The Volokh Conspiracy

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The Volokh Conspiracy

Supreme Court

New Survey Data on Public Perceptions of the Supreme Court

A detailed Marquette Law School poll finds public views of the Court are modestly negative, but most major recent decisions enjoy majority public support.

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US Supreme Court
The Supreme Court justices. (Pool/ABACA/Newscom)

 

Back in May, I wrote about survey data indicating a modest boost in the Supreme Court's popularity with the public, possibly caused by its February decision in the tariff case (which I helped litigate). Since then, the Supreme Court has issued its major decisions in a large number of cases, including those on birthright citizenship, the Second Amendment, executive removal power, and more. Recently, Marquette Law School came out with a new poll assessing public perceptions of the Court in the wake of those rulings. It finds that the Court as a whole remains modestly unpopular (47% approve, 53% disapprove), but that most of its major recent decisions have majority public support. The Court also remains a bit more popular than just before the tariff ruling, and much more popular than the other two branches of government. There are other interesting findings, as well, including on perceptions of individual justices (about which most of the public is generally ignorant).

As discussed below, the Marquette survey has a few unfortunate methodological problems. But it nonetheless provides some useful information about public perceptions of the Court.

Before going on, I will emphasize, yet again, that the Court's popularity (or lack thereof) says little about the quality of its decisions. Survey data consistently shows that most Americans know very little about the Constitution and the Court's work, and a majority of the public cannot even name one Supreme Court justice and know little about them (the Marquette poll further confirms this latter point). I also do not claim that majority public support for decisions I like (including the tariff ruling!) "proves" those decisions are correct. It does not. But, for reasons to be discussed below, public opinion about the Court does matter, in so far as it is important to protecting the institution of judicial review against potential attacks from both the right and the left. It may also be of interest to students of the court and students of public opinion (I happen to be both).

The Court's 47% approval rating is slightly higher than the 44% it got in the same poll in mid to late 2025, and about the same as the 46% it got in May (after the tariff case, but before the other rulings). An April Marquette poll showed 42% approval. This is consistent with other survey data indicating a slight improvement in early 2026, possibly driven by the tariff decision. Though the Marquette poll shows more stability than some of the others, and fluctuations between 42 and 47 could just be due to random variation.

The Court also remains much more popular (or, rather, much less unpopular) than the other two branches of government. The Marquette survey finds that President Trump has only a 38% favorability rating (a whopping 60% view him unfavorably), and both congressional Republicans and congressional Democrats, are also highly unpopular, probably even more so than Trump. The same goes for the Republican and Democratic parties generally. This, too, is consistent with previous polls showing that public views of the Court are more favorable than those of the other two branches of government.

Marquette also surveyed public attitudes on 13 significant decisions made by the Court within the last year. And all but two command majority support, including many supported by large majorities:

Marquette University

The tariff case (66% support), allowing states to ban transgender athletes from women's sports (65%), and Trump v. Cook - the decision protecting the autonomy of the Federal Reserve Board (70%) are all highly popular. Louisiana v. Callais - the Voting Rights Act decision that attracted strong left-wing ire - enjoys modest majority support (53%).  The only two decisions surveyed that don't have majority support are Trump v. Slaughter (ruling that the president can remove the heads of most other independent agencies), and a ruling allowing parties to coordinate campaign expenditures with campaigns. And even those two decisions are only modestly unpopular, getting support from 49% of the public, and 47% respectively.

These results suggest that the Court's majority this year was very much not out of step with public opinion, as critics sometimes charge. I say that even though I myself am not a fan of some of the decisions the public agrees with. While I agree with part of the reasoning of Callais, I worry that the Court's approach creates way too much leeway for racial gerrymandering by Republicans. I also have significant reservations about Trump v. Slaughter and its relationship to Trump v. Cook; reconciling those two decisions is difficult to say the least.

There are a few methodological issues with this part of the Marquette survey. The survey's descriptions of the rulings in the questions are fairly detailed and precise. But that very fact might make them hard to understand for respondents who don't know much about the issues involved (which is likely to be a large proportion of them). In addition, all of these questions are structured as "forced choice" questions, on which respondents do not have the option of answering "don't know" or "no opinion." That means the survey is capturing a lot of responses by people who don't actually have meaningful opinions on the case in question.

In addition, the Court included one case it probably should not have, and omitted at least one that should have been included. The Court did not really rule on E. Jean Carroll's suit against Trump. As the Marquette survey notes, it merely refused to review the lower court decision in favor of Carroll.  This is not actually a precedent-setting decision by the Court, and not that significant for anyone but Trump and Carroll. By contrast, the survey wrongly omits the Court's terrible decision in the Haitian TPS case, which will both have a massive immediate impact on hundreds of thousands of people and set a bad precedent for future executive immigration policies motivated by racial and ethnic prejudice.

Despite these caveats, it is clear that most of the Court's recent major decisions enjoy majority public support, some overwhelmingly so. And none are highly unpopular.

Marquette also surveyed public opinion about individual justices:

Marquette University

Strikingly - but not surprisingly  - Clarence Thomas is the only justice about whom a majority of respondents say they know enough to have an opinion. That's likely because of a combination of his long tenure, his highly controversial confirmation hearings (which many older respondents may remember), and his being the only Black justice during most of his tenure (until Ketanji Brown Jackson was confirmed in 2022).

The fact that most Americans say they haven't heard enough to have an opinion of most of the justices (including even Chief Justice John Roberts) is a further indication of widespread public ignorance about the Court and its work. I would add that we should not assume that those who do express an opinion are actually knowledgeable. Studies show that many survey respondents are willing to express views about people and issues they know little about, rather than admit ignorance. Thus, classic surveys show that large numbers of respondents will express opinions about entirely fictional legislation, such as the "Metallic Metals Act." A 2015 poll found that 30% of Republicans and 19% of Democrats supported bombing the nation of Agrabah (which is actually a fictional entity from the Disney movie Aladdin), rather than admitting they had no opinion or didn't know about it.

A recent YouGov poll, which I analyzed in my last post on the Supreme Court and public opinion, found higher percentages willing to an express an opinion about the justices. Only 27% said they had "no opinion" about Thomas, while the "no opinion" percentages for the others ranged from 35% to 44%. The key difference between this poll and the Marquette one is that YouGov gave respondents the option of saying they had "slightly" or "very" favorable or unfavorable views, instead of just allowing "favorable" or "unfavorable" (as Marquette did). I suspect many respondents who know little or nothing about the justices were willing to pick "slighly favorable" or "slightly unfavorable" in the YouGov poll, but many such people (in the Marquette survey) were unwilling to express a stronger, more unqualified view.

In both the Marquette survey and YouGov, the liberal justices are more popular than the conservative ones, and the single most popular justice in both surveys is  Sonia Sotomayor (29% favorable vs. 19% unfavorable in Marquette; 38-27 in YouGov). This may be because more of the public prefers liberal jurisprudence. But that conjecture is belied by surveys on specific decisions, where many conservative (though, of course, not all) rulings are popular (e.g. - striking down affirmative action policies).

I suspect the bigger factor here is the growing "diploma divide" in American politics. Education is increasingly correlated with support for Democrats, while the Republicans get most of their support from the least-educated parts of the population. Education is also highly correlated with political knowledge. Thus, the kinds of people who have at least some substantial knowledge of the Supreme Court justices are disproportionately likely to be liberal Democrats. On the other hand, those willing to admit they don't know enough to have an opinion are disproportionately conservative Republicans.

It's worth noting that none of the justices are wildly unpopular. Even Clarence Thomas - the single most negatively rated justice in both the Marquette and YouGov polls - has only modestly negative approval ratings (-3 in Marquette, and -9 in YouGov). Trump and Congress would love to have approval ratings like that!

Overall, the Court is only modestly unpopular, and its major recent rulings mostly get more support than opposition from the public.

As already noted, this does not prove the Court is doing a good job, either in general or on any specific case. But it is significant, nonetheless.

Today, judicial review faces potential threats from both right and left. Trump and many of his supporters have flirted with the idea of disobeying judicial rulings that go against them, and have at times flouted various lower-court rulings or tried to deceive judges. On the left, there is renewed momentum for undermining judicial review through court-packing (which I documented and criticized here and here). To the extent that the Court and its decisions remain more popular (or at least less unpopular) than the other branches of government, it makes it harder for either right or left to undermine judicial review.

I am far from an unequivocal cheerleader for the Court and its current majority. I think they have gotten some important issues badly wrong, including the Haitian TPS immigration case and the Pung property rights case, just last month. Nonetheless, I think we are far better off with strong judicial review than without it, and that the judiciary is - on the whole - doing its job far better than either Congress or the executive branch right now. For these reasons, I hope the Court can maintain its relative popularity and - ideally - boost it further, at least somewhat.

I would not want the justices to prioritize popularity too much. If the Court became wildly popular, I would worry they aren't doing enough to protect the rights of unpopular minorities, or to enforce constitutional constraints on government power in situations where politicians pursue popular-but-illegal and dangerous policies. In an ideal world, the Court's popularity would be totally irrelevant, except perhaps as a subject for academic research. But we don't live in that ideal world. Far from it.

Race Discrimination

Race Discrimination in Admissions Suit Against U Washington Can Go Forward

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From Zhong v. Univ. of Wash. Bd. of Regents, decided yesterday by Judge James Robart (W.D. Wash.):

This civil rights action arises from the University's rejection of Stanley's application to enroll in its undergraduate computer science program in Fall 2023. Plaintiffs assert that "Defendants have engaged in systemic racial discrimination against Asian American applicants" by requiring them "to meet higher standards of academic and extracurricular achievement than applicants of other races." …

Plaintiffs represent that Stanley is a resident of California and a highly qualified applicant for undergraduate admission. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Stanley was among the top students academically at his high school, scored well on standardized college admissions exams, and "took on leadership roles in a variety of academic and volunteer organizations." Stanley is a "self-taught programmer" who earned "top honors in some of the world's most competitive coding contests[.]" ([Complaint] ¶¶ 40-41 (listing the competitions); see also id. ¶¶ 43-44 (describing notable coding initatives).) When Stanley was 13 years old, Google offered him a full-time software engineer interview before learning that he was ineligible for employment based on his age. Just before his 18th birthday, Stanley successfully re-applied for a software engineering position at Google. When Plaintiffs filed suit, Stanley worked for Google as a software engineer. (See id. ¶ 50 (describing the outcome of his January 2025 full-year job performance evaluation).) …

Stanley alleges that even if the University's admissions criteria and process are facially race-neutral, the fact that the Allen School has target goals of increasing the percentages of specific underrepresented minorities leads to the inference that the University is nevertheless considering applicants' race. Whether racial discrimination occurs below the surface of the University's admissions decisions is a factual question that is not appropriate to resolve on a motion to dismiss.

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Religion and the Law

Parents' Free Exercise Claim Against School for Referring to Student by "Preferred Name[] and Gender Pronoun[]" Can Go Forward

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From Judge Paul Maloney (W.D. Mich.) in Mead v. Rockford Public School Dist.:

Dan and Jennifer Mead have a child, G.M., who attended a middle school in the Rockford Public School District. The Meads contend that the District had policies that encouraged school staff to refer to students by their preferred names and gender pronouns, even without parental knowledge or consent.

{Plaintiffs Dan and Jennifer Mead believe that everyone is born with a "fixed biological sex" as a "gift from God." They believe that it is harmful to "refer[] to a child using pronouns that are inconsistent with that child's biological sex" because those pronouns "communicate a message to and about the child that is untrue." The Meads' child [seventh-grader G.M.] is biologically female and, consistent with their religious beliefs, the Meads refer to their child as their daughter, using female pronouns and a female name.}

G.M. asked the school to refer to G.M. using a different name and gendered pronouns that did not match G.M.'s sex at birth. The school followed its policy and complied with G.M.'s request. The Meads discovered this situation, withdrew their child, and sued the District and the School Board. The Meads allege that these policies interfere with the free exercise of their religion, among other causes of action. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted in part in August 2025. The court dismissed the free exercise claim.

For more on the 2025 decision (which also did allow parents' parental rights claim to go forward), see this post. Back to today's decision:

In March 2026, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in Mirabelli v. Bonta (2026) (per curiam), a case involving similar facts and a free exercise claim. Relying on Mirabelli, the Meads filed a motion for reconsideration. The court agrees that Mirabelli calls into question the court's interpretation of the relevant law and will grant the motion to reconsider….

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What Will The "Apolitical Proceduralist" Do With The East Wing Case?

Will Justice Barrett really find standing based on an "aesthetic" injury?

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The D.C. Circuit found that President Trump's construction of the East Wing is unlawful, but has stayed the ruling for two weeks to permit the SG to seek a stay.

Trump probably cares about this construction issue more than tariffs and birthright citizenship combined. If the Supreme Court actually blocks the construction, the President will have a daily reminder outside his window of who cast the fifth vote.

Speaking of the fifth vote, I suspect Justice Kavanaugh, who spent his formative years working in the West Wing, will not vote to block the construction.

What does the Chief Justice do here? If I were Roberts, I would immediately grant an administrative stay, grant cert before judgment after a month or so of delays, schedule oral argument for spring 2027, and in June 2027 hold that the construction of the ballroom is so far along that the equities no longer permit an injunction. Then, once the East Wing is fully constructed, the Court will vacate Judge Leon's exclamation-point-riddled opinion with Munsingwear!

Ultimately, the fifth vote would fall to Justice Barrett. What would an "apolitical proceduralist" do here? The neatest path is to find there is no standing. The D.C. Circuit's entire ruling is premised on "aesthetic" injury standing. I wrote a post on this topic back in March. It cannot be the case that a person who walks past the White House has Article III standing to stop the construction of an underground security facility covered by a ballroom. Or perhaps Justice Barrett finds that the equities favor a stay. These two sentences from Judge Rao's dissent sum up the case:

The district court elevated the aesthetic displeasure of a single passerby over the government's security interests in the ballroom and the security risks of leaving an open construction site at the President's home and office. These errors in equitable judgment require vacating the injunction.

Let's see what happens.

Standing

Divided D.C. Circuit Panel Upholds Injunction Against White House Ballroom Construction; Next Stop, One First Street

Judge Rao writes a powerful dissent that is likely to find a receptive audience at One First Street.

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This morning, declaring that "the White House is the People's House," a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the district court injunction against the construction of the new White House ballroom. According  to the court, "Whether or not a massive ballroom should be constructed is for Congress to decide and is not a matter for Executive self-help."

The 100-page majority opinion in National Trust for Historic Preservation v. National Park Service was written jointly by Judges Millett and Garcia. Judge Rao dissented.

The panel stayed its decision for fourteen days for the express purpose of allowing the Trump Administration to seek review from the Supreme Court, and I would expect such a filing in due course.

If the Supreme Court does intervene, either on the interim docket or after argument, this case might present a good opportunity for the justices to revisit--and perhaps restrain--the permissive approach to standing in cases against the federal government, particularly those relying upon aesthetic standing. As Judge Rao explains in her dissent, there are serious questions about NTHP's standing here, both as an organization and as a representative of members who claim "injury" from the ballroom's construction.

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Politics

AI "Combines the Illusion of Thorough Review and Analysis with the Temptations of Speed and Low Cost"

"Attorneys now have the power to violate Rule 11 in embarrassing ways within minutes."

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From Magistrate Judge Luke Evans in yesterday's City of Murfreesboro v. BFI Waste Sys. of Tenn., LLC:

There is nothing inherently wrong with using legal research tools powered by artificial intelligence—just as, in all prior generations of the American legal profession, there was nothing inherently wrong with a supervising attorney relying on the research and analysis of junior attorneys, paralegals, firm librarians, or other staff. The supervisory attorney, however, always bore ultimate responsibility for the accuracy of the final product. In that sense, artificial intelligence is nothing more than a new and technologically interesting way to violate Rule 11.

The novel danger with artificial intelligence is how much easier a Rule 11 violation becomes when using it. Submitting false legal authority by conventional means requires either willfulness or a failure by multiple professionals involved in the preparation of a document. The probability of false legal authority slipping past multiple reviewers is low. In contrast, artificial intelligence combines the illusion of thorough review and analysis with the temptations of speed and low cost. Attorneys now have the power to violate Rule 11 in embarrassing ways within minutes.

Islamic Law

North Dakota Court Upholds Rejection of Sudanese Triple-Talaq Divorce

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From Ali v. Osman, decided yesterday by the N.D. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Lisa Fair McEvers [UPDATE: see this post for more on the lower court decision]:

Ali and Osman married in 2001 in Sudan. Both parties are dual citizens of the United States and Sudan. The parties are the parents of five children—three of whom were minors at the time of trial….

In July 2024, Ali commenced this action seeking a divorce from Osman. In October 2024, Osman moved to dismiss the divorce action, disputing that he and Ali were still married at the time of the action. Osman asserted they were no longer married because he had obtained a divorce certificate in Sudan on December 11, 2022….

The [trial] court found that, unbeknownst to Ali, Osman pronounced talaq three times prior to December 11, 2022; and on or about December 11, 2022, Osman obtained the certificate of divorce from Ali in Sudan based on his pronouncement of talaq. {The district court found: "Under Islamic law, a husband has the right to initiate a divorce ('talaq') against his wife. All that is required to achieve talaq is for a husband to pronounce his intent to divorce his wife on three separate occasions, either verbally or in writing. The husband does not need to communicate his three pronouncements to his wife. She need not be present for them or even aware of them. A wife cannot object to a talaq."}

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Free Speech

Amicus Brief in Lawsuit Against Meta Over Buffalo Supermarket Shooting and Allegedly Addictive Design

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From Jane Bambauer's and my brief in Patterson v. Meta Platforms, Inc., pending now before New York's highest court (for more on the case, see the lower court opinions)—many thanks to our excellent local counsel Vivek Tata, Molly O'Keefe, and Alastair Pearson (Elsberg, Baker & Maruri PLLC) for all their help with the brief:

[* * *]

Plaintiffs-Appellants are suing Defendants-Respondents because Defendants-Respondents hosted and displayed to users what appears to be constitutionally protected third-party speech. Such a theory of liability is inconsistent with the First Amendment, as many cases rejecting negligence liability based on the communicative impact of speech have held.

This First Amendment protection cannot be avoided on the grounds that defendants' speech products are supposedly "addictive." There is no "addictive speech" exception to the First Amendment. The government cannot interfere with speech producers' rights to choose how to format and present speech, on the theory that the products are "addictive." And it cannot interfere with viewers' access to speech products that give the viewers more of what they want, on the theory that the viewers should not want it or are somehow being manipulated into wanting it.

Indeed, using "engagement-maximizing" techniques is a commonplace, and constitutionally protected, feature of a great deal of speech: novels, TV series, political speeches, news programming, and more. By way of analogy, the Free Exercise Clause would preclude the government from restricting religious practices that supposedly psychologically "addict" congregants through such "engagement-maximizing" tools that supposedly "force-feed[]" religious material to congregants (see infra Part II). Likewise, the Free Speech Clause and Free Press Clause preclude the government from using similar arguments to restrict the design of speech products.

This First Amendment protection also cannot be avoided on the grounds that defendants' speech products use AI algorithms. The First Amendment protects listener rights as well as speaker rights. And listeners have the right to obtain ideas and information without government interference, whether the ideas and information are curated exclusively by humans or with the help of computerized algorithms.

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Free Speech

Defendant's Refusal to Identify Herself Leads to Recommended Default Judgment Against Her

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From today's Report and Recommendations by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Staffordt (E.D. Mich.) in yesterday's Evans v. Robertson:

Plaintiff Sybrena Evans, proceeding pro se, sues Defendant Danielle Robertson … for copyright infringement, defamation, fraud, and harassment. {Robertson made a special appearance as a Jane Doe stating that "Danielle Robertson" is an online alias and not her legal name. For the sake of clarity, the Court will nevertheless refer to this individual as Robertson.}

Evans moved for an order requiring Robertson to show cause why she should not be held in contempt and sanctioned for disobeying two of Judge Levy's orders to disclose her identity. The Court granted the motion and Robertson was ordered to show cause why she should not be sanctioned. Robertson responded that the Court should defer enforcement of Judge Levy's orders until it resolves the viability of Evans's claims.

"The orderly and expeditious administration of justice by the courts requires that an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings." Because of this bedrock principle, Robertson should be sanctioned with a default judgment for her violations of Judge Levy's orders….

Evans, a Michigan resident, alleges that Robertson engaged in a pervasive campaign of harassment and cyberbullying on her social media platforms and websites from 2022 to 2024. Robertson allegedly posted YouTube videos calling Robertson [perhaps meaning Evans? -EV] "Teddy Bundy" and falsely accusing her of stalking and other crimes. Evans also alleges that Robertson published deepfake pornography using Evans's likeness. In a YouTube video, Robertson allegedly discussed Evans's divorce and published documents from those proceedings, and encouraged her followers to likewise post content harassing Evans.

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Free Speech

Errors Involving Posting of Escort's Photos by Escort Service Aren't Subject to Federal Nonconsensual Porn Statute

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From Doe v. T.T., II, Inc., decided yesterday by Judge Dale Kimball (D. Utah.):

Defendant T.T. … is an escort service … When Plaintiff agreed to work as an escort in conjunction with Defendants, she signed an agreement indicating that her services as an escort would involve nudity in the presence of customers….

As part of her intake process, the parties discussed that she would need to engage in some advertisement activity directed at attracting male customers and that this would also include nudity. Defendants maintain a website advertising their services and providing photographs of their escorts. The photographs are sexually suggestive but do not generally include nudity….

Plaintiff provided photographs that included some nudity, but the nude photographs did not show her face. Defendants used the photographs Plaintiff provided to them in advertisements. Plaintiff also provided Defendants with some facial shots, but they agreed that they would not be displayed with photographs containing nudity.

In connection with her work as an escort for Defendants, Plaintiff used an assumed name. The photographs they used in advertising used that assumed name. Defendants did not use or provide information as to Plaintiff's actual name or identity. As part of its advertising for its escorts, Defendants supplied photographs to certain websites featuring sexy, nude, or semi-nude models….

Plaintiff does not claim that Defendants created ads for her without her permission. However, Plaintiff alleges that she was there was one posting including a series of photographs involving nudity that also included a photograph including her face. Plaintiff did not want photographs including her face posted with other nude photographs. She contacted Defendant about the posting and they remedied the situation. She claims that the erroneous posting was up for approximately two hours.

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Trump Calls Roberts's Bluff With New Executive Order On Birthright Citizenship

What will Justice Barrett do?

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I am, slowly but surely, making my way through the end of the October 2025 term. I've already published my take on Wolford and Hemani. I've recently completed my essay on Slaughter and Cook, which should appear in Law & Liberty next week. I've written a piece on Mullin v. Doe and Mullin v. Al Otra Lado, which should appear thereafter. Randy Barnett and I wrote an essay on Landor, which was the sleeper case of the year. SCOTUSBlog is also publishing my series of essays on Court reform. (So far, they have built some consensus; future installments may not.)

So far, at least, I have not yet published anything on Trump v. Barbara. That isn't due to a lack of thoughts. I have a lot. Indeed, Randy and I spent much of July figuring out how to present the case in the Fifth Edition of our casebook, which should be available for adoption in December 2026.

Barbara may be one of the most important decisions the Supreme Court has ever issued. Ultimately, I agree with Justice Thomas that the Chief Justice's ruling is not one for the ages. I am already dreading having to teach the case. A question I often ask is "State the holding of the case in one sentence." Try it. What is Roberts's rule of order? What is the standard of citizenship of a person born on U.S. soil? It's harder than it may seem. Your answer, whatever it is, should discuss "extraterritorial fiction." I assure you, read through the debates in the Congressional Globe, and you will not find a reference to "extraterritorial fiction." This line may be one of the most slippery blue plate specials that the Chief Justice has ever served.

In the Chief's mind, failing to issue a clear rule is the best rule of all. But surely the Chief anticipated how Trump would respond to this decision. Justice Kavanaugh surely understood that the President would not surrender.

The President has signed a new executive order on birthright citizenship. The order offers this account of what Trump v. Barbara held, and what room remains to deny citizenship to the children of certain aliens:

On June 30, 2026, the Supreme Court decided in Trump v. Barbara, 609 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 2438, 2449 (2026), that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution extends the privilege of citizenship to children born to parents in the United States "for whom no extraterritorial fiction applie[s]."  This order identifies, non-exhaustively, and prescribes action concerning certain categories of children of aliens who do not fall within the rule of birthright citizenship as announced by the Supreme Court.

Did Trump v. Barbara provide a "closed set" of exemptions to the rule in Calvin's Case or was the list "exhaustive"? I don't think the majority settled this issue, so the roster is "non-exhaustive."

The order explains that the child of an alien enemy is not a citizen at birth. I welcome a lawsuit from the ACLU demanding citizenship for the children of members of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

The order also excludes the child of a parent engaged in birth tourism. I think the argument here is that there is an "extraterritorial fiction" for this group, as the birth is the product of "fraudulent activity."

The order further provides that citizenship is denied to a "person . . .  born in a territory or territorial waters of the United States where citizenship is not conferred by Federal statute." I am not certain if there are any such jurisdictions where citizenship is conferred by executive order and not statute. But here is a test to the Insular Cases.

What will the Chief do? What will Justice Barrett do?

Stay tuned.

Update: It seems there is no statute that grants birthright citizenship to children in American Samoa.

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