The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Strictly Ballroom: Justice Kavanaugh Defeats Chief Justice Roberts

The Court rejects the D.C. Circuit's erroneous "aesthetic injury" standing precedents and the Chief can only wax about Churchill.

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I often write that my favorite writings by Chief Justice Roberts are when he's in dissent. These are the rare instances when I think he actually believes what he is writing. But the opposite seems true in National Park Service v. National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States. The Court, by a 5-4 vote, stayed the injunction, thus allowing construction of the East Wing ballroom/military complex. The majority opinion was per curiam, though as I'll explain below, it is almost certainly a Kavanaugh production. Chief Justice Roberts was in dissent, joined by the Court's three liberals. Based on my quick search, this lineup appeared only one other time in NIH v. APHA.

At this point, John Roberts is utterly unrecognizable. This was the person that George W. Bush nominated to the Supreme Court because of his robust understanding of presidential power in the national security context, yet Roberts dismissed the government's national security concerns in a perfunctory footnote. This was the same justice who bitterly dissented in Massachusetts v. EPA, finding that the broad theory of standing would inject the judiciary into political disputes, but Roberts allowed a person walking past the White House to halt the construction of a military facility. This was a Justice who upheld the arrest of a D.C. tween who ate a single french fry on the metro, but extolled a D.C. busybody who walked past the metro as "deeply committed" to preserving the nation's capital.

This sentence from Justice Kavanaugh's opinion is the sort of thing that Chief Justice Roberts would mutter in his sleep:

Meanwhile, on the other side of the ledger and against these harms, the only harm the Trust claims is the offense one of its members will suffer from having to view a structure of the "scale," "height," and "massing" the government intends. Id., at 75a. These harms and equities are not nearly in equipoise.

At this point, the Chief Justice is a shadow of his former self. This was a case where Roberts determined that Trump should not win, so he did not win. In the end, all the Chief could do is wax about Winston Churchill in his dissent. Well, I have a far more appropriate quotation for the Chief's tenure: "Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning."

I would hope to see many more Roberts dissents next term. As I wrote, "Friends don't let friends be the chief justice's fifth vote." Find a way to get to five without the Chief.

If Chief Justice Roberts is the loser here, then Justice Kavanaugh is the winner. I am fairly confident that Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion. He has become the Court's stickler for standing. I think he also wrote the jurisdictional analysis in Trump v. California.

And as I predicted, the Court rejected the D.C. Circuit's "aesthetic" injury precedents. Justice Kavanaugh leads off with the critical line:

This Court has not found standing in circumstances like these before. To the contrary, we have repeatedly held that mere offense, disagreement, or distaste does not qualify as a concrete and particularized injury under Article III.

Even if the D.C. Circuit found standing, the Supreme Court did not. I suspect that Justice Kavanaugh labored under the D.C. Circuit's terrible standing decisions for about two decades. He has now scaled them back. I hope the D.C. Circuit takes this ruling to heart, and realizes that offended observers do not state an Article III injury. Indeed, this ruling should spill over to the Establishment Clause context, as well as Havens Realty standing. People who object to a Ten Commandments display have nothing more than "offense, disagreement, or distaste."

More generally, there is something satisfying about this ruling in light of Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine. Those opposing abortion were denied "aesthetic" injury standing to see babies born. It only follows that architecture wonks likewise lack "aesthetic" injury standing to see buildings. Whatever the rules are, they should be applied equally.

I consider Justice Barrett to be the leading proceduralist on the Court. Again, she found that no one had standing in Murthy, Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, California v. Texas, and every other case Texas brought to the Court. Barrett clerked for Justice Scalia, so likely has thought about Lujan more than anyone else on the bench. If she thinks Justice Kavanaugh has the better reading of Lujan, then I'm with Barrett. This is the key sentence:

Proceeding to reject the plaintiffs' claim to standing, Lujan stressed that a cognizable interest is a necessary component of standing but not a sufficient one: Article III "requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest." 504 U. S., at 563 (internal quotation marks omitted).

At bottom, the D.C. Circuit extended Lujan in improper ways, and the Supreme Court has now yelled "stop it."

Standing

Supreme Court Allows White House Ballroom Construction to Go Forward, at Least for Now

The majority didn't decide whether the construction violated federal law, only that plaintiffs' purely aesthetic interests didn't allow them to assert a federal claim.

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From the unsigned majority opinion today in National Park Serv. v. National Trust for Historic Preservation:

In October 2025, the federal government started a project to replace the East Wing of the White House. The first phase involved the demolition of the existing East Wing, something the government completed in December 2025. The next phase, currently ongoing, involves the construction of a new East Wing, including a below-ground military installation and an above-ground ballroom.

The National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States (Trust) filed a lawsuit in federal district court challenging various aspects of the project…. On March 31, 2026, the district court granted the Trust's motion [to halt ongoing construction] and issued a preliminary injunction … [that] enjoined any further construction above ground, except as "strictly necessary" to protect the White House, the President, and his staff….  On August 7, 2026, the court of appeals … upheld the district court's injunction….

Confronted with an imminent order requiring it to substantially halt its ongoing construction activities, the government filed a motion in this Court seeking a stay of the district court's injunction pending a forthcoming petition for a writ of certiorari and any further proceedings in this Court….

Beginning with the merits, the government is likely to prevail in showing that the Trust lacks standing to challenge the East Wing project…. To establish its standing to bring this case, the Trust relies on a declaration from a single [one] of its members, Alison K. Hoagland. Hoagland says that she lives in Washington, D. C., and expects to visit the neighborhood around the White House "about once a month." She asserts that having to view the finished ballroom the government is constructing would cause her to suffer "injuries" to her "aesthetic, cultural, and historical interests" because she finds the "scale," "height," and "massing" of the government's design distasteful. On the strength of that declaration, the Trust contends, it has Article III standing to challenge the East Wing project.

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Free Speech

Startpage Search Engine Output Omitting Certain Search Results?

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Startpage is a search engine that promotes itself as protecting user privacy; it gathers results via Google and Bing, but:

We submit your search to our search partners on your behalf. They never see your personal information.

You receive results that aren't based on your personal history…. We don't store your searches. We don't build profiles. Once your search is complete, it's gone.

It apparently gets over 2 million visits per day; my friend Adam Holland regularly uses it, which is how I learned about the missing results in some Startpage searches.

Here is one example, the entirety of a Startpage search for solvera "chris dinota" (I kept the white space at the bottom to show these were the only two returned results); I use this particular query because it's closely related to the original query Adam used:

And here is a Google search for solvera "chris dinota" (done using a private window, to diminish any context-based effects on the search results):

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Free Speech

Anti-SLAPP Law Doesn't Apply to Foreign Speech by Foreigners

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The case is a decision by Judge Susan Illston (N.D. Cal.) Friday in Doe v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG (see also a separate post this morning about the substantive issues in the case). A quick summary of the facts: In 2021, Doe and Roe—a gay couple living in Saudi Arabia, who were married in California in 2013—were flying on Lufthansa from Riyadh to San Francisco. For complicated reasons related to U.S. COVID-related travel rules, Doe and Roe ended up having to disclose to a senior Lufthansa employee at Riyadh airport (Jamshed) that they were married under U.S. law, and the employee allegedly disclosed that publicly; they also allege that the information about the marriage was conveyed to Saudi authorities.

In 2021, Doe and Roe were flying on Lufthansa from Riyadh to San Francisco. For complicated reasons related to U.S. COVID-related travel rules, Doe and Roe ended up having to disclose to a senior Lufthansa employee at Riyadh airport (Jamshed) that they were married under U.S. law, and the employee allegedly said that publicly; they also allege that the information about the marriage was conveyed to Saudi authorities.

Doe and Roe sued, alleging that Jamshed's statements were actionable as disclosure of private facts, as intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other theories. Friday, Judge Illston concluded that California's anti-SLAPP statute—which provides various protections for defendants in lawsuits based on speech on public matters—doesn't apply to the case:

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Free Speech

Lawsuit Over Outing of Gay Saudi Residents by Lufthansa in Saudi Arabia Can Proceed

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[1.] First, the facts from an earlier decision in Doe v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG:

John Doe and Robert Roe are a gay couple who have been in a "committed, but discreet," relationship for 33 years, and who were married in California in 2013. Doe is a United States citizen and California resident who lives in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia most of the year, where he works for a company as legal counsel. Roe is a Saudi Arabian citizen who, until May 2021, was living full-time in Riyadh and working as a result estate [real estate? -EV] investor. Since 1989, Doe and Roe lived together in Saudi Arabia, but they were forced to keep their relationship and sexual orientation hidden because homosexuality has been treated as a capital offense in Saudi Arabia. "Living very carefully, they successfully kept their 33-year relationship a secret from the government, strangers, employers, friends, and family, alike."

In 2021, Doe and Roe were flying on Lufthansa from Riyadh to San Francisco. For complicated reasons related to U.S. COVID-related travel rules, Doe and Roe ended up having to disclose to a senior Lufthansa employee at Riyadh airport (Jamshed) that they were married under U.S. law, and the employee allegedly said that publicly; they also allege that the information about the marriage was conveyed to Saudi authorities.

[2.] Now, Judge Susan Illston's analysis from this past Friday as to why California law should apply to the case:

Saudi Arabian law is based on religious Sharia law and … homosexuality is a crime in Saudia Arabia, punishable in various ways including imprisonment and the death penalty, … [so] plaintiffs have no recourse under Saudi Arabian law…. In contrast, California's strong public policy supporting gay rights and gay marriage, and prohibiting discrimination based upon sexual orientation, is reflected in the California Constitution, numerous California statutes, and decisions by the California Supreme Court….

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Politics

Today in Supreme Court History: August 31, 1995

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8/31/1995: Students at Santa Fe Independent School District voted to allow a student to say a prayer at football games. In Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe (2000), the Supreme Court declared this prayer unconstitutional.

The Rehnquist Court

New York Times Recycles Same Old Story About Northern District of Texas

Yet the article inexplicably makes no mention of judge shopping in Massachusetts and New Hampshire.

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Stop me if you've heard this one before: conservative litigants file cases in District Courts in Texas to secure favorable forums. I've lost count of how many of these stories I've read over the years. For reasons that are unclear, the New York Times decided to publish the exact same story, again. Mind you, over the past year, the frequency of cases filed in Texas federal courts has slowed to a trickle. I've told my students clerking now not to expect nearly as many huge disputes as in years past.

There truly is nothing new here. Other than a handful of cases filed during Trump 2.0, the story is completely a rehash of what has been written before.  I do not understand why the Times felt compelled to invest resources in this story, which again, had nothing new.

Left unsaid, of course, is how liberal groups are judge shopping in the District of Rhode Island and the District of Massachusetts. But you might protest that cases in those districts are randomly assigned! But there is still 100% chance of drawing a favorable liberal judge. When the the number of progressives in the numerator is the same as the number of progressives in the denominator, Boston may as well be Wichita Falls. I'd love to see an expose about how many times Judges Talwani, Murphy, and others, have been stayed and reversed by the Supreme Court.

Anyway, nothing new to see here. And remember, sending a pizza to a judge is a threat to the rule of law but parking a guillotine in front of the Supreme Court is free expression.

What J.D. Vance Gets Wrong About Hamilton (and Markets and Milton Friedman)

The Vice President's argument for more governmental intervention in the economy is based upon a morass of misunderstandings.

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Vice President J.D. Vance believes that conservatives should abandon any commitment to free markets and limited government, in favor of what he characterizes as a more "Hamiltonian" view of government's role in American life and the economy. As Vance has recently explained, the ideas of Milton Friedman can only work if there are "Christian guardrails" and a virtuous citizenry. Insofar as those prerequisites are lacking, Vance suggests, the government needs to take a more active role.

Andrew Langer of the Institute for Liberty explains some of the follies in Vance's account in the Wall Street Journal. As Langer details, Vance seems to misunderstand markets, the importance of limited government, and the Hamiltonian ideals he purports to embrace. in the op-ed, "What JD Vance Gets Wrong About Hamilton," Langer notes

Mr. Vance's invocation of Hamilton obscures a fundamental disagreement extending back to the founding. Hamilton was a great statesman, but his political economy wasn't the uncontested expression of American republicanism. . .

Notes Langer, the policy choice today "isn't between the authentically American Hamilton and the alien Friedman. It is the continuation of an old American argument over centralization, economic direction and individual liberty."

Vance seems to think that adherence to free market principles (such as it was) is responsible for virtue's decline. Yet as Langer notes, this is a bit backwards.

Mr. Vance's history of America's institutional decline may have the causation backward. Laissez-faire economics didn't create the welfare state. It didn't transfer responsibility for human needs from local communities to Washington. Over several generations, government programs assumed functions previously performed by families, churches, mutual-aid societies, fraternal organizations and local charities.

Government expansion didn't single-handedly cause the decline of religious participation or civic life. But public provision frequently displaced voluntary provision. Americans increasingly looked to bureaucracies rather than to neighbors and communities for assistance.

Mr. Vance now cites the weakness of these institutions as a reason laissez-faire is no longer sufficient. But if government expansion weakened them, the answer can't be another round of centralization. That creates a self-reinforcing cycle: Government assumes responsibilities once exercised by civil society; civil society weakens; its weakness then becomes evidence that government must assume still more responsibility.

Langer concludes:

Government has a legitimate role in protecting rights, enforcing contracts, punishing fraud and preserving the conditions of ordered liberty. It can't manufacture faith, belonging, solidarity or moral purpose through economic planning. Those arise from relationships freely entered and responsibilities willingly undertaken.

People don't flourish because government determines how the economy should serve them. When people are free to pursue better lives, flourishing follows. A free society benefits from strong moral institutions—but neither markets nor liberty depends on government to impose them.

It would be good if more of our political leaders understood this.

An Actual SCOTUS Nightmare

Recently, Justice Jackson warned about a "Kafkaesque nightmare" at the Supreme Court. Well, I had my own.

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A common recurring nightmare is showing up for school as a student and being unprepared. I've often had a variant of that dream where I show up for the first day of class as a professor, and was unprepared to teach. In one dream I had years ago, I had to fake my way through teaching Pierson v. Post.

Last night I had a new variant of that dream, which was an actual Supreme Court nightmare. In the dream, I was co-counsel in a case set for argument. We are at the Supreme Court. The bench looks the same, but the bar section is much smaller. Chief Justice Roberts calls the case. Our lead counsel looks at me, and says "I can't do it." He steps down. I immediately panicked, as I hadn't prepared for the argument at all. But I realize someone had to go to the podium, so it would have to be me. I walk to the podium, and say "Mr. Chief Justice and may it please the Court." My mind then turns blank. I don't know anything. I can't even remember the name of the case. I don't even know the name of our client. I just stand there in silence (something that has never happened before.) Justice Thomas, as per tradition, asks the first question. I have no clue what he is asking me, though I realize it is a softball to help me out.

At that point I turn around to look at the lead counsel to see if he can jump in, and he shakes his head no.

I then say "We will rely on the submissions in our brief," and sit down. Given the circumstances, that was actually a pretty good save. I'm proud my dream-brain thought of that argument on the fly. The Chief Justice said "Thank you." I don't remember the Respondent arguing, and I didn't give a rebuttal.

After the argument concludes, I walk down to the cafeteria. I am dreading all the hate mail I will get, so I didn't even look at my phone. Several people at the Court are trying to cheer me up and tell me I did good by subbing in at the last second. I am still mortified.

So yes, the Supreme Court is always on my mind, even in my nightmares.

I searched through some old posts about law-related dreams. There were many: when Justice Kagan yelled at me, when Judge Posner yelled at me, when SCOTUS issued a cease and desist order against me, when Justice Kagan sang her hand-down of a Shelby County dissent, when the Solicitor General received an award from the Chief Justice, when Justice Thomas came to one of my book talks, when I showed Justice Breyer galleys of my book, and more.

Free Speech

First Amendment Broadly Protects Against Speech-Based Deportation of Noncitizens, Court Rules

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Some short excerpts from the >35K-word decision by Judge Noël Wise (N.D. Cal.) in Stanford Daily Pub. Corp. v. Rubio:

Plaintiffs, Stanford Daily Publishing Corporation and Jane Doe, a noncitizen student holding an F-1 visa issued by the United States, bring their claims against Marco Rubio, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, and Markwayne Mullin, in his official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security …. Plaintiffs allege that, since March 2025, the government has changed its immigration policy and pattern of enforcement, namely by arresting, detaining, and deporting students with F-1 visas when those students use their freedom of speech to express opinions that the government does not like—such as expressing support or empathy for Palestinian people, or criticizing Israel's actions regarding Palestine or the conflict in Gaza.

Plaintiffs argue that the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act … that the government relies on for its authority to cancel student visas and initiate deportation proceedings are unconstitutional…. [Those provisions are that an alien may be deported] if "… the Secretary of State personally determines that the alien's [presence] would compromise a compelling United States foreign policy interest" … [and that] "[a]fter the issuance of a visa or other documentation to any alien, the consular officer or the Secretary of State may at any time, in his discretion, revoke such visa or other documentation."

The court concluded that the First Amendment generally fully protects resident aliens pretty much the same way as it protects aliens:

The First Amendment acknowledges no "distinction between citizens and resident aliens." The right to freedom of speech, and its correlative protection from government retribution based on hostility towards speech, has generally been accorded to noncitizens living in the United States. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno ("AADC") (9th Cir. 1995); Bridges v. Wixon (1945) ("Freedom of speech and of press is accorded [to noncitizens] residing in this country.").

In AADC, the Ninth Circuit held the First Amendment prohibits deporting aliens for protected speech. As the court explained, "The Framers explicitly recognized that aliens within this country participate in a reciprocal relationship of societal obligations and correlative protection. 'As [aliens] owe, on one hand, a temporary obedience, they are entitled, in return, to their protection and advantage.'" Therefore, "the values underlying the First Amendment require the full applicability of First Amendment rights to the deportation setting." After all, "[i]f aliens do not have First Amendment rights at deportation, then their First Amendment rights in other contexts are a nullity, because the omnipresent threat of deportation would permanently chill their expressive and associational activities."

For reasons I'll explain below, I think this decision, like AAUP v. Rubio (D. Mass. 2025), is a plausible interpretation of the First Amendment precedents, but not the only plausible one. We'll likely know more when the First Circuit decides the appeal in that case, and then later when the Ninth Circuit decides the likely appeal in this one. And I expect that the matter will get to the Supreme Court if at least one appellate court rules in favor of the First Amendment claimants. Meantime, more from the opinion:

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Federal Judge Concludes Then-Candidate Trump's Attempt to Remove N.Y. Hush Money Non-Reporting Prosecution to Federal Court Came Too Late

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From the long opinion today by Judge Alvin Hellerstein (S.D.N.Y.) in People v. Trump:

Defendant Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, moved for leave to file a second notice of removal. I denied his motion, but the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded and, on remand, I was directed to consider (1) whether then former President Trump demonstrated good cause for filing an untimely notice of removal after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Trump v. United States (2024), and diligently sought removal; (2) whether removal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442(a)(1) and 1455(b)(1) is available at this stage of the state court proceedings; and (3) whether Trump's prosecution is for or relating to an act under color of federal office and whether he raises a colorable federal defense.

To remind people of the prosecution:

On March 30, 2023, a New York State grand jury indicted then former President Donald Trump on thirty-four counts of falsifying business records in the First Degree in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 175.10…. The New York County District Attorney's Office (the "People") alleged that from August 2015 to December 2017, Trump orchestrated a scheme with others to influence the 2016 presidential election, by suppressing negative information about him to benefit his electoral prospects.

As a part of this scheme, the People alleged that, at Trump's request, a lawyer who worked for the Trump Organization as Special Counsel to Trump, Michael Cohen, "covertly paid $130,000 to an adult film actress shortly before the election to prevent her from publicizing a sexual encounter with" Trump. Cohen, following Trump's instructions, proceeded to pay the adult film star, Stephanie Clifford (aka Stormy Daniels), using a shell corporation. After the election Trump reimbursed Cohen, disguising each check "as a payment for legal services rendered in a given month of 2017 pursuant to a retainer agreement." …

On December 16, 2024, the New York Supreme Court denied Trump's motion to dismiss the indictment and vacate the jury's verdict, filed in light of Trump v. United States. On January 10, 2025, the N.Y. Supreme Court sentenced Trump to unconditional discharge, and entered judgment. Trump's appeal to the Appellate Division, First Department, is pending….

Those who want to know more about removal, timeliness, presidential immunity, and more need to read the opinion.

The Fourth Amendment and Laws Requiring Video Recording Inside Stores

A new Ninth Circuit ruling raises a number of hard issues.

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Yesterday, a divided Ninth Circuit handed down Richards v. Newsom, rejecting a facial challenge to a California law, California Penal Code Section 26806, which requires federally licensed firearms dealers to maintain digital recording systems on their business premises.  The law was challenged on First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Fifth Amendment grounds.  I wanted to focus on the Fourth Amendment issues in this post, as I'm not sure the majority's reasoning was right.

I hadn't heard of this law until yesterday, so my apologies if I'm getting the details wrong.  But as I understand it, the law requires federally licensed firearms dealers (which I'll just call "gun shops" for short, if that's not too inaccurate) to have 24/7 video surveillance of "interior views of all entries or exits to the premises, [a]ll areas where firearms are displayed[, and] all points of sale, sufficient to identify the parties involved in the transaction."  They have to store the video for at least a year, and agree to turn over video records in response to a search warrant or other court order.

From a Fourth Amendment perspective, this is a hard law school exam question.  For starters, you have to figure out what to make of the order to have the system. Is the requirement of installation and use (to the extent a particular shop doesn't already have such a system) forcing the gun shop owner to act as a state actor, installing the device?   If so, what exactly is searched, and whose interests are implicated— those of the gun store owner, or the customers and others in the gun store?  Does this fall within the famously murky record-keeping framework of California Bankers Association v. Schultz, or is it more like an order to compel records as in Carpenter or Chatrie?

But wait, there's more. Under Maryland v. Macon, there's no reasonable expectation of privacy in a store open to the public, but here the surveillance is 24/7, and you don't know what might get recorded after work hours.  So would there be Fourth Amendment rights in the video itself, or would it depend on which time window of video the government later tries to compel?  And which of these issues can be addressed in a facial challenge, and how might the closely regulated industries exception apply or not apply, under City of Los Angeles v. Patel?

I don't have time for a long post to do the case justice, unfortunately.  But here's one part I want flag that strikes me as at the very least incomplete, if not likely wrong: The state action analysis.  At one point in the case, the panel discusses the plaintiffs' argument that the law made gun shops state actors under the Fourth Amendment.  Here's what the court says:

Unable to articulate any physical intrusion or actual access of audiovisual recordings by the government, Plaintiffs instead argue that Section 26806 transforms FFLs into state actors for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. To support this argument, Plaintiffs argue that they satisfy three tests discussed in Brunette v. Humane Society of Ventura County for determining when a private party has engaged in state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) the "joint action" test, (2) the "symbiotic relationship" test, and (3) the "public functions" test. See 294 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002). Again, we disagree.

This seems odd.

First, Fourth Amendment state action is generally an agency test that looks at whether the private party was acting as the government's agent, which in turn looks to knowledge, acquiescence, and the like.   The Ninth Circuit has sometimes instead in Fourth Amendment cases tried to summarize state action analysis from outside Fourth Amendment law, which is what the panel is doing here, and was doing in Brunette.  But even if you try to apply the different "tests" from outside Fourth Amendment law, the 2002 Brunette case did not purport to provide a comprehensive list of theories of state action.

Of particular relevance, Brunette did not ask the court to consider the "state compulsion" test.  As the court put it in Children's Health Defense v. Meta Platforms, quoting Supreme Court caselaw:

As we have explained, the Supreme Court has identified four tests for when a private party "may fairly be said to be a state actor": (1) the public function test, (2) the joint action test, (3) the state compulsion test, and (4) the nexus test. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 939, 102 S.Ct. 2744.

The Supreme Court in Lugar rooted this test in Adickes v. SH Kress & Co., which held that a restaurant would be a state actor if it refused service to a customer because of a state-enforced custom of segregating the races in public restaurants. Adickes noted:

For state action purposes it makes no difference of course whether the racially discriminatory act by the private party is compelled by a statutory provision or by a custom having the force of law—in either case it is the State that has commanded the result by its law.

I wonder, why isn't a gun shop turned into a state actor by a statutory provision requiring action under this state compulsion test?  Maybe the resulting act wasn't a search or seizure, and maybe it's not an issue that can be address in a facial challenge.  But I'm not sure why whatever action is compelled wouldn't be state action.

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