The Volokh Conspiracy

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The Volokh Conspiracy

Transgender Subpoena Leads To Transdistrict Struggle

A District Court in Rhode Island attempts to quash a subpoena issued by a District Court in Texas.

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The Food and Drug Administration opened an investigation of medical facilities that prescribe "off label" drugs to minors with gender dysphoria. The FDA has not determined if the use of these drugs for these purposes is safe or effective to treat gender dysphoria. The investigation began before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. In July 2025, the Assistant Attorney General issued a HIPAA subpoena on Rhode Island Hospital (which includes Brown University Health) to determine if patients received misbranded drugs. The hospital, however, refused to comply with the subpoena.

On April 30, 2026, DOJ filed a petition to enforce the subpoena with the District Court in NDTX. That same day, Chief Judge O'Connor granted the government's petition. He ordered Rhode Island Hospital to provide all records within fourteen days.

On May 6, Rhode Island Hospital filed a notice of appeal to the Fifth Circuit, and the next day filed an emergency motion to stay. Among other arguments, Rhode Island argued that venue was not proper in NDTX. The government countered that venue was proper because there is an active investigation being carried out in NDTX. On May 10, Judge O'Connor denied the motion for an emergency stay. He found that venue was proper:

Second, RIH argues that this Court is not the proper venue to adjudicate the Government's petition.7 Title 18 U.S.C. § 3486(c) permits enforcement of an administrative subpoena in "any court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which the investigation is carried on or of which the subpoenaed person is an inhabitant, or in which he carries on business or may be found." According to the Declaration from the Acting Director of the Enforcement and Affirmative Litigation Branch there is substantial operational and decision-making control of the investigation being exercised at the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Northern District of Texas, along with several subjects and potential targets of the investigation located therein.8 The record therefore reflects that the investigation is being carried on in the Northern District of Texas and the Government's enforcement petition was properly brought in this Court. Accordingly, RIH has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits as to its venue challenge.

FN8: 8 See generally Hsiao Declaration (Sealed) Ex. 1, ECF No. 10-1. The Government has presented the Court with ex parte information that supports its choice to enforce the subpoena in this Court and due to the sensitive nature of that information, it was provided ex parte. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 419 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding no abuse of discretion where the district court relied on the government's ex parte submission in reaching its decision).

That was the litigation in Texas. But there was a parallel track on the other side of the country. On May 4, even before Rhode Island Hospital filed an emergency motion before Judge O'Connor, the Child Advocate for the State of Rhode Island (a non-profit) filed an emergency motion in the District of Rhode Island to quash the subpoena. On May 7, the United States filed a motion to stay or transfer venue. The court immediately denied that motion with a text order. On May 11, the District Court granted Rhode Island Hospital's motion to intervene. The group then filed an emergency motion to quash the subpoena. Judge McElroy ordered the United States to submit the sealed Hsiao declaration.

Back in Texas, on May 11, the United States informed Judge O'Connor that the government intended to comply and provide the sealed Hsiao Declaration. On May 12, Judge O'Connor ordered that the government could not release the sealed information to the parties:

However, the Government now seeks to disclose sensitive information to a party here—but in a seemingly parallel litigation—without having shown why the sealed or protected matters should be provided to it nor how that information would be protected. In fact, the Government's representation that it does not know what protections the information related to the grand jury proceedings or sealed information in the matter pending here will receive in the Rhode Island court cuts against disclosing it. In light of grand jury proceedings' dependency on heightened secrecy, the basis for sealing declarations, and the Government's failure to show that the information that it requests leave to disclose would be protected, the Court would be derelict in its obligation to hew strictly to Rule 6(e)'s exception, and undermine the reasons given for sealing, by granting the Motion as requested. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Government is prohibited from revealing any further sealed information or information concerning the grand jury investigation until it can show that "a particularized need" exists for the materials that outweighs the basis for and policy of secrecy. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959)). The Government shall immediately distribute this Order to all members within or connected to this investigation, notifying them of the prohibitions set out herein and their obligation to comply with them. The Government may distribute a copy of this Order to the Rhode Island court.

But Judge O'Connor allowed the government to share the declaration with Judge McElroy in chambers.

The Court granted the Government's previous motion to disclose information related to the grand jury's existence because the Government specified that such information would be confined to in camera review by the Rhode Island court. That disclosure permitted the Government to disclose to the Rhode Island court that there is a legitimate investigation pending in this district, and responsive documents are due. Indeed, the Court has concluded as such, granted the Government's motion to enforce an administrative subpoena, and is superintending this matter.2 Were Rhode Island Hospital entitled to further sealed or secret information it may always move this Court for such access upon a proper showing.

On May 13, Judge McElroy issued a 24-page opinion granted the motion to quash the subpoena from NDTX and enjoined DOJ from seeking or receiving any documents pursuant to the subpoena. Judge McElroy was apparently shown the materials, but was not persuaded. She did not reference the sealed declaration. Judge McElroy acknowledged her order was completely unprecedented:

The Court is unaware of any similar case where a party has petitioned a court to quash an administrative subpoena that another court ordered enforced without prior notice or opportunity to be heard.

But she did it anyway. Indeed, Judge McElrod took a shot at Judge O'Connor:

The United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") possesses immense prosecutorial authority and discretion. As citizens, we trust that federal prosecutors, when wielding this awesome power against a state, a company, or certainly against vulnerable children, will play fair and be honest with its counterparts and the judiciary. DOJ has proven unworthy of this trust at every point in this case. It has misrepresented and withheld information to both this Court and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Texas court"). It did so in an obvious effort to shield it's recent investigative tactics—previously rejected by every other court to review them—from this Court's review, in favor of a distant forum that DOJ deems friendly to its political positions.1

FN1: 1 The presiding judge in the Texas court has branded "the Department of Justice, the world's largest law firm" a "frequent forum shopper." Opening Remarks from Judge Reed O'Connor [2024 TX Chapters Conference], The Federalist Society (Oct. 22, 2024), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HMTt9pxWBhA [https://perma.cc/GR7A-H6N8]. It is clear that the DOJ has done so here.

I attended Judge O'Connor's speech in 2024. The purpose of his remarks was to show that all litigants engage in forum shopping, including the Biden DOJ. This snippet takes Judge O'Connor's comments out of context. Here are the full remarks:

Just this year, in response to political pressure that named specific judges, the Judicial Conference took aim at single-judge divisions, especially those in Texas. Appearing to cave to criticism from commentators and political officials, this Judicial Conference proposal rejects the idea that there are no partisan judges—only judges doing their level best to faithfully apply the law to reach the correct decision.

Notably, the proposal did not target longstanding forum-shopping—or as Judge Jim Ho put it, forum-selling—in bankruptcy courts or patent venues. Such cases impact our economy in the billions of dollars and were recently highlighted only due to an embarrassing scandal. Yet the practice in these areas remain untouched by reform efforts given the absence of comparable political pressure from commentators and political officials.

Instead, the proposal focused entirely on remedies the Department of Justice, the world's largest law firm and regular forum shopper, complained of—that is, injunctions and vacaturs. The reason for this was clear: the Judicial Conference was responding to external political criticism.

It takes some cheek for a District Judge in Rhode Island to accuse others of engaging in forum shopping. I've lost count of the number of anti-Trump actions filed in Boston, Rhode Island, and other places, that have no actual connection to New England, other than the fact that the First Circuit is a very friendly venue. Did Judge McElroy blink twice about why a case called California v. Department of Education was filed in Boston? Or when Judge Boasberg ordered a plane taking off from Texas to turn around? For whatever it is worth, it is far more likely for a nexus to be found in the Northern District of Texas than in Rhode Island. You could fit the entire state of Rhode Island in the DFW Metroplex, and you could fit the city of Providence inside the bounds of the DFW airport.

On May 14, today, Judge O'Connor unsealed his March 12 order, which indicated the materials could be shared with Judge McElroy.

So here we are. A District Court judge in Texas ordered that a subpoena must be complied with. A District Judge in Rhode Island quashed that subpoena. We now have a conflict that cuts to the heart of federal power. Perhaps not since the Dorr Rebellion, which gave rise to Luther v. Borden, has a Rhode Islander thrown such a wrench into our federal system of government. During the first Trump administration, I wrote about the prospect of dueling nationwide injunctions. Now, we have dueling transdistrict fights over transgender subpoenas.

Appeals will be mounted to the Fifth and First Circuits at the same time. I know a bit about this sort of conflict. For some time, I've been involved with litigation concerning Defense Distributed. Since 2018, we have been stuck in a quagmire: the District Court in Austin transferred the case to New Jersey, the Fifth Circuit asked the New Jersey court to return the case, the New Jersey court said no, and the en banc Third Circuit declined to interfere. (Stay tuned on what comes next in this case.)

I suspect the Supreme Court will have to settle this subpoena fight at some point.

Update: I updated the passages concerning the unsealing of materials.

The Antipreemption Court

Another decision where the conservatives line up against federal preemption.

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The Roberts Court is often derided as a pro-corporation Court. I've lost count of how many stories measure the Chamber of Commerce's success rate before the Supreme Court. The reality, however, is different. The Court often leans in a jurisprudential directions that corporations do not like. One leading example is preemption. As a general rule, corporate defendants favor broad preemption to avoid liability from state suits, while plaintiffs favor narrow preemption so they can bring state tort suits. But on the Supreme Court, things do not line up so neatly. Justice Thomas, a federalist, has long been a skeptic of broad preemption. I think Justice Gorsuch is in the same camp. Justice Kavanaugh, and to a lesser extent, Justice Alito, are the strongest votes to find broad preemption. That leaves (as usual) Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Barrett as the decision-makers. Unlike in most cases that are important to conservatives, there is not an automatic conservative majority to find preemption, and indeed, it may be hard to count to five.

I think we have something of an Antipreemption Court.

Consider three preemption cases argued this term.

First, Hencely v. Fluor Corp reversed the Fourth Circuit, and found that federal law did not preempt the state-law tort claim.  Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Alito dissented, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Kavanaugh. As I noted at the time, these votes lined up with how the justices view preemption more generally.

Second, today the Court decided Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC. Here, the Court unanimously found that federal law did not preempt a state-law tort claim against transportation brokers. Justice Barrett wrote a delightful majority opinion. In only a few pages, she briskly walked through all the statutory arguments. She was confronted with an anomaly raised by the government, and responded: "The text of subsection (c)(2)(A) controls. Better to live with the mystery than to rewrite the statute." Amen.

Justice Kavanaugh wrote a concurrence joined by Justice Alito, finding that the preemption analysis is harder than the majority suggests. Ultimately Kavanaugh writes that Congress and the President can fix any problems.

The brokers and their amici raise serious concerns about the repercussions of state tort liability against brokers, and they may of course (among other possibilities) ask Congress and the President to change federal law.

That worked for Lilly Ledbetter! Still, the case was unanimous. Paul Clement, who argued Montgomery, usually does not lose 9-0. But the GOAT didn't get a single vote here.  [Update: Clement represented the Petitioner, and not the Respondent in this case. I got it completely backwards. He won 9-0. My apologies to the GOAT.]

The third preemption case, Monsanto Company v. Durnell, was also argued by Paul Clement. And if Hencely and Montgomery are any indication, I think Clement may lose this one. It won't be unanimous, but it may be 5-4 or even 6-3 for the plaintiffs. I wrote about Monsanto here and here. The Justices, even the conservative ones, are not going to engage in any creative reading of statutes to preempt federal law--even if the consequences are catastrophic. The answer will be, as Justice Kavanaugh suggested, for Congress to address the situation.

Islamic Law

North Dakota Court Refuses to Recognize Foreign Islamic Divorce

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From a decision last year in Ali v. Osman, from Judge Stephanie Hayden (N.D. Cass County Dist. Ct.); I just learned about it because it's on appeal to the N.D. Supreme Court:

Sara and Mojahid were married on February 5, 2001 in Sudan.

Under Islamic law, a husband has the right to initiate a divorce ("talaq") against his wife. All that is required to achieve talaq is for a husband to pronounce his intent to divorce his wife on three separate occasions, either verbally or in writing. The husband does not need to communicate his three pronouncements to his wife. She need not be present for them or even aware of them. A wife cannot object to a talaq.

Unbeknownst to Sara, Mojahid pronounced talaq three times prior to December 11, 2022. On or about December 11, 2022, Mojahid obtained a Certificate of Divorce from Sara in Sudan (the "Divorce Certificate") based on his pronouncement of talaq. When he obtained the Divorce Certificate, neither Mojahid nor Sara lived in Sudan. They lived in the United Arab Emirates ("UAE") at the time, which had been their residence since 2015. Additionally, Sara was not present when Mojahid obtained the Divorce Certificate. Mojahid emailed Sara the Divorce Certificate on December 19, 2022.

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Free Speech

Large Libel Models Strike Again? Google AI Allegedly Hallucinates Sex Crime Allegations Against Utah Man

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From a Complaint in Murray v. Alphabet, Inc., just removed yesterday to federal court, one of the sets of screenshots that the plaintiff says were hallucinated by Google's AI Overview:

As usual for such libel-by-AI lawsuits, the claim isn't "Garbage In, Garbage Out," in the sense that Google is creating a summary from inaccurate online allegations and is thus parroting the inaccuracies. Rather, plaintiff claims that the allegations appear only in the AI Overview, and that the AI algorithm composed the allegations itself.

The Complaint also alleges that,

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Free Speech

Starting Statement with "LOL" Doesn't Keep The Assertion in It From Being Potentially Libelous

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From yesterday's decision by Judge Dana Sabraw (S.D. Cal.) in Button v. Lopresti:

The Court accepts the Amended Complaint's allegations as true for purposes of resolving the motion to dismiss. Dusty Button was a world-renowned and well-known ballet dancer. She accumulated nearly half a million followers and subscribers on Instagram until December 2021, when she deleted her social media account due to "severe cyber bullying and harassment." Mitchell Button was a part of "Button Built," a team and brand for automotive design, builds, and work in the automotive industry. Mitchell Button also had nearly half a million followers and subscribers on his Instagram account, @button_built. He too deleted this social media account in 2021 because of "severe cyber bullying and harassment." …

In July 2021, Plaintiffs were sued in the United States District Court of Nevada for $131,000,000 ("Nevada Lawsuit"). The Nevada Lawsuit was publicized in thousands of articles, televised on news and media outlets such as Good Morning America, and published on social media pages and channels. [The lawsuit involved allegations of sexual assault. -EV] The coverage of the Nevada Lawsuit states Plaintiffs were sued in a civil action. Plaintiffs were never arrested, charged with any crime, or jailed in connection with the allegations contained in the Nevada Lawsuit. On January 6, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment in the Nevada Lawsuit. Plaintiffs posted a redacted version of the motion for summary judgment to their Instagram page, @WeTheButtons, which is "dedicated to providing accurate information about the [Nevada Lawsuit]." Defendant followed this Instagram page….

A third-party Instagram page, @trail.huntr, posted to Instagram a photo of Mitchell Button's automotive work. On January 27, 2025, Defendant posted a comment on this post, stating the Buttons were "locked up for some f*cked up stuff" and it was a "shame they weren't good people." The post by @trail.huntr was "shared" at least three hundred and twenty two times, and Defendant's comments were published to hundreds of thousands of people.

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The Harlan Institute Championship Round At The National Archives

High school students presented arguments about whether to declare independence in the presence of the Declaration of Independence.

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The Harlan Institute has completed the Fourteenth Annual Virtual Supreme Court Competition. This year, in honor of America's 250th Anniversary, the competition presented the case of Patriots v. Loyalists. This competition offered teams of two high school students the opportunity to research American history, write persuasive appellate briefs, argue against other students through video chats, and try to persuade a panel of esteemed attorneys during oral argument that the Declaration should be signed.

On April 7, we held the Final Four round at the Georgetown Supreme Court Institute. Presiding were Judge Kyle Duncan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and Judge Gregory Maggs of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. In the first match, the Petitioners were represented by Team #24358 from Creekview High School in Texas (Lauren Hohltand Tzur Shalit). Their coach was Jonathan Cartray. The Respondents were represented by Team # 24627 from Regis High School in New York (Cullen Brennan and Nicholas Kim). Their coach was Eric DiMichele.

In the second match, the Petitioners were represented by Team #24346 from Greenwich High School in Connecticut (Kaitlyn Qin and Diana Davidson). Their coach was Aaron Hull. The Respondents were represented by Team #24266 from the Baldwin School in Pennsylvania (Eileen Wang and Sarah Tarka). Their coach was Athan Biss.

After two excellent, closely-matched rounds, Team #24358 from Texas and Team #24346 from Connecticut advanced.

After the Final Four round, we walked over the Supreme Court for lunch, a tour, and a lecture. It is always a treat to bring students to the Supreme Court for the first time.

In the evening, we held the Championship Round at the National Archives. On permanent display in the Rotunda are the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. It was so special for students to debate the foundational question of independence in the presence of the Declaration. This may have been the first time since 1776 where the pro-Loyalist argument was presented before the Declaration.

Presiding were Judge Duane Benton (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit), Judge Neomi Rao (U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit), Justice Evan Young (Supreme Court of Texas), and Judge Charles Eskridge (U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas). Both teams presented compelling arguments for and against independence. In the the end, the judges selected the Patriots, Lauren Hohltand Tzur Shalit, as the Champions. Diana Davidson was selected as best oralist.

This was a magical evening and a fitting tribute to 250 years of independence. My sincere thanks two Elizabeth Steeves (Yale) and Shemaiah DeJorge (Georgetown) for helping to coordinate this competition.

I have included photos and videos below the jump.

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Free Speech

Injunction Against Referring to Ex-Wife and Children in Online Media Violates First Amendment

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An excerpt from a long Washington Court of Appeals decision approved yesterday for publication, Asbach v. Couto (Judge Bradley Maxa, joined by Chief Judge Bernard Veljacic and Judge Erik Price):

Couto and Karina divorced in 2012. Since then, Couto has had multiple DVPOs [Domestic Violence Protection Orders] issued against him regarding Karina, [his now-adult son] Aiden, and [his minor daughter] NC. Testimony in these cases and previous DVPO proceedings show that Couto frequently screamed at his family, threw things, waved a knife around, and engaged in other coercive, aggressive, and emotionally manipulative behaviors. Aiden's DVPO expired when he became an adult in 2023.

In 2024, Couto published a YouTube video in which he attempted to reach out to Aiden now that he was an adult. In the video, he stated that Karina had a narcissistic personality disorder and lies. Couto characterized this video as an attempt at reconciliation with Aiden.

Karina filed petitions for another DVPO for herself and to renew the DVPO for NC. Aiden also filed a petition for a DVPO based on the YouTube video and an allegation that Couto had intentionally shown up to Aiden's workplace and at a grocery store where NC was.

The trial court granted the DVPOs for Karina and Aiden. The court also renewed the DVPO for NC for one year, to which Couto had stipulated. The court found that Couto's YouTube video was a form of coercive control. The court's DVPOs required Couto to remove any YouTube video regarding Karina, Aiden or NC [the removal order wasn't challenged -EV], and prohibited him from posting or sharing any videos or other media with references to them.

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Free Speech

No First Amendment Violation in Ohio Closing DEI-Related Offices and Committees

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From Rice v. Schell, decided two weeks ago by Judge Matthew McFarland (S.D. Ohio), but just posted on Westlaw a few days ago:

Plaintiff Darryl Rice serves as a tenured and endowed associate professor of management for the Farmer School of Business at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio. For over a decade, Plaintiff has taught courses such as Diversity and Cross-Cultural Management, participated in Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion ("DEI") programming, and contributed to entities like DEI-based committees at Miami University. In April 2025, Miami University began to wind down certain programs and entities related to DEI. Specifically, the following entities were eventually discontinued: (1) the Office of Transformational and Inclusive Excellence, (2) the Farmer School of Business DEI Service Committee, (3) the Center for Student Diversity and Inclusion, (4) Miami Regional's Center for DEI, (5) the Department of Management DEI Service Committee, (6) Miami University's Across-the-Divide Conference, (7) the Office of Transformational and Inclusive Excellence Newsletter, (8) the Inclusive Excellence Faculty Fellows Program, (9) the DEI Mastermind Program, (10) the Diversity and Inclusion Networking Event, (11) DEI Professional Development Day, as well as other activities that Plaintiff had used to fulfill his service obligations. For purposes of Miami University's Tenure Track Guidelines, "service" obligations include "activities which contribute to the University's and/or the campus's mission," serving on committees, and providing continuing education programs if they are not already incorporated within the "teaching" category.

Miami University explained to Plaintiff that these closures were mandated by the Advance Ohio Higher Education Act ("S.B. 1"). That being said, Miami University began the process of closures and reorganization before S.B. 1 officially took effect. The Court pauses here to highlight particularly relevant portions of S.B. 1. This legislation commands that "the board of trustees of each state institution of higher education shall adopt and the institution shall enforce a policy" prohibiting, among other things, the following:

(1) Any orientation or training course regarding diversity, equity, and inclusion [unless an exception applies];

(2) The continuation of existing diversity, equity, and inclusion offices or departments; and

(3) Establishing new diversity, equity, and inclusion offices or departments….

Moreover, the statute reads: "Nothing in this section prohibits faculty or students from classroom instruction, discussion, or debate, so long as faculty members allow students to express intellectual diversity." …

Plaintiff sued, claiming that the law violated, among other things, the First Amendment, but the court disagreed:

It … proves helpful to contextualize this matter by emphasizing what is at issue and—perhaps just as importantly—what is not at issue. This is not a case involving allegations that the Government is compelling particular speech. This is not a case in which a university itself brings suit to enjoin a law. This is not a case in which students allege constitutional violations. This is not a case in which a plaintiff has been threatened with disciplinary action for certain speech. This is not a case involving allegations of a professor's speech being stymied in the classroom or on the campus green. Rather, this dispute centers around a professor who brings suit to enjoin a university to reestablish certain committees, programming, and events….

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Supreme Court

A Modest Uptick in Supreme Court Popularity

A recent YouGov poll shows the Court is likely less unpopular than before. The tariff ruling may have given it a boost. The poll has several other notable findings, as well.

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The U.S. Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court (Photo 81937138 © Steven Frame | Dreamstime.com)

 

A recent YouGov poll, conducted in early May, finds that 38% of Americans approve of the job the Supreme Court is doing, while 45% disapprove. That -7 net disapproval may not seem very impressive. But it's way better than the other two branches of government. In recent surveys, an average of 58% disapprove of Donald Trump, compared to 38% who disapprove.  Congress' approval rating is much lower, still.

The Court's current numbers are also a modest improvement from polls conducted in mid to late 2025. At that time, an Economist/YouGov poll found a net -16 disapproval (51-35), Gallup found a -10 (52-42), and Quinnipiac a -13 (53-40). In fairness, a June 2025 YouGov poll found almost identical results to their most recent one (45% disapprove, 40% approve). But that appears to have been an outlier at the time.

To the extent that the Court has become less unpopular, it may be in part because of the recent decision in the tariff case (which I helped litigate). The May YouGov poll found 58% approving of the result, while only 25% disapprove. An earlier YouGov poll, conducted right after the ruling, found 60% approve and 23% disapprove. Thus, I may have helped make the Supreme Court a little more popular (or, rather, less unpopular). I'm sure I will get invited to all the cool SCOTUS holiday parties this year (OK, almost certainly not….).

Before going further, I should emphasize that public opinion is a poor barometer of the quality of the Court's decisions. Survey data shows most Americans know very little about the Constitution and the Court's work, and a majority cannot even name one Supreme Court justice. Similarly, I do not claim that broad public support for the tariff decision proves that the justices go it right (though I do in fact believe they got it right, for other reasons). Ideally, the justices should not be guided by public opinion. Insulating them from it is one of the reasons why they have life tenure.

But, as I have noted in the past, public opinion about the Court does matter in some ways. A highly unpopular Court is more vulnerable to measures to curb or even destroy its authority, such as court-packing. And the Court can more easily strike down major policy initiatives of the president and other political leaders if it knows doing so will enjoy substantial public support. If the Court becomes sufficiently unpopular, politicians could potentially defy its rulings with little fear of political consequences. Thus, while it is unlikely the Court decided the tariff case as it did merely because the tariffs are unpopular, that unpopularity may have made it easier for the justices to strike down one of Donald Trump's signature policy initiatives.

For these and other reasons, the Court's degree of public approval can matter. That's true even though the public's assessment of the Court's work says little about whether the justices are actually doing a good job or not. Indeed, if the Court were to become immensely popular, I would worry they weren't doing enough to protect the rights of unpopular minorities.

In addition to the Court's overall approval rating and the question about tariffs, the YouGov survey has several other interesting results. They also did approval ratings for all the individual justices:

Interestingly, the three liberal justices seem to have the highest approval ratings. All three  have net positive ratings, while all six conservatives are net negative. But I would not give too much credence to these numbers. As noted above, most Americans cannot even name a Supreme Court justice, and many of those giving opinions in the YouGov survey probably know little or nothing about the justices in question. Even as it stands, for each of the justices 33% or more said they had no opinion, except Clarence Thomas (about whom only 27% had no opinion).

In addition to the tariff case, YouGov also asked respondents whether the Court should overturn Obergefell v. Hodges (the 2015 ruling striking down state laws banning same-sex marriage); 51% of respondents said "no" and only 24% said "yes." They similarly asked about the birthright citizenship case currently before the Court, on which issue 53% said the Court could ruled that "[a]ll children born in the U.S. should automatically become
citizens," while  39% wanted it to rule that "[o]nly those children born in the U.S. whose parents are citizens or lawful permanent residents should automatically become citizens."

As with the tariff case, I agree with majority public opinion on both of these issues. I have argued the Court should rule against Trump in the birthright citizenship case, and that Obergefell v. Hodges is a landmark civil rights decision, even though its reasoning should have been better. It all goes to show I am a true Man of the People! OK, maybe not… In reality, I hold all kinds of unpopular views. And I think majority public opinion is often highly ignorant and influenced by bias.

On a slightly more serious note, Obergefell's strong popularity is one of the reasons why I think it is unlikely to be overruled. And the unpopularity of Trump's position on birthright citizenship is one reason why the Court probably won't hesitate to rule against him on this issue if a majority of justices believe he's wrong (as seemed likely, though not certain, to be the case after oral argument).

There are several other interesting questions in the survey, which I may post about it in the future, if time allows. For example, the poll confirms that term limits for Supreme Court justices are popular, while court-packing is not; this despite the fact that the question on the latter was favorably worded for the pro-packing side, inasmuch as it asked about "expanding the size of the Supreme Court" without mentioning that the reason for doing so was to change the ideological composition of the Court to one more favorable to one side of the political spectrum.

In sum, the public's view of the Court is only modestly negative, and much less so than its view of the president and Congress. That's hardly a rousing endorsement. But it's a lot better than the other two branches of government, and that difference may provide some protection against political attacks on judicial independence.

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