The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

SCOTUS Stays Third-Party Removal Injunction 40 Minutes After Reply Filed

It seems the Justices worked out a plan before the briefing concluded.

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On September 24, the Solicitor General sought an emergency stay, as well as an administrative stay, of the Boston District Court's order blocking third-country removals. Justice Jackson promptly issued a schedule with the briefs due on September 28, but did not grant an administrative stay. The Solicitor General, perhaps anticipating this denial, preemptively asked that the denied application should be referred to the full Court. At the time, I speculated that by virtue of Jackson's denial of the administrative stay, the case was effectively referred to the full court.

Another theory a colleague suggested is that the Justices had already discussed the case, and the four-day briefing schedule was something of a compromise. That is, Jackson could have given a week or longer, but that delay would have triggered an administrative stay. To avoid that outcome, Jackson agreed to a shorter briefing schedule. I suppose that's possible, but if Jackson was unwilling to vote for a stay, and knew there were five votes for a stay, what exactly would that compromise buy?

In any event, the Court did not wait for Justice Jackson to formally refer the case to the Court. On September 29 around 2:40 ET, the government filed its reply brief. About 40 minutes later, the Court issued a very detailed order granting a stay, treating the application as a cert petition, granting that petition, and setting the case for argument in December. The Court also requested briefing on at least three specific questions presented:

The application for stay presented to Justice Jackson and by her referred to the Court is granted. The February 25, 2026 order and judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, case No. 1:25-cv-10676, are stayed. The application is also treated as a petition for a writ of certiorari, and the petition is granted. The parties are directed to brief and argue the following questions: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over Respondents' claims. (2) Whether the district court had authority to enter classwide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U. S. C. §1252(f)(1). (3) Whether the Government's Guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U. S. C. §1231(b), the Due Process Clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations. (4) Such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. The Clerk is directed to establish a briefing schedule that will allow the case to be argued in the December 2026 argument session. The stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court. Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson would deny the application for stay.

The Justices did not need all of the briefing to grant this stay. The die was cast as soon as the application was filed.

Moreover, it is fairly rare for the Court poses specific questions presented after treating an application for a stay as a cert petition. The Court took this path in Trump v. Slaughter (25A264), Department of Education v. Brown (22A489), and United States v. Texas (22A17). The fourth proposed question is something I could not find in any other case: "Such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case." The Court may be looking for other ways to dump this case.

The interim docket continues to evolve.

Second Amendment Roundup: Bruen's Footnote 9 Not a Carve-Out from Text and History

Judge R. Nelson’s dissent from 9th Circuit’s Yukutake decision thoroughly analyzes footnote 9.

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Having found the carrying of a handgun in public to be encompassed textually in the right to "bear arms," the Supreme Court in Bruen added that the historical record compiled by New York failed to demonstrate a tradition of broadly prohibiting the public carry of commonly used firearms for self-defense or of requiring citizens to demonstrate a special need for self-defense.  It then inserted footnote 9 to that statement, explaining that "nothing in our analysis should be interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of the 43 States' 'shall-issue' licensing regimes, under which "a general desire for self-defense is sufficient to obtain a [permit]."  However, the Court warned that "because any permitting scheme can be put toward abusive ends, we do not rule out constitutional challenges to shall-issue regimes where, for example, lengthy wait times in processing license applications or exorbitant fees deny ordinary citizens their right to public carry."

In order to uphold restrictions not based on text or historical tradition, some lower courts have latched onto, and purported to find an expansive meaning in, footnote 9.  The latest example is the Ninth Circuit's September 22 en banc decision in Yukutake v. Lopez, which upheld Hawaii's requirements that handgun purchasers obtain a handgun-acquisition permit that is void unless the purchase is completed in 30 days, and the handgun is presented for physical inspection within five days at the police station.  The majority's reliance on Bruen footnote 9 prompted a lengthy disquisition on the subject by Judge Ryan Nelson, jointed by Judges Daniel Bress, Lawrence VanDyke, Bridget Bade, and Danielle Forrest.

The following are some of the leading comments on footnote 9 in Judge Nelson's dissent.  There are actually more references to footnote 9 interspersed throughout his opinion.

But the majority incorrectly holds that footnote 9 of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1…, creates a "carve-out" or "safe harbor" from Second Amendment scrutiny, and is thus analytically distinct from Bruen's framework. Maj. Op. ––––, ––––. Footnote 9 does not say that all objective regulations placed within a "shall-issue" licensing regime are "presumptively constitutional." Id. at ––––. It only addresses "public carry" regulations not at issue here. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38 n.9…. And it does not shift to the citizen the burden to prove that a law governing protected conduct has been "put toward abusive ends." Maj. Op. –––– (cleaned up). That interpretation violates Bruen's clear command that it is the government's burden to show that restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms are "consistent with the Nation's historical tradition." 597 U.S. at 24….

Instead, footnote 9 described non-abusive regulations to ensure that only "law-abiding, responsible citizens" were carrying handguns outside the home, preserved challenges when a permitting system denies citizens their right to carry, and concerned only longstanding licensing regimes. Id. at 38 n.9… (citation omitted).

Hawaii's challenged provisions are something else. Hawaii requires purchasers of handguns to obtain a handgun-acquisition permit that is void unless the permittee completes the purchase within 30 days, and it requires persons acquiring certain firearms to bring them to a police station for physical inspection within five days of acquisition. Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 134-2(e), 134-3(c). Neither regulation has anything to do with determining whether applicants are "'law-abiding, responsible citizens'" eligible for licenses to "exercis[e] their Second Amendment right to public carry." Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38 n.9 … (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 … (2008)). Indeed, the challenged laws operate after the applicant has completed a background check, firearms training course, and myriad other requirements—i.e., after he has proven himself a "law-abiding, responsible citizen"—and has been issued a permit to purchase (not carry) a handgun. And neither regulation was "longstanding" in 2022 when Bruen issued.

Footnote 9 did not create a gaping Second Amendment exemption for states to exploit with new creative restrictions that would otherwise fail Bruen's test. The majority—like most lower courts—fails to grasp (or even acknowledge) these differences. Never has a single footnote in a Supreme Court opinion been so misread by so many lower courts to deny so many Americans their constitutional rights. The statements in footnote 9 are not the genesis of a different constitutional framework; they show merely how the framework the Court has established might be applied in particular circumstances.

This case is all the worse since the challenged laws appear to be part of Hawaii's consistent and not-so-subtle attempts to end run around the Second Amendment, which suggests that these laws are abusive under footnote 9…. Hawaii has only grown more intransigent in its "blatant defiance" of the Supreme Court's clear commands on the Second Amendment. Wilson v. Hawaii, ––– U.S. ––––, 145 S. Ct. 18, 21 … (2024) (Statement of Thomas, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (citation omitted); cf. Granillo v. State, 158 Hawai'i 385, 593 P.3d 1, 28 (2026) (accusing the U.S. Supreme Court of "[m]aking the country more dangerous with a Second Amendment unmoored from text or history and unrecognizable to the framers who wrote it"); id. (Bruen was "deadly jurisprudence," and Wolford "show[ed] disdain for Hawai'i's constitutional traditions."). But Hawaii's "[m]erely local attitudes can neither shrink nor inflate the meaning of fundamental Bill of Rights guarantees that apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment." Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2050.

A correct application of Bruen to Hawaii's regulations makes this case straightforward. First, the Second Amendment's plain text covers the acquisition of arms. A person ordinarily cannot "keep" an arm without first acquiring it, and the law has long recognized that authorization of an act includes authorization of necessary predicate acts. Luis v. United States, 578 U.S. 5, 26 … (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Hawaii's statewide restrictions govern the process by which ordinary citizens take possession of handguns; possession is the core conduct protected by the "right of the people to keep … Arms." U.S. Const. amend. II (emphasis added). Second, Hawaii has not identified "a well-established and representative historical analogue" for either its short permit-use period or its acquisition-linked inspection mandate. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30…. Because Hawaii has not carried the burden Bruen places on the government, we should have affirmed the district court's judgment. I respectfully dissent.

The majority improperly side-steps the governing rule. "When the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct." Id. at ––––. The government must then "justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation." Id. The order matters. So does the allocation of burdens. The Second Amendment's text determines whether the presumption of protection attaches; history and tradition determine whether the government has rebutted it. Id. at ––––, ––––, ––––. Courts may not insert a freestanding means-end inquiry before or between those questions. Id. at ––––. It strains credulity to interpret footnote 9 as creating a separate "carve-out" or "safe harbor" from Bruen's overarching approach. Maj. Op. ––––, ––––.

Bruen guides our analysis. And we err when we cast aside Bruen's holdings for a few clarifying statements in one of its thirty-two footnotes. Footnote 9 does not address—let alone control—this case.

Situated in the Supreme Court's step two discussion, footnote 9 provides in full: [Deleted here.]

At the outset, footnote 9 addresses public-carry licensing, not every objective regulation touching firearms. The circuit courts that have read it as the latter have overread and misapplied the Supreme Court's guidance…. In other words, the inferior courts are missing Bruen's forest for a footnote's trees.

The term "shall-issue" traditionally referred only to concealed-carry permitting schemes….

Likewise, "shall-issue" was used in Bruen to distinguish objective public-carry licensing regimes from New York's discretionary carry regime….

Lower courts have misunderstood footnote 9 and expanded the term "shall-issue" to encompass all objective regulations on the purchase, possession, carry, or transfer of firearms…. But the footnote expressly and repeatedly refers to "public carry," "bearing arms," and licensing officials' discretion over concealed-carry permit applications. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38 n.9…. Those features are not present in the laws Plaintiffs challenge.

This case concerns acquisition of handguns for simple possession, including possession in the home, "where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute." Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29…. Plaintiffs do not challenge any aspect of Hawaii's highly restrictive public-carry laws or permitting scheme. See Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2046 & n.9 (Hawaii has "a tight web of laws that severely restricts the carrying of firearms for self-defense."). Nor do Plaintiffs challenge Hawaii's myriad requirements (i.e., fingerprinting, mental-health disclosures, training courses, fees, and background checks) simply to purchase a firearm in the first place.

Plaintiffs' claims target two additional rules: what happens if an already qualified permittee does not complete a handgun purchase within 30 days, and what must occur after certain firearms have been acquired. Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 134-2(e), 134-3(c). Those rules are not carry-license criteria. They have nothing to do with "guiding licensing officials" in the issuance of public-carry permits via "narrow, objective, and definite standards." Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38 n.9 … (cleaned up). Therefore, Hawaii's regulations—which apply after an applicant has obtained a permit merely to possess a handgun in the home—are wholly outside the ambit of footnote 9.

The distinction is not formalism. Public carry and home possession have different historical traditions. See id. at 45–70 …. For example, surety laws and laws banning carrying weapons while intoxicated may illuminate regulation of public carry, but they would not automatically justify a restriction on possessing a handgun in the home…. Redefining "shall-issue" as a universal catch-all for all objective firearms licensing provisions—rather than a specific type of public-carry-permit issuance regime—collapses those distinctions. Footnote 9's discussion of "shall-issue" public-carry regimes does not speak to this case.

Free Speech

Eleventh Circuit Upholds Restriction on Referring to "Settlement" of Trump v. IRS,

though concluding that the restriction is narrow.

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From Trump v. IRS, decided today by Eleventh Circuit Judges Adalberto Jordan, Robin Rosenbaum, and Kevin Newsom:

On January 29, 2026, President Donald J. Trump (in his personal capacity), Donald J. Trump, Jr., Eric Trump, and the Trump Organization, LLC, filed a complaint against the Internal Revenue Service and the United States Department of the Treasury, alleging that a former IRS employee illegally gained access to and disclosed their tax returns. The plaintiffs brought claims for violations of 26 U.S.C. § 6103 and 26 U.S.C. § 7431(a)(1) and of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10), and sought, among other relief, damages of "at least $10,000,000,000.00." …

[Not long after the filing of the complaint], the plaintiffs—through attorneys Alejandro Brito and Daniel Epstein—filed a notice of voluntary dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). In light of the self-executing nature of that dismissal, the court closed the case on the same day….

Subsequently, 35 former federal judges (the "former judges") filed a motion for relief from judgment and asked the district court to set aside the notice and order of dismissal and reopen the case. In their motion, the former judges informed the court of a settlement between the parties that had been announced by the Department of Justice. Under the terms of the settlement, the plaintiffs secured a $1.776 billion settlement fund from the Treasury, to be paid to non-parties to the litigation, and a release by the government of "any and all claims" it may or could have against the plaintiffs, as well as President Trump's family and businesses, through May 18, 2026, the date of the alleged settlement. The former judges asserted that the settlement was "a product of collusion and [wa]s itself a fraud on the [c]ourt."

In its order directing the plaintiffs to respond, the district court notified the plaintiffs of its authority to investigate misconduct as a collateral issue under Rule 11 and noted that it might impose sanctions for filing a lawsuit for an improper purpose, e.g., "for the sole purpose of forcing a settlement." In response, the plaintiffs contested the court's power to issue monetary sanctions and argued that there was no Rule 11 violation or fraud on the court because the litigation was not collusive. They did not, however, submit any affidavits, declarations, or other evidence seeking to rebut the adversity, collusion, and improper purpose concerns. Nor did they request an evidentiary hearing….

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The Supreme Court's two decades of constitutional change

"People tend to think the times they are living in are the most unprecedented and unpredictable, but that is rarely the case."

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Randy Barnett and I have started a new series on SCOTUSBlog which charts the evolution of constitutional over the past two decades. These changes largely coincide with the five editions of our constitutional casebook.

Here is the introduction:

Lawyers tend to internalize the constitutional law that existed when they attended law school. Consider a lawyer who took the course in the spring of 2005, a few months before the Rehnquist court adjourned for the last time. That lawyer learned that the Constitution protected a right to abortion, that a university could consider an applicant's race to assemble a diverse class, that courts identified an establishment of religion by applying what is known as the Lemon test, and that Congress could protect the members of an independent agency like the Federal Trade Commission from removal by the president. None of these four propositions accurately state the law today. That lawyer probably also learned nothing about the Second Amendment, which the court had not interpreted since United States v. Miller in 1939. Yet since District of Columbia v. Heller in 2008, the court has decided six major Second Amendment cases.

We have followed these changes from an unusual vantage point. Our casebook, "Constitutional Law: Cases in Context," has gone through five editions: the first in 2008, the second in 2013, the third in 2017 (when Blackman joined), the fourth in 2021, and the fifth, which will be published this December. Casebook editors work within a fixed page budget. For every case we add, we must shorten or remove another, so each edition records a judgment about which cases a student must now read. In this new series, we will discuss what has changed over the past two decades on the court. This first installment explains how much of the course has stayed the same. In the installments that follow, we take up each area of constitutional law in turn.

The conclusion is especially important:

Each generation of law students sees changes in how the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution, shaped by the conflicts of the day. Often these shifts happen slowly and even imperceptibly. Other changes happen radically in a short span. The justices control the shift. In both types of cases, the justices may not appreciate the consequences of one decision until the next case comes along.

People tend to think the times they are living in are the most unprecedented and unpredictable, but that is rarely the case. As described above, the Supreme Court decided cases during the nation's formation, conflicts over slavery, the Civil War, Reconstruction, the Progressive Era, World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II. When teaching constitutional law, it is important to keep the big picture in mind and avoid getting bogged down in the minutiae of the day.

If I may, some recent commentary about SCOTUSBlog is misguided. The same site publishes Erwin Chemerinsky and Steve Calabresi. I view that balance as progress. And journalism is not free. Virtually every site I visit now has some sort of paywall. I ultimately decided to not charge for my content, but I could only do so because I am a tenured law professor with a steady salary. SCOTUSBlog has not paid me for my contributions, but I am still happy to have my work shared on that valuable platform.

Socialism

Were the Nazis Socialist? Only in Part

The Nazis were similar to socialists supporting economic statism, but different in other key aspects of their ideology.

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National Socialist German Student League poster. (NA)

 

Periodically, debate rages over the question of whether the Nazis were socialists. As a general rule, conservatives (and some libertarians) make this accusation, while left-wingers indignantly deny it. This question has returned to prominence in recent months, and it remains worth addressing. The right answer is that the Nazis were similar to socialists in backing sweeping government control over the economy, yet different from them in rejecting racial and ethnic equality. But the difference is greater in theory than in practice.When socialists come to power, they often engage in persecution of minority groups, even though this is inimical to their ideology. There are systematic reasons for this pattern, which go beyond the idiosyncracies of individual leaders.

All of this has significant implications for current political debates, at a time when "democratic socialism" is a growing movement and much of the right has embraced statist nationalist economics.

It is difficult to deny that the Nazis (and other similar right-wing nationalist movements) embraced sweeping economic statism, including socialist-style central planning. The movement wasn't called the National Socialist Party for nothing. I summarized some of the evidence in a 2007 post, relying on then-recent academic research (later research has not changed these conclusions):

The idea that Nazism was an extreme form of "capitalism" and Hitler primarily a tool serving the interests of "big business" is a longstanding myth that even now retains a measure of popularity in some quarters. This, despite the fact that the full name of the Nazi Party was the National Socialist German Workers' Party, and that Nazi political strategy was explicitly based on combining the appeal of socialism with that of nationalism (thus the choice of name). Once in power, the Nazis even went so far as to institute a Four Year Plan for running the German economy, modeled in large part on the Soviet Union's Five Year Plans….

Two recent books further explain the socialist elements of Nazi economic policy, and will hopefully put the final nails in the coffin of the myth that the Nazis were "capitalists" or free marketeers. In The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, historian Adam Tooze describes the statist nature of Nazi economic policy in great detail, and concludes that the Nazis imposed greater government control over the economy than any other noncommunist regime in modern history. (pp. 658-60). Tooze notes that, even before the outbreak of World War II, government military spending accounted for some 20% of the GDP, while much of the rest of the economy came under government control as a result of the Four Year Plan and other similar measures.

In Hitler's Beneficiaries: : Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State, Gotz Aly argues on the basis of extensive evidence, that German support for Nazi rule was maintained by the creation of a massive welfare state funded in large part by plunder captured in Hitler's foreign conquests, but also partly by means of "soak the rich" taxation within Germany itself.

Some nonetheless persist in viewing the Nazi economic system as "capitalist" because 1) some big businessmen (such as the Krupps) supported the Nazi regime, and 2) most of the means of production remained under private rather than state ownership. It is certainly true that much industrial capital remained formally under private ownership under the Nazis. However, under the Four Year Plan and other similar policies, it was primarily the government that determined what goods would be produced, what prices would be charged, and (in many cases) who would be the consumers. "Capitalist" private firms in Nazi Germany played a role far more similar to that of socialist managers of enterprises in the Soviet Union than that of actual capitalists in a market system. The Krupps and others certainly profited greatly under the Nazis, but so too did high-ranking Communist Party enterprise managers in the Soviet Union. Neither, however, detracted from the state's ultimate control over economic production…..

These two new books are useful complements to Avraham Barkai's 1990 work Nazi Economics, which explored the ideological origins of Nazi economic policy and showed how Nazi economic theorists explicitly advocated statism, while rejecting free markets. Like some modern opponents of globalization and free trade, the Nazis viewed economics as a zero-sum game between nations, where increasing wealth for one country could, in the long run, only be achieved by impoverishing or conquering others.

More recently, economist Bryan Caplan has surveyed the data on Nazi economic policy, indicating extensive and rapidly growing government control of the economy.

But government control of the economy was not the only element of Nazi ideology. Another key facet was racial and ethnic hierarchy. The Nazis believed the state should serve the interest of "Aryan" Germans. Other groups were at best second-class citizens, and at worst slated for slavery (as in the case of Slavic peoples), or outright extermination (as in the case of the Jews).

By contrast, socialist ideology is egalitarian. The slogan "Workers of the World Unite" urges proletarians of all ethnic and national backgrounds to come together. Marx famously regarded nationalism as a form of "false consciousness." Not all socialists reject nationalism so completely. But, as a general rule, they support racial and ethnic equality and condemn discrimination. In part for this reason, historically oppressed racial and ethnic minorities have often played a role in nascent socialist movements.

The anti-Semitic trope that communism was a Jewish conspiracy is false. Most Russian Jews were not communists, and most communists were not Jews. But it is true that Jews (and a number of other ethnic minorities) were disproportionately represented among pre-1917 Russian communists. That was in part because the communists promised ethnic equality and an end to the Russian Empire's egregious anti-Semitic discrimination. Jews were similarly overrepresented in other movements promoting ethnic equality at that time, including the Constitutional Democratic Party, which sought to make Russia a liberal democracy.

Left-wingers who argue that the Nazis were not socialist like to emphasize this egalitarian dimension of socialist ideology. They have a point. But, sadly, socialist governments often fail to live up to these principles.

The Soviet Union - the world's first socialist state - is a notable example. Despite promising equality, the Soviet government ultimately engaged in massive persecution of minority groups. Stalin deported and partially exterminated various groups, such as the Crimean Tartars. Ukrainian language and culture was subjected to widespread persecution, and the state-created famine of the 1930s was in part an effort to crush Ukrainians (though millions of Russians and others also died). For many decades, the Soviet Union also promoted extensive state-sponsored anti-Semitism and discrimination against Jews, despite the fact that Jews had been overrepresented among the "Old Bolsheviks" (early leaders of the communist movement).

Such ethnic persecution and discrimination is far from unique to the Soviet Union. It was and is common in other socialist states. The Chinese communists have engaged in horrific persecution of Uyghurs and Tibetans, among others. Pol Pot's Cambodia targeted Vietnamese and other minorities for extermination. Ethiopian communists persecuted and murdered members of the Eritrean and Tigrayan minorities. And such examples can easily be multiplied.

The ubiquity of ethnic persecution - often rising to the level of deportation and mass murder - under socialist regimes, suggests a systematic pattern. Why does it happen? A key factor is that socialism requires immense coercion and concentration of power in order to function. If you intend to subject the economy to systematic central planning, ethnic and cultural minorities are a potential danger. Their distinctive practices and traditions might deviate from the plan in various ways. Ethnic groups that seek (or might seek) autonomy or secession are a particular threat to the plan, and therefore especially likely to be subjected to repression. Thus, the Soviet government's animus against Ukrainians (the largest potentially secessionist minority in the USSR), and China's against the Tibetans and Uyghurs.

In addition, socialist hatred and fear of capitalists often leads to prejudice against minority groups - such as the Jews in Europe and Chinese in southeast Asia - who are disproportionately represented in business and financial enterprises. This is how we get the distinctive far-left version of anti-Semitism, evident in Karl Marx's writings, among others.

A Soviet joke holds that a Soviet citizen who speaks only one language (usually an ethnic Russian who knows only Russian) is a good communist. By contrast, one who speaks two languages (usually a member of a non-Russian minority group, who  speaks both Russian and that group's language) is a dangerous "nationalist." And one who speaks five, is a malevolent "Zionist" (likely, a Jew). The joke well captures socialist regimes' fear and suspicion of minority groups, despite their ideological commitment to egalitarianism.

In some cases, the idiosyncratic prejudices of individual leaders also play a role. Stalin, for example, had a variety of prejudices against various groups, including Jews. But these idiosyncracies are significant in large part because of systematic tendencies of socialism. Stalin's personal views had a big impact because the socialist system required an immense concentration of power, and massive coercion. People who questioned Stalin's prejudices (many of which were genuinely at odds with traditional Marxist ideology) could expect to lose their jobs, end up in prison or a Gulag, or even be executed.

In sum, there are important commonalities between Nazis and socialists. But also an important difference, when it comes to racial and ethnic equality. But, in a tragic irony, the point on which Nazis and socialists are similar - government control of the economy - often ends up undermining the ethnic egalitarianism which is one of the few admirable aspects of socialism.

All of this is of more than just theoretical significance at a time when many right-wingers in the US and Europe are embracing statist nationalist economic policy. Racial and ethnic bigotry and persecution is a ubiquitous feature of nationalist movements, even if most don't go as far as the Nazis did. The move towards statist nationalism is the main reason for the current resurgence of anti-Semitism and other bigotry on the political right in the US.  And nationalist central planning of the economy has  other massive flaws, many of them similar to the socialist version.

On the left, "democratic socialism" has had a resurgence in popularity. Left-liberals would do well to remember that this movement's economic policies have many of the same dangers as those of right-wing nationalists. In addition, socialists' promotion of economic central planning often ends up undermining their laudable ethnic and racial egalitarianism.

Free Speech

Lawyers Shouldn't Spit in Protesters' Faces (and Police Generally Shouldn't Kick in Doors Without Warrants)

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In In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Rapkin, decided Sept. 17 by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Stephanie Rapkin was subjected to discipline by the Wisconsin OLR (Office of Lawyer Regulations) for charging a client "thousands of dollars without a valid written fee agreement in place," "fail[ing] to diligently carry out her duties," and related misconduct, as well as this unrelated offense:

The OLR's complaint next alleged that on June 6, 2020, Attorney Rapkin "spat in the face of an African-American teenager who was taking part in a protest in Shorewood, Wisconsin" [apparently a Black Lives Matter protest -EV]. This incident led to Attorney Rapkin being convicted, following a jury trial, of misdemeanor disorderly conduct….

Rapkin didn't appear to contest the charges, saying that she had retired. The court concluded that a one-year suspension was the proper disciplinary measure:

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Problems with the New US Civil Rights Commission Report on Campus Antisemitism, Part II

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In my previous post, I argued that contrary to a new US Civil Rights Commission Report, plaintiffs alleging an illegal hostile campus environment don't need to show that the hostile environment was created by individuals or groups with discriminatory animus toward the protected class plaintiff belongs to.

Thus, Jewish students subject to a hostile environment don't need to prove that the antizionist students who created the hostile environment were motivated by anti-Jewish antimus.

This raises on obvious objection: what's to stop complainants from using hostile environment law to force universities to suppress political speech that offends them so much that they can reasonably argue that it creates a hostile environment for them? Can Hispanic students, for example, argue that speech hostile to immigration and multiculturalism creates a hostile environment, even if the speakers were not motivated by, and did not express, anti-Latino animus?

As the Report acknowledges, caselaw on whether purely political speech, not targeted at particular individuals, can create a hostile environment is far from clear.

But the Report quotes me and others as arguing, in my words, that in general "the First Amendment bars university students from basing hostile-environment claims on the ideological content of political speech they might also encounter on a street corner off-campus."

So in my view, regardless of whether antizionist activist students are motivated by antisemitic animus, their actions can create a legally hostile environment for Jewish students. But also regardless of whether there is antisemitic animus, political speech by the activists that does not amount to individualized harassment, threats, or intimidation cannot be the basis of a hostile environment claim.

However, as I have also argued, in appropriate cases such speech can provide contextual evidence as to why actions like vandalism, disruptions, and threats, not protected by the First Amendment are reasonably perceived by Jewish students as threatening and creating a hostile environment.

Free Speech

Painting Graffiti on African Burial Ground National Monument Isn't Protected Speech or Religious Practice

Self-coronate yourself elsewhere.

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The case is U.S. v. Palacio, decided last week by Judge Vernon Broderick (S.D.N.Y.); for what appears to be a video put up by Palacio, see this Instagram reel. First, the facts, as alleged by the government:

On September 20, 2024, Defendant Roberto Palacio … was charged with destruction of government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361. …

The African Burial Ground National Monument … sits on a portion of what was the nation's earliest and largest African American cemetery, which was established in or around 1673. Because African Americans were prohibited from being buried in churchyards within New York City at the time, the cemetery was located outside of the then-boundaries of the city. Approximately 15,000 to 20,000 men, women, and children were buried in the cemetery. In the early 1990s, during the excavation of what would become the Ted Weiss Federal Building, 419 human remains were uncovered at the location of a portion of the cemetery. In or around 2003, these remains were reinterred on the preserved portion of the cemetery on Duane Street near Foley Square. The Monument features a granite prism that is surrounded by a circle of the diaspora, which contains 22 Adinkra symbols, each representing different African peoples and cultures. Next to these symbols, there are seven burial mounds, which contain the 419 bodies previously discovered at the cemetery.

Defendant, who is 38 years-old, has been an artist for most of his adult life and is inspired by artists like Jean-Michel Basquiat. The graffiti included words, phrases, and symbols such as "Palacio," "REINCARNATION," Olympic rings, and "The Second Art Showing: Coming TIFF TIFF," which indicated how the audience could further engage with his art show. Moreover, it also included a large crown painted in the center of the circle of the diaspora and pink paint on the Adinkra symbols. Later that same day, Palacio made a public Instagram post (the "Post") that showed the digital rendering of a pink light beam emanating from the Monument. The Post announced the opening of an "art show" running from August 12 "until they take it down" and urged people to "go check it out." The Post also described details of graffiti, including the large blue crown and the pink paint on the Adinkra symbols. Palacio added: "This was done, illegally. I Will be turning myself in, shortly."…

Palacio admitted that on August 13, 2024, he committed an "expression of art" by vandalizing the Monument. Additionally, Palacio admitted that while he had originally planned to turn himself in soon after he committed the vandalism, he later decided to wait until September 10, 2024, because there were several art exhibits happening on that day. The cost to restore the Monument totaled "thousands of dollars." …

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Problems with the New US Civil Rights Commission Report on Campus Antisemitism, Part I

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Yesterday, the US Civil Rights Commission, composed of four Republican and four Democratic appointees, with a Democratic Chair and Vice-Chair, issued a unanimous report on antisemitism on university campuses.

I find much of the legal analysis wanting, to say the least. I will have at least a few posts explaining why, starting with this one.

The Commission's Report argues that Title VI hostile environment law only reaches hostile environment discrimination when the underlying actors accused of creating the hostile environment did so with intent to discriminate against the group claiming discrimination. (The Commission alternatively describes this as antisemitic "intent," "motivation" or "animus.")

In other words, Jewish students can't bring a hostile environment claim against Harvard University unless the Harvard students who allegedly created the hostile environment did so with antisemitic intent, regardless of how the defendant, Harvard itself, reacted.

On pages 64-69, he Report cites various legal arguments, and precedents including the First Circuit's horrible opinion in Stand With Us v. MIT, for its position, but this argument has to be wrong.

Consider the following hypothetical. Harvard deploys an AI system to send out email  announcements to students, which come from an address "HarvardAI@Harvard.edu." Students are required to read these announcements, which provide notices about exam dates, new or revised academic policies, required student orientations and trainings, and other necessary information.

Unfortunately, the AI system goes rogue, and in addition to sending out mundane announcements, it also figures out which students belong to the Black Students Association, and starts sending them, along with the standard emails, regular emails with mundane titles like "New Dorm Security Rules" but containing text that contains vile, personalized racist invective.

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Supreme Court

As Suncor Approaches, Justice Alito Recuses

The petitioners appear to lose a vote they might need in Suncor Energy v. Boulder County.

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One week from today, the Supreme Court will open its term with oral argument in Suncor Energy v. Boulder County. This case, concerning whether federal law or the constitution preempts state-law claims for damages allegedly caused by climate change, is almost certainly the most significant case of the Supreme Court's October sitting, and may be among the most consequential of the entire OT 2026 term.

This morning, the Court delivered unwelcome news to the Suncor petitioners: Justice Alito is out. According to a letter to counsel from the Clerk of Court, "Justice Alito has determined that he will not continue to participate in this case."

Justice Alito's recusal is likely bad news to the petitioners as he is among the more preemption-friendly justices on the Court, having dissented in both Virginia Uranium v. Warren and Hencely v. Fluor (both of which were recent 6-3 decisions rejecting preemption). Like most observers, I have assumed that Justice Alito was among the most likely to side with the petitioners claims (along with the Chief and Justice Kavanaugh).

Justice Alito's recusal is likely a result of his ownership of individual energy company stocks. While he does not own any shares in any of the companies that are before the Court in Suncor, he does own stocks in companies that have been subject to similar suits (and has recused in other cases accordingly). So I suspect that is what caused the recusal here. What is more difficult to explain than the decision to recuse is the timing: Why now? Calls for Justice Alito to recuse were made much earlier--and were previously rejected. Assuming his stock ownership is the reason for the recusal, this should serve as a reminder that judges should own mutual funds instead of individual stocks.

Before news of Justice Alito's recusal decision broke, I participated in a Federalist Society "Seat at the Sitting" webinar in which Suncor was a major focus. For those interested, here's the video:

And for those interested, here are my prior posts on this subject:

Free Speech

Free Speech Unmuted: Can the President Kick Reporters out of the White House?

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When President Trump moved to bar CNN, MSNOW, and Politico from the White House over "biased" coverage, it set off a fast-moving legal showdown. My co-host Jane Bambauer I break down why the law was surprisingly clear-cut. Drawing on a 50-year-old D.C. Circuit precedent and a fresh ruling on Oval Office access, they explain the crucial distinction between the press briefing room (a forum where reporters can't be excluded based on viewpoint) and the Oval Office (the president's own turf, where he can talk to whomever he wants). Plus: the due process twist that let a judge sidestep the First Amendment question entirely, the White House's slow-motion compliance with the restraining order, and why "the First Amendment is not a Freedom of Information Act."

Also check out our past episodes:

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