The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Justice Cody Hiland Graduated Law School in 1998 (Or 1999?) And Was Admitted To The Bar in (February?) 2002

What can explain that gap?

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Today Justice Cody Hiland appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Senator Durbin quoted my blog post which called him unqualified, then totally botched the question. Durbin referred to me as a "conservative law professor," so he has the same problem as the New York Times. Alas, instead of asking why Hiland decided to air private conversations with law students, Durbin simply asked Hiland about temperament.

None of the other senators gave him even the slightest tough question. It's a shame, because he likely would have had trouble. This was one of the least polished circuit court nominees I've seen. Hell, Hiland made Todd Butler look like a pro. Is the process over? Well, I came across this posting from the retired senior editor of the Arkansas Times:

Would news that a nominee for a federal judgeship twice failed the bar exam change the tenor of loud opinions on the exam rigging scandal?

Let's investigate.

For starters, it isn't entirely clear when Hiland graduated law school. Here is the line from his questionnaire. Is it 1998 or 1999? The stray 1999 is odd. Maybe he received the JD in 1998 but needed some more coursework to graduate?

According to the University of Arkansas Little Rock Bowen School of Law, Hiland graduated in 1998. Anyway, something is off here.

According to his Senate Judiciary Committee Questionnaire, he was admitted to the bar in 2002, but he does not indicate if he took the July or February administration.

I was able to find an article from the Arkansas Democrat Gazette from March 30, 2002 which indicates that Hiland passed the February 2002 bar exam. As a general rule, people take the February bar when they either (a) had some sort of conflict for the July bar or (b) failed the July bar.

Between 1997 and 2000, Hiland held various positions in the office of Governor Mike Huckabee. None required a JD. From 2000 to 2002, he worked as a Staff Attorney at the Arkansas Transitional Employment Board. It isn't clear to me how he could be a Staff Attorney before he was admitted to the bar. In 2002, after Hiland was admitted to the bar, he began as an associate at a law firm in Paris, Arkansas.

Usually, law school graduates immediately take the bar exam. Perhaps Hiland was too busy serving as an aide to the governor to do so right away. Maybe he took it for the first time in February 2002, either two or three years after graduating from law school.

If only President Trump asked Katie Zacharia when she passed the bar. It might be worth asking Hiland about how many bar exams he has taken in a Question for the Record.

Supreme Court

Two Cheers for the Supreme Court - Though Not More

The Supreme Court isn't doing quite as well as Will Baude suggests. But its performance is more than good enough to demonstrate why some "reform" proposals - including court-packing are terrible ideas.

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The Supreme Court. (NA)

 

In  a much-discussed recent New York Times article, University of Chicago law Prof. (and former VC blogger) Will Baude praises the Supreme Court and its independence:

With their sweeping midterm victory, Democrats are exploring ideas for a package of reforms to the Supreme Court. And it's not just Democrats: In recent months, the court has managed to invite calls for reform from both sides of the aisle. Some conservatives are even willing to discuss expanding the number of justices.

Still, these calls do not reflect a bipartisan agreement on what is wrong with the court. The calls for reform simply reflect the fact that the court has managed to offend people on the left and right. Defying the Trump administration on key agenda items while also enforcing colorblindness and overruling Roe v. Wade has left it with few true fans.

The left, understandably, strongly opposes the court's recent rulings on abortion, the Voting Rights Act, the unitary executive and so on. These decisions are a big deal. But court reformers still suffer from a failure of perspective. If Chief Justice John Roberts could write an opinion essay, I would imagine him saying: "What? Ruling against the administration's misuse of the National Guard, sweeping emergency tariffs and attack on birthright citizenship, plus preserving the independence of the Federal Reserve and the integrity of the midterm elections, wasn't enough for you?"

The court has ruled against the administration in high-stakes cases on those issues all in the past year. And it has done so even though six of the justices were appointed by members of the president's party — three by President Trump himself….

Under the circumstances of the second Trump term, the Supreme Court is doing amazingly well. If anything, it deserves our celebration, not our condemnation.

I agree with much of this. I made similar points in two articles critiquing proposals for court-packing (see here and here), emphasizing the importance of the Court's rulings against Trump, and how they were not simple gimmes. In each case, there were at least minimally plausible arguments the other way, such that a Court intent on helping Trump and the GOP at all costs could have found a way to do it:

Over the last 18 months, the Supreme Court has played a key role in thwarting several major Trump power grabs. The most recent example is the birthright citizenship case, which prevented him from stripping citizen status from hundreds of thousands of children of undocumented migrants and temporary visa holders, thereby subjecting them to potential deportation.

In Learning Resources v. Trump (which I helped litigate), the court struck down Trump's attempt to use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose the highest tariff schedule since the Hoover-era Smoot-Hawley tariffs that notoriously exacerbated the Great Depression. Trump's tariffs would have imposed some $1.7 trillion of new taxes on Americans. The court's reasoning was not limited to the specifics of IEEPA. All six justices in the majority made clear that they rejected the notion that the president could have a virtually unlimited power to impose tariffs. Thus, the precedent is likely to help block his efforts to twist other statutes into authorization for unconstrained presidential tariff authority….

In lesser-known cases, the court blocked Trump's effort to use the National Guard against blue states (thereby causing him to abandon the effort) and twice used brief "shadow docket" decisions to block deportations under the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 and signal that courts could review Trump's invocation of that law….

[Some critics] acknowledg… these second-term defeats are real yet insist… that they are just "a floor." But protecting people from massive power grabs that gravely endangered the liberty and well-being of millions is no small matter. The same goes for blocking executive use of the military to suppress domestic opposition. And, in each of these cases, the Trump administration had at least minimally plausible arguments for their positions, sometimes backed by prominent conservative legal scholars and commentators. A court inclined to give Trump and the GOP whatever they want could easily have gone the other way on some or all of them. Even if the court could and should have done more to constrain Trump, these rulings are crucial safeguards for liberty and democracy.

Unlike Josh Blackman, I think the conservative justices' willingness to rule against Trump and GOP priorities is a notable measure of their independence. It's a strong sign that they are not simply partisan hacks, and not beholden to any president or party. That doesn't prove that any time a conservative judge rules against a Republican president, they are necessarily right to do so. Being independent and being right are not the same thing. But both are important.

At the same time, I am less of a fan of the current Supreme Court majority than Will Baude is. In my view, they have made several very bad decisions:

Still, it is true that the conservative majority has issued some very bad rulings. I agree with Craig that Trump v. United States—the 2024 presidential immunity ruling—is one of them. But that decision does not give the president blanket immunity from all criminal prosecution for actions taken while in office or even categorical immunity for all "official acts." It's a bad decision but not one that totally eliminates criminal prosecution as a check on presidential abuses of power….  [I also have ambivalent views on Trump v. Slaughter and Louisiana v. Callais].

In my view, the Roberts Court has made several decisions that are worse than any of the above. Most notable are Trump v. Hawaii, the awful 2018 anti-Muslim "travel ban" case, and the similar recent decision in Mullin v. Doe, the Haitian TPS case. In both of these cases, the court's conservative justices turned a blind eye to blatantly unconstitutional discrimination in the immigration context (in one case based on religion, in the other on race). This is part of the court's broader pattern of indefensible double standards when it comes to immigration restrictions.

On top of that, the Roberts Court recently gave us the Supreme Court's worst Takings Clause ruling in many years, undermining its previously generally good record on constitutional property rights.

Thus, I am only willing to offer two cheers for the Court. To earn three, the justices would need to give us fewer stinkers!

That said, the Court's record in checking Trump should give pause to advocates of court-packing and other "reform" measures that would have the effect of destroying judicial review. As explained more fully in my two recent articles critiquing court-packing (here and here) the proper baseline of comparison is not an ideal Supreme Court, but one that would have little or no ability to check the party in power, especially if that party controls both the White House and Congress. The latter is the likely result of court-packing. By that standard, the Roberts Court has had a massive beneficial impact. Between them, the birthright citizenship, tariff, and National Guard decisions have saved millions of people from severe threats to their livelihoods and civil liberties (most notably hundreds of thousands of children saved from potential deportation under Trump's birthright citizenship executive order).

Like Baude, I am not opposed to all possible Supreme Court reforms. For example, I am a long-time supporter of Supreme Court term limits. I am also open to imposing tighter ethics constraints on the justices, and have criticized Justice Alito's claim that Congress lacks power to regulate the Court on such matters. Again, like Baude, I highly doubt that ethics reforms would have any significant impact on the Court's rulings. But it may still be desirable to constrain outside gifts and the like, if only to prevent more serious ethics issues from potentially arising in the future.

I also think some proposals to better manage and constrain the "shadow docket" may be desirable, though I will not try to cover this difficult issue here.

Finally, Baude is right that the Court's relative unpopularity is a potential danger. It is, as he suggests, caught between progressives who believe it's way too conservative, and right-wingers who blame it for constraining Trump too much.

At the same time, it's worth remembering that the Supreme Court is less unpopular than either of the other branches of government, and that most of its major recent decisions enjoy majority public support. As I always emphasize, a decision's popularity is far from a good indication of its correctness. But such (relative) popularity can potentially protect the Court against political attack.

Finally, I would note this: As prominent conservative legal commentator Ed Whelan points out, the results of the recent midterm election make it highly likely that Justice Alito, Justice Thomas, or both will ultimately be replaced by a liberal Democratic nominee. Democrats considering court-packing should ask themselves whether they really rather destroy judicial review, or see it wielded by what may well soon be a liberal court.

For my part, I have plenty of differences with the current conservative majority. And if it is replaced by a more liberal one, I expect to have many disagreements with that majority, as well. But either is far preferable to just getting rid of judicial review entirely. The Trump era has provided plenty of additional evidence for that proposition.

 

Why Exactly Does The Supreme Court "Deserve Our Celebration"?

Will Baude's measure of the Court's independence is when a conservative Justice rules against Trump.

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Will Baude has a new essay in the New York Times titled, "This Is What an Independent, Competent Supreme Court Looks Like." The graphic depicts a giant judge standing boldly with people on the left and right tugging at his robe in either direction. The face of the giant judge does not resemble any current member of the Court, but it may as well be Chief Justice Roberts. You see, Baude urges us to celebrate the Court because of its independence, but the only data he adduces to demonstrate that independence is that the Court's conservatives rule against President Trump:

The left, understandably, strongly opposes the court's recent rulings on abortion, the Voting Rights Act, the unitary executive and so on. These decisions are a big deal. But court reformers still suffer from a failure of perspective. If Chief Justice John Roberts could write an opinion essay, I would imagine him saying: "What? Ruling against the administration's misuse of the National Guard, sweeping emergency tariffs and attack on birthright citizenship, plus preserving the independence of the Federal Reserve and the integrity of the midterm elections, wasn't enough for you?"

The court has ruled against the administration in high-stakes cases on those issues all in the past year. And it has done so even though six of the justices were appointed by members of the president's party — three by President Trump himself. . . .

Under the circumstances of the second Trump term, the Supreme Court is doing amazingly well. If anything, it deserves our celebration, not our condemnation.

There are many, any problems with this approach.

Let's start with the two most conservative members of the Court, Justices Alito and Thomas. They ruled for President Trump in all the cases Baude mentions: the National Guard, tariffs, birthright citizenship, the Federal Reserve, and various election cases. Do their votes cut against the image of an independent Court? They owe Trump nothing, and had the backbone to resist retiring and giving Trump two more picks. (The same cannot be said for Justice Breyer's "independence" from President Biden.)

Moreover, in each of those cases, one or more of the Trump appointees was in dissent with Alito and Thomas: Gorsuch dissented in Trump v. Illinois, Kavanaugh dissented in Learning Resources v. Trump, Gorsuch dissented in Trump v. Barbara, Gorsuch and Barrett dissented in Trump v. Cook, and so on. Did these Trump appointees not demonstrate independence in these cases? Or, should their votes against Trump in other cases balance out their votes for Trump in these cases?

Justice Kagan made this point expressly during her remarks at the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference. She said that the Court "has checked the executive branch" in "very significant cases." In these cases, Kagan explained, "it's the chief justice with a little bit of a floating cast of characters around him." Truly, she views Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett as an interchangeable "floating cast of characters." The liberals (almost) aways vote in lockstep, but a conservative vote is always up for grabs. Tell us how you really feel, Elena. (I'll have much more to say about Kagan's comments at Catholic University in my next Civitas column.)

Baude jokes about the Chief Justice writing an opinion essay for all the cases where he wrote the majority opinion ruling against Trump. But reality is stranger than fiction. The truth is John Roberts writes opinion essays every term. Everything he says and does is designed to maintain some faux equilibrium. He even bundles together some essays (Slaughter and Cook) to maximize press coverage. The better question is what would Justices Thomas and Alito write if they were untethered?

The measure of independence cannot be how often Trump loses. Justices Thomas and Alito argue in those cases that the law actually supports Trump. They would contend (I think) that their colleagues' lack of independence explain their votes. Or, as Justice Alito writes in his new book, they are "insecure originalists."

Baude's essay also suffers from a tragic case of bothesidesism. He tries very, very hard to cast aspersion on the right as well as the left.

With their sweeping midterm victory, Democrats are exploring ideas for a package of reforms to the Supreme Court. And it's not just Democrats: In recent months, the court has managed to invite calls for reform from both sides of the aisle. Some conservatives are even willing to discuss expanding the number of justices.

On the left, presidential candidates and elected members of Congress have called for Court expansion. On the right, members of the House and Senate introduced a constitutional amendment to fix the size of the Court at 9. Which conservatives called for Court expansion? Other than some MAGA posters, I can't think of anyone relevant.

Baude writes further:

Some on the right see these decisions as betrayals. But the right-wing critics fail to possess patience or to understand constitutional principle. Conservative legal thinkers spent two generations rightly emphasizing the importance of originalist interpretation and limited government. And while some on the right want to move away from these principles now that they can frustrate right-wing rule, what goes around comes around, and principles will be worth more in the long run.

It is pretty clear Baude is talking about Trump who has posted on X about how his appointees betrayed him. Shame on President Trump for not possessing the patience of a life-tenured law professor and failing to read the latest issue of the Harvard Law Review. Come on. Trump is a politician who has two years left in office. His time horizon and expectations are different from academics. The problem, of course, is that Thomas and Alito insist that originalist principles support the President. It is Chief Justice Roberts, the Judge Hercules in Baude's World, who eschews any sort of originalist jurisprudence.

Baude continues to point out problems with the Court. These are all liberal complaints. Everything he says may as well be taken from the Strict Scrutiny podcast:

This is not to say that the court is doing perfectly well. It has plenty of problems. The justices face many hard cases, and they are subject to human temptations. They also struggle with the exercise of discretion in the when and how of their rulings, which can seem arbitrary or overly manipulative. These struggles are especially apparent in the court's inconsistent treatment of precedents, in its decisions about which cases to take in the first place and in the many controversies over its "shadow docket" (or interim orders docket, if you prefer).

Does Baude see any problem with decisions like Obergefell which overruled millenia of precedent to invent a constitutional right without any basis in original meaning? Did that ruling justify "court reform"?

In the end, Baude mentions almost under his breath that "modest Court reform" might include "term limits."

There is one good argument for court reform: If anything, it might have only a placebo effect — it would be a fake medicine, causing some people to feel cured and convincing the public that all of the problems they ascribe to the court have been solved. A few more modest court reforms, such as gift caps or even term limits, may well be mostly harmless. If pointless reforms cause many Americans to believe that the court is better — more independent, less corrupt and so on — that would be great for the country.

Baude does not tell us whether term limits require a constitutional amendment, or if they can be imposed by statute. I suspect this passage will be the main sentence from Baude's essay that people end up citing. To call term limits "modest" gives the whole game away. Baude says Term limits would make America great again!

Here is my bottom line. I would rather that the current crop of Justices fearlessly follow the meaning of the Constitution, results be damned, then feign "independence" as a means to avoid "Court Reform." What is the consolation prize for faking independence? Baude offers that term limits would be "harmless," basically a placebo, to help the body politic. With friends like these, who needs enemies? Judges cannot control what politicians do. They should not try to play a game.

It would not surprise me if Chief Justice Roberts retires when a Democrat is President to permanently bolster his reputation for independence. Progressives and their allies would place Roberts in the Judicial Parthenon alongside John Marshall and others. But John Glover is still not fooling anyone.

John Yoo Joins the Exodus from California; Departs for Texas

The University of California at Berkeley's law school loses its last right-leaning professor to teach in public law.

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The Daily Californian reports that Professor John Yoo is leaving the University of California at Berkeley's law school. Beginning next year, he will be full-time at the University of Texas at Austin's School of Civic Leadership.

From the story:

"Let the celebrations at my fan clubs in the City of Berkeley begin," Yoo said in an email. "Great as our university is, it would not allow a school to focus on restoring the central importance of western civilization to the education of all undergraduates." . . .

"I am sorry, however, that my departure will reduce the number of conservative professors in public law at Berkeley by 100 percent," Yoo said in the email. "I hope that the university will take this as an opportunity to consider that the notion of diversity should, most importantly, include ideology, not just the usual race, gender, and economic categories that my colleagues usually mean by diversity."

There had been one other right-leaning law professor at Berkeley, our co-blogger Orin Kerr, but he left Berkeley for Stanford in 2025.

According to Dean of Berkeley Law Erwin Chemerinsky, Yoo's decision to leave the faculty was entirely his own.

"John (Yoo) has been an important part of the faculty for many years," Chemerinsky said in an email. "This was entirely John's decision to retire. … He has indicated to me for a few years his thoughts about retiring. John is a very successful teacher and an eminent scholar." . . .

Yoo's move is also less drastic than it might appear, as he is moving from one blue state to another.  All of the other California transplants that have moved to Austin helped make sure of that (with a major assist from the Republican Party).

Supreme Court

This Supreme Court "Deserves Our Celebration, Not Our Condemnation"

Prof. William Baude on the Supreme Court and the false promise of court reform.

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Professor William Baude has an op-ed in the New York Times, "This Is What an Independent, Competent Supreme Court Looks Like," defending the Supreme Court against its critics, left and right, and suggesting that many calls for court reform are misguided.

Noting that the Democratic electoral sweep has bolstered calls for reforming, and perhaps expanding, the Court to alter its course, Baude writes:

The left, understandably, strongly opposes the court's recent rulings on abortion, the Voting Rights Act, the unitary executive and so on. These decisions are a big deal. But court reformers still suffer from a failure of perspective. If Chief Justice John Roberts could write an opinion essay, I would imagine him saying: "What? Ruling against the administration's misuse of the National Guard, sweeping emergency tariffs and attack on birthright citizenship, plus preserving the independence of the Federal Reserve and the integrity of the midterm elections, wasn't enough for you?"

The court has ruled against the administration in high-stakes cases on those issues all in the past year. And it has done so even though six of the justices were appointed by members of the president's party — three by President Trump himself. . . .

Under the circumstances of the second Trump term, the Supreme Court is doing amazingly well. If anything, it deserves our celebration, not our condemnation.

Indeed, the Court's conservatives, on the whole, have shown themselves more willing to constrain Trump's excesses than were the Court's liberals when faced with executive branch overreach by Presidents Biden or Obama.

Baude notes that the Court's willingness to reject Trump Administration priorities has caused some on the Right to question the conservative legal movement's commitment to originalism, and cautions that "what goes around comes around, and principles will be worth more in the long run." Of course, some conservatives' criticisms of the Court are for its failure to adhere to the principles some justices espouse (including originalism), not that those principles are getting in the way of making America great again.

On the question of judicial reform, Baude strikes a cautionary note, particularly if court reform is nothing more than an effort to reverse the Court's current trajectory.

In the abstract, there is nothing wrong with bipartisan judicial reform. The Supreme Court should not be preserved in amber. But partisan judicial reform — reform motivated by frustration with specific judicial decisions and the hope that the reformed court will rule differently — is a dangerous game. Because partisan reform is a tactic equally available to both sides, it accomplishes little in the long run except to accelerate the court's transformation into a political superweapon. Such a tactic might be a short-run necessity in extreme circumstances, but we are far from those extremes.

He also--quite correctly--calls out the obsession with judicial ethics as "superficial." He could add that such concerns are nearly always one-sided and selective. While it may be appropriate to further limit the justices' outside income or ability to accept gifts, we should not pretend that any such reforms would have any effect on the Court's decisions.

The justices' views on big issues are well formed. The justices themselves aren't for sale; book income reflects their increasing celebrity, not any specific quid pro quo. To be sure, it is quite possible that travel and gifts and book sales subtly reinforce the justices' incentives to play to their respective fan bases. But this kind of corruption is quite indirect, and at the same time comes from so much more than money. So ethics reform is unlikely to change much about what the court actually does.

In the end, Baude thinks the best argument for court reform is as a placebo: To convince the public that something has been done so that attention can turn to more pressing issues. As he concludes this point: "If pointless reforms cause many Americans to believe that the court is better — more independent, less corrupt and so on — that would be great for the country."

I largely agree with Baude's piece, though I may be more open to certain sorts of reforms than he reveals in this piece. Reforms that represent genuine political engagement with the work of the courts, such as measures to alter or channel jurisdiction could be quite beneficial. Measures to reduce backlogs, limit forum shopping, constrain unwarranted or overly expansive equitable relief, and expand the Court's mandatory jurisdiction are all worth considering. They also represent the sort of meaningful legislation that Congress should engage in--legislation that requires Congress to take seriously its constitutional responsibilities. (In this regard, I view the willingness to engage with jurisdictional questions in the pending infrastructure reform bill to be a welcome sign, even if I might not endorse every jurisdictional measure the bill contains.)

As Baude ends his essay, courts are not above criticism, and this includes the Supreme Court. It is nonetheless is important to distinguish between criticisms of how the Court operates and performs its job from substantive or ideological disagreement with the decisions the Court reaches.

Free Speech

No Pseudonymity for Woman Alleging She Was Falsely Accused of Sexual Relationship with Jeffrey Epstein, Doxed

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From Doe v. Doe (E.D. Pa.), decided today by Judge Gerald Pappert:

Jane Doe alleges four X (formerly Twitter) users falsely accused her of having a sexual relationship with Jeffrey Epstein and doxxed her by posting on the social networking site her full name, employment and education history, phone numbers and addresses. Doe asserts claims for defamation, false light, public disclosure of private facts and aiding and abetting. She seeks to proceed under a pseudonym because she fears for her safety, along with additional reputational and professional harm. The Court denies the motion because Doe's fear of harm does not outweigh the public's interest in open litigation.

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Criminal Justice

19-Year-Old Gets Probation (+ 6 Months Served) "After Firing over 20 Rounds, Shooting Boy Playing Basketball"

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WJLA (ABC-7) reports:

Darius Drew pleaded guilty on Aug. 10 to aggravated assault and carrying a pistol without a license. Although prosecutors asked Superior Court Judge Jennifer Di Toro for a five-year prison term, she imposed a suspended 24-month sentence and placed him on probation under the Youth Rehabilitation Act, over the government's objection.

According to the government's evidence, Drew rode a Lime bike into an alley in the 700 block of Taylor Street NW on May 11.

Surveillance video showed him firing at a car parked in the alley. Seconds later, Drew fired toward a house near the alley in the 4100 block of Ninth Street NW, striking a boy who was playing basketball at a nearby recreation center. The boy suffered a leg injury.

Drew fired more than 20 rounds from two locations, prosecutors said….

From the opinion in U.S. v. Drew, released Monday by D.C. Superior Court Judge Jennifer A. Di Toro:

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Note to Second Circuit: Antisemitic Violence Shouldn't Get a Judicial Pass

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Torres v. Carlson, currently pending before the Second Circuit, is a case brought by two Columbia University janitors under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (KKK Act).

According to their complaint, masked individuals from Columbia University's anti-Israel alliance, armed with hammers, knives, bolt cutters, chains, and zip ties, stormed Columbia's Hamilton Hall and confronted the two men. The janitors' refusal to yield drew the ire of the rioters, who then assaulted them, detained them, and slurred them as Jew-lovers, Jew-workers, and Zionists. The rioters proceeded to seize the building, break windows to chain the doors shut, barricaded themselves inside, and unfurled banners declaring an "Intifada."

Assuming the allegations are true, this seems like an open and shut case under the KKK Act, which the Supreme Court has described as reaching organized mob violence directed at a protected group and those perceived as standing with it. See Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983).

Nevertheless, the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Covington & Burling has filed an amicus brief on behalf of Jon D. Michael of UCLA Law School, Matthew Segal of Tufts, with the Second Circuit, taking issue with the district court's decisions to:

(1) resolve at the pleading stage questions of motive in the defendants' favor, crediting the defendants' characterization of their own motives over the plaintiffs' allegations and dismissing explicit antisemitic epithets as irrelevant;

(2) treat supposed political motive as categorically negating discriminatory animus—disregarding both the mixed-motive framework that operates across federal antidiscrimination law and the settled principle that speech, even on political subjects, can evidence discriminatory intent; and,

(3) view Jewish disagreement about whether all anti-Zionism is inherently antisemitic as dispositive proof that the specific anti-Zionist rhetoric in this case was not plausibly antisemitic—a standard that conflicts with binding precedent, contradicts how courts apply antidiscrimination law to groups other than Jews, and improperly gives any individual Jew the power to veto discrimination claims by all other Jews.

As an aside, there are several federal court decisions arising out of post-October 7 protest activity that strike many, including me, as applying stricter standards to civil rights plaintiffs claiming anti-Jewish violations of civil rights laws than precedent suggests applies to other plaintiffs.

Politics

Pronouncing Law Latin

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A conversation with a student reminded me of one of my favorite articles, by my UCLA colleague Henry A. Kelly (who is emeritus in the English Department). It's called "Lawyers' Latin: Loquenda ut Vulgus?," and here's the introduction (though all 14 pages of the article are much worth reading):

In "Rex v. Venables and Others: The Dead Pronunciation" (one of A. P. Herbert's "Misleading Cases"), Mr. Wick, an advocate making his first appearance in the High Court, tries out his textbook Latin before the Lord Chief Justice. The young advocate, attempting to apply for a writ of certiorari, asks for "a rule of neesee of kairtiorahree." The Lord Chief Justice pretends not to understand this or any other of Mr. Wick's Latin phrases. When ultra vires is rendered ooltrah weerayze, the Court interrupts: "Stop! Listen, Mr. Wick. The two groups of sounds last formed by you have no meaning for me, and I order you not to make use of them again."

Although the unfortunate Mr. Wick is genuinely baffled by the Court's pronunciation of Latin terms, he is offered scant sympathy:

It is not for me at my time of life to learn a new language; it is not for the King's judges to remodel their diction according to the whims of pedagogues or the habits of the Junior Bar. The bitter conclusion is, Mr. Wick, that you must go away and learn to pronounce the Latin tongue correctly, according to the immemorial practice of your profession.

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Free Speech

"Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press: Some Illustrative Examples"

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This short new article of mine has now been published in the Notre Dame Law Review. The Introduction:

There are many important big-picture questions about original meaning and the Free Speech, Free Press, Assembly, and Petition Clauses. This short Essay will leave those questions for others. Instead, it will offer as illustrations some specific, concrete questions—and, in some instances, answers—about original meaning and the freedom of expression. I hope these narrow illustrations can help us think about the broader questions.

From the table of contents, which should illustrate the subjects I cover:

I. Broad Evidence, and Silently Consistent Precedents
A. "The Liberty of the Press Is Not Confined to Newspapers and Periodicals"
B. Symbolic Expression
C. Civil Liability
II. Scant Evidence: Provoking a Riot
III. Ambiguous Evidence: Enjoining Repetition of Libels

And the Conclusion:

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Free Speech

Free Speech Unmuted: The Devil and Free Speech

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Can a state capitol allow private groups to put up holiday displays while turning away the Satanic Temple? Jane Bambauer and I examine an Iowa case to explain when the government can control speech on public property—and when it must give rival viewpoints equal access. We also discuss government speech, "public fora," and religious expression on government property.

Also check out our past episodes:

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Guns

Justice Thomas on the Second Amendment in "Sensitive Places"

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From Justice Thomas's statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Novotny v. Moore:

Maryland is one of several States that prohibit law-abiding gun owners from carrying firearms in a wide variety of public places. Under Maryland law, an individual may not carry a firearm in public demonstrations, mass transit, places of amusement, healthcare facilities, locations that sell alcohol for onsite consumption, and tens of thousands of acres of state park and forest land. The Fourth Circuit upheld these restrictions against petitioners' Second Amendment challenge because it concluded that each law banned firearms in a "sensitive place."

I am skeptical that each of these laws "is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation" in "sensitive places." Still, I agree with the Court's decision not to grant certiorari. Because each Maryland statute implicates a distinct historical tradition of firearm regulation, the breadth of petitioners' challenge would complicate our review. In an appropriate and more narrowly focused case, however, we should consider the scope of States' authority to ban firearms in "sensitive places."

The Second Amendment recognizes the people's "inherent" right to keep and bear firearms, a right that admits of only historically grounded exceptions. Before and after the founding, it was well understood that individuals enjoyed a natural right to keep and bear arms, which included the right to carry firearms in public spaces for self-defense. The Constitution "codified [that] pre-existing right." The first generations after the founding recognized the breadth of the Second Amendment's "guarante[e]," and "those who sought to carry firearms publicly and peaceably in antebellum America were generally free to do so." Thus, when a State seeks to restrict the right to bear arms—including by limiting the places in which a law-abiding citizen may carry his firearm—the State must root its law in the Second Amendment's "historical understanding" by "demonstrat[ing] that the regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation."

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