Open Thread
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Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002
Auto-post somehow failed today, so I've manually posted this. Enjoy as usual!
First, the backstory from Courthouse News Service [Monique Merrill] about an earlier decision in the case denying the defendants' motion to dismiss:
A YouTuber must face claims that he groomed and assaulted two underage fans, a federal judge ruled on Wednesday.
James Jackson, known online by the name "Onision," and his spouse Lucas Jackson, known online as "Laineybot" or "Kai," did not convince a federal judge to dismiss claims brought by former fans who accused the couple of violating sex trafficking and minor abuse laws by enticing them across state lines and coercing them into commercial sex acts.
Regina Alonso and a plaintiff identified under the pseudonym Sarah sued the YouTubers in 2023, accusing the two of using their YouTube page to solicit explicit photos from them while they were underage and sexually assaulting Sarah while she was a minor.
Now, Friday's decision in Alonso v. Jackson by Judge John Chun (W.D. Wash.) about the sealing / pseudonymity questions:
Plaintiffs bring various claims against Defendants James and Lucas Jackson relating to alleged grooming and sex trafficking when Plaintiffs were minors.
Defendants move for an order … redacting and sealing "all past and future personal identifying information (PII)" appearing on the docket and accessible via PACER, including their home address, phone number, email addresses, last names, and household details" … [and] permitting them to proceed pseudonymously by using only their first names ….
So Judge Joshua Wolson (E.D. Pa.) held yesterday in Nellom v. Shapiro, unsurprisingly. An excerpt, from the Factual Allegations section:
From Heilrayne v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, decided Jan. 27 by Judge David Ezra (W.D. Tex.) but just recently posted on Westlaw:
On April 23, 2024, the PSC [Palestine Solidarity Committee] at UT posted a notice on their Instagram account describing a protest for the following day. The notice advertised a walk-out of class, a meeting at Greg Plaza, and a "march to occupy the lawn." The post stated: "In the footsteps of our comrades at Columbia SJP, Rutgers-New Brunswick, Yale, and countless others across the nation, we will be establishing THE POPULAR UNIVERSITY FOR GAZA and demanding our administration divest from death." On April 24, the PSC posted again with a proposed schedule of events, including a walk-out of class, a guest speaker, two teach-ins, an art workshop, and study and food breaks, with the final event scheduled for 7:00 p.m.
In response, UT preemptively cancelled the event by sending notices to PSC student representatives, with one such notice dated April 23, 2024, and four others dated April 24, 2024. In those notices, UT states its reasons for cancellation as follows:
The Palestine Solidarity Committee student organization's event "Popular University for Gaza," which is planned for tomorrow, has declared intent to violate our policies and rules, and disrupt our campus operations. Such disruptions are never allowed and are especially damaging while our students prepare for the end of the semester and final exams. For these reasons, this event may not proceed as planned.
However, Plaintiffs allege such notice was not communicated to the broader student body or public until the protest was underway, at which time UT released its Event Cancellation Notice, dated April 23, 2024, to the press….
Plaintiffs were arrested and also subject to probation or deferred suspension as university discipline. They sued, claiming this violated the First and Fourth Amendments. The court concluded that plaintiffs had adequately alleged that the April 24 protest was canceled based on its viewpoint:
SUNY Fredonia philosophy professor had been barred from campus over podcast questioning illegality and immorality of adult-child sexual contact; a federal court has just allowed his First Amendment claim to go forward.
From Kershnar v. Kolison, decided Friday by Judge Lawrence Vilardo (W.D.N.Y.):
Among the many topics he studies, [SUNY Fredonia philosophy professor Stephen] Kershnar is especially interested in the "moral and legal issues implicated by sexual conduct [between] adolescents and children." His scholarship questions "whether, as a moral matter, adult-child sex is always wrong, and why we should criminalize it" even though he believes that "as a legal matter, [it] should always be criminalized." "Kershnar argues that it is important that the arguments favoring criminalization of [adult-child sex] be scrutinized so that they are defensible, [because] 'if incorrect reasons are given recognition in support of morally legitimate laws,' like those against [adult-child sex], 'then th[o]se reasons may … be used to support morally illegitimate' laws."
Kershnar elaborated on these views during two podcast appearances. In December 2020, he appeared on an episode of Unregistered—a podcast hosted by an Occidental College professor—to discuss "the traditional philosophical justifications of age[-]of[-]consent laws in the United States." During that episode, he said that "it[ i]s not obvious to [him] why" adult-child sex is always "unlawful because … humans are designed by evolution to begin reproduction below the age of 18."
A little more than a year later, on January 30, 2022, Kershnar appeared on Brain in a Vat, a podcast described as "thought experiments and conversations with philosophers." During that appearance, Kershnar said:
Imagine that an adult male wants to have sex with a 12-year-old girl. Imagine that she's a willing participant. A very standard, very widely held view is that there's something deeply wrong about this, and it's wrong independent of being criminalized. It's not obvious to me that it is in fact wrong.
Similarly, in response to a question about "whether… [,] in an attempt to find a threshold of consent," a one-year-old could ever consent to sexual activity with an adult, Kershnar said:
3/9/1937: President Roosevelt delivers a fireside chat on his Court-packing plan.
From Upsolve, Inc. v. James, decided Friday by Judge Lewis Kaplan (S.D.N.Y.) (for the earlier decision reaching the opposite result, see this post):
The nonprofit Upsolve, Inc., wishes to train non-lawyers like the Rev. John Udo-Okon to provide free legal advice to consumers facing debt-collection lawsuits. But that conduct would violate New York's prohibition on the practice of law by anyone other than a licensed attorney. The question in this case is whether Upsolve and the Rev. Udo-Okon have a First Amendment right to engage in their proposed course of conduct notwithstanding the state's licensing law. For the reasons that follow, they do not….
In earlier proceedings, Judge Paul A. Crotty granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. In finding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their free-speech claim, Judge Crotty held that the UPL Rules were a content-based regulation of speech that likely could not survive strict scrutiny….
In September 2025, the Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. The court agreed with Judge Crotty that, as applied to "convey[ing] … legal advice to a client," the UPL Rules regulate speech. But it held that the UPL Rules are content neutral and therefore subject to only intermediate scrutiny. The court remanded for reconsideration of plaintiffs' entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief under that lower standard….
3/8/1841: Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's birthday.

What’s on your mind?
From Magistrate Judge Robert Numbers (E.D.N.C.) Monday in Fivehouse v. U.S. Dep't of Defense; the government's lawyer has been a member of the bar for almost 30 years, and has worked in the U.S. Attorney's office since 2009 (according to an article in Bloomberg Law by Ben Penn):
The conduct at issue includes:
1. The inclusion of fabricated quotations and misstatements of case holdings in Defendants' response to Fivehouse's motion to supplement the administrative record (D.E. 86), including citations to Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009), Dow AgroSciences, LLC v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 637 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2011), and Sierra Club v. United States Department of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2018).
2. The inclusion of a fabricated quotation in Defendants' response opposing Fivehouse's motion concerning compliance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 16 (D.E. 79), citing South Carolina Health & Human Services Finance Commission v. Sullivan, 915 F.2d 129, 130 (4th Cir. 1990).
3. The inclusion of a fabricated quotation in Defendants' response opposing Fivehouse's motion asking the court to take judicial notice of certain matters (D.E. 80), citing South Carolina Health & Human Services Finance Commission v. Sullivan, 915 F.2d 129, 130 (4th Cir. 1990).
3/7/1965: Civil rights marchers are attacked by the police in Selma, Alabama. The event would become known as "Bloody Sunday."
What’s on your mind?
The nonexistent cases were first introduced by opposing counsel, but the appellant's lawyer didn't spot the error at the trial court, and submitted a proposed order to the trial court that cited those cases. That, the appeals court held, meant that appellant forfeited the right to challenge the decision.
In Torres Campos v. Munoz, decided Thursday by the California Court of Appeal (Justice Martin Buchanan, joined by Justices Joan Irion and Truc Do), an ex-husband (Torres) had asked for shared custody and visitation rights to the family dog (Kyra, for the curious). The ex-wife (Munoz) was represented for free by her cousin (Bonar).
Bonar began by writing a letter declining Torres's request, citing two cases that ultimately proved to be nonexistent. When Torres went to court, Bonar filed an opposition with an attached declaration by Munoz, which cited one of the fictional cases. Torres's lawyer filed a reply declaration saying nothing about the case being fictional.
"The parties stipulated to have a court commissioner act as a temporary judge to hear the matter." That commissioner "made no visitation orders and directed Torres's counsel to submit a formal order after hearing"; that formal order was apparently supposed to be based on what went on at the hearing. (Requiring parties to submit such proposed orders summarizing the court's decision is pretty common in some trial court proceedings.) Then,
Torres's counsel submitted a proposed Findings and Order After Hearing, which the court approved as conforming to its oral ruling. The order cited the fictional Twigg and Teegarden cases as follows:
"The Court notes the follow[ing] cases: Marriage of Twigg (1984) 34 Cal.3d 926 and Marriage of Teegarden (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1572 [(Teegarden)], in which the Court has to take the well-being and stability of the parties involved when deciding pet visitation and custody. Based on the testimony of Ms. Munoz and her mental state as it relates to the parties['] relationship, the Court finds it is not in the best interests of the parties['] mental stability for them to continue to interact with each other, and thus denies pet Custody.
"The Court further finds there is not a substantial relationship between Petitioner and the dog, Kyra, based on the lack of visitation in the past year."
Torres appealed, and in a motion before the briefs were filed, Bonar again cited the nonexistent cases. Only after that did Torres's lawyer "point[] out for the first time that the Twigg and Teegarden authorities cited in the court's order and in Munoz's opposition to the first motion to reinstate the appeal did not exist and were 'invented case law.'"
A Federalist Society forum on the first big case of OT 2026.
Earlier today I participated in a Federalist Society Forum on the major climate change case on the docket for OT 2026: Suncor Energy v. Boulder County, a case I previewed here.
Joining me in the discussion were West Virginia Solicitor General Michael Williams and O.H. Skinner of the Alliance for Consumers. Annie Donaldson Talley of Luther Strange & Associates moderated. Video below.
For those interested, here are my prior posts on this subject:
Lies, damned lies, and statutes of limitations.
Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.
Friends, we invite you to a stellar little event we're hosting on "The Other Declarations of 1776." As part of the nationwide celebration of 250 Years of America, we're partnering with the Liberty & Law Center at Scalia Law School for an examination of the various declarations of rights that the new states adopted in 1776. It's Friday, April 10 in Arlington, Va. Register here! And, if you want to learn more about The Other Declarations in the meantime, check out the latest blog post in our series, this week focusing on Maryland.
New on the Short Circuit podcast: A judicially engaged judge grants habeas when faced with a masked Fourth Amendment.
The en banc court pushes pause--for now
For the past year or so, those of us who follow the Religion Clauses have been waiting to see what courts would do with Louisiana's Ten Commandments law in Roake v. Brumley. Now we have an answer—though not a final one. A couple of weeks ago, sitting en banc, the Fifth Circuit vacated an earlier panel decision and dismissed the case on ripeness grounds. It's a technical ruling (though sticklers may dispute that ripeness is merely "technical"), but it's also revealing, because it shows that whether schools may display the Decalogue will depend on how the practice actually operates in context.
Here's the background. In 2024, Louisiana enacted a statute requiring every public school classroom to display the Ten Commandments. The law specifies the text to be used and requires a statement describing the Commandments' historical role in American education, but it leaves the details largely to local school authorities.
Parents filed a pre-enforcement challenge in federal court. They argued the displays would violate the Establishment Clause under Stone v. Graham, the Supreme Court's 1980 decision striking down a similar Kentucky requirement. The district court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction, and a Fifth Circuit panel affirmed. The panel reasoned that lower courts remain bound by Stone unless and until the Supreme Court overrules it.
In its ruling, the en banc Fifth Circuit declined to reach the constitutional question. Because no school district had yet implemented the law—no posters are on classroom walls yet—the court held that the dispute was premature. In effect, the court said, we need to see how this actually works in practice before we can decide whether the displays violate the Establishment Clause.
This ruling sidesteps a deeper doctrinal question. The Stone Court relied heavily on the Lemon framework, particularly the idea that government may not act with the purpose of promoting religion. The Stone Court also emphasized the special features of the public-school setting: students are a captive audience and especially susceptible to state-sponsored religious influence.
But the Court's more recent Establishment Clause cases have moved in a different direction. In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022), a school prayer case, the Court rejected the Lemon framework and instructed courts instead to look to the nation's "history and tradition," though the Kennedy Court also emphasized coercion—whether students are pressured to participate in religious exercise—as a central constitutional concern.
The difficulty is this: the Supreme Court has not overruled Stone, but it has abandoned the doctrinal foundation on which Stone rests. Lower courts are left reading the tea leaves. The Fifth Circuit panel resolved the tension one way—follow Stone until the Supreme Court says otherwise. The en banc court found a different solution. It avoided the merits altogether and ruled the case unripe until concrete facts exist.
That ripeness holding is technical (there's that word again), but I think it's analytically significant. It suggests that context will matter a great deal under the Court's newer approach. Details such as the age of the students, the way the display is presented, and whether it is integrated into instruction will all shape the constitutional analysis.
Sooner or later, a school district will implement the Louisiana statute. When it does, litigation will resume—this time with an actual record. Courts will then have to confront the central question directly: Is Stone still good law after Kennedy?
I discuss the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in more detail in a short Legal Spirits podcast episode, which you can listen to here.
3/6/1857: Dred Scott v. Sandford decided.
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