The Volokh Conspiracy

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The Volokh Conspiracy

Court Concludes Allegation Against Rep. Max Miller Is "Substantially True" and Dismisses Defamation Claim

Rep. Max Miller (R-OH) lost more than his bid for re-election.

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I may not live in Ohio anymore, but there are some Ohio legal news stories I continue to follow. Here's one.

Soon-to-be-former Rep. Max Miller (R-OH) sued his ex-wife, Emily Moreno (daughter of Ohio Senator Bernie Moreno), for defamation. Now that suit has been dismissed, and arguably in the worst way for Miller: The court concluded that the core underlying allegation is "substantially true."

Miller filed the suit after the Daily Mail published a story reporting that Miller "hurled a pot of boiling water" at Moreno during an argument, and later wrote a note apologizing for the incident. As the court notes, an audio recording (that Miller released somehow thinking it would exonerate him) confirms the core of the claim.  From the opinion:

An audio recording of the parties discussing the incident supports Defendant Moreno's contention of truth. Defendant Moreno confronted Plaintiff about pouring "bowling hot water on me." Although Plaintiff denies pouring hot water on her neck, he further admits the incident occurred. Plaintiff specifically stated "it was never done to hurt you with intent." Plaintiffs intent is irrelevant to the basic fact of whether the incident occurred, which addresses the element of falsity.

Plaintiff maintains that the gist or sting of hurling a pot of boiling water is "categorically different" than the actions Plaintiff states actually occurred. It is Plaintiffs burden to support his claims with credible, admissible evidence. Plaintiff has not shown that the statement about dousing Defendant Moreno with boiling hot water are false. The imputation that Plaintiff poured or doused Defendant Moreno with hot water is substantially true.

The court also noted the lack of any evidence that Moreno was responsible for the Daily Mail's publication of the claims.

The court dismissed Miller's suit with prejudice and awarded costs and attorney fees. Additional litigation arising out of the Miller-Moreno divorce is pending, and it's always possible Miller will appeal. Moreno is not the first woman to accuse Miller of abuse.

More background from the Washington Post here.

[Note: As initially posted, I referred to Miller as "Former Rep. Miller." OF course, he is not yet a former representative, as his term has not yet ended, so I have updated the post accordingly.

En Banc Fifth Circuit Declares House COVID Proxy Voting Rule Unconstitutional

While purporting to offer narrow relief confined to a limited portion of the bill in Texas, the court places a bullseye on broad legislation.

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Today, in Texas v. Blanche, the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the proxy voting rule adopted by the House of Representatives during the COVID-19 pandemic violated the Quorum Clause.

The opinion, by Judge Wilson, joined by Chief Judge Elrod and Judges Jones, Smith, Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, and Oldham begins:

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the House of Representatives adopted a rule allowing Members to record their presence by proxy for purposes of establishing a quorum. The House used this rule when passing the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 (the Act), having mustered a quorum by counting hundreds of otherwise absent Members as present by proxy. The Senate then passed the bill, and the President signed it into law.

The State of Texas argues that the House's proxy-presence rule is inconsistent with the Constitution's Quorum Clause, which would mean that the House did not validly pass the Act. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. Based on that proposition, Texas seeks injunctive relief against just one portion of the Act: The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA). The federal Government responds that the enrolled-bill rule, which instructs that a bill's passage through the legislature is conclusive proof of its authenticity, precludes judicial review of whether the Act's passage complied with the Quorum Clause. Alternatively, the Government argues that the Quorum Clause permits proxy presence.

The district court held that the enrolled-bill rule did not apply and that the House's passage of the Act—through use of the proxy-presence rule —violated the Quorum Clause. Accordingly, the district court enjoined the Government from enforcing the PWFA against Texas.

We conclude that the enrolled-bill rule does not bar our review because Texas's constitutional challenge does not implicate a dispute of fact regarding the Act's passage. We further conclude that the Act's passage was unconstitutional because the Quorum Clause does not allow proxies to be included when establishing a quorum. The Clause's text, context, original understanding, and unbroken historical application all indicate that Members of Congress must be present for quorum purposes—as the Supreme Court expressly held over 125 years ago, and as Congress has done ever since the Founding. "Proxy presence" does not count. While the chambers of the legislature have much discretion regarding their rules of procedure, the Quorum Clause's constraints on congressional power cannot be circumvented by congressional fiat. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

And from its closing portions:

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Guns

Second Amendment as a Right to Sell Guns as Well as to Have and Buy Them?

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From Fifth Circuit Judges James Ho and Andrew Oldham in an unsigned opinion filed yesterday in U.S. v. Deare:

Jeremiah Deare was indicted for conspiracy to engage in the business of dealing firearms without a federal firearms license in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) and for making false statements with respect to records of licensed firearms dealers. Deare then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, broadly challenging the constitutionality of § 922(a)(1)'s licensure requirement and related record-keeping requirements.

The district court denied his motion to dismiss, holding that federal licensing and record-keeping requirements are not implicated by the Second Amendment because such requirements do not affect an individual's right to keep or bear arms. The court further held that, even if federal licensing requirements are implicated by the Second Amendment, such requirements are consistent with our Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation….

Deare primarily challenges the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Specifically, he argues that the Second Amendment's plain text covers firearm sales, and that § 922(a)(1)'s licensure requirement and related record-keeping requirements are inconsistent with our Nation's history of firearm regulation.

The plain text of the Second Amendment covers the sale of firearms. As we noted in Reese v. BATFE (5th Cir. 2025), "the right to 'keep and bear arms' surely implies the right to purchase them." During oral argument, the government conceded that the Second Amendment applies to the commercial sale of firearms.

Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order denying Deare's motion to dismiss the indictment and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

(As I read the opinion, it doesn't affect the false statements charge.)

Judge Ho concurred:

It's gratifying that our court today reaffirms what we should have long understood—that the Second Amendment right to "keep and bear Arms" plainly encompasses the sale of arms as well. It seems obvious that constitutional rights are meaningless if the Government can simply prohibit the means by which citizens are able to exercise those rights.

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Guns

Gun Rights and Guilt by Association

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Credit: Wikipedia / Welkinridge.

Some excerpts from the longish opinion today in Shilling v. County of San Diego, decided today by Ninth Circuit Judge Patrick Bumatay, joined by Judges Kenneth Lee and Jennifer Sung:

The San Diego County Sheriff revoked Kenneth Shilling's concealed-carry weapon ("CCW") license over his affiliation with the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club…. [We conclude, among other things, that] the district court improperly dismissed his First Amendment [freedom of association] claim….

Kenneth Charles Shilling resides in San Diego, California. He's a member of the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club, which, according to Shilling, was founded in 1946 by World War II veterans. In his view, it's not like some other motorcycle clubs, which are known for criminal and gang activity. Instead, the Boozefighters focus on charitable work and the "core values of family, work, and community." Shilling's record is clean; he has no criminal history.

In June 2022, when the "good moral character" requirement [for getting a concealed carry license] still existed [under California law], Shilling applied for and received a CCW license from then-San Diego County Sheriff Anthony Ray. This was short lived. Less than a year and a half later, in December 2023, a different San Diego County Sheriff, Kelly Martinez, used the "good moral character" requirement to revoke Shilling's CCW license. In a letter notifying Shilling of the revocation, Sheriff Martinez explained that the "San Diego Sheriff's Department['s] good moral character definition" excludes a person who:

Has a pattern of or propensity for criminal conduct, as demonstrated by anything in the application or investigation for a license. This includes, but is not limited to, evidence of criminal behavior or a close nexus to a criminal gang. In making this determination, the Sheriff's Department shall use an objective inquiry, considering the facts and circumstances known at the time of the application or through the investigation.

The letter said that Shilling's license was revoked due to his association with the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club, which the Sheriff described as a "criminal street gang." Shilling was not given the opportunity to contest the allegations before his license was revoked, but he could request reconsideration of the decision. The new CCW regime with the "dangerousness" requirement took effect on January 1, 2024, shortly after Shilling's license was revoked….

Here's the court's analysis allowing Shilling's First Amendment freedom of association claim to go forward:

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Politics

Short Circuit: An inexhaustive weekly compendium of rulings from the federal courts of appeal

Uncontrolled burns, false claims, and federal highway funds.

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Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

Victory! Millions of Americans want and need low-FODMAP foods, which are low in certain sugars that can cause debilitating stomach issues, aggravate irritable bowels, and worse. Fortunately, this week (following the Ninth Circuit's revival of our First Amendment challenge), the FDA lifted its ban on producers truthfully labelling their products "Low-FODMAP." Says IJ client Michelle Przybocki, who abides by a strict low-FODMAP diet after nearly dying from digestive complications, "I'm thrilled that the federal government is going to allow companies to start labeling their products as 'Low-FODMAP,' because this makes it easier for me to find foods that I know will not cause me digestive issues." Click here to learn more.

New on the Short Circuit podcast: Fancy some Elevenses? Serving up Eleventh Circuit refreshments in our #12Months12Circuits series. There's excessive bail in Alabama and excessive bar fees in Florida.

  1. Man has two DUIs decades ago in Massachusetts. He recently moved to New Hampshire and tried to buy a gun but was rebuffed due to the federal ban on felons buying such things. He challenges the ban on him buying and also owning a firearm. District court: Dismissed. First Circuit: Yeah, but he hasn't alleged an intent to possess a firearm that's been in interstate commerce, and, like, maybe a gun or two out there hasn't. Somewhere? Perhaps. So no standing. As for the whole purchasing thing, we guess there might be standing given you actually were told you couldn't buy a gun? So vacated and remanded.
  2. Cop killer spends 26 years in solitary confinement in Connecticut prison. Cruel and unusual? Jury: No. District court: Oof, that's a miscarriage of justice. Second Circuit: Grant of new trial affirmed. Read More

Free Speech

No Pseudonymity for Man Suing Trump+Rubio+Musk over Ukraine-Related Actions

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From Chief Judge James Boasberg (D.C.C.) today in Doe v. Trump:

Plaintiff Michael Doe is an American citizen whose wife and daughter reside in Kyiv, Ukraine. In March 2025, his wife and daughter were almost killed in a drone strike. On behalf of himself and a class of Ukrainian refugees, Doe sues President Trump, Secretary Rubio, and Elon Musk for violating, inter alia, a federal statute that imposes sanctions on Russia, the Take Care Clause, and the First Amendment. [The claims are apparently related to the Trump Administration's actions related to sanctions on Russia Musk's actions related to Ukraine and Starlink. -EV]

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Free Speech

Great News: 80% of Americans Get This Free Speech Question Right

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According to a Foundation for Individual Rights in Education survey, 9% of Americans have full confidence that the Democratic Party will protect their free speech rights, and a statistically indistinguishable 10% have full confidence that the Republican Party will do so. Assuming no overlap between the two groups, that means 80% of Americans do not have full confidence in either party on this, which of course is the right answer.

I've got to say that I'm skeptical about the people who said "quite a lot of confidence" to each (17% as to the Democratic Party, 12% as to the Republican Party), but at least they don't have full confidence, so there's that.

Free Speech

Some of Trump's Libel Claims Against N.Y. Times Can Go Forward

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From Judge Steven Merryday (M.D. Fla.) yesterday in Trump v. N.Y. Times Co.:

Times v. Sullivan states that the First Amendment "prohibits a public official's recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." … {[N]otwithstanding the ordinary meaning and usage of "actual malice," "allegations of ill-will, improper motive or personal animosity play no role in determining whether a defendant acted with actual malice," which "does not concern ill-will, improper motive, or personal animosity," a conclusion which appears correct, in law if not elsewhere in the English language or in the common understanding. In sum, "actual malice is not about whether the speaker had evil intent or a motive arising from ill-will."} "[F]ailure to investigate before publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person would have done so, is not sufficient to establish reckless disregard[.]" Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton (1989).

[But] "reckless disregard may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his report." "Although failure to investigate will not alone support a finding of actual malice, the purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category." …

The court concluded that a large set of statements that Trump alleges to be libelous aren't actionable, "for one or more of the many and varied reasons amply and ably explained by the defendants in the motion to dismiss." But it concludes that several statements may be actionable, even given the "actual malice" requirement:

[A]s alleged in the complaint, the book, Lucky Loser, includes these statements: (1) "Donald Trump had received the equivalent of more than $400 million from his father, much of it through fraudulent tax evasion schemes"; (2) "In the language of the tax code, Fred had given his son taxable gifts masquerading as loans, a likely tax fraud that went unnoticed"; (3) "A plan was soon devised to funnel some of Fred's cash to Donald and his three siblings. They would accomplish that goal by adding a sham layer to Fred's business, one designed to evade the gift and estate taxes"; (4) "So the Trumps began submitting the padded bills to request rent increases from state officials. Part of the cost of Donld Trump's off-the-books inheritance would be passed along to this father's middle-income tenants"; (5) "Between the trust funds, the invoice-padding operation, and other devices created to siphon off his father's wealth outside the gift and estate tax system, Donald was already collecting almost $2 million a year from his father companies. His own business failures meant he kept that money tax-free"; and (6) "Donald Trump had faced these moments before, periods when it seemed his failures could not be saved only by aggressive tax maneuvers or not paying his debts". As described in the complaint, the second article includes the statement (7) "Federal, state and local authorities looked into his ties with the Mafia, found violations of money laundering rules and penalized him for skirting stock trade rules."

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Free Speech

Didn't I See That Guy on All Those Medical TV Shows?

Plus an interesting discussion of implied facts, and Virginia libel law on the requirement that a statement sufficiently tend to damage reputation.

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From Judge Norman Moon (W.D. Va.) Wednesday in Smith v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.:

The University of Virginia's ("UVA") Post-Baccalaureate Pre-Medical Program is a one-year curriculum designed for pre-med students who did not complete all prerequisites during their undergraduate study…. The Program … boasts a 94% medical-school placement rate and, accordingly, is highly selective ….

Plaintiff … did exceptionally well [in the Program], earning a "near-perfect" GPA and a 96th-percentile score on the Medical College Admission Test …. [After finishing the Program,] Plaintiff applied to thirty medical schools …. Plaintiff asked the [Post-Baccalaureate Pre-Medical Program Committee] for a letter of recommendation. These "Committee Letters" reflect "the Program's collective institutional assessment of the applicant," scaled on a score of 1 (unable to recommend at this time) to 5 (recommended with enthusiasm)…

Plaintiff alleges that he received "highly favorable" letters from his individual recommenders, who praised his intellect, work ethic, personality, and overall potential to succeed in medical school. In contrast to these letters, however, the Committee allegedly wrote a "materially adverse" letter and assigned Plaintiff a score of 2 (recommended with reservations)….

Plaintiff was rejected by all thirty medical schools he applied to, twenty-eight rejecting him without an interview. Given his otherwise strong qualifications, Plaintiff identifies the Committee letter as the clear explanation for this failure. But not only did the letter devastate these thirty applications, Plaintiff maintains—it also "derail[ed] his entire future and eradicate[ed] his chances of pursuing a career in medicine." …

Plaintiff sued for, among other things, defamation, based on these statements from the Committee Letter:

  1. Plaintiff "would benefit from some maturing years before heading to medical school."
  2. Plaintiff "was not as consistent with keeping his shadowing assignments … as expected."
  3. Plaintiff "was not as consistent with … communicating his intended class absences as expected."
  4. Plaintiff "at times had difficulty following the flow of conversation in class."
  5. "[M]any social interactions with" Plaintiff "felt awkward or disjointed." …

The court held that "Statements 1, 4, and 5 are pure expressions of opinion":

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Emergency Powers

My New Just Security Article on "How Congress Should Constrain Emergency Powers"

The article outlines an agenda for reform.

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Today, Just Security published my article "How Congress Should Constrain Emergency Powers," which outlines an agenda for reforms curbing the dangerous growth of executive emergency powers. Here is an excerpt:

Emergency powers are special authorities that are supposed to be reserved for extraordinary, unexpected crises. But all too often, U.S. presidents have sought to turn them into blank checks they can use whenever they want. As conservative Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch recently put it, "Everything is an emergency" now. "Through delegations of authority, through emergency legislation of all stripes," he warned, power has increasingly moved "over to the executive branch"—a development he described as "not a recipe for a healthy democracy over the long term." A recent report by the progressive Brennan Center for Justice similarly warns that "presidents of both parties have stretched the meaning of 'emergency' far beyond reason, enabling them to draw from a growing stockpile of statutory authorities with few real safeguards." Both Gorsuch and the Brennan Center are right.

In his second term, President Donald Trump has engaged in especially grave abuse of emergency powers. But the problem predates his return to power, and is likely to outlast his departure from the political scene. The Democrats' massive victory in the 2026 midterm election gives Congress an opportunity to begin enacting much-needed constraints on executive emergency powers. Some of those authorities should be abolished completely. Others need tighter constraints to ensure they are limited in duration, confined to genuine emergency situations, and subject to strong, nondeferential judicial review enforcing these restrictions.

Some of the powers in question arise from the National Emergencies Act of 1976, which has been particularly prone to abuse. But others involve different legislation, such as the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Alien Enemies Act, laws governing domestic use of the military, and various statutes delegating tariff authority to the executive.

While Trump's abuses of power can provide an initial impetus for reform, there is room for potential cross-ideological cooperation here. Some of the necessary reforms have previously been advocated by conservative Republicans. Given the significant likelihood that a Democratic president might be elected in 2028, conservatives might want to take the opportunity to constrain a future administration's use of these authorities.

The rest of the article outlines reform proposals for specific statutes.

Free Speech

"Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press": "Scant Evidence: Provoking a Riot"

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I'm serializing my new Notre Dame Law Review article, "Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press: Some Illustrative Examples"; here's the second Part:

Let me turn now to a different question, as to which the evidence is intriguing but scant: Was freedom of expression understood as including expression that created resentment that risked provoking riots? (This question has of course arisen often more recently, in cases such as Terminiello v. Chicago (1949) and Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement (1992).) In fact, I hadn't seen any evidence until I came across one early case, which has been apparently virtually undiscussed during the last fifty years, perhaps because it's not on Westlaw or Lexis.

The case is Commonwealth v. Haines (1824), a decision by Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice John Gibson (later the Chief Justice), apparently sitting alone as a trial judge. Haines had been accused of intentionally causing a riot by "erecting and fixing, a certain figure, resembling a man, commonly called a Paddy, as and for the effigy of St. Patrick … with the accompaniment of a rum bottle and a string of potatoes," in "a neighborhood inhabited principally by emigrants from Ireland." "[T]he exhibition of a Paddy was resented as an insult upon the Catholic portion of the Irish …."

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Preemption

Fourth Circuit Panel Splits Three Ways on Kalshi Preemption

Three judges produce four opinions on one of the more consequential preemption questions in the lower courts.

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Yesterday, in KalshiEX LLC v Martin, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit split three ways on whether sporting event contracts offered by Kalshi are "swaps" (as opposed to sports gambling), and whether state regulation of such contracts is preempted by federal law. The court's ultimate opinion was a one sentence per curiam affirming the district court, with two concurrences and a dissent.

In the end, two judges (Gregory and Thacker) concluded state regulation of these contracts is not preempted, but split over whether the contracts at issue are "swaps." (Judge Thacker concluded they are not, but Judge Gregory concluded there is no need to resolve that question.) A third judge (Benjamin) concluded that Kalshi's sporting event contracts are swaps and are preempted. So that's two votes against preemption, and two votes that whether Kalshi's contracts are swaps should determine whether they are preempted.

Judge Gregory began his concurrence as follows:

KalshiEX, LLC ("Kalshi") brings this appeal, which presents a narrow question of federal preemption. The Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA" or "the Act") grants the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") exclusive jurisdiction over transactions involving swaps traded or executed on a designated contract market ("DCM"). 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). But Congress also enacted a separate provision elsewhere in the same Act providing separate treatment for certain event contracts specifically involving gaming, among other things, and providing that certain such contracts may not be listed or traded on a DCM. Id. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i)–(iii). The question here is whether, when read together, those provisions clearly establish that the CFTC's authority over the sports event contracts at issue excludes Maryland's traditionally recognized authority to enforce its gaming laws.

I do not decide whether Kalshi's sports event contracts are "swaps" within the meaning of the CEA. That is because, even assuming they are, neither the Act nor the CFTC's implementation of it clearly establish that such contracts are entitled to trade on a DCM free from state gaming laws. Whether the contracts are swaps bears on the scope of the CFTC's regulatory authority; it does not alone answer whether that authority is exclusive to the CFTC and displaces Maryland's concurrent authority to regulate gambling. Rather than providing a settled answer, the statutory and regulatory framework leaves unresolved the relationship between the CEA's grant of exclusive jurisdiction and Congress's treatment of gaming contracts.

Because the regulation of gambling has long been a matter of traditional state police power, I would not infer that Congress displaced Maryland's concurrent authority absent a clear expression of its intent to do so. Nor has Kalshi shown that complying with both the CEA and the Maryland law at issue would be impossible or stand as an obstacle to Congress's objective to create a centralized federal regulatory framework for trading derivative contracts. I therefore conclude that Kalshi has not demonstrated that the CEA preempts Maryland's sports wagering laws and concur in the judgment affirming the district court.

Judge Thacker concurred separately, as she saw the issues differently, only she reached the same bottom-line result. Her opinion begins:

Although I ultimately concur in the bottom line opinion, that is, affirmance of the district court, I get there via a different route than does my concurring colleague. KalshiEX, LLC ("Appellant") operates a prediction market. On that market, users enter into contracts with one another in which they try to predict whether or not a given event will occur. This appeal focuses on Appellant's sporting event based contracts. For instance, a user can predict whether a given NASCAR driver will win Talladega, or whether a college basketball team will win or lose a particular game. If the prediction is correct, the user gets paid. If not, they lose money.

In this appeal, we are asked whether Appellant's sporting event based contracts are "swaps" as defined by the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA"). In my view, Appellant's sporting event based contracts are not swaps within the meaning of the CEA. See also, KalshiEX, LLC v. Assad, No. 25-7516, 2026 WL 2543846 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2026). As a result, I would hold that Appellant's contracts lie beyond the exclusive regulatory authority of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"). Therefore, Maryland officials can co-regulate these contracts.

And Judge Benjamin, dissenting, began her opinion this way.

This case concerns whether the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA") preempts Maryland's application of its gambling laws to KalshiEX's ("Kalshi") sports related event contracts traded on a federally regulated exchange. Kalshi argues that because it operates as a designated contract market ("DCM") under the CEA, its contracts fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"). Maryland argues that Kalshi's contracts are functionally indistinguishable from sports betting and thus remain subject to traditional state authority over gambling.

This appeal turns on two issues: (1) whether Kalshi's sporting event contracts are "swaps" under the CEA and, if so, (2) whether the CEA preempts otherwise applicable state law. Because I think Kalshi's sports-related event contracts are "swaps" under the CEA, and because Congress has granted "exclusive jurisdiction" over such swaps to the CFTC, I would vacate the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction and remand for further proceedings. I respectfully dissent.

This question is certainly headed to the Supreme Court, whether in this case or one of the others. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a split decision, found preemption was likely (in reviewing a preliminary injunction), whereas the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Sixth Circuits found Kalshi's arguments for preemption unpersuasive. I am personally skeptical of preemption here, but we will see whether that is ultimately the view held at One First Street.

[Note: The post above has been revised to clarify/correct my summary of the opinions. My initial phrasing was sloppy.]

Second Amendment Roundup: Major New Film "Firearms and the AR-15 Rifle"

The mechanics and features of America’s leading rifle are explained for the bench and bar.

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"Firearms and the AR-15 Rifle: A Primer for the Bench and Bar" is the title of a new and important film designed to help judges and legal professionals understand the mechanics and features of modern firearms, including the AR-15 semiautomatic rifle. The film is available on YouTube and on Rumble. Following my brief introduction, firearms expert Richard Vasquez takes the center stage.  After 21 years in the Marine Corps as an advanced gunsmith and ordnance officer, Mr. Vasquez served for 14 years in the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), including time within the Firearms Technology Branch.  He is now a firearms consultant.

This is a critical time to inform the bench and the bar about the operation of the AR-15 platform and similar semiautomatic rifles, given the ongoing legal fights over modern semiautomatic firearms including the pending Supreme Court cases of Viramontes v. Cook County and Grant v. Higgins.  This film sticks to the facts about the operations and mechanics of modern firearms without touching upon any of the legal or political debates about the AR-15. It does a particularly good job explaining the various features found on most AR-15 rifles and does a great job explaining the differences between semiautomatic firearms and other types of modern firearms, including fully-automatic machine guns.

The film was written, directed and produced by law professor and Second Amendment scholar Mark W. Smith, who was most recently seen discussing firearms and the American Revolution on the Federalist Society annual convention panel "When in the Course of Human Events" (at 22:30).

The film begins with a historical overview of the development of firearms, from single-shot flintlocks to today's semiautomatics. The film describes the basic components of firearms and rifles, in particular.  It explains what makes gas-operated semiautomatic rifles different from lever action, bolt action and pump action rifles.  The film then goes on to show in great detail how a gas-operated semiautomatic rifle operates.

Spoiler alert:  I suspect that one of the film's biggest contributions to the public discourse on semiautomatic firearms will be its easy-to-understand graphics and animations. Thanks to many colorful images, video clips, animations as well as Vasquez's break downs of modern firearm mechanics and operations, I suspect this film will become a valuable teaching tool for people interested in firearms including judges and legal professionals.

Getting to the technical aspects, Mr. Vasquez explains the AR-15 firing mechanism, beginning with the insertion of a cartridge into the chamber, pulling of the trigger, activation of the sear, release of the bolt and firing pin, striking of the primer, explosion of the powder, discharge of the bullet, bleeding of gas causing the bolt carrier group to retract, elimination of the spent cartridge, and insertion of a new cartridge from the magazine to the chamber, thus beginning a new firing cycle.  Easy to follow diagrams of each process in that order simplify and bring to life what happens each step of the way.

Next, Mr. Vasquez moves onto the outward features typical of the AR-15 platform.  The telescoping stock allows the shoulder stock to be adjusted for different statures, such as two spouses, or seasonal clothing, like an overcoat while hunting.  The pistol grip and straight-line stock reduce recoil and muzzle jump, allowing a second, more accurate shot.  The handguard (barrel shroud) with Picatinny Rail facilitates various attachments like iron sights, scopes, and flashlights.  A threaded barrel can be equipped with a flash suppressor to reduce blindness when firing at night or with a muzzle brake to lesson recoil.

Two aspects of the operational process are worth emphasis.  First, nothing about the AR-15 rifle itself dictates the number of rounds it will fire before needing to reinsert a new magazine.  That depends on the magazine, which may hold 5, 10, 20, or 30 rounds.  Second, while firing a shot automatically loads a new cartridge into the chamber, firing the next shot requires that the trigger be pulled again.  That distinguishes a semiautomatic from a fully automatic, aka a machine gun, which requires only the trigger to be depressed and held down to fire all rounds in the magazine.

It's my belief that "Firearms and the AR-15 Rifle: A Primer for the Bench and Bar" will become the definitive documentary on the mechanics of the AR-15 and modern semiautomatic rifles.

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