"We analyze roughly 280,000 candidate fundraising emails to trace the rise of anti-billionaire populism in the Democratic party and see how it is slowly merging with a new kind of anti-AI populism."
Another very interesting item from my Hoover colleague Andy Hall (Free Systems); a brief excerpt, though you should read the whole thing:
Something is shifting in the Democratic party. A string of primary upsets has fed a growing narrative that the party's base now rewards a more aggressive brand of economic populism, one aimed squarely at billionaires, corporate power, and the political influence that money buys. And a number of sharp observers, includingJasmine Sun [piece here] and Archie Hall [piece here], have been arguing that this energy may come for AI next, a prediction that draws support from David Shor's polling showing voters souring on the technology and on the companies building it as part of a broader concern towards what they see as a rigged economy and a hopeless cost-of-living crisis.
But almost all of the evidence behind this narrative describes the mood of the American electorate, and moods are only half of the story. Politicians do not respond mechanically to shifts in public sentiment—they answer to donors, activists, and primary challengers, not just median voters … and sometimes they stake out new positions well before the public asks for them, or refuse to move long after it has. If we want to know whether AI populism is becoming an organizing position of the Democratic party, rather than a diffuse sentiment floating around in polls, we need to measure the politicians directly. We need to watch what candidates actually say when they are trying to raise money, to garner attention, and to win elections.
Fundraising emails turn out to be a remarkably good place to look. Campaigns test these messages relentlessly against open rates and donations, so the language that survives is the language that operatives have learned actually moves their base—a compressed, high-frequency, almost real-time record of what politicians believe their supporters want to hear. Drawing on Derek Willis's archive of political fundraising emails, we analyzed roughly 280,000 candidate emails sent since 2017 to trace how anti-billionaire populism became a major component of Democratic fundraising rhetoric, and how, more quietly but unmistakably, AI is starting to follow the same path….
From Kitsap County Superior Court Judge William Houser in Mavy v. Tomashefsky (Wash. Super. Ct. Clallam County), decided May 28:
Petitioner requests the court to amend the existing restraining order [which is currently on appeal -EV] to include the additional restraints of:
Respondent is to have no contact with Petitioner's minor children; and
Respondent is restrained from publishing statements intended to harass, intimidate, or threaten the protected person.
Respondent shall not encourage or use a third person to post or share statements on line or via any other mode intended to harass, intimidate, or threaten the protected person; and
Respondent is restrained from publishing identifying information about the protected person or the protected person's children.
For the following reason, the Motion for Additional Restraints is DENIED….
Mr. Mavy askes that his minor children be included in the order. They were not included in the original petition. The relationship between the children and Mr. Tomashefsky is one of step-parent/step-child. There is insufficient credible evidence presented to support the finding that they have been the subject of harassment as defined by law.
Mr. Tomashefsky is the husband of Mr. Mavy's ex-wife. There is significant litigation history between the parties, including this litigation on a civil harassment order. Mr. Tomashefsky posts news accounts online that involve various issues of interest to the community. He posts these news accounts under the banner of The Olympic Herald.
The Institute for Free Speech, which represented Bakersfield College Prof. Daymon Johnson, reports:
Johnson has secured a settlement that makes his First Amendment protections permanent—and includes a $150,000 payment for attorneys' fees.
Kern Community College District has agreed to settle Johnson v. Fliger, a federal lawsuit brought by the Institute for Free Speech on behalf of Professor Johnson. Under the settlement, the preliminary injunction that a federal court entered in February 2026 will be converted into a permanent injunction for a period of five years, barring officials from investigating, disciplining, or terminating Johnson based on his speech in the classroom, in his scholarship, or as a private citizen….
Specifically, the case challenged California regulations requiring community college faculty to "employ teaching, learning, and professional practices that reflect DEIA and anti-racist principles" and to demonstrate "proficiency in DEIA-related performance to teach, work, or lead within California community colleges." Professor Johnson, a member of the dissident faculty organization the Renegade Institute for Liberty (RIFL), refused to support the government-mandated views and faced the threat of termination as a result.
Here's the excerpt I posted in February from the Johnson v. Fliger decision by Judge Kirk Sherriff (E.D. Cal.):
Plaintiff Daymon Johnson, a professor of history at Bakersfield College, brings this pre-enforcement challenge seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to preclude officials of Bakersfield College and the Kern Community College District ("KCCD") from enforcing, as to his intended speech, two provisions of the California Code of Regulations. These provisions would require Johnson to employ "teaching, learning, and professional" practices reflecting diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility ("DEIA") and anti-racist principles, require Johnson to "establish proficiency in DEIA-related performance to teach, work, or lead within California community colleges," and require defendants to evaluate Johnson based in part on his proficiency in such DEIA principles….
Johnson alleges that the DEIA regulations compel his speech and discriminate against his viewpoint in violation of the First Amendment. He alleges that he fears either being compelled to express a viewpoint with which he disagrees or being punished if he continues to refuse to express defendants' desired viewpoint or if he expresses his contrary views. Johnson has credibly identified specific speech that he reasonably fears would be proscribed by the DEIA regulations. And as the Ninth Circuit has found, he "has established a 'concrete plan to violate the law' based on his allegations regarding his desired speech and his refusal to express support for [DEIA] principles." Johnson v. Fliger (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm'n (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
Some excerpts from today's very long opinion in Pernell v. Fla. Bd. of Governors of State Univ.by Judge Britt Grant, joined by Judge Charles Wilson; note that the leading Eleventh Circuit precedent on this is Bishop v. Aronov, which both opinions discuss in considerable detail:
[A.] The provision at issue here disallows any "training or instruction that espouses, promotes, advances, inculcates, or compels" students at Florida's public colleges and universities to believe any of eight concepts relating to topics like race and sex:
Members of one race, color, national origin, or sex are morally superior to members of another race, color, national origin, or sex.
A person, by virtue of his or her race, color, national origin, or sex, is inherently racist, sexist, or oppressive, whether consciously or unconsciously.
A person's moral character or status as either privileged or oppressed is necessarily determined by his or her race, color, national origin, or sex.
Members of one race, color, national origin, or sex cannot and should not attempt to treat others without respect to race, color, national origin, or sex.
A person, by virtue of his or her race, color, national origin, or sex, bears responsibility for, or should be discriminated against or receive adverse treatment because of, actions committed in the past by other members of the same race, color, national origin, or sex.
A person, by virtue of his or her race, color, national origin, or sex, should be discriminated against or receive adverse treatment to achieve diversity, equity, or inclusion.
A person, by virtue of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, bears personal responsibility for and must feel guilt, anguish, or other forms of psychological distress because of actions, in which the person played no part, committed in the past by other members of the same race, color, national origin, or sex.
Such virtues as merit, excellence, hard work, fairness, neutrality, objectivity, and racial colorblindness are racist or sexist, or were created by members of a particular race, color, national origin, or sex to oppress members of another race, color, national origin, or sex.
Though "promot[ing]" any of these concepts is barred, criticizing them is not. Beyond that, the Act allows instructors to introduce the ideas in a neutral fashion, permitting discussion "as part of a larger course"—so long as "instruction is given in an objective manner without endorsement of the concepts." And the law does not say how far past the classroom its restrictions extend—off-campus speeches and other settings may be in play….
Yesterday, the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE), filed a lawsuit challenging an egregious violation of the First Amendment by the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE). FIRE's website has a helpful description of the damning facts of the case (see also this summary by Reason's Tosi Akintola):
The freedom to criticize law enforcement without fear of punishment is an essential right in the United States. In fact, it's one of the things that separates our free nation from a police state. But officials at the Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement don't seem to understand this.
Five months after a Rochester man, David Streever, wrote a critical email to the then-head of ICE during the agency's January crackdown in Minnesota, federal officers recently went to extraordinary lengths to confront and intimidate him — even going so far as to stake out his New York City hotel as he returned from an overseas vacation with his daughter.
That's an outrageous violation of an American's First Amendment rights. So today, the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression filed a federal lawsuit to challenge ICE's efforts to scare Streever and others into silence and remind other government officials that such behavior is un-American, unconstitutional, and unacceptable in a free society….
In January, federal immigration agents shot and killed Alex Pretti, a Minneapolis ICU nurse, during a tense encounter. Outraged, Streever wrote a stern email to then-acting ICE Director Todd Lyons, entitled "What's next" and calling the official a "monstrous human being" who will "go down in history as America's Reinhard Heydrich, the butcher," a reference to the infamous Nazi official.
The First Amendment unquestionably protects Streever's criticism. Writing an angry note to political leaders is an American tradition as old as the republic itself. That's why time and again, the Supreme Court has upheld that cherished freedom, warning against attempts to label heated political rhetoric as dangerous or unprotected.
FIRE is absolutely right. The organization first became famous for combating mostly left-wing speech codes and other abuses on college campuses. Here, they are working to counter a threat to free speech from the other side of the political spectrum. The consistency is admirable.
Sadly, this is far from the only case where ICE has violated free speech rights. In Tincher v. Noem (now redesignated Tincher v. Mullin), a federal district court found numerous examples of ICE and other federal immigration enforcement agencies using force and other illegal coercive tactics against peaceful protestors and journalists in Minnesota. An appellate court ruling later stayed the injunction issued by the district court, citing procedural considerations (e.g. - it ruled the injunction was likely overbroad). But that doesn't change the awful facts.
ICE defenders claim its campaign of intimidation is justified by the supposed need to prevent "threats" and "doxxing" of agents. Actual threats of violence can be investigated and prosecuted. But, as the Streever case and others show, ICE's campaign of harassment and intimidation goes far beyond situations where actual threats are at issue. In addition, citizens have every right to criticize government officials -including law enforcement officers - by name. That's true even if doing so results in people sending those officials angry messages.
The issues at stake here go far beyond the specific case, or the particular issue of immigration enforcement. Law enforcement agencies cannot be allowed to use their power to target and harass their critics. Conservatives inclined to sympathize with ICE here should consider how they would reach if federal or state gun-law enforcers used similar tactics against gun-rights activists.
Sadly, ICE's abuses of civil liberties and other cruel and illegal actions go far beyond violations of the First Amendment. In an August 2025 article in The Hill, I summarized many of ICE's other abusive and unconstitutional actions - including detention without due process, widespread racial profiling, and more. Things have only gotten worse since then. This is just one of a number of ways in which our current system of mass deportation endangers the liberty of American citizens, as well as that of recent immigrants.
Lawsuits like that filed by FIRE can play a valuable role in constraining ICE's violations of constitutional rights. But case-by-case litigation can only do so much. Not all victims have the resources to go through prolonged litigation. And, even for those who sue and win, justice delayed is often justice denied.
The systematic nature of ICE's many abuses calls for a systematic solution. As I explained in the Hill article, and a later follow-up piece, we should abolish ICE and transfer its funds to real cops. That will simultaneously end ICE abuses and reduce crime. In the linked pieces, I develop the case for abolishing ICE in greater detail, and address various possible counterarguments.
As to James' discrimination claim, "James, who was on disciplinary probation leading up to the suspension, admits that Columbia suspended students involved in the encampment and fails to identify another student, who was also on disciplinary probation, whom Columbia declined to discipline."
From James v. Columbia Univ., decided Thursday by N.Y. trial court judge Kathleen Waterman-Marshall:
This action arises from certain disciplinary actions by defendant Columbia University …, including Columbia's decision to place plaintiff Khymani James …, a third-year undergraduate student who identifies as a black, Caribbean-American, on a one-year suspension….
James was studying abroad in London during the fall semester of 2023 when they began posting social media content in support of Palestine. According to James, they subsequently received berating, insulting, and physically threatening social media messages as a result thereof. In an alleged effort to dissuade the individuals behind these messages from engaging with James or causing them any physical harm, James posted public messages including one stating:
Zionists in my dm wanting to meet up and fight lol. I don't fight to injure or for there to be a "winner" / "loser." I fight to k***[.] See yall in New York [] January 2024 [].
In response to alleged complaints regarding James' posts, Columbia's Center for Student Success and Intervention ("CSSI"), the office responsible for administering academic and behavioral discipline, scheduled a virtual meeting with James on January 9, 2024. Without Columbia's knowledge or consent, James livestreamed the CSSI meeting, at which James compared Zionists to Nazis and stated, [among other things], that "the world is better without them." After the meeting with CSSI, James continued the livestream and told their online audience to "be grateful" that he was not "murdering Zionists."
From State v. Zapata, decided May 12, by Wisconsin Court of Appeals Judge Sara Geenen, joined by Chief Judge Joseph Donald and Judge Pedro Colón (for more on the specific whistleblower argument, see this Courthouse News Service article [Destiny DeVooght]):
[T]he State charged {the Deputy Director of the City of Milwaukee Election Commission, Kimberly D. Zapata} with misconduct in public office (acting in excess of lawful authority) and three counts of making a false statement to obtain an absentee ballot….
[T]hrough the "MyVote website," [Zapata] "fabricated three individuals who did not exist, … used those fabricated names to have military voter absentee requests sent to the municipal clerks in Shorewood, South Milwaukee, and Menomonee Falls," and then "had the absentee ballots sent to" the state legislator. Zapata wanted to "make a point that there is fraud in existence" and have the legislator "focus" on "actual true fraud[.]" {Per the trial testimony, the MyVote website is a public-facing voter portal available in Wisconsin, wherein voters can request an absentee ballot, view their voting records and registration information, look up their polling place, and view a sample ballot.} Zapata acknowledged using her work laptop and accessing a "voter registration database" that is "only available to the municipality employees" in order to obtain the legislator's address….
Prior to the fall 2022 election, Zapata became concerned about the process for requesting military absentee ballots. Because a person requesting a military absentee ballot on the MyVote website did not need to provide photo identification or be registered to vote to make the request, Zapata felt that the process was susceptible to fraud. Zapata raised this concern with her supervisor and with the Wisconsin Elections Commission, to no avail.
This new article of mine has just been published by the Emory Law Journal. Here's the Abstract; readers might recall that I serialized an early draft of the article on the blog last year:
Recent statutes and lawsuits have sought to restrict social media or video game design practices that supposedly cause some users to become "addicted." Are such restrictions consistent with the First Amendment?
This Article begins by asking what would happen if the same arguments were applied to religious practices (whether or not the arguments' supporters would seek to so apply them). Say some religious practice was viewed as causing emotional or financial harm—e.g., by leading some adherents to feel guilty about their sexuality, to distance themselves from family members, or to give substantial portions of their assets to the religious organization. And say the practice was viewed as stemming from the adherents' nonrational decisions and emotional vulnerability, coupled with the religion's fostering intrusive urges and compulsions through techniques of reinforcement and habit formation that exploited features of people's neurotransmitter systems.
I take it that even so, the Free Exercise Clause would generally preclude restricting those practices. Many religious people derive personal value from their religious beliefs. Religious practice is constitutionally protected. And people often value their own religiously motivated decisions very differently than how other people might value those decisions.
In a few situations, the harm to the religious observer may be so sharp and immediate—or the mechanisms of control may be seen as so obviously improper—that the law may indeed intercede. But any such intercession must be based on more than some general claim of "addiction" to religious beliefs, or assertions of emotional harm or modest financial loss. And that remains true as to minors' participation in religious practices as well as adults' participation, at least so long as the minors' participation is tolerated by parents.
The Article then argues that much the same analysis should likewise apply under the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses to the design of speech products. Here too, the supposedly addictive features can be valuable to many users, even if they are harmful to some others. The design of speech products is presumptively protected by the First Amendment. And people often value features of speech products very differently than other people do. The First Amendment should thus largely preclude restrictions aimed at rescuing people from their own supposed propensity to becoming addicted to features of speech, just as it would preclude restrictions aimed at rescuing people from supposedly addictive religious behaviors.
From Judge Steven Merryday (M.D. Fla.) today in Trump v. N.Y. Times Co.(for the Complaint in the underlying case, which involves various statements about Trump's early life and business career, see here):
A public figure, perhaps the world's most prominent public figure, whose actions and remarks routinely generate immediate global news coverage, sues a newspaper, perhaps the world's most prominent English-language newspaper, along with the world's largest trade book publisher and three authors. The plaintiff initiates in the Middle District of Florida an action for defamation arising from two articles and a book, researched, written, and edited in New York but published nationwide and abroad, including in the Middle District of Florida. The plaintiff, who resides in the Southern District of Florida but maintains a business presence in the Middle District of Florida, alleges that publication of the allegedly defamatory statements in the Middle District of Florida caused reputational and economic injury in the Middle District of Florida.
The court concluded that the case had been permissibly filed in the Middle District of Florida:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), venue is proper in any "judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." Section 1391(a)(2) "contemplates some cases in which venue will be proper in two or more districts," and "a plaintiff does not have to select the venue with the most substantial nexus to the dispute, as long as [the plaintiff] chooses a venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred." …
The plaintiff claims that venue in the Middle District of Florida is proper and bases the claim on publication in the Middle District of Florida of allegedly defamatory statements {defendants distributed approximately 3,000 print copies of the allegedly defamatory articles in this district [and] … approximately 2,200 copies of the allegedly defamatory book "in or around" this district, [and] approximately 45,000 "unique online readers" in this district viewed the allegedly defamatory articles}, consequent reputational and business injuries in the Middle District of Florida, and a business presence in the Middle District of Florida. {The plaintiff is the cofounder of Trump Media & Technology Group, Corp., a media and technology company headquartered in Sarasota, Florida, and the plaintiff "was TMTG's majority shareholder at the time his claims accrued."} {To establish reputational and economic injury in this district the plaintiff alleges, "Defendants used their false and defamatory publications to disparage President Trump and impugn his reputation …. Defendants' false publications about President Trump also led directly to a precipitous decline in the stock price of TMTG, significantly injuring the President given his ownership stake."}
The defendants claim that venue in the Middle District of Florida is improper and base the claim primarily on the location of the "relevant journalistic activities" (the defendants' summary phrase), including researching, interviewing, writing, editing, and the like, almost all of which occurred in New York and the balance of which occurred in New Jersey. The defendants' claim is based on events that occurred before publication, that is, before the claim for defamation accrued. These "relevant journalistic activities" were not—either individually or cumulatively—themselves actionable as defamation (or for any other reason that appears) in Florida or New York or elsewhere.
Under Judge Tjoflat's governing logic in Jenkins Brick [the Eleventh Circuit precedent -EV], these "relevant journalistic activities" are not the events most directly, that is, most immediately and causally, connected to an actionable defamation (or, more exactly, a claim of defamation). Publication plus reputational and business damage are the events most directly connected to the alleged claim and, therefore, most determinative of a proper venue.
To be fair, it wasn't much of a surprise, and indeed it's a present Swift was entitled to expect. An excerpt from today's decision by Judge Cannon in Marasco v. Swift:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this lawsuit in February 2025, alleging federal copyright infringement against Defendants Taylor Swift [and others] …. Plaintiff is the author of two books that contain various poems—Dealing with a Chronic Illness: Vestibular Neuritis ("Dealing") and Fallen from Grace ("Fallen"), which Plaintiff alleges was later renamed Songs of the Unsung—together with a standalone poem, "Noah." Plaintiff concedes her books "are not presently being marketed," and pleads specific sales figures only for Songs of the Unsung (the renamed Fallen), alleging "approximately 300 copies" sold globally.
Sprawling twelve counts, Plaintiff alleges that a variety of Defendants' songs infringe her exclusive rights in various poems. To illustrate, Count I alleges that Defendants' song "The Man" (containing the lyric "I'm so sick of running as fast as I can/Wondering if I'd get there quicker if I was a man") infringes Plaintiff's poem "Ordinary Citizen" ("I'm running behind/You say its His word against mine") because both describe a woman working in a male-dominated office environment. Count X alleges that "The Great War" ("Diesel is desire, you were playing with fire") infringes "The Fire" ("Anger fuels our desire … I'm fighting fire with fire") because both use the metaphor of "desire as fuel and fire." Similar allegations populate the remaining counts….
Trump v. Barbara is very long. The entire slip opinion totals nearly two-hundred pages. However, Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion is stunningly short for the occasion. It stretches only twenty-six pages. Justice Jackson wrote a twenty-page concurrence that largely responded to Justice Thomas's dissent. Justice Kavanaugh wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part that spanned ten pages. Justice Thomas's dissent, joined by Justice Gorsuch, stretches ninety-one pages. He left no stone unturned. Justice Alito wrote a solo dissent that stretched thirty-nine pages. Finally, Justice Gorsuch rounded out the pack with a solo dissent that was (thankfully) only three pages.
Reading through the entire opinion from start to finish is a daunting experience. I completed the task over the weekend (fittingly in the City of Brotherly Love on the 250th anniversary of independence).
Perhaps the hardest part of this decision is keeping all of the threads together. The Justices discuss different parts of the case in different sections in different orders, making it hard to remember who lines up where.
Here, I will offer something of a reader's guide to the opinion in a chronological fashion the majority and dissenting opinions. I break the cases down into eight primary time periods. I will use the Section labels from the opinions, except for Part V, where the Chief didn't use any subsections.
What stands out most is how quickly Chief Justice Roberts moved through each period, and how much time Justice Thomas dwelled on each. To illustrate the trend, I measured Roberts's opinions in paragraph-length, and Thomas's in page-length. I will have much more to say about this case. This is just a teaser.
Period #1: The English common law before independence
Majority: II-A (4 paragraphs); V (*17-*20)
Thomas: IV-A-1 (3 pages)
Alito: I-A (2 pages)
Period #2: The law in America between independence and the ratification of the Constitution
Majority: II-A (3 paragraphs)
Thomas: IV-A-2 (3 pages)
Period #3: The law in America between the ratification of the Constitution and Dred Scott
Majority: II-B (1 paragraphs)
Thomas: I-A (4 pages); I-B (8 pages)
Alito: I-A (5 pages)
Period #4: Dred Scott and its aftermath
Majority: II-B (3 paragraphs)
Thomas: I-C (5 pages)
Alito: I-B (2 pages)
Period #5: The Civil Rights Act of 1866
Majority: II-C (4 paragraphs); V (*20, *23-24) (3 paragraphs)
Thomas: I-D-1 (3 pages)
Alito: II-A (2 pages)
Period #6: The adoption and ratification of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
Majority: III (10 paragraphs); V (*20-*21) (2 paragraphs)
Thomas: I-D-2 (5 pages); III-A (7 pages)
Alito: II-B (9 pages)
Period #7: Understanding of Citizenship Clause from 1868 to Wong Kim Ark
Majority: IV-A (4 paragraphs); V (*21-22) (2 paragraphs)
Thomas: I-E-1, I-E-2 (10 pages); III-B (4 pages)
Alito - III (2 pages)
Period #8: Wong Kim Ark
Majority: IV-B (6 paragraphs); V (*24-*25) (1 paragraph)
The court concluded that the particular broadcast in this case didn't name or otherwise sufficiently identify the plaintiff (Dr. Mahendra Amin), and thus wasn't "of and concerning" him for libel law purposes.
From Georgia Court of Appeals Judge Gobeil in Thursday's Sinclair, Inc. v. Amin; note that the other two panel members concurred only in the judgment.
Appellee Mahendra Amin, M. D., sued appellant Sinclair, Inc. d/b/a Sinclair Broadcast Group ("Sinclair") and Dawn Wooten for defamation after Sinclair aired a broadcast in which journalist Sharyl Attkisson interviewed Wooten about conditions at a detention center in Irwin County….
"[V]iewing the pleadings and affidavits submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (as the non-moving party)" …, the record shows the following. On March 5, 2023, an episode of a television news program, "Full Measure with Sharyl Attkisson," was broadcast on Sinclair television stations. In that episode, Attkisson interviewed Wooten, a nurse who worked at the the Irwin County Detention Center ("ICDC"), who claimed that in 2020, female detainees at the facility reported undergoing "mysterious surgical procedures" that "they did not fully understand." After Wooten's initial inquiries went unanswered, Wooten worked with a whistleblower group to file complaints with various federal agencies. Wooten claimed that a number of sterilization procedures, including hysterectomies, ovary removal, and tubal ligation, were being performed on ICDC women in the custody of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") without their knowledge or consent.
The episode also discussed eugenics and recounted forced sterilization procedures (throughout history) that were performed on various groups of women without their full or informed consent. In addition, the broadcast quoted language from a 2022 Senate committee report, entitled "Medical Mistreatment of Women in ICE Detention," with Attkisson stating: "A Senate committee in November concluded that 'female detainees [at the Irwin County Detention Facility] appear to have undergone excessive, invasive, and often unnecessary gynecological procedures.'"
Dr. Amin subsequently filed a complaint for defamation against Sinclair and Wooten, alleging that the broadcast was "of and concerning" him and contained false statements that accused him of performing mass hysterectomies on immigrant women housed at the ICDC that were not medically necessary and were performed without their knowledge or consent. He characterized the broadcast's statements as "convey[ing] to the average viewer that Dr. Amin was an evil doctor seeking to carry out a sterilization campaign on immigrant women detained at ICDC." Specifically, Amin challenged the following statements from the broadcast:
"Respondent was exercising her protected First Amendment right to free speech, and in so doing, did not undermine the trust of the students and families that they serve."
On September 15, 2025, the School Board issued a letter notifying Ms. Thornton, a teacher at South Sumter Middle School, that the Superintendent was imposing a five-day suspension, without pay, for violation of School Board Policy 3139 and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-10.081—Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida. The letter specifically alleged that Respondent shared a social media post "normalizing a lack of empathy" regarding the then recent assassination of Charlie Kirk. The letter further alleged that Respondent disparaged the superintendent and criticized Turning Point USA ("TPUSA") for an alleged lack of inclusivity….
Two days after the shooting, on September 12, 2025, Respondent re-posted a video to her Facebook page that did not celebrate his death, directly mention the shooting, or even state his name. Rather, the TikTok video, narrated by Jeff Guenther, LPC, communicated the message that people were entitled to their feelings—whatever those feelings might be, regarding the unfortunate event. The caption on the video states "It's about giving you permission to notice whatever you honestly feel or."
From Wizmann v. Simon & Schuster, LLC, decided Thursday by the California Court of Appeal Justice Stephen Goorvitch, joined by Justices Victoria Chavez and Anne Richardson:
Forefront Books published "Dreams Don't Die: The Story of a Man on a Mission to Inspire a Generation of Dreamers" …, the memoir of prominent real estate developer Izek Shomof …. Simon & Schuster distributed the book.
Over the course of his career, Shomof has been involved in many high-profile real estate projects in Los Angeles, including redeveloping several historic hotels and attempting to build an ambitious housing support center. These projects have generated consistent media attention and occasional controversy.
The inside flap of the book's dust jacket states, as relevant here, that "[i]t is the memoir of a man who had every opportunity to take unethical and often-illegal shortcuts but who instead chose the lesser-trod path of honesty and integrity" (the synopsis). The synopsis was also included in various promotional materials, including material published on respondents' websites….
Wizmann [Shomof's brother-in-law] sued respondents for violating the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) … and the False Advertising Law (FAL) …. Wizmann alleged that, by stating that Shomof "chose the lesser-trod path of honesty and integrity[,]" the synopsis falsely led consumers to believe that he is a "scrupulous[,]" "honest[,] [and] law-abiding businessman[,]" even though Shomof had been charged with three counts of felony receipt of stolen property … in the 1980s.
Wizmann sought monetary damages, civil penalties, and an injunction ordering respondents to (1) replace the dust jackets of "all copies of the [b]ook currently in circulation" and (2) delete the offending sentence from their websites….
