The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Pardons

Nothing New Under the Sun, Part 2713, Here as to Family Pardons

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I thought I'd pass along an item I came across in the 1856 reminiscences of a Philadelphia lawyer (David Paul Brown, The Forum, or, Forty Years Full Practice at the Philadelphia Bar, vol. 1, p. 365), a book I was looking at for an entirely different purpose. The author is offering what he sees as an interesting anecdote about U.S. Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington, President Washington's nephew; the question related to the death penalty, not just (as in the more recent family pardon controversy) a lesser felony sentence, but I thought it still provided an interesting perspective, agree with it or not.

Mr. Stockton inquired, "Have you seen the account of the melancholy position in which Governor Desha, of Kentucky, has been placed by the crime of his son?" "It is a sad affair," said the Judge. "But," rejoined Stockton, "the worst of it is, that the son, having been convicted, the Governor, his father, must now decide between signing the death-warrant or a pardon." "And that, you consider a difficulty?" said the Judge. "Certainly," replied the interlocutor; "Why, I would like to know, now, what you, an upright, impartial, and inflexible judge, would do in such a case?"

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After Nearly One Year, SCOTUS Denies Cert In Vehicle To Overrule Kagama

The Court rescheduled the case seventeen times and relisted it four times.

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On July 26, 2024, a cert petition was filed in Veneno v. United States. The Petitioner asked the Court to overrule United States v. Kagama, a precedent that established Congress's "plenary" powers over Indian tribes. The government promptly waived its response on August 8, 2024, I think in an effort to get it into the long conference. The Court requested a response on August 20, 2024. After four extensions, the SG filed its opposition on November 20, 2024.

The petition then entered what I've called docket purgatory. On December 5, 2024, it was scheduled for the January 10, 2025 conference. The case was then rescheduled seventeen times, with the last reschedule coming on June 10, 2025. The case was then distributed to the long conference on September 29, 2025, but no action was taken. The case was relisted three more times.

Finally, on November 10, 2025, the Court put the petition out of its misery, and denied cert. Justice Gorsuch wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justice Thomas.

It seems that Justice Gorsuch spent about eight months trying to get more votes for certiorari, but came up empty handed. By the time the case went to the long conference, it became clear no one else would join, so Gorsuch prepared his dissent from denial.

There is an extended discussion of the discovery doctrine, which most law students read about in Property class.

Next, and leaving the Constitution behind, the Kagama Court gestured to the European doctrine of discovery. 118 U. S., at 381–382. But our Constitution makes no mention of that doctrine. Nor, at least as conceived by the Marshall Court shortly after the Nation's founding, does the doctrine imply plenary federal power over internal tribal affairs. As that Court put it, even after the European "discovery" of North America, Tribes remained "distinct, independent political communities retaining their original natural rights,"with only "the single exception" that they could have no "intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer." Worcester, 6 Pet., at 546, 559 (emphasisadded). From this, one might glean that the discovery doctrinemeant one European nation could assert certain exclusive "rights" of intercourse with Tribes as "against all other European" claimants. R. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict Over the Management of Indian Affairs, 69 B. U. L. Rev.329, 332, n. 6 (1989). Perhaps, too, the doctrine meant that a private party could not buy tribal land without approval from the relevant European national authority. Johnson's Lessee v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 604–605 (1823). But even on its own terms, the Marshall Court appreciated, the discovery doctrine did nothing to strip Native American Tribes of "the rights which belong to self government." Worcester, 6 Pet., at 580; see also K. Richotte, The Worst Trickster Story Ever Told: Native America, the Supreme Court, and the U. S. Constitution 26–27 (2025); N. Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 195, 208–210 (1984).*

*Even as articulated by the Marshall Court, the discovery doctrine leaves much to be desired. If "discovering" a land is enough to secure certain rights over it, one might wonder why Native Americans hadn't obtained those rights over their lands long before Europeans arrived. As one commentator had already asked by the time of the Nation's founding: "If sailing along a coast can give a right to a country, then might the people of Japan become, as soon as they please, the proprietors of Britain"? R. Price, Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and the Justice and Policy of the War with America 23 (1776) (emphasis deleted).

During the tariff case, Justice Gorsuch asked Neal Katyal a question about the Indian Commerce Clause. I could tell this issue was on his mind.

Supreme Court

Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Case Seeking to Overturn Obergefell

This result is unsurprising, and was predicted by most analysts, including myself.

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Kim Davis. (Getty Images)

 

Today, the Supreme Court refused to hear Davis v. Ermold, a case in which the plaintiff sought to get the Court to overrule Obergefell v. Hodges, the historic 2015 ruling striking down laws banning same-sex marriage. There were no recorded dissents.

Some in the media and the LGBT rights community worried that the Court would take the case and reverse Obergefell. Most informed observers believed otherwise. See my August post explaining why, which built on an analysis by my Cato Institute colleague Walter Olson.

Davis, a former Kentucky county clerk  was jailed for six days in 2015 after refusing to issue marriage licenses to a gay couple, claiming she had a constitutional religious liberty right to do so. She was appealing a jury verdict against her for a total of $360,000 in emotional damages and attorneys fees. Her argument for overturning Obergefell was appended to this extremely weak religious liberty claim. I summarized the reasons why the claim is weak in my earlier post on this case:

Davis claims that government officials have a First Amendment right to refuse to issue marriage licenses to couples they disapprove of on religious grounds. It's worth noting, here, that some people have religious objections to interracial marriages and interfaith marriages, among other possibilities. Does a clerk with religious objections have a constitutional right to refuse to issue a marriage license to an interracial couple or to one involving an intermarriage between a Jew and a Christian? The question answers itself….

In the private sector, I think there often is a First Amendment free speech or religious liberty right to refuse to provide services that facilitate same-sex marriages, as with bakers who refuse to bake a cake for a same-sex wedding, website designers who refuse to design a site for such a wedding, and so on…

Public employees engaged in their official duties are a very different matter. They are not exercising their own rights, but the powers of the state. And the services they provide are often government monopolies to which there is no alternative.

In a June post on the tenth anniversary of Obergefell, I explained the great benefits of that decision, why it reached the  right result (even though I also believe it should have used different reasoning), and why it is likely to prove durable. Maybe the Court will yet prove me wrong on the latter point. But it was never going to happen in the Davis case.

There are plenty of genuine threats to liberty and equality in these difficult times. We should focus on them, not on mirages like this dog of a case.

Guns

Seemingly Unknown Antebellum Pennsylvania Case Briefly Mentioning the Right to Keep and Bear Arms

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I haven't seen it cited anywhere (presumably because it's not on Westlaw or Lexis), and I don't believe I've seen other antebellum case like this from Pennsylvania, either. It's Commonwealth v. Crause, 3 A.L.J. 299, 303 (Pa. Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1846). Crause shot and killed a man who had unjustifiably attacked him; the court ultimately opined that this wasn't justifiable self-defense, because the attack didn't threaten serious harm (not a controversial legal principle at the time):

He [the decedent] had inflicted a blow upon his person. He had made no attempt upon his life. He used no weapon nor had he any weapon about him. There was no apparent danger of loss of life or of great bodily harm. There was no attempted felony upon his person, nor was there any threatened. The deceased was caught by one of the persons present. Those present in the house had interposed to prevent further violence upon the person of the prisoner. Where then was the necessity, this urgent necessity to take his life? The necessity must be a necessity founded in his own safety. It did not exist.

But the court also made opined that the defendant's being armed didn't by itself show that he was guilty of "willful, deliberate and premeditated" (and therefore first-degree) murder, partly based on the right to bear arms:

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"Nova Espero" ("A New Hope"), a Short Film in Esperanto

My contribution to this year's Esperanto film festival (I need your "likes" on YouTube).

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I just made a new Esperanto film, which I've submitted to an Esperanto film festival (the 7th American Good Film Festival). (It's really short: under five minutes long. And don't worry: it has English subtitles.) It's called "Nova Espero," or "A New Hope."

My kids helped make it (and two have acting roles), and my thirteen-year-old son Mark did the video editing and most of the filming. You might remember my past Esperanto films, "Mesaĝo en botelo" ("Message in a bottle") and "Honesta homo" ("An honest person").

I'm embedding the film below, but most importantly, please click through to YouTube and "like" ("thumbs-up") the video there: "audience favorite" gets a special prize in this film festival! Voting only lasts a week, so please do it now.

(I don't think you can "like" a YouTube video when you watch it on this blog: click on the title at the top of the video to open it in YouTube.)

Thanks to Catie Neilson, the host of this year's festival, and Alex Miller, former vice president of Esperanto USA and indefatigable longtime film festival organizer. Click here to see the full set of films submitted to the festival. (Alex also organizes the local Atlanta Esperantist scene—if you find Esperanto interesting and are in the Atlanta area, let me know and I'll hook you up.)

Esperanto is the most popular of the constructed languages (and has been around longer than Klingon, Elvish, and High Valyrian), is extremely easy to learn, and is even easier to learn these days now that there's an Esperanto course on Duolingo. (Back in 1997-98, I had to learn it using a book. Now, I've finished the Esperanto and Klingon courses on Duolingo.) This film features Ludwik Zamenhof, the guy who founded the language in the 1870s-80s. Next year's world congress will be in Graz, Austria.

And remember, please click through to YouTube and "like" my video (and spread the word)!

Open Thread

Auto-post still buggy, but it's being worked on; hope to have daily open threads working well shortly.

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Indian Law

Doctrine of Federal "Plenary Power" over "Internal Affairs of Native American Tribes" "Should Make This Court Blush"

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From today's opinion dissenting from denial of certiorari in Veneno v. U.S. by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas:

Petitioner asks us to grant review in this case to reconsider United States v. Kagama (1886). Kagama helped usher into our case law the theory that the federal government enjoys "plenary power" over the internal affairs of Native American Tribes. It is a theory that should make this Court blush. Not only does that notion lack any foundation in the Constitution; its roots lie instead only in archaic prejudices. This Court is responsible for Kagama, and this Court holds the power to correct it. We should not shirk from the task.

As "sovereign and independent states," Native American Tribes have governed their internal affairs "from time immemorial." Worcester v. Georgia (1832). Among the sovereign powers Tribes have always enjoyed is the power to redress crimes involving their own peoples. Reflecting as much, a great many Tribes today have courts, not wholly unlike those found in States and counties across the country, open to render justice when one tribal member commits an offense against another on tribal land.

In the Major Crimes Act of 1885, the federal government sought to curtail these traditional sovereign tribal powers. There, Congress effectively wrote its own Indian criminal code, directing that tribal members who commit certain major crimes against other tribal members within "Indian country" may be tried and punished in federal court. Kagama.

The Act may not have completely displaced tribal criminal-justice authorities. Even so, the law surely represented a sweeping assertion of federal power, one that would be unthinkable elsewhere in the United States. Yes, of course, Congress may adopt a variety of criminal laws consistent with its "limited" and "enumerated" powers under the Constitution. McCulloch v. Maryland (1819). But, no, Congress does not enjoy some "general right to punish" crimes of its choosing "within … the States" however and whenever it pleases. Cohens v. Virginia (1821). Our Constitution "withhold[s] from Congress" that kind of "plenary police power." United States v. Lopez (1995).

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"Counsel, We're Having a Hard Time Believing That"

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From LNU v. Bondi, released Nov. 4, 2025 by Ninth Circuit Judges Richard Paez, Carlos Bea, and Danielle Forrest (though note that, on the merits, the court ruled in petitioners' favor):

On behalf of Petitioners, Attorney Mike Singh Sethi filed an opening brief with multiple fabricated citations and quotations. Sethi cited two cases that do not exist: Eduardo v. Garland, 28 F.4th 742 (9th Cir. 2022), cited at pages 5 and 16 of Petitioners' opening brief, and Lay v. Holder, 729 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2013), cited and discussed at page 16. And Sethi twice attributed quotations to opinions in which the quoted language does not appear: Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001), at page 17 of the opening brief, and Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2015), at page 19.

After the panel denied the parties' joint motion to submit this case on the briefs, Sethi filed a motion to correct the record regarding errata in the opening brief. That motion represented the two nonexistent cases—Eduardo v. Garland and Lay v. Holder—as typographical errors. Sethi sought to replace those cases with two cases that have similar names, entirely different reporter numbers, and in the case of Lay, a different year and a different holding. Both replacement cases either do not support or are weak support for their intended propositions. The motion does not explain how such significant typographical errors occurred.

Sethi did not appear for oral argument. Attorney William Rounds appeared on behalf of Petitioners instead. At oral argument, confronted with the above issues, Rounds at first insisted that artificial intelligence was not used to draft Petitioners' briefs and that the errors were typographical. He later conceded that artificial intelligence might have been used by the individual who drafted the briefs, and that said individual was not yet licensed to practice law. Since oral argument, we have identified further issues in Petitioners' reply brief, and we have identified at least two other opening briefs filed in pending cases in which Sethi cites cases that do not exist.

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Politics

Crime in Illinois to Send E-Mails (with Intent to Offend) That Are "Disgusting to the Senses" or "Abhorrent to Morality or Virtue"

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From People v. Ocampo, decided by Illinois Appellate Court Justice David Navarro:

[Carlos] Ocampo was charged with harassment through electronic communications based on a series of emails .… One of [Ocampo's] pleadings … contained a statement of charges from the Illinois Department of Revenue (IDOR), which sought termination of Ocampo's employment for alleged actions that took place from March 2021 to February 2022. Those allegations were that Ocampo: (1) sent multiple emails to multiple recipients that "contained numerous and unsupported and unsubstantiated allegations against IDOR employees and included inappropriate pictures of his vomit in a toilet bowl"; (2) sent multiple emails that contained "racially sensitive remarks, inappropriate photos, and disparaging comments in an attempt to harm or destroy the reputation of fellow State employees"; and (3) harassed several members of IDOR after having been asked not to contact them. Ocampo was ultimately terminated….

At trial, Vincent Cacioppo testified that he was an IDOR employee for 36 years. He never had contact with Ocampo, except for "hundreds" of emails from Ocampo, starting in 2020. Cacioppo received emails from Ocampo unrelated to work, with false accusations and "nonsense." The emails made Cacioppo feel "horribly because [Ocampo] sent them to everybody in the State legislature, my colleagues."

On February 13, 2023, Ocampo sent Cacioppo and others an email with the subject line "insufferable racists." The body of the email insinuated that Cacioppo was in the mob. Cacioppo stated that he had no way to reach out to the other people to say he was not a racist or a bully, and that the emails damaged his reputation.

Two days later, Ocampo sent an email to Cacioppo and others with the subject line, "gang of white-skinned primates," and the body of the email indicated that Cacioppo was not only "running a gang of white-skinned primates, but also a ring of corruption and thieves." It also stated that Cacioppo "micromanaged minorities to make them feel incompetent," knew very little about taxes, had emotional outbursts, and was committing "white collar crime."

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Zoning

Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention Panel on Zoning, Property Rights, and the Housing Crisis

I participated along with James Burling (Pacific Legal Foundation), Prof. Peter Byrne (Georgetown), and Prof. Sara Bronin (George Washington University).

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Model houses
Andrii Yalanskyi/Dreamstime.com

 

Yesterday, I participated in the Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention panel on "Socialism or Sensible Protections? Zoning, Rent Control, and the Housing Crisis." Although I proposed this topic to the Federalist Society Executive Committee on Property Rights (of which I am a member), I did not pick the title. The panel wasn't really about socialism, except tangentially. But it certainly was about zoning, rent control, and housing! The other participants were James Burling (Pacific Legal Foundation, author of Nowhere to Live: The Hidden Story of America's Housing Crisis), Prof. Peter Byrne (Georgetown), and Prof. Sara Bronin (George Washington University, author of Key to the City: How Zoning Shapes Our World). My own presentation was partly based on my recent article "The Constitutional Case Against Exclusionary Zoning" (coauthored with Josh Braver). We also published a shorter, nonacademic, version in the Atlantic.

For such an ideologically diverse group, there was considerable consensus on a variety of issues, especially the extent to which exclusionary zoning and other regulations are major factors. Obviously, there was also disagreement on such questions as the extent to which judicial review should be used to break down regulatory barriers, and whether zoning deregulation should be combined with housing subsidies for the poor and lower middle class.

Below is a video of the panel. Viewers may wish to skip over parts of the first 15 minutes, where the moderator spent more time than necessary recounting the participants bios.

What Does It Mean To "Regulate Importation"?

It's the central question in the tariff cases, and one exchange during oral argument caught my ear

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An interesting exchange occurred during last Wednesday's oral argument in the tariff cases [transcript available here] that caused me to scratch my head a little.

Background: As I'm sure most of you know, the relevant statute, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"), provides that if the President "declares a national emergency with respect to … any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States," the President may "regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, . . . or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest."

The bold-faced language is where all the action is – at least, that's pretty much all the Court wanted to talk about during oral argument:  Is the imposition of a tariff included within the power to "regulate importation"?[1] The Administration says it has long been so understood; indeed, at one point the Solicitor General said that "the power to impose tariffs is a core application of the power to regulate foreign commerce, which is what the phrase 'regulate importation' in IEEPA naturally evokes."  The challengers, on the other hand, pointed out that Congress has never – not once – used the phrase "regulate" to "impose taxes or for revenue-raising." Read More

The Transgender Passport Case Mini Merits Analysis

The Court is still living in Justice Kennedy's shadow and Justice Jackson questions whether executive actions have as much force as statutes.

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On Friday night, the Court granted an emergency stay in Trump v. Orr, allowing the President's passport policy to go into effect. To the Court's credit, there was a mini merits analysis:

Displaying passport holders' sex at birth no more offends equal protection principles than displaying their country of birth—in both cases, the Government is merely attesting to a historical fact without subjecting anyone to differential treatment. And on this record, respondents have failed to establish that the Government's choice to display biological sex "lack[s] any purpose other than a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group." Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 667, 705 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The omission of internal quotation marks here is significant. That quotation came from Justice Brennan's opinion in Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, a decision that Justice Kennedy cited in Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor. That one passage was the fountainhead of so many flawed precedents. The full passage from Trump v. Hawaii is here:

Given the standard of review, it should come as no surprise that the Court hardly ever strikes down a policy as illegitimate under rational basis scrutiny. On the few occasions where we have done so, a common thread has been that the laws at issue lack any purpose other than a "bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group." Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 534 (1973). In one case, we invalidated a local zoning ordinance that required a special permit for group homes for the intellectually disabled, but not for other facilities such as fraternity houses or hospitals. We did so on the ground that the city's stated concerns about (among other things) "legal responsibility" and "crowded conditions" rested on "an irrational prejudice" against the intellectually dis- abled. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 448–450 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). And in another case, this Court overturned a state constitutional amendment that denied gays and lesbians access to the protection of antidiscrimination laws. The amendment, we held, was "divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests," and "its sheer breadth [was] so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it" that the initiative seemed "inexplicable by anything but animus." Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 632, 635 (1996).

In 2018, when Trump v. Hawaii was decided, the Court needed Justice Kennedy's vote. That is no longer the case. I faulted Justice Barrett for citing this aspect of Trump v. Hawaii in her Skrmetti concurrence. And I will fault the per curiam Court for citing Trump v. Hawaiii in the passport case. This mode of constitutional adjudication should be jettisoned. We are no longer living in Justice Kennedy's shadow. Political majorities can disadvantage politically unpopular groups, unless there is some a constitutional prohibition. California democrats can gerrymander republicans out of power, and Louisiana republicans can gerrymander democrats of out of power--or at least they should be able to. Courts should not perform what McCreary County referred to as a "judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter's heart of hearts." Judges are textualists, not mentalists.

There is another facet of the passport case worth mentioning. In recent emergency docket rulings, the Court has often cited Chief Justice Roberts's in-chambers opinion in Maryland v. King. This ruling concluded the government suffers irreparable harm whenever it is unable to enforce its laws. Justice Jackson's Orr dissent pushes back on this premise in the context of an executive order:

While we have suggested that the government suffers "a form of irreparable injury" when it is enjoined from effectuating a duly enacted statute, see Maryland v. King, 567 U. S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (ROBERTS, C. J., in chambers), an executive order lacks the force of a statute, and an injunction barring such an order does not generate the same sovereign injury. To think it always does would be to endorse the "facially absurd" proposition that the President is irreparably harmed any time he is temporarily prevented from doing something he wants to do. D. V. D., 606 U. S., at ___–___ (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting from grant of stay) (slip op., at 11–12).

There is a fairly profound question here. What is law? Is law limited to a statute that was enacted pursuant to bicameralism and presentment? Or is it also law when the executive takes action pursuant to constitutional or delegated authority?

I considered this distinction in my article, Bilateral Judicial Reform. I suggested that when a district court enjoins a federal or state statute, there should be an automatic stay of the injunction. By contrast, when a district court enjoins some type of executive action, there should not be an automatic stay. I wrote:

In the federal context, laws pass through the crucible of bicameralism and presentment. Moreover, statutes were publicly debated and deliberated for ex-tensive periods, where members of the legislative and executive branch, as well as the public, had an opportunity to assess the bill. That process entitles laws to a presumption of democracy, if not a presumption of constitutionality. The same can be said of state laws that go through the legislative process. Presentment and bicameralism (unicameralism in Nebraska) are the norm for state laws. Such measures should be entitled to the same presumption of democracy, if not a presumption of constitutionality. Ditto for state constitutional amendments and referenda, which have a much stronger degree of democratic accountability than a mere statute. Statutes must be distinguished from executive actions. I would define this category broadly to include executive actions, executive memoranda, subregulatory guidance, administrative utterances, and any other diktat that can be issued without the benefit of public notice, comment, or input. They are simply announced on high from Olympus.

I thought that statutes were entitled to more deference than executive action. But Justice Jackson made a broader point. She contended that "an executive order lacks the force of a statute." In what way? Does she think that an executive order is not part of the "supreme law of the land" under Article VI? Could a judge refuse to enforce an executive order in court? Maybe Youngstown could have simply been resolved on the grounds that an executive action lacks the force of law. The previous Justice Jackson would have had far less to write. Would an executive action not preempt state law? (The Ninth Circuit held that DACA preempts state law in Brewer v. Arizona Dream Act Coalition.) If Justices Jackson, Sotomayor, and Kagan are interested, they should pursue the many ways in which executive actions lack the "force of a statute." Then we can talk about subregulatory guidance. I would be happy to have that conversation.

Should The Denial Of Rights To Aliens Cut Against Restoring The Privileges or Immunities Clause?

What rights do aliens have under Section 1?

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Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment includes references to both citizens and persons:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

The text provide that only the "privileges or immunities" of citizens are protected. By contrast, persons receive the protections of the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws. And the first sentence instructs that not all persons are citizens, but personhood can exist prior to birth.

Debates about restoring the Privileges or Immunities Clause inevitably turn to the protection of rights for people who are not citizens. In McDonald v. Chicago, the Petitioner's merits brief preemptively addressed this issue: "Nor would invocation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, referencing the rights of 'citizens,' rather than under the Due Process Clause, which protects 'person[s],' necessarily deprive non-citizens of any rights." In Timbs v. Indiana, the Petitioner argued that the Excessive Fine Clause of the Eighth Amendment should be incorporated through the Privilege or Immunities Clause. During oral argument, Justice Ginsburg asked if that argument "would leave out non-citizens?" Wesley Hottott, lawyer for the Institute for Justice, conceded the point. He said, "Yes, textually, Justice Ginsburg, that would leave out non-citizens, but, of course, Petitioner is a citizen, and that could be a decision for another day."

When McDonald and Timbs were argued, I think views on immigration were quite different then they are now. Under the political climate of the day, as well as the composition of the Court, it would have been unthinkable for the Court to decide a case that denied certain rights to aliens. In both cases, only Justice Thomas was willing to venture down that path. Justice Gorsuch has signaled that the right to a jury trial might be such a privilege or immunity of citizenship, but he hasn't signed on yet.

Today, however, the political climate with regard to immigration has changed. I don't think it would be unthinkable for the Court to rule that only citizens have a certain constitutional right. During the Rosenkranz Debate yesterday, Professor Mary Anne Case cast doubt on recognizing parental rights as a privilege or immunity of citizenship, because non-citizens would not receive those rights. I don't think that argument resonated, at all, in the ballroom. Indeed, for the first time that I can recall, the Federalist Society's National Convention held a showcase panel on illegal immigration. Speakers included Gene Hamilton from America First Legal, who served as President Trump's Deputy White House Counsel, and Trevor Ezell, who serves as Governor Abbott's Counsel. They advanced a pro-restrictionist reading of the Constitution.

Should the denial of rights to non-citizens cut against restoring the Privileges or Immunities Clause? I don't think so. The original meaning of the Constitution is the original meaning of the Constitution. We shouldn't distort that meaning to satisfy present-day preferences.

Could Congress address this situation? By analogy, the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment do not extend to Indian Tribes. For example, after Obergefell, Indian Tribes still had to decide whether to legalize same-sex marriage. The federal Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment likewise do not directly extend to Puerto Rico and other territories (though the nuances are complex).

Could Congress pass a statute guaranteeing the privileges or immunities of citizenship to resident aliens--that is, people in the country lawfully but who are not citizens? Without question, Congress could pass a statute that requires federal officers to secure these rights to aliens. But could Congress require the states to protect the privileges or immunities of aliens? Stated differently, could Congress waive a state's sovereign immunity if it deprives an alien of the privileges or immunities of citizenship? I think there would be a Boerne problem. Congress cannot expand the scope of Section 1. If the text only extends these rights to citizens, then I do not think Congress could use its Section 5 powers to require states to secure these rights to noncitizens.

This thought experiment reinforces how challenging it is to map nineteenth century understandings of citizenship onto modern immigration laws. During the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, there were discussions about Gypsies and Chinese workers. But the dynamics back then are very different from the dynamics today.

I think back to A.A.R.P. v. Trump, which ostensibly recognized due process rights for illegal aliens who were designated as enemy aliens. What process was due to these individuals? The Alien Enemies Act suggested that these aliens receive zero process at all. I have always thought this law was arguably a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

I also think back to debates about how illegal aliens affect representation. Justice Thomas's concluded in Evenwel v. Abbott that "the Constitution did not resolve whether the ultimate basis of representation is the right of citizens to cast an equal ballot or the right of all inhabitants to have equal representation."

These are all issues that are up for debate.

AI in Court

They Just Can't Help It, AI Hallucination Edition

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From Judge Judith Levy (E.D. Mich.) in Evans v. Robertson, the I've Seen Fake Cites on Both Sides Now case:

The litigants in this case … have been repeatedly warned that factitious citations will not be tolerated by the Court. Judge Stafford ordered Plaintiff and Defendant to "include a written representation that [they have] personally checked each legal citation and each citation is accurate and stands for its asserted proposition" and warned that a failure to do so may result in sanctions. Despite Judge Stafford's order, both Plaintiff and Defendant have violated the Court's express requirements and lied to the Court numerous times….

Defendant's objection, which was previously stricken by the Court, contained several factitious citations…. Plaintiff's objection contains at least two factitious citations…. Plaintiff references these factitious citations despite her declaration of verification, which states "I, the undersigned, verify that the legal authorities cited herein are accurately stated, relevant …, and drawn from controlling or persuasive precedent applicable to the issues presented in this case." …

Plaintiff's response to Defendant's objections also contains a factitious citation…. Plaintiff references this factitious citation despite her certification, which states "Plaintiff affirms that all legal authorities cited in this filing have been reviewed and verified for accuracy. All case citations were cross-checked using Westlaw and the University of Detroit Law Library, with the assistance of library staff, to ensure correct citation format, validity, and precedential status as of the date of filing." …

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