The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Criminal Justice

Justice Thomas, Joined by Justice Gorsuch, Argue for Broader Scope of Constitutional Ban on Ex Post Facto Laws

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Brief excerpts from today's concurrence in Ellingburg v. U.S., though the whole opinion is worth a read:

I join the Court's opinion in full because it correctly applies our precedent. I write separately to clarify the foundation of that precedent. This Court's 1798 decision in Calder v. Bull established that the Ex Post Facto Clauses forbid only those retroactive laws that impose "punishment" for a "crime." Over the 228 years since Calder, the Court has struggled to articulate what it means for a law to impose punishment for a crime, and thus to be subject to the Ex Post Facto Clauses.

The Court's more recent precedents have implemented Calder through two multifactor tests that turn largely on whether the legislature labels the law as criminal or civil. But in 1798, "punishment" for a "crime" would have been understood to refer to any coercive penalty for a public wrong. Many laws that are nominally civil today would therefore have been subject to the Ex Post Facto Clauses under Calder. I would restore Calder's approach to the Ex Post Facto Clauses….

Calder's understanding secures Ex Post Facto Clause protection in a wide range of contexts involving nominally civil laws. Those contexts include civil proceedings seeking fines for public offenses. See, e.g., Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co. (2016) (describing "civil penalties of up to $37,500 for each day [the challenger] violated the Act"). They include enforcement proceedings brought by administrative agencies. See Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC, 598 U. S. 175, 196 (2023) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the 20th-century rise of such proceedings). And they include municipal sanctions like speeding tickets. "If one were to commit a minor traffic offense at a time the offense was to be punished by a $25 fine, and the government were to then amend the statute and impose a fine of $1,000,000 dollars, it would be nonsensical to treat that fine as non-punitive simply because the offense was processed civilly." Brief for Professor Beth Colgan as Amicus Curiae. Because all of these offenses impose punishments for public wrongs, Calder would treat them all as subject to the Ex Post Facto Clauses.

Three Very Short SCOTUS Unanimous Opinions In One Day, But No Tariffs

The Tariffs case is still cooking, but the Court is clearing the brush.

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Generally, at the end of June, there is a running angst for a pending significant case. It is unusual to have that sort of anticipation so early in the term, but here we are. In January, the Court has had three hand-down sessions. So far, eight signed opinions have been handed down. None of these cases have been particularly significant. And still not tariffs. The Court seems to have other priorities. You could imagine the Court saying that no other opinions will be issued until tariffs is released, but that has not been the plan.

What is the cause of the delay? Who knows. But let me offer some speculation. The longer this case goes, the more likely that Trump wins, at least in part. There is a stay in place, and new tariffs continue to be imposed. As the Court takes more time, the remedial issue becomes more complicated by the day. At the outset, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction in light of irreparable harm. And as the Court takes more time to write and review, that irreparable harm becomes greater. This ruling does not need to be a ruling for the ages, so iterative rounds of revisions have a diminishing return. After the case was argued, I put the odds at 51/49 that Trump loses. I've now flipped to 51/49 that Trump wins, at least in part.

The three cases decided today were all very short and were unanimous.

Berk v. Choy was a 9-0 reversal. The majority opinion by Justice Barrett was 11 pages.

Ellingburg v. United States was a 9-0 reversal. The majority opinion by Justice Kavanaugh was 5 pages.

Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton was a 9-0 affirmance. The majority opinion by Justice Alito was six pages long. Indeed, I watched the argument in Coney Island, which may have been the shortest oral argument in the modern era.

I can't recall a day with three majority opinions that were all unanimous and all so short. Also, I would note that Williams & Connolly was counsel in Coney Island and Ellingburg. Today was a good day for Lisa Blatt and Amy Saharia.

Politics

"Lest We All Drown in a Sea of Slop"

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From Kelleher v. Town of Brookfield, decided earlier this month by Judge Brian Murphy (D. Mass.):

Plaintiff's Complaint is more than 100 pages long, often repeating itself or presenting information piecemeal and out of order, to some sort of titanic effect. While the Court appreciates that there is a long history between these parties and that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant and so entitled to a fair amount of leeway, "[e]ven pro se litigants are bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," including Rule 8's requirement that pleadings be "short" and "plain," with allegations that are "simple, concise, and direct."

Of course, the Court is well aware that attorneys, too, have long and often violated this rule (sometimes at great profit). See, e.g., Trump v. New York Times Co. (M.D. Fla. 2025) (excoriating experienced counsel for submitting a complaint that was "decidedly improper and impermissible"). However, particularly as artificial intelligence makes the production of language cheaper and faster—undoubtedly a boon to those that have historically been unable to afford garrulous counsel—it will become increasingly incumbent upon courts to insist that parties respect our limited bandwidths, lest we all drown in a sea of slop.

The Court would not make an example out of this case. However, moving forward, the Court would ask that Plaintiff (or any other prospective filer) do his best to write plainly and precisely, trusting that the Court reads closely and is unmoved by too much rhetoric.

Free Speech

$300K Settlement Against Michigan State Over Elected Officials Allegedly Orchestrating Public Criticism of (and Racism Allegations Against) Professor

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Besides the monetary settlement, MSU Trustee Dennis Denno signed a document stating,

Trustee Rema Vassar signed another stating,

While I maintain my rights to advocate for students and engage in robust debate on matters of institutional governance, I understand that the manner in which advocacy occurs matters, and I reaffirm my commitment to conducting board-related activities in ways that respect all members of the university community.

I remain committed to supporting students who seek to exercise their voices on campus while also acknowledging the complexities that arise when student advocacy intersects with faculty governance and board dynamics.

I did not intend to cause Dr. Lipton personal or professional harm and appreciate and respect Dr. Lipton's advocacy on behalf of MSU's faculty.

Moving forward, I hope all parties can focus on the important work of serving Michigan State University and its diverse community.

Here's my post on the legal issue from June:

[* * *]

Did Elected Officials Violate First Amendment by Orchestrating Public Criticism of (and Racism Allegations Against) Their Critic?

[Subtitle:] "[P]ublic condemnations, op-eds, and official complaints … through proxies are independent constitutional violations" if the officials "engaged in conduct that was motivated by the plaintiff's protected speech and had the requisite chilling effect on First Amendment activity."

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Religion and the Law

Religious Employment and Title VII: Part 2—Reading the Exemption Textually

A textualist interpretation of Section 702 shows that the exemption applies when a religious employer confines employment to people who fit the employer's religious observances, practices, and beliefs.

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In this second post summarizing our new article, we explain how textualism offers a compelling interpretive lens for reading the religious employer exemption of Title VII. Besides revealing the liberty-equality tensions discussed in Part 1, a close reading of Section 702's text vividly reveals the exemption's meaning and scope.

Here is Section 702's relevant language:

This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.

Notice the opening phrase, "This subchapter shall not apply." Subchapter denotes Title VII and shall expresses a mandate.

Section 702 covers a "religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society." Title VII does not define these terms, but each had an established usage when Congress adopted the statute. Our article concludes that the exemption applies to a wide range of religious organizations—from churches and synagogues to religious schools to soup kitchens and other faith-based organizations.

Next, Section 702 applies when a religious organization's employees "perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities." The term activities is unqualified by design. Originally, Title VII limited the exemption to employees who carry out "religious activities," but that qualification was later struck by a 1972 amendment. Section 702 covers all employees of a religious organization, regardless of whether they are engaged in religious activities.

We come to the decisive phrase. Section 702 applies "with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion." Each word matters.

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Free Speech

Buckley v. Valeo: A Retrospective Series

The introduction to an Institute for Free Speech symposium, which I'll be cross-posting over the next couple of weeks.

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By David Keating, the President of the Institute for Free Speech:

Fifty years ago this month, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its landmark ruling in Buckley v. Valeo. Fortunately for the free speech clause of the First Amendment, the Court invalidated crucial parts of the extensive 1974 amendments to the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).

To mark the January 30 anniversary of Buckley, the Institute for Free Speech and the Volokh Conspiracy today begin publishing a series of essays on the opinion, which will run through the anniversary date. We at the Institute recognize that this anniversary provides an opportunity to examine how Buckley safeguards the First Amendment rights that protect our ability to criticize, challenge, and ultimately improve our government.

And the pre-Buckley world looked quite different. Before FECA, U.S. campaign finance was largely unregulated. The 1974 amendments imposed restrictions on contributions and expenditures. Buckley largely upheld contribution limits but ruled that spending limits were unconstitutional.

Had the Court upheld the law in its entirety, Congress undoubtedly would have enacted even stricter laws to squelch critics. Numerous provisions of the pre-Buckley FECA posed a true threat to free speech, so it's not an exaggeration to say the decision saved that fundamental right.

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Three Flawed Opinions In Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections

The majority and dissent’s understanding of standing turned on their visions of democracy. The concurrence does not fare much better.

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Bost v. Illinois State Board of Election is one of the most difficult standing opinions I've encountered. This case is at once simple and extremely difficult. I've been struggling with Bost since I covered it in my Supreme Court simulation class this past semester. I found the Court's ultimate resolution unsatisfying and unpersuasive.

The question presented in Bost was whether a candidate for the House of Representatives has standing to challenge an Illinois law that permits the counting of mail-in ballots that are received after election day. Both the District Court and the Seventh Circuit found that Representative Michael Bost lacked standing. Bost, a Republican, serves in a gerrymandered district, where his margin of victory was significant. The lower courts found that there was no realistic chance that the late-arriving ballots--even if they all went for the Democratic candidate--could make a difference in the outcome of the race. As Justice Jackson wrote in dissent, Bost "never alleges that untimely ballots are more likely to break against him and in favor of his opponent." And the lower courts found that the candidate does not have an interest in padding his margin of victory.

Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Barrett concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Kagan. The Chief found that the candidate has standing because he is a candidate: "As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost has standing to challenge the rules that govern the counting of votes in his election." Justice Barrett, by contrast, found that the candidate has a pocketbook injury, and would not have created a "bespoke" rule for candidates. She wrote, "Bost has standing because he has suffered a traditional pocketbook injury, not because of his status as a candidate."Justice Jackson dissented along with Justice Sotomayor, finding that any purported injury was self-imposed in light of Clapper.

Who can challenge the rule?

As a general rule, candidates have standing to challenge election rules because those rules directly regulate the conduct of candidates. For example, a rule requiring that a certain number of signatures must be collected imposes a burden on the candidate. A rule requiring disclosure of contributions also imposes a burden on the candidate. Also, as a general rule, regulations that make it harder to cast votes can be challenged by voters. For example, requirements to sign absentee ballots in a certain way, or restrictions on where ballots can be dropped off, will impose costs on voters. Voters would have standing to challenge these rules.

 

But what about regulations that make it easier for voters to cast votes? Such is the case in Illinois, and many other states. The relevant law permits the state to count mail-in ballots that were mailed before election day but were received after election day. No voter would have standing to challenge this permissive rule of inclusion. The law imposes no burden--only a benefit. (Policies like DACA are exceptionally hard to challenge in court because they primarily provide benefits.) Voters could not base a claim on an interest in avoiding voter fraud. Voters do not have a generalized interest in the fairness of an election. 

As a result, the only party that could conceivably challenge this rule would be a candidate. In the worst-case scenario, imagine that there is a very tight race, and the margin of victory turns on counting these late-arriving ballots. At that point, the losing candidate would have standing to challenge whether those ballots should be counted. We saw similar claims raised in the wake of the 2020 election. But as the 2020 election demonstrated, the Supreme Court wanted absolutely nothing to do with eleventh hour litigation. From a practical perspective, it would make some sense for candidates to file a pre-enforcement challenge against the rule. But bringing suit before the election raises a host of problems. 

Put aside the standing analysis for a moment, and consider the timing. A person is a "candidate" for a fairly limited period of time. That span would run from when the person is certified to appear on the general election ballot and concludes when that election has a certified winner. This period will usually last less than a year, sometimes only a few months. It is extremely unlikely that a pre-enforcement challenge would move quickly enough to go from the district court to the Supreme Court in that span. Invariably, as the litigation trickles up to the Supreme Court, the complaint filed based on a past election will become obsolete, assuming the candidate ever runs for reelection. In Bost, the complaint was filed in May 2022 based on the 2022 election. Now, we are gearing up for the 2026 midterms. The world has changed since then. Indeed, boundaries can be redrawn, political sentiments can shift, and a politician's popularity might change.

The Standing Puzzle 

Candidates will generally have standing to challenge election rules. After all, most ballot access rules directly affect the candidate. But the Illinois law was different, insofar as it regulated voters. There was a somewhat comical exchange during oral argument in which Justice Kavanaugh asked, repeatedly, if the candidate was the "object" of the regulation.

CLEMENT: Look, if it helps me to say they're the direct object, I'll say it. But I do kind of think it's a -

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: They're an --an object.

JUSTICE KAGAN: It might help you with some people and not with other people.

CLEMENT: Yeah. (Laughter.)

The majority did not address the argument that Bost is the object of the Illinois law; Justice Jackson expressly rejects that argument under FDA v. AHM. Thus, Bost had to argue something of an indirect injury.

An election rule that does not regulate the candidate creates very different logistical hurdles. Or at least it creates difficult hurdles for Republicans. There is an asymmetry, as Democratic governments favor looser election integrity rules while republican governments favor tighter election integrity rules. Accordingly, the burden will invariably fall on the right side of the aisle. It is thus a bit of an anomaly in Watson v. RNC that Mississippi, a deep red state, is defending its mail-in ballot rule against a Republican challenge.

If we just keep things simple, of course the candidate has standing. Every candidate in Illinois will have to employ staff to monitor the counting of ballots after election day. That is an entirely foreseeable pocketbook injury that every politician will incur. Standing, QED. 

But if you dig a bit deeper, the question is tougher. First, under Clapper, this injury can be viewed as self-inflicted. Nothing Illinois has done requires the member to pay poll watchers and other staff after election day. The Democrat-controlled state tells the Republican member to "trust us" to ensure a fair election process. (You can perhaps sense my cynicism.) Second, under Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, is it necessarily foreseeable that the late-arriving ballots in that race will actually make a difference? If the member has a landslide victory, then those ballots will be irrelevant, and will not cause a cognizable injury. Bost has one of the few gerrymandered Republican districts in the state, which is packed with Republican voters to ensure that Democrats in other districts will win. (I doubt there are any Republican candidates in Illinois who would ever be in a close-enough election where the untimely ballots would make a difference; gerrymandering ensures all the margins are lopsided.) It's not enough that the rule could affect someone's election; the rule has to affect Bost's election. To use AHM as an example, there might be some pregnant women who suffer complications from using mifepristone, but the Court found it too remote that one of the plaintiffs would have to treat that patient. (If politicians have an interest in fair elections, why don't doctors have an interest in seeing healthy pregnancies come to term?)

There are obvious responses to these arguments. First, the Court can take judicial notice of how important it is for candidates to ensure the integrity of an election, and to promote a general sense that elections are fair. (The Court likely has doubts of how Illinois election officials would behave if not being monitored.) Second, federal judges should not be in the business of prognosticating ex ante the outcome of a race in light of past races. If ever there was a political question, this is it. As a result, courts should just presume that there will be an injury. 

Back to the other side. Bost's argument dispenses with the requirement that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing every facet of standing, and an injury in fact cannot simply be presumed. Lurking in the background is the "nightmare scenario" where this rule can only be challenged in the heat of an election where the Justices would decide the outcome. During oral argument, the Justices demonstrated they are still suffering from PTSD from the 2020 election. What a mess! As I said, I have been struggling with this case for months. 

Three Flawed Opinions 

The three opinions in Bost did little to resolve this standing puzzle. Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. The Chief's opinion was only ten pages long. The shortness is a tell. When the Chief writes something so short, you are being served a John Roberts blue plate special. On the first read, everything makes sense and the answer seems so obvious. But when you read the responses, you realize the majority opinion is built on smoke and mirrors. The Lady Gaga song "Abracadabra" plays in my head when I read a Roberts opinion.

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Donald Trump

The Art of the Deal Goes to Norway

Great Moments in Twenty-First Century International Diplomacy

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President Donald Trump apparently sent the following letter to prime minister Jonas Gahr Støre of Norway:

Dear Jonas: Considering your Country decided not to give me the Nobel Peace Prize for having stopped 8 Wars PLUS, I no longer feel an obligation to think purely of Peace, although it will always be predominant, but can now think about what is good and proper for the United States of America.

Denmark cannot protect that land from Russia or China, and why do they have a 'right of ownership' anyway? There are no written documents, it's only that a boat landed there hundreds of years ago, but we had boats landing there, also.

I have done more for NATO than any other person since its founding, and now, NATO should do something for the United States. The World is not secure unless we have Complete and Total Control of Greenland. Thank you! President DJT

President Trump also reportedly directed that this letter be shared with multiple NATO member ambassadors.

Conservatism

The Difference Between Populism and Conservatism

Yuval Levin offers a useful way to understand the difference.

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In a recent interview with Ezra Klein of the New York Times, Yuval Levin of the American Enterprise Institute offered a useful way to understand the difference between conservatism and populism.

One way to think about the difference is about whether your politics begins from what you care about most — what you love — or whether it begins from what you fear and what you hate. To me, as a young person, conservatism was appealing, and has remained appealing, because it's fundamentally rooted and begins from what we love in the world. It is a defense of what I take to be best about the world.

What is best about the world is always threatened. It's always challenged. It's challenged just by the realities of human nature. Sustaining it requires work. It requires moral formation and political action. And that's the work that conservatives at their best do — we conserve the preconditions for a flourishing life in a free society.

But if the reason you have for entering politics, first and foremost, is to combat the left, to oppose what you don't like, then your politics are going to be different than that.

Now, look, to defend what you love means fighting people who oppose it. And politics is argument, and it's always contestation.

But I think it matters a lot whether fundamentally the reason that drew you in is itself the fight or whether the reason that drew you in is a commitment to something you love, is fundamentally conservative, is about wanting to preserve the good.

Unfortunately, as Levin notes, populism seems more dominant on the political Right than conservatism at the moment.

The larger issue, exploring the extent to which Donald Trump has accomplished anything lasting during his second term, is worth a listen or a read. As is usual, Levin is filled with valuable insights.

Today's Words of Wisdom

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's brilliant - irrefutable! - defense of the President's emergency powers.

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From The Economist:

Scott Bessent, Donald Trump's treasury secretary, defended the president's plan to impose tariffs on European countries that oppose his bid to take over Greenland. [Ed. note: See co-blogger Ilya Somin's post on why taking over Greenland is, simultaneously, "evil, illegal, and stupidly counterproductive" - the great authoritarian trifecta.] Citing the president's authority to impose tariffs in an economic emergency, Mr Bessent argued that America needed to control Greenland to prevent conflict in the Arctic: "The national emergency is avoiding a national emergency."

The man is a genius!  It's the emergency that can never end! Eight words that, in their terseness and inherent circularity, recall the great works of Samuel Beckett and Eugene Ionesco. Bravo, Mr. Secretary. Now that we understand what is at stake, we can all finally get behind the important work of destroying the NATO Alliance, attacking our friends and allies, and imposing authoritarian rule on the people of Greenland.

Religion and the Law

Religious Employment and Title VII: Part 1—Civil Rights Law and the Tensions between Liberty and Equality

Understanding Title VII as a law designed to advance both liberty and equality helps to illuminate the statute's religious employer exemption.

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Last month, the BYU Law Review published our article entitled Religious Employment and the Tensions between Liberty and Equality. We appreciate this opportunity to offer a five-part series summarizing the article's key points.

Religious employment is a vital aspect of religious freedom. A church needs employees who are fully committed to the church's religious mission and who live by its religious standards. Religious fidelity is indispensable to a religious organization's success. Competence alone will not do.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains an exemption for religious employers. Sometimes called Section 702, it provides that Title VII does not apply to a religious employer "with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion." Deciding when it applies has divided federal circuits and other courts.

We begin with textualism—the theory of legal interpretation that, as Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner explained, "begins and ends with what the text says and fairly implies." (The article also examines legislative history, for those who are interested.) Reading Section 702 through a textualist lens reveals that the exemption authorizes religious employers to select employees for religious reasons free from the demands of Title VII, so long as they have a religious reason for doing so.

Some resist interpreting Section 702 as a liberty-enhancing provision out of a misreading of Title VII. They view Title VII as an uncompromising guarantee of employment equality. But close attention to the statute's text and structure reveals something more nuanced—and surprising. Title VII is not the uniformly equality-enhancing statute that many assume.

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The Board of Peace Is A Step Away From Failed International Institutions

The details are unclear, but Trump seems to be setting up an institution that could supplant the United Nations Security Council.

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Earlier this month, I published an essay titled Eliminating Liberal International Asymmetries. I discussed how President Trump is trying to abolish asymmetries in international law that will necessarily favor progressive views. I wrote about the United Nations, in particular, which has proven to be a failed institution, in large part because it gives stature to all nations.

This much is well known. But less understood is how the United Nations, and other international bodies, have inverted the normal course of international law. In many contexts, a coalition of smaller nations may seek to shape the foreign policy of larger nations that they could not challenge in other contexts. To be sure, the United States and four other superpowers retain a veto on the United Nations Security Council. But in most other contexts, a majority group of minority nations can set the agenda and shape expectations about international authority. It is far more difficult for any nation, including the United States, to withdraw from the United Nations Charter than to withdraw from a bilateral treaty. As a result, great nations have to suffer complaints from weaker nations, all for the sake of faux equality. It has always been a fiction to treat countries with weak influence as having the same stature as countries with strong influence. The United Nations reminds me of a liberal little league: no one keeps score, the best players are benched so weaker players have the same number of at-bats, and all the teams receive the same participation trophy regardless of their record.

Recent developments provide some more data points for my analysis. It seems that Trump's proposed Board of Peace is not limited to the conflict in Gaza. Rather, Trump seems to be establishing something of on alternative to the United Nations. The United States would invite members to join, and they would have to play a $1 billion entrance fee. Only the largest, most-powerful nations will be able to participate.

The New York Times has some details, but much remains unclear:

President Trump's "Board of Peace" is billing itself as a new international peacekeeping body — and permanent membership won't come cheap.

Mr. Trump is inviting countries to join beyond a three-year term, if they're willing to cough up more than a billion dollars in cash within the board's first year, according to a draft of the board's charter reviewed by The New York Times.

And while the board was conceived as part of Mr. Trump's plan to oversee Gaza, there is no mention of Gaza in the charter. That omission added to speculation that the group may have a broader mandate to cover other conflicts and could even be aimed at creating a U.S.-dominated alternative to the United Nations Security Council. . . .

The board's charter was sent out with invitations to potential members over the weekend. A copy reviewed by The Times was verified by an official on the condition of anonymity because of the delicate diplomacy. News of the $1 billion buy-in was previously reported by Bloomberg.

On Friday, the White House announced the board's members would include Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Jared Kushner, Mr. Trump's son-in-law, and Ajay Banga, the head of the World Bank.

Several countries said they had received invitations to join, including Argentina, Canada, Egypt and Turkey. King Abdullah II of Jordan has also been invited, the Jordanian Foreign Ministry announced on Sunday. . . .

The charter appears to outline a much more ambitious role for the board than the one described in Mr. Trump's plan for Gaza, published in October 2025, as well as the subsequent Security Council resolution.

The board's mission, according to the charter, is to seek "to promote stability, restore dependable and lawful governance, and secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict" and "to undertake peace-building functions in accordance with international law."

The preamble emphasizes the need for what it calls "a more nimble and effective international peace-building body" and laments that "too many approaches to peace-building foster perpetual dependency and institutionalize crisis rather than leading people beyond it."

According to the charter, the board is expected to meet for voting at least annually, and expenses are to be funded through voluntary contributions from member states or other sources. The charter does not elaborate on the peacekeeping efforts.

For nearly six decades, there has been something called a "peace process" in Israel. Can something that has failed for six decades still be called a process? Indeed, Palestinians are unique in that they can inherit refugee status. And UNRWA, the United Nations relief agency, was Hamas terrorists. There is perpetual dependency on these institutions, that are not actually equipped to end crises.

Will this Board of Peace supplant the United Nations Security Council? Who knows. But Trump, as usual, is trying to shatter paradigms in nearly every corner of the globe.

Update: The Times published a guest essay by the secretary general of the Council of Europe. It finishes with this choice:

International law is either universal or meaningless. Greenland will show which one we choose.

If international law is meaningless, that change did not happen overnight, or even with Trump's election. It has been a slow, gradual process that was visible for all to see, but those vested in its perpetuation maintained the fiction. I think international law will continue to exist, but not the form erected during the post World War II settlement. In the same way that modern conservatism no longer has much relation to the Goldwater-Reagan coalition (as Ross Douthat explained), international law will no longer have much relation to the United Nations and related institutions. Things are not fixed in stone. Trump, as I noted above, has proven a unique adeptness to finding all of the pre-exisiting cracks in these edifices, and smashing them.

Update: The Times of Israel published the text of the Charter:

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Religion and the Law

Guest-Blogging on "Religious Employment and the Tensions Between Liberty and Equality"

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I'm delighted to report that R. Shawn Gunnarson, James Phillips, and Christopher Bates will be guest-blogging this coming week on this article that they just published in the BYU Law Review; here's the Abstract:

Located in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is an exemption for religious employers that is often misunderstood. Often courts and commentators mischaracterize it as a narrow privilege for religious employers to hire people of the same religion. But the statute's text says otherwise.

This article resolves interpretive debates about the meaning and application of the religious employer exemption through a close textualist reading that discovers a new understanding of the structure of Title VII. Our approach applies the tools of textualism, the prevailing theory of statutory interpretation. Paying attention to the text and structure of Title VII reveals the statute in a new light. The text reveals Title VII as a complex piece of legislation that preserves areas of employer liberty and autonomy, even as it guarantees greater employee equality.

Viewing the structure of Title VII from the perspective of tensions between liberty and equality—a familiar theme in classical liberal theory—makes sense of Congress's decision to protect liberty for small and tribal-related businesses, bona fide occupational qualifications, and other employers, even while removing barriers to employment opportunity elsewhere. That same perspective explains why Congress adopted an exemption for religious employers to shield them from the consequences of an unqualified egalitarian framework.

A textualist reading of the exemption shows that a religious employer is authorized to make employment decisions based on religious criteria, free from any obligation under Title VII—but not to make employment decisions for non-religious reasons that the statute forbids. By articulating the exemption's best reading, our approach holds the key to resolving a long-running circuit split along with several persistent questions and objections. In sum, this article is the first to demonstrate that a textualist reading of the religious employer exemption reveals Title VII as not merely an equality statute nor a liberty statute.

I'm much looking forward to their posts.

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