Plaintiff is a naturalized citizen who has resided in the United States for over four decades since fleeing Iran. He, along with his family, was allegedly targeted by the Islamic Republic of Iran because of his father's role as a high-ranking official in the previous regime. He brings this action [under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Ministry of Intelligence and Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran (MOIS), and officials and agents of both groups, alleging that Defendants tortured him during his imprisonment in Iran and have continued to subject him to "an ongoing campaign of harassment, surveillance, and physical attacks." …
Fearful that disclosure of his identity would subject him and his family to "physical harm, retaliation, and threats to personal safety," he moved to proceed pseudonymously. The Court denied Plaintiff's initial Motion as it did not explain why pseudonymity was warranted where the risk of retaliatory harm stemmed only from Defendants, who would have access to his identity. Plaintiff has now renewed his Motion, elaborating on the harm from others that could arise if his identity were publicly disclosed in connection with this lawsuit. The Court will grant the Motion, subject to any further consideration by the United States District Judge to whom this case is randomly assigned….
From the Standing Order in civil cases issued by Judge Ana Reyes (D.D.C.)
The Court is mindful of the raging debate spaces between sentences engenders. See James Hamblin, The Scientific Case for Two Spaces After a Period, The Atlantic (May 11, 2018). Team Two Spaces champions improved readability and processing speed. See Rebecca L. Johnson, et al., Are two spaces better than one? The effect of spacing following periods and commas during reading, 80:6 Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 1504–11 (2018). Team One Space questions the science and notes that two space use is the monospaced font relic of a bygone era. See Angela Chen, Please don't use this study to justify your horrible habit of using two spaces after periods, The Verge (Apr. 28, 2018). Personally finding that one space use makes documents impenetrable, the Court sides squarely with Team Two Spaces.
Moderate that I am, I tend to go with two spaces in e-mails but one space on the blog and in articles and briefs. But I'm not positive that this is right; and in any event, if I file anything before Judge Reyes, I will of course be using two spaces.
At last Friday's University of Virginia Federalist Society Originalism Symposium on "Originalism and Article III," I participated in a Rupe Debate with Professor Jed Shugerman on the resolution: "The Supreme Court's deference to recent executive actions on the emergency docket is consistent with the separation of powers."
Professor Shugerman and I had a fruitful and enjoyable exchange, even if he agreed with me on many points and we dove deep into the question of how the Supreme Court should have handled the stay applications in the various removal cases, such as Wilcox and Boyle. The video is below.
The court concludes that Trump hadn't adequately alleged facts that would support a finding that the defendants knew the article was false (or were reckless about the prospect); Trump has an opportunity to file an amended complaint if he can identify such facts.
On January 15, 2025, Palazzolo emailed White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt advising her that Dow Jones intended to publish an article (the "Article") about a letter that President Trump purportedly sent to Epstein (the "Letter"). President Trump, through counsel, denied writing the Letter and warned Dow Jones not to publish the story. Two days later, the WSJ online edition published the Article.
The title of the Article—"Jeffrey Epstein's Friends Sent Him Bawdy Letters for a 50th Birthday Album. One was from Donald Trump"—is in bold print, with a subtitle below reading "[t]he leather-bound book was compiled by Ghislaine Maxwell. The president says the letter 'is a fake thing.'" …
The Complaint sets forth claims for defamation … alleges that the following statements from the Article are per se defamatory:
The letter bearing Trump's name, which was reviewed by the Journal, is bawdy—like others in the album. It contains several lines of typewritten text framed by the outline of a naked woman, which appears to be hand-drawn with a heavy marker. A pair of small arcs denotes the woman's breasts, and the future president's signature is a squiggly "Donald" below her waist, mimicking pubic hair.
It isn't clear how the letter with Trump's signature was prepared. Inside the outline of the naked woman was a typewritten note styled as an imaginary conversation between Trump and Epstein, written in the third person.
Voice Over: There must be more to life than having everything, the note began. Donald: Yes, there is, but I won't tell you what it is. Jeffrey: Nor will I, since I also know what it is. Donald: We have certain things in common, Jeffrey. Jeffrey: Yes, we do, come to think of it. Donald: Enigmas never age, have you noticed that? Jeffrey: As a matter of fact, it was clear to me the last time I saw you. Donald: A pal is a wonderful thing. Happy Birthday — and may every day be another wonderful secret.
I posted this morning about Doe v. OpenAI, the interesting and important lawsuit that alleges that "[d]riven by a ChatGPT-fueled delusional spiral, her ex-boyfriend [Doe's] stalked and harassed her for months—generating dozens of fake psychological reports about her via ChatGPT and distributing them to her family, friends, and colleagues, which escalated to leaving her voicemails threatening her physical safety." Regular readers of the blog might ask: What's with this Jane Doe business here? Why is this case being litigated under a pseudonym, when other tort cases generally aren't? (Pseudonymity is a rare exception to the general rule that people must sue in their own names.)
I therefore reached out about this to Doe's lawyers, thinking about whether I should file an opposition to pseudonymity here, as I have in past cases (see, e.g., Roe v. Smith (Cal. App. 2025)). The lawyers promptly responded that the pseudonymity will likely be temporary:
[W]e will not be seeking to have the case proceed in full with pseudonyms. Here's the context: our client's stalker is both dangerous and has lost touch with reality. He believes that there is a broad conspiracy that is plotting against him. He has made death threats to our client and, after being released from custody, made immediate contact with her. She currently has armed security and is deathly afraid.
We have reason to believe he will be arrested shortly. Once he is in custody, we don't believe there will be a need to continue to proceed with pseudonyms. We do think that if his name is made public in connection with this case, it will reinforce his paranoid delusions and significantly increase the likelihood that he harms our client or others who he has targeted.
In her temporary restraining order application in Doe v. OpenAI (see also the complaint), plaintiff asks, among other things, that OpenAI cut off ChatGPT access by a user; ensure that he not create new accounts; and notify plaintiff if the user does try to access ChatGPT. Here are the factual allegations:
Plaintiff Jane Doe is in immediate danger. Driven by a ChatGPT-fueled delusional spiral, her ex-boyfriend (the "User") stalked and harassed her for months—generating dozens of fake psychological reports about her via ChatGPT and distributing them to her family, friends, and colleagues, which escalated to leaving her voicemails threatening her physical safety.
His campaign culminated in encoding a death threat through ChatGPT and sending it to her family, just before he was arrested on four felony counts, including communicating a bomb threat and assault with a deadly weapon in January 2026. The criminal court deemed him incompetent and ordered him committed to a mental health facility, but—just two days ago—ordered his release due to a procedural failure by the state (a delay in transferring him from jail to the facility)….
Before he was arrested, the User was in constant communication with ChatGPT, which affirmed his delusions that he had cured sleep apnea, that the medical industry was out to get him, and that his ex-girlfriend was the problem. As he became more unhinged, it also began consulting on violent plans against third parties: in addition to helping him harass and threaten Plaintiff, his account contains conversations titled "Violence list expansion" and "Fetal suffocation calculation." [My read of the exhibits to the TRO application suggests that "fetal suffocation calculation" likely refers to the user's theories that maternal sleep apnea causes fetal asphyxiation, not to plans by the user to violently suffocate fetuses, though I appreciate that is guesswork on my part. -EV]
With the User now ordered to be freed for procedural reasons, he will be further emboldened in his belief that his worldview was exactly right. It is a certainty that he will immediately attempt to turn back to ChatGPT—again spinning out his delusions and planning violence on the platform….
The factual claims: From the Complaint in Doe v. OpenAI Found., filed Thursday in the California Superior Court (San Francisco):
OpenAI designed GPT-4o to never say no. It validated whatever delusion users presented to it, stayed engaged no matter how dangerous the conversation became, and treated every premise as one worth exploring, no matter how detached from reality it might be.
For a 53-year-old Silicon Valley entrepreneur experiencing a severe mental-health crisis, that design had devastating real-world consequences. GPT-4o fed his escalating delusion that he had developed a groundbreaking cure for sleep apnea, told him that his work threatened a trillion-dollar industry, and convinced him powerful people were coming after him. It even claimed he was being monitored by helicopters.
When his loved ones began to recognize that he was losing touch with reality and asked him to see a mental health professional, he asked GPT-4o its opinion. Instead of urging him to get help, it told him he was a "level 10 in sanity" and doubled down on reinforcing his delusions, insisting that it would take a "full specialist team" of "nine people" to replicate him. The system made him more certain and more dangerous.
By August 2025, OpenAI's own automated safety system picked up on just how dangerous he had become. It flagged him for "Mass Casualty Weapons" activity and deactivated his account. That could and should have ended the story, but it did not.
The next day, a human "safety" team member reviewed the user's account—which contained conversations titled "Violence list expansion" and "Fetal suffocation calculation," as well as chat logs naming specific individuals he was targeting and stalking in real life—and decided that deactivation was a "mistake" and that he was fine to continue using ChatGPT. OpenAI restored his account without restriction, without warning, and without notifying a single person named in his chat logs as a target—including Plaintiff Jane Doe, the user's ex-girlfriend, primary stalking victim, and the subject of a fixation that GPT-4o had dangerously deepened.
From Wikipedia, by Mos.ru, CC BY 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=177890193 (By Mos.ru, CC BY 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=177890193)
Joseph Maldonado, aka Joe Exotic, may be in prison (for charges of animal abuse and attempted murder), but he continues to make legal news.
In 2025, the former reality-TV star sued the Black Pine Animal Sanctuary alleging it mistreated four of the Tiger King's former tigers in violation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). On April 1, a district court in Indiana dismissed Maldonado's suit for lack of Article III standing. It also sanctioned Maldonado's attorney (Roger Roots) for filing a complaint and other documents containing imaginary citations and misrepresentations of authorities, likely as a consequence of using AI. While the sanctions were not large ($1,500), the court also referred Roots to the Rhode Island disciplinary authorities.
"Are the animals happy? Who the hell knows?" Certainly not Plaintiff Joseph Maldonado, who uttered those words in a 2020 Netflix documentary1 and who is now suing the wildlife park housing some of his former tigers under the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) ("ESA"). But Maldonado has no connection to these big cats beyond his personal history with them, nor has he ever visited the park. And though he claims he has had "agents" visit the tigers on his behalf, he himself is federally incarcerated and cannot view them in person until his release.
Maldonado filed his Complaint on August 29, 2025, alleging that Defendant Professional Animal Retirement Center ("PARC" or "Black Pine"), a/k/a Black Pine Animal Sanctuary, has "wounded," "harmed," and "harassed" four tigers formerly owned by Maldonado by (1) having them spayed or neutered; (2) forcing them into public observation; and (3) confining them in "woefully inadequate enclosures," all of which Maldonado alleges violate the ESA's prohibition against "taking." (ECF No. 1). Now before the Court is PARC's Motion to Dismiss, in which it argues Maldonado has no Article III standing to sue under the ESA and thus the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 11, 12).2 PARC's Motion is now fully briefed (ECF Nos. 17, 18, 19)3 and thus ripe for ruling.
Additionally, the Court issued a Show Cause Order on February 27, 2026 (ECF No. 23) ordering Maldonado's counsel to show good cause, if there be any, for inaccuracies and legal misrepresentations presented in Maldonado's Complaint and briefing. Maldonado's counsel submitted his response on March 27, 2026 (ECF No. 24), accepting responsibility for the misrepresentations but emphasizing that these errors were not made in bad faith. This issue is also ripe for ruling.
The standing ruling is interesting because while Maldonado clearly has a connection to these specific tigers, he has no ability to visit or interact with them. Given his lengthy prison sentence, he cannot even allege any actual or imminent plans to interact with the tigers. According to the court, this is fatal to his standing claim; "The only thing clear at this point is that Maldonado has strong feelings about these cats— but those strong feelings and his hope to work with them in the future are not enough to give this Court subject matter jurisdiction over his claims."
As for the sanctions, this is yet another example of an attorney (or his paralegal) relying upon AI for legal research and then failing to conduct so much as a rudimentary check of its accuracy. As so often occurs in these cases, the attorney claims extenuating circumstances (a "medical emergency" that resulted in relying on a paralegal's work) and dissembles unconvincingly.
From the opinion:
Over three months passed before the Court pointed out these blatant errors, during which time Roots filed a surreply not only discounting as inapplicable the very cases he had cited in his response but also defending the extraordinary length of that brief. And that defense leads the Court to question the veracity of his assertion that the ten-page "Corrected Response" was the version Roots originally intended to file. Indeed, if Roots intended only to file a short brief, he should have caught on that the wrong version was filed when PARC's reply noted an objection to pages 26–37 of Maldonado's response brief as violative of Local Rule 7-1(e)(1) (ECF No. 18 at 1 n.1). At that time, Roots should have notified the Court and PARC of his mistake. Instead, he doubled down to defend the lengthy brief as indicative of "[t]he complexity and importance of the issues here—including questions of ESA standing, jurisdiction, and citizen-suit enforcement…." (ECF No. 19 at 15). So, which is the Court to believe: that the extraordinarily long brief was intentional and should be considered despite its violation of the Local Rules, or that the same brief, riddled with errors, was inadvertently filed instead of a shortened, seemingly more correct brief? . . .
It is abundantly clear that Roots did not make the requisite reasonable inquiry into the law in crafting both the Complaint and the response to PARC's Motion to Dismiss. Had he done his due diligence for either filing, he would have discovered that the opinions and citations he provided were woefully mispresented or else nonexistent. Whether these incorrect filings are the work of generative AI or counsel's own sloppiness, the resulting errors and legal misrepresentations are glaring. And while the Court appreciates Roots' acceptance of some responsibility, these issues nevertheless warrant sanctions.
A final note: Releasing this opinion on April 1 was a nice touch.
4/12/1945: President Harry Truman's inauguration. He would make four appointments to the Supreme Court: Chief Justice Vinson, and Justices Burton, Clark, and Minton.
Petitioner's new-found "public figure" status, and concerns that records are "impeding his employment, professional credibility, and personal safety," don't justify sealing, either.
From Thursday's decision by California Court of Appeal Justice Natalie Stone, joined by Justice John Segal and L.A. Superior Court Judge Alexander Giza, in J.E. v. A.C.:
In April 2016 J.E. filed a petition for a domestic violence restraining order against his then-ex-girlfriend, A.C., and a temporary restraining order was granted pending the hearing on a permanent restraining order. J.E. did not appear at the hearing, and the court dissolved the temporary restraining order and dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of prosecution.
More than eight years after filing the petition, in November 2024, J.E. filed a motion to "seal or destroy" the record of the restraining order proceeding. He cited the "sensitive nature of this matter and the parties' current relationship" and argued "[p]ublic dissemination of this motion and the underlying records could cause irreparable harm to the parties' reputations and privacy," as well as "professional challenges[ ] and emotional distress." …
J.E. supported his motion with a declaration stating he and A.C. had reconciled and were now life partners. He explained he requested the restraining order when the parties "were navigating a complex and emotionally charged dynamic, which led to misunderstandings and impulsive actions on my part." J.E. stated A.C.'s attempts to contact him were "not motivated by malice or harm but rather by her deep affection and immaturity at the time."
He stated the continued existence of the records had drawn "unwanted scrutiny" in his personal and professional life and undermined the couple's efforts to "build a positive future together." He concluded, "I deeply regret filing the restraining order petition in 2016 and have since come to understand the situation in its proper context. [A.C.] had no harmful intentions, and my actions were a reaction to misunderstanding and emotional distress. Destroying these records would bring closure and allow us to continue building our lives together." …
The ruling holds the law exceeds Congress' authority under the tax power and the Necessary and Proper Clause. But it does not consider the Commerce Clause.
Yesterday, in McNutt v. US Department of Justice, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit struck down an 1868 federal law banning home alcohol distilleries. The court ruled that the law exceeded Congress' authority under the taxing power, and also under the Necessary and Proper Clause. It's an important win for constitutional federalism - as well as for home alcohol distillers! But it's significance is limited by the fact that the court did not consider the possibility that the law is authorized by Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce.
The decision was written by prominent conservative Judge Edith Jones. But the unanimous ruling was joined by liberal Obama appointee Judge James Graves. It's an impressive, and somewhat unusual, cross-ideological agreement on the type of federalism issue that often splits jurists along ideological lines.
Judge Jones is, I think, undeniably right to argue that the tax power cannot justify this law:
[T]he power to "lay and collect Taxes" means Congress can charge or demand money from taxpayers. It is also obvious that the purpose of a tax is to raise revenue for the government. Indeed, "the essential feature of any tax" is that "[i]t producesat least some revenue for the Government."NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 564 (2012)… (emphasis added)….
Section 5178(a)(1)(B) and Section 5601(a)(6) exceed these constitutional limits. Primarily, neither provision raises revenue. Not only do they prohibit at-home distilleries, but in so doing, they amount to an anti-revenue provision that prevents distilled spirits from coming into existence. Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 5001(b) (taxation begins "as soon as [the spirit] is in existence"). The provisions operate to reduce revenue instead of raising it. This violates the Supreme Court's explanation of how the federal power of taxation works: "[I]mposition of a tax nonetheless leaves an individual with a lawful choice to do or not do a certain act, so long as he is willing to pay a tax levied on that choice." NFIB, 567 U.S. at 574, 132 S. Ct. at 2600 (emphasis added). These plaintiffs have only the choice not to do as they wish or risk fines and imprisonment.
Exactly so.
The Fifth Circuit also concludes that the law in question exceeds Congress' authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, which grants the power to makes laws "necessary and proper" for carrying into execution other federal powers. I think the court is right that the law in question is not "proper." The Supreme Court, in NFIB v. Sebelius(2012), ruled that a "proper" power permissible under the Clause is one that is "ancillary" to the implementation of an enumerated power. It cannot be a "great, substantive and independent" power. See my analysis in this article. The power claimed here is clearly "great and independent." As Judge Jones notes, "[u]nder the government's logic, Congress may criminalize nearly any at-home conduct only because it has the possibility of concealing taxable activity."
I am much less persuaded by the court's conclusion that the law here is not "necessary." In McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), Chief Justice John Marshall famously ruled that "necessary" includes any measures that may be "useful" or "convenient" for implementing an enumerated power. I am no fan of this formulation, and tend to believe Thomas Jefferson and James Madison were right to argue that "necessary" means something like "essential." But Marshall's approach is longstanding precedent, unlikely to be overturned. This formulation is so permissive that I cannot think of any other modern precedent that struck down a federal law on the grounds that it isn't "necessary."
Judge Jones instead relies on another passage from McCulloch, which defines "necessary" as "plainly adapted," and thus is potentially more restrictive. But "useful" and "convenient" are the standard formulations embodied in in numerous precedents. And, on that approach, the home distillery ban probably does qualify as "necessary." For example, it might be "useful" or "convenient" to advancing the government's goal of increasing tax revenue, by incentivizing people to engage in activities subject to taxation, rather than home distilling.
Even if the home distillery ban is "necessary," it still isn't "proper." The Fifth Circuit therefore got the bottom line right.
But I would not celebrate too much, just yet. Though this law is not authorized under the tax power or the Necessary and Proper Clause, it could pass muster under Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce, which the Fifth Circuit did not consider, because the government chose not to argue this issue on appeal.
In Gonzales v. Raich (2005), the Supreme Court held that Congress' power to "regulate commerce… among the several states" gives it the authority to forbid the possession and distribution of medical marijuana that had never crossed state lines or even been sold in any market within a state. I believe Raich is one of the Supreme Court's worst-ever federalism decisions. I laid out the reasons why in a 2006 article written soon after the ruling came down. But the Supreme Court doesn't seem inclined to overrule Raich, and indeed refused to hear a case that offered a good opportunity to reconsider it, just a few months ago.
Raich held that the Commerce Clause gives Congress almost unlimited power to regulate any "economic activity" defined as any activity involving the "production, distribution, and consumption of commodities." Alcoholic beverages are pretty obviously commodities, and home distilling involves their production and distribution.
Thus, if the federal government is so inclined, it could potentially try to continue to enforce this law and - if challenged again - defend it under the Commerce Clause. When and if that happens, I hope the Supreme Court will take the opportunity to overrule or at least limit Raich. But I am not optimistic it will happen, at least not in the near future.
As the Fifth Circuit notes, there is at least one other case challenging this law, currently before the Sixth Circuit (the district court in that case had dismissed it on procedural grounds). We shall see what happens with it.
On March 2, I posted about a court opinion related to a lawsuit brought by lawyer Sonya Shaykhoun. Shaykhoun had sent out a Tweet that proved controversial; sued news outlets for (among other things) copyright infringement based on their including the Tweet in their stories about the controversy; and lost on fair use grounds. She has now filed a Third Amended Complaint in that case (Shaykhoun v. Al Jazeera Media Network (S.D.N.Y.)), and the post makes a cameo appearance. There's a lot more in the 34-page Complaint, but I thought I'd pass along some excerpts:
Plaintiff expands this [Third Amended Complaint] to address a coordinated campaign of professional retaliation—a "Market Erasure"—executed by a Transnational Criminal Organization ("TCO") Plaintiff discovered while auditing Al Jazeera Media Network ("AJMN") in Doha (2011–2014). The TCO operates globally through an institutional network of elite law firms and media proxies to shield its operations and suppress Plaintiff's forensic findings.
This is not a "defamation" case, nor is it a repackaging of defamation claims. Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Civil RICO to recover for a coordinated Market Erasure via a seven-year-long continual press assault triggered by Plaintiff's 2019 attempt to expose Osama Abu Dehay's ("Osama") lack of Jordanian law license. Lord Holt recognized in 1698, the "plinths" of law are reputation, personal security, and property ("Three Plinths") are compensable interests….
The Enterprise used "unlawful means" e.g., wire fraud and witness tampering, to interfere with Plaintiff's Three Plinths (Reputation, Personal Security, and Property). This coordinated interference seeks to protect the $Trillion extraction and achieve witness neutralization. The Enterprise launched these attacks to suppress Plaintiff's documented evidence of the licensure void and the professional omissions of the "institutional shield" provided by Pillsbury (FARA No. 5198) and media proxies….
Plaintiff Sonya Hashim Shaykhoun, Esq. is an eighteen-year veteran of the New York Bar (2008, Atty. Reg. # 4633293) with more than 22 years of experience in transactional, commercial, and regulatory matters, including senior in-house roles at major media and aviation entitles in the Arabian Gulf region (Exhibit A). She holds a Masters in English (St Andrews), a BA in Arabic and Law (SOAS), an LL.M. in Corporate and Commercial Law (SOAS), and a specialized LL.M. in Corruption, Law and Governance (Sussex/ROLACC.) …
Pillsbury (FARA No. 5198) used its "award-winning lobbyists" through its Government Law & Strategies Practice to execute a "silver-bullet" solution: branding Plaintiff a "Karen" to reduce the legal and regulatory risk of employing an unlicensed operative for fourteen years.
The March 2nd Transformation: This [institutional] shield facilitated the March 2, 2026, strike on Reason.com, published 96 hours after the Order (Exhibit H.) Citing defense counsel Sullivan and Vaishampayan exclusively, this act masqueraded as "legal commentary" on a case that never hit the press but functioned as a Predicate Act of Witness Tampering to ensure the $Trillion extraction remains buried ("it makes me question the Twitter account title, "The Commercially Savvy Lawyer," which is Plaintiff's online moniker and professional brand.)
