The Volokh Conspiracy Archive

Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

New case: In 2023, South Carolina enacted a law providing $6,000 education scholarship accounts for low-income families to be used for a virtually unlimited number of education expenses: textbooks, tutoring, homeschool materials, therapies, and tuition and fees at private and out-of-district public schools. But in response to a recent state supreme court ruling, officials have barred families from using the ESAs for private school tuition. So this week, IJ filed a petition in the South Carolina Supreme Court, arguing that the new policy falls afoul of two bedrock, towering, and monumental U.S. Supreme Court cases: Meyer v. Nebraska, which recognized the right of parents to direct the education of their children; and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, which held that this right includes the right to send one's children to a private school. Click here to learn more.

New on the Short Circuit podcast: Chicago attorney Patrick Eckler joins the podcast to share a trainwreck of a Seventh Circuit oral argument.

Here are some excerpts from Chief Judge Srinivasan's opinion concurring in the judgment as to the First Amendment inquiry in Tiktok, Inc. v. Garland. First, Judge Srinivasan stresses the history of restrictions on foreign ownership of electronic communications media:

[C]oncerns about the prospect of foreign control over mass communications channels in the United States are of age-old vintage. In that respect, Congress's decision to condition TikTok's continued operation in the United States on severing Chinese control is not a historical outlier. Rather, it is in line with a historical pattern.

The first communications medium capable of reaching mass audiences in real time—radio—was subject to restrictions on foreign ownership and control from the very outset. The Radio Act of 1912 required radio operators engaged in interstate (or international) communications to obtain a license from the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, but Congress made licenses available only to U.S. citizens or companies. Congress then extended the restrictions to encompass foreign control (not just foreign ownership) in the Radio Act of 1927, prohibiting licensing of any company if it had a foreign officer or director or if one-fifth of its capital stock was in foreign hands.

Within a few years, the Communications Act of 1934 shored up the restrictions on foreign control. Section 310 of the law incorporated with little change the 1927 Act's foreign-control requirements, and also gave the newly created Federal Communications Commission (FCC) authority to withhold a license if a company is "directly or indirectly controlled" by a foreign-dominated parent company. In urging Congress to adopt the additional restrictions on foreign control, the Navy conveyed its concerns that foreign-controlled stations could "be employed in espionage work and in the dissemination of subversive propaganda." The FCC has described Section 310's original purpose as "protect[ing] the integrity of ship-to-shore and governmental communications" from foreign interference and "thwart[ing] the airing of foreign propaganda on broadcast stations."

If I had to identify one paragraph as the key to the majority opinion in TikTok v. Garland, I think it would be this:

In this case, a foreign government threatens to distort free speech on an important medium of communication. Using its hybrid commercial strategy, the PRC has positioned itself to manipulate public discourse on TikTok in order to serve its own ends. The PRC's ability to do so is at odds with free speech fundamentals. Indeed, the First Amendment precludes a domestic government from exercising comparable control over a social media company in the United States. See NetChoice v. Moody (2024) (explaining that a state government "may not interfere with private actors' speech" because the First Amendment prevents "the government from tilting public debate in a preferred direction"). Here the Congress, as the Executive proposed, acted to end the PRC's ability to control TikTok. Understood in that way, the Act actually vindicates the values that undergird the First Amendment.

Agree or disagree with it, but it seems to me the heart of the argument.

Besides challenging the law on First Amendment grounds, TikTok also raised a Takings Clause argument, but the D.C. Circuit panel unanimously rejected it:

TikTok claims the Act constitutes a per se regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment because it will render TikTok defunct in the United States. The Government counters that TikTok has assets that can be sold, and that the Act requires only divestiture, which need not be uncompensated. Although the Act will certainly have a substantial effect on the TikTok platform in the United States, regardless whether TikTok divests, the Act does not qualify as a per se regulatory taking.

The Supreme Court recognizes two situations in which regulatory action constitutes a per se taking: (1) where the government requires that an owner suffer a "physical invasion of [its] property," and (2) where a regulation "completely deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use of [its] property." TikTok's argument is of the second variety, but it does not demonstrate the complete deprivation such a claim requires.

Here the causal connection between the Act and the alleged diminution of value is attenuated because the Act authorizes a qualified divestiture before (or after) any prohibitions take effect. That presents TikTok with a number of possibilities short of total economic deprivation. ByteDance might spin off its global TikTok business, for instance, or it might sell a U.S. subset of the business to a qualified buyer.

Besides challenging the law on First Amendment grounds, TikTok also claimed that it violated the Bill of Attainder Clause, because it singles out TikTok. The D.C. Circuit panel unanimously rejected that argument:

A law is a bill of attainder if it "(1) applies with specificity, and (2) imposes punishment." Because the Act applies with specificity, this claim turns on whether the Act can fairly be deemed a punishment. We conclude the Act is not a punishment under any of the three tests used to distinguish a permissible burden from an impermissible punishment….

[W]e have assumed without deciding that the clause applies to corporations but emphasized that differences between commercial entities and persons need to be considered. See, e.g., Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. DHS (D.C. Cir. 2018) (assuming the Bill of Attainder Clause protects corporations but emphasizing the differences between corporations and "living, breathing human beings"); BellSouth Corp. v. FCC (D.C. Cir. 1998) (assuming the clause protects corporations but recognizing the importance of understanding "its effect on flesh-and-blood people"). We take the same approach here.

To determine whether a law constitutes a punishment, we analyze:

whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment [the historical test];

whether the statute, viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes [the functional test]; and

whether the legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish [the motivational test].

The Act clearly is not a bill of attainder judged by any of these tests.

So the D.C. Circuit just held in TikTok v. Garland, written by Judge Douglas Ginsburg, and joined by Judge Neomi Rao. Some key excerpts from the panel majority:

To summarize our First Amendment analysis: The Government has provided two national security justifications for the Act. We assumed without deciding the Act is subject to strict scrutiny and we now uphold the TikTok-specific portions of the Act under each justification. This conclusion is supported by ample evidence that the Act is the least restrictive means of advancing the Government's compelling national security interests….

[T]he Government offers two national security justifications for the Act: to counter (1) the PRC's efforts to collect data of and about persons in the United States, and (2) the risk of the PRC covertly manipulating content on TikTok. Each constitutes an independently compelling national security interest.

In reaching that conclusion, we follow the Supreme Court in affording great weight to the Government's "evaluation of the facts" because the Act "implicates sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign affairs." At the same time, of course, we "do not defer to the Government's reading of the First Amendment." We simply recognize the comparatively limited competence of courts at "collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in this area." With regard to national security issues, the political branches may — and often must — base their actions on their "informed judgment," which "affects what we may reasonably insist on from the Government." …

We … reject TikTok's argument that the Government's data-related concerns are speculative. The Government "need not wait for a risk to materialize" before acting; its national security decisions often must be "based on informed judgment." Here the Government has drawn reasonable inferences based upon the evidence it has. That evidence includes attempts by the PRC to collect data on U.S. persons by leveraging Chinese-company investments and partnerships with U.S. organizations. It also includes the recent disclosure by former TikTok employees that TikTok employees "share U.S. user data on PRC-based internal communications systems that China-based ByteDance employees can access," and that the ByteDance subsidiary responsible for operating the platform in the United States "approved sending U.S. data to China several times." In short, the Government's concerns are well founded, not speculative….

Preventing covert content manipulation by an adversary nation also serves a compelling governmental interest. The petitioners object for two reasons, neither of which persuades. First, TikTok incorrectly frames the Government's justification as suppressing propaganda and misinformation. The Government's justification in fact concerns the risk of the PRC covertly manipulating content on the platform. For that
reason, again, the Act is directed only at control of TikTok by a foreign adversary nation.

From Wednesday's opinion by Judge Susan K. DeClercq (E.D. Mich.) in Druskinis v. StopAntisemitism:

In 2023, John Druskinis was a student-athlete on the University of Michigan's ice hockey team. That August, he spraypainted a picture of an ejaculating penis and the slur "fag" on the sidewalk leading up to the Jewish Resource Center in Ann Arbor. As a result, he was kicked off the hockey team, and he later publicly apologized for his actions.

Soon after, StopAntisemitism, a watchdog organization that "exposes" people it views as engaging in antisemitic behavior, caught wind of the story. It posted on X.com (formerly Twitter) about what happened but got an important detail wrong: it reported that Druskinis had spraypainted onto the Jewish Resource Center not a penis or a homophobic slur, but swastikas.

Druskinis says that StopAntisemitism purposely and maliciously turned his life into a living hell through its false reporting. He therefore sued StopAntisemitism and its executive director, Liora Reznichenko (collectively "StopAntisemitism") for defamation, false-light invasion of privacy, tortious interference with business relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The court allowed Druskinis' defamation claim to go forward as to the swastika allegation:

12/6/1865: The 13th Amendment is ratified.

Today Judge Reed O'Connor rejected a proposed plea bargain between federal prosecutors and Boeing. The deal would have resolved Boeing's criminal liability for its crime of lying to the FAA about the safety of the Boeing 737 MAX—lies that led directly and proximately to two crashes killing 346 people. The victims' families objected to the deal, and Judge O'Connor agreed with them. He concluded the provisions in the proposed resolution concerning a corporate monitor of Boeing were not in the public interest. According, Judge O'Connor rejected the proposed plea. He gave the parties (Boeing and DOJ) thirty days to advise the court as to how they want to proceed now—via a trial or (as seems more likely) a new plea deal.

I've blogged about the Boeing case a number of times before. (See earlier posts here, here, here, and here.) For the last several years, I have represented families who lost loved ones in the two crashes of Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. The families want Boeing held fully accountable for the harms caused by its federal conspiracy crime of defrauding the FAA about the safety of the 737 MAX and made subject to an independent corporate monitor to ensure that no other plane will crash because of concealed safety issues. In July, DOJ and Boeing negotiated a sweetheart plea deal that did not meet these objectives. And so, in October, I argued before Judge Reed O'Connor (N.D. Texas) that he should reject the proposed plea agreement.

Today, Judge O'Connor agreed with the families and used his authority to reject the proposed plea deal. He gave two reasons. Read More

From Judge Abrams' opinion Monday in Eckhart v. Fox News Network, LLC (S.D.N.Y.):

Defendants Fox News Network, LLC and Ed Henry filed motions for summary judgment in this action. Plaintiff Jennifer Eckhart and both Defendants then filed letters requesting leave to seal or redact certain portions of Defendants' motion papers, including (1) information that named or identified third-party women who allegedly had sexual or romantic relationships with Henry, (2) a full declaration submitted by one such woman, "Jane Doe 1," (3) identifying information of third-party Fox News employees who were involved in complaints and internal investigations, (4) email addresses and phone numbers of non-parties, (5) Fox News' confidential business information, including Henry's compensation and the size of certain business expenditures, (6) sexually explicit messages between Eckhart and Henry, and (7) sexually explicit photographs sent by Eckhart to Henry. The parties generally agreed that the first five categories of information should be sealed or redacted, but dispute whether the latter two should as well.

For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the motions to seal or redact these materials except (2) the full declaration of Jane Doe 1 and (6) the explicit messages between Eckhart and Henry. While the (7) explicit photographs will remain sealed, the Court will unseal the verbal descriptions of the photographs provided in Defendants' motions….

Eckhart accuses Henry of sexual harassment, sexual assault, sex trafficking, and rape. She alleges that the two met while employed at Fox News, at which point Henry pursued her, sent her unsolicited and inappropriate text messages, and manipulated her into having a sexual and often violent relationship with him. In one central incident in February 2017, Eckhart says that Henry lured her to a hotel room under the guise of giving her career advice but proceeded to handcuff and rape her. Eckhart also alleges that Fox News, their employer, knew of and facilitated Henry's misconduct by failing to discipline Henry after other employees submitted complaints against him and by retaliating against Eckhart when she sought to hold Henry and Fox News accountable for their conduct. Defendants contest these allegations against them.

I've long been interested in how state courts sometimes provide protection for economic liberty under state constitutions, beyond what the federal constitution would offer. I've seen this particularly in North Carolina, under the state constitution's Fruits of Their Own Labor Clause. Here's the latest example, from Tuesday's Proctor v. City of Jacksonville, in an opinion by Judge Griffin, joined by Judges Tyson and Collins:

This case arises out of tension between business owners in Jacksonville and the City …. In 2014, the City passed the Unified Development Ordinance of the City of Jacksonville ("the UDO"). The UDO provides numerous zoning maps which dictate the areas where a food truck may operate and numerous regulations which provide the conditions food trucks and private-property owners must meet before operating on private property[, including that] …

Any Food vendor shall be at least 250 feet from any other parcel containing: 1) a food vendor, 2) a low density, medium density, high density residential or downtown residential zoning district, and or 3) a restaurant; …

Plaintiffs allege the location restrictions prevent food truck operators from conducting business in approximately ninety-six percent of property located in Jacksonville. Because of these restrictions, Plaintiffs contend their rights to engage in safe and lawful occupations are severely infringed….

The Fruits of Their Labor clause provides: "We hold it to be self-evident that all persons are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of happiness."

Our Supreme Court has recognized substantive economic protections under the Fruits of Their Labor Clause prevent the State and consequently its political subdivisions from creating and enforcing regulations that impede "legitimate and innocuous vocations by which men earn their daily bread." State v. Ballance (N.C. 1949) (holding a licensing scheme for photographers violated the Fruits of Their Labor Clause); see also Roller v. Allen (N.C. 1957) (holding a licensing scheme for ceramic tile installers violated the Fruits of Their Labor Clause).

From Judge Jamal Whitehead (W.D. Wash.) yesterday in Wright v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.:

This matter comes before the Court on several discovery-related motions ….

Counsel for the parties have traded barbs in their briefs and during oral argument about each other's lack of professionalism and motives, and they offer competing accounts about their meet and confer efforts and who is to blame for a breakdown in communications. Counsel must act with "a high degree of professionalism and collegiality" during any meet and confer. LCR 1(c)(6). Regardless of whose story is to be believed, counsel fell short of this standard here.

Expletive-laden phone calls, hang-ups, backing out of prior agreements without explanation, and misleading emails purporting to "memorialize" phone calls demean the integrity of the legal process and show disrespect to all concerned, including the Court in having to resolve petty disputes. Let it be clear: the Court will not tolerate such conduct moving forward and it expects all attorneys to adhere to the highest standards of professionalism, civility, and ethical practice moving forward.

Setting aside the parties' hyperbole and bluster, the various phone calls, letters, and emails submitted into evidence show that the parties have discussed the issues raised in their respective motions and that they've hit an impasse, requiring judicial intervention. Thus, the Court finds that the parties have satisfied the meet and confer requirement with respect to the motions for a protective order and to compel, even if just barely.

I have posted to SSRN a near-final version of my article, Bilateral Judicial Reform. It should be published shortly in the Texas A&M Journal of Law & Civil Governance.

Here is the abstract:

Most debates about judicial reform are predictable and pointless. Progressives, who are unhappy with the current right-leaning judiciary, propose reforms that make it harder for conservatives to prevail in court. Conservatives, who are pleased with the current right-leaning judiciary, oppose reforms that make it harder for conservatives to prevail in court. The federal courts cannot be reformed through unilateral disarmament. Rather, any federal judicial reform must be bilateral. This Article offers ten neutral proposals that would equally weaken the right and the left. Part I introduces the first grouping of reforms about the Supreme Court Justices.

Proposal #1: Require Justices to ride circuit and preside when federal courts of appeals sit en banc.

Proposal #2: Impose statutory caps for outside income earned through book royalties, advances, and other similar business dealings.

Part II introduces the second grouping of reforms about the Supreme Court's docket.

Proposal #3: Mandate that the Supreme Court remains in session year-round, with at least one public sitting for oral argument and one conference per calendar month.

Proposal #4: Establish a standard timeline for review of petitions and applications on the merits, emergency, and capital dockets.

Proposal #5: Appeals in the Court's mandatory jurisdiction must be scheduled for oral argument.

Part III introduces the third grouping of reforms about litigation in the lower courts.

Proposal #6: Cases seeking a temporary restraining order can be decided by a single district court judge but can only yield relief to the named parties, and are limited to no more than seven days in duration.

Proposal #7: Cases seeking a preliminary injunction or equivalent relief against the federal government or a state government are referred to the en banc court, which appoints a randomly-drawn three-judge panel with two circuit court judges and one district court judge.

Proposal #8: Injunctions of statutes against the federal and state governments are automatically stayed, and if a three-judge panel submits a "certificate of division," the case is appealed to the Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction, with oral argument and decision based on emergency docket timeline.

Proposal #9: En banc circuit courts and state courts of last resort could submit cases to Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction with a "certificate of split" (actual split of authority on question of federal law) or a "certificate of importance" (case presents an exceedingly important, and unresolved question of federal law).

Proposal #10: When Circuit Judge reaches "Rule of 80," she is no longer able to vote on en banc court, and new judgeship is automatically created.

Most of these reforms, including expansion of mandatory jurisdiction, would require statutory amendments, though some proposals could be achieved through court rules. Here at least, I'm agnostic where the reform comes from. It is always better if courts self-regulate. I'll admit up front that some of these proposals are off-the-wall, and are primarily intended to stimulate debate, rather than to create a decisive action plan. A few of these proposals may create problems with judicial independence and the separation of powers, though I think they ultimately pass muster, or at least occupy a gray zone. My hope is that through some outside-the-box thinking, I can put ideas into the ether that eventually coalesce into tangible proposals.

Maybe now that the election is settled, some of these ideas may gain some traction.

12/5/1933: The 21st Amendment is ratified.

About twenty minutes after oral arguments wrapped in Skrmetti, I wrote a quick summary of how I expected Justice Kagan to snatch a victory from the jaws of defeat. Here, I will offer further insights on Justice Gorsuch. Though he didn't say anything on the transcript, Loper Bright taught us about the sound of silence.

I asked a few people who were in the Court about Justice Gorsuch's demeanor. One said, "He just sat there. Expressionless." A second said his demeanor was "I'm sitting back in my chair and not planning to ask anything or reveal anything of my thinking about this case."

But a third offered this useful observation:

I was in the courtroom for the argument. You may be interested to know that after the second petitioners' lawyer finished, Gorsuch and Barrett had a very animated conversation in whispers. Several rounds of talking into each other's ears.

I don't know what they said, but they both seemed to agree about something. Smiles all around, nodding of heads, and some gestures that signify "you get it" coupled with that.

Maybe Barrett and Gorsuch were exchanging recipes for turkey chili and turmeric steak rub. But I think it more likely they were talking about the case. Now was their agreement about applying rational basis scrutiny or applying heightened scrutiny? I lean towards the former, but I cannot be sure. To paraphrase Justice Alito in Obergefell, I assume that those who cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the recesses of their chambers, but if they repeat those views in public, they will risk being labeled as bigots.

Finally, a colleague who was not in the Court offered this recollection:

In my experience, in cases where the opposing parties are an individual vs. the government, Justice Gorsuch's total silence at oral argument means a vote for the government. I don't have the capability of doing some big study to prove this, but you probably do. In any event, if I'm right this means that Gorsuch will vote to uphold the law.

This is something that can be tested empirically. Ahem, Adam Feldman.

Speaking of Justice Alito, I think he enjoyed making this statement a bit too much:

So my question is: Why should we look to Bostock here? Bostock involved the interpretation of particular language in a particular statute. And this is not a question of statutory interpretation. It's a question of the application of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court has addressed the -- the question of how an equal protection claim should be analyzed when the law in question treats a medical condition or procedure differently based on a characteristic that is associated with just one sex. And that was Geduldig in 1974, reaffirmed in Dobbs in 2022. And neither Bostock nor Dobbs saw any connection between the Bostock reasoning and the Geduldig/Dobbs standard. Bostock did not mention Geduldig, and Dobbs did not mention Bostock. So why should we -- we look to this Bostock-type reasoning here?

I think the Trump Administration lets this case ride, and it goes to a final judgment.

From U.S. v. Abouammo, decided today by Ninth Circuit Judges Daniel Bress and Kenneth Lee and District Judge Yvette Kane (M.D. Pa.):

Ahmad Abouammo, an employee at the company then known as Twitter, allegedly provided confidential information about dissident Saudi Twitter users to a close associate of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In return, Abouammo received a lavish wristwatch and hundreds of thousands of dollars in payments from his Saudi contact. For his role in this arrangement and his efforts to cover it up, a jury convicted Abouammo for acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government or official, 18 U.S.C. § 951, conspiracy to commit wire and honest services fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, wire and honest services fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, international money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), and falsification of records to obstruct a federal investigation, 18 U.S.C. § 1519.

The court affirms Abouammo's conviction, concluding that there was enough evidence that he was acting on behalf of a foreign government official; that the statute of limitations hadn't run on the fraud and money laundering charges; and that there was no venue problem with the falsification of records charge. (Judge Lee concurred to say more as to venue.) Those discussions are long and technical, and you can read them in the full opinion. But here's the court's summary of the facts:

In 2013, Twitter hired Abouammo, a U.S. citizen, as a Media Partnerships Manager for the Middle East and North Africa region. In this role, Abouammo was to help onboard influential content creators to Twitter and serve as a liaison to persons of influence in his geographic territory. At this time, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) had fifty percent of Twitter's users in the region, and it was identified as a key prospect for growing Twitter's business.

In June 2014, a group of Saudi entrepreneurs visited Twitter's offices in San Francisco. Abouammo arranged a tour for the group. During the visit, Abouammo met Bader Binasaker, a close associate and "right-hand-man" of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ("MbS"). MbS is a son of now-King of Saudi Arabia Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud. In March 2013, MbS's father was the Crown Prince, the second most powerful position in the Kingdom, and MbS was named Head of the Private Office of the Crown Prince. In January 2015, MbS's father became King, appointing MbS as Minister of Defense and Head of his Royal Court. In April 2015, King Salman named MbS Deputy Crown Prince.

Planned Parenthood Great Nw. v. Labrador, decided today by Judge William Fletcher, joined by Judges Kim McLane Wardlaw, blocks Idaho—which generally bans abortions—from punishing doctors who "'refer[]' a patient 'across state lines to an abortion provider'" (presumably for an abortion that is legal in the other state):

Despite ample opportunity to do so, the [Idaho] Attorney General has not contested in our court the merits of the preliminary injunction. On appeal, he has relied only on [certain] jurisdictional challenges [see the full opinion for more on those challenges -EV] …. We take the failure to object on the merits to the district court's preliminary injunction as a concession by the Attorney General that the district court was correct in granting the injunction. But we will not permit the Attorney General, through the tactic of failing to argue the merits of his appeal of the preliminary injunction, to avoid our addressing those merits in the course of affirming the district court….

The professional medical speech at issue here is entitled to at least as much First Amendment protection as other speech. Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra (2018) ("Speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by 'professionals.'"). The exception for "regulations of professional conduct that incidentally burden speech" does not apply here. Section 18-622(1), as interpreted by the Attorney General in [an] Opinion Letter [that he had issued but then withdrew], is not merely an incidental burden. It directly prohibits medical professionals from "referring" a patient "across state lines to access abortion services." That is, it prohibits speech that is distinct from the actual provision of treatment.

The Volokh Conspiracy

Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions

Chief Judge Srinivasan's "Alternate Path" to Upholding the TikTok Divestiture Mandate Against First Amendment Challenge

Protecting Speech Against Governments

TikTok Divestiture Requirement Doesn't Constitute a Taking of Private Property Under the Fifth Amendment

No Bill of Attainder Problem with the Tiktok Divestiture Law

TikTok Divestiture Mandate Doesn't Violate the First Amendment

Plaintiff "Spraypainted a Picture of an Ejaculating Penis and the Slur 'Fag' on the Sidewalk Leading up to the Jewish Resource Center"

Today in Supreme Court History: December 6, 1865

Thursday Open Thread

Boeing Plea Deal Rejected by Judge O'Connor

Sealing Decision in Sexual Assault Lawsuit Against Fox News and Ed Henry

Constitutional Protections for Economic Liberty in North Carolina: The Fruits of Their Own Labor Clause and Beyond

Judges Really Don't Like This

Today in Supreme Court History: December 5, 1933

The Sound of Silence in Skrmetti

Defendant "Allegedly Provided Confidential Information About Dissident Saudi Twitter Users to a Close Associate Of [Saudi] Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman"

First Amendment Likely Protects Referring Patients for Out-of-State Abortions

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