The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

From Auto Junction Inc v. Kaluzhin, 2024 WL 7050639, decided Oct. 8, 2024 by Arizona Superior Court (Maricopa County) Judge Melissa Iyer Julian, but just posted on Westlaw several days ago—I'm skeptical about the aiding and abetting analysis, but wanted to flag the case in any event:

In this case, the only alleged defamatory statements Defendant made were included in his YouTube video where he stated that Auto Junction "don't give me my money," "they don't give me my bucks." As Defendant's reply brief points out, these statements are not defamatory because they are not substantially false. Indeed, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint admits that the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant provided for a delivery price of $1,150.00. Because the vehicle was delivered late and with only one set of keys, Auto Junction paid what it considered to be the "reasonable value" of the delivery, but did not pay the full contract amount. Accordingly, Plaintiff's defamation claim fails as a matter of law.

The crux of Plaintiff's Complaint, however, is not that Defendant made defamatory statements himself. Instead, the Complaint asserts that Plaintiff encouraged his many followers to post false, negative reviews about Plaintiff's business. The damage to Plaintiff's business was accomplished by those false negative reviews posted by Defendant's Youtube followers. As a result, Plaintiff also asserts a claim against Defendant for "aiding and abetting" defamation.

In order for a plaintiff to prevail on an aiding and abetting claim, proof of the following elements is required: "(1) the primary tortfeasor must commit a tort causing injury to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant must know the primary tortfeasor's conduct constitutes a breach of duty; and (3) the defendant must substantially assist or encourage the primary tortfeasor in achieving the breach." "Advice or encouragement to act operates as a moral support to a tortfeasor and if the act encouraged is known to be tortious it has the same effect upon the liability of the adviser as participation or physical assistance." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876, cmt. d (1979). An illustration to section 876 of the Restatement (which Arizona follows) elucidates the kind of encouragement necessary to create aiding and abetting liability under Illustration 4: "A and B participate in a riot in which B, although throwing no rocks himself, encourages A to throw rocks. One of the rocks strikes C, a bystander. B is subject to liability to C."

The Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint and the evidence submitted in response to the pending Motion establishes that Defendant's conduct was intended to encourage his followers to attack Plaintiff's business publicly. Plaintiff presented evidence that these third-party reviews were false and defamatory and are therefore unprotected speech.

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From the May 26 decision in Hayne v. Akoto, by Minnesota Court of Appeals Judge Elizabeth G. Bentley, joined by Judges Keala Ede and Lisa Beane:

On July 2, 2025, over a year after [a 2022 harassment restraining order against her] expired, Akoto moved to have the record of the case sealed under Rule 4, subdivision 1(e), of the Minnesota Rules of Public Access. In that motion, Akoto asserted that the public accessibility of the HRO records "continue[d] to cause significant harm to [her] personal and professional life," and that it had negatively impacted her "ability to obtain housing, employment, and to rebuild [her] reputation and relationships." … The district court denied Akoto's motion [and a follow-up filing that] attached exhibits purporting to show that she is underemployed and has had to live in poor conditions because of the public accessibility of the HRO records….

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I have two articles just released in their final form.

One, with James Heilpern, examines how "subject to the jurisdiction" was used in legal texts in the United States through the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Making use of treaties, statutes, congressional debates, and judicial opinions, the article considers whether that language, which was used in the Fourteenth Amendment's citizenship clause, had an established legal meaning that would have been known to the legal community in 1868. If so, what might that meaning be?

From the conclusion of that article:

The task of this Article is a narrow one. We do not investigate the specific intentions of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment or examine their specific purposes in including the Citizenship Clause. We simply ask to what degree did the drafters of that Clause use familiar legal terms and what would have been the ordinary meaning of those terms as used in a legal text. The evidence is overwhelming that the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction" would have had a natural and obvious meaning to mid-nineteenth century American lawyers. These were ordinary legal terms that regularly appeared in legal discourse.

Moreover, the evidence is overwhelming as well as to what the substantive content of that language would have been in 1866. In the legal language of the mid-nineteenth century, "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States simply meant governed by the United States. That governing authority might have been exclusive or shared, and those subject to that governing authority might have owed a duty of allegiance or they might merely have owed a duty of obedience. Those governed by the United States might be subject to American jurisdiction on a more permanent basis or they might only be subject to that governing authority on a contingent and temporary basis. Those governed by the United States might only be subject to its authority for limited purposes or they might be governed by it more comprehensively. When lawyers wanted to restrict the scope of jurisdiction, they used appropriate modifiers to do so. Using the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to express any idea other than "within the governing authority" would have been creative to the point of absurdity.

That article is now available from the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy here.

The second examines Indiana's statutory intellectual diversity mandate, known as Senate Bill 202. The law requires that professors teaching in state universities in Indiana demonstrate, among other things, that their courses include an intellectually diverse set of materials in order to retain their jobs. It charges the board of regents to use the tenure process to enforce this requirement. As written, the statute poses a multitude of difficulties for academic freedom and the intellectual enterprise of university teaching.

From the article:

SB 202 might identify a real concern about American higher education, but the
solution it offers is not only ineffective but problematic. SB 202 creates a vague set
of tenure criteria that can easily be misused to target politically controversial
professors. The result is unlikely to improve the quality of classroom teaching or
genuinely foster a climate of free inquiry on university campuses, but it might lead
professors to cater to the loudest cavilers in an effort to insulate themselves from
capricious reprisals.

That article is based on the Addison C. Harris Lecture at the Maurer School of Law and is now available in the Indiana Law Journal here.

An interesting remedy that I've seen a few cases; here is the most recent one, Hussain v. Quraishi, decided May 20 by Judge Matthew T. Wax-Krell (Conn. Super. Ct. Tolland Jud. Dist.) (plaintiffs Hussain and Garcia are the owner and practice manager of plaintiff VCare Family Practice LLC, which owns the medical office Shifa Clinic):

… Quraishi worked as an independent contractor at the Clinic doing IT work. In 2017, the plaintiffs began having issues with Quraishi, which ultimately led to Hussain applying for a civil protection order against Quraishi, which the Court granted on October 12, 2018.

After that, Quraishi stopped harassing the plaintiffs, but in July of 2025, for reasons unknown to the plaintiffs, Quraishi began posting on Facebook repeatedly about them.

In the Facebook posts, he accused them of various crimes and fraudulent actions, including, among other claims, fraud and identity theft, Medicare and Medicaid fraud, and using a deceased doctor as their medical director.

As a result, on July 7, 2025, Hussain applied for a civil protection order against Quraishi, which the Court granted on July 21, 2025. On that same date, Garcia applied for a restraining order against Quraishi (they had briefly dated in 2015), which the Court granted on July 16, Quraishi was ultimately arrested for violating the restraining order.

Despite the entry of the civil protection order and the restraining order, Quraishi continued posting about the plaintiffs throughout July of 2025 and then from November of 2025 through April of 2026. These posts included more allegations of perjury, witchcraft, identify theft, Medicare and Medicaid fraud, theft of intellectual property, counterfeiting of documents, filing false statements to the police and the courts, and fraudulent billing.

The plaintiffs deny all of the allegations made by the plaintiff [presumably intended to say "defendant" -EV] in his Facebook posts….

For purposes of obtaining a prejudgment remedy, the plaintiffs do not have to establish that they will prevail, only that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of their claims. Under this standard, the court concludes on the evidence presented that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiffs' claim against the defendant.

Free Speech Libel

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6/3/1918: Hammer v. Dagenhart decided.

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Late Tuesday evening, the Supreme Court granted Alabama's emergency motion to revise its legislative maps following Callais. The per curiam opinion offers a handy summary of Callais and expressly extends that doctrine to the vote dilution context. The merits analysis stretches one paragraph, but here I want to focus on a single critical sentence:

As to intentional vote dilution, the District Court did not heed the presumption of legislative good faith, see Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 602 U. S. 1, 10 (2024), because it interpreted the State's legal disagreement with the court's earlier remedial order as proof of discriminatory animus. Cf. Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. 579, 608–609 (2018).

When I read the Alabama district court's order, I had the same reaction: not following a court's order that was vacated cannot be used to demonstrate a discriminatory intent. The Supreme Court's decision to vacate the district court's order rendered that order null and void, as if it had never existed. The district court cannot then turn around and claim that the failure to follow its non-existent order is proof of animus. I meant to write on this point, but I didn't get a chance. (Thanks Judge Betsy.) Now is a good time.

I've written about inferior court supremacy, the notion that a single district court can settle the meaning of the Constitution. CASA v. Trump went a long way to rebutting this presumption by firmly establishing the principle of Supreme Court judicial supremacy. I have problems with this aspect of CASA, but that is now the supreme law of the land. Now, the Supreme Court's emergency docket order in Allen v. Milligan further clarifies how unsuperior the inferior courts are.

Litigants, including state governments, should not violate a binding court order. Doing so would lead to contempt of court, which did not happen here. Instead, the district court ordered Alabama to adopt a new map. Alabama chose to adopt a map that the state found consistent with Supreme Court precedent. The District Court disagreed. The state had the right to adopt that new map, knowing it would be challenged in court, and the Supreme Court would ultimately resolve the matter on its mandatory jurisdiction docket. This is more-or-less what Justice Alito discussed on the cited pages of Abbott v. Perez.

There was no defiance of any binding court order. However, Justice Sotomayor's dissent, repeatedly charges the state with defying and flouting the district court's order:

"Alabama adopted in unashamed defiance of a prior court order directly affirmed by this Court"

"It also corrodes the rule of law by rewarding Alabama's gamesmanship and outright defiance of court orders."

"Second, the Court should not have rewarded Alabama's defiance of court orders and blatant gamesmanship throughout this litigation."

"Alabama's hands, however, are far from clean. Instead, it defied the District Court's order in these cases even after this Court affirmed it. . . ."

"First, Alabama intentionally chose to flout a preliminary injunction that this Court affirmed in Allen."

Justice Sotomayor explains that Alabama hoped the Supreme Court would agree with the state on appeal:

Of course, Alabama had every right to raise its "legal disagreement," ante, at 3, with the District Court's original preliminary injunction through the appellate process orotherwise. The course of action the State chose here, however, was not the proper way of doing so. Had Alabama complied with the preliminary injunction and drawn a map with a second opportunity district, it could have relitigated the merits in the ordinary course: first at a trial on the merits, and then on appeal. At either stage, it could have raised the arguments that the litigants in Callais raised and prevailed on, or advanced challenges to the District Court's remedial order. Instead, Alabama willfully drew a map that flouted the District Court's preliminary injunction and hoped that this Court would eventually see things its way. After today, it is hard to call Alabama's cynical gambit anything other than a success, and the Court's rewarding of Alabama's behavior anything other than a blow to the rule of law.

Sotomayor also quotes from the Speaker of the Alabama House:

The record is bereft of evidence suggesting that Alabama took seriously this Court's finding of discriminatory vote dilution in Allen. Speaker of the Alabama House of Representatives Nathaniel Ledbetter put it bluntly: "'If you think about where we were, the Supreme Court ruling [in Allen] was five to four. So there's just one judge that needed to see something different.'"

This action is only improper if you accept the notion that district courts can settle these constitutional cases. But if you agree with CASA that the Supreme Court is supreme, then Alabama's actions are the only way to test the validity of a new maps. And litigants are well within their rights to hope a 5-4 decision at one stage of the litigation goes 5-4 the other way. Dobbs got to the Supreme Court because Mississippi wanted to test Roe. Callais got to the Supreme Court because Louisiana wanted to test Gingles. And Allen made several trips to the Supreme Court for similar reasons. Justice Sotomayor is wrong on this point.

I continue to find one small detail of the Slush Fund affair (Slushfundgate?) of particular interest.

As you may recall, our President's suit against the IRS was voluntarily dismissed on May 16.

Two days later, on May 18, the parties executed a "Settlement Agreement." In that Agreement, the DOJ* agrees to issue "a formal apology" to our President, and "the Attorney General of the United States agrees to create the [$1.776 billion] Anti-Weaponization Fund, subject to the terms and conditions described herein."

*The "Settlement Agreement" was signed "for the United States" by Associate Attorney General Stanley Woodward. The DOJ was, presumably, acting in its capacity as counsel to the defendant (I.R.S.).

Daniel Z. Epstein, counsel to the Plaintiffs (our President, his two sons, and the Trump Organization), is the other signatory.

In exchange for all that (the apology and the Fund), Trump and the other Plaintiffs agree to:

RELEASE, WAIVE, ACQUIT, and FOREVER DISCHARGE Defendants [the I.R.S.] and the United States from, and are hereby FOREVER BARRED and PRECLUDED from prosecuting or pursuing, any and all claims, charges, counterclaims, causes of action, appeals, or requests for any relief, including injunctive, monetary, damages, tax payments, debt relief, costs, attorney's fees, expenses, and/or interest, that - as of the Effective Date - have been or could have been asserted by Plaintiffs in the Case or the Pending Agency Claims, by reason of, with respect to, in connection with, or which arise out of, matters in the Case or the Pending Agency Claims. [Emphasis added]

Curious, no? On several grounds.

First: Trump releases all his claims against the IRS? That doesn't sound like Trump. Given that the whole undertaking is patently a sham - Trump "settling" with Trump -- why would Trump give away anything at all? Just to make it look like there's an actual "exchange" taking place?

And while it might look as though Trump is giving the "other side" something of value, he isn't. Two days before the "Settlement Agreement" was executed, his claim was dismissed, at his request, with prejudice. So when he sits down to "negotiate" his "Settlement Agreement" on May 18th, sitting across the table from his reflection in the mirror, he's already barred from ever raising those claims again. So his "waiver" is entirely redundant and meaningless.

And notice: the "Settlement Agreement" doesn't make any reference at all to the dismissal of Trump's claims. That's also a little odd. Ordinarily, when parties agree to settle ongoing litigation, their Settlement Agreement will say something like:

"Plaintiff promises to voluntarily dismiss his claims against the Defendant, in exhange for the Defendant's promise to [do something, or pay something]."

The withdrawal of Plaintiff's claim is a big part of the consideration flowing between the parties, which is what makes the Settlement Agreement an enforceable contract; the parties are exchanging things of value.

Not so, here. Trump can't promise to drop his claims against the IRS, because he's already dropped them.

And notice: in the "Settlement Agreement," Trump waives any claims he might have against the IRS. It does not say that the IRS waives any claims it may have against Trump.

But the very next day (May 19th), this curious document appeared on the DOJ website. It simply states, with absolutely no additional explanation, that

The United States RELEASES, WAIVES, ACQUITS, and FOREVER DISCHARGES each of the Plaintiffs from, and is hereby FOREVER BARRED and PRECLUDED from prosecuting or pursuing, any and all claims, charges, counterclaims, causes of action, appeals, or requests for any relief, including injunctive, monetary, damages, tax payments, debt relief, costs, attorney's fees, expenses, and/or interest, that - as of the Effective Date - have been or could have been asserted by the Defendants (i.e., the IRS) against any of the Plaintiffs or related or affiliated individuals . . . [Emphasis added].

This document - untitled, and with nothing at all of substance other than this waiver - was signed by (a presumably shame-faced and embarrassed) Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche.

Did Blanche just forget to have this clause included in the "Settlement Agreement"?! There's no additional consideration coming from the Plaintiffs in exchange for this waiver of the potential United States claims; so its either just a little gift ("From the People of the United States, in Recognition of Your Brilliant Leadership!!!!"), or it was supposed to be included in the Settlement Agreement but was inexplicably left out.

And that would constitute incompetence of truly monumental proportions. Did the Acting Attorney General not read the (two-page!) Settlement Agreement between the sitting President (for whom he works) and the IRS? Or he did read it over, and fail to notice that the immunity he thought was going to be in there for the President was missing? Is it really possible?

Sure looks that way, doesn't it?

Here's how I think it all went down. During the negotiation sessions over the "Settlement Agreement," where the hard bargaining between Trump and Trump was taking place, Trump turned to Todd Blanche, who was there as counsel to the IRS and to the President, and said:

"Draft up a Settlement Agreement - and don't forget to put in that waiver!!"

Blanche turns to his deputy, Stanley Woodward - remember, it was Woodward who actually signed the "Settlement Agreement" on behalf of the United States - and said:

"Woodward, draft up the Settlement Agreement. And don't forget to put in that waiver!!"

And Woodward thinks to himself:

"What waiver?"

He figures they must be referring to a waiver by Trump for all claims that Trump may have against the IRS. After all, one would expect a Settlement Agreement to contain a waiver running in that direction, one where Plaintiffs promise to drop their claims and not to sue the Defendants as part of the overall settlementy deal. He inserts such a clause into the Settlement Agreement.

Astonishingly, nobody notices the omission until the day after the Settlement Agreement is signed.

Keystone Kops lawyering at its best, or worst.

Today's NY Times happens to have an article about the exodus of lawyers from the federal government. ["Trump Administration Sees Striking Exodus of Legal Talent"] DOJ has lost 21 percent of its lawyers in a little over a year. AbovetheLaw.com has been reporting on this for a while, and the evidence is indeed starting to accumulate that the quality of lawyering out on the front lines is declining.

Not to worry, though. Our President reassures us:

The New York Times wrote a story today entitled, 'Trump Administration Sees Striking Exodus of Legal Talent,' as though that's a bad thing, when actually, it's very good. The people that are leaving are Radical Left Deep State Lunatics, who are destroying our Country, and Weaponizing Government. Many of them didn't leave, but were fired! The Failing New York Times writes this, but makes it sound like it's a terrible thing when actually, it's just the opposite. We want people that will, MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN, not people that are trying to destroy our Country, that were put in by Obama and Biden and, in many cases, they shouldn't have been representing the U.S.A. in the first place."

For past Free Speech Unmuted videos, see:

Free Speech Privacy

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A photo of the flag being displayed, from the application for a temporary restraining order.

From yesterday's decision (which strikes me as correct) in Accountability Now USA v. Griess, by Judge Randolph Moss (D.D.C.):

Plaintiff, an unincorporated association that maintains a 24/7 demonstration calling for the impeachment and removal of President Donald Trump on National Park Service ("NPS") land, moves for an emergency order temporarily restraining the Superintendent of the National Mall and Memorial Parks Kevin Griess and the Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum or their delegees "from taking enforcement action against them because of their display of a flag with the legend '8647.'" For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Plaintiff's motion….

The parties' disagreement … turns on whether Plaintiff's display of the "8647" flag constitutes protected speech, as Plaintiff asserts, or a "true threat" to the life or safety of the President (or an incitement to violence), as Defendants maintain. At oral argument, both sides agreed that context is dispositive. Not every use of the slang phrase "86" constitutes a threat of violence; to the contrary, it is most often used to mean that an item is no longer available or that someone or something should be removed, ejected, or thrown out. But it can, in some contexts, mean "to kill." …

"True threats of violence, everyone agrees, lie outside the bounds of the First Amendment's protection." "'True threats' encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals." "The 'true' in that term distinguishes what is at issue from jests, 'hyperbole,' or other statements that when taken in context do not convey a real possibility that violence will follow." …

The Court starts with the premise that the word "86" is a slang term with no single meaning. According to Merriam-Webster, "Eighty-six is slang meaning 'to throw out,' 'to get rid of,' or 'to refuse service to.'" The phrase "comes from 1930s soda-counter slang meaning that an item was sold out[,]" and may have been used because it rhymes with "nix." It was first used as a noun to refer "to an item … that had been sold out," but by the 1950s, the term was used as a verb, at first meaning " 'to refuse to serve a customer,' … later meaning " 'to get rid of; to throw out,' " and still later coming to mean " 'shut out' or 'rejected.'" Merriam-Webster further notes that a recent extension of these meanings has included "'to kill,'" although the dictionary declines to endorse that meaning "due to its relative recency and sparseness of use." According to Merriam-Webster, "[t]he most common meaning of eighty-six encountered today is the one that is closer to its service industry roots." …

Free Speech

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Prof. Bradypus Tridactylus. Credit: Marshall, *Annales du Muséum national d'histoire naturelle*, via Wikipedia.

From a draft by Stanford law professor Julian Nyarko and others:

We conducted a blinded evaluation of short-answer tutoring in contracts courses with sixteen U.S. law professors. Participants created 40 representative questions, wrote answers, and judged 2,918 anonymized comparisons between human and LLM responses. Professors rated LLMs far higher than their peers (average win rate = 75.33%), with models performing similarly to the best instructor. LLM responses were also rarely flagged as harmful (3.53%, vs 12.06% for professors). Preferences for LLM answers were consistent across evaluators and reflected shared professional standards….

Sixteen contracts professors from fourteen U.S. law schools—who all use the same casebook to teach the material—authored questions representative of those asked during office hours. From this pool we curated 40 representative questions spanning four instructional categories (Recall: Case or Code, Recall: Doctrine, Hypotheticals, Policy).

Recall questions—whether relating to a case, code or doctrine—tend to be amenable to answers which can be evaluated against a ground truth, and where argumentative strength is of little importance. In contrast, hypotheticals present a short set of facts and ask how the law should be applied. Together with policy questions, which often center on legal or policy design under heterogeneous preferences, providing a strong answer in this category often relies on displaying careful reasoning, weighing competing arguments and other latent, professional standards of quality—even if the relevant doctrine is now settled.

Artificial Intelligence

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Below is my list of speaking engagements for the summer of 2026. Unless otherwise noted, all events are free and open to the public—and in person. The listed times are those in the time zone where the event is being held.

I normally post lists of speaking engagements only during the academic year. But this summer, I have an unusually large number of them. So I decided to do a post.

I may add additional events and information to this post, as they are scheduled, and update details on existing ones. In the meantime if your university, think tank, research institute or other similar organization would like to invite me to speak (either virtually or in person) on any topic within my expertise, I am open for business!

June 10, 12-1 PM, Southwest Florida Federalist Society, Lawyers Division Chapter, Bruno's (restaurant), 2149 First St., Fort Myers, FL: "Immigration is Not Invasion."

June 17, 3-4 PM, Housing Working Group, American Institute for Economic Research (online event): "The Constitutional Case Against Exclusionary Zoning." This event is, I believe, limited to members of the AIER housing working group, and possibly other AIER affiliates.

June 17, 6-9 PM, Institute for Humane Studies, National Press Club, Washington, DC: "IEEPA and the Limits of Executive Power." This event features a live podcast recording, followed by a Q&A session, and a reception. Registration and other information available here.

July 7, 6-7:30 PM, Annual Supreme Court Review, National Constitution Center, Philadelphia, PA: "Tariffs and the Limits of Executive Power" (tentative title). Panel on "The Supreme Court and Executive Power."

July 15, time TBA, Brennan Center for Justice, New York University, NYU DC 1307 L Street NW, Washington, DC: "Assessing the Tariff Decision" (tentative title), conference on "Congress and the Court.

The Roberts Court seems to be methodically scaling back the excesses of the Burger Courts. But one area that has not yet been revisited is the death penalty. Despite the Court imposing "history and tradition" tests for other aspects of the Bill of Rights, the Eighth Amendment still follows the "evolving standards of decency" standard. This sort of living constitutionalism is an anathema to the notion of a written Constitution. One of the most egregious manifestations of this standard was Atkins v. Virginia. This standard was egregiously wrong and has proven impossible to implement. And murderers with purported intellectual disabilities cannot plausibly rely on this or any other Supreme Court precedent. Yet Atkins remains. Just last month the Court DIG'd Hamm v. Smith, I suspect, because Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett didn't want to decide it. I suspect there will be leaks from the Court to make sense of this flip.

The Court needs to start over on the Eighth Amendment. Or in today's lingo, they need a reboot. My new essay in Civitas Outlook is titled, "The Roberts Court Needs To Reboot The Machinery Of Death."

Here is the introduction:

In the span of one year, the Burger Court created a constitutional contradiction. Furman v. Georgia (1972) proclaimed that the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from terminating the life of murderers. One year later, Roe v. Wade (1973) ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from protecting the life of the unborn. Both rulings represented the heights of judicial hubris. The Justices, and not the elected branches, would decide who could live and who could die. Neither ruling was even remotely plausible as an originalist matter. Both rulings led to chaos and uncertainty in the law.

While the Supreme Court would not revisit Roe for nearly two decades, the Court returned to the death penalty four years later. In the face of a popular backlash, the Court in Gregg v. Georgia (1976) allowed the states to resume executions. But this decision still allowed the judiciary to superintend capital punishment based on "evolving standards of decency." This sort of living constitutionalism is an anathema to the notion of a written Constitution. But worse still, this standard gives liberal elites who define "decency" the power to define our justice system. This regrettable standard persists to the present. Just last week, the Supreme Court declined to resolve a capital case where mental health professionals insisted that a cold-blooded killer could not be executed because one of his five IQ scores may have been too low. The Court owes the victims of brutal murders and the Constitution far better. The machinery of death needs a reboot.

And the conclusion:

Given the ham-handed dismissal in Hamm, state Attorneys should go on offense. They should ask the Court to reverse Gregg, Atkins, and all related cases in every petition and cross-petition. The states need a power saw to remove this doctrine root and branch. The Court should once and for all eliminate the evolving standards test. The Eighth Amendment should be interpreted in an originalist fashion like the rest of the Bill of Rights. IQ tests did not exist in 1787, yet our framers somehow managed to execute people. States are free to impose greater restrictions on capital punishment or ban it altogether. But this issue is not for the judiciary to decide. Gregg v. Georgia should meet the same fate as other discarded Burger Court precedents like Roe, Bakke, Chevron, Lemon, and the list goes on.

Two decades after Gregg, Justice Harry Blackmun concluded that all forms of capital punishment were unconstitutional. Blackmun, the author of Roe v. Wade, may have been President Nixon's greatest mistake. Watergate was over in a few years, but Blackmun's judicial impact stretched two decades. In Callins v. Collins (1994), Blackmun declared, "From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death." Blackmun got it exactly backwards. Judicial abolition of the death penalty was the problem, not the solution. The way for judges to stop tinkering with the machinery of death is to stop tinkering with the machinery of death. The Roberts Court should reboot the machinery of death, and get the judiciary out of this interminable quagmire.

The entire Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has been an abject failure at every level. In my mind, the most perverse aspect of the abolition movement is that so much effort is aimed at helping the most gruesome murderers, even as defendants who committed far less serious offenses with a greater chance of success are severely underrepresented. States are free to abolish capital punishment, and the federal courts should exit this thicket.

From Amitay v. Jews for Jesus, decided Thursday by the California Court of Appeal (Justice Marla Miller, joined by Justices James Richman and Tara Desautels):

In December 2023, JFJ posted on its social media pages, including on Facebook and Instagram, a blurred photograph of an Israeli soldier wearing a yarmulke. Above the photograph was the following text attributed to "Nachman": "'Thank you for leaving at my home a copy of the New Testament. I look forward to reading it when I return home from the war'—Nachman, a young Haredi soldier." {Haredim are sometimes referred to as 'ultra-Orthodox,' although this term may be considered objectionable."} {Some of the posts went on to state: "One of the ways that God provides for His people is through the generosity of other people around the World, like you. Because of your support, we were able to give a copy of the New Testament to Nachman and more than 1,000 Israelis in 2023!"}

Amitay filed a complaint against JFJ, attaching screenshots of JFJ's posts. He alleged that the photographs posted by JFJ were photographs of him, that they had been posted without his consent, and that defendant had defamed him …. Amitay alleged that he was a Jewish Orthodox rabbi who had "dedicated his life to the study of the Jewish Orthodox faith and committed many years studying to become a rabbi," recounting about a dozen years of study.

He had finally gotten a job teaching at an institution in Israel where he had worked for two years, a position he described as his "dream job." His job "suddenly came to an end as he was terminated … due to an egregious act by JFJ," namely, "upload[ing] photos of Amitay on [its] social media pages." He alleged: "JFJ posted a picture of [him] on their website giving the appearance that he supports JFJ's cause. Not only was a photo uploaded, but the post included a caption also falsely expressing that [he] supported JFJ's religious views." Amitay alleged that he is "an Orthodox Jew, a more traditional branch of Judaism, which [has] starkly different views from JFJ." He "never before associated with JFJ and disagrees with their religious views." …

Amitay alleged that when his employer "saw the pictures posted online," they "expressly stated that his termination was due to the posts online of him supporting JFJ, and that they could not condone or be associated with someone involved with JFJ or their views." Amitay alleged that the posts were false because Amitay "has no affiliation with [JFJ] … and disagrees with [JFJ's] religious views." …

Free Speech Libel Religion and the Law

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From a May 5 decision by the Ohio Court of Appeals in City of Nelsonville v. Nguyen, decided by Judge Michael Hess, joined by Judges Jason Smith and Kristy Wilkin:

The State of Ohio, City of Nelsonville appeals the judgment rendered in this criminal case involving an offense of disturbing a lawful meeting. The State contends that the trial court erred when it added the element of "substantial" to the offense of disturbing a lawful meeting under R.C. 2917.12(A)(1) to its jury instructions….

The State presented witness testimony from the Nelsonville City Council President, Gregg Clement, that the Nelsonville City Council held a regular meeting on April 14, 2025 at which two new council members were to be sworn in following the roll call. However, after roll call and before the swearing in, [former City Council President] Nguyen stepped forward and began speaking.

Clement called Nguyen to order and instructed her that it was not the appropriate time to speak and that she could make comments during the citizens' comment period. Nguyen continued to speak, and Clement called her to order a second time and again instructed her that she could speak under the citizens' comment period. Nguyen continued to speak and Police Chief Devon Tolliver, who was providing security for the meeting, stepped in and tried to get Nguyen to stop speaking, but she continued so Chief Tolliver removed her from the council meeting.

Clement called a recess of the meeting for approximately 10 to 15 minutes to allow everyone to regain composure. Following the recess, the meeting was resumed, there were no further interruptions, council business was conducted, and the meeting concluded. Clement testified that he believed that Nguyen had the misconception that she was the Nelsonville City Council President and could speak anytime during the meeting. However, because Nguyen had resigned from council several weeks earlier, Clement understood that Nguyen was no longer a member of council.

Nguyen testified that she believed that she was the city council president during the April 14, 2025 meeting and had the right to speak when she did without waiting until the citizens' comment period. Nguyen testified that it was her intent to speak for two minutes. A video recording of the meeting was played for the jury. The video shows Nguyen speaking and arguing with council president and the police chief continuously for approximately three and one-half minutes. Nguyen continues to argue loudly with law enforcement off camera as she is removed from the meeting, such that Clement called a recess for approximately 10 to 15 minutes….

Nguyen was charged with a violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2917.12(A)(1):

Free Speech

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From Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV yesterday in U.S. v. Nshimiye (D. Mass.):

This is a criminal case arising out of a six-count indictment charging defendant Eric Tabaro Nshimiye with perjury, obstruction of justice, and knowingly concealing material facts in his application for refugee status in the United States.

Nshimiye has moved to dismiss the indictment, asserting that the Rwandan government and its restrictions on speech will prevent the witnesses from speaking freely about the genocide, rendering their testimony unreliable, and that admitting such testimony would violate his due-process rights…. He [also] contends that the government cannot establish that the statements alleged in Counts One and Three were knowingly false or material.

For the following reasons, the motion will be denied….

Eric Tabaro Nshimiye was born and raised in the Republic of Rwanda. He is a Hutu, which is the majority ethnic group in Rwanda. In April 1994, the Rwandan genocide targeting the country's Tutsi ethnic population began. At the time, Nshimiye was enrolled as a medical student at the University of Rwanda in Butare. The government alleges that Nshimiye was an active member of the Movement Revolutionaire National pour le Development ("MRND"), a group that committed genocidal acts in Rwanda in 1994. At some point in 1994 or 1995, Nshimiye fled Rwanda to Kenya.

In May 1995, he applied to become a refugee to the United States and was admitted in December 1995. He became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1998 and achieved United States citizenship status in 2003. The government alleges that he knowingly made false statements about his involvement in the Rwandan genocide at each stage of the immigration process.

In April 2019, Nshimiye was called to testify as a defense witness on behalf of Jean Leonard Teganya, his former University classmate and roommate. Teganya was charged with committing perjury and making false statements during immigration proceedings about his membership in the MRND and his actions during the Rwandan genocide. Nshimiye testified under oath before a federal jury….

Politics

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6/2/1952: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer decided.

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