The Volokh Conspiracy

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The Volokh Conspiracy

Politics

The Fifth Circuit and the Louisiana 10 Commandments Law

The en banc court pushes pause--for now

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For the past year or so, those of us who follow the Religion Clauses have been waiting to see what courts would do with Louisiana's Ten Commandments law in Roake v. Brumley. Now we have an answer—though not a final one. A couple of weeks ago, sitting en banc, the Fifth Circuit vacated an earlier panel decision and dismissed the case on ripeness grounds. It's a technical ruling (though sticklers may dispute that ripeness is merely "technical"), but it's also revealing, because it shows that whether schools may display the Decalogue will depend on how the practice actually operates in context.

Here's the background. In 2024, Louisiana enacted a statute requiring every public school classroom to display the Ten Commandments. The law specifies the text to be used and requires a statement describing the Commandments' historical role in American education, but it leaves the details largely to local school authorities.

Parents filed a pre-enforcement challenge in federal court. They argued the displays would violate the Establishment Clause under Stone v. Graham, the Supreme Court's 1980 decision striking down a similar Kentucky requirement. The district court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction, and a Fifth Circuit panel affirmed. The panel reasoned that lower courts remain bound by Stone unless and until the Supreme Court overrules it.

In its ruling, the en banc Fifth Circuit declined to reach the constitutional question. Because no school district had yet implemented the law—no posters are on classroom walls yet—the court held that the dispute was premature. In effect, the court said, we need to see how this actually works in practice before we can decide whether the displays violate the Establishment Clause.

This ruling sidesteps a deeper doctrinal question. The Stone Court relied heavily on the Lemon framework, particularly the idea that government may not act with the purpose of promoting religion. The Stone Court also emphasized the special features of the public-school setting: students are a captive audience and especially susceptible to state-sponsored religious influence.

But the Court's more recent Establishment Clause cases have moved in a different direction. In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022), a school prayer case, the Court rejected the Lemon framework and instructed courts instead to look to the nation's "history and tradition," though the Kennedy Court also emphasized coercion—whether students are pressured to participate in religious exercise—as a central constitutional concern.

The difficulty is this: the Supreme Court has not overruled Stone, but it has abandoned the doctrinal foundation on which Stone rests. Lower courts are left reading the tea leaves. The Fifth Circuit panel resolved the tension one way—follow Stone until the Supreme Court says otherwise. The en banc court found a different solution. It avoided the merits altogether and ruled the case unripe until concrete facts exist.

That ripeness holding is technical (there's that word again), but I think it's analytically significant. It suggests that context will matter a great deal under the Court's newer approach. Details such as the age of the students, the way the display is presented, and whether it is integrated into instruction will all shape the constitutional analysis.

Sooner or later, a school district will implement the Louisiana statute. When it does, litigation will resume—this time with an actual record. Courts will then have to confront the central question directly: Is Stone still good law after Kennedy?

I discuss the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in more detail in a short Legal Spirits podcast episode, which you can listen to here.

The First Question From The Florida Supreme Court's Newest Member: "Is your position more like Justice Gorsuch in Bostock or Justice Alito in dissent?"

The answer: "I think Justice Gorsuch was wildly incorrect."

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Florida Governor Ron DeSantis recently appointed Judge Adam Tanenbaum to the state supreme court. This will likely be DeSantis's final appointment to a Court he has completely reshaped. This seat faced some stiff competition. It was reported in Bloomberg that the Governor was looking for a "bloodthirsty" originalist. I think he got one.

In a speech, Tanenbaum said "I subscribe to the fixation thesis and the constraint principle." I would wager that most law professors have no clue what those things are. When you put a bloodthirsty originalist on the bench, litigants better be ready.

Yesterday, Tanenbaum had his first oral argument. The case was not particularly controversial. It turned on the meaning of the word "enterprise" in the state RICO statute. Aruging on behalf of Florida was Jason Muehlhoff, the deputy Solicitor General. Muehlhoff is no squish. He clerked for Judge VanDyke and worked at Gibson Dunn in Dallas. So here you have a very conservative judge asking questions of a very conservative lawyer.

Jump ahead to the 9:00 minute mark.

I have taken the liberty of transcribing the exchange:

Justice Adam Tanenbaum: Counselor: Your brief for your approach to the text in some ways resembles Justice Gorsuch's approach in Bostock. Just looking at the text, and ignoring the context in which the statute was enacted. You start by focusing in particular on [the meaning of] "enterprise" and what was going on in 1977. Can you explain, is your position more like Justice Gorsuch in Bostock or Justice Alito in dissent?

Deputy Solicitor General Jason Muehlhoff: It is certainly not Justice Gorsuch your honor. It is more along the lines of what Justice Alito and Justice Kavanaugh had in dissent, and understanding the provisions as they are naturally read. . . . I think it's safe to say this is how Justices Kavanaugh and Alito would approach it.

Justice Tanenbaum wasn't done. About ten minutes later, at the 20:30 mark, he returned to Bostock.

Justice Tanenbaum: That's why I asked, going back to my Bostock question, it seems like you are pushing this with blinders on. You're just looking at the words themselves in a definition and ignoring the context of the entire statute and what the statute is. RICO is a very particular type of crime and it was well known at the time in the 1970s what was going on and what the federal government and the Florida government was trying to get at. You are focusing on the definition of "enterprise" and look we can go after one individual, unrelated to anyone else that is trying to embark on some sort of criminal endeavor, it is just him. . . .

Muehlhoff: This Court has said time and time again that broad purposes of statement must yield to the clear text….

Justice Tanenbaum: That's what Gorsuch said too.

Muehlhoff: I think Justice Gorsuch was wildly incorrect, but that was because of the specific text of the statute.

This is a stunning exchange, not because of the briefing from the Florida Supreme Court, but because of how poorly Bostock has been received. I don't know if there is any decision in recent Supreme Court history that has aged worse than Bostock. As a matter of substance, the Court has walked back the ruling in Mahmoud and Mirabelli, and will walk it back further in Chiles and the Title IX cases. As a matter of doctrine, not a single conservative would hold up Bostock as the proper way of doing textualism. The pirate flag of textualism barely flutters.

At this point, Bostock has become a laughingstock, so much so that a conservative judge asks a conservative litigant to disavow a Supreme Court precedent on how to read statutes. Of course, that ruling is not binding on the Florida Supreme Court. It is a fun academic question whether the Supreme Court can even set a precedent of how to engage in originalism or textualism. (Tara Grove suggests that the Court lacks the power to impose any methodology.) But I couldn't help but chuckle at this exchange to see how Bostock fares in the real world.

Guns

The Zizians and the Second Amendment

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For the backstory on the Zizians, see Investigations Into 6 Killings Look to a Fringe Group Known as the Zizians (N.Y. Times, Remy Tumin & Kate Christobek), which notes, among other things, that "The group's goals aren't completely clear but online writings about their beliefs touch upon veganism, artificial intelligence and gender identity."

From U.S. v. LaSota, decided today by Judge James Bredar (D. Md.); LaSota is Ziz, the Zizians' apparent leader:

Pending before the Court is Defendant Jack LaSota's Motion to Dismiss Count One of the Indictment. {The Indictment names Defendant as "Jack LaSota" and the Government uses male pronouns to refer to LaSota in its briefing. However, LaSota states that her name is "Ziz LaSota" and that she is a transgender woman who uses female pronouns. The Court refers to Defendant as "Jack LaSota" here to match the Indictment but will use female pronouns to refer to her, in accordance with her preference.}

According to the Indictment, LaSota was a fugitive from justice, and while knowing that she was a fugitive from justice, she possessed multiple firearms as well as ammunition. Specifically, she is alleged to have possessed a scoped .50 caliber rifle, a 9×19mm handgun, approximately 420 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition, and approximately 54 rounds of 9×19mm ammunition.

In their briefing, the parties provide several additional background facts. They explain that LaSota was previously charged in state criminal proceedings in California and Pennsylvania. In these cases, LaSota was charged with one felony and multiple misdemeanors. LaSota claims that all of the alleged criminal conduct was nonviolent. The Government explains that LaSota missed court hearings in both cases, so in both of them, bench warrants were issued for her arrest.

Then, in February 2025, LaSota was found with the above-described firearms and ammunition, and she was arrested by Maryland local police. A federal grand jury then charged LaSota with being a fugitive from justice in possession of firearms and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2). LaSota's Motion to Dismiss argues that § 922(g)(2) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both on its face and as applied to her case….

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Free Speech

Court Blocks Florida Gov. DeSantis's Executive Order Designating CAIR as Terrorist Organization

The order "prevents CAIR or 'any person known to have provided material support or resources' to CAIR 'from receiving any contract, employment, funds, or other benefit or privilege'" from Florida state or local governments.

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From CAIR-Foundation, Inc. v. DeSantis, decided yesterday by Judge Mark Walker (N.D. Fla.); the analysis seems correct to me:

The question before this Court is whether the Governor can, in a non-emergency situation, unilaterally designate one of the largest Muslim civil rights groups in America as a "terrorist organization" and withhold government benefits from anyone providing material support or resources to the group. This Court finds he cannot…. The Governor's decree coerces third parties, under threat of losing government benefits, to disassociate from the Council on American-Islamic Relations ("CAIR"), thereby closing avenues of expression and suppressing CAIR's protected speech….

On December 8, 2025, Governor Desantis signed Executive Order 25-244 titled "Protecting Floridians from Radical Islamic Terrorist Organizations" (the "EO"). The EO designates CAIR as a terrorist organization and prevents CAIR or "any person known to have provided material support or resources" to CAIR "from receiving any contract, employment, funds, or other benefit or privilege" from executive or cabinet agencies or from any county or municipality of the state….

Where a government uses the "threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion … to achieve the suppression" of disfavored speech, it functionally creates "a system of prior administrative restraints" that bears "a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan (1963). A government official "cannot do indirectly what [he] is barred from doing directly: … coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on [his] behalf." Nat'l Rifle Ass'n v. Vullo (2024). The present case bears all the hallmarks of unconstitutional coercion that the Supreme Court identified in Bantam Books and Vullo….

Defendant's EO threatens those who platform, collaborate with, or otherwise provide support to Plaintiff. The "vice of the system" here is the same one the Supreme Court proscribed in Bantam Books. There, threats and coercion subjected the distribution of publications "to a system of prior administrative restraints" untethered from any procedural safeguards. [A state commission had threatened bookstores with prosecution if they continued to distribute certain books that the commission had found "objectionable." -EV] By imposing the specter of punishment on intermediary book distributors, the state "directly and designedly stopped the circulation of publications in many parts of" the state. This case is no different.

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Interview with Judge Lawrence VanDyke at the University of Florida

We talk about his background, his path to the bench, and why he does things differently on the Ninth Circuit.

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Today I interviewed Judge Lawrence VanDyke at the University of Florida Federalist Society Chapter. (I am also in town for the Originalism Conference). Judge VanDyke and I had a wide-ranging conversation about his background, his path to the bench, and why he does things differently on the Ninth Circuit. I think people who have only read VanDyke's sharp-elbowed dissents will be surprised at how he comes across in person. The judge offers some useful advice on failure and how to learn from setbacks.

Oregon

Twenty-Four States Led by Oregon File Lawsuit Challenging Trump's Section 122 Tariffs

The massive new tariffs are illegal, just like the IEEPA tariffs previously invalidated by the Supreme Court.

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Today, 24 states led by the state of Oregon filed the first lawsuit challenging Donald Trump's massive new Section 122 tariffs, which would impose 15% tariffs on most imports from nations around the world. The case is before the US Court of International Trade, which has exclusive jurisdiction over cases challenging tariffs. The complaint is available here.

I have previously written about why the new tariffs are illegal, much as were the IEEPA tariffs invalidated by the Supreme Court in the case I helped litigate on behalf of the plaintiffs. Here is an excerpt from my recent Boston Globe article explaining why the Section 122 tariffs are illegal:

Section 122 only permits tariffs for up to 150 days in response to "fundamental international payments problems" that cause "large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits" or "an imminent and significant depreciation of the dollar," or are to cooperate with other countries in addressing an "international balance-of-payments disequilibrium."

As conservative legal commentator Andrew McCarthy explained in National Review, none of these legal preconditions to the use of Section 122 exist….

A balance of payments deficit can only arise in a fixed exchange-rate system, like the one the United States had before 1973, when the federal government took part in the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates backed by US gold reserves. In that situation, the United States could experience a shortage of official currency reserves when demand for dollars at the fixed rate increased, or a shortage of gold arose. Since the introduction of floating exchange rates in 1973, that problem has been eliminated. As Nobel Prize-winning monetary economist Milton Friedman explained in 1967, "a system of floating exchange rates completely eliminates the balance-of-payments problem. The [currency] price may fluctuate but there cannot be a deficit or a surplus threatening an exchange crisis." When Section 122 was enacted in 1974, it was not yet clear whether the flexible exchange rate system would continue indefinitely. Since it did, Section 122 has never been used until now….

The three conservative justices in the majority in [the IEEPA] decision cited…. the "major questions doctrine," which requires Congress to "speak clearly" when authorizing the executive branch to make "decisions of vast economic and political significance."

They concluded that IEEPA did not clearly grant the president sweeping tariff authority. But the same is true of Section 122. At the very least, it is far from clear that it authorizes the president to impose 15 percent tariffs on goods from virtually every nation in the world, in a situation vastly different from that which inspired the law. And the effects of Trump's Section 122 tariffs would be large enough to qualify as a "major question." Within 150 days, the tariffs would impose some $30 billion in taxes on American businesses and inflict serious damage on the economy by raising prices and disrupting production in industries that depend on imports.

That figure would be much greater if Trump can extend the tariffs after the deadline expires. And if he can claim that "fundamental international payments problems" and a balance of payments deficit exist even when they obviously do not, he could likely reimpose the tariffs indefinitely, simply by issuing a new proclamation soon after the prior one expires.

Elsewhere in the article, I also explain why these tariffs violate the nondelegation doctrine.

I am far from alone in concluding that the Section 122 tariffs are illegal. As noted above, Andrew McCarthy takes the same view. See also these more extensive analyses by Phil Magness and Marc Wheat  in National Review and and Stan Veuger and Clark Packard in Foreign Policy, among others.

Oregon also led the state lawsuit challenging the earlier IEEPA tariffs, which was eventually consolidated with our own. I commend Oregon Attorney General Dan Rayfield and Solicitor General Ben Gutman for their leadership in this important cause.

I will almost certainly have more to say about this case later. It is also likely this will not be the only lawsuit challenging the new tariffs.

UPDATE: This may be the first time a lawsuit filed by blue state governments quoted Milton Friedman:

As Milton Friedman predicted in the 1960s:

[A] system of floating exchange rates completely eliminates the balance-of-payments problem—just as in a free market there cannot be a surplus or a shortage in the sense of eager sellers unable to find buyers or eager buyers unable to find sellers. The price may fluctuate but there cannot be a deficit or a surplus threatening an exchange crisis.
Milton Friedman & Robert V. Roosa, The Balance of Payments: Free Versus Fixed Exchange Rates 15 (1967).

As noted in the complaint and in my earlier Boston Globe article, Friedman's analysis explains why the kind of balance-of-payments crisis needed to invoke Section 122 simply cannot exist in a flexible exchange rate system.

Iran

My New Dispatch Article on "Why Donald Trump's Iran War is Unconstitutional"

The article explains why the war requires congressional authorization,and why this requirement is important.

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Today, The Dispatch published my article "Why Donald Trump's Iran War is Unconstitutional." Here is an excerpt:

The large-scale U.S. military attack on Iran (undertaken in collaboration with Israel) is blatantly unconstitutional, even if its wisdom and morality are more debatable.

Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the exclusive power to declare war. One can debate the extent to which presidents can initiate relatively small-scale military actions, and such debates have raged for decades. But this attack is obviously large enough to qualify as a war. Thus, it just as obviously requires congressional authorization. President Donald Trump got no such authorization, nor did he even try….

The framers of the Constitution deliberately gave Congress exclusive control over the power to initiate war. As James Madison put it, "[i]n no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found than in the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the executive department … [t]he trust and the temptation would be too great for any one man."

Alexander Hamilton—Madison's great rival and the leading champion of broad executive power among the Founders—actually agreed with Madison on this point. Defending President George Washington's 1793 proclamation of neutrality in the then-raging war between Britain and France, Hamilton wrote that "the Legislature have a right to make war" and therefore it follows that it is "the duty of the Executive to preserve Peace till war is declared." Hamilton and Madison…. were united on the proposition that no one man could take the nation to war, and that the executive must refrain from initiating such a conflict without congressional authorization….

This consensus undermines claims by modern advocates of untrammeled executive war powers that Congress' authority to declare war was just a power to declare a technical legal state, leaving the president free to initiate large-scale hostilities at will. The whole point of giving Congress the power to declare war was to ensure the executive could not start a massive conflict on its own, as European monarchs routinely did….

This limitation on presidential power is more than just a technical legal point. The requirement of congressional authorization for the initiation of war is there to ensure that no one person can take the country to war on his own, and that any major military actions have broad public support, which can be essential to ensuring that we have the will and commitment needed to achieve victory against difficult opponents. Trump's failure to seek and secure that kind of broad public support has ensured that only about 27 percent of Americans approve of this military action, compared to 43 percent who disapprove, according to a Reuters poll. Other surveys show similar results. This is a historically low level of public support at the start of a major military action and bodes ill for U.S. staying power if we suffer reverses or a prolonged conflict results.

Later in the article, I rebut the oft-made claim that the War Powers Act of 1973 somehow authorizes the president to start wars:

Many… argue that Trump's actions are authorized by the War Powers Act of 1973. But the WPA is a limitation on presidential power, not a grant of it. Enacted in the wake of real and imagined presidential abuses during the Vietnam War, it requires the president to secure congressional approval within 90 days of entering U.S. troops into "hostilities" or situations "where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." The purpose of this requirement is to constrain even small-scale combat deployments that might otherwise not require congressional authorization, because they fall short of being a war. Section 2(C) of the WPA makes clear that the statute does not expand presidential war initiation authority, emphasizing that "[t]he constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces." None of these three preconditions exist in the current situation.

The article also address nonoriginalist arguments against requiring congressional authorization for war, such as claims that it would prevent the US from taking enemies by surprise, arguments that Congress cannot act fast enough when needed, and more.

Courts

How the Supreme Court's Conception of Its Role Contributes to the Deformation of the Constitution

The Court's law-declaration approach not only departs from its dispute-resolution premise but risks yielding a faulty product.

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[The last of four blog posts drawing on this week's Hallows Lecture at Marquette Law School.]

This final blog post about the role of unstated legal ideas in deforming the Constitution involves a third unstated idea, beyond either the part played by the "three buckets" idea, combined with the "unitary executive" theory, or the contributions of various delegation theories. This unstated idea concerns the Supreme Court's conception of its role.

Students of the Court have identified two polar ideas about how the Court conceives of its role. One, which should be familiar, is called dispute resolution. The Court conceives of its job as resolving disputes between adverse parties, especially when the lower courts have disagreed about the proper disposition of the matter. The second, which commentators have labeled "law declaration," conceives of the Court's role as identifying certain important legal issues and resolving those issues without actually deciding disputes between adverse parties; instead, the Court concentrates on clarifying contested questions about the law and lets the lower courts sort out how to apply the law in the case at hand.

The Court's conception of its role in its recent opinions must be regarded as mixed; if one were in the mood to be uncharitable, one might call it schizophrenic. On the one hand, the Court insists that the authority of federal courts must be confined to resolving disputes. This is encapsulated in the law of standing. Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, can only hear actual cases and controversies between adverse parties. The plaintiff must show that it has suffered an injury that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, the defendant's action caused the injury, and a ruling for the plaintiff would make the injury go away. Every term, the Court declines to decide one or more cases for failing to qualify for standing under this elaborate matrix of factors.

On the other hand, once the Court concludes that the standing requirements have been met, it increasingly shifts to the law-declaration mode. The Court grants review only in cases presenting questions of general importance, it concentrates on resolving those questions, and having done so it sends the case back to the lower courts to apply the new or clarified understanding of the law to the facts presented by the case.

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Tariffs

US Court of International Trade Orders Refund of All Illegally Collected IEEPA Tariffs

Importantly, the Court ordered payment of refunds even to those businesses who have not filed a lawsuit to claim them.

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Today, in the case of Atmus Filtration, Inc. v. United States, Judge Richard K. Eaton of the US Court of International Trade ordered the Trump Administration to refund all tariffs illegally collected by the Trump Administration using the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA). On Monday, in V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, the case I helped bring that led to the invalidation of the IEEPA tariffs by the Supreme Court, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit unanimously rejected the Trump Administration's efforts to delay lower-court proceedings on repayment. It is notable that all 11 judges of the en banc Federal Circuit agreed, including the four who voted against us on the merits when the Federal Circuit ruled on the case last year.

The federal government owes some $175 billion in tariff refunds to importers who paid them, and they  repeatedly promised they would refund them money if they lost the case - a point which was crucial to their argument that appellate courts should stay the trial court injunction blocking further illegal tariff collection, while the litigation proceeded. Each month the government delays repayment costs taxpayers some $700 million in accumulated interest payments.

Significantly, Judge Eaton ordered payment of refunds to all those businesses that paid illegal tariffs, not just those who filed lawsuits to reclaim them:

Plaintiff's entries are among the millions of entries that were entered subject to IEEPA duties, which the Supreme Court ruled unlawful in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 2026 WL 477534 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2026). All importers of record whose entries were subject to IEEPA duties are entitled to the benefit of the Learning Resources decision.

In Trump v. CASA, Inc., the Supreme Court held "that universal injunctions are impermissible." 606 U.S. 831, 865 (2025). That holding, however, does not apply to the orders that will be issued in this case. The Court's discussion of "whether, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal courts have equitable authority to issue universal injunctions" does not constitute a legal direction to this Court. Nearly 200 years after the Judiciary Act of 1789, the United States Court of International Trade was established pursuant to the Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). To that end the Court was provided with national geographic jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581.

The Court was also given exclusive subject matter jurisdiction to hear claims like those presented in this case. This exclusive jurisdiction was recently acknowledged by the Supreme Court. See Learning Res., Inc., 2026 WL 477534, at *6 n.1 ("We agree with the Federal Circuit that the V.O.S. Selections case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the [United States Court of International Trade]."). That is, the parties to a case in no other court will be bound by this order.

Moreover, when establishing this Court, Congress cited "[c]onsiderations of judicial economy, and the need to increase the availability of judicial review in the field of international trade in a manner which results in uniformity without sacrificing the expeditious resolution of import-related disputes." 126 CONG . REC. S13344 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini). The Constitution requires this uniformity. U.S. CONST . art. I § 8, cl. 1 (providing that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States").

Finally, the Chief Judge has indicated that I am the only judge who will hear cases pertaining to the refund of IEEPA duties. So there is no danger that another Judge, even one in this Court, will reach any contrary conclusions. To find otherwise would be to thwart the efficient administration of justice and to deny those importers who have filed suit the efficient resolution of their claims, and to deny entirely importers who have not filed suit the benefit of the Learning Resources decision.

I agree that a universal injunction makes sense here. Otherwise, we will have many months of needless litigation and delay, to the detriment of both businesses victimized by the tariffs and taxpayers who will be on the hook for additional interest payments. I think Judge Eaton's distinguishing of Trump v. CASA's ill-advised strictures against universal injunctions also makes sense. However, the universal injunction ruling may well be challenged on appeal. Thus, we probably have not yet seen the end of litigation over IEEPA tariff refunds.

Stepping back from the more technical legal issues, I would note that the Trump Administration can easily resolve the refund issue simply by giving up this legal fight and issuing refunds to all those forced to pay the illegal tariffs. That would not be hard to do. The government has a record of all the payments and who made them. Calculating interest also is not difficult. The government could just make electronic payments or send checks to all those entitled to them.

Ultimately, the government illegally seized billions of dollars and therefore must pay them back.  If I unjustly and illegally take your property, I have a duty to give it back, and pay interest. The same principle applies when the federal government does it. You don't have to be a legal theorist or a tariff expert to grasp this simple point.

As various commentators have pointed out, it may not be possible to compensate all the victims of the illegal tariffs. For example, there is no established procedure for compensating consumers who paid higher prices, workers who were laid off because their employers had to cut back production, and more.  Even tariff-paying businesses like our clients in the V.O.S. Selections case will not be compensated for lost sales, disrupted relationships with supplies, loss of investments, and more. The noncompensable nature of harms like these is one of the reasons why courts erred when the stayed the Court of International Trade injunction against the tariffs issued when we won our initial trial court victory in May 2025, at a time when IEEPA tariffs had only been in force for a few weeks. As I explained at the time:

One factor courts consider in assessing a motion to stay is which side is likely to ultimately prevail on the merits….

Another key factor is which side is likely to suffer "irreparable harm" if they lose on the stay issue. We argue that our clients - and thousands of other businesses - will suffer great irreparable harm if a stay is imposed. They will lose sales due to higher prices, good will can be lost, relationships with suppliers and investors will be disrupted, and more. Those harms can't be made up merely by refunding tariff payments months from now, after the appellate process concludes.

It is too late to reverse the mistake courts made on the stay issue, and too late to prevent all the harm that error caused. But the best should not be the enemy of the good. Refunding illegal tariffs to those who paid them is not perfect justice. But it's far better than nothing.

NOTE: As I have previously noted, I am no longer a member of the V.O.S. Selections legal team, because my role ended after the Supreme Court issued its decision. Thus, I am not involved in the refund phase of this litigation.

Free Speech

Court Dismisses Discrimination Claims Against Northwestern Over Alleged Post-Oct. 7 Anti-Semitism

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[1.] From Judge John Robert Blakey's decision yesterday in Doe v. Northwestern Univ., the allegations in the Complaint (note that at this stage they are of course just allegations):

In the days following [the October 7] attack, several members of Northwestern's faculty in Evanston posted about the attack on social media, with one stating "resistance is justified when a people are occupied." Another professor, Steven Thrasher, said a New York Times story on sexual assault allegations relating to the October 7 attack was "widely discredited," and noted that a story by the Guardian was disturbingly "similar."

School programs like the Northwestern Women's Center and the Asian American Studies Program also made statements on social media. The Women's Center shared a brochure from the Palestinian Feminist Collective with short articles on protests and advocacy, protest chants, hashtags like #AlAqsaFlood, and website links to suggested readings about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Asian American Studies Program made a statement on Islamophobia and disputed reports that Hamas had "beheaded babies." Student groups like Students for Justice in Palestine ("SJP") issued statements accusing "Zionists" of "whitewashing" and legitimizing the "genocide" of Palestinians, which several Northwestern faculty members signed onto.

Northwestern maintains a satellite campus in Qatar ("Northwestern Qatar"), through which students and faculty in Evanston and Qatar may visit the other campus in exchange programs. At Northwestern Qatar, faculty also posted on social media about the Hamas terror attack. Professor in Residence Khaled AL-Hroub called for a Third Intifada to "sweep away the occupier," while an assistant professor in residence tweeted the "chain must be broken," in reference to the Hamas incursion into Israel. AL-Hroub also participated in a radio interview where he said he had not seen "any credible media reporting" that Hamas killed women and children on October 7th, prompting Northwestern to issue a statement condemning the "attempt to minimize or misrepresent the horrific killing of Israeli civilians by Hamas."

On April 25, 2024, student demonstrators at Northwestern's Evanston campus organized an encampment of tents, protest signs, and flags on Dearing Meadow, the campus' central lawn. Within the encampment, several individuals dressed up as members of Hamas, demanding to know whether others spoke Hebrew. Some of the signs featured blatant antisemitic imagery, like a slashed-out Star of David or a drawing of Northwestern's President Schilll—a Jewish man—with horns and blood dripping from his mouth.

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SCOTUS Resolves Two-Way State Court Split About New Jersey Transit

The New York Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is reversed.

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Today the Supreme Court decided two related state court cases. The question presented was whether New Jersey Transit is an arm of the New Jersey government, and therefore protected from suit by sovereign immunity. The New York Court of Appeals (the highest court in New York) found that NJ Transit was not an arm of the government. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the transit agency was an arm of the government.

Through Justice Sotomayor's unanimous decision, the Supreme Court resolved this two-way split by favoring New York's holding.

This pair of cases arises out of two accidents, one in New York City and one in Philadelphia, in which New JerseyTransit buses struck and injured people. Both victims sued New Jersey Transit, a corporation created by the New Jersey Legislature, in their respective home courts in New York and Pennsylvania. The highest courts in those States diverged as to whether New Jersey Transit is an arm of New Jersey. The Court granted certiorari to resolve whether New Jersey Transit is an arm of New Jersey and thus entitled to the State's sovereign immunity. It is not. Accordingly, the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is affirmed and the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is reversed.

It is rare enough for the Supreme Court to actually resolve a circuit split among state courts. These splits can linger for years. It is rarer still for the Court to settle a split in a single decision. It is rarer still that, in the same week, the Supreme Court rules in favor of Staten Island, but against its cross-river-rival, New Jersey. Look around, look around. At how lucky we are to be alive right now.

Moreover, there is an emergency docket angle. Back in September 2025, the New Jersey Solicitor General sought an emergency stay to block a trial from proceeding against NJ Transit in New York state court. Two weeks later, the Court granted an emergency stay:

Application (25A287) for stay presented to Justice Sotomayor and by her referred to the Court is granted. The Court has already granted certiorari on the sovereign immunity issue decided below, and the pending damages trial before the Supreme Court of the State of New York would be barred if New Jersey Transit Corporation were entitled to sovereign immunity from suit. Respondents, on the other hand, identify no tangible irreparable harm they would face if the trial were delated until after this Court decides the pending case. The trial scheduled for September 15, 2025, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County, is therefore stayed pending the issuance of the mandate of this Court in NJ Transit Corp., et al. v. Colt, Jeffrey, et al., case No. 24-1113, and Galette, Cedric v. NJ Transit Corp., case No. 24-1021.

Here, the Court stayed the trial, even though the Court would go on to unanimously rule that NJ Transit lacked sovereign immunity. This is a case where emergency relief was granted based on the risk of irreparable harm, and not the likelihood of success on the merits.

Marco Rubio Threatens to "Unleash Chiang" on Iran. What?

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Rubio: "We're going to unleash Chiang on these people in the next few hours and days. You're going to really begin to perceive a change in the scope and intensity of these attacks as, frankly, the two most powerful air forces in the world take apart this terroristic regime."

But what the heck does unleash Chiang mean?

Some internet sleuthing tells me that after the Communists took over China and Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists fled to Taiwan, conservative commentators argued that the US should support a Nationalist invasion of the mainland. The shorthand for this became "unleash Chiang." Over time, in conservative foreign policy circles, "unleash Chiang" became slang for "unleash overwhelming force."

 

Religion and the Law

Interesting Dissent in American Indian Religious Case Under Texas RFRA

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From a dissent from rehearing en banc Friday in Perez v. City of San Antonio, by Fifth Circuit Judge Andrew Oldham, joined by Chief Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod and Judges Jerry Smith, Stephen Higgenson, Don Willett, and James Ho:

The City of San Antonio plans to destroy a sacred Native American religious site. The burdens on plaintiffs' religious freedoms are undeniable. But a panel of our court dismissed them. In my view, this easily meets the standard for en banc rehearing. And I respectfully dissent from the majority's contrary view….

Gary Perez and Matilde Torres are members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church. "For centuries, [their] ancestors have gathered at a specific bend along the [San Antonio] River to meditate, worship, and pray." Specifically, church members understand "the trees and cormorants that occupy a twenty-foot by thirty-foot area" near the River to be "the 'axis mundi,'" a bridge between this world and the after-life. These elements form a cohesive "spiritual ecology;" the trees' roots "go into the underworld, underneath the earth," before "ris[ing] all the way up into the heavens," while the cormorants signify "a spirit … [that] scattered life-giving water across the San Antonio River Valley" in the church's creation story. As in many faiths, the trees and cormorants' religious significance to the Native American Church turns on a tight relationship between the sign and the thing signified—"ceremonies cannot be properly administered without specific trees present and cormorants nesting."

The City of San Antonio owns the land on which this sacred site rests, called Brackenridge Park. In 2022, the City announced "reformation efforts" in the Park. Among other things, the City plans to uproot most of the trees in the sacred area and deploy "pyrotechnics, clappers, spotlights, lasers, distress calls, effigies, balloons, explosives, and drones" to keep the cormorants away. The City maintains that this campaign "[will] not harm the birds." But the City concedes that its heavy artillery is intended to and likely will prevent cormorants from nesting in the Sacred Area.

Recognizing a grave threat to their religious practices, Perez and Torres sued under, inter alia, the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("TRFRA"). They sought an injunction preventing the City from moving forward with its destructive campaign…. [A Fifth Circuit panel decision] held that the City's campaign of tree removal, pyrotechnics, lasers, and explosives would not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious practice and, even if it did, the City's deforestation and artillery were the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling need to repair the park….

That's wrong on both counts. But the substantial-burden point is the most egregious. First, the City's plan substantially burdens religious conduct under any reading of TRFRA. Second, the panel majority's faulty substantial burden analysis poses a particularly acute risk to minority faiths. Third, the better approach is to apply the same standards to all people.

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Congress

The Role of Delegation Theories in Deforming the Constitution

The Supreme Court's approaches of assuming agency authority to issue legislative rules and of prohibiting Congress from delegating to itself have resulted in an enormous transfer of power to the Executive.

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[The third of four blog posts drawing on this week's Hallows Lecture at Marquette Law School.]

It is not just the "three buckets" picture, in combination with the unitary executive theory, as discussed in my first two blog posts, that has warped the design of the U.S. Constitution. A second "unstated idea," the topic of this third post, concerns the delegation of authority by Congress.

There is, of course, the longstanding complaint that delegations by Congress should be reined in, so as to force Congress to legislate greater specificity. This has given us agitation, most prominently by Justice Gorsuch, to overturn the longstanding doctrine that delegations are permissible as long as they include an "intelligible principle" guiding the exercise of discretion—the claim being that a more restrictive doctrine is required. More recently, it has given us the major questions doctrine, which says that far-reaching and controversial exercises of delegated authority will be set aside by the courts absent clear authorization by Congress. These are not unstated ideas—they are quite vigorously asserted and debated.

Rather, I am concerned with two other aspects of congressional delegation that are unstated but have contributed greatly to the deformation of our constitutional structure. The first concerns an extremely casual attitude to certain types of delegation to the President or one of the many administrative agencies.

The case against delegation rests on the proposition that the Constitution, in the first sentence of Article I, gives "[a]ll legislative Powers" to Congress. One would therefore assume that sensitivity to delegation would be at its height when the President or some regulatory agency claims the power to issue so-called "legislative rules"—regulations that have a force and effect similar to that of a statute. At one time, the courts were very cautious about such delegations, and said they would refuse to recognize agency rules having the force of law unless they were explicitly authorized by Congress.

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