The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Free Speech

Lawsuit Over Cancellation of April 2024 Pro-Palestine Protest at U Texas Can Go Forward

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From Heilrayne v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, decided Jan. 27 by Judge David Ezra (W.D. Tex.) but just recently posted on Westlaw:

On April 23, 2024, the PSC [Palestine Solidarity Committee] at UT posted a notice on their Instagram account describing a protest for the following day. The notice advertised a walk-out of class, a meeting at Greg Plaza, and a "march to occupy the lawn." The post stated: "In the footsteps of our comrades at Columbia SJP, Rutgers-New Brunswick, Yale, and countless others across the nation, we will be establishing THE POPULAR UNIVERSITY FOR GAZA and demanding our administration divest from death." On April 24, the PSC posted again with a proposed schedule of events, including a walk-out of class, a guest speaker, two teach-ins, an art workshop, and study and food breaks, with the final event scheduled for 7:00 p.m.

In response, UT preemptively cancelled the event by sending notices to PSC student representatives, with one such notice dated April 23, 2024, and four others dated April 24, 2024. In those notices, UT states its reasons for cancellation as follows:

The Palestine Solidarity Committee student organization's event "Popular University for Gaza," which is planned for tomorrow, has declared intent to violate our policies and rules, and disrupt our campus operations. Such disruptions are never allowed and are especially damaging while our students prepare for the end of the semester and final exams. For these reasons, this event may not proceed as planned.

However, Plaintiffs allege such notice was not communicated to the broader student body or public until the protest was underway, at which time UT released its Event Cancellation Notice, dated April 23, 2024, to the press….

Plaintiffs were arrested and also subject to probation or deferred suspension as university discipline. They sued, claiming this violated the First and Fourth Amendments. The court concluded that plaintiffs had adequately alleged that the April 24 protest was canceled based on its viewpoint:

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Free Speech

Philosophy Prof, Discussion of Adult-Child Sex Bans, and the First Amendment

SUNY Fredonia philosophy professor had been barred from campus over podcast questioning illegality and immorality of adult-child sexual contact; a federal court has just allowed his First Amendment claim to go forward.

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From Kershnar v. Kolison, decided Friday by Judge Lawrence Vilardo (W.D.N.Y.):

Among the many topics he studies, [SUNY Fredonia philosophy professor Stephen] Kershnar is especially interested in the "moral and legal issues implicated by sexual conduct [between] adolescents and children." His scholarship questions "whether, as a moral matter, adult-child sex is always wrong, and why we should criminalize it" even though he believes that "as a legal matter, [it] should always be criminalized." "Kershnar argues that it is important that the arguments favoring criminalization of [adult-child sex] be scrutinized so that they are defensible, [because] 'if incorrect reasons are given recognition in support of morally legitimate laws,' like those against [adult-child sex], 'then th[o]se reasons may … be used to support morally illegitimate' laws."

Kershnar elaborated on these views during two podcast appearances. In December 2020, he appeared on an episode of Unregistered—a podcast hosted by an Occidental College professor—to discuss "the traditional philosophical justifications of age[-]of[-]consent laws in the United States." During that episode, he said that "it[ i]s not obvious to [him] why" adult-child sex is always "unlawful because … humans are designed by evolution to begin reproduction below the age of 18."

A little more than a year later, on January 30, 2022, Kershnar appeared on Brain in a Vat, a podcast described as "thought experiments and conversations with philosophers." During that appearance, Kershnar said:

Imagine that an adult male wants to have sex with a 12-year-old girl. Imagine that she's a willing participant. A very standard, very widely held view is that there's something deeply wrong about this, and it's wrong independent of being criminalized. It's not obvious to me that it is in fact wrong.

Similarly, in response to a question about "whether… [,] in an attempt to find a threshold of consent," a one-year-old could ever consent to sexual activity with an adult, Kershnar said:

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Free Speech

Court Upholds New York's Limits on Unauthorized Practice of Law

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From Upsolve, Inc. v. James, decided Friday by Judge Lewis Kaplan (S.D.N.Y.) (for the earlier decision reaching the opposite result, see this post):

The nonprofit Upsolve, Inc., wishes to train non-lawyers like the Rev. John Udo-Okon to provide free legal advice to consumers facing debt-collection lawsuits. But that conduct would violate New York's prohibition on the practice of law by anyone other than a licensed attorney. The question in this case is whether Upsolve and the Rev. Udo-Okon have a First Amendment right to engage in their proposed course of conduct notwithstanding the state's licensing law. For the reasons that follow, they do not….

In earlier proceedings, Judge Paul A. Crotty granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. In finding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their free-speech claim, Judge Crotty held that the UPL Rules were a content-based regulation of speech that likely could not survive strict scrutiny….

In September 2025, the Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. The court agreed with Judge Crotty that, as applied to "convey[ing] … legal advice to a client," the UPL Rules regulate speech. But it held that the UPL Rules are content neutral and therefore subject to only intermediate scrutiny. The court remanded for reconsideration of plaintiffs' entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief under that lower standard….

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AI in Court

Federal Government Lawyer's Filings Appear to Include "Fabricated Quotations and Misstatements of Case Holdings"

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From Magistrate Judge Robert Numbers (E.D.N.C.) Monday in Fivehouse v. U.S. Dep't of Defense; the government's lawyer has been a member of the bar for almost 30 years, and has worked in the U.S. Attorney's office since 2009 (according to an article in Bloomberg Law by Ben Penn):

The conduct at issue includes:

1. The inclusion of fabricated quotations and misstatements of case holdings in Defendants' response to Fivehouse's motion to supplement the administrative record (D.E. 86), including citations to Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009), Dow AgroSciences, LLC v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 637 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2011), and Sierra Club v. United States Department of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2018).

2. The inclusion of a fabricated quotation in Defendants' response opposing Fivehouse's motion concerning compliance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 16 (D.E. 79), citing South Carolina Health & Human Services Finance Commission v. Sullivan, 915 F.2d 129, 130 (4th Cir. 1990).

3. The inclusion of a fabricated quotation in Defendants' response opposing Fivehouse's motion asking the court to take judicial notice of certain matters (D.E. 80), citing South Carolina Health & Human Services Finance Commission v. Sullivan, 915 F.2d 129, 130 (4th Cir. 1990).

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AI in Court

California Appeals Court Upholds Trial Court Order That Cited Hallucinated Cases

The nonexistent cases were first introduced by opposing counsel, but the appellant's lawyer didn't spot the error at the trial court, and submitted a proposed order to the trial court that cited those cases. That, the appeals court held, meant that appellant forfeited the right to challenge the decision.

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In Torres Campos v. Munoz, decided Thursday by the California Court of Appeal (Justice Martin Buchanan, joined by Justices Joan Irion and Truc Do), an ex-husband (Torres) had asked for shared custody and visitation rights to the family dog (Kyra, for the curious). The ex-wife (Munoz) was represented for free by her cousin (Bonar).

Bonar began by writing a letter declining Torres's request, citing two cases that ultimately proved to be nonexistent. When Torres went to court, Bonar filed an opposition with an attached declaration by Munoz, which cited one of the fictional cases. Torres's lawyer filed a reply declaration saying nothing about the case being fictional.

"The parties stipulated to have a court commissioner act as a temporary judge to hear the matter." That commissioner "made no visitation orders and directed Torres's counsel to submit a formal order after hearing"; that formal order was apparently supposed to be based on what went on at the hearing. (Requiring parties to submit such proposed orders summarizing the court's decision is pretty common in some trial court proceedings.) Then,

Torres's counsel submitted a proposed Findings and Order After Hearing, which the court approved as conforming to its oral ruling. The order cited the fictional Twigg and Teegarden cases as follows:

"The Court notes the follow[ing] cases: Marriage of Twigg (1984) 34 Cal.3d 926 and Marriage of Teegarden (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1572 [(Teegarden)], in which the Court has to take the well-being and stability of the parties involved when deciding pet visitation and custody. Based on the testimony of Ms. Munoz and her mental state as it relates to the parties['] relationship, the Court finds it is not in the best interests of the parties['] mental stability for them to continue to interact with each other, and thus denies pet Custody.

"The Court further finds there is not a substantial relationship between Petitioner and the dog, Kyra, based on the lack of visitation in the past year."

Torres appealed, and in a motion before the briefs were filed, Bonar again cited the nonexistent cases. Only after that did Torres's lawyer "point[] out for the first time that the Twigg and Teegarden authorities cited in the court's order and in Munoz's opposition to the first motion to reinstate the appeal did not exist and were 'invented case law.'"

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Climate Change

Previewing Suncor Energy v. Boulder County

A Federalist Society forum on the first big case of OT 2026.

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Earlier today I participated in a Federalist Society Forum on the major climate change case on the docket for OT 2026: Suncor Energy v. Boulder County, a case I previewed here.

Joining me in the discussion were West Virginia Solicitor General Michael Williams and O.H. Skinner of the Alliance for Consumers. Annie Donaldson Talley of Luther Strange & Associates  moderated. Video below.

 

For those interested, here are my prior posts on this subject:

Politics

Short Circuit: An inexhaustive weekly compendium of rulings from the federal courts of appeal

Lies, damned lies, and statutes of limitations.

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Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

Friends, we invite you to a stellar little event we're hosting on "The Other Declarations of 1776." As part of the nationwide celebration of 250 Years of America, we're partnering with the Liberty & Law Center at Scalia Law School for an examination of the various declarations of rights that the new states adopted in 1776. It's Friday, April 10 in Arlington, Va. Register here! And, if you want to learn more about The Other Declarations in the meantime, check out the latest blog post in our series, this week focusing on Maryland.

New on the Short Circuit podcast: A judicially engaged judge grants habeas when faced with a masked Fourth Amendment.

  1. The head of NYC schools' food services division co-owns a beef-importing business with executives from a company that supplies the schools with chicken. Second Circuit (unpublished): And since the chicken company executives upped his ownership stake in the beef business in exchange for letting some suspect chicken slide, lots of convictions on lots of counts affirmed all around.   Read More

Politics

The Fifth Circuit and the Louisiana 10 Commandments Law

The en banc court pushes pause--for now

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For the past year or so, those of us who follow the Religion Clauses have been waiting to see what courts would do with Louisiana's Ten Commandments law in Roake v. Brumley. Now we have an answer—though not a final one. A couple of weeks ago, sitting en banc, the Fifth Circuit vacated an earlier panel decision and dismissed the case on ripeness grounds. It's a technical ruling (though sticklers may dispute that ripeness is merely "technical"), but it's also revealing, because it shows that whether schools may display the Decalogue will depend on how the practice actually operates in context.

Here's the background. In 2024, Louisiana enacted a statute requiring every public school classroom to display the Ten Commandments. The law specifies the text to be used and requires a statement describing the Commandments' historical role in American education, but it leaves the details largely to local school authorities.

Parents filed a pre-enforcement challenge in federal court. They argued the displays would violate the Establishment Clause under Stone v. Graham, the Supreme Court's 1980 decision striking down a similar Kentucky requirement. The district court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction, and a Fifth Circuit panel affirmed. The panel reasoned that lower courts remain bound by Stone unless and until the Supreme Court overrules it.

In its ruling, the en banc Fifth Circuit declined to reach the constitutional question. Because no school district had yet implemented the law—no posters are on classroom walls yet—the court held that the dispute was premature. In effect, the court said, we need to see how this actually works in practice before we can decide whether the displays violate the Establishment Clause.

This ruling sidesteps a deeper doctrinal question. The Stone Court relied heavily on the Lemon framework, particularly the idea that government may not act with the purpose of promoting religion. The Stone Court also emphasized the special features of the public-school setting: students are a captive audience and especially susceptible to state-sponsored religious influence.

But the Court's more recent Establishment Clause cases have moved in a different direction. In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022), a school prayer case, the Court rejected the Lemon framework and instructed courts instead to look to the nation's "history and tradition," though the Kennedy Court also emphasized coercion—whether students are pressured to participate in religious exercise—as a central constitutional concern.

The difficulty is this: the Supreme Court has not overruled Stone, but it has abandoned the doctrinal foundation on which Stone rests. Lower courts are left reading the tea leaves. The Fifth Circuit panel resolved the tension one way—follow Stone until the Supreme Court says otherwise. The en banc court found a different solution. It avoided the merits altogether and ruled the case unripe until concrete facts exist.

That ripeness holding is technical (there's that word again), but I think it's analytically significant. It suggests that context will matter a great deal under the Court's newer approach. Details such as the age of the students, the way the display is presented, and whether it is integrated into instruction will all shape the constitutional analysis.

Sooner or later, a school district will implement the Louisiana statute. When it does, litigation will resume—this time with an actual record. Courts will then have to confront the central question directly: Is Stone still good law after Kennedy?

I discuss the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in more detail in a short Legal Spirits podcast episode, which you can listen to here.

The First Question From The Florida Supreme Court's Newest Member: "Is your position more like Justice Gorsuch in Bostock or Justice Alito in dissent?"

The answer: "I think Justice Gorsuch was wildly incorrect."

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Florida Governor Ron DeSantis recently appointed Judge Adam Tanenbaum to the state supreme court. This will likely be DeSantis's final appointment to a Court he has completely reshaped. This seat faced some stiff competition. It was reported in Bloomberg that the Governor was looking for a "bloodthirsty" originalist. I think he got one.

In a speech, Tanenbaum said "I subscribe to the fixation thesis and the constraint principle." I would wager that most law professors have no clue what those things are. When you put a bloodthirsty originalist on the bench, litigants better be ready.

Yesterday, Tanenbaum had his first oral argument. The case was not particularly controversial. It turned on the meaning of the word "enterprise" in the state RICO statute. Aruging on behalf of Florida was Jason Muehlhoff, the deputy Solicitor General. Muehlhoff is no squish. He clerked for Judge VanDyke and worked at Gibson Dunn in Dallas. So here you have a very conservative judge asking questions of a very conservative lawyer.

Jump ahead to the 9:00 minute mark.

I have taken the liberty of transcribing the exchange:

Justice Adam Tanenbaum: Counselor: Your brief for your approach to the text in some ways resembles Justice Gorsuch's approach in Bostock. Just looking at the text, and ignoring the context in which the statute was enacted. You start by focusing in particular on [the meaning of] "enterprise" and what was going on in 1977. Can you explain, is your position more like Justice Gorsuch in Bostock or Justice Alito in dissent?

Deputy Solicitor General Jason Muehlhoff: It is certainly not Justice Gorsuch your honor. It is more along the lines of what Justice Alito and Justice Kavanaugh had in dissent, and understanding the provisions as they are naturally read. . . . I think it's safe to say this is how Justices Kavanaugh and Alito would approach it.

Justice Tanenbaum wasn't done. About ten minutes later, at the 20:30 mark, he returned to Bostock.

Justice Tanenbaum: That's why I asked, going back to my Bostock question, it seems like you are pushing this with blinders on. You're just looking at the words themselves in a definition and ignoring the context of the entire statute and what the statute is. RICO is a very particular type of crime and it was well known at the time in the 1970s what was going on and what the federal government and the Florida government was trying to get at. You are focusing on the definition of "enterprise" and look we can go after one individual, unrelated to anyone else that is trying to embark on some sort of criminal endeavor, it is just him. . . .

Muehlhoff: This Court has said time and time again that broad purposes of statement must yield to the clear text….

Justice Tanenbaum: That's what Gorsuch said too.

Muehlhoff: I think Justice Gorsuch was wildly incorrect, but that was because of the specific text of the statute.

This is a stunning exchange, not because of the briefing from the Florida Supreme Court, but because of how poorly Bostock has been received. I don't know if there is any decision in recent Supreme Court history that has aged worse than Bostock. As a matter of substance, the Court has walked back the ruling in Mahmoud and Mirabelli, and will walk it back further in Chiles and the Title IX cases. As a matter of doctrine, not a single conservative would hold up Bostock as the proper way of doing textualism. The pirate flag of textualism barely flutters.

At this point, Bostock has become a laughingstock, so much so that a conservative judge asks a conservative litigant to disavow a Supreme Court precedent on how to read statutes. Of course, that ruling is not binding on the Florida Supreme Court. It is a fun academic question whether the Supreme Court can even set a precedent of how to engage in originalism or textualism. (Tara Grove suggests that the Court lacks the power to impose any methodology.) But I couldn't help but chuckle at this exchange to see how Bostock fares in the real world.

Guns

The Zizians and the Second Amendment

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For the backstory on the Zizians, see Investigations Into 6 Killings Look to a Fringe Group Known as the Zizians (N.Y. Times, Remy Tumin & Kate Christobek), which notes, among other things, that "The group's goals aren't completely clear but online writings about their beliefs touch upon veganism, artificial intelligence and gender identity."

From U.S. v. LaSota, decided today by Judge James Bredar (D. Md.); LaSota is Ziz, the Zizians' apparent leader:

Pending before the Court is Defendant Jack LaSota's Motion to Dismiss Count One of the Indictment. {The Indictment names Defendant as "Jack LaSota" and the Government uses male pronouns to refer to LaSota in its briefing. However, LaSota states that her name is "Ziz LaSota" and that she is a transgender woman who uses female pronouns. The Court refers to Defendant as "Jack LaSota" here to match the Indictment but will use female pronouns to refer to her, in accordance with her preference.}

According to the Indictment, LaSota was a fugitive from justice, and while knowing that she was a fugitive from justice, she possessed multiple firearms as well as ammunition. Specifically, she is alleged to have possessed a scoped .50 caliber rifle, a 9×19mm handgun, approximately 420 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition, and approximately 54 rounds of 9×19mm ammunition.

In their briefing, the parties provide several additional background facts. They explain that LaSota was previously charged in state criminal proceedings in California and Pennsylvania. In these cases, LaSota was charged with one felony and multiple misdemeanors. LaSota claims that all of the alleged criminal conduct was nonviolent. The Government explains that LaSota missed court hearings in both cases, so in both of them, bench warrants were issued for her arrest.

Then, in February 2025, LaSota was found with the above-described firearms and ammunition, and she was arrested by Maryland local police. A federal grand jury then charged LaSota with being a fugitive from justice in possession of firearms and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2). LaSota's Motion to Dismiss argues that § 922(g)(2) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both on its face and as applied to her case….

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Free Speech

Court Blocks Florida Gov. DeSantis's Executive Order Designating CAIR as Terrorist Organization

The order "prevents CAIR or 'any person known to have provided material support or resources' to CAIR 'from receiving any contract, employment, funds, or other benefit or privilege'" from Florida state or local governments.

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From CAIR-Foundation, Inc. v. DeSantis, decided yesterday by Judge Mark Walker (N.D. Fla.); the analysis seems correct to me:

The question before this Court is whether the Governor can, in a non-emergency situation, unilaterally designate one of the largest Muslim civil rights groups in America as a "terrorist organization" and withhold government benefits from anyone providing material support or resources to the group. This Court finds he cannot…. The Governor's decree coerces third parties, under threat of losing government benefits, to disassociate from the Council on American-Islamic Relations ("CAIR"), thereby closing avenues of expression and suppressing CAIR's protected speech….

On December 8, 2025, Governor Desantis signed Executive Order 25-244 titled "Protecting Floridians from Radical Islamic Terrorist Organizations" (the "EO"). The EO designates CAIR as a terrorist organization and prevents CAIR or "any person known to have provided material support or resources" to CAIR "from receiving any contract, employment, funds, or other benefit or privilege" from executive or cabinet agencies or from any county or municipality of the state….

Where a government uses the "threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion … to achieve the suppression" of disfavored speech, it functionally creates "a system of prior administrative restraints" that bears "a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan (1963). A government official "cannot do indirectly what [he] is barred from doing directly: … coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on [his] behalf." Nat'l Rifle Ass'n v. Vullo (2024). The present case bears all the hallmarks of unconstitutional coercion that the Supreme Court identified in Bantam Books and Vullo….

Defendant's EO threatens those who platform, collaborate with, or otherwise provide support to Plaintiff. The "vice of the system" here is the same one the Supreme Court proscribed in Bantam Books. There, threats and coercion subjected the distribution of publications "to a system of prior administrative restraints" untethered from any procedural safeguards. [A state commission had threatened bookstores with prosecution if they continued to distribute certain books that the commission had found "objectionable." -EV] By imposing the specter of punishment on intermediary book distributors, the state "directly and designedly stopped the circulation of publications in many parts of" the state. This case is no different.

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