The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

February 9, 2016

A flashback to the grant of the emergency stay in the Clean Power Plan.

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I remember the evening of February 9, 2016 very clearly. I had just arrived at Bush Intercontinental Airport, like I had hundreds of times before. It was around 5:00 pm. I had just cleared security in Terminal C, and was turning left near Gate C42 (yes, I know all the gates by heart). I looked at my phone and saw a tweet that the Supreme Court had granted an emergency stay order in the Clean Power Plan. I remember being surprised. I could not recall the Supreme Court ever granting a stay while a case was pending before the Supreme Court. I thought, wow, Justice Kennedy actually agreed with the conservatives. Remember this was a few months after June 2015, which was the worst term for conservatives in recent memory. I then proceeded to my gate and did not give the issue much more thought for a few days.

Then came February 13, 2016, the day Justice Scalia died. I recently wrote about that memorable day on the tenth anniversary. But at some point on that day, a thought crossed my mind: Justice Scalia's last, and perhaps most important vote, was to grant the emergency stay. Had the deliberations stretched a few more days, there would not have been five votes for a stay. The American and global economy would be very different today. In recent months, I've given several talks about the emergency docket. I always say the birth of the modern shadow docket was the Clean Power Plan vote. Others apparently agree.

Of course, the New York Times's latest reporting on the Supreme Court leaks came during Shabbat. As I signed online, my computer nearly combusted. I'll have much more to write in due course.

It is noteworthy that Justice Scalia did not contribute a memo to the conference. Why? He was probably very busy. In Unraveled, I discuss where Justice Scalia was after the Supreme Court heard its last oral argument of the sitting on January 20, 2026. The case was Sturgeon v. Frost, fittingly argued by Justice Scalia's law clerk, and future federal judge, Rachel Kovner:

On January 20, 2016 – one year to the date before the forty-fifth president would be sworn in – the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Sturgeon v. Frost. The facts of the case were simple enough. John Sturgeon piloted his hovercraft across a river in an Alaskan park. Alaska law permits the use of the hovercraft. Federal law does not. The National Park Service ordered Sturgeon to remove his hovercraft from the natural preserve. Sturgeon countered that the river was owned by Alaska and, due to the forty-ninth state's unique status, was excluded from federal jurisdiction. Arguing for the federal government was Rachel Kovner, assistant to the solicitor general, who clerked for Justice Scalia nine years earlier.1 About fifty-three minutes into the hour-long argument, Scalia posed his final question of the day: "And if you read that back into Section 100751, it seems to me the Park Service doesn't have jurisdiction." Kovner replied to her former boss, as she no doubt had said many times before in chambers, "We agree, Your Honor." Sturgeon would be the last case argued before a month-long break began. During this recess, the justices scattered across the globe.2 Some stayed local. Justice Sotomayor visited several schools in her hometown of New York City. Justice Thomas traveled to Gainesville to speak to law students at the University of Florida. Chief Justice Roberts visited New England Law School in Boston. Others traveled abroad. Justice Breyer, who is fluent in French, lectured at the Institut Français in Paris. Justice Ginsburg journeyed to the European University Institute in Florence to talk about the "Notorious RBG." During that recess, the Court's greatest globetrotter was the Justice least concerned about international law.3 Fittingly, Justice Scalia was spreading American law abroad. At the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference in July 2016, Justice Kennedy recalled that Scalia told him, "Tony, this is my last big trip." On January 24, Scalia traveled to Singapore with his friend and coauthor Bryan A. Garner. A law professor at Southern Methodist University, Garner is the preeminent American lexicographer. On January 28, Scalia gave the Lee Kuan Yew Distinguished Lecture at the University of Singapore on judicial interpretation of legal texts.4 On February 1, Justice Scalia and Justice Kemal Bokhary of Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal hosted a dialogue on judges and democracy.5 The next day, Scalia and Garner discussed their second coauthored book, Reading Law, at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.6 Garner reminisced that during their busy trip, his colleague was "unbelievably energetic and always on the go," even after working fourteen-hour days.7 On February 3, their final day in Hong Kong, Garner and his wife Karolyne had their palms read by a soothsayer at a Taoist temple. "Nino, you ought to get your palm read," Garner said. Scalia replied, "No. I don't want to know when I'll die." Garner nudged him, "Come on!" Scalia dissented, "No." After his worldwide tour, Scalia traveled from the Far East to West Texas. On the afternoon of Friday, February 12, Scalia checked into the "El Presidente" suite at the Cibolo Creek Ranch, a 30,000-acre resort outside of Marfa.8 That evening, Scalia attended a private dinner with forty other guests.9 Toward the end of the meal, he retired to bed. The next morning, when he did not arrive for breakfast, an employee of the ranch checked in his room. Scalia was found dead in his bed. A priest was called to administer last rites. Scalia was seventy-nine years old. He was survived by his wife Maureen, nine children, and thirty-six grandchildren. The justice was seven months short of his third decade on the Supreme Court.

Blackman, Josh. Unraveled: Obamacare, Religious Liberty, and Executive Power (pp. 477-479). (Function). Kindle Edition.

I will have much more to say about this leak in due course.

Free Speech

Government Likely Violated First Amendment in Getting Apple and Google to Block ICE Sightings Content, Court Holds

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From yesterday's decision by Judge Jorge Alonso (N.D. Ill.) in Rosado v. Bondi:

Plaintiff Kassandra Rosado runs a Facebook group called "ICE Sightings – Chicagoland" and Plaintiff Kreisau Group runs a phone application called "Eyes Up." Both allow users to post videos and information regarding ICE activity. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants coerced Facebook into disabling the Chicagoland Facebook group and coerced Apple into removing Eyes Up. Plaintiffs contend that this violated their First Amendment rights ….

Plaintiff Kassandra Rosado created "ICE Sightings – Chicagoland" in January 2025 as a Facebook group for people to post videos and information regarding ICE activity. On October 12, 2025, social media influencer Laura Loomer posted a link to the Facebook group and tagged Pamela Bondi and Kristi Noem. On October 14, Bondi posted: "Today following outreach from [the DOJ], Facebook removed a large group that was being used to dox and target [ICE] agents in Chicago." Also on October 14, Defendant Noem posted: "Today, thanks to [the DOJ], Facebook removed a large page being used to dox and threaten our ICE agents in Chicago."

Around October 14, Facebook disabled the group and notified Rosado that the group "went against the Community Standards multiple times." …

Plaintiff Kreisau Group created "Eyes Up" in August 2025 as a phone application for people to post videos and information regarding ICE activity. Around October 2, 2025, Apple removed several apps that shared information regarding ICE activity, including ICEBlock, Red Dot, and Eyes Up. Speaking to Fox News on October 2, Defendant Bondi stated: "We reached out to Apple today demanding they remove the ICEBlock app from their App Store – and Apple did so." And on October 8 Bondi made a public statement that "we had Apple and Google take down the ICEBlock apps."

Apple informed Kreisau Group that Apple had removed Eyes Up from the App Store after receiving "information" from "law enforcement" that the app violated Apple's guidelines. Apple stated that the app violated guideline 1.1.1, which prohibits "defamatory, discriminatory, or mean-spirited content."

The court concluded that plaintiffs had standing to challenge the government action:

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Supreme Court

Leaked Supreme Court Memos Reveal Why Court Stayed Clean Power Plan (Setting Important "Shadow Docket" Precedent in the Process)

A New York Times scoop reveals that Chief Justice Roberts was concerned that the EPA would (again) get away with imposing unlawful burdens on utilities.

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This morning's New York Times contains a blockbuster scoop by Adam Liptak and Jodi Kantor: Internal memos from the Supreme Court discussing whether to stay the Obama Administration's Clean Power Plan. The NYT has published a narrative story, a chronology of the memos, a list of "takeaways," and the documents themselves.

The documents confirm what a few of us suggested at the time: The Court's majority was concerned that, without a stay, the Environmental Protection Agency would get away with imposing unlawful regulatory burdens on electric utilities, as has occurred with the mercury regulations held unlawful by the Court in Michigan v. EPA.

As a memo by the Chief Justice notes, the EPA had crowed that the Court's Michigan decision was effectively irrelevant because utilities had been forced to spend billions of dollars to comply while waiting for the litigation to resolve, and there were reasons to fear history would repeat itself. As the Chief Justice wrote in one memo:

Past experience makes the case for irreparable harm: On June 29 2015 we ruled that the EPA's Mercury and Air Toxics Standards violated the Clean Air Act See Michigan v EPA, 135 S. Ct 2699. One day later the EPA announced that it was confident it was still on track to reduce the targeted pollutants in part because the majority of power plants  are already in compliance or well on their way to compliance Janet McCabe Acting Asst Admin for Office of Air and Radiation In Perspective: the Supreme Court's Mercury and Air Toxics Rule Decision In other words the absence of stay allowed the agency to effectively implement an important program we held to be contrary to law

While the posture is different, the Chief Justice's concerns are in line with those that prompted to Supreme Court to make pre-enforcement review of agency regulations the default presumption in 1967's Abbott Labs trilogy: Firms should not be forced to make substantial (and largely unrecoverable) investments to comply with regulations that may not be lawful exercises of agency authority.

The memos also reveal that the Chief Justice, if not the Court's entire conservative wing, understood the "major questions doctrine" as a thing, highlighting what the Court had held in UARG v. EPA--another case invalidating EPA regulations governing greenhouse gas emissions. Recall that the Chief also highlighted this UARG language in his King v. Burwell opinion. Again, from the Chief's initial memo:

[The EPA's] interpretation of §7411 represents a new approach to the statute. Past rules under $ 7411(d) have contemplated that utilities could comply with the articulated "best system of emission reduction" solely through installation of control technologies (e.g. , scrubbers)-which seem to fit more comfortably within the statutory phrase. As we noted two terms ago, agencies will face high hurdles when they seek to use novel interpretations of a "long-extant statute" to "bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in [their] regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization." Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).

The NYT obtained responsive memos from Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor, and a memos supporting the Chief's position from Justice Alito and, pivotally, Justice Kennedy. The memos make clear that, post-UARG, the conservative were very wary of efforts by the EPA to aggrandize its own authority in pursuit of greenhouse gas emission reductions. The conservative justices did not want judicial review of agency action to be irrelevant.  As Justice Alito wrote:

A failure to stay this rule threatens to render our ability to provide meaningful judicial review--and by extension our institutional legitimacy--a nullity. Whether the Clean Air Act gives the EPA the transformative authority it claims here is an important question. If we fail to stay the rule and maintain the status quo our resolution of the merits will not matter because the regulated parties will have complied Instead of robust judicial review our opinion will be a mere postscript.

Justice Kennedy ultimately concurs on the grounds that, if a stay of the CPP is inevitable (suggesting he agreed with the Chief's preliminary view of the merits), it might as well issue now.

The liberal justices, for their part, were wary of setting a precedent of this sort and suggested that an order could deny the stay, but suggest states seek extensions of the regulatory deadlines before asking the Supreme Court to take action (an approach similar to what the Court would later do in the Juliana litigation--deny relief with the suggestion that others should reconsider their position). While opposing a stay here, it is not clear any of the liberal justices (or, for that matter, any of the conservative justices) understood how issuing a stay here would encourage litigants to pursue such relief more aggressively in the future.

Note that had the D.C. Circuit stayed the CPP (which would have been appropriate given the lead times), the Court would not have been in the position of considering any of these questions. This is interesting because had the D.C. Circuit not later insisted on issuing its opinion invalidating the Trump Administration's repeal of the CPP on the eve of President Biden's inauguration in 2021, we would never have gotten the Supreme Court's ultimate decision invalidating the CPP in West Virginia v. EPA (which I dissected here). It was the D.C. Circuit's insistence on having its say in 2021, and issuing a decision that put the CPP back in force (even as the court stayed its mandate), that allowed the litigation against the CPP to continue.

The NYT does not reveal where the memos came from, but the memos contain one potential clue. All of the memos appear to be photocopies of the original documents on letterhead with the authoring justice's initials or signature--save one. The memo from Justice Sonia Sotomayor's chambers is not on letterhead, has no signature or initials, and (the NYT notes) appears to have the wrong date (likely a typo--"16" instead of "6")[Alternatively, the 16 could have been autodated when printed later on plain paper.]  This suggests the source had access to a non-final or non-circulated version of the Sotomayor memo, but the NYT gives no indication of why that might be.

If the memos came from Sotomayor's chambers--and I stress the if--this would be the second climate-related case in which something unusual happened in Justice Sotomayor's chambers. The other was AEP v. Connecticut, when Sotomayor was on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Then-Judge Sotomayor was on the AEP panel, and as I noted at the time, the case sat for years after argument and supplemental briefing without decision. The delay was so long that the issue was raised at her confirmation hearing. The decision ultimately issued after Sotomayor was confirmed, without her participation. The Supreme Court then unanimously reversed that opinion with Justice Sotomayor recused.

Politics

Call Him Judge Ho Ho Ho

A nice little Christmas present for the lawyers + "You should be spending time with family and friends over the holidays."

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From an order last Dec. 11 (but just made available on CourtListener yesterday) by Magistrate Judge Andrew Edison (S.D. Tex.):

Earlier today, I issued a Memorandum and Recommendation [Dkt. 113]. Under the rules, objections are due on December 29, 2025. I do not want anyone working the last two weeks of the year. You should be spending time with family and friends over the holidays. I will, therefore, move the deadline for the parties to object to my Memorandum and Recommendation to Friday, January 9, 2026. Happy holidays to all!

First Amendment

Virginia's Unconstitutional Effort to Strip Property Tax Exemptions From Pro-Confederate Groups

The groups and their ideology are awful. But Virginia's policy violates the First Amendment. Allowing it to stand could set a dangerous precedent.

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Logo of the United Daughters of the Confederacy. (NA)

 

Earlier this week, Virginia Governor Abigal Spanberger signed into law a bill stripping property tax exemptions from various pro-Confederate nonprofit organizations:

On Monday, Virginia's governor, Abigail Spanberger, a Democrat and the state's first female governor, signed into law a bill that eliminates tax exemptions for organizations connected to the Confederacy.

HB167, passed by Democrats in the Virginia house and senate, specifically removes the Virginia division of the United Daughters of the Confederacy, the Stonewall Jackson Memorial, the Virginia division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans and the Confederate Memorial Literary Society, along with other groups, from the state's list of organizations that are exempt from state property taxes.

While well-intentioned, this law nonetheless violates the First Amendment. I do not say that because I have any sympathy for the groups in question. I hate the Confederacy and all it stood for, oppose attempts to whitewash its reputation by claiming it wasn't established for the purpose of defending the evil institution of slavery, support taking down Confederate monuments, and oppose right-wing efforts to restore restore military base names honoring Confederate generals.

Thus, I very much sympathize with what the New York Times describes as the bill sponsors' desire to "distance Virginia from its Confederate past." As a Virginia resident and a state employee (professor at a Virginia state university), I agree the state should repudiate the Confederacy rather than honor it.

But this is not the way to do it. It seems obvious the groups in question lost their tax exemptions because of state officials' hostility to their views. While those views are indeed odious, eligibility for tax exemptions should not depend on viewpoints. Making them so dependent violates the First Amendment, which - among other things - forbids conditioning government benefits and exemptions on political and social views.

Imagine a red state legislature enacting bill discriminatorily denying nonprofit tax exemptions to left-wing "social justice" groups, or groups promoting racial minority group rights (such as the NAACP), groups promoting abortion rights, and so on. Such a bill would obviously violate the First Amendment. The Virginia law targeting pro-Confederate groups is much the same, differing only in its ideological valence.

One could try to defend the bill on the grounds that it was just amending a preexisting law specifically singling out these groups for property tax exemptions. If the state legislature can pass a law singling out certain groups by name for tax exemptions, then it can also repeal it.

I agree that the state is not required to continue these property tax exemptions forever. But there is an important difference between the original law, and this new one. The preexisting law gave property tax exemptions to a wide range of nonprofit civic and historic preservation groups, not just those espousing a particular ideology. The groups appear to have been chosen based on function not viewpoint. Here is the complete list of organizations granted exemptions, which includes veterans groups, historic preservationists, groups promoting the arts, and more:

the Association for the Preservation of Virginia Antiquities, the Association for the Preservation of Petersburg Antiquities, Historic Richmond Foundation, the Confederate Memorial Literary Society, the Mount Vernon Ladies' Association of the Union, the Virginia Historical Society, the Thomas Jefferson Memorial Foundation, Incorporated, the Patrick Henry Memorial Foundation, Incorporated, the Stonewall Jackson Memorial, Incorporated, George Washington's Fredericksburg Foundation, Home Demonstration Clubs, 4-H Clubs, the Future Farmers of America, Incorporated, the posts of the American Legion, posts of United Spanish War Veterans, branches of the Fleet Reserve Association, posts of Veterans of Foreign Wars, posts of the Disabled American Veterans, Veterans of World War I, USA, Incorporated, the Society of the Cincinnati in the State of Virginia, the Manassas Battlefield Confederate Park, Incorporated, the Robert E. Lee Memorial Foundation, Incorporated, the Virginia Division of the United Daughters of the Confederacy, the General Organization of the United Daughters of the Confederacy, the Memorial Foundation of the Germanna Colonies in Virginia, Incorporated, the Lynchburg Fine Arts Centers, Incorporated, Norfolk Historic Foundation, National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States, Historic Alexandria Foundation, and the Lynchburg Historical Foundation.

The new law strips property tax exemptions from the pro-Confederate groups, while leaving them in place for all the others. That's pretty obvious discrimination based on political ideology. The Virginia state legislature could end this tax exemption for all the groups in question, or reduce it in various ways. It could eliminate some groups but not others based on nonideological criteria. But it cannot do so based purely on the views of the groups in question.

Such viewpoint discrimination with respect to tax exemptions and government benefits is a potentially very dangerous tool that government can use to penalize opposition (even as it rewards its supporters). If courts were to uphold the Virgina law against First Amendment challenges, it would set a dangerous precedent that state and federal officials of various political stripes could exploit to target their opponents.

Even if you trust our current Democratic governor and state legislature with this kind of power, I bet you don't have similar confidence in the Republicans (and vice versa). The Trump Administration has been trying to find ways to strip tax exemptions from nonprofit groups opposed to its agenda, including various left-wing ones.  If you think Trump's efforts along these lines are unconstitutional (and they are), then the same reasoning applies to the new Virginia law.

The truth is neither Democratic politicians nor Republican ones can be trusted with the authority to dole out and remove tax exemptions and other benefits based on ideology. That's one of the reasons why we have a First Amendment in the first place.

And here, as elsewhere, freedom of speech cannot be limited to those who espouse viewpoints we like. As Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously put it, this right must include "freedom for the thought that we hate." It must extend even to those with deeply odious and reprehensible views - including, in this case, apologists for the Confederacy.

A Flashback On The Two-Year Clause

How an obscure clause made me realize my future was in academia.

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People often ask me if I always wanted to be a law professor, or if I always knew I wanted to be a lawyer. The answer to both questions is no. My entire youth focused on technology. I went to Staten Island Technical High School, a leading engineering high school. For college, I received a degree in Information, Sciences & Technology at Penn State. I did not take a single constitutional law or political science class in my undergraduate education. (I took one class on business law, but that doesn't really count.)

After graduation, I would begin working at the Department of Defense in Arlington on network security. During the summer between my Junior and Senior year, I decided to apply law school to focus on Intellectual Property. It was not a well thought-out decision. I had no lawyers in my immediate family and I knew nothing about IP. But law schools published these shiny pamphlets promising salaries of $160,000, so I thought it could work well.

I studied for the LSAT for a few weeks. I took two or three sample tests, and did well enough. I took the actual LSAT in October of my senior year and did not plan to take it again. I then applied early decision to George Mason Law School as an evening student. My plan was to work during the day at my office in Arlington, and go to class at night. Mason had a well-regarded IP program. I was aware of the conservative and libertarian reputation (Professor Walter Williams would often guest host on the Rush Limbaugh show), but that is not why I applied there. I did not apply anywhere else. I discussed this background in an article, From Being One L to Teaching One L.

During my 1L year, I fell in love with Constitutional Law. Indeed, for evening students, ConLaw was not taught till the third semester. But I regularly attended FedSoc events on campus and the National Convention. I was hooked. For my 1L summer, I attended the Institute or Justice Bootcamp (as it was then called), and my eyes were opened. I still remember the moment when Clark Neily convinced me that the war on drugs was a mistake. (Clark also told me about this new Second Amendment case he was working on, Parker v. District of Columbia.) Still, I did not even conceive that a career in constitutional law was possible for me. The most likely path, I thought, would be BigLaw.

I applied for on campus recruiting during the start of my 2L year. (I realize today firms recruit students with no grades, but there were still timelines in 2007.) I managed to secure a summer associate position with a D.C. firm. I was beyond thrilled for the opportunity, and the compensation. At the time, the $3,500/week salary was more than double what I was making at the DOD. In the lead-up to the summer, the firm circulated a "get to know you" questionnaire. One of the questions was "What are you interested in?" Of course, I wrote "The Constitution." I didn't give the form much thought.

Summer arrived. After the first day of work, we had a cocktail reception at a swanky club nearby. (To this day, I feel guilty about how much money the firm spent on entertaining law students.) One of the partners came over to me and asked "Were you the person who said he was interested in the Constitution?" He did not mean it in a good way. I said, "Yes." He replied, "The Constitution has nothing to do with my practice." Again, this was my first day on the job, where I was trying to impress the partners to make me a permanent offer.

Perhaps the prudent course for a young Josh would have been to make a joke, and laugh it off. But that's not what I did. I knew the lawyer worked on military contracts. I whipped out my pocket Constitution, and I turned to the Armies Clause in Art. I, § 8, Cl. 12, the Armies Clause. I read it, " The Congress shall have Power . . . To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years. . . ." I said every payment that you work on is authorized by this clause. The partner looked back at me, dumbfounded. He had built a successful practice on military contracts, though I doubt he ever realized or cared what the constitutional basis was those contracts.

At that moment, I realized my future was not in Big Law. The rest of the summer was enjoyable, but I regularly felt something was lacking. For example, I was working on a memo in a government contracts case, and I realized there was a notice problem, so I raised a Due Process argument. The partner told me (correctly) that constitutional issues could not be raised in this administrative proceedings, and to stick to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). By the middle of the summer, I decided that I wanted to clerk. (Back in the day, you would apply to clerkships during your 2L summer.) During my 3L year, I realized that academia would be my path. And I pursued that path. The rest is history.

In a funny way, I may owe my entire career to the obscure Armies Clause. The irony is that the "Two Years" provision of this clause has largely been ignored. Appropriations for the military routinely stretch beyond two years. I have been aware of this problem, but never gave it much thought.

That was, until I saw a new article titled Reviving the Military's Term Limit. Professors Matthew B. Lawrence and Mark Nevitt argue that the two-year limitation was obliterated by 1904 Solicitor General opinion. If this clause's original meaning is restored, then the partner (who may not still be in practice) will realize how the Constitution affects his work.

Commandeering

Will the Eleventh Circuit Allow the Endangered Species Act to Commandeer the Florida Department of Environmental Protection?

A pending case will test whether courts are willing to enforce the anticommandeering doctrine in the context of environmental protection.

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New Hampshire is not the only state subject to court-ordered commandeering. Next week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit will hear oral argument in Bear Warriors United v. Lambert, in which Florida is appealing a district court order effectively commandeering the state under the Endangered Species Act.

Bear Warriors United (BWU) is an environmental organization "dedicated to defending Florida's wildlife and serving as a powerful voice for nature." Among the species BWU seeks to protect is the manatee, which is currently listed as a "threatened" species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).

In 2022, BWU filed suit against the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) alleging that it was violating the ESA by failing to adopt and enforce sufficiently stringent regulations governing nitrogen discharges from septic tanks and wastewater treatment plants into the Indian River Lagoon, which is frequented by manatees. This failure, BWU alleges, contributes to eutrophication and the loss of seagrasses upon which the manatees rely and is thus a "take" under Section 9 of the ESA, which prohibits actions that "harm" listed species.

At heart, BWU's claim is that the FDEP is "taking" manatees because it is failing to control the private and other activities that threaten manatee populations. As the district court noted, it is "FDEP's ongoing failure to use its authority to regulate" more stringently that is at issue. Therein lies the problem.

There is reasonable debate about the extent to which the ESA's definition of harm encompasses conduct that affects species indirectly. The Supreme Court embraced a relatively broad definition of "harm" in the Sweet Home decision that encompasses habitat modification that, in turn, impairs the feeding, breeding or nesting activity of listed species. Relying upon this definition, some courts have concluded that omissions--in this case, failure to prevent activities that could adversely affect species--qualify as "harm." This is a controversial conclusion, however, and the Trump Administration has proposed narrowing that definition.

Whatever the proper definition of "harm" is under the ESA, BWU's claim has a larger problem: Under its theory, state governments are obligated to use their regulatory authority to enforce a federal regulatory scheme. This is not a case in which effluent from a state-run sewage treatment plant or other state activities are allegedly harming a listed species. It instead involves a state failing to use its sovereign regulatory authority in a manner that serves the federal government's goals. This is textbook commandeering. Thus even if one is inclined to accept the broad definition of "harm" that some courts have accepted, it cannot be enforced against state governments in this fashion.

The district court dismissed Florida's commandeering concerns in a cavalier (and somewhat incoherent) fashion. After noting in one order that "the anticommandeering doctrine does not bar federal laws that 'regulate state activities, rather than seeking to control or influence the manner in which States regulate private parties'" (quoting Reno v. Condon), the court proceeded to accept BWU's argument that the ESA's take prohibition could be used to control how FDEP regulates private parties. In another order the court correctly noted that "the anticommandeering doctrine does not apply when Congress evenhandedly regulates an activity in which both States and private actors engage" (quoting Murphy v. NCAA), but somehow missed that regulating private septic systems and wastewater treatment plants is not "an activity in which both States and private actors engage." It is, rather, precisely the sort of exercise of sovereign authority that only governments engage in, and is thus precisely what the anticommandeering doctrine protects from federal control.

This is not the first time a lower court has interpreted the ESA in a manner that violates the anticommandeering doctrines. In Strahan v. Coxe (1997), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded Massachusetts could be required to revoke licenses and permits for gillnet and lobster pot fishing under the ESA and Marine Mammal Protection Act without violating the anticommandeering doctrine. In the First Circuit's view, this was just federal supremacy in action, and the state was merely required to comply with federal law. But this misunderstands the dynamic. There is no question a state cannot immunize private action from federal prohibition, but this does not mean a state can be required to regulate or inhibit activity the federal government wishes to control, and this is true even if the state chooses to act within the relevant policy space. This is as true of gillnets and nitrogen discharges as it is of marijuana and gambling.

Although Strahan was wrong (as I discussed here at pp. 428-30), district courts have largely followed the First Circuit's reasoning. This has occurred even though, in 2018, in Murphy v. NCAA, the Supreme Court expressly held that the anticommandeering doctrine prevents the federal government from barring states from permitting a federally targeted activity (in that case, gambling) under state law.

The same principle applies in the environmental context. The federal government is free to regulate nitrogen discharges and other activities that harm listed species, and even to authorize citizen suits to assist in federal law's enforcement. It cannot require states to prohibit such activities, however. And just because a state has chosen to create its own regulatory apparatus, that apparatus cannot be required to apply standards dictated by federal law. Thus however expansively one is inclined to interpret the ESA's take prohibition, it cannot be applied as the district court did here.

I will be curious to hear how the Eleventh Circuit engages with these arguments next week, and whether it recognizes the errors of the First Circuit's analysis. There seems to be lots of confusion about commandeering these days.  I also have a draft manuscript ("Conservation Commandeering") which goes into these arguments in greater depth. It will go up on SSRN soon. Until then, stay tuned.

Free Speech

Not Judge Judy, Juror Judi—But "Stupid Mistake" Isn't "Actual Malice" for Libel Purposes

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From Scheindlin v. Accelerate 360, LLC, decided today by Judge Kyle Dudek (M.D. Fla.):

For many decades, Plaintiff Judy Sheindlin—known to millions of daytime television viewers simply as Judge Judy—has cultivated a public reputation as a tough-on-crime, no-nonsense arbitrator. The defendants in this case, A360 Media, LLC and Accelerate360, LLC (collectively "A360"), operate in a very different sphere: they publish and distribute celebrity news and tabloids, including the National Enquirer and In Touch Weekly.

In April 2024, their worlds collided. A360 published articles claiming that Sheindlin had appeared in a true-crime docuseries to advocate for the resentencing of Lyle and Erik Menendez, the notorious brothers convicted of murdering their parents. The articles reported that Scheindlin felt the brothers had been railroaded. And they quoted her as claiming the trial was "rigged."

It turns out none of this was true. An A360 reporter had watched a clip from the docuseries and mistakenly identified a different older woman—an alternate juror named Judi Zamos—for the famous television judge. Predictably, Sheindlin was not pleased. She filed this defamation lawsuit, alleging that the false reports subjected her to public ridicule and tarnished her carefully curated brand.

A360 now seeks summary judgment. It readily admits the stories were wrong, but argues that the misidentification was an honest, if unfortunate, mistake. Because of this, A360 contends that Sheindlin cannot clear the high constitutional hurdle of proving actual malice—a strict requirement for public figures suing for defamation. Furthermore, A360 argues that Sheindlin cannot prove she suffered any actual, compensable damages under Florida law.

Because the First Amendment requires a showing of actual malice rather than mere negligence, and because Sheindlin has failed to produce evidence meeting that heavy burden, her defamation claim must fail. A360's motion for summary judgment is thus GRANTED….

Here's the court "side-by-side comparison of the two" women's images:

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Trump Tweets About Standing!

Judge Leon should check the President's social media!

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A few days ago, the D.C. Circuit sent the East Wing case back down to Judge Leon. In my view, the plaintiffs clearly have no standing. Judge Rao's separate opinion cogently explains why.

Judge Leon, undeterred, ruled against Trump again! The White House can continue with "underground" construction but not "aboveground" construction! I suppose Judge Leon is an expert in construction, as he seems to think these two levels can be separated! His new order had fewer exclamation points, but he still declined to address standing. Should this case get to SCOTUS, it will be very easy for the proceduralists to smack down this ruling on standing grounds.

Indeed, even President Trump gets the standing analysis. In a series of social media posts, Trump explains why the plaintiffs in this case lacks standing. I never know how much of Trump's tweets are his and how much come from his lawyers. But at a minimum, these postings (which seem to have been made aboard Air Force One) suggest Trump understands the jurisdictional issues.

Here, Trump points out (correctly) that the only possible plaintiff with an injury is a woman who walks her dog near the White House:

The person who filed the meritless and lawless suit on the desperately needed White House Ballroom, being built as a GIFT to America (without Tax Dollars!), a woman walking her dog, has absolutely NO STANDING to bring such a monumentally important case against our Country. The Trump Hating Judge's opinion is radically different from his first opinion, that was issued weeks ago, while still being unlawful and ambiguous, which never even addressed her COMPLETE lack of Standing. Every Political "Pundit" has said this case is meritless, even a JOKE, but it's not a joke to me, or the people of America. Too much hard work, time, and money spent in order that a Judge can claim that he ruled against "DONALD TRUMP," something which I have gotten very used to, BUT WILL NOT ACCEPT! President DJT

Here Trump points out (correctly) that Judge Leon once again does not even mention standing:

The out of control Trump Hating, Washington, D.C. District Court Judge, who doesn't want to accept a $400 Million Dollar GIFT of one of the most beautiful Ballrooms anywhere in the World, desperately needed by the White House and its future Presidents (Due to time constraints, I will barely get to use it!), wants me to build the "underground" portion of the Ballroom, without the "above ground" portion, but the underground doesn't work, isn't necessary, and would indeed be useless, without the above ground sections. The underground portion is wedded to, and serves, the upper portion, including the Bomb Shelters, a State of the Art Hospital and Medical Facilities, Protective Partitioning, Top Secret Military Installations, Structures, and Equipment, Protective Missile Resistant Steel, Columns, Roofs, and Beams, Drone Proof Ceilings and Roofs, Military Grade Venting, and Bullet, Ballistic, and Blast Proof Glass. It's all tied together as one big, expensive, and very complex unit, which is vital for National Security and Military Operations of the United States of America! The Judge's decision, which doesn't even discuss the vital subject of STANDING, of which the plaintiff has none, severely jeopardizes the lives and welfare of the people who work, and will be working, at the White House — including all future Presidents of the United States, and their families. President DONALD J. TRUMP

During oral argument, Judge Leon apparently refused to discuss standing, and told the lawyer from DOJ to take up standing with the Court of Appeals.

This post goes more to the merits, and explains the underground construction cannot be separated from the aboveground construction. Standing comes in at the end.

The White House doesn't have a Ballroom (No Taxpayer Money!), which Presidents have desperately wanted and desired for over 150 years, but a Trump Hating, Washington, D.C. District Court Judge, a man who has gone out of his way to undermine National Security, and to make sure that this Great Gift to America gets delayed, or doesn't get built, is attempting to prevent future Presidents and World Leaders from having a safe and secure large scale Meeting Place, or Ballroom, one with Bomb Shelters, a State of the Art Hospital and Medical Facilities, Protective Partitioning, Top Secret Military Installations, Structures, and Equipment, Protective Missile Resistant Steel, Columns, Roofs, and Beams, Drone Proof Ceilings and Roofs, Military Grade Venting, and Bullet, Ballistic, and Blast Proof Glass —which all means that no future President, living in the White House without this Ballroom, can ever be Safe and Secure at Events, Future Inaugurations, or Global Summits. This Magnificent Space will allow them to carry out their vital duties as the Leader of our Nation. Furthermore, the Ballroom, which is being constructed on budget and ahead of schedule, is needed now. Almost all material necessary for its construction is being built and/or on its way to the site, ready for installation and erection. Much of it has already been paid for, costing Hundreds of Millions of Dollars. If somebody, especially one with no standing, had a complaint — Why wasn't it filed many months earlier, long before Construction was started? The Public Record was open for all to see. Everybody knew that it was planned, and going to be built. This highly political Judge, and his illegal overreach, is out of control, and costing our Nation greatly. This is a mockery to our Court System! The Ballroom is deeply important to our National Security, and no Judge can be allowed to stop this Historic and Militarily Imperative Project. Thank you for your attention to this matter! President DONALD J. TRUMP

Finally, Trump thinks that Judge Leon works for Chief Judge Boasberg, who was MANDAMUSED.

A Trump Hating Judge, for the first time in History, wants Congress to pay Hundreds of Millions of Dollars for a Glorious Ballroom, instead of accepting Donations from Great American Companies and Citizens. This is a first — In other words, he wants Tax Payers to pay for the Ballroom, instead of Donors and Patriots! The Ballroom is FREE to our Country, A GIFT, and vital for our National Security. This Judge, who works for another Judge who was just MANDAMUSED for the unfair and biased way he treats me, should be ashamed of himself! President DONALD J. TRUMP

Know who can't get mandamused? The President. Say what you will about Trump, but he gets procedure.

The Slowing of Fourth Amendment Law, and Now Advisory Opinions: A Comment on Chatrie v. United States

The second in a series.

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On April 27th, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Chatrie v. United States, on the Fourth Amendment implications of geofencing. I have already posted the amicus brief I wrote for the Court in the case, and I am writing a series of posts in anticipation of the argument. This is the second post in the series.

In this second post, I want to focus on how the Court hasn't handed down a case on the Fourth Amendment and new technology in a long time, and that it is now doing so in what amounts to  an advisory opinion.  These two things are related, I think. And for those of us interested in how Fourth Amendment law develops, they're related in an important way.

First, consider the timing.  Chatrie comes after a surprisingly long gap in Supreme Court attention to how the Fourth Amendment should apply to new technologies.  It has been 8 years since the Court's 2018 ruling in Carpenter v. United States on the Fourth Amendment implications of cell-site location information.  That's a relatively long gap. After City of Ontario v. Quon in 2010 on pagers, United States v. Jones in 2012 on GPS devices, Riley v. California in 2014 on searching cell phones incident to arrest, the Microsoft warrant case in 2018, and Carpenter that same year, it had become a staple of the Justices' speeches that Court was going to have to take a lot of cases on the Fourth Amendment and digital technologies in the future.

Instead, for eight years, we get bupkes.

Next, ponder the advisory-opinion aspect of the case.  The cert petition in the case asked the Court to take on two issues: Was the Fourth Amendment violated, and does the exclusionary rule apply?  In the proceedings below, the fifteen judges on the en banc Fourth Circuit were hopelessly divided on the Fourth Amendment issues—but only one of the fifteen Judges thought the exclusionary rule applied. Instead of taking both issues, the Supreme Court granted cert limited to the first issue.

Think about that. Even if the Court holds that Chatrie's Fourth Amendment rights were violated, it won't make any difference to Chatrie. The lower court has already held that there is no remedy, and that is a retrospective question unaffected by what the Supreme Court might rule on the merits in coming months.  Going forward, the Court gets to hand down what is in a practical sense an advisory opinion on how the Fourth Amendment applies to geofencing.  Many people care a great deal about what that practically-speaking-advisory-opinion will say, of course.  But the actual individual involved, Chatrie, won't get relief.

What is going on?  I think these two points are directly linked.

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Privacy

Justice Ginsburg Cancer Treatment Leak Prosecution: Blame the Cat

"Russell insisted that he didn't know how his credentials had been used to run the 'Gins' and 'Ginston' searches. But he theorized that 'potentially his cat had run across the keyboard and typed in those letters.'"

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From U.S. v. Russell, decided Tuesday by Fourth Circuit Chief Judge Albert Diaz, joined by Judges Robert King and Stephanie Thacker:

Before Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg passed away, … [i]n January 2019, employees at George Washington University Hospital discovered a Twitter post that revealed information about Justice Ginsburg's recent visits to the hospital. The post contained a screenshot of the hospital's patient search screen, which highlighted Justice Ginsburg's name and showed the dates of ten visits, along with medical services she received (which included radiology, oncology, and surgery services)….

Law enforcement later learned that before circulating on Twitter, the screenshot was posted on the anonymous message board 4Chan. It appeared on a thread titled "Politically Incorrect," where users promoted a conspiracy theory that Justice Ginsburg had died and prominent Democrats were covering up her death.

The hospital's Chief Information Officer, Nathan Read, investigated the leak. He obtained search logs for anyone who had used the hospital's system to look for patients with last names starting with "Ginsb" in the relevant time frame….

Read's … search parameters revealed that a non-hospital issued device, operating under Russell's username, searched for "Gins" on January 7, 2019. That search was sandwiched between two others. Seconds before, the same device searched for "Barker," and seconds after, it searched for "Ginston." Barker was a hospital patient, but the hospital had no record of ever serving someone with the last name Ginston.

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Who Owns The President's Papers?

Yes, there is a Domestic Emoluments Clause issue.

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The Office of Legal Counsel concluded that the Presidential Records Act (PRA) is unconstitutional. In Civitas Outlook, I explained why I thought this opinion was consistent with recent Supreme Court precedents, including Trump v. Mazars.

Others, unsurprisingly, disagree. Christopher Fonzone, who headed OLC during the Biden Administration, writes that the PRA is constitutional. Here, I want to focus on one aspect of Fonzone's analysis: who owns the President's papers?

Fonzone writes:

First and foremost, the Property Clause. Article IV of the Constitution expressly grants Congress the "Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting" U.S. property. Since the Constitution and Congress create and fund all of the offices in the White House, those offices are unquestionably government offices. As OLC recognized in the 1978 testimony concerning the constitutionality of the PRA, "[i]t is well established that the work product of government employees prepared at the direction of their employer or in the course of their duties is government property." Thus, Congress may "extend this principle" to require the preservation of "records prepared or received by the President in the course of his duties" and "no substantial separation of powers problems would, in our view, be raised." (As I discuss below, the April 1, 2026 OLC opinion includes no discussion of the Property Clause.)

The Carter Administration may have reached this conclusion, but (thankfully) one executive branch cannot bind another executive branch--especially one that was "especially pleased" to acquiesce to so many congressional constraints on presidential power.

Fonzone does not mention that the Supreme Court expressly left this issue open in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (1977):

We see no reason to engage in the debate whether appellant [President Nixon] has legal title to the materials. . . .

The litigation over Nixon's records did not end in 1978. There was extensive caselaw that stretched decades. In 1992, the D.C. Circuit stated that the papers did belong to Nixon:

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Tariffs

Trump Administration Presents Update on its Tariff Refund Plan

The plan is not completely terrible. But many importers may still have difficulty getting the refund money owed to them.

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After the Supreme Court struck down Donald Trump's massive International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs in a case I helped litigate along with the Liberty Justice Center and others, litigation continued over tariff refunds owed to the many businesses that paid illegally collected tariffs under IEEPA - a total of some $166 billion. In March, Judge Richard K. Eaton of the US Court of International Trade - the judge assigned to oversee the refund process - ordered the administration to grant refunds to to all those businesses that were forced to pay the tariffs - including those that had not filed lawsuits seeking refunds. This week, on April 14, in response to Judge Eaton's court order, the US Customs and Border Protection agency (CBP) submitted a required update on the status of their refund plan. The Hill has a helpful summary:

Roughly 330,000 importers who paid a combined $166 billion as part of President Trump's emergency tariffs are waiting on refunds after the Supreme Court in February struck down the levies in a blockbuster 6-3 decision.

CBP, the federal agency in charge of collecting tariffs, has warned the immense scale of the refund effort requires time. Officials have been working to launch the first phase of the new system on April 20, though the agency previously suggested importers may need to wait an additional 45 days afterwards to actually receive their funds.

Lord said the system will be able to process electronic refunds for about 82 percent of the affected tariff entries. That accounts for about $127 billion in deposits. More than 56,000 importers have already signed up, and the number continues to grow as the system nears its launch.

Others won't be able to use that automated process. Some entries that haven't gone through a formal close-out step called "liquidation" and are subject to antidumping orders must instead go through a manual, administrative process that requires additional steps, Lord noted.

CBP says that applies to about $2.9 billion worth of tariff deposits that need refunding.

This seems less bad than the worst-case scenario in which the administration could simply stonewall most victims of the illegal tariffs, through some combination of malice and bureaucratic incompetence. It is also significant that the administration has - so far, at least - not tried to appeal Judge Eaton's order. In my earlier post on this subject, I indicated they might at least appeal the universal nature of the order, which could potentially be attacked based on the Supreme Court's 2025 ruling Trump v. CASA, Inc. (though I also indicated that I believe Judge Eaton correctly distinguished CASA).

But, as the Hill article notes, the process may still be time-consuming and difficult for many businesses. That is particularly true for smaller importers that have less bureaucratic capacity than bigger firms. Meanwhile, the longer the process drags on, the more interest payments we taxpayers will be on the hook for, a point Judge Eaton rightly stressed in his March ruling.

And, as I pointed out in my previous post, even the most complete possible tariff refund system will not fully compensate many harms inflicted by the illegal tariffs on both businesses and consumers. Among other things, they cannot compensate businesses for lost sales, disruptions in supplier relationships, lost investments, and more. Consumers, of course, will not be compensated for having to pay higher prices.

For these reasons, as also noted in my earlier post, courts made a mistake when they stayed the Court of International Trade injunction against the tariffs issued when we won our initial trial court victory in May 2025. As I noted at the time:

One factor courts consider in assessing a motion to stay is which side is likely to ultimately prevail on the merits….

Another key factor is which side is likely to suffer "irreparable harm" if they lose on the stay issue. We argue that our clients - and thousands of other businesses - will suffer great irreparable harm if a stay is imposed. They will lose sales due to higher prices, good will can be lost, relationships with suppliers and investors will be disrupted, and more. Those harms can't be made up merely by refunding tariff payments months from now, after the appellate process concludes.

All of the noncompensable harms we warned against came true. And, in addition, the administration has been slow to enact an effective tariff refund system, thereby further exacerbating the harm, and leaving taxpayers on the hook for rapidly growing interest payments.

I hope courts learn from this experience. When and if they strike down Trump's newest massive illegal tariffs - those imposed under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 -  they should know not to stay any injunction issued against them. Judges should not blindly accept administration assurances that any harms will be promptly remedied by refunds issued after the fact.

NOTE: As I have previously noted, I am no longer a member of the V.O.S. Selections legal team, because my role ended after the Supreme Court issued its decision. Thus, I am not involved in the refund phase of this litigation.

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