The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

"What Does It Mean To Be A Christian On The Bench?"

"A Conversation with Matthew J. Kacsmaryk and James C. Ho"

|

On Saturday evening, the Texas Review of Law & Politics awarded its 2026 Jurist of the Year award to Judge Kacsmaryk. The latest bobblehead has a perfectly coifed head of hair, far different from the mop atop the 2024 winner.

Today, the Texas A&M Journal of Law Civil Governance published a very timely conversation between Judge Kacsmaryk and the 2023 Jurist of the Year, Judge James C. Ho. It is titled, "What Does It Mean To Be A Christian On The Bench?" I would encourage you to read the entire dialogue, but I'll highlight a few parts here.

First, Judge Kacsmaryk had this to say about textualism in Bostock:

Most famously or infamously, the Bostock case produced three separate "textualist" readings of a statute enacted in 1964 and a sexual dimorphism as old as Genesis.4 Justice Gorsuch focused on Text, finding a "but-for causation" requirement because of "because of." Justice Alito marshaled volumes and volumes of History. Justice Kavanaugh invoked longstanding Tradition rooted in Separation of Powers. But these Titans of Textualism could not harmonize Text, History, and Tradition to agree on workable Title VII definitions of "sex" or "because." Reading these opinions, I discerned that Text, History, and Tradition should yield an agreed "ordinary public meaning" if jurists have a shared teleological end: truth. I hear Pilate's retort: "What is truth?"5 Here, I mean the truth the Textualist Trinity should yield: the "ordinary public meaning" of the words at the time of their enactment, as uttered and understood by the relevant writers and ratifiers—consistent with compositionality6 and against any absurdity.7 . . . This is where the faithful Christian should have a Textualist advantage: we believe there is such a thing as objective, external, knowable Truth.

Second, Judge Kacsmaryk explained how he had to be recruited to become a federal judge.

H: Listening to you discuss judicial philosophy and interpretive theory, I think many people would be surprised to learn that you never sought to be a federal judge. You had to be recruited.

K: In fact, if memory serves, you were the first person to ask if I might relocate to the Amarillo Division to fill the vacancy there. As I recall, I said I was interested in returning to the Department of Justice but had zero interest in the judiciary. You said that's exactly what you liked about the idea—that it wasn't something I ever sought.

H: Matthew 20 reminds us that "whoever wants to become great among you must be your servant . . . just as the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve." That's the same ethos that we should find in our judges as well. People who will use power, not to serve themselves, but to serve others. People who are willing to be a judge—but not desperate to be a judge. People whose goal isn't to get onto a bench, but to get into heaven.

Third, Judge Ho opined on what it means to be a federal judge. It is not as glamorous as people might suspect.

Because if you do this job right, it's actually not a fun job. If you're doing it because you want stature and respect and prestige—you want to be praised by the right people and invited to the right parties—then you're going to be distracted. Instead of following the law, you're going to focus on reaching the outcomes that the popular people want you to reach. And we've all seen how that turns out.

Judge Ho has written about how judge, like umpires, fear getting booed. But to be precise, the fear is that judges will be booed by legal elites on the left. The fear does not run the other way. Conservative judges historically have had nothing to fear from being booed by conservatives. Well, that was the case. I made waves years ago by calling out conservative judges. To this day, I continue to pay the price. But more recently, President Trump has turned up the heat. Many of his attacks cross the lines, but as always, there is a kernel of truth in his barbs.

Fourth, Judge Ho reveals that he initially declined Ted Cruz's invitation to become Solicitor General:

K: You served at the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel and the Senate Judiciary Committee before heading to the private sector. When Senator Cruz suggested that you take over as Texas Solicitor General, you actually declined at first.

H: I've known Senator Cruz for over 25 years, and as far as I can recall, it's the only time he was ever really angry with me. Allyson and I were still new to Dallas. We were just starting our careers here. We also wanted to start our family. That was the whole point of leaving D.C. and moving back to Texas. So I told him that I was profoundly humbled that he would think of me, but that I couldn't do it. But he and others kept at it, and they eventually convinced me to change my answer. As you say, public service is in both of our DNA.

Fifth, Judge Ho discusses how he and his wife, Allyson Ho, balance their careers:

K: Well, you and Allyson have dealt with death threats too, I know. You and Allyson also had some unique considerations that I didn't face in deciding whether to take the bench.

I'm talking about the fact that you were both active Fifth Circuit practitioners before you joined the court. How did you think and pray through that decision?

H: Allyson and I have both been so very blessed in our lives, and that includes practices and careers that we really enjoyed. And by 2017, we were both really starting to hit our stride. So yes, like you, I wasn't planning to pursue the bench. Instead, we were focused on helping the Senators identify others to fill various vacancies—including you, of course! So when I got the call from the Senator's chief counsel asking me if I would consider it, I was very surprised. Allyson and I discussed how it might work, with both of us as Fifth Circuit practitioners. And it's actually not as hard as you might think. As a judge, I have to recuse, not just on every case that Allyson is on, but on every case anyone at her firm is on, whether she's involved or not. The recusal applies to the whole firm. And it's a big firm. But that's okay. Because at any given sitting, there are multiple Fifth Circuit panels. So it's not a big deal for the firm to be recused on any panel I'm ever on. There are other Fifth Circuit panels. The firm isn't recused from our court altogether.

K: So how did it work when President Trump named you to his Supreme Court list in 2020?

H: From a recusal standpoint? Well, there was no vacancy at the time. The President wasn't actually nominating anyone. He was just putting out a list. But if you're asking purely hypothetically about recusal, there are multiple Fifth Circuit panels, but there's only one Supreme Court. I can't imagine that Allyson's firm would want to be categorically recused from the highest court in the land. Or any other major firm with a significant appellate practice, for that matter. To have to tell every client that, if you hire them, they can only seek cert from an eight-member Court? That would effectively end her career and her practice—one she's worked so hard, for decades, to build. I brought this up when folks called me about the list in 2020. I didn't want to deceive anyone. But I was told it wasn't a problem. There was no vacancy. The only question was whether I was willing to be included on a list.

I don't think people quite appreciate what it would mean for the Ho family if Judge Ho were elevated to the Supreme Court. I have written many times that Judge Ho is not auditioning for the Supreme Court. No one believes me, because the audition trap is inescapable. But he is bearing his heart out and speaking truth as a husband. Listen to what the man has to say.

You should read the entire dialogue.

Criminal Law

"Reckless, to Be Sure. Stupid." "But Mere Reckless Stupidity Does Not a Malicious Federal Arsonist Make"

A court sets aside a federal arson conviction (which would have carried a "mandatory minimum sentence" of "seven years") for a fan's throwing flares at a soccer stadium and causing minor damage and a minor injury.

|

From today's decision by Judge Roy Dalton (M.D. Fla.) in U.S. v. Ramirez Reyes:

In this arson case brought under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), Ramirez was charged with maliciously damaging Inter&Co Stadium by throwing two flares during an Orlando City soccer match. The flares landed in the "Supporters Terrace" section of the stadium, where they burned for sixty seconds before going out. The flares caused discoloration of the aluminum bleachers and minor deterioration of the concrete floor. A four-year-old girl, E.Z., also sustained a superficial burn when one of the flares burned a hole in her jacket; medics at the stadium gave her an ice pack, and she recovered after applying burn gel at home for a few days.

No emergency response was requested, the match was not paused, and no one evacuated the stadium. After throwing the flares, Ramirez removed his hat and jacket, went back to his seat, and put the hat and jacket back on before exiting the stadium.

At trial, Ramirez moved for a judgment of acquittal ("JOA"), which the Court denied, and the jury then found Ramirez guilty of damaging the stadium and injuring E.Z. Ramirez now renews his JOA motion, seeks a new trial, and objects to the mandatory minimum sentence—seven years—as cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. The Government opposes. The Court concludes that the Government's evidence was insufficient to prove that Ramirez had the requisite malicious intent….

Read More

Drug Policy

No Preliminary Injunction Over Residents' Claim That S.F. Failed to Adequately Police Tenderloin Sidewalks

"[P]laintiffs have failed to respond to the City's evidence that changes in its policies have actually improved conditions in the Tenderloin such that Plaintiffs are no longer at risk of the harms they cited in their motion."

|

From today's decision by Judge Jon Tigar (N.D. Cal.) in Roe v. City of S.F.:

Plaintiffs are residents and businesses that live and operate in the Tenderloin neighborhood in San Francisco. {Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the City from "directly or indirectly supplying fentanyl or methamphetamine-related drug paraphernalia to any individuals, groups, organization, or entities within the Tenderloin neighborhood and … from allowing City-funded contractors to furnish such paraphernalia to any individuals, groups, organizations, or entities in the Tenderloin." Plaintiffs contend that the City's "affirmative conduct" regarding harm reduction and housing attract drug addicts to the Tenderloin and that "violent, gang-affiliated drug dealers also converged on the neighborhood." Plaintiffs rest their request for preliminary injunction on their claims for private nuisance and public nuisance.} … Plaintiffs [also] allege claims for: (1) violation of the ADA; (2) violation of the Rehabilitation Act; (3) violation of California's Disabled Persons Act ("DPA"); … and [4] state-created danger under the Due Process Clause ….

The City argues that Plaintiffs have failed to establish standing because they have not shown that (1) the City's paraphernalia policies have increased drug use or other social ills in the Tenderloin or (2) that cessation of those policies would lead to a decrease. They also argue that the City has taken numerous "concrete steps" to abate drug use and maintain positive conditions in the Tenderloin since this case was filed. They note that Plaintiffs have failed to respond to the City's evidence that changes in its policies have actually improved conditions in the Tenderloin such that Plaintiffs are no longer at risk of the harms they cited in their motion. [City Filing] at 18 ("Photos of the area outside Plaintiffs' homes and businesses confirm the conditions alleged have abated to the extent they ever existed."). The City submit photographic evidence of these improvements, as well as testimony from some Plaintiffs conceding that conditions have improved such that they are no longer at risk of injury.

Thus, the City argues, Plaintiffs now base their request for injunction only on the theoretical possibility of future injury, which is insufficient. The City adds that "speculative fears" of future injuries are specifically not cognizable injuries for the purposes of private nuisance actions. The City also argues that Plaintiffs fail to establish the redressability element of standing as they cannot prove that enjoining the city from distributing drug-related supplies in the Tenderloin would resolve the drug usage, homelessness, and crime issues. Finally, the City argues that enjoining its policies could actually worsen conditions in the Tenderloin by forcing addicts to use shared or unsafe drug paraphernalia.

These arguments are both unrebutted and persuasive.

Read More

Politics

Maryland Lawyer/Ex-Legislator Again Rebuffed in Attempt to Seal Alleged Libel

|

From Bennett v. Brown, decided Friday by Judge Ellen Lipton Hollander (D. Md.):

The Bennetts, a married couple, own United, a federally licensed firearm business. The case is rooted in a civil enforcement action filed by defendants in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland against plaintiffs and two other gun shops, accusing them of facilitating illegal firearm trafficking. See State v. Engage Armament LLC, C-15-CV-24-4781 ("Engage Case"). The allegations concerned, inter alia, plaintiffs' business transactions between 2020 and 2024 with an individual later convicted in federal court for "engaging in the business of dealing firearms without a license." On February 14, 2025, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County dismissed the Engage Case, with prejudice. {Defendants have appealed the dismissal, which is pending.} This suit followed on August 30, 2025….

In the proverbial "kitchen sink" approach, the Amended Complaint (ECF 35) contains nine counts. {The Amended Complaint is a quintessential example of shotgun pleading. Indeed, it seems as if counsel rifled through a hornbook and selected every conceivable claim. Such pleadings impose undue burdens on litigants and the judiciary.} Plaintiffs assert two claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: "Malicious Investigation and Litigation," in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution (Count I), and "Conspiracy To Deny Constitutional Rights," in violation of the Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution (Count II). Count III asserts a claim of Defamation, based in part on the Press Release. Count IV alleges "Interference with Second Amendment Firearm Rights in Violation of PLCAA," i.e., the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act …. Count V is titled "Interference with Business Right and Contract." Count VI asserts "Violation of Maryland Declaration of Rights," i.e., "Due Process Violations and Abuse of Process" pursuant to Articles 2, 5, 24, and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Count VII alleges "False Light Invasion of Privacy." In Count VIII, plaintiffs lodge a claim for "Federal Civil Rico Violations" ("RICO") …. Count IX asserts a claim for "Invasion of Privacy."

The Press Release was issued by Maryland Attorney General Anthony G. Brown on September 3, 2024, and joined by Schwalb and Everytown Law. It announced the initiation of the Engage Case. According to the Press Release, United and two other gun shops "ignored clear warning signs" that they were facilitating the illegal trafficking of firearms by selling firearms to "a straw purchaser." The Press Release also claimed that the gun shops played a "role in fueling gun violence across the region." Moreover, the Press Release asserts that the Engage Case constitutes a "'warning to other [gun] dealers who put public safety at risk to make a profit[.]'"

The Press Release was included as an exhibit to the Complaint, and was filed under seal. Plaintiffs also filed a motion to seal the Press Release, as well as a supporting memorandum….

Read More

Second Amendment Roundup: The Citizenship Clause Implicates the Second Amendment.

Aliens here unlawfully or on a nonimmigrant visa are prohibited from possession of firearms.

|

On April 1, the Supreme Court will hear argument in Trump v. Barbara, concerning the meaning of the Citizenship Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.  As I discussed here when the Court granted cert, there is a significant collateral issue at stake besides whether a birth certificate reflects citizenship.  That issue relates to whether a person may lawfully receive or possess firearms.

The Gun Control Act (GCA) makes it unlawful for "an alien" who "is illegally or unlawfully in the United States" or who (with certain exceptions) "has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa" to receive or possess a firearm.  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).  As elsewhere provided, "The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United States."  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).  The Fourteenth Amendment defines "citizens" as "persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof."  Is a person born here of illegal aliens or of temporary visitors on a nonimmigrant visa a non-citizen who does not have Second Amendment rights?

I filed an amicus curiae brief in the Barbara case on behalf of the Article III Project in support of the petitioners and reversal.  Although none of the briefs of the parties or amici (including mine) discuss the nexus between the Citizenship Clause and the Second Amendment, that issue looms in the background of who are citizens and thus who may lawfully possess firearms.

The federal appellate courts have consistently held that illegal aliens are subject to the federal gun ban because they are not protected by the Second Amendment.  Post-Rahimi, the Seventh Circuit held in U.S. v. Carbajal-Flores (2025): "Even if the plain text of the Second Amendment presumptively protects Carbajal-Flores because he falls within 'the people,' a long tradition exists of disarming individuals, like illegal aliens, who have not sworn allegiance to the sovereign."  As if to confirm his dangerousness, the defendant was apprehended firing shots at passing vehicles during the George Floyd riots.

Similarly, in U.S. v. Jimenez-Shilon (2022), the Eleventh Circuit skipped over the textual issue and found that under the history-tradition test, firearm ownership was limited to citizens.  While decided just before Bruen, the court relied only on what would become Bruen's text-history test and did not wander into tiers of scrutiny.

While the cases are rarer, it has also been held that aliens here under a nonimmigrant visa are not protected by the Second Amendment.  Noted U.S. v. Oghenebrume (M.D. La. 2025): "F-1 visas are held by those 'having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning,' who enter the United States 'temporarily and solely for the purpose of' education. Thus, on its face, the provision restricts aliens who have no intention of becoming a citizen and who have not declared allegiance to the United States."

Read More

AI in Court

Former Fox Anchor Andrea Tantaros's Court Filings Contained Inaccurate Citations; Court Suspects AI Hallucinations

Tantaros is representing herself in a lawsuit against Fox and, among others, ex-Senator Scott Brown, alleging sexual harassment and other claims.

|

From Friday's decision by Judge Sidney Stein (S.D.N.Y.) in Tantaros v. Fox News Network, LLC:

[B]oth Tantaros's opposition to Brown's motion to dismiss the complaint and her unauthorized sur-reply contain both inaccurate and non-existent citations to cases and statutes. After Brown's counsel notified Tantaros of citation issues in her opposition brief, Tantaros filed a "Notice of Correction of Citations" which purported to "immediately withdraw[] voluntarily" some but not all of the non-existent or inaccurate citations in her opposition to Brown's motion.

Troublingly, Tantaros nevertheless included inaccurate citations in her later-filed sur-reply. This pattern of behavior indicates that Tantaros has used artificial intelligence tools in preparing her filings but did not verify the accuracy of citations produced by those artificial intelligence tools before submitting them to the Court.

Read More

Politics

Short Circuit: An inexhaustive weekly compendium of rulings from the federal courts of appeal

Permissible ingredients, mandatory detention, and burrowing mites.

|

Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

"Just two years ago, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Constitution promises you a timely and meaningful hearing before a neutral judge if police seize your property for civil forfeiture." But, says IJ Senior Director of Strategic Research Lisa Knepper, "modern civil forfeiture laws, as written and as practiced, frequently fail to deliver on that promise." And we've got the receipts to prove it. This week, IJ released Policing for Profit 4, the latest and greatest edition of our landmark research into the use and abuse of civil forfeiture across the country. The report contains all the latest data that you've come to expect, as well as a timely, meaningful, and unbelievably thorough (but accessible!) analysis of forfeiture statutes, procedures, and timelines across the states and the federal gov't.

New on the Short Circuit podcast: We bring on a team of experts to address that age-old, existential question: What's your favorite circuit?

New on the Unpublished Opinions podcast: We bring on a team of experts to address age-old, existential questions: What the Heck? And, why is Afroman so great? And, why is everyone talking about swinging dicks?

  1. Massachusetts provides special-education services to all students, but students enrolled in private schools by their parents—and only those students—are forbidden from receiving the services in their schools. Private-school families: But we have a fundamental right to choose private school, and it's unconstitutional to burden fundamental rights by conditioning public benefits on forgoing those rights. First Circuit: We think the Constitution only protects Free Exercise rights from this kind of burden, not other fundamental rights. Suit dismissed. (This is an IJ case.)
  2. Is a New York City law that revives otherwise time-barred civil claims based on gender-based violence preempted by a state law covering similar claims but with a different revival window? Second Circuit: This is a question better answered by the New York Court of Appeals. Question certified! Concurrence: The answer is clearly "yes," but I begrudgingly go along with the certification because a bunch of state courts are for some reason waiting for a federal court to answer this question of state law. Read More

Free Speech

Khan v. Yale University #TheyLied Case Dismissed Because of Plaintiff's "Egregious" Litigation Misconduct

Not the misconduct itself, but noted in the court's opinion as one of the items plaintiff had sought to withhold from discovery: "During a separate text conversation on May 11, 2018, Plaintiff texted Mr. Roe: 'If I had 5 dollars for every gender, I would have 5 dollars coz women are objects.'"

|

This is the case in which the Connecticut Supreme Court held that an accuser's allegations in college disciplinary proceedings are not absolutely privileged against defamation claims in a future lawsuit. But today, Judge Kari Dooley (D. Conn.) dismissed that libel lawsuit (Khan v. Yale Univ.); here's most of the conclusion to that long opinion, which follows a detailed recitation of various misconduct:

As to the document production, while the Court agrees that the production of over 70,000 pages of largely irrelevant materials has all the hallmarks of a classic "document dump," the Court does not, on the present record, infer that it was Plaintiff's intent to forestall impending depositions or the conclusion of discovery. It certainly had that effect, and such an effect was absolutely predictable, but the misconduct was in the production itself of largely unresponsive and irrelevant documents.

The indirect publication of Jane Doe's name through precisely the same method found by this Court to be egregious and intentional is shocking. It appears that Plaintiff will not be deterred. Notably, he did not seek reconsideration of this Court's decision or findings [requiring that he not disclose the name -EV], he simply chose to ignore them. And with respect to the instant motion, he merely reiterates the arguments the Court has already rejected.

The inaccurate and false sworn Interrogatory responses reveal that Plaintiff will withhold damaging information in discovery so as to increase the likelihood of his success on the merits. As discussed above, it is clear his lawyer knew nothing of the sexual misconduct claims made against Plaintiff by women other than Jane Doe and simply relied upon Plaintiff's self-report. When questioned by the defense, Plaintiff's counsel confirmed that he had checked with Plaintiff about any other complaints. Nothing. And as discussed above, the Court finds his claim to have interpreted the Interrogatory as applying only to claims that resulted in criminal charges as straining credulity beyond its breaking point.

Read More

Free Speech

Ex-FBI-Agents Alleging They Were Fired for Working on "Arctic Frost" Can Proceed Pseudonymously

|

From Chief Judge James Boasberg (D.D.C.) yesterday in Does 1 & 2 v. Patel:

Plaintiffs are two former Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agents who allege that they were summarily dismissed from the FBI in October and November 2025 in retaliation for their assignment to "Arctic Frost," a federal investigation into a suspected conspiracy to overturn the results of the 2020 Presidential Election. Asserting that the terminations violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights, they seek declaratory and injunctive relief, including reinstatement and expungement of their personnel records. They now move to proceed pseudonymously, contending that public identification would expose them and their families to immediate risk of doxing, harassment, and physical harm and would also significantly impair their ability to perform sensitive law-enforcement work if reinstated.

The Court will grant the Motion, subject to any further consideration by the United States District Judge to whom this case is randomly assigned. See [Local Civil Rule] 40.7(f) (providing that Chief Judge shall "hear and determine … motion[s] to file a pseudonymous complaint")….

Read More

More
Make a donation today! No thanks
Yes! I want to put my money where your mouth is! Not interested
I’ll donate to Reason right now! No thanks
My donation today will help Reason push back! Not today
Yes, I’ll donate to Reason today! No thanks
Yes, I’ll support Reason today! No thanks
Yes, I’ll donate to Reason today! No thanks
Yes, I’ll donate to Reason today! No thanks
Yes, I’ll donate to Reason today! No thanks
Yes, I’ll donate to Reason today! No thanks
Yes, I’ll donate to Reason today! No thanks
Yes, I’ll donate to Reason today! No thanks