The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Learning Resources for Learning Resources

How to teach the tariffs case?

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Learning Resources v. Trump may seem like a very important decision today, but I'm not sure how much it will matter in the near future.

First, Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion. The Chief, per his usual style, said very little. He purported to simply apply longstanding doctrine, even where he broke new ground, especially on the application of the major questions doctrine for foreign affairs. Moreover, Roberts did not fully engage with most of the historical precedents advanced in Justice Kavanaugh's dissent. Roberts opinions are, as a general matter, not good teaching tools. Students invariably are left feeling unfulfilled.

Second, it isn't clear to me whether this case even belongs in a constitutional law casebook. I think classes on statutory interpretation could benefit from this decision. The major questions doctrine also makes sense for an administrative law class. But the majority opinion says very little about constitutional law. Sure, the Chief Justice gestures to Article I, which reserves the taxing power to Congress. And that principle does some work with the major questions doctrine. But the real work is not based on the text of the Constitution, but instead on how Congress over time delegated the power to impose taxes to the President. Again, this is not really about constitutional law. (I suspect the birthright citizenship will also be resolved on statutory grounds, removing another possible entry to a constitutional law casebook.)

Third, what should students make of the disagreement between Justice Gorsuch and Justice Barrett? I feel like not much new is added from Biden v. Nebraska. Indeed, Justice Barrett, as well as Justice Kagan, seem annoyed that Justice Gorsuch is still making them expend time on this dispute. Is any of this back-and-forth helpful to students in a class on statutory interpretation? I am doubtful. This opinion took nearly five months after oral argument to publish. Query how much of that delay was caused by Justice Gorsuch responding to the four "camps."

Fourth, what about the non-delegation doctrine? After oral argument, I suspected that Justice Gorsuch would at least discuss the non-delegation doctrine, but ultimately it made only a few brief appearances in his opinion. By contrast, Justice Thomas introduced an entirely new line of thought: the non-delegation doctrine only applies to core legislative powers that affect life, liberty, and property. But powers outside that core, that do not affect public rights, can be delegated without limitation. Is Justice Thomas right? I need to think about it some more. Justice Gorsuch raises some questions, but he doesn't really have a strong response. The Thomas dissent may be the only part of the entire case that belongs in a constitutional law casebook. I'll admit it is strange to only include a dissent, but students will benefit from Thomas's careful study.

Fifth, what about Justice Kavanaugh's dissent? It is nearly twice the length of the majority opinion. I found it more persuasive than I expected. Even though I have been following this issue for the past year, I never took the time to carefully walk through the statutory history. I don't think the issue is as "clear" as Kavanaugh said, but I am convinced this issue is close. There is no way that Justice Kagan could be right that the government loses based solely on the statute. I think the government loses only through an application of the major questions doctrine. And I need to think a bit more about Justice Kavanaugh's historical account of the tariff power controls. I almost wish that the Chief assigned the majority opinion to Justice Barrett, as she would have taken the time to fully engage the dissent. But Roberts kept this one for himself.

Ultimately, like much of Trump law, I don't think this decision will have much staying power. It is just another application of the major questions doctrine, even if the Justices still do not agree what that doctrine is.

Putting Trump's Backlash Against The Tariff Ruling In Context

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In Learning Resources v. Trump, the Supreme Court invalidated President Trump's global tariffs by a 6-3 vote. Almost immediately, Trump held an impromptu press conference, in which he lashed out at the Court, and in particular two of his appointees, Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett, who joined the majority. The presser was classic Trump: angry, winding, but direct. First, he conveyed a truth that Republican presidents have known for nearly a century, but have rarely said aloud: progressive justices never break ranks when it counts, but conservative justices will invariably find the principle to do so. Second, Trump uttered another unspoken truth: Presidents fear that criticizing the Supreme Court may result in the Justices ruling against them. The Justices are supposed to rule without fear or favor, but they are still human and will invariably react to what they see as an overbearing president. Third, Trump now sees clearly the problem with those who advised him on his first batch of Supreme Court nominees. Rather than focusing on nominees who favored a strong, robust executive, they supported nominees who actually wanted to transfer power from the executive to Congress and to the courts. Should Trump have another Supreme Court vacancy, these three important lessons will inform his future decision.

Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has had a majority of Republican-appointed Justices. Indeed, in 1991, eight of the nine Justices had been appointed by Republican presidents. Only Justice Byron White, a Kennedy appointee, was on the other side. Yet, the Court still leaned to the left. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1991), five Republican appointees voted to reaffirm Roe v. Wade. And even when the Court found a conservative majority, swing votes like Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy moderated the outcome to the left. But the opposite effect seldom, if ever, happened. Over the past two decades, I have struggled to think of a decision where a Democratically appointed Justice cast the decisive fifth vote for a conservative victory. Justice Stephen Breyer, to his credit, cast an important vote to save a Ten Commandments monument at the Texas Capitol, but that narrow ruling was overwhelmed by a companion case from Kentucky that broadly expanded the Court's power to scrutinize religious displays. Justice Breyer also cast a key vote in a pair of affirmative action cases from Michigan, but there, too, racial preferences were largely upheld. And in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012), Justices Breyer and Elena Kagan joined the Chief Justice in holding that states could opt out of the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid expansion. But it has been reported that they did so as part of a compromise to avoid invalidating the entire program. Since Justice Breyer's retirement, I think the odds of compromises from the left are slim. 

President Trump's press conference described this dynamic and used his own appointees as examples. Trump said, "The Democrats on the court are thrilled, but they will automatically vote no." Trump added that the Democratic appointees are "an automatic no, just like in Congress." How often do Democratic politicians break ranks and vote on principle? Republicans in Indiana voted against redistricting. Will any Democratic state legislatures actually vote against a Democratic gerrymander? Trump's analogy between Democratic politicians and Democratic-appointed judges has some merit. I struggle to think of any significant case where the Court's progressive justices cast a dispositive vote against the progressive side. 

Trump continued that the Democratic appointees are "an automatic no, no matter how good a case you have, it's a no." I think Trump is saying what every Supreme Court litigator would quietly admit: in an ideological case, only three or four votes are really ever up for grabs, and they are all on the right. But Trump drew a contrast: "You can't knock their loyalty, one thing you can do with some of our people." In other words, the progressive justices never break ranks when it counts, but "some of our people," that is, the conservative Justices, do.

Trump also shone a light on an unspoken element of Supreme Court advocacy: you cannot say or do anything that could offend the Justices. Trump explained he kept his mouth shut: "I wanted to be very well-behaved because . . . I didn't want to do anything that would affect the decision of the Court, because I understand the Court." He does understand the Court better than most people might think. Trump continued, "I understand how they are very easily swayed. I want to be a good boy."

Trump, likely on the advice of counsel, was told not to say anything negative about the Court while the case was pending, lest he sway the decision. The implication here was clear: if Trump criticizes the Court, he is more likely to lose. Trump even acknowledged this point in his roast at the Alfalfa Club earlier this month. He quipped, "I had the nastiest, most vicious joke about John Roberts," but "if you think I'm going to tell that joke you can forget it." Trump said the quiet part out loud: "I'm going to kiss his ass for a long time." Well, at least for a few weeks. Now Trump can tell the joke.

Do you see the problem? Judges are supposed to decide cases without fear or favor. Whatever a litigant says about the judge should have no bearing whatsoever on the outcome of the case. But of course, every first-year law student knows this isn't actually true. The clear import of some of the commentary about Trump's press conference is that he made it less likely that the Justices will rule in his favor in future cases. Judges are human. Indeed, judges are even more sensitive than mere mortals. One does not become a judge by ignoring how the public perceives them. And even if the justices tell themselves that Trump's comments have no effect on their ruling, the public perception is that there is such an effect. And where did this perception come from?

I'll let you in on a little secret. Much of the commentary you read about the Supreme Court involves obsequiousness in an attempt to curry favor. Law professors, in particular, want to be held in high regard by the justices. After all, they want to be cited and have their students hired as law clerks. (I, for one, never hold back, even if there are consequences for my candor.) You wonder why Trump's lawyer told him to put a muzzle on it?

Finally, I think Trump is having a rude awakening about the Supreme Court nominees from his first term. While Trump is angry at Justices Gorsuch and Barrett, I think his ire should be directed at the lawyers who advised Trump to pick them. A flashback is helpful. Immediately after Justice Scalia died, Trump realized he had an opening. If Trump could convince conservatives that he could be trusted to appoint a conservative to replace Scalia, he could win the primary. Trump innovated the process by releasing several lists of potential nominees. (It is noteworthy that Gorsuch and Kavanaugh were not on the initial list.) But let's be frank. Trump didn't know the people on the lists. He worked with the names given to him. And Trump, unlike prior presidents, didn't have a firm grounding in constitutional law or what the Supreme Court did.

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Climate Change

A Conversation about the Endangerment Finding Rescission

A couple of lawyers and a couple of scribes discuss the legal challenges to come.

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On Friday afternoon I took a break from reading the Supreme Court's tariff ruling to talk about the EPA's final rule rescinding the "endangerment finding," which serves as the basis for regulating greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, on Andrew Revkin's "Sustain What" podcast. We were joined by environmental attorney Sean Donohue (who will be among those challenging the EPA's final rule) and Jean Chemnick of E&E News/Politico.

It was a fun discussion which highlighted some of the legal issues that will arise as courts (first the D.C. Circuit and then, some expect, the Supreme Court) consider the question, even if Sean Donohue was somewhat constrained in what he could say given the pending litigation. Here's a video:

The EPA's final rule, as published in the Federal Register, is here. Additional materials and supporting documents are available on the EPA website here. And the first petition for review of the rescission filed in the D.C. Circuit on behalf of multiple environmentalist, public health, and other public interest organizations is here. (And, yes, Donohue is one of the attorneys listed.)

For more background on the legal issues and what may be in store, here are some of my posts on the subject:

Annotating President Trump's Press Conference About The Tariffs Ruling

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Much has been written about President Trump's press conference in the wake of Learning Resources. The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board charged that the "rant in response to his tariff defeat at the Court was arguably the worst moment of his Presidency." Ed Whelan said the speech was "stupid and vile."

I quite deliberately waited a bit to watch Trump's remarks. I wanted to actually read the opinion first, and let the tumult of Friday settle down. It helps that I am not on social media, and completely turn off the internet on shabbat.

Now, with some distance from Friday, I watched the press conference. This might be one of the most important presidential remarks about the Supreme Court since FDR's Court-Packing address. Of course, it is done in Trump's inimitable style with dripping vitriol, but as Trump often does, he says the things we all think but are simply unsayable in polite company. People need to focus less on how Trump says things and more on what he actually says.

Rather than trying to summarize it, I will offer a passage-by-passage annotation.

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An Edited Version Of Learning Resources

I've finished reading the entire tariff decision, and editing it down for the Barnett/Blackman casebook.

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I realize I am unorthodox. I avoid commenting on a Supreme Court opinion till I've read the entire thing from front to back. I find the experience far more rewarding. I also avoid reading takes by people who almost certainly did not read the entire decision, or perhaps just skimmed the syllabus. Of course, the fact that Learning Resources had seven separate opinions, and stretched more than 170 pages, made the experience a bit unpleasant, but persevere I did.

Here is my first stab at an edited version for the Barnett/Blackman supplement, down to about 50 pages.

The majority opinion is very short, about 6 pages. The Roberts opinion can be stated very simply. As I've said before, the shorter a Roberts decision is, the more he is concealing.

The Gorsuch opinion, which stretches nearly 50 pages in the reported version, is cut down to 14 pages. For the most part, Gorsuch is responding to Barrett, Kagan, and Kavanaugh/Thomas. I feel like the only person on planet Earth who truly needs to read the entire Justice Gorsuch opinion is Justice Gorsuch. This was for him, not his colleagues, or anyone else for that matter. Depending how much of the other four opinions you assign, you can probably skip around the Gorsuch opinion.

The Barrett concurrence is thankfully short, and I shortened it further to two pages.

I cut most of the Kagan concurrence to a page, only including the parts where she throws shade at Justice Gorsuch.

The Jackson concurrence on legislative history can be eliminated altogether. I kept a really short segment.

The Thomas dissent is about six pages. It reminds me a bit of Zivotofsky. He has very deep views on the President's powers with regard to foreign policy. In Zivotofsky, Scalia challenged him. Here, Gorsuch doesn't really try.

The Kavanaugh dissent is 23 pages long, much longer than the majority. This extended excerpt is justified, at least in part, because Kavanaugh goes deep into issues that Roberts glosses over. Justice Kavanaugh also tends to use theme and variation. He will state a point, develop it, then restate the point in a different way, and then restate it again. As Justice Scalia would say, repetition is afoot.

I will probably cut this excerpt down further to about 35 or 40 pages for the supplement, and under 30 pages for the casebook. It still isn't clear to me exactly how to teach the Major Questions Doctrine in ConLaw, as this is more of a statutory interpretation/admin principle. I had hoped to include it in a section on non-delegation, but the Court assiduously avoided that issue.

Enjoy! I will have a lot of commentary on this case in the coming days.

Tariffs

Andrew McCarthy on "Why Trump's Section 122 Tariffs Are Illegal"

The prominent conservative legal commentator outlines the case against Trump's latest tariff power grab.

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Within hours of the Supreme Court's decision striking down his massive IEEPA tariffs in our case challenging them, Donald Trump issued an executive proclamation invoking Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose 10% global tariffs, and then upped the rate to 15%. Prominent conservative legal commentator Andrew McCarthy has an insightful National Review article explaining why these new tariffs are also illegal. McCarthy and I differ over many issues. But we agree on this one. Here's an excerpt:

These new tariffs are even more clearly illegal than Trump's IEEPA tariffs…..

In Section 122, Congress endowed the president with narrow, temporary authority to impose tariffs "to deal with large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits" (emphasis added). What Trump is complaining about — something he insists is a crisis but is not — is the balance of trade, not of payments. The United States does not have an overall balance of payments deficit, much less a large and serious one.

A trade deficit between the U.S. and a foreign nation occurs, mainly in connection with goods (which is just one aspect of international commerce), when imports are greater than exports. This is not really a problem for a variety of reasons — e.g., a trade deficit results in an investment surplus, the U.S. is a major services economy and often runs exported services surpluses that mitigate the imports deficit in goods, etc.

The balance of payments is a broader concept than the balance of trade. It accounts for all the economic transactions that take place between the United States and the rest of the world. Even without getting into every kind of transaction that entails, suffice it to say that foreign investment in the United States, coupled with the advantages our nation accrues because the dollar is the world's reserve currency, more than make up for the longstanding trade deficit in goods.

Our overall payments are in balance. There is no crisis.

It's vital to understand why Section 122 was enacted. There was a financial crisis in the late 60s and early 70s under the Bretton Woods system, when the dollar was tied to gold. Foreign countries that held dollar reserves could exchange them for gold at a fixed rate. Meanwhile, our government was spending at a high clip due to the Vietnam War and Great Society programs. This and the obligation to pay out gold put enormous pressure on the dollar…

Now, over a half century later, these conditions no longer obtain. The dollar floats and the government does not concern itself with gold parity. The dollar is the global reserve currency, so demand for dollars by foreign nations is robust. We have strong capital inflows and our highly liquid financial markets are the envy of the world. Notwithstanding trade deficits, there is no balance of payments problem.

Nor is it necessary, as Section 122 puts it, to impose temporary tariffs in order "to prevent an imminent and significant depreciation of the dollar in foreign exchange markets[.]"

There is no rationale under Section 122 to impose tariffs. Because President Trump has no unilateral authority to order tariffs, he must meet the preconditions of Section 122 to justify levying them. He cannot. Not even close.

I agree. And I think there are additional reasons why the new Section 122 tariffs are illegal. I will have more to say about them in the coming days.

Supreme Court

A Puzzle about Learning Resources v. Trump

Why is the decision named what it is?

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Yesterday's Supreme Court decision rejecting President Trump's use of the International Emergency Economic Policy Act (IEEPA) to impose tariffs is styled Learning Resources v. Trump. But why?

The tariff case was actually two cases. Learning Resources, which had been filed in a federal district court, and Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, which was filed in the Court of International Trade and then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. One question before the Court was which of these litigation pathways was the right one.

Here is what the Court said on that point in a footnote:

We agree with the Federal Circuit that the V.O.S. Selections case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT. The plaintiffs' challenges "arise[] out of " modifications to the HTSUS. 28 U. S. C. §1581(i)(1). Where, as here, such modifications are made under an "Act[] affecting import treatment," 19 U. S. C. §2483, they are "considered to be statutory provisions of law for all purposes," §3004(c)(1)(C). Thus, the plaintiffs' challenges "arise[] out of [a] law of the United States providing for . . . tariffs." 28 U. S. C. §1581(i)(1). For the same reasons, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia lacked jurisdiction in the Learning Resources case.

Based upon this, it seems to me the decision should be captioned Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, not Learning Resources. After all, if the district court lacked jurisdiction in Learning Resources, that case should have been dismissed and the Supreme Court would not have had jurisdiction to review that case on the merits. It did, however, have jurisdiction to reach the merits in V.O.S. Selections, so that is the case on which the Court actually ruled. But that is not what the Court did.

Donald Trump

Trump on the Supreme Court's Tariff Decision

It wasn't the Court's opinion that is an "embarrassment."

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After the Supreme Court ruled (correctly) that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the imposition of tariffs, President Trump issued remarks on the decision. It was quite something.

Here are some excerpts form the transcript:

The Supreme Court's ruling on tariffs is deeply disappointing, and I'm ashamed of certain members of the court, absolutely ashamed, for not having the courage to do what's right for our country.

I'd like to thank and congratulate Justices Thomas, Alito and Kavanaugh for their strength and wisdom and love of our country, which is right now very proud of those justices. . . .

The Democrats on the court are thrilled, but they will automatically vote no. They're an automatic no, just like in Congress, they're an automatic no. They're against anything that makes America, strong, healthy and great again. They also are a, frankly, disgrace to our nation, those justices. . . .

Others think they're being politically correct, which has happened before far too often with certain members of this court, and it's happened so often with this court — what a shame — having to do with voting in particular, when in fact they're just being fools and lapdogs for the RINOs and the radical left Democrats and, not that this should have anything at all to do with it, they're very unpatriotic and disloyal to our Constitution.

It's my opinion that the court has been swayed by foreign interests and a political movement that is far smaller than people would ever think. It's a small movement. I won by millions of votes, we won in a landslide. With all the cheating that went on, there was a lot of it, we still won in a landslide. Too big to rig.

But these people are obnoxious, ignorant and loud. They're very loud. And I think certain justices are afraid of that. They don't want to do the right thing. They're afraid of it. . . .

I understand how they are very easily swayed. I want to be a good boy. . . .

To show you how ridiculous the opinion is, however, the court said that I'm not allowed to charge even one dollar. I can't charge one dollar, can't charge a dollar. I would have used one penny, but we don't make the pennies anymore. We save money.

Can't charge one dollar to any country under IEEPA, not one dollar, I assume to protect other countries. This must have been done to protect those other countries. Certainly not the United States of America, which they should be interested in protecting. That's what they're supposed to be protecting. . . .

Our country is the hottest country anywhere in the world right now, and it was a dead country one-and-a-half years ago under an incompetent president. But now I'm going to go in a different direction, probably the direction that I should have gone the first time.

But I read the language. I'm very good at reading language, and it read our way 100 per cent. But now I'll go the way I could have gone originally, which is even stronger than our original choice.

As Justice Kavanaugh — whose stock has gone so up, you have to see, I'm so proud of him — wrote in his dissent, "Although I firmly disagree with the court's holding today, the decision might not substantially constrain a president's ability to order tariffs going forward." So think of that, "the decision might not substantially constrain." And it doesn't. He's right. In fact, I can charge much more than I was charging. So I'm going to just start. . . .

And from the Q&A at the press conference:

Question:  Mr. President. What will you say to foreign nations who seek to renegotiate their deals? And what did you mean a moment ago when you said that the Supreme Court has been swayed by foreign interests?

Trump: Well, I think that foreign interests are represented by people that I believe have undue influence. They have a lot of influence over the Supreme Court, whether it's through fear or respect or friendships, I don't know. But I know some of the people that were involved on the other side and I don't like them.

I think they're real slimeballs. And, uh, got to do what's right for the country. You got to do what's right for the Constitution. That's why I respect so much, Justice Thomas and Alito, Kavanaugh, because they not only dissented, their dissent is so strong. When you read their dissent, you know, a lot of times you'll read a dissent and it's like, well, you don't know.

It could go either way. There's no other way. The good news is it's like Justice Kavanaugh said, very strongly said, you have other ways you can go. You don't have to go that way. You can go other way. There are numerous other ways you can go. And frankly, this should have been done by presidents many years ago.

They allowed our country to be eaten alive. We lost 50 percent of our car business. We used to make cars. We made all cars. And then Mexico came, Canada came, Japan, and Germany, but they're all coming back now. They're all coming back at record levels. . . .

And on his appointments to the Court:

Question: Mr. President, Justices Gorsuch and Barrett, are you surprised in particular by their decision today?

Trump: I am.

Question: And do you regret nominating them?

Trump: I don't want to say whether or not I regret. I think their decision was terrible. Yeah. I think it's an embarrassment to their families, you want to know the truth, the two of them. Yeah.

Supreme Court

An MQD Receipt Justice Gorsuch Overlooked

Justices Kagan and Sotomayor have signed on to at least one opinion that expressly relied upon the major questions doctrine.

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Justice Gorsuch's concurrence in Learning Resources v. Trump is something of a Godfather-esque settling of family business. He challenges and critiques all of his colleagues (save for the Chief) and brings receipts. As one would expect, his opinion draws tart responses from other justices (which could explain why it took so long for the Court to release the opinion).

Whatever one concludes about Justice Gorsuch's exchange with Justice Kagan, and whether the progressive justices implicitly adopted arguments embracing the major questions doctrine in this case, he is correct that Justices Kagan and Sotomayor have signed on to MQD-reasoning in the past, he just forgot to include one of the most salient receipts.

In 2015, both Justices Kagan and Sotomayor signed on to Chief Justice Roberts' opinion for the Court in King v. Burwell. Of note, that opinion relied upon MQD reasoning in concluding that Congress had not delegated authority to the Internal Revenue Service to determine whether tax credits would be available in federal exchanges. Here's the relevant passage:

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Tariffs

My New Atlantic Article About Our Win in the Tariff Case

It covers many issues raised by the decision.

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President Donald Trump holds up the chart of "reciprocal" tariffs he pledged to impose on other nations, during an event in the Rose Garden.
Trump announces his "Liberation Day" tariffs. April 2025. (CNP/AdMedia/Newscom)

The Atlantic just published my article  (gift link) about the tariff ruling decided by the Supreme Court yesterday, in which I was co-counsel for the plaintiffs in one of the three cases before the justices. The article covers many issues raised by the case, including major questions, nondelegation, implications for the rule of law, and Trump's plan to use Section 122 to impose massive new tariffs. Here is an excerpt:

In a 6–3 decision yesterday, the Supreme Court rightly ruled that, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, the president does not have the power to "impose tariffs on imports from any country, of any product, at any rate, for any amount of time." The ruling is a major victory for the constitutional separation of powers, rule of law, and millions of American consumers and businesses harmed by these tariffs.

This decision spared America from a dangerous, unconstitutional path. Under President Trump's interpretation of the law, the president would have had nearly unlimited tariff authority, similar to that of an absolute monarch. That undermines basic constitutional principles. The Framers of the Constitution had sought to ensure that the president would not be able to repeat the abuses of English kings, who imposed taxes without legislative authorization….

Trump's position had multiple flaws. IEEPA does not even mention tariffs, nor any synonyms such as duties and imposts. The law does authorize the president to "regulate" certain types of international transactions in the event of an "emergency" that amounts to an "unusual and extraordinary threat" to the United States. But the tariff authority and the power to "regulate" foreign commerce are listed in separate clauses of the Constitution. And, as Chief Justice John Roberts noted in his opinion for the Court, the tariff authority is part of the power to tax, an authority the Framers of the Constitution carefully reserved to Congress because they had "just fought a revolution motivated in large part by 'taxation without representation.'" Furthermore, during the previous nearly 50-year history of IEEPA, Roberts continued, "no President has invoked the statute to impose any tariffs—let alone tariffs of this magnitude and scope…."

Three of the justices in the majority—Roberts, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett—also concluded that the Trump administration's interpretation of IEEPA goes against what has become known as the "major questions" doctrine, which requires Congress to "speak clearly" when authorizing the executive to make "decisions of vast economic and political significance…."

In addition to upholding the separation of powers, the decision is a victory for the rule of law, which requires that major legal rules be clearly established by legislation, not subject to the whims of one person. Since first imposing the Liberation Day tariffs, Trump has repeatedly suspended and reimposed various elements of them. He has also imposed or threatened to impose IEEPA tariffs for a variety of other purposes, such as countering the supposed threat of foreign-made movies, punishing Brazil for prosecuting its former president for attempting to launch a coup to stay in power after losing an election, and most recently castigating eight European nations opposed to his plan to seize Greenland. Such gyrations undermine the stable legal environment essential for businesses, consumers, and investors, and create endless opportunities to reward cronies and punish political adversaries. Studies show that firms contributing to the Republican Party were disproportionately likely to receive exemptions from tariffs imposed during Trump's first term, while firms contributing to Democrats were more likely to have to pay. If allowed to stand, the IEEPA tariffs would have created much greater opportunities for such corruption….

The administration may try to reimpose many of the tariffs using other statutes… But those laws have various constraints that would make it hard for the president to simply impose unlimited tariffs, as he could have done under his interpretation of IEEPA. As Chief Justice Roberts noted in his opinion yesterday, "When Congress has delegated its tariff powers, it has done so in explicit terms, and subject to strict limits…" If Trump or a future president does claim that those other statutes give him unlimited power, tariffs imposed based on any such theory would themselves be subject to legal challenges. Yesterday's decision signals that a majority of the Court is seriously skeptical of claims of sweeping executive tariff authority.

For a compendium of  all my writings about the tariff litigation, see here.

Free Speech

Court Blocks Community College "Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility" Requirements for Teaching

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From yesterday's decision by Judge Kirk Sherriff (E.D. Cal.) in Johnson v. Fliger (for more on an earlier phase of the case, see here):

Plaintiff Daymon Johnson, a professor of history at Bakersfield College, brings this pre-enforcement challenge seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to preclude officials of Bakersfield College and the Kern Community College District ("KCCD") from enforcing, as to his intended speech, two provisions of the California Code of Regulations. These provisions would require Johnson to employ "teaching, learning, and professional" practices reflecting diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility ("DEIA") and anti-racist principles, require Johnson to "establish proficiency in DEIA-related performance to teach, work, or lead within California community colleges," and require defendants to evaluate Johnson based in part on his proficiency in such DEIA principles….

Johnson alleges that the DEIA regulations compel his speech and discriminate against his viewpoint in violation of the First Amendment. He alleges that he fears either being compelled to express a viewpoint with which he disagrees or being punished if he continues to refuse to express defendants' desired viewpoint or if he expresses his contrary views. Johnson has credibly identified specific speech that he reasonably fears would be proscribed by the DEIA regulations. And as the Ninth Circuit has found, he "has established a 'concrete plan to violate the law' based on his allegations regarding his desired speech and his refusal to express support for [DEIA] principles." Johnson v. Fliger (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

Johnson has established that his intended speech, which reflects his opposition to the DEIA regulations and to the state's DEIA policies, concerns a matter of public concern. To the extent the DEIA regulations proscribe and chill Johnson's intended speech in his teaching or scholarship as a professor, in his work with a "dissident faculty" group on campus that opposes the DEIA regulations, or in his capacity as a private citizen or public academic engaging in extracurricular speech, Johnson has a First Amendment interest in such intended speech. See Demers v. Austin (9th Cir. 2014); Reges v. Cauce (9th Cir. 2025). Defendants have failed to demonstrate "a legitimate administrative interest in suppressing the speech that outweigh[s] the plaintiff's First Amendment rights." …

Johnson has failed to establish a likelihood of success on his challenge to Bakersfield College's requirement that he complete mandatory DEIA training as a requirement to participate on faculty screening committees, as the government may express its views through such employee training, and Johnson fails to show that the training requires him to personally endorse the government's views as his own. Nor does Johnson establish that his official capacity speech as a member of Bakersfield College's Equal Opportunity & Diversity Advisory Committee ("EODAC") is protected speech, as it is government speech and he has not established that it is sufficiently connected to scholarship or teaching. See Sullivan v. Univ. of Washington (9th Cir. 2023) (rejecting argument that faculty members serving on state university's animal care and use committee were entitled to First Amendment protection, because they were "not thereby engaged in 'teaching and academic writing'"). Johnson also fails to establish a likelihood of success on his facial challenge to the DEIA regulations, as the DEIA regulations apply to a range of non-speech conduct and Johnson fails to show that they prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech relative to their plainly legitimate sweep….

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Free Speech

Reptiles v. Plants & Dogs: Reptiles Lose

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From the Report & Recommendation in New Moon Reptiles LLC v. Saekow d/b/a DD's Plants, issued by Magistrate Judge Ryon McCabe (S.D. Fla.) on January 22 and approved Tuesday by District Judge Aileen Cannon:

This is a defamation and tortious interference case arising from social media posts. Plaintiffs operate a Florida-based business engaged in the importation, exportation, and sale of reptiles. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant … published false social media posts claiming that Plaintiffs caused the death of certain reptiles by shipping them to a trade show in California under unsafe circumstances that caused their deaths….

Plaintiffs sent a cease-and-desist letter to Defendant in Nevada on October 20, 2025. Defendant responded on October 30, 2025, through counsel, by denying any wrongdoing and refusing to remove the social media posts at issue. By way of the pending motion, Plaintiffs seek entry of an ex parte temporary restraining order ("TRO") that would, among other things:

  1. prohibit Defendant from publishing or republishing statements concerning Plaintiffs, their owners, or their families,
  2. require Defendant to remove previously published social media posts,
  3. enjoin Defendant from encouraging or inciting third-party contact or harassment, and
  4. maintain these restraints through the pendency of the case.

As of the date of this Report and Recommendation, Defendant has not been served or appeared in the case….

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Free Speech

Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms That Pseudonymity Is Available to Parties Only in "Exceptional Case[s]," Under "Highly Limited Circumstances"

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Boe v. Garcia, decided Thursday by Eleventh Circuit Judges Robert Luck, Barbara Lagoa, and Andrew Brasher, upheld a district court's denial of pseudonymity in a case where plaintiff is alleging police misconduct. The court, reviewing the district court's denial of pseudonymity for abuse of discretion (the standard of review used by federal courts in such cases), reasoned:

Generally, pleading in federal court must name all the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). But, under certain, highly limited circumstances, we allow plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously. Indeed, we have held that "parties may use fictitious name[s] only in exceptional case[s]." "The ultimate test for permitting a plaintiff to proceed anonymously is whether the plaintiff has a substantial privacy right which outweighs the customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings."

To decide whether privacy trumps publicity, a court must first consider "whether the party seeking anonymity (1) is challenging government activity; (2) would be compelled, absent anonymity, to disclose information of utmost intimacy; or (3) would be compelled, absent anonymity, to admit an intent to engage in illegal conduct and thus risk criminal prosecution." A court must then "carefully review all the circumstances of a given case and then decide whether the customary practice of disclosing the plaintiff's identity should yield to the plaintiff's privacy concerns." "Other factors to consider include [4] whether the party seeking anonymity is a minor or [5] faces a real threat of physical harm absent anonymity" and whether anonymity "[6] poses a unique threat of fundamental unfairness to the defendant."

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From Prof. Jack Goldsmith (Harvard) on the Tariff Decision

"A massive defeat for the president and an extraordinary affirmation of the Supreme Court's power."

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An excerpt from his Executive Functions post today; note that his and Curtis Bradley's Foreign Affairs, Nondelegation, and the Major Questions Doctrine, 172 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 (2004) was heavily cited both by Justice Gorsuch's concurrence and Justice Kavanaugh's dissent:

A very significant aspect of the Chief Justice's [Major Questions Doctrne] analysis is that three conservative justices embraced it to rule against President Trump's signature policy. And they did so in the most difficult possible context, with an issue involving national security and foreign affairs.

This is a rebuttal to those who have claimed that the Court, or at least those three justices, invoke the doctrine opportunistically and politically to hurt Democratic presidents. And I think it signals more clearly than ever that, going forward, this Court is going to view broad delegations of statutory authority to a president to act, and/or extravagant presidential interpretations of authorizations to act, with skepticism. The three justices firmly committed here to the MQD can (if they wish) ensure that outcome in a case of just about any political configuration.

To the extent this is true, it is a hugely important complement to the Court's emerging broad view of the unitary executive. Put another way, it is a vindication of Sarah Isgur's view that the tradeoff on the Court for enhancing vertical unitary presidential control is "for the court to rein in Congress's bad habit of delegating vast and vague powers to the executive branch," including through MQD.

It also puts in a better light the Court's interim orders to date in Trump 2.0, a large number of which, due to the application strategy of the Solicitor General, involved issues of vertical control. The tariff opinion gives the lie to the notion that the Court is in the bag for the president and also makes its approach to issues of presidential power in Trump 2.0 both clearer and more nuanced….

[T]he Trump press conference [following the decision] was an amazing portrait of a president who claims to be unbound by law seethingly acquiescing in a court ruling on "an important case to me" that he abhorred with every fiber of his body. It is clear the administration will use every alternative legal tool at its disposal to replicate or go further in deploying international economic weapons. That is its legal prerogative. But still, Trump's anger combined with his acquiescence in the ruling elevated the Court and was a remarkable testament to its power….

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