The Volokh Conspiracy

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The Volokh Conspiracy

Justice John Marshall Harlan's Lecture Notes On Wong Kim Ark

An excerpt from my 2013 co-authored article on Harlan's constitutional law lectures.

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Last week, while listening to the oral argument in Trump v. Barbara, I was pleasantly surprised to hear Justice Gorsuch ask the Solicitor General and Cecilia Wang, counsel for the ACLU, about Justice Harlan's constitutional law lectures concerning Wong Kim Ark. Back in 2013, Brian Frye, Michael McCloskey, and I transcribed and published all of Harlan's lecture. This was done the old-fashioned way, without the benefit of AI. We went to the Rare Books room at the Library of Congress, and photographed more than 500 pages of archived materials. We also published an article in the George Washington Law Review analyzing the lecture notes.

Given the recent attention to Justice Harlan, I thought it would be helpful to reproduce both our discussion of Harlan's lecture on Wong Kim Ark, as well as the full transcript from the classes from before and after Wong Kim Ark was decided. (Yes, Harlan talked about the case while it was pending, and previewed his vote). Those excerpts appear in this post.

The ACLU and Justice Gorsuch accurately quoted the lecture notes, but I think you need to read the full context to understand Harlan's position. I will have more to say about Harlan's view in separate writing. Here, I just want to lay out the background.

Josh Blackman, Brian Frye and Michael McCloskey, John Marshall Harlan: Professor of Law, 81 George Washington Law Review 1063 (2013).

Brian Frye, Josh Blackman, and Michael McCloskey, Justice John Marshall Harlan: Lectures on Constitutional Law, 1897-98, 81 George Washington Law Review Arguendo 12 (2013).

C. American Citizenship and Equal Protection

One of Harlan's most passionate lectures was his discussion of United States v. Wong Kim Ark329 on March 19, 1898.330 In Wong Kim Ark, the Supreme Court considered whether birth in the United States was sufficient to grant United States citizenship to a person of Chinese descent.331 The Court, in a 6–2 decision by Justice Gray, held that Wong Kim Ark, who was born in the United States to Chinese citizens, acquired American citizenship at birth by the principle of jus soli.332 Chief Justice Fuller, joined by Justice Harlan, dissented, arguing for the principle of jus sanguinis, under which a child inherits citizenship from his or her father, regardless of birthplace.333

Wong Kim Ark was argued on March 5 and 8, 1897.334 When Harlan discussed it in class on March 19, 1898, he expressed views closely reflecting the dissent he eventually joined.335 Harlan argued that Chinese-Americans could not be assimilated into the American populace, and thus were not entitled to birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.336 The case would be decided nine days later on March 28, 1898, after which Harlan explained how he reconciled his views with those of the majority.337 This discussion illuminates Harlan's chimerical views on race, and juxtaposes his enlightened dissents in Plessy v. Ferguson338 and the Civil Rights Cases339 with his xenophobic views in Wong Kim Ark.

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Birthright Citizenship

The Birthright Citizenship Question that Stumped the Solicitor General

It was surprising that the Solicitor General did not appear to have thought much legislative power under Section 5.

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In reviewing the Supreme Court oral argument in United States v. Barbara, in which the justices considered the lawfulness of President Trump's anti-birthright-citizenship Executive Order, I was struck by an exchange in which a fairly obvious question seemed to catch the SG off guard.

Justice Kavanaugh asked the Solicitor General about the extent to which Congress might have authority to modify the contours of birthright citizenship, and the SG's response suggested he had never pondered this question before.  Here is the transcript of exchange:

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Of what relevance, if any, do you think Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment has here that gives Congress the power to enforce the article, the Fourteenth Amendment, by appropriate  legislation? Does that give Congress room here, or do you not think so?

GENERAL SAUER: I --I do think that a ruling in our favor would leave room for Congress. I --I don't think you have to rely on Section 5. I think that Congress has its own inherent power to grant citizenship by statute. So, if the Court were to rule in our favor for the classes of individuals that they say should be covered, Congress has the latitude to do that.

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: How much room do you think Section 5 gives, if any --and it may not be any --Congress to interpret the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" or to define that? Does it --is that --is that relevant at all?

GENERAL SAUER: It's a great question, and I'm thinking about it for the first time. I assume it would be governed by the congruence and proportionality test from this Court's case law. How that would apply here, I don't know. And I don't think it's presented because our contention is that the statute means exactly the same thing. If anything is congruent and proportional, it's that. And I think the Court held that in United States against Georgia.

I understand that the SG is trying to defend the Executive Order, and it is quite unlikely that Congress is going to enact legislation on birthright citizenship any time soon, but I was nonetheless quite struck to hear the SG confess he had not previously considered the extent to which Congress might have the power to define who is "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States for purposes of birthright citizenship, as this would seem to be quite relevant to the legal issues in play.

I previously blogged on the oral argument in Barbara here.

Upcoming Visiting Position at University of Virginia

I will be a Visiting Professor at the University of VIrginia School of Law during the Fall 2026 semester.

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UVA

I would like to take this opportunity to announce that I will be a Visiting Professor at University of Virginia School of Law during the Fall 2026 semester. It is an honor to be invited to visit at one of the nation's very top law schools. I know some UVA faculty already, and look forward to meeting more faculty and students while there.

During that semester, I will continue to be an employee of the mighty Commonwealth of Virginia (both UVA and my permanent home, George Mason University, are Virginia state universities). I will also continue my work as Simon Chair in Constitutional Studies at the Cato Institute. Similarly, I will continue to blog regularly right here at the Volokh Conspiracy site.

"The First Tell Was the File Name of the Principal Brief: 'Cocounsel Skill Results'"

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From Friday's Sixth Circuit decision in U.S. v. Farris, by Judges Eric Clay, Julia Gibbons, and Whitney Hermandorfer:

Howe [a court-appointed criminal defense lawyer appealing a drug trafficking sentence] filed two briefs—a principal brief and a reply—on behalf of Farris. Upon our initial review of the case, we began to suspect that Howe's briefs were generated, at least in part, by artificial-intelligence software. The first tell was the file name of the principal brief: "CoCounsel Skill Results." CoCounsel is the name of Westlaw's internal artificial-intelligence platform. From our vantage point, that file-name abnormality suggested that Howe's brief might have derived not from Howe's independent work, but directly from artificial-intelligence software.

Further suspicions arose when, during our substantive review of the briefs, we discovered three problematic citations:

Page 4 of the principal brief states, "The Guidelines' commentary makes clear that '[m]ere presence or knowledge of the offense is not sufficient to make a person a participant.' U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.1."

Page 10 of the principal brief states, "The Sixth Circuit has reversed role enhancements on similar facts. In Washington, the Court held that 'simply facilitating the offense without exercising decision-making authority is insufficient.' 715 F.3d at 985."

Page 10 of the principal brief states, "Likewise, in Anthony, the Court vacated a § 3B1.1 enhancement because '[t]here was no evidence [the defendant] directed or supervised anyone else.'"

The reply brief repeats the latter two quotations. Each of these citations references genuine legal authorities. But the purported direct quotations do not appear in their cited sources. And upon deeper review, we were unable to locate any relevant legal authority that contained the same or substantially similar language as the above quotations. So, it did not appear that the misattributions involved mere citation mix-ups or transcription errors.

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Second Amendment Roundup: U.S. Supports Rehearing in D.C. Magazine Ban Case

The issue is whether the invalid magazine ban infects the registration-licensing convictions.

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The United States has filed a Response to the District of Columbia's Petition for Rehearing En Banc in Benson v. United States, in which the D.C. Court of Appeals held the District's magazine ban to violate the Second Amendment.  Applying Heller and Bruen, the court held that magazines "are unquestionably arms, they are in not only common but ubiquitous use for lawful purposes, and there is no history or tradition of blanket bans on arms in such common use…."  The U.S. agrees with that, but argues that the ban should have been held unconstitutional as applied, not facially.

Mr. Benson possessed a 30-round magazine, but that number is statutorily irrelevant, as the District bans any magazine holding over 10 rounds.  The court explained:

The 11+ magazine ban is facially unconstitutional because it is unconstitutional on its plain terms, not just in some idiosyncratic applications, and it is not readily susceptible to any judicial narrowing that avoids its constitutional infirmities. The fact that it captures some conduct that hypothetically could have been proscribed by a more narrow statute is beside the point. It might be that a ban on 30-round magazines, or on 100-round magazines, would pass constitutional muster. But in no sense does that mean that this law could be constitutionally applied to prosecute those who possess those larger magazines. Because this law does not require the government to prove those higher capacities, it has not drawn the line in a constitutionally permissible place.

The United States objects based on the theory that the statute is not unconstitutional in all applications, such as a ban on a 100-round magazine might be.  It states: "In other words, because the statute had some unconstitutional applications—namely, banning (say) 12-round magazines—the entire statute has to fall. That analysis gets the Rahimi inquiry backwards: the statute should survive if it 'is constitutional in some of its applications.'"  (Emphasis added.)  But what the U.S. calls "the statute" is not this statute.  The actual statute here includes no constitutionally-permissible application.  By contrast, in Rahimi itself, the law was not unconstitutional in all applications because the defendant himself was found to represent "a credible threat to the physical safety" of an intimate partner or child, the exact terms of the law.

The Supreme Court in Heller held the D.C. handgun ban to be unconstitutional in all applications, even though fully-automatic handguns or possession by a felon could be banned under some other laws.  Bruen held New York's carry ban unconstitutional in all applications to be violative of the Second Amendment, even though carrying of handguns could be banned in courts under separate laws.

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Free Speech

D.C. Circuit Declines to Stay Department of War's "Supply-Chain Risk" Designation of Claude

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From today's order by Judges Karen LeCraft Henderson, Gregory Katsas, and Neomi Rao in Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Dep't of War:

Anthropic PBC develops Claude, a family of advanced artificial-intelligence models. In 2024, the Department of Defense (which now calls itself the Department of War) began using Claude in connection with various military operations.

But on March 3, 2026, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth determined that procuring AI goods or services from Anthropic presents a supply-chain risk to national security under 41 U.S.C. § 4713. The impetus for the determination was Anthropic's refusal to contractually authorize the Department to use Claude for mass domestic surveillance or lethal autonomous warfare. As a result, the Department has canceled its contracts with Anthropic, begun to remove Claude from its systems, and prohibited its other contractors from using Anthropic as a subcontractor on work performed for the Department. The Department has not prohibited contractors from using Claude for work performed for entities other than the Department.

Anthropic seeks review of the Secretary's determination under section 4713 to bar the company from providing goods or services to the Department. It claims that the determination was contrary to law, unconstitutional, and arbitrary. Anthropic seeks a stay pending review on the merits or, in the alternative, expedited consideration of the merits.

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Free Speech

"Hatchet Wielding Hitchhiker" / Convicted Murderer Caleb McGillvary Loses Defamation Case Against Rolling Stone

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From yesterday's opinion in McGillvary v. Rolling Stone, LLC, by Judges Richard Wesley, Richard Sullivan, and Steven Menashi:

McGillvary alleges that Rolling Stone defamed him in a 2023 article, "DARK TALE: A Hatchet Wielding Hitchhiker Went Viral. Then He Killed Someone," that, by way of reviewing a forthcoming television documentary, described his involvement in thwarting a high-profile attack in 2013 (for which he was cleared of any wrongdoing) and in committing a later unrelated murder for which he was convicted and is now serving a fifty-seven-year sentence….

McGillvary contends that the article contained four libelous statements: (i) "[t]hose who knew [McGillvary] describe [him] as prone to fits of rage" (the "fits of rage" statement); (ii) "[McGillvary] tried to start a fire in the family home and was subsequently sent into foster care at the age of 13" (the "fire starter" statement); (iii) "[McGillvary] began bragging to Fresno locals that he'd handed [McBride] a joint laced with a number of drugs" (the "laced-joint" statement); and (iv) McGillvary told McBride "that they were both ghosts" and encouraged him to drive his truck into a crowd of people "right now" since "nobody could see us" (the "ghosts" statement). We address each statement in turn.

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My Interview with Peter Canellos, Author Of "Sam Alito and the Triumph of the Conservative Legal Movement"

Eleven questions on YLS, SG, OLC, DNJ, CA3, GWB, and SCOTUS.

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I am very excited to announce the release of Peter Canellos's new book on Justice Alito, titled "Revenge for the Sixties: Sam Alito and the Triumph of the Conservative Legal Movement." Peter previously wrote a readable and insightful biography of Justice John Marshall Harlan I, "The Great Dissenter."

I interviewed Peter Canellos and posed eleven questions on YLS, OSG, OLC, DNJ, CA3, GWB, and SCOTUS. Extra credit if you get all the acronym references. The interview is published at Civitas Outlook.

One of the more fascinating insights is how the Alito family was affected by the Warren Court:

JB: Let's jump back to the beginning. In the 1950s, Trenton, New Jersey, was a conservative blue collar suburb of Philadelphia with a large Catholic population, many of whom were Italian. One of the defining features of being a conservative is trying to conserve that which was. Or, as President Trump might say, America was great, became less than great, and that greatness must be restored. What values did Trenton instill in a young Sam Alito that Justice Alito values today? Relatedly, could you discuss how the decisions of the Warren Court impacted the Alito family? This was one of the more fascinating tidbits from Alito's early life in your book.

PC: Justice Alito strongly identifies with a story of struggle that is familiar to many children and grandchildren of European immigrants, including myself. His father and grandparents came to America seeking opportunity, faced hardships and prejudice (a daily reality for Italian Americans in the Chambersburg section of Trenton, where his parents grew up), and then overcame them by dint of hard work and sacrifice. This is a narrative that spans generations. His parents worked extra jobs to put themselves through college and graduate school. Alito and his sister had it much easier, but were intensely aware that they were carrying the hopes and dreams of their parents and grandparents. And Alito fulfilled his family's expectations to a spectacular degree: top of his high-school class, editor of the school newspaper, winner of multiple citizenship prizes.

But this is not, in my opinion, a MAGA story about lost greatness. The Alitos believed in upward mobility. Despite their very devout Catholicism, his parents preferred public education. Each, at various points, worked in public schools. So did Alito's uncle. Moving beyond Chambersburg was a goal to be strived for, not an occasion for sadness or regret. Nonetheless, Justice Alito has spoken in interviews of his disappointment at what he sees as the run-down condition of Trenton, and even as far back as high school, he was faced with the destruction of a large swath of the city in the race riots that followed Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.'s assassination. Now, when Alito bemoans the fate of Chambersburg, he does so with a tone of nostalgia. It was the place where Italians put down roots, created an ethnic enclave, and established businesses like the Italian Peoples Bakery & Deli. It's widely noted that Alito, as a jurist, has a strong sense of tradition. He believes traditions should be enshrined in the Constitution, as long as they were in place at the time of the framing. It's a deeply sentimental, atavistic vision that grew out of his identification with his family's immigrant tale.

A later part of that tale is his parents feeling buffeted by the demands of the Warren Court. His mother, Rose, used Bible passages in her classes as a public-school teacher in Hamilton Township. But the Warren Court ruled such teachings unconstitutional, on the grounds that they alienated non-believers. His father, as the research chief for the New Jersey legislature, was handed the politically freighted task of equalizing the populations of state House and Senate districts, the result of another Warren Court decision demanding equal apportionment. Alito recalled lying in bed listening to the clicking of his father's slide rule as he struggled with the Herculean task.

I was also intrigued by the parallel paths that young John Roberts and Samuel Alito took through the Reagan Justice Department--yet the both wound up on the Supreme Court:

JB: Both a young John Roberts and a young Samuel Alito served in the Reagan Justice Department. But Roberts entered as a political appointee, climbing the ranks from Special Assistant to the Attorney General to Associate White House Counsel. By contrast, Alito entered the government as a civil servant. Between 1977 and 1981, he served as an Assistant United States Attorney in New Jersey. His boss was the Chief of Appeals, Mary Anne Barry Trump, the sister of the future President. But in 1981, he joined the Solicitor General's Office. How did a civil servant come to the attention of the Solicitor General Rex Lee? In 1986, Alito moved over to the Office of Legal Counsel under Chuck Cooper. How did he get that position? How did Attorney General Meese influence Alito?

PC: Rex Lee didn't view himself as a conservative activist. His greatest pride as solicitor general was his strong record of winning cases before the Supreme Court. During his years in the U.S. Attorney's office of New Jersey, Alito proved to be an adept appellate lawyer. He had the kind of pure legal acumen that Lee wanted in his office.

During the second Reagan Administration, however, the tide turned significantly. The new Attorney General, Ed Meese, wanted only conservatives in his inner circle. Alito lacked the political bona fides of other Meese aides. Chuck Cooper, who had served in the more activist Civil Rights Division, earned Meese's trust as a conservative. And Cooper had found Alito to be a rare ally in the solicitor general's office; the two men agreed on the need to push civil rights law in a more conservative direction. So when Cooper became the head of Meese's Office of Legal Counsel, he decided that he needed Alito as his top deputy. But he had to prove to Meese that Alito was really a conservative. Cooper coached Alito through a letter explaining the roots of his conservatism, which Cooper then shared with Meese's team as evidence of Alito's ideological correctness. In the letter, Alito made some startling assertions, including that he was a member of Concerned Alumni of Princeton, which opposed admitting women. The letter helped Alito get the job in the Office of Legal Counsel, but later it would almost derail his Supreme Court nomination.

You will learn a lot about Justice Alito.

Laws/Rules Made Up to Apply to Israel

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Over on X, @Optimist_Gaza challenged readers to list five examples of supposed international law Israel's critics invented to apply to Israel's detriment.

Shany Mor (@ShMMor) quickly came up with twenty-three off the top of his head (reprinted with Shany's permission).

1. Designating a combatant a journalist automatically immunizes that combatant from attack.

2. A territory is occupied even if there is no presence whatsoever after a hostile armed force by virtue of being blockaded.

3. A famine can be declared where people are not dying of starvation.

4. A territory becomes the sovereign title of one party — even when that party never exercised sovereignty over it in the past — when a second party conquers it from a third party which attacked it.

5. An armistice line explicitly set by all parties in an armistice agreement as not constituting an international border becomes one when the armistice is violated and war relaunched. But only to the advantage of the aggressing and losing party.

6. An unimplemented non-binding resolution to create an international zone permanently excludes sovereignty by one state over any part of the zone, but has no such effect on other parties, such that, say West Jerusalem can't be considered to be in Israel, but Bethlehem is "occupied Palestinian territory."

7. A state is not allowed designate a city inside its sovereign borders as its capital.

8. If one belligerent party attacks another with rockets, the attacked party is now responsible for feeding the civilians of the attacking party. Read More

Tariffs

Our Amicus Brief in the Section 122 Tariff Case

I submitted the brief on behalf of the Cato Institute and myself.

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Earlier today, the Cato Institute and I filed an amicus brief in Burlap and Barrel, Inc. v. Trump, one of the cases challenging Trump's massive new Section 122 tariffs before the US Court of International Trade. The case  was filed by the Liberty Justice Center (LJC), the same public interest group that I worked with on the earlier case that led to the invalidation of Trump's earlier IEEPA tariffs by the Supreme Court. I am not one of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs in this new case. But Cato and I are happy to support LJC and others in this important cause. For that reason, I wrote this brief.

Here is an excerpt from the Introduction to our brief, which summarizes our arguments:

Since the invalidation of the massive International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs, by the Supreme Court in Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 146 S. Ct. 628 (2026),  the President has sought to effect a similar usurpation of congressional tariff authority by using Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose 10 percent tariffs (likely to be increased to 15 percent) on imports from almost all our trading partners. This sweeping imposition is just as illegal as the previous one was, and for many of the same reasons.

Part I briefly explains why Section 122 simply cannot be used in current circumstances. The statute only permits tariffs for up to 150 days in response to "fundamental international payments problems" that cause "large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits" or "an imminent and significant depreciation of the dollar," or create a need to cooperate with other countries in addressing an "international balance-of-payments disequilibrium." 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a). These conditions simply cannot exist in a flexible exchange rate regime of the sort in place today.

In Part II, amici explain why, if there is any ambiguity about whether Section 122 authorizes the massive tariffs imposed by the administration, the major questions doctrine (MQD) requires this issue to be resolved against the Defendants. The major questions doctrine requires Congress to "speak clearly" when it assigns to the executive "decisions of vast 'economic and political significance.'" Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014). The impact of the massive new Section 122 tariffs is as large or larger than many previous policies invalidated by the Supreme Court on major questions doctrine grounds. And the tariff power is not exempt from major questions scrutiny on the supposed ground that it is a "foreign affairs" power. The major questions doctrine also counts against giving the administration a blank check in determining whether the preconditions to invoke Section 122 exist.

Part III shows that, if Section 122 did grant the President the power he claims, it would violate the nondelegation doctrine, which constrains transfer of legislative power to the executive. "[T]he core Congressional power to impose taxes such as tariffs is vested exclusively in the legislative branch by the Constitution." V.O.S. Selections v. Trump, 149 F.4th 1312, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2025), aff'd sub nom. Learning Res., 146 S. Ct. 628 (2026). If the Defendants' interpretation of Section 122 is correct, the President could claim there is a balance-of-payments crisis at virtually any time and repeatedly impose 15% tariffs against virtually any imports from any country, circumventing the 150-day time restriction simply by declaring a new balance-of-payments problem exists when earlier tariffs expire. Such a sweeping delegation of a core congressional power would violate the requirements that Congress cannot make "boundless" delegations of the power to tax, and that "[t]he 'guidance' needed is greater when an agency action will 'affect the entire national economy' than when it addresses a narrow, technical issue." FCC v. Consumers' Research, 145 S. Ct. 2482, 2497, 2501 (2025) (quotation omitted).

Cato and I are grateful to Joshua Claybourn of Jackson Kelly, PLLC, and his firm for their invaluable assistance in helping draft, format, and file the brief on short notice.

I have previously written about the Section 122 tariffs and the important issues they raise here, here, and here.

Originalism

"The Meese Prize for Excellence in Originalist Scholarship," Nominations Due May 15

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From the announcement page:

The Federalist Society is pleased to announce a $15,000 annual prize for new scholarship that makes a distinct and highly significant contribution to the field of originalism….

The Prize will be awarded to the best originalism article printed or accepted for publication during the prior calendar year [2025], or the best originalism book published in the prior calendar year….

Each year, a panel consisting of leading experts—drawn from academia, constitutional litigation, and the judicial branch—will recommend the Meese Prize recipient, and the Federalist Society will announce the Meese Prize recipient at the National Lawyers Convention, usually held in November.

The Federalist Society will accept nominations for the first annual Meese Prize until May 15, 2026 at meeseprize@fedsoc.org. While not required, any cover letter for the nomination should not exceed two pages.

Self-nominations are allowed, I'm told.

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