The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Harassment

Does Light Consist of "Object[s]"?

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In HAC v. ER, decided in August by the Michigan Court of Appeals (Judges Sima Patel, Michael Riordan, and Brock Swartzle), petitioner had tried to get personal protection orders against his neighbors; the trial court rejected petitioner's claims, and the court of appeals affirmed.

Under the relevant Michigan law, such orders are generally issued when there's a finding of "stalking," which is defined as "continuing harassment," which in turn covers certain kinds of "continuing unconsented contact." Unconsented conduct is defined to include, among other things, "Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased, or occupied by that individual."

Petitioner alleged various incidents of alleged harassment; the court mostly concluded that he hadn't introduced enough evidence supporting each, but the analysis as to one category of incidents struck me as more legally interesting:

[T]he petition against ER [also] alleged that respondents "installed powerful spot lights that are aimed [at] [petitioner's] house," causing petitioner to "[b]lack out my windows so [he] can [s]leep." In his petition against AR, petitioner alleged that the spot lights "are aimed at [his] house." Petitioner testified that the exterior flood lights have shined on his home for the past five or six months before he filed the petitions. Specifically, the flood lights shine toward the windows of his home during the nighttime, or "[a]ll night, from dark." On at least one occasion, petitioner texted respondents to cease shining the lights toward his home. On another occasion, petitioner asked them in-person to "direct [the lights] away from [his] house."

At an unknown time and date, a "zoning officer" visited petitioner's house after petitioner complained that respondents were violating the lighting ordinance. Petitioner stated that the lights were still shining on his home as of the night of February 22, 2024. Several photographs were admitted into evidence, which showed the lights at respondents' house, how the lights shine on petitioner's home, and poster board and cardboard covering petitioner's windows….

[P]etitioner contends that the light from respondents' flood lights "consist[s] of 'packets of energy' which, while different in kind than a physical object, is no less an 'object' than any other object." However, except for providing one dictionary definition of "light," petitioner offers no other authority or rationale in support of this argument, so we consider it abandoned. In any event, we agree with the trial court that such allegations, if true, might constitute some type of "ordinance violations" but do not necessarily rise to the level of requiring a PPO….

The key here, I think, isn't that light isn't an object as a matter of physics; rather, it's not an object as a matter of law.

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"The Fallacy Fallacy"

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An excerpt from Maarten Boudry (Persuasion):

My doubts [about the value of focusing on logical fallacies] began when I was still in academia, teaching critical thinking to philosophy students and science majors alike. Fallacies are a favorite chapter in such courses. In some ways, they are ideal teaching material: they come in tidy lists and seem easy to apply. Many trace back to Aristotle and still parade under their Latin names—ad hominemad populumad ignorantiamad verecundiam (better known as the argument from authority), the slippery slope, affirming the consequent, and so on.

So I dutifully taught my students the standard laundry list and then challenged them to put theory into practice. Read a newspaper article or watch a political debate—and spot the fallacies!

After a few years, I abandoned the assignment. The problem? My students turned paranoid. They began to see fallacies everywhere. Instead of engaging with the substance of an argument, they hurled labels and considered the job done. Worse, most of the "fallacies" they identified did not survive closer scrutiny.

It would be too easy to blame my students. When I tried the exercise myself, I had to admit that I mostly came away empty-handed. Clear-cut fallacies are surprisingly hard to find in real life. So what do you do if your professor tells you to hunt for fallacies and you can't find any? You lower the bar. To satisfy the assignment, you expand your definition….

In 2015, I published a paper in the journal Argumentation with two colleagues arguing that fallacy theory should be abandoned. Here is its crux: every so-called fallacy closely resembles forms of reasoning that are perfectly legitimate, depending on the context. In formal terms, good and bad arguments are often indistinguishable. Worse, there is almost always a continuum between strong and weak arguments. You cannot capture that gradient in a rigid formal scheme. As my friends Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber succinctly put it in The Enigma of Reason: "most if not all fallacies on the list are fallacious except when they are not." …

Read the whole thing here.

AI in Court

Defendant's Own AI Legal Research Isn't Protected by Attorney-Client Privilege

"Because Claude is not an attorney, that alone disposes of Heppner's claim of privilege."

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From U.S. v. Heppner, handed down today by Judge Jed Rakoff (S.D.N.Y.):

At a pretrial conference in this matter held on February 10, 2026, the Court … granted from the bench the Government's motion for a ruling that certain written exchanges that defendant Benjamin Heppner had with a generative artificial intelligence ("AI") platform were not protected from Government inspection by either the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. This Memorandum sets forth the reasons for the Court's ruling….

[T]he indictment charges that Heppner defrauded [GWG Holdings'] investors out of more than $150 million by making false representations about, and causing GWG to enter into undisclosed self-serving transactions concerning, two privately held companies that Heppner controlled, Beneficient Company Group, L.P. and Highland Consolidated L.P.

In connection with Heppner's arrest on November 4, 2025, agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation executed a search warrant at Heppner's home and seized numerous documents and electronic devices. Heppner's counsel later represented to the Government that among the seized materials were approximately thirty-one documents that memorialize communications that Heppner had with the generative AI platform "Claude," which is operated by the private company Anthropic.

According to Heppner's counsel, the documents represent communications between Heppner and Claude that took place "in 2025, after Mr. Heppner had received a grand jury subpoena [and] after it was clear with discussions with the government that Mr. Heppner was the target of this investigation." Without any suggestion from counsel that he do so, Heppner "prepared reports that outlined defense strategy, that outlined what he might argue with respect to the facts and the law that we anticipated that the government might be charging." Thus, counsel asserted, Heppner "was preparing these reports in anticipation of a potential indictment."

In exchanges with the Government, Heppner, through his counsel, asserted privilege over these documents (the "AI Documents"), arguing that (1) Heppner had inputted into Claude, among other things, information that Heppner had learned from counsel; (2) Heppner had created the AI Documents for the purpose of speaking with counsel to obtain legal advice; and (3) Heppner had subsequently shared the contents of the AI Documents with counsel. Heppner's counsel conceded, however, that counsel "did not direct [Heppner] to run Claude searches." …

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Free Speech

No Pseudonymity for Man Suing Harvard Alleging Jews Aim "to Exterminate or Enslave All Non-Jews"

The plaintiff claims he was denied admission to Harvard Business School, apparently because he is a "non-veteran, non-queer, non-Jewish White male applicant[]."

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From Judge Allison Burroughs' Feb. 2 decision in Doe v. President & Fellows of Harvard College:

While it is within the Court's discretion to allow a party to proceed under a pseudonym, "[a]s a general rule, the presumption is that all judicial proceedings remain open to the public." "The presumption against pseudonymous litigation gives way only in 'exceptional cases.'" The analysis is as follows: "1) there is a presumption in favor of disclosure; 2) a party may rebut the presumption by showing that a need for confidentiality exists; 3) the court must balance the need for confidentiality against the public interest in disclosure." Alleged risks of harm that are speculative in nature, generalized, or without corroboration do not justify anonymity.

Having considered Plaintiff's Motion, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not rebutted the presumption in favor of disclosure. Plaintiff states that the litigation involves sensitive personal information regarding Plaintiff's ethnic heritage and academic records, and Plaintiff's identification would risk causing Plaintiff "unusually severe" professional, financial, and physical harm. The alleged risks that Plaintiff sets forth in his motion are without corroboration and do not rise above a level of mere speculation. Further, lawsuits often "implicate substantial amounts of private information," and if warranted going forward, the Court may employ tools such as redacting or sealing documents to manage privacy concerns that arise during the litigation. In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion, is DENIED.

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Politics

New in City Journal: Let's Fix Our Federal Holiday Schedule

How I would rearrange the current calendar, which makes no sense.

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I recently became an adjunct fellow at the Manhattan Institute. The flagship journal of MI is City Journal, where I will contribute on a regular basis. For my inaugural essay, I decided to do something totally different, that is only tangentially about the law.

I have long had problems with how the calendar of holidays is structured. These holidays were not organized in a single plan, but instead were added in a piecemeal fashion over the years. Professionally, I see the difficulties of optimizing the law school academic calendar. I usually teach on Mondays. As a result, there is a gap for both the fall and spring semesters with Labor Day and MLK Day, respectively, which requires making up a class at an irregular time. Some years ago, I tried to move Labor Day till later in the semester to give students another reading day before exam; my motion failed. And, as a parent, I am repeatedly frustrated with how many days my kids have off from school. It is an abomination to hold back-to-back half days--all the frustration of getting kids ready in the morning, only to have to pick them up a few hours later. Anyway, calendars could improve. And one way to start is by realigning the holidays.

My essay is titled, Let's Fix Our Federal Holiday Schedule.

Here is the introduction:

At present, the United States has 11 federal holidays, accumulated over the course of two and a half centuries. Some of the current dates make sense; others don't. As a whole, these national holidays create complexities for Americans' school, work, and vacation calendars. We should rearrange this lineup.

Three principles guide this endeavor. First, it must be bipartisan. For better or worse, some holidays have become more associated with the Left and others with the Right. Reform will require give and take from both sides.

Second, the holidays should make it easier to establish regular schedules in schools and workplaces. One holiday in close proximity to another disrupts continuity.

Third, under the current calendar, several months have no holidays while other months have several. As any school child will tell you, it's not fair that six holidays are crammed together in the cold months, while only one holiday is in spring. As any school administrator will confide, Labor Day and MLK Day both make scheduling classes difficult. The holidays should be spaced out more evenly.

A few adjustments could create a calendar that garners bipartisan support, simplifies scheduling, and spaces out time for reflection and relaxation.

And here is where I ultimately wind up:

The resultant calendar: New Year's Day on January 1; Martin Luther King Jr. Day on the first Monday in February; President's Day on the first Monday in March; Labor Day on the first Monday in May; Memorial Day on the last Monday in May; Juneteenth on June 19; Independence Day on July 4; Constitution Day on September 17; Veterans Day on the third Monday in October; Thanksgiving on the fourth Thursday in November; and Christmas on December 25.

This plan checks all the boxes.

As is the case with many of my writings, the purpose here is to stimulate discussion. I'm sure there are other, better proposals. If you think of something, please drop me a line!

The American Constitution Society Still Does Not Have A Competing Theory Other Than "Antitrumpism"

After half a century of great debate, the originalists are still not tired of winning.

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Jeffrey Toobin had a remarkable column in the New York Times, titled "The Plan for a Radically Different Supreme Court Is Here." What is that plan? Read the article from top to bottom, and you won't find an actual plan. Not even the concept of a plan.

The ostensible purpose was to suggest that the American Constitution Society could be a viable alternative to the Federalist Society. There is glowing praise of ACS's newish President, Phil Breast. This column follows another glowing profile of Brest by Carl Husle in the Times in October. (I don't recall any such similar fanfare for Sheldon Gilbert, who has effortlessly taken the helm of FedSoc.) Yet if you peel a few layers deep off Toobin's lede, you realize precisely why ACS can never rival FedSoc. It is not because of lack of funds or lack of power, but due to a lack of ideas. In short, despite their best efforts, there is no viable alternative to originalism.

Like many Democrats, Mr. Brest rejects originalism and believes there should be a different way to interpret the Constitution. "We have to have an affirmative message around constitutional interpretation in the same way there has to be an affirmative message around elections and politics," he told me. "And it can't just be, 'We're not originalists' in the same way that A.C.S. can't just be, 'We're not the Federalists.' That's not how I view the organization, and that's not how I want to be part of the solution to countering originalism. There has to be an affirmative piece there."

What is that "affirmative" theory? Brest has no clue. The only viable strategy is "antitrumpism."

For now, under Mr. Brest, the A.C.S. seems headed for an approach that looks like the one that Democratic politicians have so far adopted: aimed more at opposition to Mr. Trump's record rather than on a specific, alternative vision for the Constitution. In his opening message to the group, Mr. Brest described the A.C.S. as building "a bulwark against overreach by the Trump administration and the Roberts court." This is understandable, perhaps even wise, because in the view of Mr. Brest's universe of allies, the Trump administration has violated constitutional norms under any interpretive theory.

So much for a ruling for the ages.

How does that approach translate to judicial philosophy? In other words, what would a future Democratic President look for in judges? Brest also doesn't know:

Mr. Brest has pledged that A.C.S. will continue its Biden-era focus on judicial appointments. "As an organization, we will stay on top of legislators, we will stay on top of the next administration, to make sure that judges are the No. 1 priority going forward," he said.

As for what those judges will stand for — as opposed to what they stand against — Mr. Brest has no clear answer. He, along with other Democrats, will need one.

I've lost count of the number of law review articles that attack originalism and textualism. Frankly, I've stopped reading them because they don't matter anymore. There was an ideological battle that was waged and won. And until the left can put forward a viable theory to compete, originalism will remain the dominant jurisprudential force. As Justice Scalia would say, FedSoc doesn't need to outrun the bear, we only need to outrun ACS. After half a century of great debate, the originalists are still not tired of winning.

Free Speech

No Retroactive Pseudonymization in Federal Court Under California "Safe at Home" Program

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From a decision last week in Smith v. Solomon, by Judge André Birotte Jr.:

Plaintiff files the [application] in a case voluntarily dismissed on January 28, 2026. Plaintiff now requests an order directing the "immediate redaction and removal of all personal identifying information ("PII")—including Plaintiff's legal name, address, or any identifying data" from PACER, PacerMonitor, CourtListener, any automated third-party docket-aggregation websites, any public-facing pages generated by the Court, or any publicly viewable filings in this matter. Plaintiff argues that the appearance of his full legal name in court documents threatens his safety, privacy, and well-being.

First, Plaintiff asks the Court to redact certain documents pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2. As an initial matter, it is not clear to the Court that any of the information Plaintiff seeks to have redacted falls within the scope of information that may be redacted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2. Moreover, as stated in the Local Rules, "[i]t is the responsibility of the filer to ensure full compliance with the redaction requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2." Plaintiff himself filed the information at issue without redactions. Thus, the Court cannot retroactively redact any information.

Next, Plaintiff argues the Court has the authority to protect litigants that file cases under pseudonyms. While the Court does have authority to permit a party to file under a pseudonym, the Court will exercise that authority only once a moving party has met their burden pursuant to a motion to use a pseudonym. The "normal presumption in litigation is that parties must use their real names." To overcome this presumption, a moving party must demonstrate that the "party's need for anonymity" outweighs the "prejudice to the opposing party and the public's interest in knowing the party's identity." Again, Plaintiff has not filed any motion to file the case under pseudonym nor has he made any argument overcoming the presumption against anonymity in his [application]….

Plaintiff's [further] argument that his information should be redacted pursuant to the California Safe at Home confidentiality program is also not persuasive. The California Safe at Home program is administered by the California Secretary of State's Office and offers a substitute mailing address for certain individuals who are in fear for their safety. While the Court recognizes the value of this program and Plaintiff's membership, he has not provided any explanation as to why this program requires or merits retroactive redaction of documents filed by Plaintiff himself.

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AI in Court

"One Would Expect … Attorneys Believe They Bring Some Level of Value to Their Clients Beyond That of a Machine"

A magistrate judge recommends a $10K sanction for a lawyer's repeated incorrect citations, and has some things to say about the pattern he has been seeing in his own court.

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From Thursday's Report and Recommendation in Virgil v. Experian Info. Solutions Inc. by Judge Mark Dinsmore (S.D. Ind.):

[T]his is the third time in the last year that the Undersigned has faced a similar issue. We live in a world of rapid technological advancement. A world in which many individuals have concerns that their jobs may be replaced by increasingly educated machines.

The practice of law is not just a job, it is a profession; a profession with standards and ethical responsibilities. One of the most troubling aspects of these situations is the lack of respect for the profession, and the lack of respect by the offending attorneys for their own personal capabilities, that these situations represent.

One would expect that, when individuals choose this profession, they do so in part because they believe they have some talent for the work. One would expect that, after several years of law school, and more years of practice, those attorneys believe they bring some level of value to their clients beyond that of a machine. Yet these situations represent an abdication of those personal and professional responsibilities to those very machines, which to date have not proven themselves up to the task.

While the Undersigned has long recognized the value of the proper and efficient use of technology, my confidence in the profession and the generations of lawyers who have shaped it prevents me from believing that it can ever be replaced by a machine, no matter how advanced. However, the preservation of that profession requires ever increasing levels of diligence and vigilance from each and every attorney and judge involved in the process. Absent that, someday clients may well be better off accepting advice from a machine as opposed to a careless and inattentive attorney. That is a day the profession of law must not allow to come to pass….

Some more details on the particular transgressions in the case:

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"The Quality of Counsel's Filings Further Deteriorated"

"AI presents opportunities for efficiency gains to be sure, but the costs to clients and public faith in attorneys is steep where ethical duties and judgment are cast aside and a litigation put on autopilot."

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A passage from one of counsel's filings, particularly noted by the court.

Some excerpts from the long discussion in Parker v. Costco Wholesale Corp., decided in November by Magistrate Judge S. Kate Vaughan (W.D. Wash.), but only recently posted on Westlaw:

The Court identified material misstatements and misrepresentations in those filings, which contained hallucinated case and record citations and legal errors consistent with unverified generative artificial intelligence ("AI") use and ordered Counsel to show cause as to why sanctions should not issue. The Court outlines its observations before turning to Counsel's explanations….

Review of Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("MSJ Response") indicated the filing relied on inapplicable law, misrepresented and misquoted the law and the record, and included a wide array of idiosyncratic citation errors. For brevity, the Court summarizes the most egregious examples….

[Among other things,] Counsel included hallucinated and inaccurate quotes to the record. This was particularly egregious given that he sought to demonstrate a question of material fact precluded summary judgment and attempted to do so by relying on mischaracterized evidence….

Viewed collectively, these legal, citation, and factual errors bore the hallmarks of unreviewed AI-generated work product or exceedingly negligent drafting….

The quality of Counsel's filings further deteriorated….

Plaintiff's Reply was otherwise notable in two respects. First, the text appeared to have been copy-pasted from a generative AI program without any quality control. Straight, as opposed to curly, apostrophes and quotation marks remained throughout, indicating the content was likely not typed into a word processor. At some point, the program apparently experienced, and documented, an "[ ]artificial error[.]"

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