The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Politics

Retrospective Voting and the 2026 Election

A key "information shortcut" worked well in the 2026 election. But political ignorance remains a serious danger.

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In my book Democracy and Political Ignorance  and various other writings going all the way back to my very first academic article (published in 1998), I have warned of the dangers of widespread voter ignorance. And I have argued that "information shortcuts" - small bits of knowledge that supposedly make up for ignorance about details - are generally ineffective or even counterproductive. Thus, I should acknowledge that one of those shortcuts - retrospective voting - worked fairly well in the recently concluded 2026 election. At the same time, the problem of political ignorance remains a grave menace.

Retrospective voting is probably the most often-used information shortcut, and the one most cited by scholars who argue that voter ignorance isn't much of a problem. The basic idea is simple: to be a good voter you don't need to know much about government and public policy. You just need to know whether things are going well or badly under the rule of the incumbents.

If things are going well, you vote to reelect them to continue their good work. If badly, you vote to "throw the bastards out." Then you elect a new set of bastards in their place; but the new bastards will hopefully know they need to do a good job, else they will get thrown out in their turn, at the next election. As Ronald Reagan famously put it during the 1980 election, "Next Tuesday all of you will go to the polls… I think when you make that decision it might be well if you would ask yourself: Are you better off than you were four years ago?"

I and other critics have long pointed out that, when ignorant voters use the retrospective voting shortcut, they often end up rewarding and punishing incumbents for things they did not cause (usually short-term economic trends), while ignoring more subtle long-term issues. In addition, they often don't know which officials are responsible for which issues, and tend to overlook the possibility that the opposition party's policies will be as bad or worse.

Nonetheless, retrospective voting actually worked pretty well in the 2026 election. As I noted in a previous post, polls show that many voters punished the Republicans for high prices caused by Trump's tariffs,  the failed Iran War, and the administration's cruel campaign of mass deportations (which particularly angered Hispanic voters in key states and congressional districts). One can also add the issue of corruption, which polls  indicate also had a big impact.

The Republicans really were responsible for all three of these policies. They weren't caused by exogenous factors outside of Trump's control. And the policies really did have massive negative effects in raising prices, an unsuccessful war, and massive cruelty and violations of civil liberties caused by the deportation campaign. The scope and effects of corruption are harder to measure. But this administration may be the most corrupt in American history. And, on all four issues, the Democrats are likely to be at least somewhat better.

But while retrospective voting worked reasonably well in the 2026 midterm election, we cannot conclude that the problem of political ignorance doesn't matter, or even that it's overblown. Rather, the shortcut was effective primarily because of the large and obvious nature of Trump's failures.

Along with other scholars, I have long recognized that retrospective voting can be effective if incumbents screw in ways that have large and obvious bad effects - ones that even very ignorant voters can easily see and understand. For example, I often cite economist Amartya Sen's famous finding that mass famines never or almost never occur under democracies (even as they happen much more often under dictatorships). Even ignorant voters will notice a famine is going on, blame incumbents for it, and vote accordingly.

Trump's failures over the last two years weren't quite as bad as a mass famine. But they were nonetheless large (including a major war and  the highest tariff schedule since the Great Depression), highly visible, and many of their effects were easy to understand. It isn't hard to notice that massive tariff increases cause prices to rise. The war and its effects on prices were also highly visible. Images of brutal deportations and resulting civil liberties violations were all over the news. Most voters probably didn't know about the details of the administration's corruption. But there was so much of it, that most probably heard at least something about it.

Many policy failures are far less readily apparent than that. And ignorant voters are therefore likely to overlook or misunderstand them. It's not hard to find examples even in the 2026 election itself. To take a particularly important case, the US faces a massive looming fiscal crisis, caused in large part by the combination of an aging population and out-of-control entitlement spending.  Yet most candidates of both parties largely ignored this problem, and promise continued massive spending, and avoiding tax increases for almost everyone, except perhaps a few billionaires and other very wealthy people. They could do that because surveys show most voters are ignorant about our fiscal situation and especially don't realize the key role of entitlement spending.

Voters' justified negative reaction in 2026 to tariffs, mass deportations, corruption, and the Iran War also highlight the failure of information shortcuts in the 2024 election. At that time, it was evident to informed observers that Trump would seek to institute massive tariffs and cruel deportation policies. Indeed, I myself was among those who cited them as among the principal reasons to oppose Trump in that election. Large-scale corruption was also predictable, given Trump's long history of skullduggery. Yet swing voters got these issues wrong - despite the fact that high prices were a major issue in 2024, and tariffs and mass deportations would predictably raise them (as I also pointed out at the time).

The Iran War was admittedly less predictable. Trump even promised to avoid new wars. But his well-documented combination of ignorance and impulsiveness meant that returning him to office created a significant risk of a foreign policy crisis spiraling out of control.

And on all these issues, it was predictable (and predicted by many, including me) that Trump 2.0 would surround himself with cronies and loyalists likely to indulge his worst instincts. No longer would he be constrained by "adults in the room," as occasionally happened during his first term.

Thus, while an information shortcut worked well in 2026, it's important to recognize that was only necessary because shortcuts failed miserably in 2024, which was an only modestly more difficult situation. In that earlier election, we did not yet see the effects of Trump's awful second-term policies. But most of those policies and effects were readily predictable by any moderately well-informed observer. Yet most swing voters were much more ignorant than that, and thus instead voted to punish Democrats for high prices, ignoring the high likelihood that electing Trump would make that problem worse, not better.

In addition, as I emphasized in my November 2024 post on voter ignorance in that year's election, a combination of ignorance and bias led many voters to underestimate the significance of Trump's assault on basic norms and principles of liberal democracy.

It is also important to remember that the problem of voter ignorance is not just that it leads voters to make "wrong" choices between the options put before them. It also makes those options worse in the first place. As I have long argued in my book and elsewhere, political ignorance also makes those options worse in the first place. Politicians and campaign strategists know they face a largely ignorant electorate, and act accordingly. Sweeping the fiscal crisis under the rug is just one of many examples of that tendency. Even if information shortcuts consistently helped voters choose the lesser of the evils before them (which, sadly, they don't!), ignorance would still make those options much more evil than they would be otherwise.

Trump is a particularly egregious long-time exploiter of political ignorance, which played key roles in his rise and return to power. But more conventional politicians also routinely exploit it, as Barack Obama did, for example.  For those keeping score, I have been arguing that political ignorance is a serious danger for over 25 years, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, and through many changes in the political winds.

The  2024 election led me to conclude that voter ignorance was an even more serious problem than I previously thought. This year's election is, perhaps, a data point for the other side.  But whether or not the problem is worse than I thought before 2024, it continues to be a serious danger.

There is no easy fix for widespread voter ignorance. I assessed  various possible options in my 2023 book chapter on "Top-Down and Bottom-Up Solutions to the Problem of Political Ignorance, and in Chapters 5-7 of Democracy and Political Ignorance. I think the most promising approach make fewer decisions at the ballot box and more by "voting with your feet," where incentives to seek out information and use it wisely are better. I also argue in both works that the idea of simply paying voters to increase their knowledge deserves more attention. But any remedy will take time, and we may need a combination of several strategies, not just one.

In sum, the 2026 election is an example of retrospective voting working relatively well. But we should not conclude this shortcut - or any other - is a good general solution to the problem of widespread political ignorance.

Religion and the Law

Expressly Christian Messages by Secretary of Agriculture to Employees Violated Establishment Clause,

a federal court held today.

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The top of the Secretary's Easter message.

From Judge Trina Thompson (N.D. Cal.) today in Nat'l Federation of Federal Employees v. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture:

The Court ORDERS that the Secretary must recognize certain boundaries when communicating religious messages. She "[m]ust stop if a colleague asks [her] to stop," she "[c]annot create a hostile work environment through persistent unwelcome advances," and she "[c]annot use official authority to pressure subordinates." USDA Secretary's Memorandum 1078-019. She may "[d]iscuss [her] religious beliefs with interested colleagues," "[s]hare why [her] faith is meaningful to [her]," "[p]olitely invite coworkers to religious services or events," "[e]xpress religious viewpoints during appropriate conversations." This Court expresses no view whatsoever on what the Secretary can and cannot do in her personal capacity….

On July 4, 2025, Secretary [of Agriculture Brooke] Rollins sent an email from her official email account celebrating Independence Day. The message was sent to all USDA employees. Her message concluded with a written statement, "May God continue to protect the United States of America and may His favor shine over all her land." On November 26, 2025, Rollins sent a Thanksgiving message from her official email account to all USDA employees, attributing the first Thanksgiving in part to "gratitude towards a loving God."

The complaint identifies two subsequent communications as expressly promoting Christianity. On December 23, 2025, Rollins emailed USDA employees a Christmas message containing a video in which she stated that "The spirit of generosity flows from the very first Christmas when God gave us the greatest gift possible, the gift of his Son and our Savior Jesus Christ, who came to free us from our sins and open the door to eternal life. This is the reason for the season…."

On April 5, 2026, she sent an Easter email addressed to "All USDA Employees" which read:

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The Pew Research Center Report on Future of World Religions

The religious landscape in the United States will look very different in 2070, and so will debates about religious liberty.

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The Pew Research Center has published a comprehensive survey about population growth within the world religions between 2020 and 2070. The results are worth a careful study to forecast the future religious landscape in the United States, and how those numbers will affect debates about religious liberty. Here is a summary:

The United States is expected to follow roughly the same pattern of religious change as the overall North American region.5 By 2070, Christians are expected to decline to less than half of the U.S. population, while religiously unaffiliated people will rise to about 41%. And Jews – who were the country's third-largest religious group in 2020 – will be outnumbered by both Muslims and Hindus in 2070 if recent demographic trends continue.

The numbers concerning Jews are also significant:

As of 2020, Pew Research Center estimates there were about 15 million Jews by religion around the world, 12.5 million of whom lived in Israel and the United States. By the Center's projections, Israel alone will hold the majority of the world's Jews within a few decades.

If recent demographic trends continue, Israel will be home to 62% of the global Jewish population in 2070, up from 46% in 2020. During this 50-year time span, the number of Jews living in Israel is forecast to grow from 6.8 million to 11.1 million, due primarily to what demographers call "natural increase": the number of births exceeding the number of deaths in a population.

I've written on this blog before that I can see a future where my family and I will have to move to Israel. The events of the last election make that outcome seem just-that-much-more likely. And remember, the persecution of Jews will always be a precursor to persecution of other faiths.

Ultimately, debates about religious liberty will look very different as the composition of religious group changes. I would note that at the recent Federalist Society convention, there was a brief mention about the risks of Shariah Law--a topic that I can't ever recall being discussed on a FedSoc platform. This issue will soon get even hotter in Texas as the government continues to shift.

contract law

Georgetown's Counterclaims Against Professor Fired for "Sexual Misconduct" Can Go Forward

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From Judge Amy Berman Jackson (D.D.C.) yesterday in Egolf v. Georgetown Univ.:

Plaintiff David Egolf was a tenured associate professor at defendant Georgetown University …. In 2015, after an investigation into an internal complaint lodged against Egolf by a Georgetown student, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that placed rules on Egolf's conduct in return for his continued employment at the University. In 2023, following a second report by a recent Georgetown graduate, the University completed another investigation into Egolf and his conduct.

Egolf filed suit against Georgetown and certain University officials, claiming that the second investigation violated Title IX, Georgetown's Faculty Handbook, and the 2015 settlement agreement. Georgetown has answered the complaint and has filed a counterclaim alleging that Egolf breached the 2015 settlement agreement when he engaged in conduct that violated numerous provisions of the contract. Georgetown seeks compensatory damages and a declaratory judgment….

According to Georgetown, on September 20, 2013, a student accused Egolf of sexual harassment. Egolf was placed on administrative leave with pay while the University reviewed the student's complaint. The University's Office of Institutional Diversity, Equity, and Affirmative Action ("IDEAA") investigated the claim and, on May 9, 2014, issued a Notice of Findings in which it found, in part, that Egolf:

violated the University's Policy Statement on Harassment and Sexual Harassment by making unwelcome sexual advances and engaging in unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature in violation of the policy; engaged in prohibited retaliation against the student; and failed to recognize and ignored the principle underlying [the University's Policy on Consensual Sexual Relationships], which prohibits participation in a professional relationship with a student where there is a conflict of interest.

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Politics

"Can AI Ace Your Exam? A Penn Law Experiment," by Prof. R. Polk Wagner

"On two exams, both scored on an open, non-saturated scale, it outscored every enrolled student."

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A very interesting preprint; here's the Abstract:

I report a controlled experiment that ran a frontier large language model through eleven real University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School final exams in Spring 2026 and sent the machine's answers out for blind grading alongside the work of enrolled students. Each exam was answered twice: once with no course materials in the model's context (the "no-materials" arm, relying on the model's training alone) and once with the course syllabus and an outline supplied (the "with-materials" arm). Three findings emerge.

First, the model is broadly competitive: across the ten exams returned with grades, it passed every one, sat at or above the class median on every one, and reached the top decile on seven. On two exams, both scored on an open, non-saturated scale, it outscored every enrolled student.

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Politics

"Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press": "Broad Evidence, and Silently Consistent Precedents"

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I thought I'd serialize my new Notre Dame Law Review article, "Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press: Some Illustrative Examples"; here's the first Part:

* * *

In certain areas, First Amendment precedent turns out to be quite consistent with original meaning—even though the Court hasn't squarely discussed historical evidence in any detail. This might be a fortunate accident, or perhaps a random coincidence in the policy judgments of the modern Court and the Framing generation. But I expect that some at least stems from a phenomenon that Justice Scalia discussed in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (1995): "Principles of liberty fundamental enough to have been embodied within constitutional guarantees are not readily erased from the Nation's consciousness. A governmental practice that has become general throughout the United States, and particularly one that has the validation of long, accepted usage, bears a strong presumption of constitutionality."

In some situations, this observation may not be accurate. But in others, there really does appear to be a longstanding constitutional understanding that has become so much part of the law that a court that simply follows doctrine will incorporate original meaning. Let me offer three examples.

A. "The Liberty of the Press Is Not Confined to Newspapers and Periodicals"

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A Tribute to Judge Posner, from Vice Chief Judge David Weinzweig (Ariz. Ct. App.)

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I thought I'd pass along this tribute, which I thought was moving and apt:

Dinner with Judge Richard Posner

One condition

Twenty years ago, I was elevated to chair the antitrust section of the State Bar of Arizona, and I needed a headliner to pack the room for my first event. Who in the world of antitrust could draw interest outside that world? The answer was obvious: the closest thing antitrust has to a rock star, Judge Richard Posner.

So I cold-emailed Judge Posner an invitation to address judges, lawyers and law students in Tempe. I doubted he would reply, but he did, quickly. He would be happy to come—under one condition. I told him to name it.

No antitrust law. Anything but antitrust law.

I agreed, of course. He could have lectured on gardening for all I cared.

We all have our favorite jurists, past and present. Until last week, Judge Posner was my favorite living one. He died at 87. His writing is the reason I became an antitrust lawyer.

Thirty years in the law, and I still turn to one trusted source when an issue is opaque or abstract. I run a quick Westlaw search for Judge Posner's take, and the fog lifts.

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Free Speech

Israeli-American Emory Professor's Defamation Case Against CAIR Georgia and Emory Student Can Go Forward (in Part)

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Some excerpts from the long opinion by Judge Thomas Thrash (N.D. Ga.) yesterday in Winer v. Mohammad:

This action arises out of alleged defamatory statements that Defendant Umaymah Mohammad, a student at the Emory University School of Medicine, made about Plaintiff Joshua Winer, a physician and professor at Emory. Mohammad, who is Palestinian, sent an email to the entire School of Medicine student and faculty body on January 17, 2024, in which the Plaintiff alleges she "praised terrorism against Israel, expressed her hatred towards Israel and the United States, and stated that Israel, the United States, and Emory are perpetrating a genocide against Palestinians in Gaza."

Nearly two months later, in March 2024, the Plaintiff published an op-ed piece in an Israeli news publication sharing his decision to travel to Israel to volunteer as a physician in the Israeli Defense Force ("IDF") following the October 7th Hamas attack on Israel. The Plaintiff identifies as Jewish and maintains dual American and Israeli citizenship. He is a surgical oncologist at Emory Winship Cancer Institute, a professor in the Department of Surgery, Division of Surgical Oncology at the School of Medicine, and serves as the School of Medicine Surgical Clerkship Director.

In April 2024, Mohammad participated in an interview for a news organization called Democracy Now!. In the interview, Mohammad was asked about the email she sent and was asked to explain the importance of the issue to her. As part of her response, Mohammad referenced Winer by stating that

one of the professors of medicine we have at Emory recently went to serve as a volunteer medic in the Israeli Offense Force [sic] and recently came back. This man participated in aiding and abetting a genocide, in aiding and abetting the destruction of the healthcare system in Gaza and the murder of over 400 healthcare workers, and is now back at Emory so-called teaching medical students and residents how to take care of patients.

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Justice Cody Hiland Graduated Law School in 1998 (Or 1999?) And Was Admitted To The Bar in (February?) 2002

What can explain that gap?

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Today Justice Cody Hiland appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Senator Durbin quoted my blog post which called him unqualified, then totally botched the question. Durbin referred to me as a "conservative law professor," so he has the same problem as the New York Times. Alas, instead of asking why Hiland decided to air private conversations with law students, Durbin simply asked Hiland about temperament.

None of the other senators gave him even the slightest tough question. It's a shame, because he likely would have had trouble. This was one of the least polished circuit court nominees I've seen. Hell, Hiland made Todd Butler look like a pro. Is the process over? Well, I came across this posting from the retired senior editor of the Arkansas Times:

Would news that a nominee for a federal judgeship twice failed the bar exam change the tenor of loud opinions on the exam rigging scandal?

Let's investigate.

For starters, it isn't entirely clear when Hiland graduated law school. Here is the line from his questionnaire. Is it 1998 or 1999? The stray 1999 is odd. Maybe he received the JD in 1998 but needed some more coursework to graduate?

According to the University of Arkansas Little Rock Bowen School of Law, Hiland graduated in 1998. Anyway, something is off here.

According to his Senate Judiciary Committee Questionnaire, he was admitted to the bar in 2002, but he does not indicate if he took the July or February administration.

I was able to find an article from the Arkansas Democrat Gazette from March 30, 2002 which indicates that Hiland passed the February 2002 bar exam. As a general rule, people take the February bar when they either (a) had some sort of conflict for the July bar or (b) failed the July bar.

Between 1997 and 2000, Hiland held various positions in the office of Governor Mike Huckabee. None required a JD. From 2000 to 2002, he worked as a Staff Attorney at the Arkansas Transitional Employment Board. It isn't clear to me how he could be a Staff Attorney before he was admitted to the bar. In 2002, after Hiland was admitted to the bar, he began as an associate at a law firm in Paris, Arkansas.

Usually, law school graduates immediately take the bar exam. Perhaps Hiland was too busy serving as an aide to the governor to do so right away. Maybe he took it for the first time in February 2002, either two or three years after graduating from law school.

If only President Trump asked Katie Zacharia when she passed the bar. It might be worth asking Hiland about how many bar exams he has taken in a Question for the Record.

Supreme Court

Two Cheers for the Supreme Court - Though Not More

The Supreme Court isn't doing quite as well as Will Baude suggests. But its performance is more than good enough to demonstrate why some "reform" proposals - including court-packing are terrible ideas.

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The Supreme Court. (NA)

 

In  a much-discussed recent New York Times article, University of Chicago law Prof. (and former VC blogger) Will Baude praises the Supreme Court and its independence:

With their sweeping midterm victory, Democrats are exploring ideas for a package of reforms to the Supreme Court. And it's not just Democrats: In recent months, the court has managed to invite calls for reform from both sides of the aisle. Some conservatives are even willing to discuss expanding the number of justices.

Still, these calls do not reflect a bipartisan agreement on what is wrong with the court. The calls for reform simply reflect the fact that the court has managed to offend people on the left and right. Defying the Trump administration on key agenda items while also enforcing colorblindness and overruling Roe v. Wade has left it with few true fans.

The left, understandably, strongly opposes the court's recent rulings on abortion, the Voting Rights Act, the unitary executive and so on. These decisions are a big deal. But court reformers still suffer from a failure of perspective. If Chief Justice John Roberts could write an opinion essay, I would imagine him saying: "What? Ruling against the administration's misuse of the National Guard, sweeping emergency tariffs and attack on birthright citizenship, plus preserving the independence of the Federal Reserve and the integrity of the midterm elections, wasn't enough for you?"

The court has ruled against the administration in high-stakes cases on those issues all in the past year. And it has done so even though six of the justices were appointed by members of the president's party — three by President Trump himself….

Under the circumstances of the second Trump term, the Supreme Court is doing amazingly well. If anything, it deserves our celebration, not our condemnation.

I agree with much of this. I made similar points in two articles critiquing proposals for court-packing (see here and here), emphasizing the importance of the Court's rulings against Trump, and how they were not simple gimmes. In each case, there were at least minimally plausible arguments the other way, such that a Court intent on helping Trump and the GOP at all costs could have found a way to do it:

Over the last 18 months, the Supreme Court has played a key role in thwarting several major Trump power grabs. The most recent example is the birthright citizenship case, which prevented him from stripping citizen status from hundreds of thousands of children of undocumented migrants and temporary visa holders, thereby subjecting them to potential deportation.

In Learning Resources v. Trump (which I helped litigate), the court struck down Trump's attempt to use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose the highest tariff schedule since the Hoover-era Smoot-Hawley tariffs that notoriously exacerbated the Great Depression. Trump's tariffs would have imposed some $1.7 trillion of new taxes on Americans. The court's reasoning was not limited to the specifics of IEEPA. All six justices in the majority made clear that they rejected the notion that the president could have a virtually unlimited power to impose tariffs. Thus, the precedent is likely to help block his efforts to twist other statutes into authorization for unconstrained presidential tariff authority….

In lesser-known cases, the court blocked Trump's effort to use the National Guard against blue states (thereby causing him to abandon the effort) and twice used brief "shadow docket" decisions to block deportations under the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 and signal that courts could review Trump's invocation of that law….

[Some critics] acknowledg… these second-term defeats are real yet insist… that they are just "a floor." But protecting people from massive power grabs that gravely endangered the liberty and well-being of millions is no small matter. The same goes for blocking executive use of the military to suppress domestic opposition. And, in each of these cases, the Trump administration had at least minimally plausible arguments for their positions, sometimes backed by prominent conservative legal scholars and commentators. A court inclined to give Trump and the GOP whatever they want could easily have gone the other way on some or all of them. Even if the court could and should have done more to constrain Trump, these rulings are crucial safeguards for liberty and democracy.

Unlike Josh Blackman, I think the conservative justices' willingness to rule against Trump and GOP priorities is a notable measure of their independence. It's a strong sign that they are not simply partisan hacks, and not beholden to any president or party. That doesn't prove that any time a conservative judge rules against a Republican president, they are necessarily right to do so. Being independent and being right are not the same thing. But both are important.

At the same time, I am less of a fan of the current Supreme Court majority than Will Baude is. In my view, they have made several very bad decisions:

Still, it is true that the conservative majority has issued some very bad rulings. I agree with Craig that Trump v. United States—the 2024 presidential immunity ruling—is one of them. But that decision does not give the president blanket immunity from all criminal prosecution for actions taken while in office or even categorical immunity for all "official acts." It's a bad decision but not one that totally eliminates criminal prosecution as a check on presidential abuses of power….  [I also have ambivalent views on Trump v. Slaughter and Louisiana v. Callais].

In my view, the Roberts Court has made several decisions that are worse than any of the above. Most notable are Trump v. Hawaii, the awful 2018 anti-Muslim "travel ban" case, and the similar recent decision in Mullin v. Doe, the Haitian TPS case. In both of these cases, the court's conservative justices turned a blind eye to blatantly unconstitutional discrimination in the immigration context (in one case based on religion, in the other on race). This is part of the court's broader pattern of indefensible double standards when it comes to immigration restrictions.

On top of that, the Roberts Court recently gave us the Supreme Court's worst Takings Clause ruling in many years, undermining its previously generally good record on constitutional property rights.

Thus, I am only willing to offer two cheers for the Court. To earn three, the justices would need to give us fewer stinkers!

That said, the Court's record in checking Trump should give pause to advocates of court-packing and other "reform" measures that would have the effect of destroying judicial review. As explained more fully in my two recent articles critiquing court-packing (here and here) the proper baseline of comparison is not an ideal Supreme Court, but one that would have little or no ability to check the party in power, especially if that party controls both the White House and Congress. The latter is the likely result of court-packing. By that standard, the Roberts Court has had a massive beneficial impact. Between them, the birthright citizenship, tariff, and National Guard decisions have saved millions of people from severe threats to their livelihoods and civil liberties (most notably hundreds of thousands of children saved from potential deportation under Trump's birthright citizenship executive order).

Like Baude, I am not opposed to all possible Supreme Court reforms. For example, I am a long-time supporter of Supreme Court term limits. I am also open to imposing tighter ethics constraints on the justices, and have criticized Justice Alito's claim that Congress lacks power to regulate the Court on such matters. Again, like Baude, I highly doubt that ethics reforms would have any significant impact on the Court's rulings. But it may still be desirable to constrain outside gifts and the like, if only to prevent more serious ethics issues from potentially arising in the future.

I also think some proposals to better manage and constrain the "shadow docket" may be desirable, though I will not try to cover this difficult issue here.

Finally, Baude is right that the Court's relative unpopularity is a potential danger. It is, as he suggests, caught between progressives who believe it's way too conservative, and right-wingers who blame it for constraining Trump too much.

At the same time, it's worth remembering that the Supreme Court is less unpopular than either of the other branches of government, and that most of its major recent decisions enjoy majority public support. As I always emphasize, a decision's popularity is far from a good indication of its correctness. But such (relative) popularity can potentially protect the Court against political attack.

Finally, I would note this: As prominent conservative legal commentator Ed Whelan points out, the results of the recent midterm election make it highly likely that Justice Alito, Justice Thomas, or both will ultimately be replaced by a liberal Democratic nominee. Democrats considering court-packing should ask themselves whether they really rather destroy judicial review, or see it wielded by what may well soon be a liberal court.

For my part, I have plenty of differences with the current conservative majority. And if it is replaced by a more liberal one, I expect to have many disagreements with that majority, as well. But either is far preferable to just getting rid of judicial review entirely. The Trump era has provided plenty of additional evidence for that proposition.

 

Why Exactly Does The Supreme Court "Deserve Our Celebration"?

Will Baude's measure of the Court's independence is when a conservative Justice rules against Trump.

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Will Baude has a new essay in the New York Times titled, "This Is What an Independent, Competent Supreme Court Looks Like." The graphic depicts a giant judge standing boldly with people on the left and right tugging at his robe in either direction. The face of the giant judge does not resemble any current member of the Court, but it may as well be Chief Justice Roberts. You see, Baude urges us to celebrate the Court because of its independence, but the only data he adduces to demonstrate that independence is that the Court's conservatives rule against President Trump:

The left, understandably, strongly opposes the court's recent rulings on abortion, the Voting Rights Act, the unitary executive and so on. These decisions are a big deal. But court reformers still suffer from a failure of perspective. If Chief Justice John Roberts could write an opinion essay, I would imagine him saying: "What? Ruling against the administration's misuse of the National Guard, sweeping emergency tariffs and attack on birthright citizenship, plus preserving the independence of the Federal Reserve and the integrity of the midterm elections, wasn't enough for you?"

The court has ruled against the administration in high-stakes cases on those issues all in the past year. And it has done so even though six of the justices were appointed by members of the president's party — three by President Trump himself. . . .

Under the circumstances of the second Trump term, the Supreme Court is doing amazingly well. If anything, it deserves our celebration, not our condemnation.

There are many, many problems with this approach.

Let's start with the two most conservative members of the Court, Justices Alito and Thomas. They ruled for President Trump in all the cases Baude mentions: the National Guard, tariffs, birthright citizenship, the Federal Reserve, and various election cases. Do their votes cut against the image of an independent Court? They owe Trump nothing, and had the backbone to resist retiring and giving Trump two more picks. (The same cannot be said for Justice Breyer's "independence" from President Biden.)

Moreover, in each of those cases, one or more of the Trump appointees was in dissent with Alito and Thomas: Gorsuch dissented in Trump v. Illinois, Kavanaugh dissented in Learning Resources v. Trump, Gorsuch dissented in Trump v. Barbara, Gorsuch and Barrett dissented in Trump v. Cook, and so on. Did these Trump appointees not demonstrate independence in these cases? Or, should their votes against Trump in other cases balance out their votes for Trump in these cases?

Justice Kagan made this point expressly during her remarks at the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference. She said that the Court "has checked the executive branch" in "very significant cases." In these cases, Kagan explained, "it's the chief justice with a little bit of a floating cast of characters around him." Truly, she views Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett as an interchangeable "floating cast of characters." The liberals (almost) aways vote in lockstep, but a conservative vote is always up for grabs. Tell us how you really feel, Elena. (I'll have much more to say about Kagan's comments at Catholic University in my next Civitas column.)

Baude jokes about the Chief Justice writing an opinion essay for all the cases where he wrote the majority opinion ruling against Trump. But reality is stranger than fiction. The truth is John Roberts writes opinion essays every term. Everything he says and does is designed to maintain some faux equilibrium. He even bundles together some essays (Slaughter and Cook) to maximize press coverage. The better question is what would Justices Thomas and Alito write if they were untethered?

The measure of independence cannot be how often Trump loses. Justices Thomas and Alito argue in those cases that the law actually supports Trump. They would contend (I think) that their colleagues' lack of independence explain their votes. Or, as Justice Alito writes in his new book, they are "insecure originalists."

Baude's essay also suffers from a tragic case of bothesidesism. He tries very, very hard to cast aspersion on the right as well as the left.

With their sweeping midterm victory, Democrats are exploring ideas for a package of reforms to the Supreme Court. And it's not just Democrats: In recent months, the court has managed to invite calls for reform from both sides of the aisle. Some conservatives are even willing to discuss expanding the number of justices.

On the left, presidential candidates and elected members of Congress have called for Court expansion. On the right, members of the House and Senate introduced a constitutional amendment to fix the size of the Court at 9. Which conservatives called for Court expansion? Other than some MAGA posters, I can't think of anyone relevant.

Baude writes further:

Some on the right see these decisions as betrayals. But the right-wing critics fail to possess patience or to understand constitutional principle. Conservative legal thinkers spent two generations rightly emphasizing the importance of originalist interpretation and limited government. And while some on the right want to move away from these principles now that they can frustrate right-wing rule, what goes around comes around, and principles will be worth more in the long run.

It is pretty clear Baude is talking about Trump who has posted on X about how his appointees betrayed him. Shame on President Trump for not possessing the patience of a life-tenured law professor and failing to read the latest issue of the Harvard Law Review. Come on. Trump is a politician who has two years left in office. His time horizon and expectations are different from academics. The problem, of course, is that Thomas and Alito insist that originalist principles support the President. It is Chief Justice Roberts, the Judge Hercules in Baude's World, who eschews any sort of originalist jurisprudence.

Baude continues to point out problems with the Court. These are all liberal complaints. Everything he says may as well be taken from the Strict Scrutiny podcast:

This is not to say that the court is doing perfectly well. It has plenty of problems. The justices face many hard cases, and they are subject to human temptations. They also struggle with the exercise of discretion in the when and how of their rulings, which can seem arbitrary or overly manipulative. These struggles are especially apparent in the court's inconsistent treatment of precedents, in its decisions about which cases to take in the first place and in the many controversies over its "shadow docket" (or interim orders docket, if you prefer).

Does Baude see any problem with decisions like Obergefell which overruled millenia of precedent to invent a constitutional right without any basis in original meaning? Did that ruling justify "court reform"?

In the end, Baude mentions almost under his breath that "modest Court reform" might include "term limits."

There is one good argument for court reform: If anything, it might have only a placebo effect — it would be a fake medicine, causing some people to feel cured and convincing the public that all of the problems they ascribe to the court have been solved. A few more modest court reforms, such as gift caps or even term limits, may well be mostly harmless. If pointless reforms cause many Americans to believe that the court is better — more independent, less corrupt and so on — that would be great for the country.

Baude does not tell us whether term limits require a constitutional amendment, or if they can be imposed by statute. I suspect this passage will be the main sentence from Baude's essay that people end up citing. To call term limits "modest" gives the whole game away. Baude says Term limits would make America great again!

Here is my bottom line. I would rather that the current crop of Justices fearlessly follow the meaning of the Constitution, results be damned, then feign "independence" as a means to avoid "Court Reform." What is the consolation prize for faking independence? Baude offers that term limits would be "harmless," basically a placebo, to help the body politic. With friends like these, who needs enemies? Judges cannot control what politicians do. They should not try to play a game.

It would not surprise me if Chief Justice Roberts retires when a Democrat is President to permanently bolster his reputation for independence. Progressives and their allies would place Roberts in the Judicial Parthenon alongside John Marshall and others. But John Glover is still not fooling anyone.

John Yoo Joins the Exodus from California; Departs for Texas

The University of California at Berkeley's law school loses its last right-leaning professor to teach in public law.

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The Daily Californian reports that Professor John Yoo is leaving the University of California at Berkeley's law school. Beginning next year, he will be full-time at the University of Texas at Austin's School of Civic Leadership.

From the story:

"Let the celebrations at my fan clubs in the City of Berkeley begin," Yoo said in an email. "Great as our university is, it would not allow a school to focus on restoring the central importance of western civilization to the education of all undergraduates." . . .

"I am sorry, however, that my departure will reduce the number of conservative professors in public law at Berkeley by 100 percent," Yoo said in the email. "I hope that the university will take this as an opportunity to consider that the notion of diversity should, most importantly, include ideology, not just the usual race, gender, and economic categories that my colleagues usually mean by diversity."

There had been one other right-leaning law professor at Berkeley, our co-blogger Orin Kerr, but he left Berkeley for Stanford in 2025.

According to Dean of Berkeley Law Erwin Chemerinsky, Yoo's decision to leave the faculty was entirely his own.

"John (Yoo) has been an important part of the faculty for many years," Chemerinsky said in an email. "This was entirely John's decision to retire. … He has indicated to me for a few years his thoughts about retiring. John is a very successful teacher and an eminent scholar." . . .

Yoo's move is also less drastic than it might appear, as he is moving from one blue state to another.  All of the other California transplants that have moved to Austin helped make sure of that (with a major assist from the Republican Party).

Supreme Court

This Supreme Court "Deserves Our Celebration, Not Our Condemnation"

Prof. William Baude on the Supreme Court and the false promise of court reform.

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Professor William Baude has an op-ed in the New York Times, "This Is What an Independent, Competent Supreme Court Looks Like," defending the Supreme Court against its critics, left and right, and suggesting that many calls for court reform are misguided.

Noting that the Democratic electoral sweep has bolstered calls for reforming, and perhaps expanding, the Court to alter its course, Baude writes:

The left, understandably, strongly opposes the court's recent rulings on abortion, the Voting Rights Act, the unitary executive and so on. These decisions are a big deal. But court reformers still suffer from a failure of perspective. If Chief Justice John Roberts could write an opinion essay, I would imagine him saying: "What? Ruling against the administration's misuse of the National Guard, sweeping emergency tariffs and attack on birthright citizenship, plus preserving the independence of the Federal Reserve and the integrity of the midterm elections, wasn't enough for you?"

The court has ruled against the administration in high-stakes cases on those issues all in the past year. And it has done so even though six of the justices were appointed by members of the president's party — three by President Trump himself. . . .

Under the circumstances of the second Trump term, the Supreme Court is doing amazingly well. If anything, it deserves our celebration, not our condemnation.

Indeed, the Court's conservatives, on the whole, have shown themselves more willing to constrain Trump's excesses than were the Court's liberals when faced with executive branch overreach by Presidents Biden or Obama.

Baude notes that the Court's willingness to reject Trump Administration priorities has caused some on the Right to question the conservative legal movement's commitment to originalism, and cautions that "what goes around comes around, and principles will be worth more in the long run." Of course, some conservatives' criticisms of the Court are for its failure to adhere to the principles some justices espouse (including originalism), not that those principles are getting in the way of making America great again.

On the question of judicial reform, Baude strikes a cautionary note, particularly if court reform is nothing more than an effort to reverse the Court's current trajectory.

In the abstract, there is nothing wrong with bipartisan judicial reform. The Supreme Court should not be preserved in amber. But partisan judicial reform — reform motivated by frustration with specific judicial decisions and the hope that the reformed court will rule differently — is a dangerous game. Because partisan reform is a tactic equally available to both sides, it accomplishes little in the long run except to accelerate the court's transformation into a political superweapon. Such a tactic might be a short-run necessity in extreme circumstances, but we are far from those extremes.

He also--quite correctly--calls out the obsession with judicial ethics as "superficial." He could add that such concerns are nearly always one-sided and selective. While it may be appropriate to further limit the justices' outside income or ability to accept gifts, we should not pretend that any such reforms would have any effect on the Court's decisions.

The justices' views on big issues are well formed. The justices themselves aren't for sale; book income reflects their increasing celebrity, not any specific quid pro quo. To be sure, it is quite possible that travel and gifts and book sales subtly reinforce the justices' incentives to play to their respective fan bases. But this kind of corruption is quite indirect, and at the same time comes from so much more than money. So ethics reform is unlikely to change much about what the court actually does.

In the end, Baude thinks the best argument for court reform is as a placebo: To convince the public that something has been done so that attention can turn to more pressing issues. As he concludes this point: "If pointless reforms cause many Americans to believe that the court is better — more independent, less corrupt and so on — that would be great for the country."

I largely agree with Baude's piece, though I may be more open to certain sorts of reforms than he reveals in this piece. Reforms that represent genuine political engagement with the work of the courts, such as measures to alter or channel jurisdiction could be quite beneficial. Measures to reduce backlogs, limit forum shopping, constrain unwarranted or overly expansive equitable relief, and expand the Court's mandatory jurisdiction are all worth considering. They also represent the sort of meaningful legislation that Congress should engage in--legislation that requires Congress to take seriously its constitutional responsibilities. (In this regard, I view the willingness to engage with jurisdictional questions in the pending infrastructure reform bill to be a welcome sign, even if I might not endorse every jurisdictional measure the bill contains.)

As Baude ends his essay, courts are not above criticism, and this includes the Supreme Court. It is nonetheless is important to distinguish between criticisms of how the Court operates and performs its job from substantive or ideological disagreement with the decisions the Court reaches.

Free Speech

No Pseudonymity for Woman Alleging She Was Falsely Accused of Sexual Relationship with Jeffrey Epstein, Doxed

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From Doe v. Doe (E.D. Pa.), decided today by Judge Gerald Pappert:

Jane Doe alleges four X (formerly Twitter) users falsely accused her of having a sexual relationship with Jeffrey Epstein and doxxed her by posting on the social networking site her full name, employment and education history, phone numbers and addresses. Doe asserts claims for defamation, false light, public disclosure of private facts and aiding and abetting. She seeks to proceed under a pseudonym because she fears for her safety, along with additional reputational and professional harm. The Court denies the motion because Doe's fear of harm does not outweigh the public's interest in open litigation.

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Criminal Justice

19-Year-Old Gets Probation (+ 6 Months Served) "After Firing over 20 Rounds, Shooting Boy Playing Basketball"

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WJLA (ABC-7) reports:

Darius Drew pleaded guilty on Aug. 10 to aggravated assault and carrying a pistol without a license. Although prosecutors asked Superior Court Judge Jennifer Di Toro for a five-year prison term, she imposed a suspended 24-month sentence and placed him on probation under the Youth Rehabilitation Act, over the government's objection.

According to the government's evidence, Drew rode a Lime bike into an alley in the 700 block of Taylor Street NW on May 11.

Surveillance video showed him firing at a car parked in the alley. Seconds later, Drew fired toward a house near the alley in the 4100 block of Ninth Street NW, striking a boy who was playing basketball at a nearby recreation center. The boy suffered a leg injury.

Drew fired more than 20 rounds from two locations, prosecutors said….

From the opinion in U.S. v. Drew, released Monday by D.C. Superior Court Judge Jennifer A. Di Toro:

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