The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Three Flawed Opinions In Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections

The majority and dissent’s understanding of standing turned on their visions of democracy. The concurrence does not fare much better.

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Bost v. Illinois State Board of Election is one of the most difficult standing opinions I've encountered. This case is at once simple and extremely difficult. I've been struggling with Bost since I covered it in my Supreme Court simulation class this past semester. I found the Court's ultimate resolution unsatisfying and unpersuasive.

The question presented in Bost was whether a candidate for the House of Representatives has standing to challenge an Illinois law that permits the counting of mail-in ballots that are received after election day. Both the District Court and the Seventh Circuit found that Representative Michael Bost lacked standing. Bost, a Republican, serves in a gerrymandered district, where his margin of victory was significant. The lower courts found that there was no realistic chance that the late-arriving ballots--even if they all went for the Democratic candidate--could make a difference in the outcome of the race. As Justice Jackson wrote in dissent, Bost "never alleges that untimely ballots are more likely to break against him and in favor of his opponent." And the lower courts found that the candidate does not have an interest in padding his margin of victory.

Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Barrett concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Kagan. The Chief found that the candidate has standing because he is a candidate: "As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost has standing to challenge the rules that govern the counting of votes in his election." Justice Barrett, by contrast, found that the candidate has a pocketbook injury, and would not have created a "bespoke" rule for candidates. She wrote, "Bost has standing because he has suffered a traditional pocketbook injury, not because of his status as a candidate."Justice Jackson dissented along with Justice Sotomayor, finding that any purported injury was self-imposed in light of Clapper.

Who can challenge the rule?

As a general rule, candidates have standing to challenge election rules because those rules directly regulate the conduct of candidates. For example, a rule requiring that a certain number of signatures must be collected imposes a burden on the candidate. A rule requiring disclosure of contributions also imposes a burden on the candidate. Also, as a general rule, regulations that make it harder to cast votes can be challenged by voters. For example, requirements to sign absentee ballots in a certain way, or restrictions on where ballots can be dropped off, will impose costs on voters. Voters would have standing to challenge these rules.

 

But what about regulations that make it easier for voters to cast votes? Such is the case in Illinois, and many other states. The relevant law permits the state to count mail-in ballots that were mailed before election day but were received after election day. No voter would have standing to challenge this permissive rule of inclusion. The law imposes no burden--only a benefit. (Policies like DACA are exceptionally hard to challenge in court because they primarily provide benefits.) Voters could not base a claim on an interest in avoiding voter fraud. Voters do not have a generalized interest in the fairness of an election. 

As a result, the only party that could conceivably challenge this rule would be a candidate. In the worst-case scenario, imagine that there is a very tight race, and the margin of victory turns on counting these late-arriving ballots. At that point, the losing candidate would have standing to challenge whether those ballots should be counted. We saw similar claims raised in the wake of the 2020 election. But as the 2020 election demonstrated, the Supreme Court wanted absolutely nothing to do with eleventh hour litigation. From a practical perspective, it would make some sense for candidates to file a pre-enforcement challenge against the rule. But bringing suit before the election raises a host of problems. 

Put aside the standing analysis for a moment, and consider the timing. A person is a "candidate" for a fairly limited period of time. That span would run from when the person is certified to appear on the general election ballot and concludes when that election has a certified winner. This period will usually last less than a year, sometimes only a few months. It is extremely unlikely that a pre-enforcement challenge would move quickly enough to go from the district court to the Supreme Court in that span. Invariably, as the litigation trickles up to the Supreme Court, the complaint filed based on a past election will become obsolete, assuming the candidate ever runs for reelection. In Bost, the complaint was filed in May 2022 based on the 2022 election. Now, we are gearing up for the 2026 midterms. The world has changed since then. Indeed, boundaries can be redrawn, political sentiments can shift, and a politician's popularity might change.

The Standing Puzzle 

Candidates will generally have standing to challenge election rules. After all, most ballot access rules directly affect the candidate. But the Illinois law was different, insofar as it regulated voters. There was a somewhat comical exchange during oral argument in which Justice Kavanaugh asked, repeatedly, if the candidate was the "object" of the regulation.

CLEMENT: Look, if it helps me to say they're the direct object, I'll say it. But I do kind of think it's a -

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: They're an --an object.

JUSTICE KAGAN: It might help you with some people and not with other people.

CLEMENT: Yeah. (Laughter.)

The majority did not address the argument that Bost is the object of the Illinois law; Justice Jackson expressly rejects that argument under FDA v. AHM. Thus, Bost had to argue something of an indirect injury.

An election rule that does not regulate the candidate creates very different logistical hurdles. Or at least it creates difficult hurdles for Republicans. There is an asymmetry, as Democratic governments favor looser election integrity rules while republican governments favor tighter election integrity rules. Accordingly, the burden will invariably fall on the right side of the aisle. It is thus a bit of an anomaly in Watson v. RNC that Mississippi, a deep red state, is defending its mail-in ballot rule against a Republican challenge.

If we just keep things simple, of course the candidate has standing. Every candidate in Illinois will have to employ staff to monitor the counting of ballots after election day. That is an entirely foreseeable pocketbook injury that every politician will incur. Standing, QED. 

But if you dig a bit deeper, the question is tougher. First, under Clapper, this injury can be viewed as self-inflicted. Nothing Illinois has done requires the member to pay poll watchers and other staff after election day. The Democrat-controlled state tells the Republican member to "trust us" to ensure a fair election process. (You can perhaps sense my cynicism.) Second, under Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, is it necessarily foreseeable that the late-arriving ballots in that race will actually make a difference? If the member has a landslide victory, then those ballots will be irrelevant, and will not cause a cognizable injury. Bost has one of the few gerrymandered Republican districts in the state, which is packed with Republican voters to ensure that Democrats in other districts will win. (I doubt there are any Republican candidates in Illinois who would ever be in a close-enough election where the untimely ballots would make a difference; gerrymandering ensures all the margins are lopsided.) It's not enough that the rule could affect someone's election; the rule has to affect Bost's election. To use AHM as an example, there might be some pregnant women who suffer complications from using mifepristone, but the Court found it too remote that one of the plaintiffs would have to treat that patient. (If politicians have an interest in fair elections, why don't doctors have an interest in seeing healthy pregnancies come to term?)

There are obvious responses to these arguments. First, the Court can take judicial notice of how important it is for candidates to ensure the integrity of an election, and to promote a general sense that elections are fair. (The Court likely has doubts of how Illinois election officials would behave if not being monitored.) Second, federal judges should not be in the business of prognosticating ex ante the outcome of a race in light of past races. If ever there was a political question, this is it. As a result, courts should just presume that there will be an injury. 

Back to the other side. Bost's argument dispenses with the requirement that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing every facet of standing, and an injury in fact cannot simply be presumed. Lurking in the background is the "nightmare scenario" where this rule can only be challenged in the heat of an election where the Justices would decide the outcome. During oral argument, the Justices demonstrated they are still suffering from PTSD from the 2020 election. What a mess! As I said, I have been struggling with this case for months. 

Three Flawed Opinions 

The three opinions in Bost did little to resolve this standing puzzle. Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. The Chief's opinion was only ten pages long. The shortness is a tell. When the Chief writes something so short, you are being served a John Roberts blue plate special. On the first read, everything makes sense and the answer seems so obvious. But when you read the responses, you realize the majority opinion is built on smoke and mirrors. The Lady Gaga song "Abracadabra" plays in my head when I read a Roberts opinion.

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Donald Trump

The Art of the Deal Goes to Norway

Great Moments in Twenty-First Century International Diplomacy

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President Donald Trump apparently sent the following letter to prime minister Jonas Gahr Støre of Norway:

Dear Jonas: Considering your Country decided not to give me the Nobel Peace Prize for having stopped 8 Wars PLUS, I no longer feel an obligation to think purely of Peace, although it will always be predominant, but can now think about what is good and proper for the United States of America.

Denmark cannot protect that land from Russia or China, and why do they have a 'right of ownership' anyway? There are no written documents, it's only that a boat landed there hundreds of years ago, but we had boats landing there, also.

I have done more for NATO than any other person since its founding, and now, NATO should do something for the United States. The World is not secure unless we have Complete and Total Control of Greenland. Thank you! President DJT

President Trump also reportedly directed that this letter be shared with multiple NATO member ambassadors.

Conservatism

The Difference Between Populism and Conservatism

Yuval Levin offers a useful way to understand the difference.

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In a recent interview with Ezra Klein of the New York Times, Yuval Levin of the American Enterprise Institute offered a useful way to understand the difference between conservatism and populism.

One way to think about the difference is about whether your politics begins from what you care about most — what you love — or whether it begins from what you fear and what you hate. To me, as a young person, conservatism was appealing, and has remained appealing, because it's fundamentally rooted and begins from what we love in the world. It is a defense of what I take to be best about the world.

What is best about the world is always threatened. It's always challenged. It's challenged just by the realities of human nature. Sustaining it requires work. It requires moral formation and political action. And that's the work that conservatives at their best do — we conserve the preconditions for a flourishing life in a free society.

But if the reason you have for entering politics, first and foremost, is to combat the left, to oppose what you don't like, then your politics are going to be different than that.

Now, look, to defend what you love means fighting people who oppose it. And politics is argument, and it's always contestation.

But I think it matters a lot whether fundamentally the reason that drew you in is itself the fight or whether the reason that drew you in is a commitment to something you love, is fundamentally conservative, is about wanting to preserve the good.

Unfortunately, as Levin notes, populism seems more dominant on the political Right than conservatism at the moment.

The larger issue, exploring the extent to which Donald Trump has accomplished anything lasting during his second term, is worth a listen or a read. As is usual, Levin is filled with valuable insights.

Today's Words of Wisdom

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's brilliant - irrefutable! - defense of the President's emergency powers.

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From The Economist:

Scott Bessent, Donald Trump's treasury secretary, defended the president's plan to impose tariffs on European countries that oppose his bid to take over Greenland. [Ed. note: See co-blogger Ilya Somin's post on why taking over Greenland is, simultaneously, "evil, illegal, and stupidly counterproductive" - the great authoritarian trifecta.] Citing the president's authority to impose tariffs in an economic emergency, Mr Bessent argued that America needed to control Greenland to prevent conflict in the Arctic: "The national emergency is avoiding a national emergency."

The man is a genius!  It's the emergency that can never end! Eight words that, in their terseness and inherent circularity, recall the great works of Samuel Beckett and Eugene Ionesco. Bravo, Mr. Secretary. Now that we understand what is at stake, we can all finally get behind the important work of destroying the NATO Alliance, attacking our friends and allies, and imposing authoritarian rule on the people of Greenland.

Religion and the Law

Religious Employment and Title VII: Part 1—Civil Rights Law and the Tensions between Liberty and Equality

Understanding Title VII as a law designed to advance both liberty and equality helps to illuminate the statute's religious employer exemption.

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Last month, the BYU Law Review published our article entitled Religious Employment and the Tensions between Liberty and Equality. We appreciate this opportunity to offer a five-part series summarizing the article's key points.

Religious employment is a vital aspect of religious freedom. A church needs employees who are fully committed to the church's religious mission and who live by its religious standards. Religious fidelity is indispensable to a religious organization's success. Competence alone will not do.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains an exemption for religious employers. Sometimes called Section 702, it provides that Title VII does not apply to a religious employer "with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion." Deciding when it applies has divided federal circuits and other courts.

We begin with textualism—the theory of legal interpretation that, as Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner explained, "begins and ends with what the text says and fairly implies." (The article also examines legislative history, for those who are interested.) Reading Section 702 through a textualist lens reveals that the exemption authorizes religious employers to select employees for religious reasons free from the demands of Title VII, so long as they have a religious reason for doing so.

Some resist interpreting Section 702 as a liberty-enhancing provision out of a misreading of Title VII. They view Title VII as an uncompromising guarantee of employment equality. But close attention to the statute's text and structure reveals something more nuanced—and surprising. Title VII is not the uniformly equality-enhancing statute that many assume.

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The Board of Peace Is A Step Away From Failed International Institutions

The details are unclear, but Trump seems to be setting up an institution that could supplant the United Nations Security Council.

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Earlier this month, I published an essay titled Eliminating Liberal International Asymmetries. I discussed how President Trump is trying to abolish asymmetries in international law that will necessarily favor progressive views. I wrote about the United Nations, in particular, which has proven to be a failed institution, in large part because it gives stature to all nations.

This much is well known. But less understood is how the United Nations, and other international bodies, have inverted the normal course of international law. In many contexts, a coalition of smaller nations may seek to shape the foreign policy of larger nations that they could not challenge in other contexts. To be sure, the United States and four other superpowers retain a veto on the United Nations Security Council. But in most other contexts, a majority group of minority nations can set the agenda and shape expectations about international authority. It is far more difficult for any nation, including the United States, to withdraw from the United Nations Charter than to withdraw from a bilateral treaty. As a result, great nations have to suffer complaints from weaker nations, all for the sake of faux equality. It has always been a fiction to treat countries with weak influence as having the same stature as countries with strong influence. The United Nations reminds me of a liberal little league: no one keeps score, the best players are benched so weaker players have the same number of at-bats, and all the teams receive the same participation trophy regardless of their record.

Recent developments provide some more data points for my analysis. It seems that Trump's proposed Board of Peace is not limited to the conflict in Gaza. Rather, Trump seems to be establishing something of on alternative to the United Nations. The United States would invite members to join, and they would have to play a $1 billion entrance fee. Only the largest, most-powerful nations will be able to participate.

The New York Times has some details, but much remains unclear:

President Trump's "Board of Peace" is billing itself as a new international peacekeeping body — and permanent membership won't come cheap.

Mr. Trump is inviting countries to join beyond a three-year term, if they're willing to cough up more than a billion dollars in cash within the board's first year, according to a draft of the board's charter reviewed by The New York Times.

And while the board was conceived as part of Mr. Trump's plan to oversee Gaza, there is no mention of Gaza in the charter. That omission added to speculation that the group may have a broader mandate to cover other conflicts and could even be aimed at creating a U.S.-dominated alternative to the United Nations Security Council. . . .

The board's charter was sent out with invitations to potential members over the weekend. A copy reviewed by The Times was verified by an official on the condition of anonymity because of the delicate diplomacy. News of the $1 billion buy-in was previously reported by Bloomberg.

On Friday, the White House announced the board's members would include Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Jared Kushner, Mr. Trump's son-in-law, and Ajay Banga, the head of the World Bank.

Several countries said they had received invitations to join, including Argentina, Canada, Egypt and Turkey. King Abdullah II of Jordan has also been invited, the Jordanian Foreign Ministry announced on Sunday. . . .

The charter appears to outline a much more ambitious role for the board than the one described in Mr. Trump's plan for Gaza, published in October 2025, as well as the subsequent Security Council resolution.

The board's mission, according to the charter, is to seek "to promote stability, restore dependable and lawful governance, and secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict" and "to undertake peace-building functions in accordance with international law."

The preamble emphasizes the need for what it calls "a more nimble and effective international peace-building body" and laments that "too many approaches to peace-building foster perpetual dependency and institutionalize crisis rather than leading people beyond it."

According to the charter, the board is expected to meet for voting at least annually, and expenses are to be funded through voluntary contributions from member states or other sources. The charter does not elaborate on the peacekeeping efforts.

For nearly six decades, there has been something called a "peace process" in Israel. Can something that has failed for six decades still be called a process? Indeed, Palestinians are unique in that they can inherit refugee status. And UNRWA, the United Nations relief agency, was Hamas terrorists. There is perpetual dependency on these institutions, that are not actually equipped to ended crises.

Will this Board of Peace supplant the United Nations Security Council? Who knows. But Trump, as usual, is trying to shatter paradigms in nearly every corner of the globe.

Update: The Times published a guest essay by the secretary general of the Council of Europe. It finishes with this choice:

International law is either universal or meaningless. Greenland will show which one we choose.

If international law is meaningless, that change did not happen overnight, or even with Trump's election. It has been a slow, gradual process that was visible for all to see, but those vested in its perpetuation maintained the fiction. I think international law will continue to exist, but not the form erected during the post World War II settlement. In the same way that modern conservatism no longer has much relation to the Goldwater-Reagan coalition (as Ross Douthat explained), international law will no longer have much relation to the United Nations and related institutions. Things are not fixed in stone. Trump, as I noted above, has proven a unique adeptness to finding all of the pre-exisitng cracks in these edifices, and smashing them.

Religion and the Law

Guest-Blogging on "Religious Employment and the Tensions Between Liberty and Equality"

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I'm delighted to report that R. Shawn Gunnarson, James Phillips, and Christopher Bates will be guest-blogging this coming week on this article that they just published in the BYU Law Review; here's the Abstract:

Located in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is an exemption for religious employers that is often misunderstood. Often courts and commentators mischaracterize it as a narrow privilege for religious employers to hire people of the same religion. But the statute's text says otherwise.

This article resolves interpretive debates about the meaning and application of the religious employer exemption through a close textualist reading that discovers a new understanding of the structure of Title VII. Our approach applies the tools of textualism, the prevailing theory of statutory interpretation. Paying attention to the text and structure of Title VII reveals the statute in a new light. The text reveals Title VII as a complex piece of legislation that preserves areas of employer liberty and autonomy, even as it guarantees greater employee equality.

Viewing the structure of Title VII from the perspective of tensions between liberty and equality—a familiar theme in classical liberal theory—makes sense of Congress's decision to protect liberty for small and tribal-related businesses, bona fide occupational qualifications, and other employers, even while removing barriers to employment opportunity elsewhere. That same perspective explains why Congress adopted an exemption for religious employers to shield them from the consequences of an unqualified egalitarian framework.

A textualist reading of the exemption shows that a religious employer is authorized to make employment decisions based on religious criteria, free from any obligation under Title VII—but not to make employment decisions for non-religious reasons that the statute forbids. By articulating the exemption's best reading, our approach holds the key to resolving a long-running circuit split along with several persistent questions and objections. In sum, this article is the first to demonstrate that a textualist reading of the religious employer exemption reveals Title VII as not merely an equality statute nor a liberty statute.

I'm much looking forward to their posts.

Second Amendment Roundup: Expert Historian Testimony Is Unnecessary in Second Amendment Litigation

Wolford presents a good opportunity for the Supreme Court to explain why.

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In Wolford v. Lopez, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to clarify for the lower courts the difference between legislative and adjudicative facts. Lower courts hostile to the Second Amendment routinely confuse legislative and adjudicative facts, seeking to turn Second Amendment litigation into an expensive and time-consuming battle of the academic experts and historians where the "winner's" opinions are insulated from review absent a finding of clear error.

Adjudicative facts refer to evidence about the conduct of the parties within a case, i.e., the answer to the question "did the defendant drive through a red light?" Historical laws and events that do not bear on the conduct of the specific parties are legislative facts, i.e., Founding Father James Madison died in 1836 or the British were marching to seize arms and weapons when the Battle of Lexington and Concord broke out.

Nevertheless, lower courts often hear testimony from so-called "expert" historians on questions of legal interpretations involving Second Amendment issues and historical firearm regulations. Then, those lower courts rely on that testimony to make legal findings about the meaning of the Second Amendment and the constitutionality of modern gun laws. Not only are these courts legislating from the bench, they are signaling a return to interest balancing in defiance of the Court's holding in Bruen.

In the district court in Wolford, Hawaii submitted multiple expert reports that opined on the meaning of the common law and early American firearm restrictions. Historian Clayton Cramer's amicus brief in Wolford explains that in some instances, these experts opined on whether Heller, McDonald, and Bruen are historically accurate. But such determinations are legal conclusions, not factual findings. Legal conclusions cannot be made by expert witnesses, only judges can make legal conclusions. But such expert testimony is unnecessary to determine whether a historical analogue proffered by the government is relevantly similar to a modern gun control law being challenged.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has never required testifying experts to resolve Second Amendment questions. Heller came to the Court on a motion to dismiss, with no factual record developed below. McDonald similarly did not need a trial – the only issue was whether the Second Amendment applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. When New York argued that the Court could not decide Bruen without further fact finding, the Court rejected that assertion and further dismissed as unnecessary Justice Bryer's request for remand, instead ruling directly on the pleadings without any discovery. Rahimi came to the Court on a guilty plea, without any trial. Expert testimony by historians and others addressing the Second Amendment's meaning is unnecessary and should be discouraged by the Supreme Court.

Treating legislative facts as adjudicative facts subjects rights' claimants to long, expensive trials, and binds appellate courts to incorrect factual findings. If the historical record was a matter of adjudicative fact, plaintiffs and the government would have to submit expert testimony, file and adjudicate Daubert motions, examine and cross-examine these witnesses, and then let a jury or judge make findings of fact about what the Founding generation intended over 200 years ago. This is unfair to Second Amendment rights claimants when confronted with the largely infinite resources of the government and the gun control-supporting handmaidens in universities and public health schools full of anti-gun Progressives.  Further, findings of fact can only be reversed by an appellate court if they are "clearly erroneous," which is a very high bar to satisfy.  Credibility determinations at the trial level also come into play further complicating the issue.

Amusingly, or maybe not so much, one district court found that Massad Ayoob could not be credited as an expert in firearms given his pro-Second Amendment leanings despite being recognized as a world-class expert firearm and self-defense expert for decades.  Instead, the court deferred to Lucy Allen, an economist, who "has been conducting statistical analyses related to crime and gun use for twenty-five years" – hardly a qualification as a self-defense expert – and who serves as an "expert" in other gun cases for $900 per hour.

Or consider historian Saul Cornell, who wrote in Slate that "the majority opinion in NYSRPA v. Bruen is one of the most intellectually dishonest and poorly argued decisions in American judicial history."  In one of his  many declarations filed thereafter, he purports to explain: "Following the mandates set out … in Bruen, history provides essential guideposts in evaluating the scope of permissible regulation under the Second Amendment."

However, if courts treat history as legislative facts, as they should (and as the Supreme Court instructs by its decisions in Heller, Bruen, McDonald, Caetano, and Rahimi), then appellate courts may review a district court's findings de novo, go beyond the record to find more legislative facts, and consider facts introduced by the parties in the appellate court but not the district court. This further lessens the burden on rights' claimants who should not be required to spend exorbitant sums preparing and defending expert testimony.

When the Supreme Court decides Wolford, it should seize upon the opportunity to instruct the lower courts that Second Amendment cases turn on legislative and not adjudicative facts. Legislative facts cannot be converted into adjudicative facts by judicial fiat, and expert testimony interpreting historical firearm laws is not necessary or encouraged. Appellate review of Second Amendment challenges should be de novo and not subject to a clearly erroneous standard on appeal.

For more detail on the use of biased "experts" in Second Amendment cases, see my post "Should Courts Appoint Historians as Experts in Second Amendment Cases?"

Donald Trump

Trump's Plan to Seize Greenland is Simultaneously Evil, Illegal, and Counterproductive

It would alienate allies, impose US rule on an unwilling population, and blatantly violate both US and international law.The plan to impose tariffs on nations opposing the seizure is also illegal and harmful.

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Donald Trump's plan to seize Greenland has the rare distinction of simultaneously combining grave injustice, massive illegality, and extreme counterproductive stupidity. The same is true of his more recent effort to impose tariffs on eight European countries opposing the plan.

Let's start with first principles. As the Declaration of Independence states, government should be based on the "consent of the governed." No real-world government is fully consensual. But a US conquest would make the government of Greenland less consensual than it is now. Polls indicate some 85% of Greenlanders oppose annexation by the US, while only 6% support it. In the 2025 Greenland election, the overwhelming majority of them voted for parties that support either independence or continued rule by Denmark.

Forcible annexation could perhaps be justified if it were the only way to stop some kind of severe oppression. But there is nothing like that in Greenland. Nor is there any reason think that US rule would be significantly better in terms of protecting various human rights than the current combination of Danish rule and extensive regional autonomy.

In addition to being unjust, US conquest would also obviously be illegal. It would, in fact, be a war of aggression similar to Russia's assault on Ukraine.  The Nuremberg tribunal ruled that starting a war of aggression is "the supreme international crime," and this was one of the main charges on which many of the Nazi defendants were convicted.  Denmark has owned Greenland for centuries and its sovereignty over that territory is universally recognized, including by the US in a 1917 agreement, in which the US accepted the "extension" of Danish control over all of Greenland.

The initiation of war - perhaps even an illegal war - can sometimes be justified for the purpose of removing a brutally oppressive regime. But, again, Danish rule in Greenland is nothing like that.

A war of aggression to conquer Greenland would violate US law, as well as international law. The US and Denmark are both signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty, which  established NATO. Article V of that treaty requires the parties to come to each other's defense in the event of an "armed attack" against any of them, in Europe or North America. If the US is required to help defend Denmark against attack, it is obvious that it also has an obligation not to attack Denmark's territory itself.

Under Article VI of the Constitution, "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Thus, Trump and other US officials are required to obey both the North Atlantic Treaty and the 1917 treaty recognizing Denmark's sovereignty over Greenland.

These points all still apply if Trump's plan is "merely" to use the threat of force to coerce Denmark into selling Greenland. Using the threat of an unjust and illegal war to take another nation's land is itself unjust and illegal. It's a kind of international extortion scheme.

In addition to being unjust and illegal, the plan to seize Greenland is also incredibly stupid and counterproductive. The main official rationale is the supposed need to protect Greenland from seizure by Russia and China. But those countries have no forces in the region that could possibly take it. Moreover, in the unlikely event that a genuine threat were to materialize, an existing agreement with Denmark already allows the US to station as many troops in Greenland as it needs for defense. In the event of attack, the two nations could also call on the assistance of the other NATO states.

If Trump really wanted to counter Russia, he would join with other NATO allies in backing Ukraine. If Russia is defeated in Ukraine, or even just remains bogged down there, it cannot pose much of a threat to Greenland or any other NATO territory. Instead, Trump has been betraying Ukraine and undermining NATO by threatening an ally's territory. Such moves actually help Russia and our other enemies, rather than hinder them.

An attack on Greenland would predictably alienate the allies, and severely undermine the alliance, if not destroy it completely. The loss of our most important allies would weaken the US and strengthen our enemies far more than owning Greenland could possibly benefit us. Denmark itself is a longtime steadfast ally, and sent some 10,000 troops to support us in Afghanistan. If we betray a close, longstanding ally in such an egregious way, other allies will see they cannot count on us, and will draw the obvious conclusions.

Another possible rationale for Trump's move is obtaining Greenland's mineral wealth. But we can far more easily obtain access to it through the simple mechanisms of trade and investment, to which Denmark and Greenland are open. In any event, any economic or strategic gain here is far outweighed by the immense harm of alienating all our allies.

What is true of Trump's plan to conquer Greenland is also true of his more recent plan to impose 10% tariffs (slated to increase to 25% on June 1) on eight European nations opposing his effort. Using such economic coercion to promote an unjust goal is an additional injustice. In addition to unjustly punishing the European allies, it will also harm numerous US businesses and consumers, much as Trump's previous tariff increases are doing.

This use of tariffs is also illegal. The likely mechanism Trump intends to use is International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA). As I have pointed out before, IEEPA doesn't authorize tariffs at all (the word isn't even mentioned in the statute). In addition, IEEPA can only be used to counter an "unusual and extraordinary threat" to America's economy, national security, and foreign policy.

There is nothing unusual and extraordinary about Danish rule over Greenland. It has existed for centuries! Nor, for reasons noted above, does it pose any kind of threat to the US. The utter ridiculousness of claims to the contrary is yet another example of why courts should not defer to executive invocations of extraordinary emergency powers, but rather should require the executive to prove the claimed emergency triggering the use of extraordinary authority actually exists. Otherwise, emergency powers would become blank checks the president can use whenever he feels like it, which is the exact opposite of how emergency powers are supposed to work.

In the event there is uncertainty about what IEEPA means, the "major questions" doctrine, which requires Congress to "speak clearly" when authorizing the executive to make "decisions of vast economic and political significance," mandates a narrow interpretation here. Tariffs imposed for the purpose of facilitating a war of conquest that would have the effect of undermining America's most important alliance are pretty obviously an issue vast economic and political significance.

Furthermore, if IEEPA really is a blank check for the president to impose tariffs in any situation he wants, the law would become unconstitutional. It would violate the nondelegation doctrine, which limits the extent to which Congress can transfer its powers to the executive.

These and other issues related to IEEPA are among the questions currently being considered the Supreme Court in the tariff case in which I am one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs. If we prevail, it may prevent Trump from using IEEPA to try to help him seize Greenland, as well.

Trump could potentially instead rely on Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which allows imposition of tariffs against imports that the Department of Commerce investigates and concludes "threaten to impair" national security. But, as with IEEPA, the claim that national security is threatened by imports here is absurd. If it were to be accepted by courts, Section 232 would also become a blank check for unlimited executive imposition of tariffs. Here, too, the major questions and nondelegation doctrines would weigh against the administration's position.  The supposed threat is here is not actually the imports themselves, but Denmark's refusal to transfer Greenland to the US. And the claim that that is a threat is also ridiculous.

Finally, imposing massive tariffs on NATO allies in order to pressure them to abandon Denmark is yet another stupid and counterproductive move. It, too, alienates allies and undermines US national security far more than it could possibly benefit it. Having numerous European states as allies is infinitely more valuable than anything we could get from owning Greenland.

Immigration

How to Abolish ICE

Recent events in Minnesota bolster the already strong case for abolishing ICE - and for the plan of doing so by transferring its funds to ordinary state and local police.

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Recent Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)  depredations in Minnesota further strengthen the already compelling case for abolishing the agency. A recent federal district court ruling outlines in detail ICE's extensive use of force against peaceful protestors, violations of a variety of constitutional rights, and other cruel, unjust and illegal actions.  Moreover, it is clear that these wrongs are not just the fault of a few rogue agents, but structural defects in the agency and its mission, exacerbated by the Trump administration's enormous expansion of it, and hiring of numerous dubious new recruits. The agency doesn't even follow its own supposed safety guidelines, which neglect was one of the reasons for the indefensible killing of Renee Good.

These widespread abuses have turned already skeptical public opinion further against ICE, to the point where a substantial majority of Americans disapprove of the agency, and - for the first time - a narrow plurality want to see it abolished.

Abolition is indeed the right approach. In an August 2025 article in The Hill, I outlined how to do it: by shutting down the agency and transferring its funds to state and local police. This strategy would have the virtue of  simultaneously further expanding political support for abolition,  reducing crime, and ending ICE abuses. Here is a brief excerpt:

The Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency has become notorious for its cruelty, abuses of civil liberties and racial profiling. As a result, the agency and the Trump administration's deportation policies generally have become increasingly unpopular…..

[M]ost Democrats have hesitated to call for the agency's abolition, probably for fear of seeming to be soft on crime…. But opponents can avoid such accusations by combining abolition of ICE with reallocation of its funds to ordinary police, which would undercut accusations of being pro-criminal or anti-law enforcement. This could greatly expand support for abolition….

In my 2022 book "Free to Move," I proposed dismantling ICE and giving the money to ordinary police, perhaps in the form of federal grants to state and local law enforcement. Recipient agencies should be required to use the funds to target violent and property crime, and abjure ICE-style abuses.

Putting more ordinary police on the streets is an effective way to reduce crime rates, according to a long line of studies….

Focusing on undocumented immigrants is a poor use of law enforcement resources…. Transferring ICE funds to state and local police would allow a greater focus on violent and property crime, regardless of the perpetrators' background….

Abolishing ICE would not end all deportations. State and local authorities could still, in many cases, turn illegal migrants over to the federal government for removal… But abolishing ICE would make deportation much more dependent on state and local cooperation and would empower jurisdictions to make their own choices.

This strategy is even more viable today than might have been the case a few months ago. Events in Minnesota have further turned public opinion against ICE, and the idea of transferring its funds to real cops can provide an additional boost for abolition, by neutralizing fears that doing so would somehow increase crime. In addition, transferring the money to state and local cops could draw support from law enforcement interest groups that would stand to benefit.

In the August article, I also outlined how ICE abuses - including illegal violence, racial profiling, and horrific detention conditions - were already ubiquitous, even before the outrages in Minnesota. Recent events are an expansion of these evils, not a singular aberration. In that article, and a follow-up piece for the Boston Globe, (non-paywalled version here), I addressed a number of possible objections, such as concerns that local police also engage in various abuses. Here is an excerpt from that second article:

Many studies show that putting more police on the streets can reduce crime. Indeed, diverting law enforcement resources from deportation to ordinary policing can help focus more effort on the violent and property crimes that most harm residents of high-crime areas. Deportation efforts, by contrast, target a population with a lower crime rate than others…..

Some progressives might nonetheless oppose transferring funds to conventional police. The latter, too, sometimes engage in abusive practices, including racial profiling. I share some of these concerns and am a longtime advocate of increased efforts to combat racial profiling. But comparative assessment is vital here. Despite flaws, conventional police are much better in these respects than ICE, with its ingrained culture of brutality and massive profiling. They have stronger incentives to maintain good relations with local communities and don't need to rely on racial profiling nearly as much to find suspects. A shift of law enforcement funds from ICE to conventional police would mean a major overall reduction in racial profiling and other abuses.

Survey data show most Black people (the biggest victims of profiling) actually want to maintain or increase police presence in their neighborhoods, even as they (understandably) abhor racial profiling. Grant money transferred from ICE could potentially be conditioned on stronger efforts to curb racial profiling and related abuses, thereby further reducing the problem. It should also be conditioned on spending it on combatting violent and property crime, and structured in a way that prevents excessive dependence on federal funding.

If ICE can be abolished without transferring the funds to local and state police, I would still support doing so. But the strategy I outline offers the most likely pathway to political success, and could simultaneously reduce criminality in high-crime neighborhoods.

I first outlined this general approach to immigration and crime issues in Chapter 6 of my 2022 book "Free to Move: Foot Voting, Migration, and Political Freedom," where I also make other points on why crime control is a poor justification for deportation and immigration restrictions. See also my more recent discussion of these broader issues here.

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