1/4/2012: President Obama makes three appointments to the NLRB. The Supreme Court would find these appointments unconstitutional in NLRB v. Noel Canning.
The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002
Open Thread
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Revisiting A.A.R.P v. Trump In Light Of United States v. Maduro
The United States military is like a Denny's.
As regular readers know, I do not use the internet on Shabbat. From sundown on Friday until an hour after sundown on Saturday, I am blissfully offline. And, time and again, news breaks while I am offline. Indeed, the atrocities of October 7 occurred while I was incommunicado. (Many Jewish people used their phones on Shabbat for first time during this awful day.) In April 2025, the litigation over A.A.R.P v. Trump broke during Good Friday. And the capture of Nicholas Maduro also occurred in the early hours of Saturday morning.
Of course, I do not live in a hermetically sealed bubble, so I heard news about the military operation in Caracas throughout the day. But I waited until Saturday evening to sign online, and study the incident carefully. Indeed, there is some virtue in not reading early reports, which tend to usually be incomplete or inaccurate. (During breaking news, especially mass shootings, I try not to read any news until the dust has settled.) By Saturday night, the facts from Venezuela have been fairly established.
From a legal perspective, I do not have much to add to what Jack Goldsmith wrote about the operation. We can safely ignore any arguments about the U.N. Charter.
Instead, it is useful to revisit A.A.R.P. v. Trump in light of United States v. Maduro. When Trump first began the efforts to remove alleged members of Tren De Aragua under the Alien Enemies Act, all the usual suspects laughed at him. They alleged there was no real national security concern. They charged Trump (once again) with racism and bigotry. Judge Boasberg ordered the planes to turn around from his vacation home, no doubt, because he thought the entire operation was a sham. If Boasberg thought this was a serious national security procedure, he likely would have not been so eager to intervene. Lawyers told federal judges in Texas that there was not really an armed conflict. (The upcoming Fifth Circuit en banc argument should be lit.) The United States Supreme Court, including all three Trump appointees, rejected the President's powers on the emergency docket without even waiting for the lower court to rule.
In reality, the Trump Administration has been planning a months-long framework concerning Venezuela and Maduro. No one, not even the enlightened Judge Boasberg, is privy to all of those details. Indeed, I suspect the lawyers who are asked to argue in D.D.C. are not always told the full story. In this case, we witnessed Lawfare at its worst because it directly affected national security. Thankfully, Judge Boasberg did not order the 150 aircraft to turn around.
It is also useful to ponder that Trump's two greatest losses before the Supreme Court concerned his presidential powers over protecting national security: Trump v. Illinois and A.A.R.P. v. Trump.
A generation ago, the litmus test for a Supreme Court Justice was how they would rule on "War on Terror" cases. It was well reported that John Roberts rose to the head of the pack, at least in part, because he was seen as a strong vote to support the Bush foreign policy. Recall that Roberts interviewed with the Attorney General for the Supreme Court while he was presiding over Hamdan, and Bush interviewed him on the same day the case was decided. Talk about auditioning!
Yet, in the present day, Roberts, as well Justice Kavanaugh (who was Bush's staff secretary!), and Justice Barrett ruled against Trump in both cases. And the third foreign policy defeat might be the tariff case--the centerpiece of Trump's entire foreign policy. If Trump loses, Justice Gorsuch and possibly Justice Barrett will rule against him. I assure you that Trump will be unconcerned with Justice Gorsuch's interest in reinvigorating the non-delegation doctrine.
I have been giving some more thought of late about who Trump's next Supreme Court nominee would be. Indeed, my thinking was nudged by a telling line in Ed Whelan's predictions for 2026. Ed wrote that Justices Thomas and Alito are likely not to retire because "each justice has ample reason to doubt that whoever was picked to replace him would be as effective." Does anyone wonder why?
It is no surprise that Trump went out of his way to effusively praise Thomas and Alito and hope they do not resign. Trump's time horizon ends in January 2029. He doesn't care what happens to the composition of the Court after that date. And both Alito and Thomas are almost certainly going to make that mark. Yet, Trump has far more restrained compliments about his own three picks. The most he could say about Justice Barrett was that she was "a very good woman" and "she's very smart." These are the sort of saccharine compliments Trump dispenses like Pez.
If there is a vacancy, Trump cannot lose sight that his three picks ruled against him in Illinois, A.A.R.P., and perhaps the tariff case. (Though I have the unorthodox take that Trump wins that case.) What does Trump do with these votes? I think he will ignore all of the voices who advised him on selecting his first batch of nominees. I don't think he even picks a judge. He will likely pick someone he knows and trusts, and who has been in the trenches with him. Solicitor General John Sauer seems like the most likely pick--especially if he manages to win the tariff case.
Congressional Acquiescence Facilitates Executive Branch Military Adventurism
Here as elsewhere, lethargy in the legislature is no way to counter execss energy in the executive.
Yesterday, Civitas Outlook published my column on the lawfulness of the Trump Administration's drug boat strikes. Depending on your view, that column is either quite timely (there were additional boat strikes on December 31) or completely overtaken by events.
For reasons I explain, the strikes are easier to justify in light of late 20th-century precedent than they are under the original understanding of the relevant constitutional provisions. The same holds true of the Trump Administration's attack on Venezuela to arrest Nicholas Maduro (and bomb the Hugo Chavez Mausoleum). In this regard, my views are quite similar to those of Jack Goldsmith, noted by Eugene below.
These portions of the column are relevant on this point:
Presidents of both parties have assumed the authority to direct military operations without legislative authorization. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice has generally approved such actions, reasoning that the deployment of military forces, even offensively, does not require prior congressional approval or a declaration of war, provided the operations are of insufficient "nature, scope and duration" to constitute an actual war. As Professor McConnell notes, OLC can now draw on a long history of such actions to justify its conclusions, but "has made little or no attempt to square" its conclusions "with constitutional text or early history."
Whatever the founding-era understanding, Presidents have increasingly taken it upon themselves to deploy the nation's military without seeking congressional authorization. This has placed the onus on Congress to police and constrain the President's desire to project military force overseas. As my Civitas colleague, John Yoo has argued, if Congress wishes to constrain a President's military adventurism, it may use the power of the purse. The military that the President has at his disposal to deploy is a function of what Congress has authorized and funded. And if a President wants to use that military in ways Congress disapproves of, potentially blurring the line between waging war and preventing crime (such as drug smuggling), Congress can limit appropriations or enact other constraining legislation.
If, as President Trump has announced, U.S. forces will be effectively running things in Venezuela until a new government is in place, this may trigger the War Powers Resolution, though the executive branch has not always faithfully complied with its constraints. From my column:
Congress sought to limit the President's ability to push the nation into war without legislative approval by enacting the War Powers Resolution in 1973. Among other things, this law directs the President to inform Congress within 48 hours of deploying U.S. military forces into "hostilities" and "situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances," unless the deployment is pursuant to legislative authorization (such as an AUMF). Once this notice is given, the War Powers Resolution provides that the President has 60 days to withdraw the military forces unless Congress has authorized the continued deployment.
While most Presidents have abided by the Resolutions notice requirement most of the time, compliance with the 60-day withdrawal requirement has been honored in the breach. Sometimes the executive branch has offered tortured explanations for its failure to comply, such as by arguing that actions in support of NATO operations or the deployment of air power without ground forces do not constitute covered "hostilities." In other instances, no justification has been given for failing to withdraw forces or seek congressional authorization for continued operations. . . .
The OLC has determined that bomb and missile strikes against alleged drug boats and cartel members are not covered "hostilities" because U.S. service members are not in danger, according to press reports. (The relevant memos have not been released.) In effect, the Administration's position seems to be that the War Powers Resolution is not really triggered so long as those targeted by the U.S. military cannot shoot back. This may seem like an absurd argument, but it is not a Trump Administration innovation. The Obama Administration used this precise rationale to justify continued air strikes on Libya for more than 60 days in 2011 without congressional authorization (although it is interesting to note that this argument was made by lawyers in the State Department and the White House, and was not embraced by OLC). Thus, the Trump Administration can argue, with some force, that it is acting in accordance with established practice to which Congress has acquiesced.
Note, however, that after the U.S. intervened in Panama to arrest strongman Manuel Noriega, Congress passed a resolution approving of the action. If the Trump Administration anticipates a continued military presence in Venezuela, it should also seek congressional approval (and should do so whether or not it anticipates threats to U.S. forces). And if the Administration does not seek legislative approval on its own accord, Congress should insist on it (and threaten more than a small portion of Secretary Hegseth's travel budget if the Administration does not cooperate).
My columns concludes:
It may seem incongruous that the President may initiate a de facto war against drug cartels and their supporters without a Congressional declaration of war, but unless and until Congress reasserts its prerogatives, the commander in chief will dictate when and how U.S. military force is deployed. If legislative approval was necessary to authorize attacks on the Barbary pirates over two centuries ago, such approval should be required to assault the narco-pirates of today. But such constraints on military adventurism are not self-enforcing. Such constraints require legislative action. As with so many issues today, Congress is asleep at the switch, giving the President free rein. Lethargy in the legislature is no way to counter the executive's excess energy.
Thoughts on the Capture of Maduro and Trump's Attack on Venezuela
Maduro is a brutal dictator who is getting what he deserves. But Trump's actions are still illegal, because lacking proper congressional authorization. Whether they result in a beneficial regime change in Venezuela remains to be seen.
Last night, US forces launched strikes on Venezuela and seized that country's dictator Nicolas Maduro, bringing him back to the US to face charges for drug smuggling. Maduro is getting what he deserves, even if for the wrong reasons. But the US attack is illegal, and it is far from clear whether it will really lead to a beneficial regime change in Venezuela.
I shed no tears for Maduro, who is a brutally oppressive dictator and not the legitimate ruler of his country (given his falsification of the 2024 election results). His real crime is not drug smuggling or "narco-terrorism" but repression and murder on a massive scale, creating the biggest refugee crisis in the history of the Western Hemisphere. The recent history of Venezuela is an abject lesson in the perils of "democratic socialism." That sort of regime leads to poverty and massive human rights violations - and doesn't stay democratic for long.
If Maduro ends up spending the rest of his life in a US prison, it will be just punishment for his many crimes, though drug smuggling is not what he really deserves to be punished for. The US War on Drugs is itself deeply unjust and turning it into a real war makes it worse.
But, the evils of Maduro notwithstanding, the US attack is still illegal, because lacking proper congressional authorization. I have long argued (most recently here) that the initiation of any large-scale military action requires congressional authorization, and this case surely fits the bill. Extensive air strikes combined with insertion of ground forces to seize a national leader is more than just some minor action that the president can take on his own authority. That's even more true if Trump really plans to have the US "run" Venezuela until a new government can be established. Doing that would likely require a much larger US military intervention.
Defenders of the legality of Trump's actions cite the 1989 invasion of Panama, which was undertaken in large part for the purpose of apprehending Panamian dictator Manuel Noriega; like Maduro, Noriega was charged with smuggling illegal drugs into the US. But the 1989 Panama precedent does not actually justify Trump's actions. On December 15, 1989 (five days before the US invasion), Noriega foolishly announced that Panama and the US were in a "state of war," thereby creating conflict between the two countries that did not exist in the Venezuela case. In addition, Panamanian forces had killed or wounded two US military personnel in the Panama Canal area, and detained other American citizens. Unlike Noriega in 1989, the Venezuelan regime did not declare war on the US or otherwise initiate a military conflict. Thus, congressional authorization is needed to make any US military intervention constitutional.
Jack Goldsmith notes that Trump's action could also be defended by analogy to various other US military actions undertaken without congressional authorization. I would argue that these previous actions were either undertaken in response to actual attacks or declarations of war (as with Panama in 1989), were too small-scale to qualify as wars (as with, e.g., various quick air strikes), or were themselves illegal. Past illegal actions don't justify future ones. And, for those keeping score, I said much the same thing about various illegal unauthorized uses of force under Democratic presidents, as with Barack Obama's 2011 Libya intervention. Goldsmith himself recognizes that such precedents don't actually make Trump's actions legal; they only make it likely he will get away with the illegality.
Trump is also still not justified in invoking the Alien Enemies Act to detain and deport Venezuelans without due process. There is still is no declared war, or "invasion" or "predatory incursion" on US territory (prerequisites for invoking the act). For a detailed discussion of why illegal migration and drug smuggling do not qualify as "invasion," see my article "Immigration is Not Invasion." I will soon post an updated version that takes account of recent events.
Similarly, Trump's strikes against supposed drug boats in the Carribean are also still illegal and criminal. Don't just take my word on the reasons for their illegality. Take that of John Yoo, prominent conservative legal scholar, and leading advocate of sweeping executive power over national security issues. It is perversely ironic that Trump decided to apprehend Maduro and give him due process, even as he just simply murders supposed low-level drug runners out of hand.
Whether the attack will result in a beneficial regime change in Venezuela remains to be seen. So far, the socialist dictatorship remains in power, led by Maduro's vice president and other minions. At least for the moment, they still control the military and security services. Whether Trump is willing to launch the kind of ground invasion needed to remove them remains to be seen. But perhaps the regime will yet collapse of its own accord (e.g. - maybe the military will fracture). We shall see.
Ideally, the US should help the Venezuelan opposition - led by Edmundo Gonzalez (the real winner of the 2024 election) and Nobel Prize winner Maria Corina Machado - take power. But it is far from clear that Trump has any intention of doing that. He seems to have already ruled out Machado.
If Trump's actions here do ultimately result in beneficial regime change, it will be a rare of case of one of his illegal actions accomplishing a great good. But it could easily end up being an illegal action that leaves Venezuela and the world no better off than before, with the arguable exception of giving Maduro his just deserts for the wrong reasons.
UPDATE: The fact that the US and many other nations (rightly) do not recognize Maduro as the legitimate president of Venezuela may affect whether he is entitled to any kind of legal immunity as a head of state. I think he should not have immunity, and I believe head of state immunity is, in any event, unjust, much like sovereign immunity more generally. At the very least, mass-murdering dictators like Maduro and Vladimir Putin should not have any kind of immunity. But even if Maduro isn't entitled to immunity, that still does not mean that Trump's military intervention is legal. The problem with it is not violation of head-of-state immunity, but violation of the US Constitution's separation of powers.
Prof. Jack Goldsmith (Harvard Law) "On the Legality of the Venezuela Invasion"
This isn't my field, so I can't offer any independent judgment on it—but it is Goldsmith's, and I generally think his work is well-informed, thoughtful, and fair-minded, so I thought I'd pass along his analysis. Here's his Conclusion:
In sum, it would not be terribly hard for the Justice Department to write an opinion in support of the Venezuela invasion even if the military action violates the U.N. Charter.
To repeat, that does not mean that the action is in fact lawful—and it pretty clearly isn't under the U.N. Charter. It only means that the long line of unilateral executive branch actions, supported by promiscuously generous executive branch precedents, support it. As I wrote in connection with the Soleimani strike: "our country has—through presidential aggrandizement accompanied by congressional authorization, delegation, and acquiescence—given one person, the president, a sprawling military and enormous discretion to use it in ways that can easily lead to a massive war. That is our system: One person decides."
This is not the system the framers had in mind, and it is a dangerous system for all the reasons the framers worried about. But that is where we are—and indeed, it is where we have been for a while.
Today in Supreme Court History: January 3, 1911
1/3/1911: Justice Willis Van Devanter takes oath.
Open Thread
What’s on your mind?
Requiring Registered Sex Offenders to Post Signs on Halloween Saying "No Candy or Treats at This Residence"
unconstitutionally compels speech, says the Eighth Circuit federal court of appeals.
Sanderson v. Hanaway, decided today by Eighth Circuit Judge Jane Kelly, joined by Judges James Loken and Ralph Erickson, struck down part of a Missouri law that provides,
Any person required to register as a sexual offender … shall be required on October thirty-first of each year to:
- Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children;
- Remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to employment or medical emergencies;
- Post a sign at his or her residence stating, "No candy or treats at this residence";
- Leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m.
From the court's opinion:
The First Amendment's protection "includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." … The sign mandate … explicitly requires registrants to post a sign bearing a specific message…. [T]he sign mandate compels speech and, thus, is unconstitutional unless it can survive strict scrutiny….
The sign mandate will survive strict scrutiny only if it "furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." The district court found that "Defendants have established a compelling interest in restricting certain conduct of sexual offenders on Halloween that satisfies the strict scrutiny standard." Neither party challenges that determination on appeal, and understandably so. We therefore move directly to the question of whether the statutory provision is narrowly tailored. In other words, is the sign mandate the least restrictive means of achieving the government's compelling interest
At trial, the State's witnesses offered several justifications for the sign mandate. Law enforcement officers testified that the signs were beneficial for enforcement purposes because the signs (1) allow them to "be able to ensure that there is compliancy," (2) make enforcement of the Halloween statute more efficient, and (3) provide an extra layer of protection for children.
"Our Constitutional Rights … Should Not Hinge on a Where's Waldo Quiz"
From Judge Kenneth Lee's concurrence in today's Baird v. Bonta, joined by Judge Lawrence Vandyke:
California insists that citizens in counties with populations fewer than 200,000 people can apply for an open-carry license. Yet California admits that it has no record of even one open-carry license being issued. How could this be? One potential reason is that California has misled its citizens about how to apply for an open-carry license.
California has issued a 17-page application with the heading, "STANDARD INITIAL AND RENEWAL APPLICATION FOR LICENSE TO CARRY A WEAPON CAPABLE OF BEING CONCEALED." The first paragraph of the form then says that the law "requires the Attorney General to issue a statewide standard application form for CCW [Concealed Carry Weapon] licenses." Throughout the application, it uses the word "concealed" or "CCW" 67 times. But the phrase "open carry" is not mentioned once.
Most Californians would reasonably think that this form is used only for a concealed carry weapon permit. But they would be mistaken. A person seeking an open-carry permit must fill out a document described as a "Weapon Capable of Being Concealed" / "CCW [Concealed Carry Weapon]" form. This would be like a city telling its citizens that they can obtain a building permit for a fence in their front yard but not advising them that they actually have to submit a demolition permit form.
Second Amendment Protects Right to Open Carry, Ninth Circuit Panel Holds (2-1)
If the decision doesn't go en banc, it may go to the Supreme Court, because the Second Circuit held the opposite (and there's thus a circuit split).
A short excerpt from today's very long opinion in Baird v. Bonta by Judge Lawrence VanDyke, joined by Judge Kenneth Lee:
This case arises out of Appellant Mark Baird's civil rights lawsuit against the Attorney General of California, Appellee Rob Bonta. Baird is a law-abiding citizen who wishes to openly carry a firearm in California, yet California has banned open carry in all counties with populations greater than 200,000. According to the most recent census, those counties are home to roughly 95% of the state's population. The 5% of California's population for whom open carry is not outright banned everywhere in the state are purportedly able to apply for a license that would allow them to exercise their constitutional right to open carry in just their county of residence, although their ability to secure even that license is, on the record before us, at best unclear….
We agree with Baird that California's ban on open carry in counties with a population greater than 200,000 fails under Bruen, and we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment on this issue. With respect to Baird's as-applied and facial challenges to California's licensing requirements in counties with populations of less than 200,000, we conclude that Baird waived his as-applied challenge by not contesting the district court's dismissal in his opening brief and that Baird's facial challenge fails on the merits on the record of this case….
For most of American history, open carry has been the default manner of lawful carry for firearms. It remains the norm across the country—more than thirty states generally allow open carry to this day, including states with significant urban populations. Indeed, several of our Nation's largest cities and states recently returned to unlicensed open carry by explicitly authorizing it. For example, Texas reauthorized open carry without a license in 2021. Kansas likewise transitioned back to allowing open carry without a permit in 2015. And other states that placed restrictions on open carry in recent decades have also removed those burdens.
Similarly, for the first 162 years of its history open carry was a largely unremarkable part of daily life in California. From 1850, when California first became a state, until the Mulford Act of 1967, public carry of firearms in California (open or concealed) was entirely unregulated….
Suit Alleging Retaliatory Police Mislabeling as Repeat Violent Offender Can Go Forward
Plaintiff claims his actual offenses were a curfew violation during 2020 protests and spitting on FBI agent.
From Haro v. Bryant, decided today by Judge J.P. Boulee (N.D. Ga.):
On June 4, 2020, Plaintiff was allegedly protesting police brutality and the use of excessive force when the Atlanta Police Department ("APD") arrested him for a curfew violation. During the arrest, Plaintiff spit on a Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") officer, and as a result, he was additionally charged with battery on a police officer.
Approximately ten weeks later, in August 2020, Defendant—the former chief of the APD—created a joint task force with the FBI, the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Georgia and others named "Operation Phoenix." Operation Phoenix was established to address the rise in violent crime in Atlanta during the COVID-19 pandemic.
On October 29, 2020, Defendant and the City of Atlanta co-hosted a press conference and contemporaneously co-published a press release to announce Operation Phoenix, identify its early results and arrests and explain the dramatic effect those arrests had on reducing violence crime. The press release, which was distributed to those at the press conference and widely republished, was headlined, "FBI Announces Results of Operation Phoenix." The press release stated, in material part, as follows:
FBI Special Agent in Charge Chris Hacker, Interim Atlanta Police Chief Rodney Bryant, and U.S. Attorney Byung J. "Bjay" Pak announce that twelve of Atlanta's most violent offenders are being charged as a result of Operation Phoenix, a sustained and coordinated law enforcement initiative to fight violent crime in the City of Atlanta.
The press release went on to state that:
Operation Phoenix began on August 18, 2020 in an effort to identify, investigate, and prosecute those individuals deemed the most dangerous to the citizens of this city. Federal law enforcement agencies worked in conjunction with local and state law enforcement officials to identify offenders.
Notably, the press release identified Plaintiff as one of the twelve violent individuals arrested as part of Operation Phoenix. Plaintiff's photo was also included in the press release.
Defendant, along with representatives from the other agencies involved in Operation Phoenix, spoke at the press conference, which lasted approximately twenty-five minutes. Defendant explained at the press conference that those arrested in conjunction with Operation Phoenix "were repeat violent offenders." Defendant further noted, among other things, that "[t]here was some nexus with them and violence, and we deemed them to be responsible for some of the most violent crimes in the City of Atlanta. This included guns, gang affiliations, gun trafficking, and so on."
Plaintiff contends that he is neither a violent criminal nor associated with any gang. Consequently, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant defamed him by implying in the press release and press conference that he is one of the most dangerous violent criminals in Atlanta….
Short Circuit: An inexhaustive weekly compendium of rulings from the federal courts of appeal
Flashing blue lights, veteran housing, and DEI trainings.
Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.
Papers, please. IJ Senior Attorney Anya Bidwell comments on the lack of accountability for federal police over at The New Republic, in Radley Balko's piece about the Trump Administration's immigration enforcement blitz.
New on the Short Circuit podcast: Find out what it's like to litigate for people behind bars—including when they overcome qualified immunity.
- For weeks, staff at a secure, state-run Norwich, N.Y. facility for people with severe disabilities ignore man's increasingly worrisome signs of heart disease, as well as his mother's pleas to take him to a hospital. Per an expert, his death felt like drowning. Facility: Ah, but he was admitted voluntarily, so we didn't have a constitutional duty of care to him. Second Circuit: Grant of qualified immunity reversed. To trial this must go.
- Allegation: In 2020, college student reports that she was pulled over and sexually assaulted at night by someone in an unmarked vehicle with flashing blue lights. She leaves her phone at the Washington County, Va. sheriff's station while officers take her to the scene and soon thereafter receives threatening text messages telling her to recant or else. Officers review traffic footage of the wrong day and time and lie to her, saying they saw her car but not the assailants' in the video (in fact, they saw neither). They accuse her of sending the text messages to herself. Fearing that a legitimate cop is the assailant, she recants. She's charged with making a false report (and subjected to intense public vitriol). After her acquittal, she sues the officers. District court: She recanted, so. Fourth Circuit: Case undismissed. Read More
The Jealous Mistress, vol. 1
From vol. 1, number 2 of The Jealous Mistress, a periodical briefly published starting in 1925 by the Colorado Bar Association.
The reference, of course, is to the phrase "the law is a jealous mistress," which is sometimes credited to Justice Joseph Story, in his speech at his inauguration as Dane Professor of Law at Harvard in 1829:
Presence of Probable Cause Precludes Claim That Immigration Arrest Was Retaliation for First-Amendment-Protected Speech
So concludes a federal district in Louisiana, disagreeing with a Ninth Circuit panel.
From Judge Terry Doughty (W.D. La.) Tuesday in Lozano v. Ladwig:
Petitioner is a Mexican national, who lives in Knoxville, Tennessee. Twenty-two years ago, while a minor, Petitioner and his family entered the United States on a B-1 visa. They, however, overstayed their visas. In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear, charging him removable for overstaying his visa. In 2013, an Immigration Judge administratively closed Petitioner's removal proceedings after finding Petitioner eligible for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA"). His DACA status has since lapsed.
In 2024, Petitioner was charged in Tennessee state court for drug-related charges [and apparently convicted for possession of methamphetamine -EV]. On October 14, 2025, DHS issued a Warrant for Arrest of Alien against Petitioner. The next day, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") arrested Petitioner at a Tennessee state courthouse when Petitioner went there for a probation-related drug test.
Plaintiff sought habeas corpus, and a temporary restraining order against continued detention, arguing "that the government arrested him in retaliation for publicly criticizing the Trump administration's immigration policies." But the court rejected this claim:
Parental Custody Rights, Homeschooling, Religiosity, Views on "LGBTQ+ Community," and More
Reed v. Reed, an appeal decided Wednesday by the Pennsylvania Superior Court (Judge Mary Jane Bowes, joined by Judges Mary Murray and Jill Beck), involved a paternal grandfather seeking shared legal custody and partial physical custody of two children (N.R. and M.R., ages 8 and 10 as of the time of the appellate decision). Many states allow grandparents shared custody in some situations, especially when their child (the grandchildren's parent) is dead, as was the case here. But, to oversimplify to some extent, they generally require some showing of failings on the part of the other parent.
In this case, the trial court did indeed rule for the grandfather, but the appellate court disagreed. An excerpt from the trial court's opinion (other portions of the trial court's opinion are discussed by the appellate opinion, so I haven't excerpted them here, but you can see a lot more here):
At the custody hearing on March 3, 2025, [Mother] testified that her friend Joanna, who is a member of the "Biker Church" in Boyertown, P[ennsylvania], traveled "in spirit" to [Paternal Grandfather]'s home in California, where she saw [Paternal Grandfather] and his wife talk about [Paternal Grandfather] reporting [Mother] to OCY.
When asked by this Court whether Joanna had any history of mental health treatment or criminal background, [Mother] replied, "Nope." [Mother] further testified that her children and God are ranked equally in terms of importance in her life, however, [Paternal Grandfather]'s counsel offered into evidence a video from [Mother]'s YouTube channel, where [Mother] stated that God comes before her children. When asked by [Paternal Grandfather]'s counsel whether she receives cues from God regarding her children, [Mother] indicated that she is "led to do certain things based on [her] faith with God." When asked by [Paternal Grandfather]'s counsel whether [Mother] is guided by voices or instructions, she simply stated, "Not necessarily. Kind of like you will get an instinct to do something, or your gut feeling about doing something." Notably, [Mother] testified that she has never had any sort of mental health diagnosis and is not willing to be examined as she does not "feel it's necessary" and has "no concerns at all for [her] mental health." …
The trial court granted Grandfather shared legal custody, which required a finding that substantial risk of parental neglect was proved by the statutorily required clear and convincing evidence; the appellate court disagreed. An excerpt from the long appellate opinion:
ChatGPT-Generated Poster of Supreme Court Justices Since 1900
My prompt: "Please create a poster showing all the Supreme Court Justices who have served since 1900, in chronological order, with the name and term of service for each one underneath the Justice's picture." The result:
Today in Supreme Court History: January 2, 1923
1/2/1923: Justice Pierce Butler takes oath.
