The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Religion and the Law

Court Rejects Lawsuit Alleging Religious Liberty Commission Isn't "Fairly Balanced"

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From Interfaith Alliance v. Trump, decided Monday by Judge John Cronan (S.D.N.Y.):

[A.] [T]he Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA") … reflects a compromise: Congress was concerned about advisory committees being dominated by special interests, but also realized that such committees could be useful sources of advice and ideas. So instead of saddling advisory committees with endless red tape, Congress imposed relatively light requirements, [including that] a committee's membership must be "fairly balanced" in light of the functions it performs….

This case presents a FACA challenge to the Religious Liberty Commission (the "RLC" or the "Commission"), an advisory committee established last year by President Donald J. Trump. The RLC consists of up to fourteen voting members appointed by the President and is tasked with producing a report on the foundations of religious liberty in America and the current threats to its exercise.

Plaintiffs argue that the Presidentially-appointed members of the RLC are not fairly balanced ….

[B.] Plaintiffs … fail to state a claim … [in part because] the RLC's membership has a fair balance of viewpoints given the functions it performs….

Because the Court disposes of this case on those grounds, it assumes, for the sake of argument, that whether an agency's membership is fairly balanced is reviewable under the APA because it is not "committed to agency discretion." … [T]his question has deeply divided the courts ….

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A Free-Exercise Challenge to NY's Medically Assisted-Suicide Law

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A group of Catholic healthcare providers has filed a federal lawsuit seeking to enjoin enforcement of New York's new Medical Aid in Dying Act. Among other things, the plaintiffs allege that the Act, which takes effect next month, violates their rights under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.

The litigation is at a very early stage. New York has not yet responded. Still, if the statutory regime operates as the plaintiffs allege, they appear to have a pretty good free exercise argument.

The controversy concerns a practice supporters call medical aid in dying and opponents call medically assisted suicide. I will generally use the latter term because it more directly describes the act the statute authorizes: a physician provides medication that a patient may administer to himself to end his life.

New York's existing Palliative Care Information Act requires physicians and nurse practitioners to offer terminally ill patients information and counseling about end-of-life care options. The new Act authorizes an additional option: a mentally capable adult diagnosed with a terminal illness may request medication to end his life.

The plaintiffs argue that, taken together, the statutes will require medical providers to offer information and counseling about this option. Providers unwilling to counsel patients themselves must, they say, arrange for someone else to do so, or refer or transfer the patient.

The lead plaintiffs are the Carmelite Sisters for the Aged and Infirm, an order that cares for elderly and dying people. The Carmelites object not only to prescribing the medication or allowing its use on their premises--in fact, the law does not require the Carmelites to do either. The Carmelites believe that counseling, referral, and transfer would themselves constitute impermissible cooperation with an immoral practice.

Assuming the law requires what the plaintiffs allege, that forced cooperation would probably qualify as a substantial burden on their religious exercise. Under Hobby Lobby, courts generally may not second-guess a sincere religious judgment about complicity. A court could not simply tell the Carmelites that counseling or referral is too remote from the patient's ultimate decision to count as religiously objectionable.

But substantial burden is only the beginning. Under Employment Division v. Smith, a neutral and generally applicable law ordinarily does not trigger strict scrutiny.

The Carmelites argue the new law does not apply generally because it exempts hospices, which also care for terminally ill patients and address end-of-life decisions. If hospices are exempt while Catholic nursing homes are not, comparable institutions receive different treatment. New York will presumably argue that hospices are not similarly situated, perhaps because they play a different role in patient care or enter the process after broader treatment decisions have already occurred.

If the Carmelites are correct and the law does not apply generally, strict scrutiny would apply. New York would have to show that requiring the Carmelites themselves to provide or arrange the counseling is the least restrictive means of ensuring that patients receive accurate information. That may be difficult. The state could provide a website, telephone service, written notice, independent counseling system, or list of participating providers.

In short, if the Carmelites' account of the facts and the law proves correct, their Free Exercise Clause claim seems a strong one.

Behind this case is a profound disagreement about end-of-life care. Supporters emphasize autonomy and compassion for people facing severe suffering. Opponents see medically assisted suicide as inconsistent with the duty to protect life and care for patients.

These decisions are often excruciating for patients, families, doctors, and caregivers. Abstract principles can seem inadequate in such circumstances.

But that is not the issue the court is being asked to decide. The question is narrower: whether New York may require religious institutions to participate in medically-assisted suicide in ways that violate their faith.

I discuss the case in a new Legal Spirits Short Take, available here.

Politics

U Michigan Student Sues Alleging Wrongful Discipline for Unauthorized AI Use­­—But Can't Sue as a Jane Doe

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From Doe v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., decided yesterday by Judge Laurie Michelson (E.D. Mich.):

Plaintiff, a student at the University of Michigan, was disciplined her for alleged academic misconduct—an unauthorized use of AI to write course papers. She was put on disciplinary probation and required to write a 1,000-word reflective essay. Plaintiff maintains that she has "documented disabilities" including generalized anxiety disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder. She alleges that her "disability-related writing traits could be misinterpreted as AI and should not be treated as proof of misconduct." Thus, on February 9, 2026, she filed this lawsuit against numerous University of Michigan officials and instructors, claiming that the disciplinary action violated the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and her procedural due process rights….

Doe sought leave to proceed under a pseudonym (as people suing pseudonymously generally must do), but the court said no. The court rejected her claim that pseudonymity was justified by risk of reputational harm claim:

Plaintiff's contention that she would suffer "a severe stigmatic and reputational injury" if she had to litigate under her name is unsupported. Plaintiff says that "harm cannot be fully cured by later relief" if her identity tied to "alleged academic dishonesty and to mental health information[,]" is disclosed." But "[u]nsubstantiated fears of speculative harm are insufficient to outweigh the presumption of open judicial proceedings."

[And] Plaintiff's argument that "claims of academic dishonesty" would impact her "ability to practice professionally as a physician" is not a legally cognizable consideration under Porter. See Doe v. Univ. of Akron(collecting cases where courts denied requests by plaintiffs faced with academic dishonesty allegations who claim "damage to [their] reputation" and concerns about "career opportunities")….

The Court appreciates Plaintiff's situation. But many federal court plaintiffs must face disclosure of sensitive or personal information that they would likely prefer to keep private. Plaintiff fails to carry her burden to show that her case is otherwise exceptional.

The court also reasoned that the claim didn't involve matters of "utmost intimacy":

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Politics

Judge James C. Ho's Speech On "Judicial Courage" and Judicial Selection

"Nobody actually reads what people have said and written. And that’s why mistakes are made. Because if nobody reads, then it’s not about who would do the job best. It’s about who wants the job most."

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Last week, Judge James C. Ho of the Fifth Circuit delivered a stirring address at a First Liberty Institute gathering. I was very impressed by the speech, and asked Judge Ho for permission to publish his remarks. He kindly agreed. The theme of the event was "Judicial Courage," and Judge Ho discusses how courage should impact judicial selection. I will include the full post below the jump, but here is an important excerpt:

Second, consider the advice that Paul gave in his first epistle to Timothy about choosing a good leader.  Don't pick "a recent convert, or he may become conceited and fall under the same judgment as the devil."

Instead, recall what was done when it was time to replace Judas among the 12 disciples.  As the Book of Acts explains, "choose one of the men who have been with us the whole time."

In other words, don't pick the Johnny-come-latelies—the ones who only showed up after it became socially acceptable and career enhancing to do so.  Choose only from those who have been here from the beginning, even when it was hard—those who were with us, not out of convenience, but out of conviction.

So long as you've narrowed the pool that way, then it really doesn't matter who gets it—as long as they get it.

That's a far cry from how the process often plays out.  There's a saying in my chambers:  Nobody reads.  It's true in litigation.  And it's true in judicial selection, too.

Nobody actually reads what people have said and written.  And that's why mistakes are made.  Because if nobody reads, then it's not about who would do the job best.  It's about who wants the job most.

And that's exactly wrong.  It's exactly backwards.  Because I want the people who are too busy to campaign—who just want to get the work done and then go home to their families.

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Updating The Wall of Receipts For President Trump's Three Appointees

How have Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett voted over the past year on the interim and certiorari dockets?

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Most of the analysis of how Justices votes focuses on the merits docket. But there are far more votes worth tracking. In March 2025, I published a detailed analysis of how the three Trump appointees had voted on the Court since their appointment on the interim docket and on the certiorari docket. Here, I'd like to provide an updated wall of receipts for the past fifteen months.

Rulings on the Interim Docket

This list includes recent rulings on the interim docket where Justices Thomas or Alito would have granted or denied relief, and one or more of the Trump appointees were on the other side. Again, I pick up after March 2025 where my last tally concluded.

  1. A.A.R.P v. Trump (2025)- Justices Thomas and Alito would not have blocked President Trump's removal of Venezuelan nationals under the Alien Enemies Act. Justice Kavanaugh concurred in the majority's opinion, while Justices Gorsuch and Barrett were silent.
  2. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. Howe (2025) - Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch would have allowed an Eighth Circuit ruling to go into effect finding that there is no private right of action under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett almost certainly voted to grant a stay. In May 2026, the Court remanded the case to the Eight Circuit in light of Callais. My suspicion was that Kavanaugh and Barrett were hoping the Section 2 issue goes away since the Band likely has no viable case after Callais.
  3. National Institutes of Health v. American Public Health Association (2025) - Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh would have allowed the executive branch to block certain DEI grants to NIH. But, Justice Barrett only granted a partial stay, denying the majority a full fifth vote.
  4. South Carolina v. Doe (2025) - Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch would have granted an injunction pending appeal to allow a school to limit bathroom use based on biological sex. Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett did not signal their dissent.
  5. Trump v. Illinois (2025) - Justices Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch would have allowed President Trump to deploy the National Guard to Illinois to assist in immigration enforcement. Justice Kavanaugh concurred in the Court's ruling against Trump. Justice Barrett was silent.
  6. Mirabelli v. Bonta (2026) - Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh, along with the Chief Justice, granted a partial victory to parents challenging California's "gender transition" policy for students. Justices Thomas and Alito would have granted the parents' application in full. Justice Gorsuch (likely) joined the per curiam opinion, but did not write separately.
  7. GenBioPro v. Louisiana (2026) and Danco Laboratories v. Louisiana (2026) - Justices Thomas and Alito would have allowed the lower court ruling to go into effect, which blocked the shipment of mifepristone in the mails. Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett likely voted to stay the Fifth Circuit's judgment.
  8. Blanche v. Perlmutter (2026) - Only Justice Thomas would have allowed President Trump to fire the head of the U.S. Copyright Office. After Slaughter, the Court denied the application rather than GVRing it.

Denials of Certiorari

This list includes the denials of certiorari where Justices Thomas and/or Justice Alito would have voted to grant the petition.

  1. Speech First, Inc. v. Whitten (2025) - Justices Thomas and Alito would have reviewed the challenge to Indiana University's "bias incidents" response team.
  2. Hittle v. City of Stockton, California (2025) - Justices Thomas and Gorsuch would have granted a petition to revisit the McDonnell Douglas balancing framework under Title VII.
  3. Apache Stronghold v. United States (2025) - Justices Thomas and Gorsuch would have reviewed a case involving the federal government's destruction of an Indian sacred site. (Justice Alito was recused.)
  4. L. M. by and through Morrison v. Town of Middleborough, Massachusetts (2025) - Justices Thomas and Alito would have reviewed the appeal of a student who was punished for wearing a shirt that said "There are only two genders."
  5. Snope v. Brown (2025) - Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch would have granted a petition to review Maryland's ban on AR-15s. Justice Barrett was silent. Justice Kavanaugh concurred in the denial of cert, but wrote "this Court should and presumably will will address the AR–15 issue soon, in the next Term or two." The Court took two such cases about a year later in July 2026.
  6. GHP Management Corporation v. City of Los Angeles (2025) - Justices Thomas and Gorsuch would have reviewed a pandemic-era eviction moratorium as a violation of the Takings Clause.
  7. Veneno v. United States (2025) - Justices Thomas and Gorsuch would have reviewed a case challenging the federal government's plenary powers over Indian tribes.
  8. Hutson v. United States (2025) - Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch would have intervened to terminate a "longstanding and unlawful prison-building order."
  9. Alabama v. Powell (2026) - Justices Thomas and Alito would have summarily reversed an Alabama criminal case, finding there was no violation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
  10. United States v. Carter (2026) - Justices Thomas and Alito would have reviewed a District of Columbia policy that requires police to consider a defendant's race.
  11. Doe v. Hochul (2026) - Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch would have reviewed the case of a religious healthcare worker who was fired for refusing the COVID-19 vaccine.
  12. Dershowitz v. Cable News Network (2026) - Justices Thomas and Gorsuch would have granted review to reconsider the "actual malice" standard for defamation.

I will offer some commentary on this list in a future writing.

Please email me if I missed any cases.

Free Speech

Not What Judges Want to See from Litigants

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From today's sanctions order in Copycat Legal PLLC v. Peralo, by Judge David Leibowitz (S.D. Fla.), entered on the court's own initiative (the defendant is described in the Complaint as "a digital content creator who primarily focuses on producing videos in short form for his YouTube, TikTok, SnapChat, and Instagram viewers" and who claims to have "over 2 million followers across social media, 2.5 billion views and … over 4 billion impressions in polls/quizzes"):

Pro se Defendant Charles A. Peralo ("Defendant") has repeatedly failed to obey the Court's orders. Accordingly, the Court will impose a monetary sanction on him.

Rule 16(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a court may, sua sponte, "issue any just orders, including those authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(vii), if a party or its attorney … fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order." Sanctions under Rule 16 are "designed to punish lawyers and parties for conduct which unreasonably delays or otherwise interferes with the expeditious management of trial preparation." …

Defendant has repeatedly and brazenly ignored this Court's orders. On June 11, 2026, the Court denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, noting it bore indicia of AI-generated material, and ordered Defendant to file an answer to Plaintiffs' first amended complaint no later than June 25. Defendant blew through that deadline.

On July 2, Plaintiffs informed the Court that Defendant refused to participate in drafting a joint scheduling report per the Court's June 12 Order, "[d]espite at least thirteen (13) e-mail follow-ups." Plaintiffs included screenshots of Defendant's responses to those emails, where Defendant said (among other things), "[y]ou are a fat [f**cking] loser," "you are my dancing monkey," and "you're a [f**cking] moron." [All expurgations are from the court opinion itself. -EV]

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The New York Times On Heritage Foundation 2.0

With a flashback to my resignation.

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This time last year, I felt a sense of great accomplishment. The Third Edition of the Heritage Guide to the Constitution had been sent to the printers, with an expected delivery date of September 17. Even though the book was complete, my work was far from over. During the summer of 2025, I was planning the launch event for Constitution Day at Heritage, as well as a massive book signing at the Federalist Society's National Lawyers Convention. Moreover, I was producing the audio version of the book, which was to be released in a serial podcast format. Most of our authors had already come into the Heritage Studios to record their essays. Things were looking up by the day. My work at Heritage had become one of my most fulfilling and rewarding professional experiences. Then it all came crashing down.

What a difference a year makes. On December 21, 2025, I published my resignation letter from Heritage. Several of my colleagues were fired from Heritage. Others resigned noisily, but most resigned quietly. Now, the dust appears to have settled. With few exceptions, people who no longer fit at the new Heritage are no longer there. Kevin Roberts survived the scandal and is likely to endure for some time. Indeed, he has recruited new supportive Board members and appointed subordinates who support his vision. The new hires are all mission aligned. The old Heritage ceased to exist long before Tucker Carlson's infamous podcast, but now "Heritage 2.0", as it is called, is firmly established.

The New York Times Magazine has a deeply reported story, titled What the Crackup of the Heritage Foundation Says About the Post-Trump Right. The article is consistent with what I've heard over the past year, and sheds light on some items that had been less-than-clear.

Here is an excerpt about the wave of departures (both voluntary and involuntary) from Heritage:

Many employees and experts at Heritage appeared to disagree with the premise that such people belonged in their coalition, and especially that anyone was trying to set them right. Longtime Heritage employees told me that the people they usually collaborated with in congressional offices, circuit courts, foreign embassies and other institutions no longer wanted to be publicly associated with Heritage and what they perceived as its fidelity to Carlson. In a resignation letter later made public, Josh Blackman, a legal scholar who had for years been working on a new edition of "The Heritage Guide to the Constitution," said the volume's contributors pulled out of an event promoting the book and refused to sign copies. Judges who had spoken at the foundation, Blackman wrote, said "they would no longer affiliate with Heritage."

In the wake of Roberts's video, dozens of staff members departed. Eighteen of them ended up at former Vice President Mike Pence's new think tank, Advancing American Freedom, which Pence founded shortly after leaving office in 2021, as a home for more traditional conservatives. (It has attracted money and experts, if perhaps not yet a proportionate boost in cachet.)

Roberts seemed unfazed by the departures. "There are a handful, not many remaining, now former colleagues who wanted to direct Heritage's mission, its implementation of that mission, in sort of a 1980s-style way," he told me. "So, I guess it's appropriate they went to Pence's think tank." Certain scholars, particularly in the legal and economics departments, had been "used to getting their own way," he went on. "And it's good that they're gone."

I think my colleagues who left Heritage would agree that it is good they are gone.

Update: John Malcolm, formerly of Heritage and now of Advancing American Freedom, posted on X:

For the record, I didn't speak to this reporter, but her article is interesting & largely accurate. In it, Kevin Roberts says (referring to me & my colleagues who left Heritage to join Advancing American Freedom) that he's glad we're gone. I couldn't agree more. Although there are some great people who are still there, we are glad we're gone too.

Eliminate the Summer Recess

A new series on SCOTUSBlog with recommendations for Unilateral Supreme Court Reform.

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I have written about bilateral judicial reform: how can Congress and the Supreme Court work together to reform the institution? In a new series for SCOTUSblog, I take a different approach: unilateral SCOTUS reform. What can the Supreme Court, acting alone, do better? These proposals are, in large part, a series of thought experiments. Some of them are admittedly off-the-wall and are unlikely to be adopted. Others may seem such common sense that they can be readily adopted. But all reconsider the status quo and what procedures are worth keeping and which should be changed.

My first installment calls on the Court to eliminate the summer recess. Here is a snippet:

In my article Bilateral Judicial Reform, I proposed that Congress should mandate that the court hear arguments year-round. Specifically, Congress would require that the court schedule at least one public sitting for oral argument and one conference per calendar month. But this reform could also come from the court, or even from the chief justice acting alone. Although it is something of a black box how the court determines its schedule, every year the court releases a calendar indicating when there are argument days and when the court will hold private conferences. This process could slowly adjust to hosting more meetings.

The court could ease into change by scheduling a one day virtual meeting in July, in August, and in September. Virtual oral argument and conferences were held during the pandemic period. They were not ideal but were used effectively when the justices could not assemble in person. And the circuit courts of appeals routinely hold online arguments. Virtual sessions work well for my plan because the justices tend to scatter from July through September. Critically, the justices wouldn't have to alter their summer travel plans. Whatever tensions and conflicts that arise during the term can still be mellowed out as the justices get out of Dodge. . . .

The more fundamental change would require breaking the mold that all opinions must be decided by the end of June. This practice makes sense from a logistical perspective: Any cases argued during a particular term should be decided during that term. But in the long run, this concern is myopic. Supreme Court opinions establish rules for "the ages." Why should a landmark opinion argued in late April be rushed out by June? No one does their best work under time pressure. Rushed compromises can create unintended problems for generations unknown. An opinion should be released when it is ready and not accelerated to meet some artificial vacation deadline. This utilitarian calculus may offer the strongest justification to eliminate the summer recess: the justices will produce better opinions without the Fourth of July looming.

My next installment will call on the Justices to hold regular press conferences.

Politics

Heartwarming? Appalling? On Whose Part? Whatever It Is, It's Strange Indeed

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'Tis strange,—but true; for truth is always strange;
Stranger than fiction; if it could be told,
How much would novels gain by the exchange!
How differently the world would men behold!
How oft would vice and virtue places change!
The new world would be nothing to the old,
If some Columbus of the moral seas
Would show mankind their souls' antipodes.

— Byron, Don Juan

From Stewart v. Pemiscot County, decided yesterday by Judge Stephen Clark (E.D. Mo.):

This case proves the wisdom of Lord Byron, who is credited with the maxim truth is stranger than fiction.

Stewart pleaded guilty to statutory rape. Several years later, his defense attorney—now a judge—officiated Stewart's marriage to his victim. The wife of the attorney-turned-judge later successfully moved to vacate Stewart's guilty plea, arguing that it "resulted in a manifest injustice." Stewart now sues Pemiscot County and various County officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a wide-ranging conspiracy to cover up the terms of his plea agreement….

In October 2009, Stewart pleaded guilty to first-degree statutory rape …. Judge William Carter—then a private attorney—negotiated Stewart's plea agreement…. The written judgment imposed four years of a suspended sentence and four years' probation, but according to Stewart "no lifetime GPS supervision appeared," in the judgment.

Three months later, Stewart and Probation Officer Libby Banks signed a Global Positioning Agreement that mandated compliance with its terms until 2058. Stewart completed his term of probation in October 2013 without a violation. A year later, Stewart's then-attorney … filed a motion to discharge Stewart's lifetime supervision….

{[According to statements in a later proceedings,] at the time of the offense, Stewart was 17 years old and the victim was 13 years old. Seven years after the offense, Stewart and the victim married; Judge Carter served as the officiant. Stewart and his victim, now wife, had six children together.}

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Free Speech

School District Wrongly Retaliated Against Parent for Making and Publishing Video of Rainbow Pride Flag on Display in School

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Image from video depicting flag in classroom (Pruitt had redacted the teacher's face)

A short excerpt from the long opinion in Pruitt v. Grosse Pointe Public School Sys., decided Friday by Judge Robert White (E.D. Mich.):

Plaintiff Gary Shane Pruitt, a parent, attempted to raise concerns with officials from the Grosse Point Public School System (the District) about the educational environment at the public middle school his child attends. Pruitt objected to the display of rainbow pride flags in classrooms. The District officials could have listened to Pruitt's concerns and then defended a teacher's decision to display the flag. Surely, the teacher only aimed to create a welcoming environment for all her students. Instead, Pruitt's concerns were dismissed.

So Pruitt visited the school to record a video of the flag. He came with his son, after school hours, and only entered the school after receiving permission from a school employee. And despite the fact multiple school officials observed him in the school, he was never asked to leave. Weeks passed without comment or action from school officials.

Then Pruitt took his concern to a public forum—posting a video to social media showing the rainbow pride flag on display. The video included Pruitt's voiceover calling the display of the rainbow flag political and divisive, and he called on parents to "speak out" about the "radical programing" from "groomer teachers[.]" In response, the school principal initially sent an e-mail to parents, affirming the non-threatening nature of the video and identifying its publication as the "political" speech of a "parent[.]"

But public criticism followed. The District, citing complaints from staff and community members for the "disruption to the educational environment[,]" issued Pruitt a no-trespass order. A picture of Pruitt's face was posted at the entry to the school and the district threatened criminal prosecution if Pruitt violated the order.

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Justices Kagan and Barrett on the SCOTUS Leaks

All nine justices are frustrated by leaks yet confidential information somehow keeps leaking.

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Over the past decade or so, I have written quite a bit about Supreme Court leaks. For a time, Joan Biskupic had the inside scoop. Indeed, Biskupic relayed in her books that she had private conversations with the Justices. I've heard that Chief Justice Roberts, in particular, felt burned that Biskupic published information that was supposed to be off-the-record. So it goes. But after Justice Ginsburg's death, Biskupic's information largely dried up. Of course, Josh Gerstein at Politico got the Dobbs leak, but that was a one-off. Gerstein has not published any more inside information. More recently, Jodi Kantor of the New York Times has published a regular stream of information from the Court.

No matter how you slice it, the problem of leaks continues.

Justices Kagan and Barrett addressed the issue of leaks at some length during their congressional testimony (which I am just now wrapping up).

Kagan told the House Committee:

We can't engage do our business, we can't engage in confidential communication, which is the best way to operate is to be fully open with one's colleagues about one's views and if you think that those views are going to appear on the front page of the newspaper, you pull back, you don't have the kinds of conversations that I think the court really depends on to do great work. so this is something that has frustrated all of us and we are continuing to make efforts to resolve.

Kagan offered similar remarks to the Senate Committee:

The leaks "dramatically change the way we do business internally or at least has the potential to do so. The way we relate to each other depends so much on honest communication among the nine of us. And if the nine of us do not have trust in one another and don't have trust in one another and all the people who work for us, then those kinds of honest conversations that we need to do our business are not going to take place. They are at least going to be frustrated, so I think it is a problem that has frustrated every single one of the justices because of the security issues, but because it is just not the way a court should operate and not the way a court can operate if it wants to have the kind of deliberations that are the backbone of what we do."

Justice Barrett volunteered some information about the Court's new NDAs.

We are doing our best. we have instituted protocols to keep better track of who has access to document, who has touched documents when printed. We have always required employees to sign a confidentially agreement but recently we begin requiring employees to sign a nondisclosure agreement, which we do have carveouts for whistleblowers and that sort of thing, and those carveouts go beyond what federal statutes require. but we are hoping that driving the need for confidentiality home with these NDAs will just be an additional check on employees who are sharing information inappropriately and often illegally.

The Supreme Court has never publicly acknowledged that clerks are required to sign NDAs. We learned of this news from, drumroll please, a leak to the New York Times. Indeed, the Court offered no comment to the Times:

A spokeswoman for the court declined to comment about the nondisclosure agreements. She also did not respond to a question about whether the justices have been asked to sign the contracts.

The people who described the agreements spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly about court matters.

Judge Barrett has now confirmed the leak, perhaps without even realizing it. I wonder if anyone at the Court caught this.

Over the years, I speculated that Justice Kagan was at least adjacent to some Supreme Court leaks. I take Kagan's congressional testimony to be truthful, so I'll admit I was wrong. And I'll take Kagan as speaking truthfully that none of her other eight colleagues would leak information. If that's the case, then how can the leaks be explained? Are there simply rogue law clerks who are acting ultra vires, without the knowledge of their boss? Or maybe there is something short of tacit approval?

In any event, I appreciate that Kagan and Barrett have now locked in about leaks. Any clerk from their chambers would now be deluded to think their boss quietly supports a leak.

Court Packing

My New UnPopulist Article on Why "Court-Packing is a Dangerous Gambit Best Avoided"

It responds to a creative court-packing proposal put forward by Andy Craig.

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Today, the UnPopulist published my article "Court Packing is a Dangerous Gambit Best Avoided." It responds to Andy Craig's earlier article putting forward a novel plan that combines court-packing with a constitutional amendment imposing term limits on Supreme Court justices. While Craig's proposal is better and more creative than traditional court-packing plans, I argue it is still a cure more dangerous than the disease it seeks to remedy.

Here is an excerpt that briefly summarizes the rest:

Court-packing has once again become a major focus of political contention, with many on the political left advocating it in response to what they believe are badly flawed and illegitimate decisions by the Supreme Court. In a recent article for The UnPopulist, Andy Craig provides reluctant support for court-packing, but with a twist he argues will minimize the danger: combining court-packing with a constitutional amendment imposing term limits on Supreme Court justices that would—if enacted—reverse the packing. The term-limit system would give every president two appointments per term, thereby potentially producing more ideological balance on the bench.

Craig's proposal is clever and a cut above more conventional defenses of court-packing. But I remain unpersuaded. His argument falls short in multiple ways. He overrates the negative aspects of the current Supreme Court majority and underrates their positive contributions, including on the very issue of combating incipient authoritarianism, the main focus of his concerns. He also overestimates the supposed inevitability of future court-packing and the feasibility of his compromise plan. Finally, there are good alternative fixes for many of the problems that (rightly) concern Craig.

I previously criticized court-packing in a Lawfare article published last month, where I explained (among other things) why the Supreme Court's recent decision in Louisiana v. Callais doesn't justify packing. In another recent piece, I assessed "non-packing" rationales for increasing the size of the Supreme Court.

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