The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

The Transgender Athletics Cases

They were not as combative as I would have expected, and maybe even not 6-3.

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I have now finished reading the 250-pages of transcript in Little v. Hecox and West Virginia v. B.P.J. My global reaction was that the Justices were surprisingly not combative. After Skrmetti and Mahmoud last term, I was expecting a much more vigorous and contentious argument. But it was just the opposite. The Justices were surprisingly restrained. I don't think the vote here is 6-3. It might be 7-2, or maybe even 8-1 in favor of the government in both cases. Title IX is different than Title VII, and the Equal Protection issue here is different than the Equal Protection issue in Obergefell.

Perhaps the defining feature was Justice Kagan having a two-hour long discussion with all five lawyers about whether a plaintiff could bring an as-applied challenge for an equal protection claim. This was such a genuine and nerdy discourse. The advocates seemed surprised, and a bit frustrated, with how much time was being devoted to it. I'll talk about this issue later.

Maybe something could be said for the sequencing of the cases. Skrmetti and Mahmoud involved very thorny issues of parental rights to obtain medical treatment and parental rights to opt out of LGBT instruction. But Hecox and B.P.J. involved far simpler Title IX and Equal Protection analyses (putting aside the as-applied stuff for now.) I think people genuinely do not understand all the nuances of transgender medicine but anyone who has ever watched a sporting event gets the issues in Hecox and B.P.J. I don't even think this issue is particularly polarizing. This is what Trump would call an 80-20 issue.

If the athletics case had come to the Court before Skrmetti and Mahmoud, the arguments could have been more contentious. Indeed, what if Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, a bathroom case, was granted before Bostock was decided?

I think of Obergefell in a similar fashion. Thirty years ago, who would have thought that the Supreme Court would find a right to same-sex marriage five years before finding that Title VII bars LGBT discrimination. Sometimes, the Court does things out of order.

Finally, I think we have to account for the changing tides with regard to transgender issues. The public sees these matters far differently than a decade ago. The somewhat sedate arguments yesterday can be traced to the path already laid down.

Guns

Cavalier Knight's Challenge to N.Y. Bricks-and-Mortar Requirement for Gun Dealers Can Go Forward

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An excerpt from Knight v. City of New York, decided yesterday by the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judges Denny Chin, Richard Sullivan, and Maria Araújo Kahn:

Cavalier D. Knight, a would-be gun dealer residing in New York City [challenges a New York City regulation requiring] applicants for firearms dealer licenses to "maintain a place of business in the city," which effectively requires the applicant to maintain a brick-and-mortar location.

The trial court concluded Knight lacked standing to bring the challenge, but the appellate court reversed, and sent the case back down for a substantive Second Amendment analysis:

To satisfy Article III's standing requirement, "a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) injury-in-fact, which means 'an actual or imminent' and 'concrete and particularized' harm to a 'legally protected interest'; (2) causation of the injury, which means that the injury is 'fairly traceable' to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) redressability, which means that it is 'likely,' not speculative, that a favorable decision by a court will redress the injury." For an injury in fact to be concrete and particularized, it must "actually exist" and "affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." …

As alleged, the City informed Knight that without a brick-and-mortar location, he would be ineligible for a dealer license. The district court, however, held that this aspect of Knight's claim is not redressable because even with a dealer license, unchallenged New York City zoning provisions would prohibit Knight's contemplated business.

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Is Australian Attorney and Activist Randa Abdel-Fattah an "Extremist Terrorist Sympathizer"?

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Randa Abdel-Fattah is an Australian writer, attorney, and "antizionist" activist of Egyptian and Palestinian descent. This is what she posted on Oct. 8, 2023, while terrorists who entered Israel on hang gliders and proceeded to massacre, kidnap, and brutalize civilians were still at large:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In January 2024, she published an article dismissing (true) reports of sexual assault of Israeli women by Hamas terrorists as "atrocity propaganda."

 

 

 

 

 

 

Here she is expressing her commitment to harassing "zionists:"

 

 

 

 

 

 

In February 2024, she was one of ten authors who signed a letter demanding the Adelaide Book Festival to disinvite Thomas Friedman because he's a "zionist."

Her reaction to the massacre of fifteen Jews celebrating Hanukkah in December was to decry those "quickly surrendering to the agenda of those who are using a horrific act of antisemitism to entrench anti-Palestinian racism," and its exploitation "Zionists, white supremacists, the far right to advance their racist, violent, and oppressive agendas."

The Adelaide Book Festival chose to disinvite her thereafter, on the vague grounds that it would not be "culturally sensitive" to have her after the Bondi atrocity.

In response, she accused the Festival of anti-Palestinian racism, which in turn led to widespread withdrawals of other authors from the Festival on either anti-censorship or anti-racism grounds, which in turn led to the cancellation of the Festival this year.

She has now posted the following statement:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I can't imagine that in a country where the loser pays the winner's legal fees, she really wants a trial on whether calling her an extremist and terrorist sympathizer is false.

Free Speech

Multi-Billion Dollar Corporation Drops Suit Against Inter-American Development Bank, After Court Holds It Can't Sue as "Doe Corporation"

The case helps illustrate why the legal rules surrounding when parties can litigate under pseudonyms are so important.

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Here's a paragraph summary from Chief Judge James Boasberg's initial decision denying pseudonymity to the company, in Doe Corp. 1 v. Inter-American Development Bank (D.D.C.):

Plaintiffs are corporate entities who have filed this lawsuit against the Inter-American Development Bank, claiming that the IDB has improperly initiated sanctions proceedings against them. Doe Corporations allege that those proceedings violate both Defendant's governing charter and its contracts with Plaintiffs. Concerned that revealing that they are the subjects of the IDB's sanctions proceedings would result in "reputational harm," "crater new business," and "jeopardize existing projects," Doe Corporations now move to proceed under pseudonyms….

The D.C. Circuit upheld that decision (disclosure: I filed a friend of the court brief arguing that the company indeed shouldn't be able to sue pseudonymously). Yesterday, that decision essentially became final (the D.C. Circuit issued its mandate to the lower court), and then yesterday the company dropped the case:

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) and 41(a)(1)(B), Plaintiffs Doe Corporation 1, Doe Corporation 2, Doe Corporation 3, and Doe Corporation 4 [which all seem to be affiliates of one company -EV], by and through undersigned counsel, hereby voluntarily dismiss all their claims in this action without prejudice. No answer or motion for summary judgment has been served by Defendant Inter-American Development Bank in this action.

And while it's hard to know for sure why the company did that, it seems likely that it's because of what was said in its argument for pseudonymity: Identifying itself as the plaintiff would damage its future prospects with other business partners.

Now I think that pseudonymity should indeed be unavailable in such cases; here's the Summary of Argument from my brief, which goes into a good deal of detail on the subject.

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Politics

Zen and the Art of Persuasive Writing, Word Choice

Distrust badverbs.

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Adverbs were invented to serve other words and phrases, like Robin to Batman, literary sidekick to superhero, offering color and commentary about verbs and adjectives. They come in at least five flavors:

Adverbs of time tell the reader when something has or will happen, pointing to a date on the calendar (today, yesterday, tomorrow) and general time periods (forever, soon).

    • Don't worry, I'll eventually get to it.

Adverbs of frequency tell the reader how often something has or will happen (constantly, frequently, rarely, always, daily, weekly, monthly, yearly).

    • Nick usually cared when a close friend died.

Adverbs of manner tell the reader how something happened (slowly, beautifully, loudly, wisely). Adverbs of manner often stand next to the main verb.

    • She harmlessly fired a weapon into the air.

Adverbs of degree tell the reader that something is intense (very, clearly, totally).

    • It's very

Adverbs of place tell the reader where something happened (everywhere, here, there, under, somewhere).

    • It's sunny somewhere.
  1. Badverbs

Adverbs are not your friend. I believe the road to hell is paved with adverbs, and I will shout it from the rooftops.  —Stephen King

Adverbs do many things for writers. They are frequently used in the law to intensify and hedge. I distrust hedge and intensifier adverbs, which I call badverbs, because they tell the reader what to think with no support or explanation. Badverbs are not your friend. They compromise the cause of clarity and distract from the message, breeding doubt in the reader's brain and raising questions that harm, not help, your cause.

i. Intensifier Adverbs

Surely: the adverb of a man without an argument.  —Edward St. Aubyn

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Second Amendment Roundup: Hawaii Sticks to Its Black Code Precedent

Its Amici in Wolford v. Lopez abandon the embarrassing “analogue.”

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On Tuesday, January 20, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Wolford v. Lopez, which concerns whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that Hawaii may prohibit the carrying of handguns by permit holders on private property open to the public unless the property owner affirmatively gives express permission.  The Ninth Circuit upheld the ban under Bruen based on the existence of merely two purported historical analogues, a 1771 New Jersey law on poaching and an 1865 Louisiana Black Code law.

As I explained in a previous post, I filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the National African American Gun Association, extensively detailing the nature of the Louisiana law as part of the Black Codes intended to limit the freedom of movement and the right to bear arms of the newly-freed slaves.  As explained in the New York Tribune, March 7, 1866, the statute making it unlawful to "carry firearms on the premises or plantations of any citizen" without consent was part of "a code of laws [for blacks] establishing a system of serfdom, forbidding the free passage of blacks from one plantation to another, and under the form of apprenticeship and Vagrant laws reenacting slavery in fact."

But in Respondent's Brief, Hawaii doubles down on its reliance on the Louisiana law.  After all, it's one of only two supposed historical "analogues" offered.  It cites a handful of other laws, but they concerned private property not open to the public.  As to the Louisiana law, Hawaii wants to have it both ways: "The Black Codes are undoubtedly a relic of a shameful portion of American history.  But that does not mean that the laws contained within them are irrelevant to the Second Amendment's historical analysis."  No explanation is offered as to why.

Hawaii tries to soften the blow by asserting that "contemporary opponents of the Black Codes agreed that the Second Amendment did not authorize armed entry without the consent of a property owner."  But it cited just one such opponent, who said quite the opposite.  General D.E. Sickles, Commander of the Department of South Carolina, issued a decree in 1866 providing that, while the "constitutional rights of all loyal and well-disposed inhabitants to keep and bear arms will not be infringed, nevertheless this shall not … authorize any person to enter with arms on the premises of another against his consent."  Entering "against" one's consent is quite the contrary of entering "without" one's consent.

Eight of the usual suspects filed amici curiae briefs in support of Hawaii, but not a single one mentioned the embarrassing 1865 Black Code law of Louisiana.  Everytown for Gun Safety danced around the issue but kept the law in the closet.  Its brief scolds the United States and petitioners for "contend[ing] that a firearms regulation is per se unconstitutional if it has a purportedly improper purpose to frustrate Second Amendment rights…."  Pray tell, exactly which regulations are being referred to?  You've got to read the amicus brief of the United States or the brief of petitioners to find that Everytown is referring to the 1865 Louisiana law.

Everytown next berates the United States and petitioners as being "wrong to argue that modern firearms regulations are consistent with the Second Amendment only if the government can marshal some minimum number of historical regulations that mirror the contemporary law."  Given that the Ninth Circuit found only two measly laws as purported analogues, that shows the absence of a National tradition of regulation.

As Everytown points out, Bruen relied in part on treatises and historical newspapers to illuminate the meaning of the Second Amendment. But none of the sources it cites support Hawaii's law, least of which did The Loyal Georgian, Feb. 3, 1866, an African American newspaper that celebrated the Second Amendment and concluded: "All men, without distinction of color, have the right to keep and bear arms to defend their homes, families or themselves."  (I located that article in researching my 1998 Freedmen book (reissued as Securing Civil Rights), which Heller repeated.)

The brief of the Brady Center cites just a handful of irrelevant historical laws, but conspicuously missing is the 1865 Louisiana law.  The brief of Professors of Property Law mustered up a total of five mostly colonial laws to cite in a footnote but failed to discuss their contents.  The brief of what it self-characterizes as "the Amici States – the District of Columbia" et al. (sic) cites no historical laws.

As Bruen held, "when the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation."  Hawaii may not have an easy time at oral argument explaining how it has met its burden.

Federal Officer Removal in Plaquemines Parish

Justice Barrett is thinking about Chief Judge Pryor's holding that Mark Meadows could not remove the Georgia criminal prosecution to federal court.

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On Monday, the Court heard oral argument in Chevron v. Plaquemines Parish. The question presented is whether the energy company, a federal contractor, could remove a case to federal court "when sued for oil-production activities undertaken to fulfill a federal oil-refinement contract." I don't have terribly strong thoughts about this particular question, but my ears perked up when Justice Barrett brought up officer stuff. Yes, you can never get away from officer stuff.

ACB inquired abut Chief Judge Pryor's decision in Georgia v. Meadows (2023). As you might recall, the Fulton County DA indicted President Trump and several of his associates, including former Chief of Staff Mark Meadows, for events arising from the 2020 election. But by the time the case arrived to the Eleventh Circuit, Meadows no longer held that position. Judge Pryor found that the federal-officer removal statute does not apply to former federal officers.

In that case Georgia conceded that the Chief of Staff was an "officer" position, and the Eleventh Circuit relied on that concession. I'm not so sure about that concession. There is some reason to think the Chief of Staff is neither a principal nor an inferior officer of the United States. He just might be an employee, in which case he could not avail himself of the federal officer removal statute at all. But that issue was not litigated, so I'll leave it here. And for those with short memories, Seth Barrett Tillman and I argued that Trump, as President, was not an "Officer of the United States," and thus could not remove the case to federal court. Judge Hellerstein, who has been in the news of late with the Maduro case, "believe[d]" in dictum that the President was an "Officer of the United States" for purposes of Federal Officer Removal Statute.

Anyway, back to Meadows. Paul Clement represented Meadows, and filed a cert petition in June 2024. It was denied in November 2024, without any relists, or dissents. At the time, I suspected the Court wanted to get as far away from J6 as possible, and in any event, this was not the ideal vehicle to resolve the issue. Judge Pryor held in the alternative that even if Meadows could remove the case, the events giving rise to the indictment were not related to Meadows's official duties.

Fast-forward to Plaquemines Parish (which is close to where ACB grew up in New Orleans.) Chevron was represented by (who else) Paul Clement. And Justice Barrett asked about Judge Pryor's opinion:

JUSTICE BARRETT: The other thing is we've never addressed whether the federal officer has to be a federal officer now or at the time the conduct occurred. And in the Meadows case, which was pretty recent, Chief Judge Pryor said, well, it has to be at the time currently, which would not apply to your clients.

So if you could address those two.

MR. CLEMENT: Well, there's a lot there. I mean, first --and --and let me make sure I don't forget either piece.

JUSTICE BARRETT: Yeah.

So, on your second question, well, what can I say? I mean, Chief Judge Pryor got that badly, badly wrong. I asked on behalf of Mr. Meadows for this Court to take a look at it and fix it. This Court wasn't interested. But, you know, the arguments are overwhelmingly strong that that's --that the Eleventh Circuit decision is wrong. But even the Eleventh Circuit, my understanding is, has not applied that in the government contractor case because, you know, one of --I mean, there's a lot wrong with that approach, but one of the things is it's really hard to apply in the government contractor case because what are you saying? Like, the contract officer that gave us the contract in World War II still needs to be alive or still needs to be on the job? I mean, that doesn't make any sense.

JUSTICE BARRETT: Well, I don't --I don't know whether it makes sense or not because, as you say, we didn't take up that question before. I just don't want to implicitly resolve it here because it's a live one.

MR. CLEMENT: It's not a live one on the Fifth Circuit on remand. You know, if you want to drop a footnote and say you're not deciding that case or that issue in the opinion, you know, that --that --that would be an appropriate approach, I think.

I think there are only a handful of advocates who could stand at the podium and stay that the Chief Judge of the Eleventh Circuit was "badly, badly wrong." And there are even fewer advocates who can complain that their cert petition in another case was denied. Paul Clement did both things in the span of a few moments.

Now, onto the transgender cases. Many more posts to come.

Sign Up For Advancing American Freedom's Judicial Clerkship Training Academy

The deadline is January 30.

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I am pleased to announce that Advancing American Freedom is hosting a Judicial Clerkship Training Academy in Washington, D.C. on March 18-20. I will be on the faculty, teaching a seminar on statutory interpretation. This is a great opportunity for future law clerks to learn about the job. The deadline is soon--January 30--so sign up quickly. Here are the details:

Judicial Clerkship Training Academy

Wednesday, March 18 – Friday, March 20, 2026

Applications due by Friday, January 30.

Please click here to apply.

Topics covered include legal writing, originalism, textualism, and practical discussions with prominent judges and former clerks. Speakers will include federal judges, professors who teach at well-known law schools, and legal practitioners. The program is designed for attendees who have already accepted offers for judicial clerkships with start dates in 2026.

Court "Order for Lunch"

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You can see such orders in court dockets, mostly in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and might be curious just what's on the menu. Unfortunately, the document doesn't include the lunch order as such, but rather a court order authorizing the purchase of lunch for jurors. The Northern District of California also sometimes issues orders for jury breakfast, most recently in Elon Musk v. Samuel Altman (to be delivered through AI-using delivery robots, doubtless).

As I understand it, most courts don't routinely provide meals for jurors, but at least some courts do it at least some of the time, for instance during jury deliberations. I assume that courts in other federal districts likewise at least sometimes provide meals for jurors as well without requiring a court order. But I'm happy to be corrected if I'm mistaken on that.

Politics

No Shirt, No Shrewd, No Parking

"[O]n numerous occasions over the next fifteen months, Appellant was seen walking or standing in front of Appellee's home wearing only brightly colored underwear."

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Johnson v. Faeder was decided yesterday by the Tennessee Court of Appeals (Judge Valerie Smith, joined by Chief Judge Michael Swiney and Judge Neal McBrayer). Defendant-Appellant Faeder is a lawyer who has a web site called One Shrewd Dude (presumably referring to himself), is a former college philosophy teacher and the author of the "bookella" Philosophy Without Reference: An Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy, and has "competed in six Magic: The Gathering Pro Tours" (see also here). Plaintiff-Appellee Johnson lives two houses away from Faeder. Here's the court's discussion of what happened:

[O]n July 14, 2021[,] … Appellee's husband (who is not a party to this litigation), saw Appellant in Appellee's backyard without permission and accompanied by his two young children. Appellant was shirtless at the time, and Mr. Johnson asked that Appellant put on a shirt. Appellant then left the Johnsons' yard with his children. There was no direct interaction between Appellant and Appellee during this encounter.

On July 29, 2021, Appellant delivered a letter to Appellee's mailbox. The delivery consisted of a men's shirt accompanied by a typed letter addressed to "Shirtman," seemingly in reference to Mr. Johnson. In the letter, Appellant proposed a solution for any future incidents: if Appellant's children wandered onto the Johnsons' property while Appellant was outside without a shirt, the Johnsons could bring him the enclosed shirt, which he would then wear and later return to their mailbox for repeated use. Appellant signed the letter "Your Eternally Neighborly Neighbor."

Relations between the parties further deteriorated following this incident. The record indicates that on numerous occasions over the next fifteen months, Appellant was seen walking or standing in front of Appellee's home wearing only brightly colored underwear. This behavior occurred repeatedly, including occasions when Appellee was hosting a children's birthday party and an Easter gathering at her home.

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Politics

Zen and the Art of Persuasive Writing: Be Aware of the Audience

Absent readers and absent writers; know the reader.

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Ancient Mesopotamians used pictures of basic objects to preserve and describe their culture. The Phoenicians pivoted from pictures to symbols around 1600 B.C., a harbinger of our modern alphabet.  Each symbol represented a spoken sound, but the reader read the symbols from right to left.

This method spread to Israel and Greece, where the Phoenician alphabet was refashioned into the Greek alphabet, but the Greeks invented vowels and redirected the reader from left to right.

The Romans then used the Greek alphabet to make the Latin alphabet, and hundreds of languages have sprung from the Latin alphabet, including English.

When the Phoenicians invented the alphabet and written communication, they invented a method to exchange and preserve thought, long after the thinker has stopped thinking. Words live on the page, where they reverberate beyond our physical and temporal reach. A device that teleports ideas through space and time. Yes, it sounds like Star Wars, but I only mean to say that shouting distance was no longer required to make a point. As a result, we can read the Gettysburg Address in 2024, even though President Abraham Lincoln died in April 1865. Lincoln understood this power and described it well:

Writing, the art of communicating thoughts to the mind through the eye, is the great invention of the world[,] enabling us to converse with the dead, the absent, and the unborn, at all distances of time and space.

But it's not all sunshine and rainbows. The distance of time and space between readers and writers produced new challenges, which I call the Absent Reader and the Absent Writer.

An absent reader for the writer.

First, a writer writes alone. Readers are absent when writers craft and recraft their words and sentences. The reader is not in the room during the creative process, peering over the writer's shoulder to ask questions and raise concerns:

What does this mean?

Why are you discussing that point?

I'm losing interest.

OK bruh, I'm lost.

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Are Historians Really Apolitical?

80% of members at the American Historical Association conference supported a resolution about "the U.S.-sponsored genocide perpetrated by Israel in Gaza."

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In debates about originalism, historians claim the moral high ground. We are lectured that only those with doctorates, trained in the proper methodology, can place history in the proper context. And the historians insist that they, unlike conservative law professors, are apolitical, and bring no biases to their careful work.

Does anyone actually believe these claims? You shouldn't.

The New York Times reports from the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Leadership of the American Historical Association has vetoed two resolutions criticizing Israel's actions in Gaza that were approved by a member vote over the weekend, saying they lay outside the group's mission and would pose risks to the organization and the historical profession.

The first resolution criticized what it characterized as intentional "scholasticide" in Gaza, where most of the educational system, including all 12 universities, has been damaged or destroyed. The second condemned ongoing attacks on academic freedom at American universities, including the silencing of protest against "the U.S.-sponsored genocide perpetrated by Israel in Gaza."

Both resolutions passed with nearly 80 percent support from the almost 500 members who attended the vote, held on Saturday during the group's annual conference in Chicago. But on Sunday the 16 voting members of the executive council voted not to pass them on to the full membership of roughly 14,000 for final consideration.

"As worded the two resolutions fall outside the scope of the American Historical Association's chartered mission," the council said in a statement. "Approving them on behalf of the entire association would present institutional risk and have long-term implications for the discipline and the organization." . . .

The "scholasticide" measure was passed with 282 votes for, 76 against, and two abstentions. The academic freedom resolution passed 245 in favor, 62 against, with one abstention.

Professional historians are not apolitical. They lean overwhelmingly to the left, and are subject to the same sorts of biases as conservatives.

I suppose we should be thankful that the AALS is not venturing down this road. As left-wing as the legal professoriate is, it still seems moderate when compared to the liberal arts. The MLA, of course, passed the Gaza resolution:

The academic freedom resolution was developed in coordination with members of the Modern Language Association, the country's largest scholarly association in the humanities. Over the weekend, it was approved by that group's delegate assembly, by a vote of 61 in favor, 52 against. That resolution will now pass to a vote by the group's roughly 20,000 members, where it must receive a majority that also totals at least 10 percent of membership.

And you wonder why conservatives have taken such aggressive postures to higher education.

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