The court entered judgment today on this in Schmidt v. Falcon School Dist. 49; here's an excerpt from the Mar. 21, 2025 opinion by Magistrate Judge Maritza Dominguez Braswell (D. Colo.) explaining the issues:
On November 10, 2022, the [School District Board of Education] conducted a special meeting to consider a proposed resolution concerning an outspoken member of the Board, Ivy Liu. During that meeting, certain attendees held signs calling on Ms. Liu to resign. Others in attendance displayed signs that had "thumbs up" or "thumbs down" symbols displayed.
Apparently, the chaotic nature of the November 10, 2022, special meeting prompted the [Board] to "reevaluat[e] standards of appropriate decorum at Board meetings." This re-evaluation led to what the Court will refer to as District 49's "Sign Policy." The Sign Policy prohibits District 49 meeting attendees from holding signs with specific written language on them—such as text calling for a Board member to resign. The Sign Policy allows for other expressive conduct, including thumbs up/thumbs down signs, jazz hands, and standing. Defendants say they began enforcing this policy during the November 10, 2022, regular meeting which immediately followed the same-day special meeting regarding Ms. Liu.
The Board conducted another meeting on February 22, 2023. For at least some portion of the meeting, Plaintiffs, sitting in the front row, held 8½ x 11" letter-sized signs at chest level. These signs called for the resignation of Defendant Graham [the School Board president], as well as fellow Board members, Lori Thompson and Rick Van Wieren. Nearly 2 hours and 45 minutes into the February 22, 2023, meeting, a disagreement arose between Ms. Liu and Defendant Graham. Nearly 2 hours and 50 minutes into the meeting, Defendant Graham halted the meeting and demanded that Plaintiffs not display their signs. Approximately a minute later, Defendant Graham again paused the meeting and declared the Board was going into recess to address Plaintiffs' signs.
The inquiring court attorney-referee asks if he/she may attend either an unspecified "protest rally" in support of LGBTQIA rights or an annual community Pride Parade together with his/her minor child. The inquirer proposes to do so solely in his/her capacity as a parent, and expects to remain anonymous.
As quasi-judicial officials, court attorney-referees must comply with the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct in performing their official duties and otherwise must "so far as practical and appropriate" use the Rules to guide their conduct (22 NYCRR 100.6[A]). Like judges, they must avoid even the appearance of impropriety (see 22 NYCRR 100.2) and always act to promote public confidence in the judiciary's integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[A]). They also must not "directly or indirectly engage in any political activity" unless an exception applies (see 22 NYCRR 100.5[A][1]). For example, a judge or quasi-judicial official who is not in his/her window period must not attend political gatherings (22 NYCRR 100.5[A][1][g]; Opinion 22-126).
We note, initially, that a judge or quasi-judicial official "may not engage anonymously in otherwise prohibited political activity" (Opinion 16-85). Nor is there any exception permitting a judge or quasi-judicial official to attend an otherwise impermissible event "as a volunteer chaperone for students" (Opinion 24-60).
Community Pride Parade
We have advised that "judges may march in parades sponsored by municipalities or by civic, charitable, ethnic, cultural, or other not-for-profit organizations unless the parades are inseparable from the sponsoring organizations' fund-raising initiatives" (Opinion 06-147). Thus, for example, judges may march in a "community parade" celebrating both "a county bi-centennial and the end of the war in the Persian Gulf" (Opinion 91-55). Likewise, a judge may serve as a Grand Marshal or Deputy Grand Marshal in a St. Patrick's Day parade, which is organized as "a community event" rather than a fund-raiser (see Opinions 04-144; 96-148).
From yesterday's statement by D.C. Circuit Judge Justin Walker, joined by Judge Florence Pan, concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc in AP v. Budowich (see also this June 9 post about the panel opinion):
In this case, "White House officials excluded the AP from the Oval Office and other restricted spaces. Officials announced that access was denied because the AP continued to use the name Gulf of Mexico in its Stylebook, rather than the President's preferred Gulf of America." The district court enjoined the Government from excluding the AP from "the Oval Office, Air Force One, and other limited spaces based on the AP's viewpoint when such spaces are made open to other members of the White House press pool." An emergency panel of this court partially stayed the district court's injunction pending appeal….
There have been many name changes in recent years. The Cleveland Indians were renamed the Cleveland Guardians. George Washington University's Colonials were renamed the Revolutionaries. Fort Bragg was renamed Fort Liberty before it was renamed Fort Bragg again. And on and on.
Whether to embrace these name changes — or even to keep track of them — is at least in part a political choice. So this case about the AP's refusal to say "Gulf of America" is a case about the AP's political speech. And as a general matter, political speech is highly protected speech that the government cannot compel or punish.
The New York Times is reporting that the Environmental Protection Agency is preparing to propose rescinding the "endangerment finding"--the conclusion that greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change and associated risks--as a way of shutting off all regulation of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. I have previously explained why this is a fool's errand that is unlikely to withstand judicial review (while noting the EPA has other options to roll back GHG regulation).
The report is somewhat sketchy on the precise argument the EPA plans to make.
The Trump administration has drafted a plan to repeal a fundamental scientific finding that gives the United States government its authority to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions and fight climate change, according to two people familiar with the plan.
The proposed Environmental Protection Agency rule rescinds a 2009 declaration known as the "endangerment finding," which scientifically established that greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide and methane endanger human lives. . . .
The E.P.A. proposal, which is expected to be made public within days, also calls for rescinding limits on tailpipe emissions that were designed to encourage automakers to build and sell more electric vehicles. . . .
The E.P.A. intends to argue that imposing climate regulations on automakers poses the real harm to human health because it would lead to higher prices and reduced consumer choice, according to the two people familiar with the administration's plan. . . .
In calling to repeal the endangerment finding, the draft E.P.A. rule does not appear to focus on the science or try to make the case that fossil fuels aren't warming the planet.
Instead, it argues that the E.P.A. overstepped its legal authority under the Clean Air Act by making a broad finding that greenhouse gas emissions endanger the public welfare. It makes the case that the E.P.A. administrator has limited power that apply only to specific circumstances.
Not trying to challenge existing climate science directly is wise, for reasons I noted in my initial post on this subject, as it relieves the EPA of the obligation of explaining away decades of the agency's own statements. The EPA still faces a serious problem insofar as it wants to adopt a new interpretation of the relevant Clean Air Act provisions, and reject interpretations long embraced by the agency and federal courts.
Further, insofar as the agency wants to argue that the resulting regulations are unwise or ineffectual, it will be courting even more legal trouble. The relevant CAA provisions (like those at issue in American Trucking) separate the question of whether or not emissions cause or contribute to pollution from the question of what sort of regulations must be adopted. Nothing in the CAA allows the Administrator to forego adopting vehicle emission standards due to concerns about cost or consumer choice. There are strong arguments this is a bad way to approach environmental regulation, as it can obligate an agency to adopt welfare-reducing regulations, but that's a complaint about the Clean Air Act, not EPA regulations, and as such it is a question that needs to be addressed by Congress.
It is also worth noting that automakers are not clamoring for repeal of vehicle emission standards, as they've already designed compliant vehicles. This makes the Administration's prioritization of challenging endangerment and the vehicle emission rules an odd choice, as there are other areas in which deregulatory efforts would be welcomed by the regulated community and would be more likely to unleash investment and innovation.
The Supreme Court may have eliminated the district court practice of entering universal injunctions in suits against the federal government in Trump v. CASA, but this is but one step toward reining in judicial overreach by district courts, for reasons I explain in my latest Civitas Outlook column.
A taste:
In a sweeping and compelling opinion by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, a majority of the Court concluded that universal injunctions exceed the scope of the judicial power under the Judiciary Act. As Justice Barrett explained, Congress never granted district courts the authority to enjoin the federal government from taking action against parties not before the court. This is true no matter how egregious or objectionable the government action is.
"A universal injunction can be justified only as an exercise of equitable authority, yet Congress has granted federal courts no such power," Justice Barrett explained. While it is commonly remarked that it is the province and duty of federal courts to "say what the law is," and police the lawfulness of executive branch action, "federal courts do not exercise general oversight of the Executive Branch." Rather, "they resolve cases and controversies consistent with the authority Congress has given them."
For reasons I explain, district courts are likely to continue giving broad relief in some cases--and there are signs that too many district court judges think the answer to executive branch overreach is for the judiciary to respond in kind.
The Court may have trimmed the sails of district court remedial overreach in Trump v. CASA, but there is more work to be done to prevent the spread of an "imperial Judiciary." Just as lower courts took liberties with their equitable authority to issue injunctions, some district courts have been too quick to find litigants have standing to sue, too willing to entertain suits against memoranda and presidential directives before they have been implemented or acted upon, and too ready to issue orders directing all manner of executive branch conduct. The justices have reversed some of the most egregious of these actions, but not enough (yet) to keep district courts coloring within the lines.
In Trump v. CASA, Justice Barrett explained how judges should understand their role in our constitutional republic. For the time being, it seems a great many district court judges prefer Justice Jackson's vision instead.
Plus, "He claims that, going forward, he will undertake certain 'remedial efforts,' including, inter alia, 'establish[ing] ... database reconciliation procedures involving resolution of discrepancies through direct consultation of archival legal resources and substitution of alternative, verifiable authorities where necessary.' Most lawyers simply call this 'conducting legal research.'"
On June 26, 2025, the Court ordered Mr. Feldman to show cause in writing on or before July 10, 2025, why the brief in support of Defendant Affable Avenue LLC's ("Affable") motion to dismiss should not be stricken from the docket and sanctions imposed against him pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Mr. Feldman submitted his written response to the Order to Show Cause. On the same date, Plaintiffs filed a letter opposing Affable's request to file additional documents in support of its motion to dismiss. On July 14, 2025, Mr. Feldman filed, on behalf of Affable, a letter in further support of Affable's request to file additional papers in support of its motion to dismiss.
The Court looked askance at Mr. Feldman's Response because the writing style in it differed markedly from the writing style in the letter he submitted to the Court three days later. (Compare Response with Dkt. #166). Mr. Feldman's Response contains an extended quote from Ray Bradbury's Fahrenheit 451 and a metaphor about an ancient stylus. By contrast, his July 14, 2025 letter contains typographical errors in the very first paragraph, and, indeed, throughout. This prompted the Court to further analyze Mr. Feldman's Response. On page three, Mr. Feldman contrasts his conduct with the misconduct described in two (real) cases: Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2023), and Park v. Kim, 91 F.4th 610 (2d Cir. 2024). On page four of the Response, Mr. Feldman appears to quote from Mata (without providing a pin cite), as follows:
Critically, unlike the pattern of deception identified in Mata, where sanctions were imposed not merely for citing fictitious cases but for the attorneys' "failure to be forthcoming, withdraw the prior submissions, and continue to give legitimacy to fake cases in the subsequent submissions despite having multiple reasons to believe that the cases lacked authenticity," I immediately acknowledged the errors upon notification and undertook comprehensive corrective action within twenty-four hours.
This quote appears nowhere in Mata. A Google search revealed it to be a direct quote from an October 24, 2023 article that recaps an analysis of Mata done by an attorney named Christopher F. Lyon. Mr. Feldman did not attribute the quote to this article. That is especially concerning considering that he was responding to an Order to Show Cause why he should not be sanctioned for his erroneous citations. And it would be especially concerning, and indeed unacceptable, if Mr. Feldman used a large language model to draft his Response without verifying whether the quotations in it were accurately attributed.
In a recent post, co-blogger David Bernstein discusses the "social trust" rationale for immigration restrictions: the idea that the increased ethnic and cultural diversity caused by immigration reduces social trust, which in turn leads to various bad outcomes. This is one of the more sophisticated justifications for immigration restrictions. But it deserves to be rejected, nonetheless. For the main reasons, why see this excellent analysis by my Cato Institute colleague Alex Nowrasteh, my discussion of his piece, and the relevant section of Chapter 6 of my book Free to Move: Foot Voting, Migration, and Political Freedom.
To briefly summarize, the data shows that 1) the link between trust and various beneficial social outcomes is highly questionable, 2) the evidence that immigration reduces trust is also weak, and 3) even if trust is beneficial and immigration reduces it, institutional incentives are often an effective substitute for it. Nowrasteh delves into the trust issue in greater detail in two social science articles (see here and here). His book Wretched Refuse: The Political Economy of Immigration and Institutions (coauthored with Ben Powell), also has lots of relevant material.
My own view, summarized in my previous post on this topic, is that some minimum threshold of social trust is essential, but it doesn't follow that higher trust is necessarily better:
[E]ven if social trust is desirable (and it's hard to deny that societies need at least some minimal level of trust), it doesn't follow that more is always better. It could be that once you achieve a relatively modest level of trust (e.g. - we generally trust strangers not to assault or swindle us, and the like), further increases have few benefits. At some point, increased trust could even be harmful. For example, excessive trust in commercial transactions make us vulnerable to exploitation by conmen. Excessive trust in government officials might enable them to get away with corruption and harmful and unjust policies, and so on. If so, declining trust - whether driven by immigration or other factors - may not be a problem unless and until it gets a society below that bare minimum.
In fairness, David Bernstein doesn't actually endorse the social trust rationale for immigration restrictions. He just uses this argument to counter a specific libertarian response to a different rationale for immigration restrictions: claims that unconstrained immigration would overburden the welfare state. One response to that claim is that immigration actually reduces natives' support for welfare benefits because the latter dislike seeing welfare payments going to immigrants (particularly ones from significantly different racial, ethnic, or cultural backgrounds). This is backed by evidence indicating that ethnically diverse societies, on average, have less welfare-state redistribution.
Pro-immigration libertarians need not rely on this point in countering the welfare-state rationale for restrictionism. We have several other strong responses, as well. But this one is also valid, despite David's concerns. It is important to remember that opposition to redistribution to a given group isn't the same thing as declining social trust, generally. People can and often do oppose coercive redistribution to those whom they nonetheless trust when it comes to a variety of commercial and social transactions. That happens all the time! I trust all sorts of people whom I not willing to pay higher taxes to give extra welfare benefits to. You likely feel the same way. Moreover, as noted above, declining trust isn't necessarily a bad thing, unless it falls below minimally acceptable levels.
Even if increased diversity caused by immigration does somehow reduce trust to a degree that causes real harm, that has to be weighed against the enormous damage caused by immigration restrictions themselves, including that inflicted on receiving-country natives. Immigration restrictions reduce the economic liberty and prosperity of natives more than any other government policy enacted by Western democracies. It would require a truly enormous increase in social beneficial trust to even come close to offsetting that.
And if immigration simultaneously reduces both social trust and welfare-state spending, it may well be that the benefits of the latter outweigh any harm caused by the former, even aside from other beneficial effects of free migration. That's especially likely to be true from a libertarian perspective, which holds that excessive government spending is a great menace.
Finally, as David points out, libertarians believe (rightly) that welfare state spending itself has a negative effect on social cohesion because "government tends to be corrosive of community and pits people who might otherwise get along against each other in a scramble for political rents." If so, the net effect of immigration on trust may actually be positive! It may initially reduce trust by increasing diversity; but then there is a countervailing increase caused by cuts in government spending.
I am putting up my list of upcoming speaking engagements earlier than usual, because several are upcoming even before the start of the Fall 2025 academic semester.
Unless otherwise noted, all events are free and open to the public—and in person. The listed times are those in the time zone where the event is being held.
I will likely add additional events and information to this post, as they are scheduled. In the meantime if your university, think tank, research institute or other similar organization would like to invite me to speak (either virtually or in person) on any topic within my expertise, I am open for business!
July 23, 12-1 PM, Society for the Rule of Law, Washington, DC (virtual event): "Trump's Tariffs and the Rule of Law." Panel on "Tariffs and the Rule of Law." Other participants are Andrew Morris (New Civil Liberties Alliance) and Gregg Nunziata (Society for the Rule of Law). See here for link, where the event can be viewed live.
July 23, 6-7 PM, New Civil Liberties Alliance, Victims of Communism Museum and Memorial Foundation 900 15th St., NW, Washington, DC: "The Case for Nationwide Injunctions" (debate with Prof. Ronald Cass).
July 30, 1:30-2:30 PM, Pacific Legal Foundation, Arlington, VA (virtual event): "The Constitutional Case Against Trump's Trade War," panel on "Tariffs and the Constitution: Who Holds the Power?" Other participants are Molly Nixon (Pacific Legal Foundation) and Rebecca Melsky and Eva St. Clair (Princess Awesome). Links and registration available here.
Aug. 27, 3-4 PM, International Young Lawyers' Association Annual Conference, Washington, DC: "Challenges to the Rule of Law in the United States," Panel on "The Rule of Law in a Changing World." The other panel participants are Meryl Chertoff (Georgetown University) and Anna Bower (Lawfare). Registration and other information on the conference, available here.
September (exact date/time TBD), Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico (virtual event): "The Constitutional Case Against Trump's Tariffs."
Sept. 5, 3:30 - 5 PM: 51st Annual Advanced Business Law Conference, Virginia State Bar, Williamsburg, VA: "The Trump Tariff Litigation," panel on "Beyond Our Borders: U.S. Business Impacts of Trade Regulation and Immigration Law Changes, Tariffs and Geopolitical Uncertainties." I believe attendance is limited to participants in the conference. Registration and other information on the conference available here.
Sept. 15, 3:10-4:30 PM, Seminar on Constitutional Crisis, University of Miami Law School, Miami, FL (virtual event): "Trump, Emergency Powers, and the Constitution." This event is only open to students enrolled in the relevant seminar.
Sept. 17, 3:15-4:45 PM, 2025 Education Law and Policy Conference, panel on "Federal Efforts to Combat Antisemitism: Restoring Campus Civil Rights or Infringing Academic Freedom?", Ritz-Carlton, 1150 22nd St NW Washington, DC: "How to Combat Anti-Semitism Without Destroying Freedom" (tentative title). Other panelists include Tyler Coward (FIRE), Kenneth Marcus (Brandeis Center), and Sarah Perry (Defending Education). Information about the conference and registration available here. Event co-sponsored by the Federalist Society and Defense of Freedom Institute.
Sept. 25, Time TBA, Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law, New York, NY: "Trump's Abuse of Emergency Powers" (tentative title), panel on emergency powers.
October 2, Time TBA, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, Philadelphia, PA: "The Constitutional Case Against Trump's Tariffs." Sponsored by the UPenn Federalist Society.
October 9, 4-5:15 PM, Hart Auditorium, McDonough Hall, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC: "Immigration and Judicial Review Under Trump 2.0," (tentative title), Panel on "Do the Courts Matter? The Trump Administration Attempts to Radically Change Immigration Law." Annual Immigration Law and Policy Conference. Other panelists include Omar Jadwat (ACLU) and Breanne Deppisch (Fox News). See here for more information on this conference.
October 22, 1:30-2:30 PM, Society for the Rule of Law, Washington, DC: "Constraining Emergency Powers," panel on "State of Emergency: Can Congress Still Check the Executive?" Other participants include Amanda Carpenter (Protect Democracy), former Rep. Barbara Comstock, and James Waller (Foundation for American Innovation). Schedule and other information available here.
October 30, 12:30-1:30 PM, University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis, MN: "The Case for Universal Injunctions," panel on universal injunctions and related remedies. Other participants will include Prof. Greg Sisk (Univ. of St. Thomas) and Prof. Monica Haymond (Northwestern).
October 31, 12:30-1:30 PM, University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis, MN: "The Constitutional Case Against Trump's Tariffs." This event may be limited to St. Thomas faculty and students.
November 8, 11:15-12:30 AM, Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention, Washington, DC: "Zoning, Property Rights, and the Housing Crisis," Panel on "Zoning, Rent Control, and the Housing Crisis." Other participants include Prof. Sara Bronin (George Washington University School of Law), James S. Burling (Pacific Legal Foundation), and Prof. J. Peter Byrne, (Georgetown). This event is only open to registered attendees of the National Lawyers Convention.
Dec. 3, 12-1:30 PM, Guadalajara International Book Fair (FIL), Barcelo Hotel, Guadalajara, Mexico: "Free to Move: Foot Voting, Migration, and Political Freedom" (tentative title), Panel on Migration in the 21st Century. Other panel participants will be Eileen Truax (journalist covering immigration issues), and Christopher Dominguez. More information about the FIL book fair available here.
Dec. 4, 3:15-4:30 PM, Law Faculty, Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education (Tec de Monterrey), Rm. A6-206, Monterrey, Mexico: "Political Ignorance and Constitutional Design." This event is likely limited to University of Monterrey students and faculty. But I may be able to get a few other people admitted upon request.
Dec. 5, 3:15-4:30 PM, School of Social Sciences and Government, Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education (Tec de Monterrey), A6-106, Monterrey, Mexico: "Democracy and Political Ignorance." This event is likely limited to University of Monterrey students and faculty. But I may be able to get a few other people admitted upon request.
Dec. 15, 6:30-8:00 PM, Honors Workshop, Law Faculty, Uriel Reichman University, Herzliya, Israel: "The Presumptive Case for Organ Markets." This event is likely to be limited to participants in the Honors Workshop and Uriel Reichman University faculty. But I may be able to get a few other people admitted upon request.
Dec. 16, 4-5:30 PM, Safra Center for Ethics, Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, Elga Cegla Hall, Room 21, Tel Aviv, Israel: "Not Everything is an Emergency: The Case for Strong Judicial Review of the Exercise of Emergency Powers."
So a federal judge held yesterday, acknowledging that the government may refuse to fund abortions, but concluding that the exclusion of funding to affiliates unconstitutionally violates their rights of expressive association.
Yesterday's decision by Judge Indira Talwani (D. Mass.) in Planned Parenthood Fed. of Am., Inc. v. Kennedy (appeal pending) considered Section 71113(a) of the Reconciliation Act, which bars federal funding to any "entity, including its affiliates, subsidiaries, successors, and clinics," that provides abortions and satisfies certain other criteria (to oversimplify somewhat).
The court acknowledged that "Congress has long prohibited the use of any federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program except in limited circumstances," and that "The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way." But it concluded that the restriction on funding groups because of the actions of their affiliates violated the freedom of expressive association protected by the First Amendment. Here's a short excerpt from the long opinion:
Section 71113 does not merely "withhold[ ] funding based on whether entities provide abortion services," but also based on whether "an entity, including its affiliates," provides abortion services. And Defendants assert that "two entities' existence under common control" would satisfy the dictionary definition of an "affiliate," and that, in Defendants' view, Planned Parenthood Federations' "membership standards," "accreditation standards," and "shared medical standards and guidelines," would be sufficient to show common control such that Planned Parenthood Members who do not provide abortion could be "affiliates" of the Planned Parenthood Members who do.
To the extent that Section 71113 may be applied to Planned Parenthood Members who do not provide abortion, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in establishing that the law impermissibly conditions the receipt of Medicaid funding on these Members foregoing their right to associate with Planned Parenthood Federation and other Members. Members who do not provide abortions cannot escape the law's burden except by disassociating from Members that do. And because Section 71113 may be applied to Members who are affiliates of each other via the structure, governance, and membership requirements of Planned Parenthood Federation, disassociating with other Members requires disassociating from Planned Parenthood Federation itself.
A major orange juice importer has filed a lawsuit in the US Court of International Trade challenging Trump's planned imposition of 50% tariffs on imports from Brazil:
A U.S.-based juice company is suing over President Trump's pledge to impose a steep 50 percent tariff on Brazilian imports starting next month.
Johanna Foods Inc., a major importer of orange juice, filed a lawsuit on Friday in the U.S. Court of International Trade in New York, saying that the measure, announced in a July 9 letter from Mr. Trump to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, threatened to upend its business and sharply drive up prices for American consumers.
Mr. Trump has used tariffs aggressively to shape trade policy. In justifying the tariff on Brazil, he cited factors including what he called an unfair trade relationship and a "witch hunt" trial against Brazil's former right-wing president, Jair Bolsonaro, a close ally.
"There is no unusual or extraordinary threat," the company said in the complaint, pointing to the lack of a formal executive order or declaration of national emergency. The complaint also said that the letter to Mr. Lula did not constitute an executive order.
The complaint said the tariffs would increase Johanna Foods' annual import costs by $68 million and lead to retail price hikes of up to 25 percent. Johanna Beverage Co., a related company based in Washington State, is also listed as a plaintiff.
Brazil, the world's largest exporter of orange juice, supplies well over half of the fresh orange juice consumed in the United States, according to Agriculture Department figures. Brazil is also a major exporter of coffee to the United States.
The Johanna Foods complaint is available here. It raises many of the same issues as the lawsuit against Trump's "Liberation Day" tariffs, filed by the Liberty Justice Center and myself, on behalf of five small businesses harmed by this massive trade war. A unanimous ruling in our favor by the US Court of International Trade concluded that IEEPA "does not authorize the President to impose unbounded tariffs" and that such "an unlimited delegation of tariff authority would constitute an improper abdication of legislative power to another branch of government." The case (consolidated with a similar lawsuit filed by 12 state governments) is now on appeal before the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, with oral argument scheduled July 31 (see here for the appellate briefs of the parties, and here for the many amicus briefs supporting us, filed by groups on different sides of the political spectrum).
Like us, Johanna Foods argues that IEEPA does not authorize trade-deficit related tariffs, that there is no "emergency" and "unusual and extraordinary threat" of the sort required to utilize IEEPA, and that unconstrained presidential tariff authority would violate constitutional limits on delegation of legislative power to the executive. Their initial complaint does not make the argument that IEEPA doesn't authorize tariffs at all, or raise the major questions doctrine (which requires Congress to "speak clearly" when delegating to the executive the power make "decisions of vast economic and political significance"). But perhaps they will add these points in later filings.
In a previous post on the Brazil tariffs, I outlined how they highlight the egregious nature of the Administration's position even more than Trump's other IEEPA tariffs do:
The Brazil situation exemplifies why Trump's use of IEEPA is illegal and harmful. Brazil's prosecution of Bolsonaro is pretty obviously not an "emergency" or an "unusual and extraordinary threat" to the US economy or national security. Both of these conditions are required to invoke IEEPA. This situation just underscores the danger of allowing the president to define those terms however he wants, without any judicial review, as the administration claims he can.
The Brazil tariffs are even more indefensible than Trump's other IEEPA tariffs. In addition to the Bolsonaro prosecution, Trump's letter announcing the new tariffs cites that country's supposedly unfair trade policies. But the US actually has a substantial trade surplus with Brazil, of some $7.4 billion per year, according to the office of the US Trade Representative. In combination with Brazil's retaliatory tariffs, Trump's massive new tariffs against that country will predictably harm consumers and businesses in both countries, for little if any gain.
If the president can use IEEPA to impose tariffs for completely ridiculous reasons like these, he can use it to impose them against any nation for any reason. That reinforces our argument that the administration's interpretation of IEEPA leads to a boundless and unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive.
The proposed revised settlement agreement provides C.M. a public apology from the Davidson County Board of Education for a "mischaracterization of racial bias arising from [C.M.]'s comments," correction of C.M.'s school records, the Board's "acknowledge[ment] [of] the inappropriate response to this matter by a former member," and monetary compensation of $20,000. In exchange, Plaintiff has agreed to release any and all claims against the Defendants, and the parties have agreed to pay their own attorneys' fees and costs. The agreement specifies that its terms "are not to be construed as an admission of liability or wrongdoing" by either party and that the settlement "is entered as a cost-effective alternative to costly legal proceedings."
C.M. asked his English teacher whether a reference to "aliens" during class discussion referred to "space aliens or illegal aliens who need green cards." C.M.'s question did not substantially disrupt class, nor did his comment interfere with the School's work or collide with other students' rights.
But the School equated C.M.'s question with a vile racial slur pursuant to Board policy and suspended him for three days, out of school, without a hearing or the opportunity to appeal…. The Board upheld C.M.'s School suspension pursuant to its policy equating the word "aliens" with "the n word."
From McCarthy v. U.S. DEA, decided yesterday by Third Circuit Judge Cindy Chung, joined by Judges Peter Phipps and Jane Roth:
McCarthy is a physician assistant who held a DEA COR [Certificate Of Registration] allowing him to prescribe Schedule II through V controlled substances. McCarthy prescribed controlled substances despite the fact that he was not being supervised by a physician with whom he had a written agreement as required by Pennsylvania law. In response to his conduct, on April 21, 2023, the DEA issued McCarthy an Order to Show Cause why his continued registration was not inconsistent with the public interest. [Factual details omitted. -EV]
McCarthy … argues that the Administrator's decision to revoke his COR was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion…. To make this point, McCarthy primarily relies on "summaries" of eight DEA adjudications. McCarthy's counsel now acknowledges that seven of these summaries were inaccurate, that the eighth decision does not exist, and that the summaries and non-existent decision were all generated by Artificial Intelligence (AI). McCarthy's counsel further acknowledges that he never took care to confirm the accuracy of the summaries or even that the decisions existed. {We ordered McCarthy's counsel to provide the cases to the Court and explain if and how he verified the accuracy of his summaries. In his response, McCarthy's counsel acknowledged that he knew that he had submitted erroneous summaries and a non-existent case to this Court long before the filing of his response. We are separately ordering McCarthy's counsel to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for his conduct, particularly for his lack of candor to the Court.}
Accordingly, we will not consider this portion of his brief. {McCarthy's counsel also concedes that the Government has successfully rebutted the eight summaries. This provides us with another reason not to consider this portion of the brief.} …
Here's the order to show cause, which requires McCarthy's lawyer "to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for his conduct with respect to the briefing in this case, specifically with regard to his lack of candor to the Court":
In 2023, a grand jury in this district indicted then-former President Donald J. Trump and an associate for mishandling classified documents and impeding the ensuing investigation. In the course of its investigation leading up to the indictment, the grand jury subpoenaed Kashyap Patel, who now serves as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. As both the Government and Patel himself later revealed, he resisted the subpoena before this Court's predecessor ordered him to testify—which he eventually did under a grant of immunity.
Earlier this year, the news organization Politico filed an Application seeking access to the court records generated by Patel's unsuccessful efforts to contest the subpoena. The Government subsequently released redacted versions of these records, but Politico now seeks further unsealing. Contrary to Politico's contentions, the Government has correctly articulated the categories of information related to Patel's testimony that can—and cannot—be disclosed. Even by those terms, however, the Government's proposed redactions appear to the Court to be overbroad. It will therefore order the Government to propose a new set of redactions that map onto the categories it acknowledges can be divulged or justify why the existing redactions are appropriately narrow….
A couple of weeks ago, I attended the traveling Nova exhibit in DC, memorializing the torture, rape, murders and kidnappings of hundreds of peaceful young Israelis by Hamas terrorists at the Nova music festival on October 7, 2023. The exhibit brought back the emotions I felt in July 2024, visiting the site of Nova, Kibbutz Nir Oz, and other sites where Hamas gleefully committed the worst imaginable atrocities against any civilians they encountered: Hamas, like the Nazis, represents a sort of depraved evil that is almost impossible to fathom.
Yesterday, I had a long thread on X explaining why the antizionist ideology of people like Peter Beinart inevitably leads them to support genocidal policies toward Israeli Jews. I noted that Beinart had a brief period of soul-searching immediately after 10/7, and then went back to business as usual.
Shany Mor then pointed out that Beinart and others similarly-situated ended their brief period of soul-searching when Israel was alleged to have killed five hundred civilians in a direct attack on a hospital in Gaza. It turned out that the alleged attack never happened; rather, an Islamic Jihad missile aimed at Israel fell short, hit the hospital parking lot, and killed or wounded several dozen people. All the details implicating Israel were fabricated. Nevertheless, the initial attack provided Beinart et al. with an opportunity for a Two Minute Hate, and thereafter they snapped out of their October 7 funk and resumed their prior role as Hamas apologists and Israel-haters.
Shany then reminded me of a post he had written before the hospital-massacre-that-never-happened: "In the suicide bombing years it was precisely at the moment of a Palestinian atrocity that the rhetorical demonization of Israel would escalate. It's transparent cognitive dissonance reduction: if Palestinians just did THAT to them, then the Israelis must be even more evil."
So let's roll with that. Hamas has been a remarkably evil, depraved terrorist group at least since the 1990s, when it blew up school buses and the like to undermine the Oslo Accords and present itself to the Palestinian public as a "resistance" alternative to Fatah. But even with that as background, even five minutes of reading about or watching videos from the 10/7 atrocities, proudly filmed by Hamas terrorists themselves, gives you a window into a level of depraved evil that is hard to fathom.
As a rule, even the Nazis didn't proudly film themselves committing atrocities against children, but instead generally tried to cover it up. The natural reaction of normies to such depravity is to conclude that Hamas is, like the Nazis, an evil that must simply be eradicated. There is no possibility of it reforming, of living alongside it, of excusing it, or of justifying it.
That's normies. But if you are of a particular ideological bent, you assume the people you designate "brown" (regardless of actual hue) and "colonized" are inherently innocent. But since you reasonably can't deny Hamas's crimes (especially since they themselves filmed and uploaded them), you have to explain them. And since Hamas's terrorists' are inherently the good guys, being brown and all, the only explanation was that they were driven to madness by their oppression, by Israel. It *has* to be Israel--the putative "white" "colonizer" that's at fault, so it has to be that.
Islamist ideology? Antisemitism? Constant dehumanization of Jews in Hamas media and education? Feh! It can't be that, that would make it Hamas's fault.
So, in an amazingly daft intellectual slight of hand, Hamas's atrocities don't show how evil Hamas is, they show how evil Israel is. This is why you then must tear down posters of hostages, lest they create cognitive dissonance by portraying Israelis as victims.
And this is why they not only believe Hamas's lies and exaggerations of about Israeli conduct of the war, they actually emotionally *want* Israel to be massacring and starving Palestinians, because this then confirms their view that the entire thing, including Hamas's atrocities on 10/7, is Israel's fault.
Hamas is shrewd enough to understand this dynamic, and affirmatively welcomes civilian casualties, because it plays into the narrative that the "antizionists" want to believe, indeed must believe to sustain their ideology.
If you think this is implausible, consider the intellectual knots that Stalinists in the West from the 1930s to the 1950s (and sometimes beyond) tied themselves into, to excuse or justify Stalin's crimes. The leftist antizionists today are their intellectual, and not uncommonly literal genetic, descendants.
The erosion of moral clarity within Western institutions, as revealed by the Gaza war, is deeply rooted in the intellectual decline caused by postmodern thinking. At the core of this crisis is a shift from objective truth to subjective ideology, where facts become subordinate to feelings, and moral judgment is replaced by a hierarchy of perceived victimhood.
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