The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

How To Assess AI-Aided Students?

We need to reconsider oral evaluations.

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When ChatGPT first hit the mainstream in 2022, I realized that law school assessments would need to change. At the time, I asked my ConLaw students what they thought about oral exams, like in ancient times. Their immediate reaction was one of absolute panic and dread. At the time, I didn't pursue the matter further. My exams were proctored in class, and used locked-down laptops, so I didn't think it was feasible for students to use AI during the proctoring.

Four years later, things have changed. I've watched many YouTube videos of how students expertly cheat on exams using AI. They place vaseline or some other agent in front of their webcam, take pictures of the question with their phones or smart glasses, and provide perfect answers. The situation is even worse with any sort of take-home work. The temptation for students to provide perfect answers every time is too high. Indeed, a student who doesn't use AI is putting herself at a disadvantage.

Some professors have responded to this trend by embracing AI. They encourage their students to use it "responsibly" (whatever that means) and to show their prompts and other searches. I, for one, remain an AI luddite. I assure all of my readers that every word I write comes from my brain, without the use of generative AI. Generally, I write a post straight through without pauses, and then go back to clean it up. (My typos are proof that I don't use AI.) Unfortunately, Google now pushes AI to the top of every query, though I always click through the links and check primary sources. I never trust the Gemini summary.

I would highly recommend a memo prepared by Dean Bobby Chesney at the University of Texas. Chesney relays a number of issues his faculty has considered concerning AI. In particular, Chesney writes that "we've also seen a surge of interest in assessments involving class participation and live presentations (even oral exams in some cases)."

I have come to much the same conclusion. My tentative plan for ConLaw in the spring is to switch to an oral, in-person midterm.

Taking a step back, I have long struggled with how to use midterms effectively. The most useful aspect of a midterm is to provide an early intervention--feedback for students who need help. But by the time the midterm is graded, it is often too late in the semester to correct course. (I do not give multiple choice questions in ConLaw, though that format would make it far easier to grade quickly.) When I started teaching, I would proctor the midterm right before spring break, and then spend the entire spring break grading midterms, and return them when we got back. Needless to say, with family commitments, that is no longer an option. The other problem with midterms is that some students have not yet hit their stride by the seventh week. Indeed, there was not always a clear correlation between grades on the midterm and grades on the final.

All of these concerns remain. Still, in light of the threat to assessments posed by AI, I will need to redouble my efforts. Here is my working approach: halfway through the semester, I will proctor an individualized, oral midterm in my office. Each session will last approximately five minutes. If I do ten sessions per hour, with breaks, I can wrap up the entire process in a single day. There is an advantage to doing everything in a short period of time to reduce the risk of students talking to each other. At my law school, 1Ls do not have classes on Friday, so that timing would work well. In the first instance, I would randomly assign students to slots throughout the day. If they have an actual, documented conflict, they can reschedule. And there will be two weeks of advance notice, which should help reduced potential conflicts.

I will need to give some more thought about how to handle timing for accommodated students. As most professors know, the number of students who have testing accommodations has skyrocketed in recent years. Often accommodations are provided for students who are not able to write with a pen or type with a keyboard--so-called "scribing." But the oral exam eliminates that need. Students would only need to listen and speak.

Students would not be allowed any materials or devices during the sessions. I'll leave a basket (maybe a Farraday box) outside my office to deposit all tech. Some smart glasses can be disguised as regular glasses. I hope this doesn't become an issue.

I would also record and digitally transcribe the entire session, should any disputes arise later. The midterm would not be worth a large portion of the grade. I think all law schools permit professors to vary grades a small amount based on participation. I would make that participation score turn on the performance of the in-person midterm. (I've never figured out how to accurately and consistently record class participation over the course of a semester, so I don't try.)

The substance of the midterm will simulate a final exam, but on a reduced scale. I will circulate five fact patterns to the student in advance. That way students can prepare and will not be surprised.  The questions will not be a full-blown fact pattern like the final, but a single paragraph that has embedded a few related ConLaw issues. I will tell students that during the oral midterm, they will pick one of the questions at random, maybe by drawing an index card from a deck.

Students will then have to give a one minute prepared remark answering the prompt--basically the opening statement a lawyer would give during an oral argument. At that point, I can ask a series of follow-up questions to probe different aspects of the answer. I might ask them about a case they mentioned, or ask why they didn't mention a particular case. This would be the sort of Socratic Dialogue I do in class every week. Indeed, I imagine I would use the same questions I pose in class, so there will be fewer surprises.

At the end of the session, I would provide feedback on the spot. I imagine the grade will be a number between 1 and 5, or 1 and 10. I can then point out where they gained and lost points. This feedback would be immediate and personalized. Students usually receive grades on midterms weeks or even a month later, long after they've forgotten what the question was.

Students would be instructed to not talk with their classmates about the exam. I am skeptical of how closely this instruction will be followed. The upshot of providing the questions in advance is that students can work together, or with their Chatbot, to prepare answers. But all of that preparation goes out the window once I start asking followup questions.

Using an oral midterm is sort of an interim solution. The ultimate move would be to make the final exam an in-person oral exam. A challenge is anonymity. While final exams require anonymity, it is less important for midterms. Professors are expected to go over a student's midterm to provide one-on-one feedback. But perhaps as so much of the work students submit is no longer their own, but instead created by AI, eliminating the cloak of anonymity may be the final way to determine what a person actually knows.

As I said above this plan is tentative. (Then again, a blog post I wrote years ago concerning "tentative" thoughts is still being cited as my definitive view.) I welcome thoughts and comments from other professors who have considered these issues.

War

My Grandfather's Account of the Early Days of Germany's Attack on the Soviet Union in World War II

Today is the 85th anniversary of that momentous event.

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Nathan Firun (WW II-era photos). (NA)

 

Today is the 85th anniversary of Operation Barbarossa, the German attack on the Soviet Union, in 1941. Virtually all my then-living relatives were caught up in the war in one way or another. But none more immediately than my grandfather Nathan Firun, who was 17 at the time. This is a shortened version of his story of that time, which he recounted to me in 2011. He hated talking about his experiences in World War II, and only after much effort did I persuade him to tell this story:

Nathan was a graduate of a special military high school in Leningrad, trained as an artillerist. Soon after the fighting began, he enlisted in a "militia" unit of (mostly) untrained civilians. The men were issued Canadian-made rifles left over from World War I, with only five bullets per rifle. When they asked to use one bullet each to test-fire the rifles to make sure they worked, permission was denied, because there were too few bullets to go around. The unit was employed digging trenches behind the lines.

Sometime later, they were required to turn in their weapons, so they could be sent to a unit at the front, where there were men with no weapons at all.  Nathan said this was the first moment when he realized the war must be going badly for the Soviet side.

In late August, they were  informed their position had been flanked by the Germans, and the men were required to disperse and make their way back to Soviet lines in small groups. After some harrowing adventures, Nathan did indeed evade the Germans and found a Soviet unit. The other soldier with him was not so lucky. He entered a village they passed on their way, and was never seen again. Nathan never knew what happened to him. Perhaps he got killed or was captured by the Germans.

When he returned to Soviet lines, Nathan was detained by the NKVD (the secret police agency later known as the KGB) for the "crime" of "betraying" the USSR by being caught behind enemy lines. He and a large group of other soldiers in similar straits were herded into a barbed-wire enclosure, and would very likely have ended up in a special punishment battalion (or, worse, a Gulag).

Fortunately, an NKVD lieutenant noticed that Nathan had a shoulder patch indicating that he was an artillerist. He came up to Nathan and asked if he really was one and knew how to operate artillery. Nathan said "yes." The NKVD officer then said that they had two antitank guns that had just been brought up and needed to be set up and used to counter an imminent German attack. He told Nathan to gather ten other men from among the "traitors" and undertake the task.

"Where are the shells for the guns?" Nathan asked.

"You're asking me where the shells are?", said the NKVD man, "Go find some yourself!"

Nathan did as he was told, and  set up and operated the guns (with the help of several other men released from detention for that task). After some effort, they did indeed find the necessary shells.

The NKVD officer almost certainly knew that Nathan and the other soldiers who had been cut off behind enemy lines weren't actually "traitors." Else he wouldn't have trusted them with artillery pieces. The NKVD was implementing Stalin's awful orders, regardless of how insane and unjust they might be.

In the ensuing engagement, the Germans were repelled, and Nathan was wounded. He ended up in a hospital back in Leningrad, even as the city came under siege. At that point, it became clear that one else in the city knew he had been detained by the NKVD for being caught behind enemy lines. In the chaos of those days, Soviet record-keeping was even more shoddy than usual, and apparently no one had bothered to make any official record of my  Nathan's 'crime'. Nathan's father (my great-grandfather), Boris Firun, told him he should keep this story secret, and never tell anyone.

Boris had been detained by the NKVD himself several times in the 1930s, and knew whereof he spoke. One time, he had been arrested for attending a speech by Stalin's rival Leon Trotsky. Even though, at the time of the speech, Trotsky was still a high-ranking Communist Party leader in good standing, the NKVD later pursued anyone who had gone to hear him. Boris managed to persuade them he had not actually gone to the event (though in fact he had).

My grandfather did indeed keep the story secret through almost four years of additional fighting. He eventually commanded an antitank gun battery and won numerous decorations. He did not reveal these events to anyone until he told me the story 70 years later.

There were about 100 men in Nathan's class at the military high school. Only about five to ten survived the war.

Nathan Firun passed away in 2021, at the age of 97. We miss him greatly.

 

Birthright Citizenship

Compendium of Writings About Birthright Citizenship

Links to my writings on this important issue about to be decided by the Supreme Court.

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The Supreme Court is likely to decide Trump v. Barbara, the birthright citizenship case, sometime this week or next week. Here is a compendium of links to my many writings about this issue. I have omitted a few that merely link to writings of mine published elsewhere. Except where otherwise noted, all are posts that originally appeared right here at the Volokh Conspiracy blog:

"Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution," Oct. 30, 2018. My very first piece about this issue, written during Trump's first term, when the question first became prominent.

"Legacy Preferences, Citizenship, Migration, and the Implications of a Constitutional Ban on Hereditary Privilege," July 12, 2023. This piece expresses some of the reasons for my ambivalence towards birthright citizenship, given that it is a kind of system of hereditary privilege.

"Birthright Citizenship and Undocumented Immigrants," Just Security, Nov. 25, 2024. An early critique of the then-anticipated Trump second term birthright citizenship policy.

"More on Birthright Citizenship and Undocumented Immigrants," Jan. 7, 2025.

"Trump's Birthright Citizenship Order is Even Worse than Expected - and Even More Blatantly Unconstitutional," Jan. 21, 2025. My initial critique of Trump's birthright citizenship executive order  - which was even worse than I expected.

"Federal Court Issues Temporary Restraining Order Blocking "Blatantly Unconstitutional" Trump Birthright Citizenship Order," Jan. 23, 2025. Analysis of the first judicial decision against Trump's order.

"Two Federal Courts Issue Injunctions Against Trump's Birthright Citizenship Executive Order," Feb. 8, 2025.

"Birthright Citizenship - A Response to Barnett and Wurman," Feb. 15, 2025. My critique of a prominent defense of the constitutionality of Trump's order, by Randy Barnett and Ilan Wurman.

"More on Birthright Citizenship and Undocumented Immigrants - Rejoinder to Barnett and Wurman," Feb. 18, 2025. My rejoinder to Barnett and Wurman's response to their critics.

"Trump Administration Asks Supreme Court to Lift Universal Injunctions Against its Birthright Citizenship Order," Mar. 14, 2025.

"A Simple Defense of Nationwide Injunctions," May 16, 2025. The birthright citizenship litigation is an excellent demonstration of why we need nationwide injunctions.

"A Bad Decision on Nationwide Injunctions," June 27, 2025. My critique of Trump v. CASA, Inc., the Supreme Court decision striking down nationwide injunctions in the birthright citizenship litigation. I also note possible alternative ways to secure universal remedies.

"Federal Court Issues Class Action Injunction Against Trump's Birthright Citizenship Executive Order [Updated]," July 10, 2025. Class actions are one possible way to get around Trump v. CASA, Inc.

"Appeals Court Rules Trump's Birthright Citizenship Order is Unconstitutional and Upholds Nationwide Injunction Against it," July 24, 2025. Analysis of important Ninth Circuit decision against the birthright citizenship order.

"Courts are Checking Trump More Effectively than Many Think," Sept. 22, 2025. The birthright citizenship litigation is one key example of this broader phenomenon.

"First Circuit Rules Trump's Birthright Citizenship Executive Order is Unconstitutional," Oct. 4, 2025. Analysis of another decision against the the birthright citizenship order.

"Slavery and Birthright Citizenship," Mar. 2. 2016. Why the Trump administration's position on birthright citizenship is incompatible with the main purpose of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

"Slavery and Birthright Citizenship," Lawfare, Mar. 16, 2026. My most comprehensive explanation of why the Trump administration's position on birthright citizenship is incompatible with the main purpose of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Giving citizenship to freed slaves and other Blacks. Much expanded version of the earlier VC post of the same title.

"Justice Barrett, Slavery, and Birthright Citizenship," Apr. 1, 2026. Analysis of a key moment in the Supreme Court oral argument in Trump v. Barbara.

"Birthright Citizenship as a Second-Best Policy," Apr. 4, 2026. While I oppose Trump's efforts to deny birthright citizenship children of undocumented immigrants on both legal and moral grounds, I do not believe birthright citizenship is actually the ideal policy. It is a second-best option, at best.

Politics

What Did Professor Barrett Think About Smith?

Justice Barrett's views on the Supreme Court's supervisory power were set two decades ago; what about her views on the Free Exercise Clause?

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Employment Division v. Smith was decided in 1990. Three years later, RFRA was enacted. Amy Coney began law school at Notre Dame in 1994. City of Boerne v. Flores was decided in 1997. In Flores, Justice Scalia offered a full-throated defense of his Smith opinion. In 1997, Coney also graduated from law school. In OT 1998, she clerked for Justice Scalia. In a 2008 article in the Notre Dame Law Review, Professor Barrett discussed Smith, RFRA, and Boerne.

In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not bar the application of neutral, generally applicable laws to religious practices. See id. at 885. RFRA, which attempted to restore the pre-Smith understanding that state actors cannot burden the free exercise of religion in the absence of a compelling interest, was a "direct response" to this decision. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512. The Court held RFRA unconstitutional on the ground that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not grant Congress the power to define what the Constitution requires, as opposed to the power to remedy violations of it. See id. at 519.

Amy Coney Barrett, Introduction, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1147, 1172 (2008)

In 1991, during Judge Thomas's confirmation hearing, Senator Patrick leahy asked Thomas if he ever "stated whether you felt that [Roe v. Wade] was properly decided or not?" Thomas replied that he did not "recollect[] commenting one way or the other" on Roe v. Wade during law school or in the two decades afterwards. I don't think Barrett could have said the same thing if he was asked about Smith during her confirmation hearing. Barrett clearly thought about Smith. Still, as best as I can tell, Professor Barrett never publicly wrote whether she thought Smith was rightly decided or not. She wasn't a Free Exercise Clause scholar, so that omission is not suprising.

This background brings me to Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (2021). In that case, there were three votes to overrule Smith. But Justice Barrett, joined by Justice Kavanaugh, declined to take that step. Justice Barrett raised a host of questions that might need to be answered were Smith to be overruled. I've yet to meet a single religious liberty litigator who actually thinks Barrett's decision to not overrule Smith was due to those questions.

Rather, the far more likely scenario is that she thought Justice Scalia was right in 2021. She likely came to that conclusion in the 1990s as a student when Smith and Boerne was decided, or while serving as a law clerk for Justice Scalia in 1998, or while serving on the Notre Dame Law faculty. Again, to this day, Barrett's close friend Professor Rick Garnett feels compelled to defend Smith even when there is no credible attack against it.

Now, onto Hunter v. United States. Justice Barrett favorably cited her law review articles to support her judicial belief that the Supreme Court lacks a supervisory power. It's possible that Justice Barrett's views on Smith were wiped away, tabula rasa, upon her confirmation. But I would wager, Justice Barrett's views on Smith were set some time ago and aren't going to change.

Free Speech

Independent Journalist's Lawsuit Against West Texas County Can Go Forward, Recommends Magistrate Judge

The case is mostly about photography restrictions and false arrest, but the plaintiffs also allegedly "discussed playing Disney music during public meetings to prevent Flash—through copyright restrictions—from monetizing his recordings."

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From Wednesday's report and recommendation by Magistrate Judge David Fannin (W.D. Tex.) in Flash v. Jeff Davis County, a summary of the allegations in plaintiff's Complaint (recall that, at this point. these are just allegations):

David Flash … is an independent journalist who covers regional events and public affairs in West Texas. In September 2023, Flash's news outlet, the Big Bend Times, published investigative news stories centered around the conduct of multiple County officials. The stories accused the officials of misusing county resources and questionable law enforcement practices.

Flash faced backlash after the stories were published. Defendant Lisa Dennison, an employee for the County Attorney's Office, confronted him and told him he was under investigation. A few months later, an anonymous poster released Flash's mugshots—which were private under a Texas Government Code Chapter 411 non-disclosure order—and characterized him as "not a trusted media source." He later discovered Dennison had been the one who had obtained his mugshots.

Defendant Glen Eisen, Dennison's supervisor, was apparently aware that Dennison had misappropriated Flash's mugshots but did not take disciplinary action. As Flash was beginning to face backlash in Fall 2023, Defendant King Merritt filed a police report detailing an incident with Flash at the County Attorney's Office between Eisen and Flash. Eisen had asked Merritt to arrest Flash for "causing problems at the Jeff Davis County Attorney's Office." Merritt attempted to detain Flash, but Flash left before he could do so and no further action was taken.

On October 20, 2023, Flash returned to the County Courthouse. Defendant Mary Ann Luedecke, a justice of the peace for the County, attempted to detain him after he photographed a sign outside her office. Two days later, Luedecke sent out an alert to regional law enforcement agencies that labeled Flash as a "First Amendment auditor." Luedecke and Eisen also called the District Attorney's Office to warn them that a "First Amendment auditor" was "on the loose."

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Free Speech

Nassau County (N.Y.) Buffer Zone Outside Houses of Worship Struck Down

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Nassau County's Religious Safety Act "makes it unlawful for any person to," "from one hour before to one hour after 'any religious service, community meeting, ceremony, or other congregational, educational or organizational meeting or event,'"

demonstrate, picket, protest, distribute literature, display signs, engage in oral advocacy, or other forms of expressive or symbolic conduct, whether conducted individually or in groups, within thirty-five (35) feet of the Entrance Area or Driveway of a Place of Religious Worship.

As Judge Sanket Bulsara (E.D.N.Y.) noted Thursday in Borecky v. County of Nassau, this covers (among other things) "wearing a t-shirt that contains a political, religious, or symbolic message of any kind," since that is a "form[] of expressive or symbolic conduct." And it's unconstitutional, Judge Bulsara held (I think correctly), given McCullen v. Coakley (2014), which struck down a similar buffer zone outside abortion clinics. Here's a short excerpt from the long opinion:

The Supreme Court's decision in McCullen is instructive. Massachusetts enacted a 35-foot buffer law prohibiting anyone—except employees, patients, and first responders, or those merely passing through—from entering or remaining "on a public way or sidewalk adjacent to a reproductive health care facility['s]" entrance, exit, or driveway. "Sidewalk counselors" sought to engage in one-on-one conversations with persons entering the clinic to dissuade them from obtaining abortions. And they sought to do so in a manner similar to the Plaintiffs here: by "offering information" with a "caring demeanor, a calm tone of voice."

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Politics

Justice Scalia's Message To Law School Faculty

I heard Justice Scalia bestow this wisdom in 2013, and never forgot it.

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I became a law professor in the fall of 2012. In January 2013, I attended the Federalist Society faculty conference in New Orleans. Justice Scalia was gracious enough to speak at the evening reception. His remarks stuck with me, and affect much of what I do.

That speech in New Orleans was not recorded, but Justice Scalia offered similar remarks at the dedication of George Mason Law School's new building in March 1999. Thankfully, Chris Scalia and Ed Whelan reproduced that speech in Scalia Speaks.

Here is an excerpt:

To the faculty: Before I became part of the problem in Washington, I used to do what you do—and I miss it. Allow someone who is now at a sufficient distance from his teaching years that he can see rather more clearly what he did right and what he did wrong to give you advice.

During the last few years of my academic career, I had become—or at least thought I had become—something of an expert in my chosen field of administrative law. It was easy to get what I wrote published, and I had a lot of insights I thought worth writing about. I reached the point (which I had seen some of my older colleagues reach, but thought I would never experience) of begrudging the time that I had to take away from my research and writing to devote to teaching class, and to the preparation for teaching class. (The preparation, as you all know, takes much more time than the teaching itself: at least three hours of the one for each hour of the other—unless you have not taught the course before, in which case the spread is much greater.)

When I look back at those feelings now, I think what a fool I was. The Great American Law Review Article—let's face it—has a shelf life of at most ten years, after which it is of little more than historical interest. And the Great American Law Treatise endures not much longer. But I still encounter students whom I do not remember, but whom I taught at Chicago and Stanford between 1976 and 1981, and indeed whom I taught at Virginia between 1967 and 1971, who come up to me with great warmth and affection, and say what a lasting impact I had upon their love for, and their approach to, the law. And many of them, I assume, have similarly infected others. In fact, I occasionally encounter students who were taught by my father at Brooklyn College in the 1940s and 1950s, who come up to tell me what a terrific teacher he was, and how he affected their intellectual life.

So do not delude yourselves. Research and writing is of course a part of the academic life—and perhaps the part that makes you best known, for the time being, beyond the walls of your own institution. But the reality is that the part of your academic career that will have the most lasting impact—and that will be remembered after you are gone—is those hours that you spend producing a living intellectual legacy, in the classroom. Of course administrators ought to be aware of this as well as faculty. Some law schools value teaching more than others; I hope George Mason will always be a teaching law school.

These words affect everything I do as a professor. Students have to come first.

Whenever a student asks me for something, and I am inclined to reply "I'm busy" or  ignore the email, I remember what Justice Scalia told me, and reply to the student right away. My response may be "I can't help you right now but we can chat at some point in the future" or "I don't know the answer but I'll try to find someone who does." I always try to provide some guidance. Indeed, I routinely get emails from students at other schools seeking advice, as no one on their faculty can stand in a position to help. I am especially eager to provide whatever assistance I can.

I am infuriated by professors who do not respond to student emails. Unless a professor is on leave, there is no excuse to not respond to a student's email within 24 hours. Professors are only expected to teach a few hours per week, but the responsibilities are not limited to the classroom.

I've written many books and articles, but I know that when my time comes, those tracts will collect (virtual) dust. My students, and the students I have influenced, will be the true embodiment of my legacy.

The Supervisory Power Of The Supreme Court As A Form Of Virtue Signaling

Only Justice Thomas was willing to look past the difficult consequences of an appellate waiver.

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Hunter v. United States was not on my radar screen. But this may be one of the most unexpectedly fascinating cases of the year. The question presented is simple enough. In what cases can a defendant escape a knowing and intelligent waiver of appellate rights.

The top-line vote was 8-1, though as I noted yesterday, the majority splits 2-3-3. Justice Kagan and Chief Justice Roberts were squarely in the majority. Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, tried to expand the majority opinion. Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justices Alito and Barrett, felt compelled to say the majority opinion was actually more narrow. This was hardly a usual 8-1 decision.

The dissent by Justice Thomas raised many important points that were completely ignored by the majority. Justice Barrett wrote a partial rejoinder that was very unsatisfying.

Justice Thomas points out how the majority creates an exception to the appeal waiver doctrine out of thin air. Justice Kagan does not rely on any law, contract-law principle, or common law rule. Rather, the Court could only rely on the so-called "supervisory power." But as Professor Barrett persuasively explained in a law review article two decades ago, this sort of power is a fiction without any grounding in law. Justice Frankfurter explained in McNabb v. United States (1943) that the supervisory power was based on general "considerations of justice not limited to the strict canons" of law. In other words, no law.

What then is the basis to create the exception? In short, virtue signaling. The Court is afraid how people will see the judiciary. This sort of institutionalism is at the cornerstone of Chief Justice Roberts's approach to judging, but it has no basis in law. Justice Thomas, as usual, is the only member of the Court willing to say the uncomfortable part out loud.

The Court, however, fails to identify any basis in law for its exception. It identifies no constitutional text, statute, or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure that even suggests its miscarriage-of-justice exception. And, it identifies no established common-law or equitable doctrine that resembles it.The Court instead grounds its exception in the need to avoid "bring[ing] the judicial system into disrepute." Ante, at 1, 11. Because federal courts have a "role . . . in approving and implementing appeal waivers," the Court argues, this Court must create appropriate rules for enforcing them, which should advance the court system's own "'institutional interest.'" Ante, at 8–9. 9

Of course, the Court's desire for a particular legal rule does not give it the right to create it. "Our duty is to apply the law, not to make it." Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666, 677 (1874). Thus, concerns about public perception of the judiciary provide no justification for the Court's decision. The power to change the law to avoid outcomes that the people do not like "lies with the people, and not with the judiciary." Ibid.

Justice Kagan was petrified of how people would see the court if some judge imposed a sentence based on race, sex, or some other prohibited characteristic. I think the response to such misbehavior would be through the judicial misconduct process or even impeachment. Moreover, if there was an actual miscarriage of justice, I would think political pressure could be brought on the executive branch to modify the terms of sentence or perhaps even provide a presidential commutation. The political branches are capable of dealing with bad situations. The answer does not lie in the courts making stuff up.

As for the supervisory power, Justice Thomas responds directly to Justice Barrett:

JUSTICE BARRETT, for her part, adopts a sounder methodology. See ante, at 1 (concurring opinion). But, in my view, the common-law-of waiver principles she invokes cannot justify this decision either for several reasons. First, if today's decision could be justified as an act of common-law finding rather than policymaking, one would expect to find a more robust tradition of decisions applying a similar rule in similar situations. Yet, neither JUSTICE BARRETT nor the Court can point to any. See infra, at 22–23. Second, JUSTICE BARRETT cites authorities explaining that certain rights may never be waived. Ante, at 2; see infra, at 22. That general principle is true as far as it goes. But, common-law doctrines require rules with identifiable content for judges to apply, not only general principles. It is not entirely clear how the general principle that some rights cannot be waived leads to the Court's granular rule under which appeals can be waived, but those waivers become void if any of four specific factual scenarios later occur at sentencing. Third, this body of law precluded waivers of certain procedures that implicated the "substantial" features "of the legal tribunal" or the "fundamental mode of its proceeding." R. Bowers, Law of Waiver §397, p. 394 (1914). It is not clear to me that appeals of sentencing errors—appeals that did not even exist until 100 years after the founding and that must be asserted by the defendant—are sufficiently fundamental to criminal procedure for these doctrines to have any purchase. In any event, Hunter never developed an argument along these lines, which may explain why the Court, on my reading, declined to adopt it.

I've read and re-read Justice Barrett's short concurrence. I almost get the sense that she blinks. She knows Justice Thomas is right, and agrees with him, but finds some way to distinguish this case to avoid a "miscarriage of justice." In other words, Justice Barrett wouldn't want the judiciary to be viewed in such a negative light. But again, this approach to judging amounts to little more than virtue signaling.

Justice Kagan's opinion to avoid a "miscarriage of justice" is a throwback to the Warren Court where the Justices actively made policy. But as Justice Thomas explains, "policy concerns are not rules of decision in courts of law."

Justice Alito's vote in this case is baffling. He might think the exception is so narrow as to have no real effect.

Finally, it appears that the Court lacks Article III standing. Justice Thomas observes:

3Because Hunter cannot say whether he will ever be prescribed ob-jected-to medication, he has conceded that his claim is not ripe under binding Fifth Circuit precedent. Hunter may well lack Article III standing under our precedents. The Court nonetheless proceeds to the merits without addressing its jurisdiction.

Yes Justice Kagan and her colleagues leap over these procedural problems to engage in policy-making. Where is Justice Barrett on this jurisdictional point?

Kudos to Lisa Blatt. She won two cases on Friday, Hunter and the Rooker-Feldman case. Very different analyses, both victories.

Politics

Short Circuit: An inexhaustive weekly compendium of rulings from the federal courts of appeal

Rum, time travel, and inappropriate trophies.

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Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

New on the Short Circuit podcast: Lawyers and bond hearings in the wrong order, plus, in #12Months12Circuits, we hit the Sixth.

  1. Puerto Rico went through a special sort of bankruptcy to sort out its debt problems via a court-approved restructuring plan. Now, it asserts that claims against individual police officers for violations of constitutional rights are barred by the plan because the gov't has to defend those suits and can choose to indemnify the officers. First Circuit: The plan does not purport to extinguish these civil-rights claims, and it's dubious it could discharge them even if it tried.
  2. Buffalo: We had to demolish this building on an emergency basis because it was an abandoned drug den on the verge of collapse. Property owner: Was not. Second Circuit: And this, children, is what we call a fact dispute. To the jury it goes!
  3. Second Circuit: FTX CEO SBF SOL. Read More

When Justice Professor Merged With Justice Barrett

Hunter presented a weird syncretism between Amy Coney Barrett's scholarship and her jurisprudence.

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For many years, Ruth Bader Ginsburg was a professor and an advocate. She had written and litigated extensively on many constitutional law issues, including sex discrimination and abortion. When Ginsburg became a circuit court judge, and then a Supreme Court justice, no one would have expected her to abandon all of her views on constitutional law. Of course she insisted during her confirmation hearing that she would approach issues with an open mind. But to no one's surprise, Ginsburg's constitutional jurisprudence largely reflected her scholarly agenda. I think much the same can be said of Professors Scalia, Breyer, Kagan, and other academics who became Justices. Indeed, these professors were nominated based in part on their scholarly writing.

Yet, I cannot recall any Justice so clearly stating that her judicial opinion was equivalent with her scholarly opinion--that was until I read Justice Barrett's concurrence in Hunter v. United States.

Barrett cites two of her own law review articles as support for her judicial opinion:

Like JUSTICE THOMAS, I am skeptical that the SupremeCourt possesses an inherent, supervisory authority over inferior federal courts. See A. Barrett, The SupervisoryPower of the Supreme Court, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 324 (2006). At the same time, I have distinguished exercises of such authority from the development of procedural common law. See A. Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 Va. L. Rev. 813, 883–884 (2008). The former concerns narrow, discretionary rules; the latter involves doctrines, like preclusion and abstention, which are "settled by tradition or emergent consensus." Id., at 884.

The use of the word "I" here is fascinating. Justice Barrett is "skeptical" of the supervisory power, citing Professor Barrett. Justice Barrett has drawn a distinction, citing Professor Barrett. This is a weird syncretism between Amy Coney Barrett's scholarship and her jurisprudence. Is there any daylight between what Professor Barrett wrote about two decades ago and what Justice Barrett thinks now? I doubt it.

Supreme Court nominees are often asked about their past writings. The stock answer is that those writings represented their role as an advocate or professor, but they will approach each case with a fresh perspective. Of course this response is not accurate, as Justices do not forget everything they once knew. And Justice Barrett's self-citation proves the point.

Politics

No Right to Videorecord in Tax Collector's Office

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From Patrick v. Pasco County Fla. Tax Collector, decided Tuesday by Judges Kevin Newsom, Andrew Brasher, and Frank Hull:

Plaintiff Lana Patrick is a self-described "Journalist/Activist." This case arises from Patrick's attempt to record a video inside the Pasco County Tax Collector's ("Tax Collector") office near Dade City, Florida….

"The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest." Smith v. City of Cumming (11th Cir. 2000). But the right to record is not absolute, because "the Constitution does not require the government to 'grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech,' no matter the setting, 'without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker's activities.'"

Instead, the validity of a regulation depends on the forum in which it applies: a traditional public forum, a designated public forum, a limited public forum, or a nonpublic forum. {Although the public may have an interest in the proper functioning of a county tax office, the First Amendment "does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government."} Patrick does not challenge the district court's characterization of the Tax Collector office's lobby as either a limited public forum or a nonpublic forum.

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Second Amendment

Fiddlers, Drunkards, Marijuana, and the Second Amendment

The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Hemani.

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In United States v. Hemani, the U.S. Supreme Court yesterday held that the federal government could not prosecute Ali Hemani under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)'s "unlawful user" provision solely because he used marijuana a few times a week while owning a firearm at home. Ilya Somin and Stephen Halbrook wrote about the decision yesterday. In this post, coauthored with Wyoming law professor George Mocsary, I'd like to provide some additional perspective.

The Hemani decision is personally important to the many millions of Americans who use marijuana and who also possess firearms, while being careful never to mix the two. The Court has removed from these peaceable and responsible citizens the threat of a 15-year sentence in federal prison.

The decision is also important to the growing jurisprudential doctrine of the Second Amendment. Under the Court's precedents in Bruen and Rahimi, new types of gun control laws can be justified by analogy to older, historic laws. Hemani  teaches that courts should be rigorous when the government attempts to make far-fetched analogies to disarm huge categories of Americans who are not dangerous. We argued in an amicus brief in the case, along with NRA's Joe Greenlee (the brief's lead author) and Professor F. Lee Francis of Widener Law School, that someone who uses marijuana is not comparable to a nineteenth century "vagrant" who might be sent to a workhouse, nor to a "habitual drunkard" who had to be institutionalized after losing his mental capacity. The Court agreed.

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