens of thousands of tons of humanitarian assistance had been intercepted by Hamas. Israel's persistence in facilitating aid despite this pattern of theft and operational risk is fundamentally inconsistent with any claim of genocidal intent and goes well beyond what IHL requires of a state fighting an adversary embedded among civilians.
Israel's conduct—warning civilians before military action, adjusting operations to minimize harm, and confronting an enemy that intentionally situates military assets under civilian sites such as hospitals and schools—reflects an approach to urban warfare that many militaries struggle even to approximate.
Its civilian-casualty rate remains among the lowest of any comparable conflict, an especially notable fact given the extreme density of the environment and the absence of any fully safe haven outside the conflict zone. While casualty numbers alone cannot determine legality, sustained efforts to reduce civilian harm cut directly against the charge that Israel seeks the group's destruction.
The attempt to stretch the definition of genocide to encompass any high-intensity urban warfare causing civilian suffering would not protect civilians. Instead, it would hand terrorist groups a blueprint: embed deeper within civilian populations, ensure any military response causes significant civilian casualties, and weaponize legal institutions to delegitimize self-defense.
These efforts to rewrite international law to suit a political campaign against Israel would, if allowed, weaken the Genocide Convention itself. A diluted genocide standard does not protect vulnerable groups; it renders the Convention less able to confront real genocidal campaigns when they arise.
The Convention must be preserved as a principled, objective standard—not reshaped on the fly to serve particular political objectives.
