The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

John Yoo Joins the Exodus from California; Departs for Texas

The University of California at Berkeley's law school loses its last right-leaning professor to teach in public law.

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The Daily Californian reports that Professor John Yoo is leaving the University of California at Berkeley's law school. Beginning next year, he will be full-time at the University of Texas at Austin's School of Civic Leadership.

From the story:

"Let the celebrations at my fan clubs in the City of Berkeley begin," Yoo said in an email. "Great as our university is, it would not allow a school to focus on restoring the central importance of western civilization to the education of all undergraduates." . . .

"I am sorry, however, that my departure will reduce the number of conservative professors in public law at Berkeley by 100 percent," Yoo said in the email. "I hope that the university will take this as an opportunity to consider that the notion of diversity should, most importantly, include ideology, not just the usual race, gender, and economic categories that my colleagues usually mean by diversity."

There had been one other right-leaning law professor at Berkeley, our co-blogger Orin Kerr, but he left Berkeley for Stanford in 2025.

According to Dean of Berkeley Law Erwin Chemerinsky, Yoo's decision to leave the faculty was entirely his own.

"John (Yoo) has been an important part of the faculty for many years," Chemerinsky said in an email. "This was entirely John's decision to retire. … He has indicated to me for a few years his thoughts about retiring. John is a very successful teacher and an eminent scholar." . . .

Yoo's move is also less drastic than it might appear, as he is moving from one blue state to another.  All of the other California transplants that have moved to Austin helped make sure of that (with a major assist from the Republican Party).

Supreme Court

This Supreme Court "Deserves Our Celebration, Not Our Condemnation"

Prof. William Baude on the Supreme Court and the false promise of court reform.

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Professor William Baude has an op-ed in the New York Times, "This Is What an Independent, Competent Supreme Court Looks Like," defending the Supreme Court against its critics, left and right, and suggesting that many calls for court reform are misguided.

Noting that the Democratic electoral sweep has bolstered calls for reforming, and perhaps expanding, the Court to alter its course, Baude writes:

The left, understandably, strongly opposes the court's recent rulings on abortion, the Voting Rights Act, the unitary executive and so on. These decisions are a big deal. But court reformers still suffer from a failure of perspective. If Chief Justice John Roberts could write an opinion essay, I would imagine him saying: "What? Ruling against the administration's misuse of the National Guard, sweeping emergency tariffs and attack on birthright citizenship, plus preserving the independence of the Federal Reserve and the integrity of the midterm elections, wasn't enough for you?"

The court has ruled against the administration in high-stakes cases on those issues all in the past year. And it has done so even though six of the justices were appointed by members of the president's party — three by President Trump himself. . . .

Under the circumstances of the second Trump term, the Supreme Court is doing amazingly well. If anything, it deserves our celebration, not our condemnation.

Indeed, the Court's conservatives, on the whole, have shown themselves more willing to constrain Trump's excesses than were the Court's liberals when faced with executive branch overreach by Presidents Biden or Obama.

Baude notes that the Court's willingness to reject Trump Administration priorities has caused some on the Right to question the conservative legal movement's commitment to originalism, and cautions that "what goes around comes around, and principles will be worth more in the long run." Of course, some conservatives criticisms of the Court are for its failure to adhere to the principles some justices espouse, not that those principles are getting in the way of making America great again.

On the question of judicial reform, Baude strikes a cautionary note, particularly if court reform is nothing more than an effort to reverse the Court's current trajectory.

In the abstract, there is nothing wrong with bipartisan judicial reform. The Supreme Court should not be preserved in amber. But partisan judicial reform — reform motivated by frustration with specific judicial decisions and the hope that the reformed court will rule differently — is a dangerous game. Because partisan reform is a tactic equally available to both sides, it accomplishes little in the long run except to accelerate the court's transformation into a political superweapon. Such a tactic might be a short-run necessity in extreme circumstances, but we are far from those extremes.

He also--quite correctly--calls out the obsession with judicial ethics as "superficial." He could add that such concerns are nearly always one-sided and selective. While it may be appropriate to further limit the justices' outside income or ability to accept gifts, we should not pretend that any such reforms would have any effect on the Court's decisions.

The justices' views on big issues are well formed. The justices themselves aren't for sale; book income reflects their increasing celebrity, not any specific quid pro quo. To be sure, it is quite possible that travel and gifts and book sales subtly reinforce the justices' incentives to play to their respective fan bases. But this kind of corruption is quite indirect, and at the same time comes from so much more than money. So ethics reform is unlikely to change much about what the court actually does.

In the end, Baude thinks the best argument for court reform is as a placebo: To convince the public that something has been done so that attention can turn to more pressing issues. As he concludes this point: "If pointless reforms cause many Americans to believe that the court is better — more independent, less corrupt and so on — that would be great for the country."

I largely agree with Baude's piece, though I may be more open to certain sorts of reforms than he reveals in this piece. Reforms that represent genuine political engagement with the work of the courts, such as measures to alter or channel jurisdiction could be quite beneficial. Measures to reduce backlogs, limit forum shopping, constrain unwarranted or overly expansive equitable relief, and expand the Court's mandatory jurisdiction are all worth considering. They also represent the sort of meaningful legislation that Congress should engage in--legislation that requires Congress to take seriously its constitutional responsibilities. (In this regard, I view the willingness to engage with jurisdictional questions in the pending infrastructure reform bill to be a welcome sign, even if I might not endorse every jurisdictional measure the bill contains.)

As Baude ends his essay, courts are not above criticism, and this includes the Supreme Court. It is nonetheless is important to distinguish between criticisms of how the Court operates and performs its job from substantive or ideological disagreement with the decisions the Court reaches.

Free Speech

No Pseudonymity for Woman Alleging She Was Falsely Accused of Sexual Relationship with Jeffrey Epstein, Doxed

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From Doe v. Doe (E.D. Pa.), decided today by Judge Gerald Pappert:

Jane Doe alleges four X (formerly Twitter) users falsely accused her of having a sexual relationship with Jeffrey Epstein and doxxed her by posting on the social networking site her full name, employment and education history, phone numbers and addresses. Doe asserts claims for defamation, false light, public disclosure of private facts and aiding and abetting. She seeks to proceed under a pseudonym because she fears for her safety, along with additional reputational and professional harm. The Court denies the motion because Doe's fear of harm does not outweigh the public's interest in open litigation.

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Criminal Justice

19-Year-Old Gets Probation (+ 6 Month Served) "After Firing over 20 Rounds, Shooting Boy Playing Basketball"

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WJLA (ABC-7) reports:

Darius Drew pleaded guilty on Aug. 10 to aggravated assault and carrying a pistol without a license. Although prosecutors asked Superior Court Judge Jennifer Di Toro for a five-year prison term, she imposed a suspended 24-month sentence and placed him on probation under the Youth Rehabilitation Act, over the government's objection.

According to the government's evidence, Drew rode a Lime bike into an alley in the 700 block of Taylor Street NW on May 11.

Surveillance video showed him firing at a car parked in the alley. Seconds later, Drew fired toward a house near the alley in the 4100 block of Ninth Street NW, striking a boy who was playing basketball at a nearby recreation center. The boy suffered a leg injury.

Drew fired more than 20 rounds from two locations, prosecutors said….

From the opinion in U.S. v. Drew, released Monday by D.C. Superior Court Judge Jennifer A. Di Toro:

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Note to Second Circuit: Antisemitic Violence Shouldn't Get a Judicial Pass

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Torres v. Carlson, currently pending before the Second Circuit, is a case brought by two Columbia University janitors under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (KKK Act).

According to their complaint, masked individuals from Columbia University's anti-Israel alliance, armed with hammers, knives, bolt cutters, chains, and zip ties, stormed Columbia's Hamilton Hall and confronted the two men. The janitors' refusal to yield drew the ire of the rioters, who then assaulted them, detained them, and slurred them as Jew-lovers, Jew-workers, and Zionists. The rioters proceeded to seize the building, break windows to chain the doors shut, barricaded themselves inside, and unfurled banners declaring an "Intifada."

Assuming the allegations are true, this seems like an open and shut case under the KKK Act, which the Supreme Court has described as reaching organized mob violence directed at a protected group and those perceived as standing with it. See Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983).

Nevertheless, the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Covington & Burling has filed an amicus brief on behalf of Jon D. Michael of UCLA Law School, Matthew Segal of Tufts, with the Second Circuit, taking issue with the district court's decisions to:

(1) resolve at the pleading stage questions of motive in the defendants' favor, crediting the defendants' characterization of their own motives over the plaintiffs' allegations and dismissing explicit antisemitic epithets as irrelevant;

(2) treat supposed political motive as categorically negating discriminatory animus—disregarding both the mixed-motive framework that operates across federal antidiscrimination law and the settled principle that speech, even on political subjects, can evidence discriminatory intent; and,

(3) view Jewish disagreement about whether all anti-Zionism is inherently antisemitic as dispositive proof that the specific anti-Zionist rhetoric in this case was not plausibly antisemitic—a standard that conflicts with binding precedent, contradicts how courts apply antidiscrimination law to groups other than Jews, and improperly gives any individual Jew the power to veto discrimination claims by all other Jews.

As an aside, there are several federal court decisions arising out of post-October 7 protest activity that strike many, including me, as applying stricter standards to civil rights plaintiffs claiming anti-Jewish violations of civil rights laws than precedent suggests applies to other plaintiffs.

Politics

Pronouncing Law Latin

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A conversation with a student reminded me of one of my favorite articles, by my UCLA colleague Henry A. Kelly (who is emeritus in the English Department). It's called "Lawyers' Latin: Loquenda ut Vulgus?," and here's the introduction (though all 14 pages of the article are much worth reading):

In "Rex v. Venables and Others: The Dead Pronunciation" (one of A. P. Herbert's "Misleading Cases"), Mr. Wick, an advocate making his first appearance in the High Court, tries out his textbook Latin before the Lord Chief Justice. The young advocate, attempting to apply for a writ of certiorari, asks for "a rule of neesee of kairtiorahree." The Lord Chief Justice pretends not to understand this or any other of Mr. Wick's Latin phrases. When ultra vires is rendered ooltrah weerayze, the Court interrupts: "Stop! Listen, Mr. Wick. The two groups of sounds last formed by you have no meaning for me, and I order you not to make use of them again."

Although the unfortunate Mr. Wick is genuinely baffled by the Court's pronunciation of Latin terms, he is offered scant sympathy:

It is not for me at my time of life to learn a new language; it is not for the King's judges to remodel their diction according to the whims of pedagogues or the habits of the Junior Bar. The bitter conclusion is, Mr. Wick, that you must go away and learn to pronounce the Latin tongue correctly, according to the immemorial practice of your profession.

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Free Speech

"Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press: Some Illustrative Examples"

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This short new article of mine has now been published in the Notre Dame Law Review. The Introduction:

There are many important big-picture questions about original meaning and the Free Speech, Free Press, Assembly, and Petition Clauses. This short Essay will leave those questions for others. Instead, it will offer as illustrations some specific, concrete questions—and, in some instances, answers—about original meaning and the freedom of expression. I hope these narrow illustrations can help us think about the broader questions.

From the table of contents, which should illustrate the subjects I cover:

I. Broad Evidence, and Silently Consistent Precedents
A. "The Liberty of the Press Is Not Confined to Newspapers and Periodicals"
B. Symbolic Expression
C. Civil Liability
II. Scant Evidence: Provoking a Riot
III. Ambiguous Evidence: Enjoining Repetition of Libels

And the Conclusion:

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Free Speech

Free Speech Unmuted: The Devil and Free Speech

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Can a state capitol allow private groups to put up holiday displays while turning away the Satanic Temple? Jane Bambauer and I examine an Iowa case to explain when the government can control speech on public property—and when it must give rival viewpoints equal access. We also discuss government speech, "public fora," and religious expression on government property.

Also check out our past episodes:

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Guns

Justice Thomas on the Second Amendment in "Sensitive Places"

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From Justice Thomas's statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Novotny v. Moore:

Maryland is one of several States that prohibit law-abiding gun owners from carrying firearms in a wide variety of public places. Under Maryland law, an individual may not carry a firearm in public demonstrations, mass transit, places of amusement, healthcare facilities, locations that sell alcohol for onsite consumption, and tens of thousands of acres of state park and forest land. The Fourth Circuit upheld these restrictions against petitioners' Second Amendment challenge because it concluded that each law banned firearms in a "sensitive place."

I am skeptical that each of these laws "is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation" in "sensitive places." Still, I agree with the Court's decision not to grant certiorari. Because each Maryland statute implicates a distinct historical tradition of firearm regulation, the breadth of petitioners' challenge would complicate our review. In an appropriate and more narrowly focused case, however, we should consider the scope of States' authority to ban firearms in "sensitive places."

The Second Amendment recognizes the people's "inherent" right to keep and bear firearms, a right that admits of only historically grounded exceptions. Before and after the founding, it was well understood that individuals enjoyed a natural right to keep and bear arms, which included the right to carry firearms in public spaces for self-defense. The Constitution "codified [that] pre-existing right." The first generations after the founding recognized the breadth of the Second Amendment's "guarante[e]," and "those who sought to carry firearms publicly and peaceably in antebellum America were generally free to do so." Thus, when a State seeks to restrict the right to bear arms—including by limiting the places in which a law-abiding citizen may carry his firearm—the State must root its law in the Second Amendment's "historical understanding" by "demonstrat[ing] that the regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation."

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Free Speech

Justices Thomas and Alito on State Requirements That Continuing Professional Education Discuss Certain Topics

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From Justice Thomas's dissent from denial of certiorari today in Khatibi v. Yip, joined by Justice Alito (Justice Gorsuch voted to grant the petition, but didn't sign on to the dissent):

In 2022, California began requiring private instructors in privately run and privately accredited continuing medical education (CME) courses to discuss how so-called implicit bias affects healthcare outcomes. The Ninth Circuit held that First Amendment scrutiny did not apply to this compelled-speech requirement because the breadth of California's CME regulation renders the content of any CME course government speech, not private speech. That logic fundamentally misunderstands this Court's precedents and the Constitution. First Amendment protections do not give way simply because a State heavily regulates speech.

I would have granted certiorari to clarify the government-speech doctrine. At a minimum, the Ninth Circuit misapplied Shurtleff v. Boston (2022), which instructs courts to identify government speech by considering (1) "the history of the expression at issue," (2) "the public's likely perception as to who (the government or a private person) is speaking," and (3) "the extent to which the government has actively shaped or controlled the expression." The Ninth Circuit collapsed those distinct inquiries, focusing on the breadth of the government's regulatory scheme at each step. More fundamentally, however, Shurtleff is leading courts astray.

I joined Justice ALITO's concurrence in Shurtleff, which warned that the majority's three-factor test could cause courts to conclude that extensive government regulation transforms a private message into government speech exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. As the Ninth Circuit's decision shows, those concerns were prescient. This Court should reconsider whether the Shurtleff test is the proper mode of analysis for identifying government speech…

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Religion and the Law

Washington May Permit Nudity-Focused Businesses "to Set Entry Requirements Based on Genitalia"

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Billy Binion (Reason) reports:

The Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC) voted last month to permit businesses to set entry requirements based on genitalia when nudity is a core part of the operation—thus allowing, say, an all-female nude establishment to reject customers with male genitals without having to fear anti-discrimination enforcement from the state.

This is not a sentence you necessarily see every day. But it is the latest plot twist related to the legal odyssey that is Olympus Spa v. Armstrong, a case concerning a nude spa that has been embroiled in a yearslong, ever-crescendoing fight with the state after it declined to admit a preoperative transgender woman to its location in Lynnwood, Washington….

"In the limited circumstance where a business requires nudity as a central purpose of the business," the addition reads, "such business may maintain a rule that entry to spaces where nudity is required be based on genital characteristics." After the vote, the executive director was to work with the Office of the Attorney General to officially file the rule….

The [underlying Olympus Spa] story, while niche, has elicited some strong reactions. "This is a case about swinging dicks," wrote Judge Lawrence VanDyke of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in March. "You may think that swinging dicks shouldn't appear in a judicial opinion. You're not wrong. But as much as you might understandably be shocked and displeased to merely encounter that phrase in this opinion, I hope we all can agree that it is far more jarring for the unsuspecting and exposed women at Olympus Spa—some as young as thirteen—to be visually assaulted by the real thing."

Much worth reading in full.

The Virginia Bar Shows More Sense than the Williamsburg Commonwealth Attorney

Williamsburg authorities may believe letting a young child walk to a pond is a criminal offense, but it is no obstacle to practicing law.

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Readers may recall the story of Karyann Parkinson, the Williamsburg mother (and law student) who was criminally prosecuted for letting her young child walk to a neighborhood pond to collect goose feathers. As I recounted in The Free Press, Parkinson was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a first-degree misdemeanor in Virginia, because the authorities thought her child was too young to take a walk. The judge sentenced her to six-months in jail, but suspended the sentence. An appeal is pending.

As a consequence of her conviction, Parkinson was added to Virginia's Child Abuse and Neglect Registry, where she will be listed for the next seven years. Parkinson also feared that the conviction could prevent her from practicing law.

Prosecutors brought the charges against Parkinson while she was preparing to take the Virginia Bar exam, and her conviction came while her character and fitness application was under review. It is common to place character and fitness evaluations on hold pending the outcome of legal or disciplinary proceedings, and Parkinson initially received a communication to that effect.

Upon review of the details of Parkinson's case, however, the Virginia Board of Bar Examiners concluded that nothing alleged against Parkinson cast doubt on her character and fitness to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia, and her application was approved. The Williamsburg Commonwealth Attorney should take note.

While the Virginia Bar authorities recognized that Parkinson's actions were not the sort of thing that should prevent bar admission, the Williamsburg Commonwealth Attorney apparently believes that Parkinson's actions were worth criminal prosecution--with all that entails. In this case, that meant police officers had to spend half a day of paid time (if not time and a half) sitting in a courthouse when they could have been out on the street responding to community needs. They will do it again in February when a court will hear Parkinson's appeal (which will take the form of a de novo jury trial, given how Virginia handles such cases).  Williamsburg and James City County are reasonably safe communities, but is this really the best way to allocate law enforcement resources?

No doubt some prosecutions for child endangerment are motivated for a concern about a child's safety, but it is hard to credit such a justification here. The Commonwealth Attorney's office waited two weeks to file charges after the initial incident, but not because it was gathering evidence or conducting any sort of investigation. Rather, as one of the police officers testified at trial, it was because Parkinson was pregnant, so they thought it was reasonable to wait. (Yet she was still charged before giving birth, natch.) As I noted in my Free Press piece, it is hard not to conclude Parkinson's real offense was being insufficiently obsequious to the authorities.

Upon review, the Virginia Board of Bar Examiners realized that Parkinson's actions did not justify delaying (let alone preventing) her admission to the Virginia Bar. With more time to consider the case (and the outrage it has engendered) perhaps the Williamsburg Commonwealth Attorney should reconsider the continued prosecution of Parkinson for what was, at worst, a debatable parenting choice. Confessing error and asking the court to vacate the conviction would seem to be a better use of tax dollars and public resources than continuing to pursue this case.

Free Speech

School Board Member Seeks "Better Sense of How" Church "Approaches Issues of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Around Their Messaging" …

"around some key issues relevant to marginalized communities," including as to "the Church's views on same-sex marriage, '[a]ccess to safe and affordable abortion,' '[a]ccess to gender affirming medical care,' '[c]onversion therapy for LGBTQIA+ individuals (youth and adults),' and '[i]nclusive sexual education and access to birth control for youth.'"

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This happened when the board was deciding whether to allow a long-term lease of space on weekends to a church, pursuant to a policy that allowed such leases for community groups generally. And, a federal court held Friday, this violated the First Amendment. Some excerpts from the long opinion in Pines Church v. Hermon School Dep't, by Chief Judge Lance Walker (D. Me.):

Plaintiff Matt Gioia moved his family from Colorado to Maine in the summer of 2020 to start a new church. Gioia was born in Waterville, Maine, and lived in Guilford, Maine until he graduated high school and joined the military at seventeen years old. Initially, Gioia's church—The Pines Church—gathered at his home. In March of 2021, The Pines Church began holding Sunday morning services at a movie theater in Orono, Maine, pursuant to a month-to-month lease arrangement. As the Church grew, Gioia began to look for a new space that could accommodate a larger group.

Gioia sought space from the Hermon School Department, which generally opens up its facilities to various groups:

This policy provides that "[s]chool facilities should be made available for appropriate community use when such facilities are not required for their primary purposes: the instruction of students and related school activities." The policy distinguishes between "occasional or short-term use of school facilities," which "shall be authorized by the school principal," and "long-term rental or lease," which "shall be authorized by the Hermon School Committee upon the recommendation of the Superintendent of Schools."

But the Hermon School Committee (which consisted of "Committee Chair Jesse Keith, Vice Chair Karen Shorey, Stephanie Oiler, Haily Keezer, and Christopher McLaughlin") denied the Church's request for a year-long or six-month lease, allowing only a month-to-month lease (which appeared to be inadequate for the church, given its need for a stable meeting location). Here's part of the summary of the facts, based on the bench trial that the court held:

The next day [after a hearing], a former committee member emailed Keith and Shorey to share her belief "that it is not in our communities [sic] best interest to lease one of our school facilities to any religious organization," warning that "[t]here is a quiet movement in our country by some conservative religious groups who are actively working to soften the boundaries between church/state, starting with our schools" and that granting the Church a lease would lead to "a slippery slope." She wondered how the Hermon School Department would have to respond to a similar request from "an Imam who wants to open a mosque," in light of the "precedent" set by a lease to The Pines Church.

Her email concluded with unintended irony: "There's a reason why the founding fathers wrote the constitution the way they did." Keith and Shorey denied at trial that this email influenced their decision-making with respect to the Church's lease request, which I find implausible in light of the trial record….

McLaughlin reached out to [HSD Superintendent Micah] Grant and explained that he "had a few additional questions" for Gioia:

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