The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Free Speech

Trump Administration Agrees to Consent Decree in Missouri v. Biden Social Media Case

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From the Consent Decree filed today in Missouri v. Biden (W.D. La.):

As President Trump stated upon taking office on January 20, 2025, "[o]ver the last 4 years, the previous administration trampled free speech rights by censoring Americans' speech on online platforms, often by exerting substantial coercive pressure on third parties, such as social media companies, to moderate, deplatform, or otherwise suppress speech that the Federal Government did not approve." "Under the guise of combatting 'misinformation,' 'disinformation,' and 'malinformation,' the Federal Government infringed on the constitutionally protected speech rights of American citizens across the United States in a manner that advanced the Government's preferred narrative about significant matters of public debate." To prevent such censorship from recurring, Plaintiffs and Defendants agree to the terms set forth below, to be enforced upon approval by the Court, for a period of 10 years.

Individual Plaintiffs, Dr. Aaron Kheriaty, Ms. Jill Hines, and Mr. Jim Hoft, joined by the States of Missouri and Louisiana, alleged … that federal government Defendants unlawfully pressured, coerced, induced, and encouraged major social media platforms to censor their posts about Covid-19, the Hunter Biden laptop report, and the 2020 Presidential election….

The Parties … agree that government, politicians, media, academics, or anyone else applying labels such as "misinformation," "disinformation," or "malinformation" to speech does not render it constitutionally unprotected. See United States v. Alvarez (2012) (plurality op.) ("Absent from those few categories where the law allows content-based regulation of speech is any general exception to the First Amendment for false statements. This comports with the common understanding that some false statements are inevitable if there is to be an open and vigorous expression of views in public and private conversation, expression the First Amendment seeks to guarantee.")….

[T]he Government [therefore] cannot take actions, formal or informal, directly or indirectly—except as authorized by law—to threaten Social-Media Companies with some form of punishment (i.e., an adverse legal, regulatory, or economic government sanction) unless they remove, delete, suppress, or reduce, including through altering their algorithms, posted social-media content containing protected free speech….

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Free Speech

Court Dismisses Suit Against N.Y. Times & Serial Productions over The Idiot Podcast

The podcast is M. Gessen’s story about cousin Allen Gessen (who is the plaintiff in this case) and his murder-for-hire conviction. Extra juicy tidbit in this case: Venue!

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For some backstory, see this DoJ press release ("Murder For Hire Convict Sentenced To Ten Years In Prison" / "Allen Gessen Was Convicted Of Soliciting an Undercover Agent to Murder the Estranged Mother of His Children") and the N.Y. Times introduction of the podcast. From Allen Gessen v. Masha Gessen, decided today by Judge Leo Sorokin (D. Mass.); note that Allen Gessen is a lawyer, albeit unsurprisingly now a disbarred one:

This action began with a flurry of simultaneous filings by [Allen] Gessen. He filed a complaint naming himself and his children, O.G. and E.G., as plaintiffs and bringing claims against a journalist who is his cousin, The New York Times, and Serial Productions. The claims seek to prevent the publication of a podcast the defendants are producing about Gessen and his family. The complaint was accompanied by motions to proceed anonymously and to seal Gessen's submissions to the Court.

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AI in Court

$14K Sanction for Local Counsel's Not Meaningfully Supervising Out-of-Jurisdiction Counsel

with cameo appearance by out-of-jurisdiction counsel's citation of non-existent cases.

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Lawyers who aren't members of a court's bar can still usually represent clients in that court, so long as they ask for admission "pro hac vice" (for this occasion only) and engage a local counsel who is a member of the bar. Unsurprisingly, this means local counsel will be responsible for the pro hac counsel, as an opinion from Magistrate Judge Mark Clarke (D. Ore.) yesterday in Couvrette v. Wisnovsky illustrates:

The Court ORDERS [local counsel] Mr. Murphy to pay [$14,205.66, which is] 15% of Defendants' Amended Bill of Costs and Reasonable Attorney Fees. Mr. Murphy is also ORDERED to attach this Opinion and Order with any future motions for leave to appear pro hac vice in which he seeks to associate as local counsel in the District of Oregon….

Ms. Couvrette … [had] asked Mr. Murphy to serve as local counsel for Mr. Brigandi's pro hac vice admission. Mr. Murphy signed Mr. Birgandi's pro hac vice application and personally attested that he read and understood the requirements of serving as local counsel under LR 83-3….

Mr. Brigandi's son was dating Ms. Couvrette's daughter, and Mr. Brigandi had agreed to represent Plaintiffs for free. According to Mr. Murphy, Mr. Brigandi was primarily responsible for the litigation strategy and for all dispositive motions practice. Mr. Murphy explained, "[m]y role mostly involved strategizing with Mr. Brigandi and Ms. Couvrette on how to fashion a settlement in connection to the commercial property…. I believed that my expertise in landlord tenant law would be helpful." …

At issue before the Court is whether Mr. Murphy willfully violated [Local Rule] 83-3 by failing to meaningfully participate in the case. Mr. Murphy argues that the Court should not impose a sanction because he did not participate in the summary judgment briefing and he was unaware that the Local Rules required him to review his associated pro hac vice counsel's filings prior to submission.

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Free Speech

Court Dismisses Libel Claim by Ex-Hunter-Biden Business Partner Tony Bobulinski Against Ex-Trump-White-House-Aide Cassidy Hutchinson

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From Judge Emmet G. Sullivan (D.D.C.) today in Bobulinski v. Hutchinson:

The following facts are taken from the allegations in the Complaint, which the Court assumes are true for the purposes of deciding this motion and construes in Mr. Bobulinski's favor. Mr. Bobulinski is a "decorated Navy veteran and successful businessman." After his military service, Mr. Bobulinski joined Hunter Biden in or around 2017 as a business partner serving as CEO of SinoHawk Holdings, "a company designed to find investments in the United States." Mr. Bobulinski subsequently "confirmed to the United States Senate the veracity of [] emails [indicating] that Joe Biden was involved with his son's business dealings with foreign nations, and that the Biden family accepted money from foreign nations."

"On November 1, 2020, Mr. Bobulinski attended one of President Trump['s] campaign rallies in Rome, Georgia, and briefly met with Mark Meadows, President Trump's Chief of Staff, during the rally." Ms. Hutchinson served as principal assistant to Mr. Meadows; and in September 2023 published a book entitled, Enough. In the book, Ms. Hutchinson describes the meeting between Mr. Bobulinski and Mr. Meadows at the campaign rally as follows:

In the shadows of the bleachers, I observed Mark and Tony Bobulinski's interaction through a gap in the vehicles. When they said their goodbyes, I saw Mark hand Tony what appeared to be a folded sheet of paper or a small envelope.

Bobulinski alleges that Ms. Cassidy's statement is false: "at no point did Mr. Meadows hand Mr. Bobulinski any sheet of paper or envelope."

Mr. Bobulinski alleges that Ms. Hutchinson "made this accusation to imply that Mr. Bobulinski was involved with some sort of shady business dealing with Mr. Meadows," and that her commentary and juxtaposition of other facts creates a "defamatory implication." In support, he quotes the following text:

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Free Speech

Trump Administration Trying to Pressure Broadcasters Not to Schedule Football Game Broadcasts for Same Time as Army-Navy Game

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From Friday's Executive Order, "Preserving America's Game":

Section 1.  Purpose.  For over a century, the Army-Navy Game, known as "America's Game," has stood as a symbol of excellence and the American spirit.  Now, the recent and potentially ongoing expansion of the College Football Playoffs (CFP) and other postseason college football games threatens to encroach upon the second Saturday in December—a date traditionally reserved exclusively for "America's Game."  Such scheduling conflicts weaken the national focus on our Military Service Academies and detract from a morale-building event of vital interest to the Department of War.  Accordingly, it is the policy of the United States that no college football game, specifically college football's CFP or other postseason games, be broadcast in a manner that directly conflicts with the Army‑Navy Game….

Sec2.  Implementation.  (a)  The Secretary of Commerce and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) shall coordinate with the CFP Committee, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, related organizations, other appropriate Government agencies, and the playoffs' broadcast and media rights partners with the goal of establishing an exclusive window for the Army-Navy Game, during which no other college football game is broadcast.

(b)  The Chairman of the FCC shall consider reviewing the public interest obligations of broadcast licensees to determine whether those obligations would require that the Army-Navy Game remain a national service event.

Sec3.  General Provisions.… (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law ….

A few thoughts on why this strikes me as an attempt to unconstitutionally pressure broadcasters:

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Guns

Felon Gun Possession Bans, the Commerce Clause, and the Second Amendment

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In U.S. v. Williamson, Fifth Circuit Judges Jacques Wiener, Don Willett, and Cory Wilson followed Fifth Circuit precedent in holding that the federal ban on gun possession by a felon was constitutional. But Judge Willett, joined by Judge Wilson, added this concurrence:

I remain doubtful that our precedent rejecting enumerated-powers challenges to § 922(g)(1) was correctly decided. As a threshold matter, "Congress has no power to enact a comprehensive criminal code, … § 922[(g)], like every other federal statute, must be based on one or more of Congress's powers enumerated in the Constitution." The Interstate Commerce Clause is a "natural first place to look." But the Clause's original meaning—adherence to which is "[t]he first and most important rule in constitutional interpretation" —does not support § 922(g)(1).

Consider the ratification debates. How could the Federalists have assured skeptics that Congress lacked power to infringe individual rights —including the right to "keep … Arms"—if the mere exercise of that right were itself enough to trigger federal power? If mere possession sufficed, the Commerce Clause would quietly—but completely—confer the very general police power the Constitution withholds from Congress.

To be sure, the Supreme Court has embraced an "expansive interpretation of the commerce power." But even that understanding extends only to "three general categories of regulation"—none of which includes "[m]ere possession of a firearm." [The concurrence cited Gonzales v. Raich (2005), which listed the "three general categories" as "regulat[ing] the channels of interstate commerce," "regulat[ing] and protect[ing] the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and persons or things in interstate commerce," and "regulat[ing] activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. -EV] For that reason, I remain open to reconsidering our precedent insulating § 922(g)(1) from enumerated-powers challenges.

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Free Speech

Journal of Free Speech Law: "Making Broadcast Content Regulation Aggressive Again," by Stuart Minor Benjamin

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The article is here; some excerpts from the Introduction:

Starting in the 1980s under President Reagan, the FCC curtailed or abandoned most of the content regulations of broadcasting that it had earlier promulgated. That pattern continued through the Biden Administration: Such regulation was largely dormant. Statutes regulating content existed (although, with the episodic exception of indecency, they were interpreted narrowly). But regulations created by the FCC were either repealed (notably the fairness doctrine), never applied (e.g., the broadcast hoax rule), or applied so rarely and weakly as to be toothless (e.g., the broadcast news distortion policy).

Broadcast television may seem like a relic of the past to some readers of this Article. But it garners more than 20% of all television viewing, and the legal issues it raises are important. The developments presented in this Article highlight important questions about the desirability of regulation and tell an instructive story about roads taken and not taken.

There are two key elements of the legal landscape for broadcasting. First, every license is for a term of years and then is subject to renewal under the statutory "public interest, convenience, and necessity" standard. The same public interest standard applies to any application to transfer a license from one entity to another, which means that any corporate merger or acquisition involving licenses requires the FCC finding that the transfer is consistent with the public interest. And, as judicial opinions and Commission practice make clear, the public interest standard extends well beyond concerns about competition.

How can the FCC exercise such pervasive control over a means of communication? That implicates the second key element of the legal landscape—Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.

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Free Speech

Divided Ninth Circuit Upholds California Exclusion of Religious Curricula from Parent-Designed Charter School "Independent Study Programs"

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From Woolard v. Thurmond, written by Judge Andrew Hurwitz and joined by Judges Eric Miller and Jennifer Sung, and released in slightly amended form yesterday:

California provides free public education through its common schools. It long did so through brick-and-mortar schools owned and operated by public school districts. In 1992, California authorized the establishment of charter schools, "public schools funded with public money but run by private individuals or entities rather than traditional public school districts."

Like traditional public schools, charter schools can provide non-classroom-based instruction, including "independent study" programs, in which parents provide home-based direct instruction approved by the school and coordinated, evaluated, and supervised by state-certified teachers. To participate in these programs, parents must enter into a contract with the school specifying the objectives, methods of study, and methods used for evaluating student work. The school is then required to provide appropriate materials and services necessary to achieve the agreement's objectives.

The plaintiffs … are parents and guardians of students enrolled in independent study programs at two California charter schools who requested that the schools purchase and permit the use of sectarian curricular materials for instruction in the programs. The schools rejected those requests because California law provides that "sectarian or denominational doctrine" shall not "be taught, or instruction thereon be permitted, directly or indirectly, in any of the common schools of this State," Cal. Const. art. IX, § 8, and that "a charter school shall be nonsectarian in its programs." The plaintiffs claim that the rejection of their request pursuant to those laws violates the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses ….

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The First Rule Of Traveling Is Never Stop Moving

Never wait until it is too late.

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This week is a busy travel period. Sunday evening, I flew from Houston to Phoenix. Monday afternoon, I spoke at the Arizona State FedSoc chapter on a panel about antisemitism. Tomorrow, I have a FedSoc double-header in North Carolina: UNC Law at lunchtime and Duke Law in the evening. And Wednesday I am speaking to the Triangle Lawyer's Chapter in Raleigh. I fly back to Houston on Wednesday.

As you may have heard, airports are a bit of a mess now. Fortunately, so far I have avoided the mess.

On Sunday, I was closely tracking the wait times at various check points at IAH. For a brief period, the Pre-Check line was open at Terminal A with a short wait. Even though my flight was out of Terminal C, I could easily connect via the Skyway. My Uber driver took me to Terminal A. But there was so much traffic we couldn't make it up the ramp. (The backup was due to people spilling out of the terminal onto the street.) So I hopped out of the car, got my suitcase from the trunk, and walked into the garage. On the ground floor of the airport there was this massive queue. A signed indicated the wait from that point was more than two hours. I did not get on that line, knowing the Pre-Check line was shorter. I walked around baggage claim, and up a different escalator that took me to the departures area. Because I had TSA Touchless ID, I had no wait at all. I was through security in about a minute, even as posted wait times stretched three hours.

Monday presented different travel challenges. The problem today had nothing to do with TSA. Here, I can blame American Airlines. My talk was from 12:15-1:15. My flight from PHX to RDU (Raleigh-Durham) was scheduled to depart at 4:15. That gave me a leisurely gap. As is my practice, early in the morning, I checked the inbound flight (coming from Denver), and the inbound flight to the Denver flight (coming from Charlotte). Early on, I saw that the Charlotte leg was delayed by about 3 hours and in turn the Denver leg was delayed by 3 hours. My own flight was not yet delayed, but I knew it was coming. Around 11:30, American sent an alert with the delay, and allowed me to cancel my ticket with a refund to the original form of payment. That's all I needed to hear. American was anticipating a potential cancellation. Shortly before I had to walk over to ASU, I researched other options. I was in an American hub, so I figured flights to Charlotte would be more frequent. Charlotte is a 2.5 hour drive from Chapel Hill. Close enough. I could pre-order an Uber from CLT to Chapel Hill.

I found a flight from PHX to CLT leaving at 2:50. My event would finish at 1:15, so I would need to hustle. And if there was a long line at the airport, I would be even more squeezed. For a last minute fare, the rates were high, but not crazy. The difference between the coach fare and the business class fare was only $300, which I purchased. There were only a handful of middle seats in the back of the plane, which I would struggle with. Plus I knew I would need every minute. A business class ticket relieves the pressure, as I can board later and still have overhead space for my bag.

I was nervous about long waits at the airport. I compulsively checked the wait times for PHX at various junctures and noticed that the lines never exceeded 20 minutes or so. As I would later find out, the ICE Police were taking on many of the duties. At my checkpoint, ICE was helping people put their items in bins and ushering them through medical detectors. No, they were not asking for papers. I know some people had nefarious thoughts, but the assistance smoothed the process. I made it through security in a few minutes. I even had time to get some food for the four-hour flight.

I would use that four-hour flight productively. I read the entire Watson transcript and wrote a post about the case. At present (around 11:15 ET), I am in the Uber on my way to Chapel Hill. I should be there shortly after midnight. My original flight took off about 40 minutes ago, and will land around 3:00 AM. So yes, all this work to get to the hotel about three hours early. But I avoided the angst of waiting by a gate for four hours. That flight could just as well have been cancelled, and I would have been stuck in Phoenix for one more night.

I do not anticipate the shutdown will be resolved in the next 48 hours, so I I've already made provisions for Wednesday when I fly home. Clear lets you book a "concierge" experience where they will meet you at the curb and escort you through security. In most cases, paying $99 for this service seems like an absolute waste of money, but if it saves a two-hour wait, it is well worth it. Alas, IAH has no available concierge slots left for the foreseeable future. Either they are all booked, or the service has been disabled. I have one event next week, and already told the chapter that if there are four hour waits at the airport, I will have to switch to Zoom. Indeed, I worry that I could not even make my return flight given the finish time of the event and potential delays.

In sum, the first rule of traveling (as Gary Leff often says) is to never stop moving. Always be proactive, and never reactive. Keep an eye on all options, have backup plans, and don't be afraid to change travel plans on short notice. And never try to fit a tight connection. It's not worth it. In all my years of traveling, I have unexpectedly gotten stuck in a city overnight once. It was, fittingly enough, in Phoenix more than a decade ago.

It's Elementary, My Dear Watson

The 2000 and 2020 elections are still on the Justices' minds.

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In October, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections. This case considered the narrow question of whether a congressional candidate had standing to challenge the state's policy that counts ballots received after election day. At the time, I observed that the Court was suffering from PTSD after the 2020 election. The Justices were seriously concerned about litigation after election day that could flip the result. The Court's decision in January 2026 reflected these concerns. The Justices allowed the pre-election challenge to go forward in large part to avoid chaotic eleventh-hour litigation that could change the outcome of a race. The three opinions in that case were not very persuasive but it seemed clear to me that the Justices were concerned about the practical consequences of a contrary ruling.

Paul Clement argued Bost. And Clement would come back to the podium today for round two in Watson v. RNC. This case focused on the merits questions: can Mississippi count ballots that arrive after election day?

It was an unusual oral argument. A deep red state was defending a permissive voting law that was opposed by the RNC. Moreover, the state was represented by Solicitor General Scott Stewart, a former Justice Thomas clerk, who argued Dobbs. I don't think Stewart ever expected to be on the receiving end of sharp questions from Justices Thomas and Alito, while Justice Sotomayor tried to bail him out.

During a colloquy with Justice Barrett, Sotomayor gave Stewart a pep talk: "You're getting caught up, counsel, again. Could you go back to the question? Justice Barrett is not arguing with you." Justice Alito even seemed to counsel Stewart against agreeing with Justice Sotomayor too much: "Justice Sotomayor is asking you what I think she intends to be a friendly question, but maybe you want to think about whether you want to go that far." By contrast, Paul Clement was right at home. My favorite line of the day from Clement was, "Well, not surprisingly, Justice Thomas, you are exactly right." Always a good answer.

During a somewhat recent oral argument, a conservative litigant was having trouble, and fought one of Justice Thomas's hypothetical. I told my student that when you are on the right, the only acceptable answer that you can give to Justice Thomas is "Yes, your honor, that is correct." On the left, Solicitor General Prelogar made an art form of answering "yes" to Justice Sotomayor's string of leading questions.

Back to Watson. Like in Bost, the Justices are still suffering PTSD from the 2020 election. They are profoundly concerned that late-arriving ballots could "flip" an election and the loser would lose confidence in that race. Even though the Justices denied cert on all of Trump's petitions from 2020, they likely saw the potential for bedlam. They might worry this issue could recur in a very, very close race.

Indeed, Bush v. Gore came up several times. At one point, Justice Sotomayor said if late-arriving military ballots were not counted in 2000, "maybe we should have another president now because." Clement replied, "So, with all due respect, that is the reddest of red herrings because what happened in the 2000 election." Tell us how you really feel, Justice Sotomayor! Well to be precise, a President Al Gore would have been term limited many years ago, but I suppose as a counterfactual, a term of President Gore may have affected who won subsequent elections. In all likelihood, Justice Souter would have stepped down in June 2001, likely giving Judge Sotomayor an earlier promotion.

My initial take on Watson was that the Justices would reverse the Fifth Circuit, but I think it likely that the Justices affirm, at least in part. Justice Barrett was concerned about the issue of whether a ballot could be "recalled" by USPS or FedEx. In other words, a vote could be cast by the deadline, but then "uncast," thus changing the bottom line vote. Barrett asked if only that part of the law could be struck down. I'm not sure what gets a majority here.

Here are some of the highlights:

JUSTICE ALITO: Do you think it's legitimate for us to take into account Congress's desire, Congress's passage of the Election Day statutes for the purpose of combatting fraud or the appearance of fraud and will and some of the briefs have argued that confidence in election outcomes can be seriously undermined if the apparent outcome of the election at --on the day after the polls close is radically flipped by the acceptance later of a big stash of --of ballots that flip the election or --yeah.

John Eastman could not be reached for comment.

Justice Gorsuch again asked about mail-in votes swinging an election:

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, in my hypothetical, which, you know, you say is unlikely to swing an election and all of that on recall, but as soon --you know, if --if history teaches anything, scant or not scant, it's that as soon as something's allowed, it will happen eventually, right? And --you know, so --so somebody -my hypothetical happens and everybody recalls their ballots. I'm just not sure what recourse the state would have against people who violated its anti-recall law.

Justice Kavanaugh quoted Professor Rick Pildes who wrote about how late-arriving ballots could "destabilize" an election:

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And then picking up on Justice Alito's questions, Professor Pildes and others have said that late-arriving ballots open up a risk of what might destabilize the election results. "If the apparent winner the morning after the election ends up losing due to late-arriving ballots, charges of a rigged election could explode. The longer after Election Day any significant changes in vote totals take place, the greater the risk that the losing side will cry that the election has been stolen."

Pildes responded that "I didn't take any position in these writings, nor have I elsewhere, about whether the federal election-day statute pre-empts state laws that permit post-election day receipt of absentee ballots, as long as they have been postmarked by election day." Rather, his analysis was based on "policy considerations."

Kavanaugh returned to the theme of appearance of fraud and confidence in elections:

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Justice Gorsuch's Recusal in Glynn Environmental Coalition v. Sea Island Acquisition

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One of my favorite hobbies is scanning the Supreme Court's orders list and trying to figure out why a Justice recuses. Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Jackson will indicate whether the recusal is due to prior government service or something to that effect. The other justices offer no explanation at all. Even then, it is usually easy to figure out the recusal. For example, Justice Alito has disclosed the ownership of certain stocks, which will often trigger recusals. In other cases, such as St. Isidore, we can speculate about a recusal due to a personal relationship. But then there are some recusals that are tougher to figure out.

In today's orders list, Justice Gorsuch recused in Glynn Environmental Coalition v. Sea Island Acquisition. The case came from the Eleventh Circuit, so there was no obvious recusal from prior service. And I was no aware that Gorsuch held stock in either company. So I did a little digging.

It turns out that a decade ago the Respondent Sea Island Acquisition was purchased, in part, by The Anschutz Corporation. The Sea Island Hotel is now affiliated with the Broadmoor Hotel in Colorado. The ties between Justice Gorsuch and Philip F. Anschutz have been well documented, and led to his 2024 recusal in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition. v. Eagle County, Colorado. I would wager that Gorsuch's recusal here is Anschutz related.

There was no brief in opposition to certiorari filed here, so there was no disclosure form. I wonder how this case was flagged for a recusal? Does every cert petition get filtered by the Court for possible conflicts?

Free Speech

Court Rejects Women Inmates' Objections to California Law Related to Housing of "Transgender, Nonbinary, or Intersex" Inmates

The court's reasoning mostly turns on a conclusion that much of the prison behavior that plaintiffs complained about wasn't dictated by that particular law.

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From today's long decision by Judge Jennifer Thurston (E.D. Cal.) in Chandler v. Macomber:

[S]ix women incarcerated in California women's prisons … challenge a California law [S.B. 132] that dictates how prison officials and staff must address and house inmates who identify as transgender, nonbinary, or intersex. The plaintiffs allege that this law has forced … California prison officials … to transfer dangerous and violent people from men's prisons into women's prisons, simply because those people say (sometimes untruthfully) that they are transgender, nonbinary, or intersex. The plaintiffs also object more generally that they will be forced to share intimate spaces with transgender, nonbinary, and intersex inmates.

{Krystal Gonzalez alleges she was sexually assaulted by a person she describes as "a trans-identifying biological male inmate" who transferred into her housing unit, although she does not say exactly when. She reported the assault, but "staff failed to pursue her report," ignored the grievance she filed, and accused her of wrongdoing, i.e., of "willful misgendering" the inmate who assaulted her. In her experience, transgender inmates "rush to engage in sexual relationships with female inmates" when they arrive in the women's prison and sometimes put on a "feminine" affect in the presence of prison guards, only to revert to "masculine habits" when guards are away.

Janine Chandler alleges she suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of domestic and sexual abuse she experienced at the hands of her former husband and other relatives. She alleges "the presence of criminal, intimidating males gives her flashbacks of her violent husband." She is Muslim, and her faith "instructs her not to be unclothed with unrelated males," but as a result of S.B. 132, she alleges that she might now be required to undress in the presence of people who she considers to be men.

Tomiekia Johnson also suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of sexual assault and domestic violence in her past. She alleges the presence of transgender inmates exacerbates her condition. Less directly, she alleges she has witnessed or heard about sexual harassment and an attempted rape by an transferred inmate, who she describes as a "large man who dresses and grooms masculinely and is not interested in making any effort to present as a woman." Johnson was not the victim, but she alleges the prison did not reprimand or move the perpetrator away from the alleged victims; instead prison officials placed Johnson and the other accusers in solitary confinement and have accused them of making false reports, including in connection with this very lawsuit. Johnson also alleges that she is eligible for resentencing and a commutation but has been denied parole "for political reasons."

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Free Speech

Justice Sotomayor on the Freedom of the Press and the Right to Ask Questions

The Justice largely agrees with Fifth Circuit Judge James Ho's dissenting opinion below, but writes alone in dissenting from the Supreme Court's decision not to consider the case.

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From Justice Sotomayor's dissent from the denial of certiorari today in Villarreal v. Alaniz, which strikes me as quite persuasive:

Petitioner Priscilla Villarreal is a reporter who was arrested for doing something journalists do every day: posing questions to a public official. Specifically, Villarreal twice texted with a police officer to corroborate information Villarreal already knew about events that had occurred within her community. That officer voluntarily provided the information Villarreal sought, and Villarreal published those facts, consistent with her role as a journalist.

Six months later, Villarreal was arrested for asking those questions. {Villarreal [was accused] of violating Texas Penal Code Ann. §39.06(c), which states that "[a] person commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit …, he solicits or receives from a public servant information that: (1) the public servant has access to by means of his office or employment; and (2) has not been made public." In the 23 years since the statute was enacted, there is no documented arrest in Webb County, let alone conviction, for violating §39.06(c).}

Making matters worse, Villarreal alleges that the arrest followed a months-long effort by a police department and district attorney's office to retaliate against her because they disliked much of her reporting on their activities. Of course, that reporting was often critical of them.

It should be obvious that this arrest violated the First Amendment. Yet the Fifth Circuit held that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity, and now Villarreal is left without a remedy. The Court today makes a grave error by declining to hear this case….

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Free Speech

S. Ct.: Police Had Qualified Immunity for Use of Wristlock on Capitol Sit-In Protester

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From Zorn v. Linton, decided today in an unsigned per curiam opinion:

On the Governor's inauguration day in Vermont, protesters staged a sit-in at the state capitol. When the capitol closed for the day, police officers told them that they would be arrested for trespassing. They refused to leave. As officers removed the protesters one by one, Sergeant Jacob Zorn asked Shela Linton to stand up and warned her that he would eventually have to use force to remove her. She refused to stand.

Zorn took Linton's arm, put it behind her back, placed pressure on her wrist, and lifted her to her feet. Linton sued Zorn for using excessive force, claiming that the arrest left her with arm injuries and psychological disorders. The Second Circuit held that Zorn was not entitled to qualified immunity. We reverse….

Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from suit under § 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly established law. "A right is clearly established when it is 'sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.'" A right is not clearly established if existing precedent does not place the constitutional question "'beyond debate.'"

To find that a right is clearly established, courts generally "need to identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances … was held to have violated" the Constitution. The relevant precedent must define the right with a "high degree of specificity," so that "every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply." Principles stated generally, such as that "an officer may not use unreasonable and excessive force," do not suffice. In short, officers receive qualified immunity unless they could have "read" the relevant precedent beforehand and "know[n]" that it proscribed their specific conduct.

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Free Speech

Journal of Free Speech Law: "Anti-Zionism and Title VI: College and University Responsibility," by David E. Bernstein

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The article is here; the Introduction:

Since Hamas's October 7, 2023 attack on southern Israel, the start of the subsequent war in Gaza, and an outbreak of campus protests expressing vehement hostility to Israel, dozens of universities across the United States have faced lawsuits, administrative complaints, and federal investigations alleging dereliction of their Title VI duty to protect Jewish students from discrimination. These Title VI claims typically include allegations that universities have been deliberately indifferent to the way actions by anti-Israel protesters have created a severe and pervasive hostile environment for Jewish and Israeli students.

Public attention has focused on perceived hateful speech by anti-Israel protesters. This includes slogans seen as calling for the destruction of Israel (e.g., Arabic chants of "From River to the Sea, Palestine is Arab"); speech that is often interpreted as calls for violence against Israel, Jews, and their supporters (e.g., "Globalize the Intifada" and, in Arabic, "Khaybar Khaybar oh Jews, the army of Muhammad will return"); expressions of support for Hamas in general (e.g., "Glory to the Martyrs") and its October 7 crimes in particular (e.g., flyers that feature paragliders, glorifying the Hamas terrorists who massacred Israelis after flying into Israel on paragliders); and pro-Hamas events on October 7, 2024, the anniversary of the massacre.

Judicial decisions and scholarly commentary have tended to frame the Title VI claims primarily as conflicts over political expression of this sort by anti-Israel protesters. In late 2023, the federal Department of Education advised university officials that in the context of anti-Israel protests, constitutionally protected speech alone can create a hostile environment that universities are obligated to address, albeit without suppressing speech.

Much of the subsequent debate, in courts and otherwise, has been over whether rhetoric widely perceived as antisemitic or as endorsing violence in the abstract can ordinarily support hostile-environment liability without violating the First Amendment. Jewish students' claims should be rejected, some argue, as objections to rhetoric the students find deeply offensive but that is constitutionally protected. A recent attention-getting article asserted that Jewish students' claims may not ordinarily rely—even merely as evidence of an overall hostile campus climate—on campus protesters engaging in such incendiary rhetoric.

This Article argues that prevailing analyses of post-October 7 Title VI claims are incomplete and are often legally mistaken because they ignore or misinterpret a central element of hostile-environment doctrine: context. Hostile-environment law asks whether conduct is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies students access to educational opportunities. This inquiry is contextual and depends on the "constellation of surrounding circumstances."

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Free Speech

Court Refuses to Block Continued Distribution of DOGE Witness Deposition Videos

"[T]he materials at issue concern the conduct of public officials acting in their official capacities, which substantially diminishes any cognizable privacy interest and weighs against restriction."

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From Authors Guild & Am. Council of Learned Societies v. National Endowment for the Humanities, decided today by Judge Colleen McMahon (S.D.N.Y.):

Defendants … move for entry of a protective order in the aftermath of Plaintiffs' decision to publish on the internet video recordings of four depositions taken during discovery in these consolidated actions. The videos—totaling approximately twenty-five hours of testimony—were posted publicly on YouTube and on the websites of Plaintiffs American Council of Learned Societies and Modern Language Association. The Government objected to their dissemination, particularly in light of reported harassment, even threats, directed at the witnesses and members of their families after the videos were posted.

On March 13, 2026, the Court issued an interim order directing Plaintiffs to remove the videos and to cease further dissemination pending full briefing, argument, and resolution of the dispute. The videos have since been taken down.

The Government now seeks a protective order prohibiting Plaintiffs from republishing the recordings and restricting Plaintiffs' dissemination of any discovery materials that are not filed on the public docket. The Government is correct that the videos are not judicial documents and so carry no presumption of public access.

But they are also not covered by the existing protective order in this case and, absent a court order, could be publicly disseminated by any party in the ordinary course. The issue is therefore whether the Government has carried its burden under Rule 26(c) to justify restricting that dissemination. It has not.

The Government's motion for a new protective order is therefore DENIED….

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