The Volokh Conspiracy
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A Modest Revelation About Trump v. Anderson
Recent New York Times reporting about the Court's deliberations on the case modestly reinforces the view that the Court ruled that disqualification from office-holding under Section 3 requires congressional legislation.

Today's much-discussed New York Times article by Jodi Kantor and Adam Liptak includes many details about the inner workings of the Supreme Court's deliberations on several key cases decided this year. For the most part, I think the revelations aren't enormously surprising. Chief Justice John Roberts maneuvered for consensus on some key cases. But, in two important ones involving Trump - Trump v. Anderson (the Section 3 disqualification case) and Trump v. United States (the presidential immunity case) - he ultimately sided with a bloc of four conservative justices when full consensus proved elusive. That is fairly evident from the opinions in the cases themselves.
But the reporting does shed a little light on one issue regarding Trump v. Anderson. In my forthcoming article criticizing that ruling, I argue that the majority ruled that people can only be disqualified from holding office under Section 3 of Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to special congressional legislation under Section 5 of the same Amendment (which gives Congress the power to enact "appropriate" enforcement legislation). In legal parlance, they held that Section 3 is not "self-executing." That is also what the concurring opinions by Justice Amy Coney Barrett and the three liberal justices assume (both opinions differ with the majority on that issue). But some other commentators - most notably Will Baude and Michael Paulsen - disagree, arguing that majority only concluded that states cannot disqualify a candidate like Trump.
The New York Times article suggested the justices themselves interpret the ruling much as I do:
While all nine justices agreed that Mr. Trump should remain on state ballots, four of the conservatives were pushing to go beyond that and rule that the Constitution's prohibition would require congressional action to take effect. Such a decision would provide greater protection for Mr. Trump: To prevent him from taking office if he won re-election, Congress would have to vote to enforce the insurrectionist ban.
That left the chief justice in control of the outcome. He lingered over the choice, those familiar with the process said. Ultimately, he sided with the four conservatives in an opinion that he wrote but that was issued unsigned [emphasis added]. Justice Amy Coney Barrett and the three liberals wrote concurrences saying the majority had gone too far.
Although the judgment was 9 to 0, the justices had not reached true agreement.
If Kantor and Liptak's sources are accurate, four conservative justices (Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Thomas) wanted a ruling holding that congressional legislation is required and Roberts ultimately "sided" with them. If so, that means all nine justices interpret the ruling as requiring such legislation (we know Barrett and the liberals did, based on what they say in their concurring opinions).
Various caveats apply. Most obviously, it is the text of the ruling that is binding, not the subjective intentions of the justices who joined it. Perhaps the majority justices intended to rule that Section 3 isn't self-executing, but failed to actually incorporate that idea in the opinion. In my view, the text of the opinion points in the same direction (see pp. 327 of my draft article); but it's not completely definitive. In addition, it's possible that Kantor and Liptak's sources are somehow dissembling or misinformed.
Still, if the story is correct, the revelation has some significance, because it may prefigure what the Court would do if Section 3 disqualification issues come before it again.
Ultimately, the big flaws in the Court's decision are that the majority reached a poorly reasoned decision on self-execution, and all nine justices greatly overstated the threat posed by a "patchwork" of state rulings on disqualification, while ignoring the danger of allowing insurrectionists to return to power - especially to the most powerful office in the land. I go into these and other issues in greater detail in my article. Because that article will officially be in print tomorrow, it's too late for me to incorporate the New York Times revelation. But I don't think it would alter any of my conclusions.
The excellent Baude-Paulsen critique of the Court's ruling also was posted too late for me to consider it in my own article. I agree with most of their criticisms of the decision, but - as noted above - differ somewhat with their assessment of its scope.
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If Baude is correct and the Court did not hold that Section 3, as applied to at least the presidency (and likely Congress as well), is not self-executing, why didn't the opinion correct the misperceptions of the concurrences? Instead, the opinion said:
No justice questioned that Congress has the power to enforce Section 3. So, that sentence from the opinion only makes sense if it reads "vests [only] in Congress."
You believe something / anything the NYT “reported”? Wow
Somin wrote an essay attacking the unanimous Scotus decision, but somehow believes from this NYT leak that the justices secretly agree with him. I think the published opinion speaks for itself.
Somin said the NYT leak establishes the justices agree with him only on whether the per curium opinion held that Section 3 is not self-executing.
And if it was passed now, it would be ex post facto legislation...
The majority of the Senate believed that Trump could be impeached after he left office; the ones who pretended to think otherwise were just making an excuse for their cowardice. If they aren't happy with him as a candidate, they should have shown a little more backbone then.
"And if it was passed now, it would be ex post facto legislation…"
The constitutional prohibitions of ex post facto laws apply only to criminal offenses and penalties. Occupational debarment is civil in nature, not criminal. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104-105 (1997).
Sure, but that is just arguing that it wouldn't be constitutionally prohibited ex post facto legislation. It would still be ex post facto.
Well, the 14th Amdt was ex post facto in that sense as well, so I don't quite see your point.
Just that he was right to call a law enacted after the act it applied to "ex post facto", regardless of whether the Clause would apply to it. It's just latin for "after the fact", after all.
Said clause, by the way, does not say anything at all to suggest that it only applies to criminal laws. That's a convenient invention by the courts.
So some clerk or justice is repeatedly disobeying established rules and authority and undermining a branch of government probably in the hopes of ultimately 'overthrowing' it and the NYT is openly aiding and abetting them? Sounds pretty insurrectioney to me. Why aren’t we busting out five alarm alphabet soup investigations and handcuffs and serious jailtime when we already know some of the conspirators? Or is it okay when the ‘good guys’ do it?
Leaks? Not seeing beyond a reasonable doubt, let alone an actual mechanism by which this might overthrow anything, compared to attacking police and threatening the lives of members of Congress and the Vice President, expecting the then-President to declare martial law.
How can you say it’s not self executing without also saying it requires Congressional action. I don’t understand the distinction.
Somin said ithe Court held it was not self executing and required Congressional legislation.
"While all nine justices agreed that Mr. Trump should remain on state ballots, four of the conservatives were pushing to go beyond that and rule that the Constitution's prohibition would require congressional action to take effect. Such a decision would provide greater protection for Mr. Trump: To prevent him from taking office if he won re-election, Congress would have to vote to enforce the insurrectionist ban."
This sounds like there's a difference between 1) denying that it's self-executing and 2) holding that it requires Congressional action. I don't see the distinction.
I don't really see the distinction, either.
I'm seriously not understanding how you can read the decision and not understand that the solitary avenue available for disqualifying Trump is per Congressionally enacted enabling legislation, currently the federal insurrection statute.
States can disqualify people from state office without that enabling legislation, because states have a pre-existing power to set the qualifications for their own offices, they didn't NEED the 14th amendment to disqualify people they decided were insurrectionists, so they don't need Section 5 enabling legislation, either. (Relevantly, electors are state officers...)
Similarly Congress, constitutionally granted the power to determine the qualifications of its own members, does not need enabling legislation to do so, because it didn't need the 14th amendment to do so.
But the Presidency is not a state office, and Congress has no constitutional grant of power to decide the qualifications for that office, so the 14th amendment is required to impose the disqualification, and the Court ruled that enabling legislation is required to provide a process for imposing it.
And the only present enabling legislation is the federal insurrection statute.
The quote mentions Congressional action, never discussing self-execution. What makes you think the quote suggests a distinction?
Somin makes the same error as many others, focusing only on J6 and ignoring the rest of the attempted coup. The fake electors, pressuing state election officials to ignore the votes and declare Trump the winner, lying about the election, and pushing Pence to ignore EC votes. Those are in many ways worse than J6.
Congress could act to make those things illegal.
"The fake electors, pressuing state election officials to ignore the votes and declare Trump the winner, lying about the election, and pushing Pence to ignore EC votes. "
None of which is correct. Continuing the falsehoods serves nothing.
"Coup" has a meaning, you know. It's a violent takeover of government. So, while the J-6 break in might in principle constitute a coup, fake electors and political pressure to subvert the electoral count simply fail to qualify as such.
So, there is no "rest of the attempted coup" for Somin to ignore.
You've never heard of a bloodless coup?
It just requires that the takeover be illegal.
Yeah, I've heard of a bloodless coup. It's a a figure of speech.
"Coup” has a meaning, you know. It’s a violent takeover of government...
...doesn't even reach the status of of figure-of-speech. A bloodless coup is still a coup d'état, but without violence
Just like what Trump attempted was not just a coup, but a self-coup, an autogolpe (from the Spanish, pronounced ow-tuh-GAHL-pay). And it wasn't nearly as much of a bloodbath as he (and certain followers well-represented here) would have preferred.
You're still having a bit of trouble understanding what was going on.
There was no seizing of power from the other branches. If Trump's plan had worked, he wouldn't have any more power than any other President gets to exercise. He would simply have remained President for another four years, and his term would be nearing its end now.
All he was doing was using political pressure to try to get Congress to exercise discretion in counting the electoral college votes in his favor. This was to be an exercise of power BY Congress, not a seizure of power FROM Congress. And it was to be accomplished by political pressure, NOT violence. The violence that happened actually put an end to Trump's plans, rather than being part of them.
Now, I agree that this was a wrong thing for Trump to do, because Congress didn't properly have the discretion Trump wanted them to exercise, they were engaged in a ministerial act, not a discretionary one. But it's hardly a novel thing to attempt, Democrats tried pulling something similar in 2017, it just fell through.
Your problem, I think, is that you're determined to treat the break in as though it was part of Trump's plans, when it actually disrupted them.
You really think that if Trump managed to become and unelected president that the Ds would just be ok with it? A successful coup in the US an life continues as normal? That is insane.
Brett: “So, while the J-6 break in might in principle constitute a coup…”
Why yes, it might.
Brett: “Democrats tried pulling something similar in 2017, it just fell through. ”
Oh? In the years and months before 2017, the Democrats incessantly repeated a Big Lie — that only an unimaginably complex conspiracy of thousands of people coordinating massive fraud could block Clinton’s “win in landslide?”
Democrats brought more than 60 lawsuits, trying but failing to convince the courts of the alternate facts necessary to the big lie? They tried but failed to intimidate officials of several states into reversing their states’ election results? Tried but failed to undermine the Justice Department and enlist the help of the military?
Failing in all other areas and facing the January 6th Congressional validation of their defeat, Democrats used a final rally as the focus point and culmination of their years-long campaign of ruthless, relentless, denialist propaganda? As their candidate failed to gain the constitution’s mandated approval of the people, Democrats tried to block a peaceful transfer of power, provoking a domestic insurrection among their followers to nullify an election they unambiguously lost?
On January 6th, 2017, eight Democratic Senators and more than half of Democratic House members voted against certification of state election results, in order to overturn the election?
Skipping over the demonstration of your typical reliance on portable goalposts…
One of these things is not like the other; both of these things are not the same.
I’d say states can certainly remove unqualified candidates from their ballots – whatever the office.
If the Supreme Court doesn’t want a “patchwork” of state decisions re Amendment 14(3), they can take an appeal of one of the state decisions and rule yes or no on whether the person is disqualified as a matter of law. That would provide a nationally-uniform decision.
The Supreme Court seems to have made a special rule for *major-party* Presidential candidates that nothing can keep them off the ballot, not even actual disqualification to hold the Presidency.
Donald Trump's petition for certiorari raised a single question: "Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot?" SCOTUS ruled merely that responsibility for enforcing Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates rests with Congress and not the States.
Anything beyond that is obiter dictum.
Dictum can be a way for those who are actually interested in listening to what the Court is saying to learn how the Court would rule in a somewhat similar case that happened to not be before them.
Of course, the problem here is that Somin really wants a major constitutional crisis where Congress decides to tell the voters to go pound sand, and annoints a defeated candidate President in place of the 'threat to democracy'. (Imagine me saying that in a mocking tone of voice while making air quotes.)
The problem here is that the American people said that people who engaged in insurrection were ineligible for office, and because you want someone who engaged in insurrection to be president, you have rewritten that in your mind to say, "Congress can make people who engaged in insurrection ineligible for office, if it feels like it."
The American people also said that Congress could write the enabling legislation. "Self execution" is all well and good for transparently objective matters like age or where somebody was born. It sucks for matters that require judgement calls.
You have mis-paraphrased Section 5. It does not say "the enabling legislation." It said that Congress shall have "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Which is a grant of power to Congress; it in no way even hints that only Congress has such power.
Is a necessary reason to explain the judgment part of the holding or merely dicta?
Looks like the Court endorsed a power for Congress the Justices might live to regret.
The Good Behavior Clause:
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior.
That of course has been interpreted to mean lifetime appointment, with removal only by impeachment. But it says something else—something provocative—because “good behavior,” is not, “high crimes and misdemeanors.”
Arguably, a Court which empowers Congress to act, and indeed requires Congress to act, to clarify the removal power under the 14A, empowers Congress to act likewise under the Good Behavior Clause.
Suppose Congress decides to do so. It passes a law to define, “Good Behavior,” in terms of ethical standards Congress finds reasonable for Article III judges. No bribe taking; mandatory recusal for appearance of conflict, with appearacne of conflict rigorously defined; no participation or appearance of participation in partisan politics, with that also defined; no decisions which in effect decree election outcomes. Also, no family income except the salary prescribed by Congress for a judge or justice, or the proceeds of assets held in a blind trust set up before the judge or justice is sworn in.
To armor plate the income requirement, Congress sharply increases pay level for judges, quadruples the current pay level for Justices, indexes those pay rates to inflation, and prescribes that judicial compensation, and the limitations on it, apply for life, whether or not the judge or justice continues on any Court. Thus, no back-door bribery of a judge or justice by promise of lucrative employment or other emoluments post-judicial service.
Thus, to accept judicial appointment under the United States becomes a lifetime commitment to enforceable ethical standards. In exchange, the judge or justice can expect the highest rate of compensation the government of the United States offers to anyone, and that rate of compensation will continue without reduction after retirement.
Congress also prescribes a mechanism for ethics enforcement. It makes enforcement dependent on prosecution and conviction beyond a reasonable doubt in a jury trial held in the district where the judge or justice sits. And Congress decrees that no such trial will be held, except upon indictment specifically alleging bad behavior, by a grand jury sitting in that district.
Congress also reinforces the grand jury power, making it mandatory, never discretionary, for the Justice Department to prosecute every such indictment to a verdict, and limiting appeals of such prosecutions to The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, except in cases where the judge convicted is a member of that court, when the Supreme Court will instead hear the appeal. The Supreme Court is thus barred from hearing ethics appeals from its own members, as well as those from every other United States Court except the DC circuit.
Congress concludes its constitutionally necessary action pursuant to its Article 1 powers. It denies to the judicial system any jurisdiction to hear any case about judicial ethics requirements, or enforcement procedures for them. Any change, either to the ethics standards, or to the enforcement procedures, will require an act of Congress.
"while ignoring the danger of allowing insurrectionists to return to power"
It seems to me that anybody who actually BELIEVED somebody was an 'insurrectionist' would be outraged that they had never been charged with the federal felony, "insurrection".
The desire to have Trump legally treated as an insurrectionist, without any particular impulse to actually have him charged with the crime and tried for it, really suggests that on some level you don't think the charge can actually be proven.
So you keep trying to wish into existence some way of treating him as guilty without bothering with any LEGAL attempt to establish that guilt, especially one where he'd enjoy the presumption of innocence and a right to mount a defense.
This is really a despicable stance, I think.
Yeah, Somin keeps talking about insurrection while ignoring the lack of any common national definition of it, or of any conviction or even a charge against Trump or anyone else of "insurrection." After the NY 'election interference' conviction, any thinking person should be very worried about the rise of convictions and punishments handed out for crimes that haven't been charged, convicted or even defined in a court of law. With that kind of thing going on, the danger of a patchwork of state-level decisions on a candidate's eligibility to run for office should be self-evident.
Multiple people explained the historical and legal definitions of “insurrection,” which in an originalist sense is fairly broad.
Where does this “common national definition” test come down for any number of constitutional provisions SCOTUS interprets?
Trying to stop the passage of power, at any rate, is a rather clear case. Imagine if a violent mob tried to stop Congress from counting the votes to make Abraham Lincoln president.
Putting aside 14A, sec, 3 is not a criminal provision, the specific things that multiple 1/6 participants were charged with overlap with what the term “insurrection” includes. It doesn’t have to literally include the word “insurrection.” Can be functional.
If a “patchwork” of state eligibility rules is a problem, our current election system must be a 4 alarm fire.
It's a common English word. The insurrection statute — the one Brett wants to rely on as required — also does not provide a definition of the term; in other words, if he had been prosecuted for, and convicted of, insurrection, it would also be without any "common national definition."
Since that does not in fact describe the NY conviction, what's your point? Trump was charged with and convicted of crimes that were charged, convicted, and defined in a court of law.
It isn't at all self-evident. Presidential candidates from other than the Dems and Republicans are always on the ballot in a subset of states based on patchwork application of state-level decisions. Not to sound like Margrave, but why should Dems and Republicans be special?
Because they control the government, and want themselves to be special. Did you think there was something more complicated about it than that?
Since that does not in fact describe the NY conviction
The NY conviction was a felony, as opposed to a misdemeanor, because the statute in question raises falsification of business records to a felony if it was done to cover up another crime. The second crime was not charged, convicted, or even described in court. The judge said it existed, then told the jury it was multiple choice and they didn't need to agree on which one they thought it was. I'm told that this is how the law works in New York, which I am shocked, shocked! to hear, but that doesn't make it right. A prosecutor should not be able to gain a conviction based on just asserting that a crime happened, without even saying what it was. The people who call this conviction bullshit are right to do so.
Sigh. Once again: you people have misunderstood the NY statute. It does not require that some other crime have been committed (let alone that it was committed by the defendant). The statute requires that the person who falsified the records had the intent to aid, conceal, or cover up some other crime. The element of the actual penal statute is a mental state, not another crime. This isn't some special, novel, NY statute that operates in a unique way.
You have been told repeatedly that disqualification is not a criminal matter. He wasn't being treated as "guilty" of anything; he was being treated as having engaged in insurrection.
Disqualification doesn't have to be a criminal matter. So long as the only enabling legislation is a criminal law, it is CURRENTLY a criminal matter. That's the Supreme court's position, and mine.
Tomorrow Congress could enact a law permitting a civil procedure for imposing disqualification. There used to be such a procedure, until 1948, when it was repealed.
But until they do, criminal conviction is the only way to do it.
I read the Baude-Paulsen article.
I don’t agree with certain things they argue. The bit about “obviously” their view of originalism is the law as compared to the opinions of the Supreme Court come to mind.
I think the article as a whole is good though sometimes their case is not totally convincing.
They suggest that the per curiam originally clearly said the provision is not self-executing. The “dissent” (see Mark Joseph Stern) pushed back. Then, certain language that made that clear was removed though the surrounding text — which implies it — remained. The “concurrence” left in their strong language.
That part of the paper reads like a Josh Blackman post.
Not enough bashing of Barrett and the liberals.
"For the most part, I think the revelations aren't enormously surprising."
That is fair as far as it goes though not all of the revelations were known & some were probably somewhat surprising. Alito losing the majority opinion in Fischer is the biggest reveal, probably.
The value of the reporting is to flesh out some details & more so to inform the general public about what is happening.
Just a thought.
Should this issue first be predicated on an indictment and conviction from a court of competent jurisdiction?
Given that this has yet to have happened, any speculation is based on nothing more that 'fart gas'. And just as substantial.
In principle, the jointly sovereign People enjoy a power to bestow their gift of office arbitrarily, and without constraint. Then came the Supreme Court, and a bunch of VC advocates, to add constraints. For instance, assertions that before the People may disqualify a candidate, the candidate must be convicted of a crime.
That was not originalist U.S. constitutionalism. That was action, with an eye illegitimately to constrain the People’s sovereignty. It was the work of a corruptly partisan Supreme Court—which had lately joined former President Trump in his ongoing contest against the People for sovereignty over the United States.
Unless political happenstance delivers a presidential election victory to candidate Harris—and somehow empowers her to take office—expect a final twist in that ongoing sovereignty contest. As joint agents of the People’s overthrow, it will remain for Trump and the Court to fight it out, to determine which emerges as the nation’s new sovereign.
Sentimentalists and lawyers will presume a Court victory, just as they presume nothing especially notable has already happened. To many, a judicialist regime for the nation would seem not that different from present practice—just a bit more specific, and a bit more emphatic, about what part of government enjoys ultimate, unappealable power.
However, experience shows contests for sovereignty more likely become tests of brute force than otherwise. Trump’s personal capacities may seem to be fading, but if so, his backers will remain prepared to step in, organize, and pay for whatever force will best reward their efforts and investments.
If that happens, justices of the present Court will be lucky to slip into peaceful retirement. To resist would likely cost them their lives.
I doubt even one reader of the VC will find the above speculation plausible. It discomfits me; I heartily wish I could see anywhere else present circumstances might reasonably take the nation. I wish I could think I was mistaken about critical facts, or uncritically following flawed logic.
A problem I cannot find my way around is a politically partisan Supreme Court majority, actively in league with a corrupt presidential candidate, whose options have apparently shrunk to becoming president by whatever means, or dying in prison.
If you want to critique my speculation, please do so. But please do not omit to explain why I misunderstand the problem.
That is not remotely what the Supreme Court said. Neither the People nor the people were a party to the case.
Nieporent — As I am sure you understand, my comment had nothing to do with parties to the case.
The jointly sovereign People authored a decree—the 14A—which the Supreme Court ought to have followed, but instead ignored. Or, more precisely, it was a decree the Court majority purported to change. The change announced a constraint on the People's power by the Court, while demanding a further constraint on the People's power by Congress.
Neither the Court nor Congress enjoy any legitimate power to constrain the People in their exercise of sovereign constitutive prerogative. What qualifications for federal office may be is a matter for the People to decree at pleasure, without constraint, and without appeal.
As always, I get that as a libertarian you feel compelled to quibble every time sovereignty gets mentioned. It's a tic. Persuade your like-minded colleagues to get rid of it, and libertarians might cease to be cranks.
The “need for enabling legislation” bit is cited with some reference to the fifth section of the 14th Amendment.
The power to enforce the amendment applies to the whole thing. It also is present in other amendments, including the 13th Amendment.
There was no need for Congress, and Congress alone, to enforce the 13A before slavery ended. There was no need for Congress, and Congress alone, to protect birthright citizenship, state deprivation of due process of law, and so on before those provisions came into effect.
Ditto the enforcement of the 15th Amendment. Congress did pass various enforcement acts, including the Voting Rights Act of 1964, which superseded state law in relevant cases. But, that was not necessary except to the extent states failed to enforce it properly.
The conceit is that Section Three is somehow different when applied to federal offices because of the overall nature of the issue. The author of this post, Baude/Paulsen, and others pointed out the problems with that argument.
Still, it is not that “it’s so obvious!” that only Congress can enforce, and only then will it become binding, provisions of the 14th Amendment. Along with the basic point that it is not a criminal provision — the prime application after the Civil War underlines this but damn if people don’t care — this is a major confusion here.