The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Free Speech

The Importance of Decisions About Whether to Permit Pseudonymity

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I thought I'd pass along portions of the friend-of-the-court brief that three other law professors and I (four of the very few academics who have written on the law of pseudonymous litigation) put together in support of a certiorari petition in Doe v. Trustees of Indiana Univ. This Part explains why the question is important, which is part of the reason why we think the Court should take its time to review the matter; other Parts, which I'll blog shortly, explain how and why the decisions below are in conflict and therefore need the Court's attention.

Many of our readers may already be familiar with the arguments I lay out below, but this is my attempt to relatively crisply put them together.

[I.] Decisions about whether to permit pseudonymity are important to the public, to litigants, and to the justice system

[A.] Such decisions are important to the public

Public access to information about civil cases "serves to promote trustworthiness of the judicial process, to curb judicial abuses, and to provide the public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system, including a better perception of fairness." Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 682 (3d Cir. 1988). This access "protects the public's ability to oversee and monitor the workings of the Judicial Branch," and the Judiciary's "institutional integrity." Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 263 (4th Cir. 2014). "Any step that withdraws an element of the judicial process from public view makes the ensuing decision look more like a fiat and requires rigorous justification." Hicklin Eng'g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2006).

"[A]nonymous litigation" thus "runs contrary to the rights of the public to have open judicial proceedings and to know who is using court facilities and procedures funded by public taxes." Doe v. Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2016). "Identifying the parties to the proceeding is an important dimension of publicness. The people have a right to know who is using their courts." Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997).

Party names often offer the best clue for discovering further information about the case. Consider journalists who write about civil litigation. Without party names, they are limited to what they can glean from the filings and what the pseudonymous parties' lawyers are willing to reveal.

But armed with the names, they can investigate further. They can contact the parties' coworkers, business associates, or acquaintances. They can search court records in other cases to determine whether the fact pattern in this case had led to other litigation. They can more generally see what other cases have been filed by the plaintiff or against the defendant and see whether the parties have been found to be credible or not credible in the past. They can determine whether the parties might have ulterior motives for litigating. See Volokh, The Law of Pseudonymous Litigation, at 1370-72.

Pseudonymity also tends to lead to additional restrictions on public access as a case unfolds. Because filed documents will often contain information that indirectly identify a pseudonymous party, courts may need to outright seal other case information or enjoin a party from publicly revealing the pseudonymous party's name (or other details of the lawsuit) in order to maintain effective pseudonymity. See id. at 1372-76.

And allowing pseudonymity in one case invites pseudonymization of all other cases that raise similar concerns, "open[ing] the door to parties proceeding pseudonymously in an incalculable number of lawsuits" of that kind. Doe v. Moreland, No. 18-cv-800, 2019 WL 2336435, *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 2019); see also Doe v. Fedcap Rehab. Servs., Inc., No. 17-cv-08220, 2018 WL 2021588, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2018) ("At bottom, Plaintiff wants what most employment-discrimination plaintiffs would like: to sue their former employer without future employers knowing about it."); Volokh, supra, at 1451-56.

Courts have therefore treated litigating under a pseudonym as implicating the right of public access to judicial proceedings. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d at 274; Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 2008); Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 685 (11th Cir. 2001). And, because of this, all "circuit courts that have considered the matter have recognized a strong presumption against the use of pseudonyms in civil litigation." Does 1-3 v. Mills, 39 F.4th 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2022).

[B.] Decisions about whether to permit pseudonymity are important to enforcement of legal rules

At the same time, denying pseudonymity can also undermine the public policy that the civil causes of action are aimed to serve. Plaintiffs faced with the prospect of being publicly identified might choose not to litigate, and might thus forgo the remedies that civil causes of action exist to provide.

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Politics

The Justice Department is Failing American Jews

Hamasnik protestors are violating various federal laws, and the Justice Department is doing nothing about it

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[Cross-posted with my Times of Israel blog]

As Times of Israel readers are well-aware, since October 7, anti-Israel groups have launched widespread assaults on the rights of Jewish Americans, especially but not exclusively on college campuses.

I regularly tweet (@ProfDBernstein) about these incidents and comment, "Where is the Justice Department? Where is the FBI?"

I often get responses like, "isn't the Department of Education investigating some of these colleges? What can the feds really do?"

The answer is that "the feds," and the Department of Justice in particular, could do a lot to protect American Jews, and they are doing little to none of it.

Here are some examples.

(1) The Ku Klux Klan Act prohibits conspiracies to deprive Americans of their civil rights. This Act could be invoked against student groups that are blocking Jewish students from traversing their campuses, as at UCLA, and against groups that blockade public roads, depriving people of their right to travel. The Act has been invoked in private lawsuits, but the Justice Department has not brought a single case.

(2) The FACE Act prohibits "the use of physical force, threat of physical force, or physical obstruction to intentionally injure, intimidate, interfere with or attempt to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person who is exercising or trying to exercise their First Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of religious worship." Hillel buildings serve as houses of worship, and various campuses have seen acts of intimidation of and interference with those students trying to enter or exit Hillel buildings. No one involved in these incidents has been charged under the act.

(3) Various complaints and lawsuits against universities have documented threats and assaults against Jewish students in violation of their civil rights. The Justice Department has not brought any criminal or civil charges against the perpetrators, with the exception of a Cornell student who threatened to kill Jewish students. Lower-level and less well-publicized threats, harassment, and assaults have not attracted Justice Department intervention.

(4) American intelligence officials have revealed that anti-Israel protesters are getting money from Iran, in violation of US sanctions laws. Despite this public revelation, no one has been indicted for receiving or serving as a conduit for this money. [Indeed, I wonder whether this information was released precisely because the intelligence folks are frustrated that Justice hasn't done anything about it.]

(5) For political reasons, police departments in cities including DC, Philadelphia, and Baltimore have refused requests by university officials to clear illegal, antisemitic campus encampments. This inaction violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the law. More narrowly, this abuse of police discretion violates the conditions on which cities receive billions of dollars in federal funds. The Justice Department seems entirely quiescent in the face of this malfeasance. Similarly, local prosecutors across Virginia and elsewhere have told police that they will not prosecute Hamasnik protesters who violate state laws by wearing masks to intimidate the public. Again, no intervention against discriminatory law enforcement from the Justice Department.

(6) There are strong indications that antisemitic groups like American Muslims for Palestine and National Students for Justice in Palestine have illegal ties to Hamas. Several state attorney generals, most prominently Virginia's Jason Miyares, are investigating these ties. There are also civil lawsuits pending against these organizations for material support for terrorism that has killed Americans. There is no indication that the Justice Department is seriously investigating.

(7) Jewish-owned businesses have been vandalized in New York and other cities. No federal civil rights charges have been filed against the vandals.

(8) Universities such as Yale have illegally failed to disclose massive donations from Qatar, Hamas's ally. The legal consequences of this failure have been minimal.

(9) Finally, while the Department of Education has been investigating allegations of universities discriminating against Jewish students via a hostile environment, double standards, or otherwise, every one of these complaints has been filed by a private party, giving the Department of Education a legal obligation to investigate. The department does not appear to have opened a single investigation of its own, nor has it referred even the most egregious cases to the Justice Department for potential civil litigation. Every lawsuit that has been filed has been the product of private rather than government efforts.

One can speculate as to why the Justice Department has been so quiescent in the face of the largest outbreak of antisemitism in the United States in decades, failing to use existing legal tools when the antisemitism turns illegal. But what we can say for sure is that despite Attorney General Merrick Garland's stated commitment to protecting the American Jewish community from hate crimes, his Justice Department has been an almost complete failure in combating such crimes inspired or committed by anti-Israel activists.

Donald Trump

A Modest Revelation About Trump v. Anderson

Recent New York Times reporting about the Court's deliberations on the case modestly reinforces the view that the Court ruled that disqualification from office-holding under Section 3 requires congressional legislation.

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US Supreme Court
The Supreme Court Justices. (Pool/ABACA/Newscom)

 

Today's much-discussed New York Times article by Jodi Kantor and Adam Liptak includes many details about the inner workings of the Supreme Court's deliberations on several key cases decided this year. For the most part, I think the revelations aren't enormously surprising. Chief Justice John Roberts maneuvered for consensus on some key cases. But, in two important ones involving Trump - Trump v. Anderson (the Section 3 disqualification case) and Trump v. United States  (the presidential immunity case) -  he ultimately sided with a bloc of four conservative justices when full consensus proved elusive. That is fairly evident from the opinions in the cases themselves.

But the reporting does shed a little light on one issue regarding Trump v. Anderson. In my forthcoming article criticizing that ruling, I argue that the majority ruled that people can only be disqualified from holding office under Section 3 of Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to special congressional legislation under Section 5 of the same Amendment (which gives Congress the power to enact "appropriate" enforcement legislation). In legal parlance, they held that Section 3 is not "self-executing." That is also what the concurring opinions by Justice Amy Coney Barrett and the three liberal justices assume (both opinions differ with the majority on that issue). But some other commentators - most notably Will Baude and Michael Paulsen - disagree, arguing that  majority only concluded that states cannot disqualify a candidate like Trump.

The New York Times article suggested the justices themselves interpret the ruling much as I do:

While all nine justices agreed that Mr. Trump should remain on state ballots, four of the conservatives were pushing to go beyond that and rule that the Constitution's prohibition would require congressional action to take effect. Such a decision would provide greater protection for Mr. Trump: To prevent him from taking office if he won re-election, Congress would have to vote to enforce the insurrectionist ban.

That left the chief justice in control of the outcome. He lingered over the choice, those familiar with the process said. Ultimately, he sided with the four conservatives in an opinion that he wrote but that was issued unsigned [emphasis added]. Justice Amy Coney Barrett and the three liberals wrote concurrences saying the majority had gone too far.

Although the judgment was 9 to 0, the justices had not reached true agreement.

If Kantor and Liptak's sources are accurate, four conservative justices (Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Thomas) wanted a ruling holding that congressional legislation is required and Roberts ultimately "sided" with them. If so, that means all nine justices interpret the ruling as requiring such legislation (we know Barrett and the liberals did, based on what they say in their concurring opinions).

Various caveats apply. Most obviously, it is the text of the ruling that is binding, not the subjective intentions of the justices who joined it. Perhaps the majority justices intended to rule that Section 3 isn't self-executing, but failed to actually incorporate that idea in the opinion. In my view, the text of the opinion points in the same direction (see pp. 327 of my draft article); but it's not completely definitive. In addition, it's possible that Kantor and Liptak's sources are somehow dissembling or misinformed.

Still, if the story is correct, the revelation has some significance, because it may prefigure what the Court would do if Section 3 disqualification issues come before it again.

Ultimately, the big flaws in the Court's decision are that the majority reached a poorly reasoned decision on self-execution, and all nine justices greatly overstated the threat posed by a "patchwork" of state rulings on disqualification, while ignoring the danger of allowing insurrectionists to return to power - especially to the most powerful office in the land. I go into these and other issues in greater detail in my article. Because that article will officially be in print tomorrow, it's too late for me to incorporate the New York Times revelation. But I don't think it would alter any of my conclusions.

The excellent Baude-Paulsen critique of the Court's ruling also was posted too late for me to consider it in my own article. I agree with most of their criticisms of the decision, but - as noted above - differ somewhat with their assessment of its scope.

 

The Trump Leaks Are Far Worse Than The Dobbs Leak.

Knives are out for Chief Justice Roberts, and poor Justice Alito.

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A short while ago, I published a lengthy post detailing the New York Times's latest reporting on the three Trump cases: Trump v. Anderson, Fischer v. United States, and Trump v. United States. Here, I will offer several big-picture observations.

First, this leak is far worse than the Dobbs leak. In Dobbs, one or more people exfiltrated a draft opinion from inside the Court, and somehow that opinion made its way to Politico. (Maybe Jodi Kantor can tell us how that happened!) It was devastating for the draft decision to become public, and it nearly led to the assassination of Justice Kavanaugh. But the aftermath of the leak was swift and overwhelming: the Court was placed on lockdown, and a sweeping investigation was launched to find the culprit(s). But the Trump leaks are systematic and thorough. We have insights of confidential memoranda, detailed conversations at conferences, KBJ's changed vote, Justice Alito losing the Fischer majority, and information about many Roberts clerks were working on the case. This tapestry would require insights from so many different people. Moreover, all of this comes after the Dobbs leak when Chief Justice Roberts (apparently) put strict limitations on access to Court information. What did all of those measures accomplish? Apparently not much.

Second, and I alluded to this point in my earlier post, Justice Kagan is absent from this reporting. There is absolutely nothing about what she thought or did during these deliberations. There are insights into all of the other eight Justices, but nothing on Kagan. This isn't new. Back in the day when Biskupic got the scoops, Kagan was also largely absent. I think it likely that Kagan, or at least Kagan surrogates, are behind these leaks. If Kagan is willing to publicly undermine her colleagues in a speech at the Ninth Circuit, why would she do any less off-the-record? Moreover, this entire story is consistent with Kagan's MO, and describing the Court as bending over backwards for Trump. On that point, I would be willing to place a bet that the three Trump appointees rule against Trump in any election case that comes to the high court. Like in the tax return cases, Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett will gladly knock Trump off the scene and declare their independence. Would you take the opposite bet?

Third, I am still flummoxed how Fischer was simply taken away from Justice Alito. Was this reassignment voluntary? Or was this like a scene in the Godfather, where Roberts made an offer that Alito could not refuse? It is difficult to imagine how difficult this term was for Alito. Barely two years ago, he was on top of the world, holding together a five-member bloc in Dobbs. Now he had only four majority opinions, and lost three! Roberts had seven signed opinions, and authored Anderson!

Fourth, I am still struck by the granular reporting that all four of Roberts's clerks were working on the opinion till the last minute. Was this some effort to heap praise on them, for shuttling back-and-forth between chambers? Or was it some attempt to place blame on them. For those who keep track of such things, here are the four:

1. Jason Bell (Harvard 2021 / Kovner (E.D.N.Y.) / Higginson)
2. Alexander Cave (Harvard 2020 / Srinivasan)
3. Benjamin Daus (Yale 2021 / Kovner (E.D.N.Y.) / Thapar)
4. Sakina Haji (Chicago 2021 / Newsom)

Fifth, we do not get much insights into Justice Barrett, other than that she frustrates her conservative colleagues. She is non-commital at conference, and then decides to break out on her own, with Justice Kagan as the wind beneath her wings. Justice Barrett continues to learn on the job, and figure things out as she goes along.

Sixth, Justice Jackson comes across as a savvy operator. She was in the majority for Fisher, as a way to get the Court to remand the case to Judge Chutkun. And I think she was poised to join the majority in Anderson on the "officer" stuff. Something happened there, but Kantor does not tell us. She is playing the game quite well.

I will close by renewing my call for Chief Justice Roberts to resign. He will never be John Marshall, or Fred Vinson for that matter. Historians will judge him harshly as a failed chief justice who kept digging his hole deeper and deeper, completely oblivious to how he is actually perceived. The only path forward is for him to stop caring about "institutionalism" and decide each case as a judge would decide the case. This game will never work.

NY Times Big Reveals On Deliberations In Three Trump Cases

How did Roberts come to write Trump v. Anderson, Fischer v. United States, and Trump v. United States?

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The front page of today's New York Times blares the headline "How Roberts Shaped Trump's Supreme Court Winning Streak." The piece by Jodi Kantor and Adam Liptak delivers on providing the inside scoop of the three Trump cases: Trump v. Anderson, Fischer v. United States, and Trump v. United States. Like with Joan Biskupic's reporting (1, 2, 3, 4), much of what Kantor and Liptak report can be deduced from the opinion assignments and the final work product. But the Times offers some new insights that could not be inferred. Indeed, it seems clear that they have several high-ranking sources. Though, I will place one note at the outset: they offer inside information about eight of the nine Justices. But there is nothing about the thinking of Justice Kagan. Her fingerprints are wiped clean--like with a cloth.

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Solicitor General

A Conversation with Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar

One of the nation's finest oral advocates discusses representing the United States in the Supreme Court and other topics.

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Earlier this month, the Case Western Reserve University School of Law hosted a conversation with U.S. Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar for the 2024 Sumner Canary Lecture.

The hour-long discussion covered a range of issues, from the responsibilities of the Solicitor General's office, preparing for oral argument, the "emergency docket," and (of particular importance to some of us) whether the Administrative Procedure Act should be understood to authorize nationwide vacatur.

The National Law Journal and CWRU Observer both covered the event. Video is below.

A list of prior Canary lectures, including video of remarks by (then judges) Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Barrett can be found here.

Affordable Housing

New Study on How to Address Public Ignorance About Housing Policy

New data shows that "housing supply skeptics" can be persuaded by evidence showing that allowing more construction reduces prices. But not clear this is a good road map for addressing the problem of public ignorance in the real world.

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Wooden block homes with a ban sign
Andrii Yalanskyi/Dreamstime.com

Exclusionary zoning regulations that severely restrict housing construction are a major cause of the housing shortages besetting large parts of the United States. The standard explanation for why these rules persist is self-interested voting and lobbying by NIMBY ("not in my backyard") homeowners who want to keep housing prices high in order to protect the value of their own property. But evidence increasingly indicates that much of the political support for exclusionary zoning actually comes from people - both renters and homeowners - who simply don't understand basic economics and therefore do not realize that increasing housing construction is likely to reduce housing costs. Such people are suspicious of developers and tend to believe that additional construction will just benefit only the developers themselves or other wealthy people.

In a just-posted article, legal scholar Chris Elmendorf and political scientists Clayton Nall and Stan Oklobdzija (ENO) provide valuable evidence on the extent to which this kind of public ignorance can be overcome by presenting "housing supply skeptics" with countervailing evidence. ENO are also the authors of two important previous studies on public opinion about housing issues, which I considered here and here. Below is the abstract for their latest article:

Recent research finds that most people want lower housing prices but, contrary to expert consensus, do not believe that more supply would lower prices. This study tests the effects of four informational interventions on Americans' beliefs about housing markets and associated policy preferences and political actions (writing to state lawmakers). Several of the interventions significantly and positively affected economic understanding and support for land-use liberalization, with standardized effect sizes of 0.15 − 0.3. The most impactful treatment—an educational video from an advocacy group—had effects 2-3 times larger than typical economics-information or political-messaging treatments. Learning about housing markets increased support for development among homeowners as much as renters, contrary to the "homevoter hypothesis." The treatments did not significantly affect the probability of writing to lawmakers, but an off-plan analysis suggests that the advocacy video increased the number of messages asking for more market-rate housing.

The new ENO study has several important findings. Most obviously, they show that new information can have a big impact in changing supply skeptics' minds about housing deregulation. When shown a short educational video explaining how liberalization can reduce housing prices, many become much more supportive of cutting back on zoning restrictions. As ENO explain, this makes housing policy different from issues on which voters have more deeply rooted attitudes, and therefore tend to ignore or dismiss opposing evidence.

It is also notable that homeowners were just as likely to change their minds in response to the video as renters (possibly even slightly more so). This further undermines the argument that opposition to zoning reform is primarily rooted in the narrow self-interest of NIMBYs. If the self-interest story were valid, realizing that liberalization would lead to lower housing prices should actually lead homeowners to oppose it even more. Yet ENO find the opposite effect.

So far, ENO's results seem very optimistic. We can spread the gospel of YIMBYism simply by showing people simple videos! But I would add some cautionary notes.

First, as a practical matter, most voters are unlikely to take the time to watch even a short video about a policy issue they have relatively interest in. Most people are "rationally ignorant" about politics and public policy, and devote only very limited time to learning about the issues. Second, even if they do watch a video, in the real world they probably won't pay as careful attention as in an experimental setting.

Finally, while ENO have performed a valuable service by showing that most opposition to zoning deregulation is driven by ignorance rather than narrow self-interest, we should not discount self-interested NIMBYism entirely. Such people clearly do exist, and often have disproportionate influence over local politics. They're often the people most likely to show up at zoning board meetings, for example.

On balance, I think YIMBYism can make better progress by resorting to appealing rhetoric, than by expecting large numbers of people to watch videos or study other educational materials. Past studies, including some of ENO's previous work, suggests that people are more sympathetic to YIMBYism if it is described as giving property owners the freedom use their land as they wish, than if we refer to developers and business interests. It also helps to emphasize that reform can lower prices and enable people to live closer to offices, stores, and other locations they want easy access to. Of course studies also show that the NIMBY side also has effective rhetorical ploys, usually focused on the role of business interests, and claims that only the wealthy will benefit from liberalization.

Ultimately, YIMBYs should pursue a strategy of combining political action with constitutional litigation.  Josh Braver and I have made the case that most exclusionary zoning violates the Takings Clause on both originalist and living constitution grounds. Past successful constitutional reform movements have usually pursued a two-track strategy, rather than relying on one method alone.

In sum, the new ENO paper is an excellent contribution to the literature, and should give some hope to YIMBYs. But changing minds in the real world is likely to be much harder than in a laboratory setting.

Politics

Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions

Eleven-person juries, noncustodial plaintiffs, and abdicated responsibilities.

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Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

New cert petition! One might think that, in determining whether a statute restricts speech or restricts nonspeech conduct (a question that tends to matter a great deal in First Amendment cases), courts should ask whether the statute … restricts speech? Or whether it restricts nonspeech conduct? Fourth Circuit: Wildcard! Let's instead use a "non-exhaustive list of factors" combined with a brand-new level of "loosened," "quite different," and "more relaxed" constitutional scrutiny. Read the cert petition to learn why the Fourth Circuit's approach is decidedly not cricket and entrenches a circuit split on a question of nationwide importance.

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Free Speech

On the Missions of Academic Institutions

As long as academic institutions place social justice goals ahead of truth seeking and knowledge creation, they will lose the respect of the public and will not live up to their potential.

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For my last post in this series related to my new book Habits of a Peacemaker: 10 Habits to Change Our Potentially Toxic Conversations into Healthy Dialogues, I turn to the role of institutions of higher education. I spend much of Chapter 2 in Habits talking both about how humanity generates knowledge and how we should each responsibly seek after it. I offer practical tips for doing the latter so that we can have more productive discourse. In theory, at least, modern universities should be places that can help with that enterprise. Sadly, too often, they are not playing that role. Many Americans do not trust these institutions or the people in them. And at least part of the problem, in my view, is a lack of understanding by faculty and administrators of the heavy cost that comes from moving universities away from seeking for and disseminating truth.

In a recent event at the Bech-Loughlin First Amendment Center, Jonathan Rauch, Jonathan Haidt, and I engaged in a discussion with our audience about whether the missions of universities should be to pursue truth or to seek social justice. We also questioned whether that framing created a false dichotomy. As you might expect, the audience had mixed reactions. Different groups adopted each of the available views. Haidt, Rauch, and I then discussed the topic more in depth.

I return to it now to make a simple point. Universities must recognize the price that comes with deviating from a truth-seeking mission towards a social justice mission. That price is respect and credibility. And they will pay it whether they like it or not.

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Rahimi On Remand

"We read the Court's analysis in Rahimi to have modified Bruen in at least one relevant respect."

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On September 12, the Fifth Circuit decided United States. v. Rahimi on remand from the Supreme Court. All-too-often, people think a Supreme Court decision is the end of the matter. But in reality, the lower court has to actually enter a judgment to carry the Supreme Court's ruling into effect.

Here is how the per curiam panel opinion describes Rahimi:

The Supreme Court, clarifying its Bruen test, reversed our judgment and held that § 922(g)(8) is facially constitutional. United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. ----, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024).

I agree. The Supreme Court did not faithfully apply Bruen. It changed the test! For all of the outrage about the Fifth Circuit's reversal rate, a lower court cannot be faulted for faithfully following precedent. Ditto for when the government changes its position on appeal, thus radically altering the dispute, which happened in the mifepristone cases.

The panel identified at least one important regard in which the Court "modified" the Bruen test:

We read the Court's analysis in Rahimi to have modified Bruen in at least one relevant respect. In Bruen, the Court instructed that surety laws provided no historical analogue for banning a person from having a gun, because surety laws only required "certain individuals to post bond before carrying weapons in public." 597 U.S. at 55. "These laws were not bans on public carry." Id.; see also id. at 59 (same). So any "reliance on [surety laws] [was] misplaced." Id. at 55. In Rahimi, the Court announced that surety laws "confirm" that covered individuals "may be disarmed." 602 U.S. at ----, 144 S. Ct. at 1901.

The panel is exactly right. In Bruen, Justice Thomas rejected the relevance of the surety laws. But in Rahimi, Chief Justice Roberts glommed together the surety laws (ex ante restriction) with felon disenfranchisement laws (ex post restriction) to support the disqualification for those subject to domestic violence restraining orders, but who were not convicted.

Judge Ho wrote a concurrence that makes this point explicit.

First, he explains that it is not the role of the lower courts to anticipate where the Supreme Court is likely headed:

The Supreme Court can adjust or amend its own precedents at its discretion. Inferior courts have no such luxury. The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed us to follow its precedents, whether we agree with them or not—and whether we expect the Court itself to follow them or not. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001).

Second, as we all know, only the Supreme Court can modify its own precedents. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit halted the Mississippi abortion law that was upheld in Dobbs:

So we'd be defying the Court's express command if we decided cases based on anticipated changes to its precedents. It's up to the Court to modify or overrule its own precedents, as it alone deems appropriate—and to reverse us when it does. See, e.g., Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Dobbs, 597 U.S. 215 (2022), rev'g 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019).

Third, Judge Ho explains that the Fifth Circuit in Rahimi faithfully followed Bruen.

That's exactly what happened here. We faithfully applied the Court's decision in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). See United States v. Rahimi, 61 F.4th 443 (5th Cir. 2023). No member of our court disagreed with our interpretation or application of Bruen. As one of our distinguished colleagues put it, our job is not to relitigate Bruen, but to "operat[e] in good faith" and "faithfully implement Bruen." United States v. Daniels, 77 F.4th 337, 357–58 (5th Cir. 2023) (Higginson, J., concurring).

But fourth, the SCOTUS majority modified Bruen:

The Court has now modified Bruen—as our decision today explains. See United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. _ (2024), rev'g 61 F.4th 443; ante, at 2 n.1.

Judge Ho also highlights a point I raised on the blog: why must a criminal defendant, seeking to dismiss an indictment, bring a facial challenge to the statute? This framework, I observed, seems inconsistent with the standard in United States v. Lopez:

I write separately to note a second alteration to Court precedent. In the past, the Court has held unconstitutional laws that punish people who don't belong in federal prison—even if the defendant himself does. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also United States v. Kersee, 86 F.4th 1095, 1101–02 & n.2 (5th Cir. 2023) (Ho, J., concurring). That principle readily applies here—victims of domestic violence don't belong in prison. . . .

Well, consider what the Court did in Lopez. Like Rahimi, Lopez is a dangerous person. Lopez was paid to bring a gun to school "so that he . . . could deliver it after school to 'Jason,' who planned to use it in a 'gang war.'" United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993). But the Court nevertheless decided Lopez's Commerce Clause challenge—and held the Gun-Free School Zones Act unconstitutional—because it sweeps in those who don't belong in a federal prison. See 514 U.S. at 562 ("§ 922(q) has no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.").

The same logic applies here.

And it is no answer to say that the Second Amendment requires a different standard than the Commerce Clause or the First Amendment.

As noted, Lopez involved a claim under the Commerce Clause, not the Second Amendment. But the Court has repeatedly instructed that "[t]he constitutional right to bear arms in public for self-defense is not 'a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.'" Bruen, 597 U.S. at 70 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality opinion)). So our court dutifully decided Rahimi's claim.

Judge Ho concludes that the Court may have foreclosed Rahimi from raising this claim, but others may raise it in a future proceeding:

The Supreme Court has now decided Rahimi. The decision does not mention Lopez, and it does not allow Rahimi to litigate the sincere concerns expressed by various amici curiae, judges, scholars, and practitioners. It does acknowledge the "potential faults" with § 922(g)(8). 602 U.S. at _ n.2. But it concludes that any defects must be addressed in a future proceeding.

Rahimi is an unsatisfying decision that quietly modified a two-year old precedent. And everyone who joined that decision knows it. Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh were never fully happy with Bruen in the first place. Had it not been for the chaos caused by the Dobbs leak, I think the Thomas majority might have fractured. And Justice Gorsuch cannot hide behind the facial analysis. Only Justice Thomas was willing to stand up for the Second Amendment, even when it allowed a dangerous person like Mr. Rahimi to have a firearm.

Qualified Immunity

Sixth Circuit Denies Qualified Immunity for State University Officials Who Allegedly Violated Professor's First Amendment Rights

Officials allegedly retaliated against a professor who expressed politically controversial statements about the best treatments for gender dysphoria among youth.

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In Josephson v. Ganzel, a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court's denial of sovereign immunity and qualified immunity to public university officials who allegedly took adverse employment actions against a professor who expressed skepticism about certain treatments for youth diagnosed with gender dysphoria.

Judge Mathis wrote for the panel, joined by Senior Judge Gilman and Judge Griffith. His opinion begins:

The First Amendment protects popular and unpopular speech alike. Allan Josephson worked as a professor of psychiatry at a public university's medical school. After developing an interest in the medical treatment of childhood gender dysphoria, he began publicly discussing his views on that topic. In October 2017, he expressed his thoughts on treating childhood gender dysphoria during a panel discussion sponsored by a conservative think tank. His commentary was unpopular with his coworkers and supervisors. Josephson believes that his superiors retaliated against him for the views he expressed during the panel discussion, ultimately culminating in the nonrenewal of his contract with the university after more than fifteen years of employment. So he sued the individuals that he says violated the First Amendment by retaliating against him.

The defendants argue that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity. The district court disagreed, and so do we. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

Dr. Josephson was a psychiatrist and a member of the faculty at the University of Louisville School of Medicine in the Department of Pediatrics. He participated in a panel sponsored by the Heritage Foundation on gender dysphoria in children. During this panel, he expressed his opinion that "gender dysphoria is a socio-cultural, psychological phenomenon that cannot be fully addressed with drugs and surgery. Thus, doctors and others should explore what causes this confusion and help the child learn how to meet this developmental challenge."

After word of his participation spread within the medical school, he was demoted and, later, his contract with the school was not renewed. Dr. Josephson then sued alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights.

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Immigration

Lessons of the Haitian Migrant Cat Scare

Despite scaremongering to the contrary, Haitian immigrants don't eat cats, and have much lower crime rates than native-born Americans. There are some broader lessons to be learned from this epsode.

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Cat on a leash
Felix Mizioznikov / Dreamstime.com

Over the last few days, there has been an uproar over claims by nativists and immigration restrictionists that Haitian immigrants in Springfield, Ohio have been eating cats and other pets. Former President Donald Trump repeated those assertions in the recent presidential debate. As it turns out, the Ohio feline community can rest easy. Both local authorities in Springfield and Ohio's Republican governor say there is no evidence indicating that Haitian migrants in the area have eaten any cats or other pets. At the very least, if such things were happening routinely, we should have substantial evidence of it; and we don't.

More generally, as Cato Institute immigration policy expert Alex Nowrasteh documents, Haitian immigrants (both legal and illegal) actually have much lower crime rates than native-born Americans. And his data doesn't fully control for differences in age and sex; if it did, Haitian immigrants are likely to look even better, as recent immigrants tend to be younger and have a higher percentage of men than the general population (and young men have higher crime rates than other demographic groups). Other evidence shows they have a high rate of assimilation and income growth, which - despite mythology to the contrary  - is actually true of recent immigrants, more generally.

There are some broader lessons to be learned from this sorry episode. First, it's important to look at aggregate data, rather than just focusing on a few individual incidents, that may be unrepresentative, even if they happened. As of 2022, there were over 730,000 Haitian immigrants in the United States, and the numbers have risen further since then, as a result of refugee flows generated by growing violence and economic crises in Haiti. With such a large group, it's almost inevitable there are going to be a few who commit terrible crimes. There may even be one or two who ate a cat at some point! But you can say the same thing about virtually any other large group, including native-born Americans, one of whom apparently really did recently kill and eat a cat. Before concluding that any group poses an unusually great risk, you have to look at aggregate data. By that standard, Haitian immigrants are actually less dangerous than native-born citizens.

Even if a group does have an unusually high crime rate, it will usually be wrong to discriminate against them based on racial or ethnic characteristics they have no control over. But at least in such cases we can plausibly argue there is a problem that might require a policy response. There is no such issue in the case of Haitians.

The cat-eating hysteria is  even worse than the usual scenario of nativists holding an entire immigrant group responsible for the unrepresentative actions of a few members. Here, it appears the accusation was just totally false. But it is still an example of the more general problem of focusing on dramatic stories rather than more systematic data.

Second, it is a mistake to judge migrants by the state of their countries of origin, assuming that if the latter is awful, that means the migrants will create similar awfulness in their new homes. Haiti is one of the poorest and most violent societies in the Western Hemisphere. But that's not because Haitians are, by nature, somehow inherently violent and lazy. Rather, it's because Haiti has terrible political institutions. Given the chance to live and work in a society with better institutions, Haitian migrants do well, as most have in the US.

Indeed, the history of the US is in large part a history of immigrants arriving from societies with terrible political institutions, and doing well here. If you think that immigration replicates the conditions of the migrants' countries of origin, then the United States should long since have descended into stagnation and tyranny. After all, the vast majority of modern Americans are descendants of migrants from poor and oppressive societies. Yet, far from causing degradation, they have contributed to making American the wealthiest, freest, and most powerful nation in the world.

For a more detailed look at arguments that immigration causes institutional degradation, I recommend Alex Nowrasteh and Benjamin Powell's book, Wretched Refuse: The Political Economy of Immigration and Institutions. I  consider some of these issues myself in Chapter 6 of my own book, Free to Move: Foot Voting, Migration, and Political Freedom.

 

 

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