The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Religion and the Law

"Al Ghashiyah Testified That … as Head of the Family, He Has Decided that Islamic Law Is the Law that Applies to the Family"

Uh, no, says the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, refusing to set aside plaintiff’s brother’s will, in which the brother left nothing to the plaintiff.

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From al Ghashiyah v. Oster, decided last Thursday by Wisconsin Court of Appeals Judges JoAnne Kloppenburg, Jennifer Nashold, and Chris Taylor:

Al Ghashiyah is the only brother of James C. Charles Casteel. Casteel died in October 2024. Thomas Oster, a longtime friend of Casteel, filed a petition for the formal administration of Casteel's estate and filed Casteel's will with the circuit court.

Casteel's will bequeaths the contents of his estate to certain friends and family members. The will does not bequeath any of Casteel's estate to al Ghashiyah. Al Ghashiyah filed a motion requesting that the court apply Islamic law to the administration of the estate. Al Ghashiyah asserted that, under Islamic law, Casteel's estate must be distributed among Casteel's surviving siblings, with any surviving male siblings receiving twice the share of any surviving female siblings.

At an evidentiary hearing on Oster's petition and al Ghashiyah's motion, al Ghashiyah confirmed that his motion was a request that the circuit court apply Islamic law instead of the laws of the State of Wisconsin, and instead of following Casteel's will. Al Ghashiyah testified that, with his brother's death, al Ghashiyah became the head of the Casteel family, and as head of the family, he has decided that Islamic law is the law that applies to the family.

Al Ghashiyah also testified that he and Casteel did not discuss whether or not Casteel's property should be distributed according to Islamic law, and that, to al Ghashiyah's knowledge, Casteel did not practice the Islamic faith. The court denied al Ghashiyah's motion requesting that the court apply Islamic law….

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AI in Court

Nonexistent Case Citations on Both Sides + "Rubberstamp[ing]" by "Local Counsel"

"In an era of rampant unverified AI usage within the legal field, this case presents a prime example of the risk associated with serving as a rubberstamp when acting as local counsel."

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In Withers v. City of Aberdeen, decided yesterday by Judge Sharion Aycock (N.D. Miss.), both sides had filed briefs containing citations to nonexistent cases; the briefs were drafted by out-of-state counsel, each of whom had local counsel (as the rules generally require). Withers was represented by Wilson with Ridgeway as local counsel; the City was represented by Williams with McClinton as local counsel. I focus here just on the sanctions imposed on local counsel:

Ridgeway is a Mississippi licensed attorney who works for Christian & Small, LLP. She sponsored Wilson's pro hac vice admission in this case and serves as local counsel for Withers. As noted, Ridgeway appears as a signatory to Withers' Opposition to Defendant City of Aberdeen's Motion for Summary Judgment [105], which contained two citations to nonexistent cases. Though she was not the drafter of that document, she admitted to failing to review and verify the accuracy of the legal authority cited therein. In other words, she did not check the cases after authorizing her signature on the filing.

At the hearing, Ridgeway explained that she was unaware of Wilson's AI use but did not attempt to excuse herself on that basis. She explained that she does not personally use AI and that her firm has a policy in place pertaining to AI use. In essence, Wilson would present Ridgeway with a copy of proposed filings drafted by Wilson, and the two would discuss the substance of the same. Despite this communication between the two, Ridgeway admitted to not reviewing the legal citations in those drafts before they were filed, including Withers' Response [105]. Ridgeway accepted responsibility for her role in the violation stemming from the fake cases cited in that filing as well as in others. {Following the show cause hearing, Ridgeway informed the Court that she had self-reported to the Mississippi Bar. The Court finds that this act demonstrates her acceptance of accountability.}

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Politics

Obligation to Cite-Check the Cases Cited by the Other Side and Report Errors to Court

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It's hardly news that you shouldn't file briefs with AI-hallucinated cases. But should you check all of your opponent's citations to see if they're hallucinated, so that you can alert the court to that?

I at first thought not. Naturally, if a citation is critical to the opponent's argument, you'll want to read the case the opponent is citing, and alert the court if the case doesn't actually exist. But many citations are on tangential points, cited for uncontroversial matters; there isn't much reason to try to track them down.

Indeed, even using a tool such as Westlaw's document analysis tool, which can do a good job checking citations in bulk takes at least some time and therefore client money: One needs to not just run the tool but closely analyze any errors it claims to find. And then one would have to spent time and money confirming that they are genuine errors and not typos, since one doesn't want to seem to be making a mountain out of a molehill, and writing up the analysis.

But it now seems clear that quite a few judges do get annoyed not just at the lawyers whose briefs contain hallucinations, but also at opposing counsel who don't warn the court about those hallucinations. I saw this most recently in Landberg v. City of N.Y., where appellate court judges admonished the opposing counsel (to be sure, much less harshly than they admonished the directly offending lawyer); see this video, starting roughly at the 19-minute mark. Here's an excerpt from an article at 404 Media (Samantha Cole):

[T]he attorney [Friscia] representing the owner of the property that faces the sidewalk, stood up before the judges next. He started to speak, but [Presiding Justice Hector] LaSalle wasn't finished with the dressing-down. "He's raising a court of appeal standard that doesn't exist," LaSalle said, interrupting Friscia. "He was using it as a component of his argument, and you didn't think you should bring it to our attention?"

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Free Speech

Archaeologist's Libel Claim Over Allegations of "Trafficking in Stolen Native American Human Remains" Can Go Forward

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From Judge Robert Hinkle (N.D. Fla.) May 27 in Shanks v. Schwadron:

Shanks was an archaeologist employed at the National Park Service. His supervisor {Mr. Russo}, also an archaeologist, … and Mr. Shanks were the subject of an inspector general's investigation …. After an investigation, the inspector general issued a report that included the following facts, which are largely undisputed.

A collector approached Mr. Russo with an offer to sell the Park Service items retrieved from burial mounds on Tyndall Air Force Base. The report refers to these as potsherds, defined as pottery fragments found at archaeological sites. Items placed with human remains as part of a death rite are known as funerary objects.

Mr. Russo concluded the Park Service could not purchase the collector's items because if, as the collector said, they had been obtained at Tyndall, they would be considered funerary objects, whose purchase would be illegal. For convenience, this order sometimes refers to these items as potsherds, not funerary objects, without noting each time any uncertainty about their actual nature.

To avoid the perceived legal obstacle to purchasing these items, Mr. Russo enlisted a straw purchaser, who provided Mr. Russo a $1,000 check payable to the collector. Mr. Russo apparently intended to obtain the items to donate them to the State of Florida for preservation. Mr. Russo, accompanied by his subordinate Mr. Shanks, traveled to the collector's location, delivered the check to the collector, and took possession of the items, together with two Native American skulls. The skulls found their way to the State of Florida, which, at the time of the inspector general's report, was in the process of repatriating them. But the potsherds wound up on a shelf in Mr. Russo's office.

The inspector general concluded Mr. Russo's and Mr. Shanks's actions did not violate the most closely implicated federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1170, which is entitled "Illegal trafficking in Native American human remains and cultural items."

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Free Speech

Ex-DOGE Staffer, Ex-Pete-Hegseth Advisor Justin Fulcher Sues the Guardian for Libel

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From today's Complaint in Fulcher v. Guardian News & Media LLC (D.D.C.); of course, these are just plaintiff's allegations:

On June 9, 2025, The Guardian published an Article on its website at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jun/09/hegseth-wiretap-inquiry-justin-fulcher …. The Article contains numerous false and defamatory statements of and concerning Mr. Fulcher that are attributed to four unnamed sources. These statements include:

  1. "Hegseth aide upended Pentagon leak inquiry with false wiretap claims".
  2. "ex-Doge staffer Justin Fulcher suggested he had evidence of wiretap that would help investigation".
  3. "Days before Pete Hegseth fired three top aides last month over a Pentagon leak investigation into the disclosure of classified materials, according to four people familiar with the episode, a recently hired senior advisor said he could help with the inquiry."
  4. "The advisor, Justin Fulcher, suggested to Hegseth's then chief of staff, Joe Kasper, and Hegseth's personal lawyer, Tim Parlatore, that he knew of warrantless surveillance conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA) that had identified the leakers."
  5. "Fulcher offered to share the supposed evidence as long as he could help run the investigation, three of the people said. But when he eventually sat down with officials, it became clear he had no evidence of a wiretap, and the Pentagon had been duped."
  6. "The problem was that development was not communicated to the White House—so several Trump advisors who were told of the NSA wiretap claim believed that was part of the 'smoking gun' evidence against the three aides fired by Hegseth, until they developed their own doubts."
  7. "The Guardian revealed last month that there were unsubstantiated NSA warrantless wiretap claims underpinning the leak investigation, but its origin story and the involvement of Fulcher in the controversy has not been previously reported."
  8. "It was not immediately clear why Fulcher chose to become involved in the investigation, but several days after he was replaced as a Doge lead, he went to Kasper and expressed a willingness to help with the investigation, which Kasper attributed to him wanting to prove his worth, two of the people said."
  9. "Kasper told Fulcher to go to Parlatore, who had been tasked with supervising and managing the investigation. When Fulcher approached Parlatore, he suggested that he knew of NSA intercepts supposedly showing that Caldwell had leaked using his personal phone, the two people said."
  10. "Looking back on the chain of events, three people familiar with the conversations described Fulcher's claims as conveniently dovetailing with prevailing suspicions at the time about Caldwell printing lots of documents and his efforts to have the leak investigation shut down."
  11. "Still, a cursory check at that stage into the NSA claims [by Mr. Fulcher] would have shown them to be false."
  12. "The claims [by Mr. Fulcher] were relayed to Hegseth and the White House as being accurate."

In truth, Mr. Fulcher never suggested, stated or otherwise communicated to Joe Kasper, Tim Parlatore, or anyone else that the NSA had conducted warrantless surveillance that identified the source(s) of the leak alleged in the Article, or that Mr. Fulcher had access to such surveillance. Further, Mr. Fulcher never asked Joe Kasper, Tim Parlatore, or anyone else if he could join or assist with an investigation into the leak alleged by the Article, nor did he tell anyone that he could "help run" it….

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Free Speech

"Plaintiff Also Alleges That the Grammy Awards 'Have Become a Public Nuisance' and Are 'Committing Industrial Espionage'"

Plus, the Alien and Sedition Acts.

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From a decision by Judge Fernando Olguin (C.D. Cal.) in Satish Dat Beast v. [Sabrina] Carpenter, filed May 8 but just posted on Westlaw:

On April 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Complaint and a Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Plaintiff brings this suit because certain recording artists allegedly "are committing defamation (libel and slander) and/or the dignitary tort of the invasion of privacy by talking about President Donald John [T]rump in a negative manner which could be perceived as violation of the Alien and Sedition Acts." Plaintiff also alleges that the Grammy Awards "have become a public nuisance" and are "committing industrial espionage" with television networks through their programming selections. Plaintiff seeks, among other things, an order precluding Defendants from advertising to him on cable television broadcasts.

No dice, says the court, which had to screen the case because plaintiff sought to sue with a waiver of filing fees.  The court notes that plaintiff (who "often uses the name Ronald Satish Emrit") is a frequent and frivolous litigant, and that the particular complaint's allegations are 'clearly baseless,' 'fanciful,' and 'delusional.'"

Immigration

Federal Court Invalidates Trump's $100,000 H-1B Visa Fee as Illegal Usurpation of Congress' Power to Tax

The ruling relies in part on the Supreme Court's decision in the tariff case.

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NA

Earlier today, in the case of California v. Mullin, the US District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a decision striking down the Trump Administration's $100,000 fee on applications for H-1B visas (which are used by tech firms, research institutions, and other organizations to hire immigrant workers and researchers with a variety of specialized skills). Judge  Leo Sorokin ruled that the plan is illegal because it usurps Congress's power to tax. He relies in part on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, the tariff case I helped litigate:

The Court begins with Plaintiffs' assertion that the Policy intrudes upon Congress's
taxing power. The first inquiry is whether the $100,000 payment requirement constitutes a tax. The parties quibble about whether the requirement resembles a tax or a "penalty," as characterized by two Supreme Court precedents: Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius….

Here, the $100,000 payment requirement for all H-1B petitions does not aim to establish that hiring H-1B workers is illegal. The payment is not a penalty, just as the IRS fee in Sebelius was not, because it is not "punishment for an unlawful act or omission." Id. at 567. Hiring workers pursuant to the H-1B program is plainly lawful. Of course, rendering the hiring of H-1B workers "unlawful" would eliminate the program established by Congress through the statute, which would raise a different separation-of-powers concern…

Furthermore, Defendants claim that the $100,000 payment requirement is "a regulatory
payment," which is "not the same as a tax…"  This is mere ipse dixit. Defendants offer no definition for what constitutes "a regulatory payment," cite no cases or statutes employing the term, and advance no reasoned argument explaining how this term encompasses something different than a tax or a penalty….

That does not end the Court's analysis. While the Constitution exclusively vests
Congress with the "Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises," U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, Congress can delegate the taxing power to the executive branch so long as it "clearly" indicates "its intention to delegate." Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 224 (1989). Thus, the relevant inquiry here is whether the provisions of the INA granting the President discretionary powers to regulate the entry of noncitizens reflect a delegation of Congress's taxing power. Under INA § 212(f), the President has the authority to "impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). INA § 215(a) additionally grants the President the power to impose "reasonable rules, regulations, and orders" as well as "limitations and exceptions" to the entry of noncitizens. Id. § 1185(a)(1).

Plaintiffs argue that these provisions do not confer the power to impose taxes, relying on the Supreme Court's recent guidance in Learning Resources. That case involved a challenge to the President's imposition of tariffs under the IEEPA….. The
IEEPA permits the President to "investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any . . . importation or exploration of . . . any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest" when responding to a national emergency. Id. at 636. The Court found that the IEEPA does not delegate taxing powers to the President, noting that the specific powers listed in the IEEPA do not include "any mention of tariffs or duties." Id. at 642. The Court further noted that the power to "regulate . . . importation" does not encompass the power to tax, because the term "regulate" "means to 'fix, establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method, or established mode; to direct by rule to restriction; to subject to governing principles or laws'"—none of which captures the power to tax. Id. at 642-43…

Applying Learning Resources to the case at hand, the Court finds that INA §§ 212(f) and 215(a) do not delegate taxing power to the President. These sections allow the President to impose "restrictions," "rules," "regulations," "orders," "limitations," and "exceptions" to the entry of noncitizens to the United States. Like the powers delineated in the IEEPA, none of these terms, by their ordinary meaning, include the power to tax.

I agree with the court's analysis, and am glad the tariff case turned out be a useful precedent here. The court also ruled the imposition of the $100,000 fee violates the Administrative Procedure Act.

I have previously criticized the $100,000 H-1B fee on both legal and policy grounds here, here, and here.

Obviously, today's decision will almost certainly be appealed, and the legal battle will continue. But, especially after Learning Resources, I am guardedly hopeful the various groups challenging the fee will prevail.

NOTE: In the original version of this post, I  misidentified Judge Leo Sorokin as the late Judge H. Lee Sarokin. I apologize for the error, which has now been fixed.

 

 

 

What Judge Wood Did Not Say About Judge Ross's Misconduct

She says nothing about Judge Ross's dishonesty, nothing about the private reprimand, and nothing about Pauline Newman.

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Bloomberg Law published an unusual Op-Ed by retired Judge Diane Wood of the Seventh Circuit. Judge Wood discusses the Judge Ross situation, but leaves much out. I think what Wood did not say is far more important than what she did say.

First, here is how Judge Wood describes the facts:

The misconduct was of a personal nature: Judge Ross was engaged in a sexual relationship with a law-enforcement officer whose department regularly appeared before that judge.

If a student at the University of Chicago offered that summary of the case, she would be failed. Judge Ross's sexual activity was appalling, but the most severe transgression was lying to the Chief Judge of the Circuit and the Chief Judge of the District. The closest Judge Wood got to acknowledging the dishonesty was this sentence:

Because Ross ultimately confessed everything and expressed what the committee regarded as genuine remorse…

This is a very roundabout way of saying she confessed to the sex and confessed to lying.

Second, Judge Wood offers no comment about the Eleventh Circuit Judicial Council's decision to issue a private reprimand. The most she will say is that the Judicial Conduct & Disability Committee did not err in affirming that decision.

The JC&D Committee had to decide what would most likely produce the desired result—permanent cessation of that kind of behavior. It also had to decide whether it believed that the judge's remorse and willingness to mend her ways were genuine. Others may have decided differently, but I see nothing here that casts doubt on the genuineness or integrity of the decisions the JC&D Committee made.

Why wouldn't the decision be genuine or have integrity? The relevant question is whether it is correct as a matter of law. But even this question is constrained, as the JC&D Committee's review was limited to a deferential standard. Here is the entirety of the analysis:

In light of our review for errors of law, clear errors of fact, or abuse of discretion, and in deference to the Circuit Judicial Council's consideration of the special committee's review of the evidence, we affirm the Circuit Judicial Council's unanimous decision concluding that the subject judge's actions constituted judicial misconduct. The special committee conducted a thorough investigation and afforded the subject judge all the process that was due under the JC&D Act and the Rules. Accordingly, we find no error of law or abuse of discretion in the special committee's investigatory process. And we conclude that the remedial measures ordered by the Judicial Council under 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(2)(A) are appropriate and proportionate to the Judicial Council's findings in relation to the seriousness of the misconduct, balanced against the subject judge's correction of the prior false statements and subsequent candor with the special committee, the special committee's assessment that the subject judge is unlikely to engage in similar misconduct in the future, and the subject judge's otherwise exemplary service to the court.

The finding was affirmed based on no "abuse of discretion" or "error of law." This is not exactly a ringing endorsement of the Eleventh Circuit's ruling, which I'll note had no noted dissents--the only name on the document was Chief Judge Pryor. Does Judge Wood think the Eleventh Circuit Judicial Council made the right decision in the first instance? We don't know.

Third, Judge Wood suggested that there are limits on how judges can be reprimanded. She suggests that taking away cases from a judge amounts may be unconstitutional:

Some have argued that this system is unduly solicitous of judges who engage in behavior so obviously unbecoming a federal judge. They contend that, at a minimum, this kind of misbehavior should always be made public. But there is only so far that the Conduct Act can go before it bumps into the constitutional protections for a judge's tenure in office.

Indeed, some think that depriving the judge of her caseload is a de facto temporary removal from office and thus beyond the power of the judiciary. Critically, however, the judge is actually not removed and continues to receive her salary.

Where has Diane Wood been on the Pauline Newman case? Has she published any op-eds criticizing Chief Judge Kimberly Moore? Why did she not join former-Judge Paul Cassell's amicus brief in support of Judge Newman's cert petition?

Fourth, Judge Wood makes it seem like no other punishments were possible. She doesn't state the obvious: the reprimand should have been made public. Judge Ross could have kept her cases, but she would have faced litigants who perceive a plausible conflict of interest. That act would have been punishment by itself.

Fifth, Judge Wood reflects on her own tenure:

As chief judge of the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for nearly seven years, I well appreciate the constitutional tight-rope that these cases present.

Chief Judge Wood helmed the Seventh Circuit during the final years of Richard Posner's decline. I think an entire book could be written about how Judge Posner flouted the rules of judicial conduct, yet his colleagues took no actions against him. Maybe he should have been given the Pauline Newman treatment so he could spend all of his efforts on writing books. Indeed, Judge Posner's final act before resigning was to publish a bizarre book that attacked his colleagues based on confidential information. I do not think Judge Wood was the right person to comment on failing to take adequate action against a misbehaving judge.

Finally, I mention one last point, with some hesitation. Arthur, Gabe, and I pitched our essay to Bloomberg Law. The editor promptly got back to us and wrote "I don't think this fits into our coverage." Apparently, Judge Wood's non-defense of the courts does fit into the coverage. Go figure.

This entire piece feels forced. I think someone in the judicial apparatus asked a well-regarded, retired judge to defend the handiwork of the Eleventh Circuit. But she couldn't quite do that. She said very little, and reinforced how indefensible the Eleventh Circuit's private reprimand was. I'm not buying it. I've yet to talk to an actual judge who thinks the Eleventh Circuit got it right. If someone wants to defend what the Eleventh Circuit did here, they will actually have to discuss in detail.

I would hope that one of the law clerks who initially blew the whistle opts to appeal this matter to the full Judicial Conference. Chief Justice Roberts cannot simply turn this matter over like a couch cushion.

Update: A colleague wrote, "I just read Judge Wood's op-ed again, and I realized what it reads like: the hostage statement of someone who has been kidnapped." Yes, I agree. Also, how can Judge Wood say with certainty the subject judge was Eleanor Ross, and not even mention the reprimand was private. This situation seems like a fix.

Religion

The Pentagon's New War - Canceling American Religion and American History

A guest post by Prof. Paul Finkelman.

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Professor Paul Finkelman has asked me to post the following guest post, and I am more than happy to do so. Prof. Finkelman is a leading legal scholar and legal historian, and is the President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy, emeritus at Albany Law School.

For my part, I will note that I agree with most of his analysis. As a general rule, the government should not be in the business of promoting or discouraging religious observances. But the military presents a special case, because the lives of members of the armed forces (while on duty) are under government control to such an extent, that - in many situations - there is no way for them to practice their faiths unless the government facilitates it in various ways. When the government does that, it should not discriminate between adherents of different religions. What follows is written by Prof. Finkelman, and not me (Ilya Somin):

The Trump administration recently announced that it is removing about 180 religions from those recognized by the Pentagon. This is an obvious violation of the First Amendment's protection of religious liberty. In essence, the Administration has "established" 31 religions as acceptable to the U.S. government and denied religious freedom to members of many other faiths. Plausibly, the Pentagon could decide not to have military chaplains, and not to have religious symbols on military graves, and no longer provide a color guard for veterans  buried in cemeteries tied to particular faiths. It could prohibit military personnel from giving last rites to when those in the military die in combat or a military hospital. Members of the armed services would no longer have their religion on the dog tags. This would presumably not violate the First Amendment because the government would be taking a complete "hands off" policy to religion.

Such a policy  would run counter to the history of the American military starting with the Revolution. It would also undermine the morale of those who put their lives on the line for the nation. In our 250 years as a nation, we have increasingly expanded the range of religions recognized by the military. Initially, all chaplains were Protestant ministers. During the Mexican-American War President James K. Polk appointed two Catholic chaplains, reflecting the changing demographics of the nation. During the Civil War, the Lincoln administration intervened to allow rabbis to serve as chaplains. Today chaplains, whatever their background, are trained to serve members of all faiths. But, with this new rule, policies will change. Dog tags will no longer recognize the faiths of many service personnel. Chaplains may not respect the religious concerns of those who serve. Chaplains, trained to serve people of all faiths, may no longer be able to do so.

The message of the administration is that some faiths matter, and many do not. There seems to be some politics involved here. The "liberal" Unitarian/Universalist Church, which is as old as the nation itself, is no longer officially a church. Nor are churches tied to minorities, such as the Native American Church or the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME).

This policy is in conflict with the First Amendment, because the President and Secretary of Defense have in fact "established" 31 religions as being legitimate and worthy of government support, and asserted that about 180 are not either "real" religions or worthy of support.

Ironically, the Pentagon announced this on the anniversary of the D-Day invasion in World War II, when about 2,500 American men (and another 2,000 allies from Canada, Great Britain, and other allies) died. Some of those who died were probably members of faiths that the Pentagon no longer recognizes as "real" religions.

This slap in the face to Americans of minority faiths (and their families) who have died for our country is a direct assault on the Constitution. Among those religions that have now been cancelled by the administration (making it the leader of cancel culture in America,) are some of our most venerable faiths including Congregational Churches, the United Church of Christ, Unitarian/Universalist, Disciples of Christ, Mennonite, Moravian, Dutch Reformed, Adventist churches (other than Seventh Day Adventists), African Methodist Episcopal (AME), AME-Zion, the Native American Church, traditional tribal religions, and Deists  In addition, religions practiced by many people who landed on our shores from the mid-Nineteenth to the present, such as Confucianism, Coptic, Druze, Zoroastrianism, and Santeria, which are no longer recognized as religions.

Some of the designations on the list seem utterly weird and arbitrary. The list of acceptable faiths includes many that are designated "Christian," with the name of a denomination after that term. However, the list does not designate the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) as Christian. That would probably come as a great surprise to the more than six-and-a-half million members of the Utah based Church. As the Church notes on its website:  "Members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints unequivocally affirm themselves to be Christians."

By denying that members of the LDS Church are Christians, the administration is taking sides in a complicated theological debate between some Christian theologians and LDS theologians. This is emphatically not a debate in which the Pentagon, the President, or the federal government should take sides. This decision has also infuriated political leaders and LDS Church leaders in Utah.

However, even as it recognizes the LDS Church based in Utah, the list does not include the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, which for last quarter century has called itself Community of Christ, based in Missouri. Thus, Secretary Hegseth and President Trump have not only declared that Mormons are not Christians but have also decided which is the "real" Mormon Church. This is a type of establishment determination that the First Amendment prohibits.

This new policy is being implemented while the President and his administration are gearing up to celebrate the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. The policy is a direct refutation of the American Founding and insult to the memory of many of the most important Founders of our nation. At least a dozen of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, including its most important co-authors, practiced faiths that the Secretary of Defense and the President have decided are not "real" religions, or at least religions worth of respect.

In 1776 the Continental Congress appointed a five person committee to write the Declaration of Independence. Three were members of faiths that Donald Trump and his minion, Pete Hegseth, have just cancelled. John Adams was a Unitarian and Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin were Deists. The President and his Secretary of Defense want to cancel other signers as well. Benjamin Rush was a Deist, like Franklin and Jefferson. John Bartlett, a signer from New Hampshire, is buried in a Universalist graveyard. At least seven signers were members of Congregational Churches, including such significant founders as Roger Sherman, Oliver Wolcott, and Robert Treat Paine. These denominations can still be found in the United States, but not in the new Trump/Hegseth military. Most Congregational Churches morphed into the United Church of Christ (UCC) in the late twentieth century which today has more than 4,600 churches, but the President and Secretary of Defense have also canceled that. [Secretary Hegseth does list the "Church of Christ" as an acceptable religion, but that is a different denomination from the UCC.]

After the Declaration of Independence was signed, Americans of all faiths fought for the cause. The current administration has cancelled the faith of Major General Philip Schuyler, the commanding officer of the New York militia (and the father-in-law of Alexander Hamilton), because he was Dutch Reformed. Major General Israel Putnam, a New Englander, could not have a dog tag that states his faith, because he was a Congregationalist.

Trump and Hegseth want to cancel numerous presidents because of their faith. In addition to John Adams and his son John Quincy Adams, Millard Fillmore and William Howard Taft were also Unitarians. Taft, a conservative Republican, was Secretary of War (when that was actually the real name of the department) and then President. He later served as Chief Justice of the United States. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery. It is not clear if that could happen today since the military no longer recognizes the Unitarian faith. Nor does it recognize the Dutch Reformed faith of Presidents Martin Van Buren and Theodore Roosevelt. Col. Roosevelt is remembered for leading a regiment he organized, the Rough Riders, in the Spanish American War. Today Secretary Hegseth might let him command troops, but the Army would not recognize his faith as a "real" religion. President James A. Garfield, who was also a major general in the Civil War (and led troops at Shiloh and Chickamauga) was a member of the Disciples of Christ. Lyndon B. Johnson, who was a Commander in the Navy in World War II and a reserve officer for more than two decades after the War, was also a member of the Disciples of Christ. But you won't find a minister from that faith in today's Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard. Trump and Hegseth have cancelled it.

During World War II the Navajo Code Talkers risked their lives as Marines, providing real time intelligence of Japanese troop movements, while speaking on radios in Navajo. Many code talkers were members of the Native American Church or a traditional Navajo faith. In Europe, about 10,000 American soldiers of Japanese ancestry served the Nisei Brigade, the most decorated unit in American military history. More than 4,000 of these Japanese-American soldiers were awarded purple hearts for their combat wounds and more than 4,000 also earned a bronze star and other medals for valor, including the Congressional Medal of Honor. Some of these courageous soldiers followed the Shinto faith. At the same time, the separate unites of the Tuskegee airmen earned three Distinguished Unit Citations while individual Tuskegee airmen earned more ninety-five distinguished Flying Crosses, many purple hearts, and more than 750 other medals for their heroism. The Tuskegee fighter escorts lost, on average, about half as many bombers as other escort units. Many of these airmen were members AME and AME-Z churches. But, the faiths of the code talkers, the Nisei Brigade and the Tuskegee airmen are now verboten by orders of Trump and Hegseth.

The Hegseth/Trump announcement – on the anniversary of D-Day – loops us back to the insult to followers of religions that the United States no longer honors or recognizes. Among those landing at Normandy was 56 year old Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., the son of the President Teddy Roosevelt. He was the oldest soldier, and the only general, to land at Normandy on D-Day. Although suffering from arthritis and heart disease he led his troops with distinction until he died of heart failure in July. He received the Congressional Medal Honor, posthumously, for his incredible leadership at Normandy. But today, the historic religion of his family—the Dutch Reformed Church—along with the faiths of tens of thousands of other veterans, has been removed from our military.

We honor Ben Franklin, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson, Presidents John Quincy Adams, Van Buren, Fillmore, Garfield, Teddy Roosevent, and Taft, the Navajo Code talkers, the Niese Brigade, the Tuskegee Airmen, and General Teddy Roosevelt, Jr., for their patriotism and courage. It is a sad day that the President and his Secretary of Defense dishonor their religions and their faith.

American Revolution

Gordon Wood, RIP

The great historian of the American Founding passed away yesterday, killed by a car while walking.

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Gordon Wood. (Brown University.)

 

Media reports indicate that Brown University Professor Gordon Wood passed away at the age of 92 yesterday, apparently killed by a passing car while walking. Wood was the greatest historian of the Founding era and the ideology of the American Revolution, author of such seminal works as The Creation of the American Republic and The Radicalism of the American Revolution, among many other important works. He had an enormous influence on generations of historians, legal scholars and many others.

In addition, his work on the universalist Enlightenment liberal political ideals of the Revolution and the Founding is a compelling antidote to both right-wing ethno-nationalists (who envision the US as a nation based on ties of race, ethnicity, and culture), and far-left claims that the Founding was primarily about promoting slavery and white supremacy.

I had a slight acquaintance with Wood, whom I met at a couple of academic conferences. I wish I had known him better. He will be greatly missed.

In Prof. Wood's honor, I repost an excerpt from one of his last public speeches, a talk he gave at the American Enterprise Institute last fall (I previously wrote about the speech and its significance here). Wood's message is vitally needed today, as much as ever:

I want to say something about the Declaration of Independence and why it is so important to us Americans.

There has been some talk recently that we are not and should not be a credo nation, that beliefs in a creed are too permissive, too weak a basis for citizenship and that we need to realize that citizens who have ancestors that go back several generations have a stronger stake in the country than more recent immigrants.

This is a position that I reject as passionately as I can. We have had these blood-and soil-efforts before, in the 1890s when we also had a crisis over immigration. Some Americans tried to claim that because they had ancestors who fought in the Revolution or who came here on the Mayflower, they were more American than the recent immigrants….

The United States is not a nation like other nations, and it never has been. There is at present no American ethnicity to back up the state called the United States, and there was no such distinctive ethnicity even in 1776 when the United States was created….

Because of extensive immigration, America already had a diverse society. In addition to seven hundred thousand people of African descent and tens of thousands of native Indians, nearly all the peoples of Western Europe were present in the country. In the census of 1790 only sixty percent of the white population of well over three million remained English in ancestry…

When Lincoln declared in 1858 "all honor to Jefferson," he paid homage to the Founder who he knew could explain why the United States was one nation, and why it should remain so. Half the American people, said Lincoln, had no direct blood connection to the revolutionaries of 1776. These German, Irish, French, and Scandinavian citizens either had come from Europe themselves or their ancestors had, and they had settled in America, "finding themselves our equals in all things." Although these immigrants may have had no actual connection in blood with the revolutionary generation that could make them feel part of the rest of the nation, they had, said Lincoln, "that old Declaration of Independence" with its expression of the moral principle of equality to draw upon. This moral principle, which was "applicable to all men and all times," made all these different peoples one with the Founders, "as though they were blood of the blood and flesh of the flesh of the men who wrote that Declaration…." This emphasis on liberty and equality, Lincoln said, shifting images, was "the electric cord. . . that links the hearts of patriotic and liberty-loving men together, that will link those patriotic hearts as long as the love of freedom exists in the minds of men throughout the world."

In Jefferson's Declaration Lincoln found a solution to the great problem of American identity: how the great variety of individuals in America with all their diverse ethnicities, races, and religions could be brought together into a single nation. As Lincoln grasped better than anyone ever has, the Revolution and its Declaration of Independence offered us a set of beliefs that through the generations has supplied a bond that holds together the most diverse nation that history has ever known.

Since now the whole world is in the United States, nothing but the ideals coming out of the Revolution and their subsequent rich and contentious history can turn such an assortment of different individuals into the "one people" that the Declaration says we are. To be an American is not to be someone, but to believe in something. That is why we are at heart a [creedal] nation, and that is why the 250th anniversary of the Declaration next year is so important.

I extend my condolences to such of Professor Wood's family, friends, and colleagues as may read this post. His passing is a terrible loss.

Stop Calling it an Immunity! There's No Immunity!

It's all a figment of Todd Blanche's imagination.

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Yesterday's lead story in the NY Times is headlined:

Trump Keeps Immunity from I.R.S., a Victory in a Long-Running Feud

Subhead: "Even as they rebelled against a $1.8 billion fund for President Trump's allies, Republicans looked the other way as his administration granted him potentially lucrative tax protections."

The article notes that plans for the Trump-Blanche $1.776 billion Slush Fund were abandoned due to "Republican anger," but:

"Not so for the sweeping protections from I.R.S. audits that Mr. Blanche also ordered up for Mr. Trump and his family. On that front, Republican reaction has been much more muted, and Mr. Blanche said the audit shield would stay in place. . . .  The result is that an apparently unprecedented and enormously valuable public benefit for the president has, so far, flown under the radar in Congress and passed into Mr. Trump's hands without much protest from members of his own party."

It is indeed a shame that the Republicans have not spoken out against this part of the Trump-Blanche deal.

But we should not fall into the trap of talking as though Blanche has already conferred some kind of "immunity" – or an "audit shield" – on Trump. He has not. He's certainly been trying to do so, but because he is not authorized to do so, his attempt is of no force and effect.

Take a close look at the document that purports to give Trump and his family a shield against IRS actions.  It is dated (and was publicly posted) on May 19th – the day after the parties in Trump v IRS executed their so-called "Settlement Agreement," which contains no mention of any waiver of IRS claims, or immunity, or "audit shield," or anything remotely similar.

The May 19th document, signed by Todd Blanche, the Acting A.G., states two facts in the first paragraph: that the May 18th Settlement Agreement (1) "has created the Anti-Weaponization Fund," and (2) has "directed the Attorney General to issue an order establishing funding and any other relevant requirements for the Fund."

Both are correct; the May 18th Settlement Agreement, by its express terms, did both of those things.

Then, after declaring that capitalized terms in the May 19th order have the same meaning as in the Settlement Agreement, the entirety of the document reads as follows (I have broken up the single sentence of the waiver provision into its component parts, just for ease of comprehension; any omitted text is marked by ellipses):

The United States

RELEASES, WAIVES, ACQUITS, and FOREVER DISCHARGES each of the Plaintiffs [i.e., President Trump, his sons, and the Trump Organization] from,

and is hereby FOREVER BARRED AND PRECLUDED from prosecuting or pursuing,

any and all claims . . . or requests for any relief . . . whether presently known or unknown, that . . . have been or could have been asserted by [the IRS] against any of the plaintiffs . . . by reason of, in connection with, or which arise out of …

any matters currently pending or that could be pending (including tax returns filed before the Effective Date) before [the I.R.S.] or other agencies or departments. [Emphases added]

Well!

Where does Todd Blanche get the authorization to grant a waiver like this?! To anyone, let alone to his boss, the President of the United States?

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Parental Rights

Government May Not "Demand Divorce as a Precondition for Maintaining Parental Rights"

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From Texas Supreme Court Justice Evan Young's majority opinion Friday in In the Interest of H.S.:

Few principles in our history and traditions are as deeply rooted as the sanctity of the family. Fit parents, and not the government or anyone else, have the right and the corresponding responsibility to direct their children's upbringing and to be their children's primary source of protection and guidance.

At the same time, a parent's inability or unwillingness to satisfy basic, minimum standards of care can lead to abuse or neglect, which justifies governmental intervention to protect the children. The desired outcome of that intervention is a family's rehabilitation, the restoration of wayward parents to their proper roles, and the government's exit from the family's affairs.

In extreme cases, however, parents can forfeit their parental status altogether. When that happens, the government invokes the judicial process to pursue the termination of parental rights, after which parents and their children become strangers in the eyes of the law.

The strong presumption is that termination is not in a child's best interest, so a parental-termination order must always be a last resort and never a first impulse. Such an order risks offending the laws of nature and is impermissible under the laws of the United States and of Texas absent clear and convincing evidence both that the parent failed to discharge his obligations to his child and that the termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest. These heightened standards are required because termination affects the fundamental rights of all involved—not just of parents to their children but also of children to their parents.

This case requires us to apply these principles with respect to a married couple with three children. The government sought termination of both parents' rights to each child. A jury determined that the requisite grounds for termination had been proven as to both parents, and the trial court rendered judgment accordingly. The court of appeals affirmed. We likewise affirm as to Father, but we hold as a matter of law that the government has failed to establish that termination of Mother's rights is in the children's best interest. As to Mother, therefore, we reverse and render.

There's a lot going on in the opinion, which is nearly 10K words long, but here's a quick summary of the argument as to mother, with an interesting discussion related to divorce:

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Free Speech

How Do You Know She Is a Witch? Or Satan's Soldier?

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From Life Mastery Network LLC v. Haygarth, decided May 22 by Judge Jill Otake (D. Haw.), but just posted on Westlaw:

Liane, who goes by Liana Shanti, founded her company, LMN, which is used to operate online educational courses that aim to improve students' businesses, lifestyles, and overall wellness. On Plaintiffs' website, Liane markets herself as a "world renowned thought leader in quantum energy healing, spiritual psychology, nutrition, emotional transformation, and feminine wealth[.]" She has more than 35,000 social media followers and more than 100,000 customers in 90 countries….

Defamatory statements about Plaintiffs started surfacing online around April 2022 after Haley began to speak out on her own social media accounts about abuse she allegedly experienced. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have made false and damaging factual statements about Plaintiffs, including accusations of running a cult, human trafficking, extortion, fraud, and other misconduct. The statements that Plaintiffs claim are defamatory can be organized into three categories as described below. Specific statements will be included within the Court's analysis.

There's a lot going on in the opinion, which is >15K words long. But here's one particular item that's a bit out of the ordinary for a libel case; it's about defendant Paula Haygarth's counterclaims against plaintiff, on which Haygarth sought summary judgment:

[A]n Instagram account username, @lianashanti, posted the following statements, verbatim {emphases added}:

  • "MEET PAULA HAYGARTH. WE HAVEN'T FORGOTTEN ABOUT HER. SHE'S ONE OF THE LEAD PEOPLE TRACED DIRECTLY THROUGH IP ADDRESES AND KNOWN EMAILS TO REDDIT AND THE OTHER FRAUD WEBSITES IN THE 30+ PAGE INVESTIGATIVE REPORT. SHE IS A DARK REIKI PRACTITIONER WHO HAS PRACTICED EXTENSIVE BLACK WITCHCRAFT ON MALIE'S DAUGHTHER'S SHE – NOT SURPRISINGLY – HAS THE SAME ATTORNEY AS BYRON HORVATH. THEY ARE NOT FRIENDS, JUST AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE."
  • "Jesus, we ask you to DELETE AND DESTROY all toxic lies from this satan servant – PAULA HAYGARTH – who is campaigning to invalidate truths of #childabuse to cover up her own misery. She is hateful and envious, and in her hatred and envy, she cannot bring herself to acknowledge the pain of all the children who have been harmed by their parents. She abandoned her own son Austin, and her guilt and shame have turned her into a soldier of satan."
  • "What WE are doing – this JESUS LED community calling out THESE people … Paula Haygarth … This vile group of PEDOS[;] PEDO SUPPORTERS[;] PEDO ALIGNERS[;] VICTIM BLAMERS … Paula Haygarth."

[i.] Dark Reiki Practitioner/Witch

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Free Speech

The 12 Cases Consolidated as ChatGPT Product Liability Cases in S.F. Superior Court

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For those following litigation over AI output, here's the consolidation order, together with the motion that led to it. (The motion, in the nature of things, is a partisan presentation, but still seems potentially helpful.) Of the eight cases discussed in the motion, the motion says,

  • 5 of the cases involve wrongful death claims, as follows, Raine (age 16), Lacey (age 17), Shamblin (age 23), Enneking (age 26), Ceccanti (age 48).
  • 2 of the cases involve minors, as follows, Raine (age 16) and Lacey (age 17).
  • 4 of the cases involve negligence claims based on negligence per se theories.
    • All of these (Lacey, Shamblin, Enneking, and Ceccanti) allege violation of California Penal Code § 401(a) (deliberate aid and encouragement of suicide); and
    • 1 of these (Shamblin) alleges violation of California Penal Code § 192(b) (manslaughter).

The motion lays out some of the general theories, and gives more details on each of the eight cases. (Presumably the other four cases were added on separately; the motion was filed Nov. 14, 2025, and the coordination hearing was on Jan. 30, 2026.)

Free Speech

Texas Court Orders Google to Remove Information Posted by User Regarding xAI-Linked Data Center

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Excerpts from an order issued May 19 by Tarrant County District Court Judge Megan Fahey, in CTC Property LLC v. Shulgin:

On August 15, 2025, this Court entered a Temporary Injunction Order enjoining Mr. Shulgin from using, uploading, disclosing, or transferring CTC Confidential Information—defined as photographs or videos of, or other information describing, the construction or design of any of CTC's artificial-intelligence data facilities—and ordering him to submit his devices for forensic imaging….

The Court finds that CTC will suffer ongoing, irreparable harm as long as CTC Confidential Information remains publicly accessible on the internet, as such disclosure deprives CTC of a competitive advantage regarding the construction of its artificial-intelligence data facilities, for which no adequate remedy at law exists.

Based on the foregoing findings, IT IS ORDERED that any and all photographs, videos, or other CTC Confidential Information posted by or at the direction of Defendant to Google Maps, or to any other publicly accessible internet platform, shall be removed. Plaintiff CTC Property LLC is authorized to serve a certified copy of this Order on Google LLC and/or any other internet service provider or platform hosting CTC Confidential Information posted by or at the direction of Defendant, and such entities shall comply with this Order.

Google LLC, its subsidiaries and affiliates, and any other person or entity with notice of this Order who is in possession of, or has the ability to remove, the CTC Confidential Information identified herein, are directed to remove such materials upon service of this Order and identification of the specific content by Plaintiff within 72 hours of service of this Order.

The Complaint alleges that "Shulgin – with both a Russian and U.S. online presence – used his former position as a technician subcontractor to misappropriate CTC's confidential information to take photos … of the inside workings of a data center CTC is building in Memphis, Tennessee." Seems pretty clearly unconstitutional and otherwise improper as to Google, who wasn't made a party to the case (see here for more on the general legal questions raised by such orders aimed at third parties). But in any event, it struck me as worth noting.

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