The Volokh Conspiracy

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The Volokh Conspiracy

Donald Trump

Colorado Supreme Court Rules Trump is Ineligible for the Presidency Under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment

The Colorado court got this issue right. The case is now likely headed to the US Supreme Court.

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Donald Trump speaking
Donald Trump. ( Kyle Mazza/SOPA Images/Sipa USA/Newscom)

 

Today, the Supreme Court of Colorado ruled that Donald Trump is ineligible to be on the ballot for the 2024 presidential election because he is disqualified by Section 3 of the 14th Amendment. Section 3 states that "No person" can hold any state or federal office if they had previously been "a member of Congress, or… an officer of the United States" or a state official, and then "engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof." The Colorado court ruled that Trump "engaged in insurrection" because of his role in instigating the January 6, 2021 assault on the Capitol, and is therefore disqualified. This - and the lower court ruling it reviewed - are the first decisions that address the Section 3 case against Trump on the merits; several previous rulings in other states have dismissed Section 3 claims against Trump on varous procedural grounds.

I can't give anything like a complete analysis of the 213 pages of majority and dissenting opinions here. But I think the 4-3 majority got it right. Trump is indeed ineligible.

The per curiam majority opinion does an excellent job of handling all the major issues at stake: whether the January 6 attack was an insurrection, whether Trump's role in it was extensive enough to qualify as engagement, whether the president is an "officer of the United States," and whether Section 3 is "self-executing" (that is, whether state governments and courts can enforce it in the absence of specialized congressional legislation). In the process, the justices partly affirmed and partly overruled the trial court decision, which held that Trump did indeed engage in insurrection, but let him off the hook on the badly flawed ground that Section 3 doesn't apply to the president.

The case is now likely headed to the US Supreme Court. The justices may well hear it on an accelerated schedule, so as to resolve the case before we go too far into the GOP primary process. The Colorado Court has stayed its decision until at least January 4, to allow time for appeals to the US Supreme Court.

The 4-3 vote is not as close as it looks. Two of the three dissenting justices did so on the ground that Colorado state election law doesn't give the state courts the authority to decide Section 3 issues. They did not endorse any of the federal constitutional arguments on Trump's side. And these state statutory issues probably cannot be reviewed by the US Supreme Court, because state supreme courts are the final arbiters of the meaning of state law (with a few exceptions that do not apply here).

I think it's fairly obvious that the January 6 attack on the Capitol amounts to an insurrection, and the Colorado justices also concluded this is not a close issue:

[F]or purposes of deciding this case, we need not adopt a single, all-encompassing definition of the word "insurrection." Rather, it suffices for us to conclude that any definition of "insurrection" for purposes of Section Three would encompass a concerted and public use of force or threat of force by a group of people to hinder or prevent the U.S. government from taking the actions necessary to accomplish a peaceful transfer of power in this country.

This is an important point that I have tried to highlight in some of my own writings about the case. January 6 qualifies as an "insurrection" even under a fairly narrow definition of the term that is limited to the use of force to take over the powers of government. We don't need to rely on much broader definitions advocated by some legal scholars.

The Colorado Court didn't address the argument that there was no insurrection because the rioters and Trump sincerely believed he won the election, and therefore thought they were acting to protect the Constitution. But, under that reasoning, most of the ex-Confederates whom Section 3 was originally enacted to disqualify would also have been exempt, since they sincerely believed the secession of the southern states was legally authorized by the Constitution (and they had far better legal arguments for their position than Trump for his).

As I see it, the hardest issue raised in the case is whether Trump's involvement in the insurrection was extensive enough to count as "engaging" in it. On this question, the justices affirmed the detailed and compelling analysis of the district judge, much of which rests on factual findings that can only be reversed for "clear error." They also emphasized this important point:

As our detailed recitation of the evidence shows, President Trump did not merely incite the insurrection. Even when the siege on the Capitol was fully under way, he continued to support it by repeatedly demanding that Vice President Pence refuse to perform his constitutional duty and by calling Senators to persuade them to stop the counting of electoral votes. These actions constituted overt, voluntary, and direct participation in the insurrection.

As I pointed out in a recent Bulwark article about the case, this goes beyond encouraging violence (as Trump did before the attack) or failing to try to stop it. It amounts to using the attack as leverage to try to force Congress to keep him in power. Using a violent insurrection in this way surely qualifies as "engaging in it," even if Trump's other actions fell short of doing so. Even if this somehow still falls short of "engagement," this and Trump's other actions surely at least gave "aid and comfort to the enemies" of the United States.

The court also gave a thorough and compelling explanation for its rejection of the argument that the president is not an "officer of the United States" covered by Section 3. Here is a key excerpt:

When interpreting the Constitution, we prefer a phrase's normal and ordinary usage over "secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation."District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008). Dictionaries from the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification define "office" as a "particular duty, charge or trust conferred by public authority, and for a public purpose," that is "undertaken by . . . authority from government or those who administer it." Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 689 (Chauncey A. Goodrich ed., 1853); see also 5 Johnson's English Dictionary 646 (J.E. Worcester ed., 1859) (defining "office" as "a publick charge or employment; magistracy");United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211, 1214 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747) ("An office is defined to be 'a public charge or employment,' . . . ."). The Presidency falls comfortably within these definitions…..

The preference for "ordinary meaning" is a standard tenet endorsed by most originalist judges. The quote from Heller to this effect is by the late Justice Scalia, a major icon of originalist jurisprudence.

And it's pretty obvious that the ordinary meaning of "officer of the United States" includes the holder of the most powerful office in the federal government! As the Colorado Supreme Court puts it, "President Trump asks us to hold that Section Three disqualifies every oath-breaking insurrectionist except the most powerful one and that it bars oath-breakers from virtually every office, both state and federal, except the highest one in the land. Both results are inconsistent with the plain language and history of Section Three."

The opinion also addresses the argument that the presidency was excluded because it wasn't specifically listed, but some other positions (e.g. - members of Congress) were:

It seems most likely that the Presidency is not specifically included because it is so evidently an "office." In fact, no specific office is listed in Section Three; instead, the Section refers to "any office, civil or military." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3. True, senators, representatives, and presidential electors are listed, but none of these positions is considered an "office" in the Constitution. Instead, senators and representatives are referred to as "members" of their respective bodies.

I would add that senators, representatives, and electors are less clearly officers than the president, because they do not have individual authority to issue orders to subordinates, a point I expounded on in my Bulwark article.

The Court similarly addressed the issue of whether Section 3 is self-executing. The key point here is that every other part of the Fourteenth Amendment is considered self-executing, despite the fact that Congress can provide for additional enforcement through its power to enact "appropriate" enforcement legislation under Section 5. There is no good reason to exempt Section 3 from this general principle:

The Supreme Court has said that the Fourteenth Amendment "is undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of circumstances." The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). To be sure, in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court was directly focused on the Thirteenth Amendment, so this statement could be described as dicta. But an examination of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments ("Reconstruction Amendments") and interpretation of them supports the accuracy and broader significance of the statement….

There is no textual evidence that Congress intended Section Three to be any different…. Furthermore, we agree with the [plaintiffs] that interpreting any of the Reconstruction Amendments, given their identical structure, as not self-executing would lead to absurd results. If these Amendments required legislation to make them operative, then Congress could nullify them by simply not passing enacting legislation. The result of such inaction would mean that slavery remains legal; Black citizens would be counted as less than full citizens for reapportionment; non-white male voters could be disenfranchised; and any individual who engaged in insurrection against the government would nonetheless be able to serve in the government. government, regardless of whether two-thirds of Congress had lifted the disqualification.

Justice Samour, the only one of the three dissenters who based his position on any federal constitutional issue, argues that Section 3 cannot be self-executing because making it so would deprive candidates for office of the "due process of law." But the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments only provides a guarantee of due process before a person can be deprived of "life, liberty, or property."

Disqualification under Section 3 doesn't threaten any of these. Loss of eligibility for holding various types of public offices pretty obviously doesn't threaten anyone's life or property rights. And it isn't a threat to liberty, either. No one claims that the Twenty-Second Amendment deprives people of "liberty" merely because they become ineligible for the presidency if they have already served two terms.

The Supreme Court has held (wrongly in my view) that a degree of constitutional due process is required for deprivation of some types government benefits, particularly those that provide essential needs, such as welfare benefits for the poor.

Eligibility for the presidency isn't an essential need in the same way. If Trump is no longer eligible for the presidency, he isn't going to starve or become homeless. And even when it comes to deprivation of vital welfare benefits for the poor, the Supreme Court has held that due process requires only an administrative hearing, not a "judicial or quasi-judicial trial." The five-day trial held by the district court in the Colorado case in which both sides presented extensive evidence and expert testimony easily meets any plausible due process requirements for a case like this, even if we assume that the Due Process Clause applies (which I think it does not).

I am not qualified to comment on the Colorado statutory issues raised by the other two dissenting justices. To me, it would be strange if the law did not give state courts the power to adjudicate cases over Section 3 disqualification, just as they routinely consider other candidate eligibility issues. But I am no expert on Colorado election law, and therefore might be missing something. I will only reiterate that the federal Supreme Court probably lacks the power to review the Colorado state court's resolution of these issues of state statutory law.

The same point applies to the Colorado court's conclusion that, under state law, candidates ineligible for the presidency are barred from appearing on primary ballots, as well as those for the general election.

More can be said. But this post is already too long, and I will stop - for now. I will probably have more to say as this case moves on to what is likely to be review by the federal Supreme Court.

Free Speech

Prof. Rick Hasen on the Colorado S. Ct. Trump Disqualification Ruling

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From Election Law Blog, about today's Anderson v. Griswold decision:

I am traveling and so I offer only some brief and initial thoughts here about what the United States Supreme Court may and should do in light of the Colorado Supreme Court's determination that Donald Trump is ineligible to serve as president under Section 3 of the 14th amendment for encouraging insurrection.

My bottom line is that the Colorado opinion is a serious and careful opinion that reaches a reasonable conclusion that Trump is disqualified. Nonetheless the opinion reaches many novel legal issues that the U.S. Supreme Court could decide the other way should that court reach the merits. (The three dissenters on the Colorado court did not really reach the merits.) Trump would need to prevail on only one of these legal issues to win on any appeal, so in some ways the legal odds are with him.

It is far from clear that the U.S. Supreme Court will reach the merits—there are many legal doctrines like ripeness and mootness that would give the Court a way to avoid deciding the issues in the case. But it is imperative for the political stability of the U.S. to get a definitive judicial resolution of these questions as soon as possible. Voters need to know if the candidate they are supporting for President is eligible. And if we don't get a final judicial  resolution before January 6, 2025 a Democratic-majority Congress could decide Trump is disqualified even if he appears to win the electoral college vote. That would be tremendously destabilizing.

In the end the legal issues are close but the political ramifications of disqualification would be enormous. Once again the Supreme Court is being thrust into the center of a U.S. presidential election. But unlike in 2000 the general political instability in the United States makes the situation now much more precarious.

Ilya Somin has posted a much more detailed analysis. I expect that Josh Blackman, Will Baude, or both will likewise blog about the case in much more detail (their work was cited in the opinions). I agree that this is a question of national importance, and that the U.S. Supreme Court should therefore review the Colorado Supreme Court's decision. [This paragraph was revised to include the link to Ilya's post.]

Free Speech

Free Speech and "Harassment Restraining Orders"

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I was on the California Appellate Law Podcast discussing this, though my analysis isn't limited to California. An excerpt from the podcast summary:

Prof. Eugene Volokh joined us to discuss restraining orders, how many of them violate the First Amendment as unlawful prior restraints, and how you can spot the First Amendment problems. The purpose of a restraining orders is to get a person to stop harassing you, but "harassment" can be a pretty vague term—and the same goes for "bullying," "cyberbullying," "hate speech," etc.—especially when no physical violence threatened or happening. The result is that many restraining orders not only prevent the subject from speaking TO the plaintiff, but from speaking ABOUT the plaintiff, and last INDEFINITELY….

[Some] items discussed in the episode:

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Justice O'Connor and If

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I haven't had anything to say on occasion of the death of Justice O'Connor; there just doesn't seem to be anything to add beyond what others have said. (I particularly recommend Jonathan Rauch's remembrance and reflection.) But I did notice that Bishop Mariann Edgar Budde's homily at the funeral quoted Justice O'Connor's speech in honor of one of her Stanford professors (Harry Rathbun), which in turn quoted Rudyard Kipling's If.

The Bishop thought the poem gave some insight into the Justice's character, and I think she was correct. Plus, it's a great poem; here's the excerpt that Justice O'Connor had included in her speech:

If you can keep your head when all about you
Are losing theirs and blaming it on you,
If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you,
But make allowance for their doubting too;
If you can wait and not be tired by waiting,
Or being lied about, don't deal in lies,
Or being hated, don't give way to hating,
And yet don't look too good, nor talk too wise:

If you can dream—and not make dreams your master;
If you can think—and not make thoughts your aim;
If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster
And treat those two impostors just the same;
If you can bear to hear the truth you've spoken
Twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools,
Or watch the things you gave your life to, broken,
And stoop and build 'em up with worn-out tools: …

If you can talk with crowds and keep your virtue,
Or walk with Kings—nor lose the common touch,
If neither foes nor loving friends can hurt you,
If all men count with you, but none too much;
If you can fill the unforgiving minute
With sixty seconds' worth of distance run,
Yours is the Earth and everything that's in it,
And—which is more—you'll be a Man, my son!

Dog Sniff of a Person is a Fourth Amendment Search, New York Court Rules

But how close is close enough? No one knows.

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The police often rely on trained narcotics-detection dogs to alert for drugs.  How far the police can use those dogs under the Fourth Amendment has led to a lot of cases.  Today the New York Court of Appeals added an interesting one on an important question: Is a dog sniff of a person in a public area a Fourth Amendment search?

First, some context.  The Supreme Court has held that a dog sniff in a public area is not a search.  It reached that ruling in cases that happened to involve a sniff of luggage and a sniff around a car. When confronted with a dog sniff on a home front porch, however, the Court ruled that the entry of the dog on to the porch was a search because it went beyond the implied license of the area around the home, the so-called curtilage.  The "search" was the entry of the dog within the private area of the curtilage with intent to do a sniff, not the sniff itself.

So what about a dog sniff of a person in a public area?  The curtilage concept has only been applied to homes, not people. Does that mean dogs can sniff a person?  It's clear that a dog sniff is a search if the dog actually touches the person.  But what if the dog just comes close to the person, without touching them? Is that a search?

That was the issue in today's ruling in People v. Butler.  After observing what they think is a hand-to-hand drug transaction, officers see the suspect get in his car.  They pull him over for a traffic violation.  He steps out of his car, and officers notice a big bulge in his pants that he claims is $1,000 in cash.  Officers get the narcotics-detection dog, a Belgian Malinois named Apache, to smell around the car.  Apache alerts.

They then let the dog sniff around the suspect, Butler.  The dog alerted again, "put its nose in the defendant's groin/buttock region, and sat, alerting the officer that it had located narcotics."  There was no evidence that Apache had actually touched Butler.  But he had put his nose near Butler's groin.

That's a search, the New York Court of Appeals ruled:

Applying the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the instant case, we hold that the use of a canine to sniff defendant's body for the presence of narcotics qualified as a search. This is true even if we accept County Court's apparent conclusion that when Apache put its nose in defendant's "groin/buttock region," the dog did not make actual contact with defendant and sniffed only the air closely surrounding his person. The lack of direct physical contact is not dispositive in this context because of the "heightened" interest society recognizes in the privacy and security of the human body, which can encompass space immediately surrounding the body and was clearly implicated by what occurred here (cf. Jardines, 569 US at 7 [majority op] and 13 [Kagan, J., concurring]).

It cannot be disputed that society treats many matters related to the body as private, or that individuals have a significant interest in the security and integrity of their persons . . .  The Fourth Amendment protects those important interests from unreasonable intrusion by the government. . . .

Thus, the Supreme Court has long held that the Fourth Amendment is implicated when the government attempts to gather evidence of criminal activity from an individual's person. It has recognized that a search occurs whether the particular method employed by the government entails a "compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body" (Winston v Lee, 470 US 753, 759 [1985]; see Schmerber, 384 US at 767); "gentle" or "light" contact with the body (see Maryland v King, 569 US 435, 446 [2013]); "brief" contact with "outer clothing" (Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 24-25 [1968]); mandated collection by the individual searched of matter emitted from their body for testing by the government (Skinner, 489 US at 617); or the "visual and aural monitoring" of private bodily functions (id.). In addition, multiple federal circuit courts have held that the use of magnetometers to detect concealed metal is a search, notwithstanding that the use of such technology does not involve physical contact and is "far less intrusive than the use of large dogs to sniff [people's] bodies" (Horton, 690 F2d at 478 [collecting authorities]; see United States v Albarado, 495 F2d 799, 803 [2d Cir 1974] ["Even the unintrusive magnetometer walk-through is a search in that it searches for and discloses metal items within areas most intimate to the person where there is a normal expectation of privacy"]).

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Property Rights

My Contribution to Brennan Center Symposium on the Most Significant State Constitutional Cases of 2023

I focus on the Washington Supreme Court's flawed decision holding an eviction moratorium is not a taking of private property.

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The Brennan Center State Court Report has posted a symposium on the "2023's Most Significant State Constitutional Cases." My contribution focuses on the Washington Supreme Court's flawed ruling in holding that an eviction moratorium is not a taking of private property requiring compensation under its state constitution. Here's an excerpt:

My choice for a notable state constitutional case is Gonzales v. Inslee, where the Washington Supreme Court held that the state's long-running Covid-era eviction moratorium was not a taking of private property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the state constitution. For many months, the state barred landlords from evicting tenants for nonpayment of rent.

In Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2021 that even temporary mandated physical occupations of privately owned land qualify as "per se" (automatic) takings under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Gonzales only addresses claims under Article I, Section 16 of the Washington Constitution. But the state supreme court ruled that eviction moratoriums are not covered by the per se rule, even assuming it applies…. The justices reasoned the eviction moratorium was merely a "regulation" of a preexisting "voluntary relationship" between tenants and owners. They ignored the obvious point that, in the absence of the "regulation," the tenants would have no right to remain on the owners' land. Thus, an eviction moratorium undeniably does mandate a physical occupation of property.

The court's reasoning — which may be copied by other state and federal courts — has implications that go beyond eviction moratoriums (though those are significant in themselves). If there is no takings liability for physical occupations linked to "voluntary relationships," then there is no taking when conservative states require businesses and employers to allow employees and customers to bring guns onto their property, or when they enact laws barring employers from excluding workers who refuse to get vaccinated for Covid-19 or other contagious diseases….

The Gonzales decision also included a dubious ruling that eviction moratoria don't violate the state constitution's Contract Clause, an issue analyzed in an earlier Brennan Center essay by Anthony Sanders of the Institute for Justice.

In addition to my piece, the symposium on 2023 state constitutional cases includes contributions by a variety of prominent legal scholars and commentators, including Erwin Chemerinsky, Leah Litman, Meryl Chertoff, Anthony Sanders,  and more. It's a helpful reminder that state constitutional law has a big impact, even though it rarely attracts the kind of attention that high-profile federal cases get.

Climate Change

D.C. Circuit Rejects Oil Company Attempt to Remove District's Climate Suit to Federal Court

Yet another federal circuit court of appeals rejects energy company removal claims.

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Today, in District of Columbia v. Exxon Mobil Corp., a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected an attempt by oil company defendants to have a "greenwashing" lawsuit against them removed to federal court. Rejecting the oil companies' argument that the climate change-related claims should be heard in federal court, the D.C. Circuit instead concluded that the District of Columbia's district-law-based claims against oil companies could remain in district court where they were filed.

The unanimous opinion, written by Judge Neomi Rao, is quite clear and direct. It was joined by Judges Greg Katsas and Florence Pan.  Here is how it summarizes the decision:

The District of Columbia sued several energy companies in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging the companies violated District law by making material misstatements about their products' effects on climate change. The defendants removed the case to the federal district court, which determined it lacked jurisdiction and remanded.

We agree that remand was proper. Under the time honored well-pleaded complaint rule, it is the cause of action chosen by the plaintiff that governs whether a lawsuit may be filed in federal court. Here, the District did not invoke a federal cause of action but relied instead on the District of Columbia's consumer protection statute. The companies raise what amount to federal defenses, but that is not enough to establish federal jurisdiction over the District's claims.

The opinion makes clear that this is not a particularly close question, and aligns with that of every other federal circuit court to consider the question. The panel that heard the claim was about as favorable for the oil companies as they could have hoped for, and their claims still still went nowhere. The ruling further supports the arguments I made in my post last week explaining why these cases are not cert-worthy.

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Free Speech

COVID Lockdown Violation Conviction Reversed, Based on N.J. Policy Exempting "Political Activities"

Defendant was "walking along the highway holding up signs to passing motorists stating 'PHUCK,' '#THIN BLUE,' and 'Slow Down Police Ahead.'"

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State v. French, decided Wednesday by the N.J. appellate court (in an opinion by Judges Susswein and Vanek) reverses defendant's convictions for violating a COVID stay-at-home order in May 2020; the defendant had been "walking along the highway holding up signs to passing motorists stating 'PHUCK,' '#THIN BLUE,' and 'Slow Down Police Ahead." The order provided, in relevant part,

All New Jersey residents shall remain home or at their place of residence unless they are … leaving the home for an educational, religious, or political reason ….

The court's analysis:

At an April 4, 2020 press briefing, the Governor was asked specifically about the ability to protest under EO 107. He responded: "[D]on't protest as a group. We respect folks who want to protest, find some other way to do it virtually online, whatever it might be."

The Governor further clarified his position regarding protests under the relevant executive orders at a press briefing on April 29, 2020:

People have a right to protest. I wish they would do it from home …. The thing that really bothered me was they were congregating, and they weren't wearing masks for the most part and they were on top of each other and that's what led to the [violation of the executive order] …. I wish folks would protest from home and virtually, but if they're going to protest we're [going to] be tough on enforcing the … no congregation.

… [A] June 17, 2020 memorandum from the State of New Jersey Attorney General entitled "Guidance Regarding Municipal Prosecutors' Discretion in Prosecuting COVID-19 Related Offenses" … directs:

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You Might Want to Read More Sentences of Arizona v. United States

A response to Josh Blackman on the new Texas immigration enforcement law.

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In his post below, my friend and co-blogger Josh Blackman writes that there is only one sentence of Arizona v. United States that you need to know to answer whether federal law clearly preempts the new state Texas immigration enforcement bill.   Here's the sentence:

There is no need in this case to address whether reasonable suspicion of illegal entry or another immigration crime would be a legitimate basis for prolonging a detention, or whether this too would be preempted by federal law.

Josh reads that as indicating that Arizona does not clearly conflict with the Texas law.  On his reading of the sentence, this is a question left open by Arizona, with Texas fairly raising an interstitial question ripe for litigation that could go either way.

But I don't think that's what the sentence says or means.

The power to detain a person to investigate a crime based on mere "reasonable suspicion" is just a power to very temporarily detain them.  It's a Terry stop authority, giving officers, say, 20 or 30 extra minutes to check out what is going on.  That power does not allow the government to detain someone for much more than that time, or to bring them to a new place.  Under Dunaway v. New York, that kind of stop is an arrest as a matter of Fourth Amendment law, and that requires probable cause.

As I read that one sentence, all it did was leave  open whether a state is allowed to add on that extra 20-30 minutes or so to investigate an immigration offense.

I'm not an expert in the new Texas law, but it does not seem to be a Terry stop law.  It appears to authorize arrests, which is a different ball of wax in the law of criminal procedure.  As I recall, arrests were dealt with in another part of the Arizona decision,  Section IV(C), which ruled that the Arizona law allowing arrests for committing removable offenses was preempted.

If we're looking for the one sentence from Arizona to read on that issue, this one seems particularly relevant:

By authorizing state officers to decide whether an alien should be detained for being removable, § 6 violates the principle that the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government.

Of course, I wouldn't just read that one sentence.  But Section IV(C) seems like an important section to focus on, not the one sentence about Terry stops.

Science Fiction

Review of "The Ballad of Songbirds and Snakes"

The new movie is a compelling film version of Suzanne Collins' prequel to the Hunger Games trilogy.

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Tom Blyth and Rachel Zegler star in "The Ballad of Songbirds and Snakes." (Lionsgate.)

 

My wife and I recently watched The Ballad of Songbirds and Snakes, the film version of Suzanne Collins' prequel to her famous Hunger Games trilogy. It was really impressive, even more so than I expected. If you liked the original trilogy and/or the films based on it (starring Jennifer Lawrence as Katniss Everdeen), you will love this movie.

The original trilogy is set in a world where what's left of the former United States is ruled by a tyrannical central government (the "Capitol") that oppresses and exploits twelve subordinate districts. Every year, each district must send two children (known as "tributes") to participate in the Hunger Games, a nationally televised game show where they fight each other to the death until only one (the "Victor") survives. The government uses the Games to entertain the public and divert their attention away from its oppressive nature, while also reminding the districts that any attempt at rebellion is doomed to failure.

The prequel is set in the early days of the Hunger Games, soon after the Capitol suppressed a bloody rebellion by the districts. The main character is a young Coriolanus Snow - the future Capitol President who is the primary antagonist in the original trilogy.  At the start of the prequel, Snow is an ambitious student from a prominent Capitol family that has fallen on hard times. He becomes a "mentor" to one of the tributes, responsible for helping her in the Games and promoting her to the viewing public.

The big challenge for both the movie and the book is that this is the origin story of a villain. Thus, it's hard for Suzanne Collins and the film screenwriters to make audiences empathize with the main character. But they pull it off brilliantly.

They succeed so well that I actually found it easier to empathize with Snow than with Katniss Everdeen in the original trilogy. Very few of us have Katniss's selfless heroism. On the other hand, many people face difficult tradeoffs between doing what is right and seeking power, prestige, and comfort - the kinds of choices Snow faces. We often have strong impulses in both directions, as Snow does. Viewers can see themselves in Snow. Most of us are more like him than like Katniss. Snow is not simply an out-and-out amoral villain (at least he doesn't start out that way or quickly become it). He struggles with the tradeoffs, and so do many of us.

These kinds of challenges are most obvious for ambitious people living under oppressive authoritarian regimes, like Snow under the Capitol. As Snow finds out, it's almost impossible to attain power and prestige in such a system without perpetrating evil. But these challenges come up in liberal democracies, as well. Think, for example, of the various conservative opinion leaders, activists, and politicians who have had to choose between maintaining their principles and getting ahead in the conservative movement in the Trump era.

The film and book also do a good job of showing the origins of the authoritarian Capitol regime, and why people in the Capitol see the world as they do. More than the original trilogy, The Ballad of Songbirds and Snakes gives us a window into the Capitol's ideology, which emerges as a kind of authoritarianism emphasizing security and order. In part because of the trauma of the earlier war, Capitol citizens simultaneously despise and fear the people of the districts. That makes it easier for them to accept something like the Hunger Games, especially once the Games become more exciting and entertaining (a process depicted in the prequel).

In addition to Snow, the other major characters are also compelling. Rachel Zegler effectively depicts the charismatic District 12 tribute Lucy Gray Baird, who wins over the Capitol audience and - for a time - inspires Snow to be a better person. There are obvious parallels between Lucy and Katniss Everdeen in the original trilogy. Both are District 12 tributes who become highly popular and pose a potential threat to the Capitol. But, while Katniss is an introvert and a highly skilled fighter, Lucy (who has little combat ability) is an extrovert and talented performer. The prequel implicitly compares the two in interesting ways.

Dr. Volumnia Gaul, well-played by Viola Davis, is a compelling cross between Hobbes and Dr. Mengele. Her worldview becomes a kind of foundation for the Capitol's ideology: people are naturally aggressive and violent, and therefore must be ruled by a strong hand. The actors playing other major characters also do a great job, including Peter Dinklage as Dean Casca Highbottom, the apparent inventor of the Games. Dinklage is most famous for playing Tyrion Lannister on Game of Thrones. But he played this very different character so well, that I never once thought of him as Tyrion while watching this movie.

In sum, if you like the Hunger Games world at all and/or science fiction generally, you should check out this movie.

For those interested, I reviewed previous Hunger Games movies here, here, and here. I have also written about political themes in the original trilogy (see here, here, and here).

The One Sentence From Arizona v. United States That You Need To Know For Texas's New Immigration Law (Updated)

"There is no need in this case to address whether reasonable suspicion of illegal entry or another immigration crime would be a legitimate basis for prolonging a detention, or whether this too would be preempted by federal law."

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Today, Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed into law S.B. 4. This law makes it a state offense to illegally cross the border. Before you shout that this law clearly violates Arizona v. United States (2012), re-read this passage from Justice Kennedy's majority opinion:

However the law is interpreted, if §2(B) only requires state officers to conduct a status check during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released, the provision likely would survive pre-emption—at least absent some showing that it has other consequences that are adverse to federal law and its objectives. There is no need in this case to address whether reasonable suspicion of illegal entry or another immigration crime would be a legitimate basis for prolonging a detention, or whether this too would be preempted by federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948) (authority of state officers to make arrests for federal crimes is, absent federal statutory instruction, a matter of state law); Gonzales v. Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475–476 (CA9 1983) (concluding that Arizona officers have authority to enforce the criminal provisions of federal immigration law), overruled on other grounds in Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (CA9 1999).

Arizona left open the question of whether Texas can detain aliens who violated federal immigration law. I made this point in the New York Times in October:

"The core question is whether the states can make it a crime to violate federal immigration law, and detain an alien for violating that law," said Josh Blackman, a constitutional law professor at South Texas College of Law Houston, who has written that Justice Anthony Kennedy, the author of the Arizona decision, left open the question of detentions.

I am skeptical that Arizona v. United States, a 5-4 decision, would come out the same way today. But there is no need to revisit the decision, as Justice Kennedy expressly left the issue unresolved. I still think there may be some wrinkles with the state law with regard to processing asylum claims, but that will come out in litigation. Speaking of which.

I expect the United States to file suit any minute in the Western District of Texas, Austin Division, where it will likely be assigned to Judge Roger Pitman, who tends to get most of the federal government's suits against Texas that are filed in Austin. The ACLU will also find a favorable division somewhere in the Valley. Conservatives are not the only ones who know how to forum-shop. All of which is to say that in the near future, the Fifth Circuit will be likely asked to stay a district court injunction. And at that point, the case will come to the Supreme Court's emergency docket. And we know how the Fifth Circuit tends to fare on the emergency docket.

Update: I appreciate the Orin wrote a brief reply to my post. He explains that this passage only concerned the duration of a Terry stop. He wrote, "all it did was leave open whether a state is allowed to add on that extra 20-30 minutes or so to investigate an immigration offense."

Justice Kennedy made two points.

First, the Court did not resolve "whether reasonable suspicion of illegal entry or another immigration crime would be a legitimate basis for prolonging a detention." That is the Terry issue. In other words, a suspicion that a person illegally entered would be subject to the usual constraints of the Fourth Amendment. No debate there.

Second, the Court declined to resolve an issue beyond the Fourth Amendment: "whether [prolonging a detention for] reasonable suspicion of illegal entry or another immigration crime … would be preempted by federal law." In other words, the Court could have held that a detention of any duration, indeed one less than the 20 or 30 minutes that Terry would otherwise allowed, would be preempted.

My post was referring to the second point. The parentheticals that follow also address the preemption issue.

If the short term detention for reasonable suspicion is not preempted, and the person is found to have illegally entered, then he violated state law, and a lawful arrest can be made.

Had Justice Kennedy said even a brief detention would be preempted, I don't think Texas could ever even detain the person to determine their immigration status. Is that right? I don't think this issue is clear, or open-and-shut. My only point was that the issue is not foreclosed by Arizona.

Why Do We Have An Establishment Clause?

Speaker Mike Johnson was both right and wrong

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Last month, House Speaker Mike Johnson caused a stir by stating in an interview that "the separation of church and state is a misnomer." Johnson was responding to a skeptical interviewer on CNBC who asked whether it was appropriate for Johnson to be seen praying on the House floor. In response, Johnson said the following:

The Founders wanted a vibrant expression of faith in the public square because they believed that a general moral consensus in virtue was necessary to maintain this grand experiment in self-governance…. 

The separation of church and state is a misnomer. People misunderstand it…. It comes from a phrase that was in a letter Jefferson wrote. It's not in the Constitution. And what he was explaining is, they did not want the government to encroach upon the church, not that they didn't want principles of faith to have influence on our public life."

We need more faith in public life, he continued:

Not an establishment of any national religion. But we need everybody's vibrant expression of faith, because it's such an important part of who we are as a nation.

Critics objected that Johnson's sentiments were dangerously ahistorical and un-American. But Johnson was at least partly right--which means, of course, that he was also partly wrong. He was right about the phrase "separation of church and state" not appearing in the First Amendment, but in a letter Thomas Jefferson wrote about a decade later. The Supreme Court picked up Jefferson's phrase more or less by accident in the mid-nineteenth century (you can read about it here). And he was right that many of the Framers thought religion essential for public morality and would not have objected to religion's influence on government.

Where Johnson went wrong, though, was presenting those views as the only ones. Plenty of people at the time of the Framing thought that the Establishment Clause was there to protect Christianity from state corruption. But others thought that the Clause was meant to keep government free from religious bigotry and fanaticism, which had ruined European politics for centuries. Indeed, Madison's famous Memorial and Remonstrance, written during the Virginia Assessment Controversy of the 1780s, argued against a tax for the payment of clergy on the ground that such a tax was dangerous both for the church and the state. Presumably, Madison knew he had to appeal to both sides if he wanted to prevail (as he did).

As Phillip Munoz has recently shown, Americans have been debating the point of the Establishment Clause from the beginning--and they continue to do so now. Johnson presented one side of that debate, but it's not the only one. My colleague, Marc DeGirolami, and I have recorded a podcast on Johnson's comments that explores the controversy in more depth. You can listen to the episode here.

Politics

Fifth Circuit Rules that Victims' Families' Challenge to the Boeing Deferred Prosecution Agreement is "Premature"

The Fifth Circuit concludes that the violations of the Crime Victims Rights Act can provide grounds for refusing to dismiss the conspiracy charges against Boeing ... in later proceedings.

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Late Friday, the Fifth Circuit ruled in an important Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) case. The case challenges the Boeing deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) connected with Boeing's conspiracy to conceal safety issues surrounding its 737 MAX aircraft—a conspiracy that caused two 737 MAX crashes. Under the DPA, the Government and Boeing can move to dismiss the pending conspiracy charge against Boeing after the DPA concludes (in January). In its ruling, the Fifth Circuit held that the families who represent the victims killed in the two crashes could then challenge that dismissal motion. The ruling sets the stage for the families to continue their fight to hold Boeing accountable for its deadly conspiracy.

The case arises out of the crashes of two Boeing 737 MAX aircraft—crashes which killed 346 passengers and crew. The Justice Department later investigated Boeing for deliberately concealing safety problems with the 737 MAX.  After the Department collected compelling evidence of Boeing's concealment, the Justice Department and Boeing secretly negotiated a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) covering the crashes. In January 2021, the Department filed conspiracy charges against Boeing and, immediately thereafter, the DPA. The DPA provided that if Boeing committed no new crimes over the next three years, then the Justice Department would move to dismiss the charges at the conclusion of the three-year period. The Justice Department, working with Boeing, illegally concealed the DPA from the victims' families while they negotiated it.

After the DPA was filed, in December 2021, fifteen victims' families challenged the DPA. I filed motions on their behalf, arguing that the DPA had been negotiated in violation of their CVRA rights—including in particular their right to confer with prosecutors. Ultimately, in October 2022, the federal district court judge handling the case (Judge Reed O'Connor) ruled that the Justice Department had violated the families' rights in reaching the secret deal. But then, in February 2023, Judge O'Connor ruled, regretfully, that he could not enforce the victims' families' right to confer.

As authorized by the CVRA, I filed a petition with the Fifth Circuit, asking it to overturn Judge O'Connor's ruling. Following oral argument in July, on Friday the Fifth Circuit ruled that the families' petition was "premature." The appropriate time for challenging the DPA, the Fifth Circuit concluded, was when the parties (the Justice Department and Boeing) make a motion to dismiss the charges under the DPA.

The Fifth Circuit began by overturning Judge O'Connor's regretful conclusion that he lacked any power to enforce victims' rights:

We must … address the district court's additional conclusion that, despite its "immense sympathy" for the crime victims here, it lacks legitimate authority "to remedy the incalculable harm" those victims have suffered. To the extent that this conclusion determinatively denies application of the CVRA, that is inconsistent with the statute, the criminal rules, and court authority to resolve criminal proceedings commenced in court.

The Fifth Circuit then explained a parallel between the judicial authority that exists when the Government makes a motion to dismiss pursuant to a DPA and when it asks for dismissal of charges as part of guilty plea negotiations:

The emphasis we note, therefore, is that in both circumstances—full dismissal of charges to resolve a criminal prosecution or partial dismissal of charges to resolve a prosecution by guilty plea—courts retain adjudicatory responsibility, including an obligation to apply the CVRA. Public perception and confidence in the criminal justice system assume that when criminal charges are submitted for judicial resolution, the courts vigilantly will enforce the public interest, including Congress' command that crime victims are heard and protected.

…

…[I]n both cases—an accepted/rejected Rule 11 guilty plea or a granted/denied Rule 48(a) dismissal—the public interest, especially that of crime victims, rests crucially on court-approval. In short, the judicial role stays present and constant throughout, and courts must validate the public interest, above all, including rights that Congress has given to crime victims.

The Fifth Circuit found that its earlier ruling in In re Dean (5th Cir. 2008) provided a helpful analogy for resolving this case.  In Dean, the Government and a corporate defendant secretly negotiated a plea deal in violation of crime victims' rights—and the Fifth Circuit instructed that the district court should carefully protect the victims' rights in subsequent proceedings. The same concern is present in this (the Boeing) case:

With the above in mind, the logic of our court's decision in In re Dean, is instructive and, in application here, determinative. As in Dean, the victims' families "should have been notified of the ongoing [DPA] discussions and should have been allowed to communicate meaningfully with the government . . . before a deal was struck." 527 F.3d at 395. That is particularly true if the deal, in ultimate outcome as approved by federal court, means no company, and no executive and no employee, ends up convicted of any crime, despite the Government and Boeing's DPA agreement about criminal wrongdoing leading, the district court has found, to the deaths of 346 crash victims.

Against this backdrop, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the families' petition challenging the DPA was "premature"—and the fact that the Boeing DPA had been negotiated illegally and in violation of crime victims' rights should be considered at the next stage of the process:

For this reason, as it was in Dean, we decide that mandamus intercession is premature. Thus far, the district court has demonstrated careful competence that, whereas it cannot substantively revise the DPA between the Government and Boeing, it nonetheless must uphold crime victims' statutory rights at every stage of the court's criminal proceedings. If a sought-for final stage is a Government motion to dismiss, we are confident, as in Dean, that the district court will assess the public interest according to caselaw as well as the CVRA, including violations already admitted to, as well as any other circumstances brought to its attention by the victims' families. See United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 629 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (en banc) (reiterating Supreme Court and prior Fifth Circuit precedent that district judges are empowered to deny dismissal when "clearly contrary to manifest public interest" as assessed "at the time of the decision to dismiss") ….

The Fifth Circuit then dismissed the victims' families' petition—"without prejudice"—noting that it was "confident that the district court will uphold victims' CVRA rights throughout the instant criminal proceedings, above all when, how, and if judicial approval is sought to resolve this case."

Judge Clement concurred in the majority opinion and added an additional note about the importance of judicial enforcement of the CVRA:

I write separately to note that our decision should not be read as holding that the district court was prohibited from setting aside the DPA at an earlier stage of these proceedings—including upon motion from the victims' families—after finding that the victims' CVRA rights had been violated. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178 (providing that contracts entered in violation of public policy are void and unenforceable). Otherwise, we would be inviting criminal defendants and the government to violate victims' CVRA rights by negotiating DPAs in secret and taking their chances that the district court will accept Rule 48(a) dismissal years down the line.

Our holding is only that the district court was not required to do so. After all, the CVRA's "shall ensure" provision grants the district court discretion as to how it ensures that crime victims are afforded their statutory rights. See, e.g., 150 Cong. Rec. S4269 (Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (stating that the "shall ensure" provision "is critical because . . . it is the courts that will be responsible for enforcing" victims' CVRA rights); 150 Cong. Rec. 22953 (Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (explaining that the "clear intent and expectation of Congress" was for district courts to "giv[e] meaning to the [CVRA] rights we establish"). And here, we are confident that the district court will ensure that the victims' families are afforded such rights prior to passing on any Rule 48(a) motion.

In light of the Fifth Circuit's decision, the case now effectively returns to the district court. If (as expected) the Justice Department moves to dismiss the conspiracy charge against Boeing, the effect of granting that motion would be (as the Fifth Circuit pointedly noted) that "no company, and no executive and no employee, ends up convicted of any crime, despite the Government and Boeing's DPA agreement about criminal wrongdoing leading, the district court has found, to the deaths of 346 crash victims." The families will strenuously object to any such resolution of the case, as it is impossible to see how such a result could be consistent with the public interest.

The 6/13/2000 Memorandum to Chief Justice Rehnquist: "Compensation Increase for Justices - Response to Justice Thomas - Guidance Needed"

Some actual reporting by ProPublica.

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I have been quite critical of the stories published by ProPublica over the past year. The articles are agenda-driven, and attempt to discredit the Supreme Court, and Justice Thomas in particular. However, ProPublica's latest piece has some newsworthy reveals.

In January 2000, Justice Thomas apparently told Representative Cliff Stearns, a Republican from Florida, that salaries for Supreme Court justices should be increased. Thomas also apparently said that one or more Justices would retire in the next year if salaries wre not increased. Stearns memorialized this conversation in a letter to Thomas:

Dear Justice Thomas: Just a note to let you know how much enjoyed visiting with you on the flight back from Jacksonville to Dulles. 1 intend to look into a bill to raise the salaries of members of The Supreme Court. As we agreed, it is worth a lot to American to have the constitution properly interpreted. We must have the proper incentives here, too.

In June 2000, Leonidas Ralph Mecham, the director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts wrote a letter to Chief Justice Rehnquist about Thomas's exchange. (Mecham had served in that position since his appointment by Chief Justice Burger in 1985.) The letter begins:

It has been reported to the AO General Counsel's office that Justice Clarence Thomas at a reception talked to Representative Cliff Stearns (R-FL) and said that unless the compensation for Supreme Court justices is increased, "one or more justices will leave soon."

Thomas's request was announced at a meeting of the Federal Judges Association, and the news circulated in Washington. At the time, the 2000 election had not yet happened, but presumably this statement was made in anticipation of a Republican victory. Justice O'Connor was rumored to have wanted to step down during a Republican administration. Cue Bush v. Gore critics.

Mecham explained that Stearns was preparing legislation that would delink compensation for Supreme Court justices with compensation for lower court justices.

Apparently Stearns plans to offer an amendment to the Commerce, Justice, State, Judiciary appropriations bill to delink Supreme Court justices' pay from the pay of all other judges as well as from Congress and the Cabinet. He would create a pay commission devoted solely to Supreme Court justices which would study the pay needs of justices and report to Congress with the intent that Congress would then vote for a compensation increase solely for the justices.

For years, lower-court federal judges had complained that salaries had not been adjusted for inflation. Delinking the salaries could result in freezing compensation for inferior-court judges:

Is it wise, for example, to decouple justices both from the rest of the judiciary and Congress and then presumably have a congressional vote on a commission proposal devoted solely to increasing justices' compensation? Within the judiciary, that could run the risk of looking like a dog in the manger approach. To Congress, it could be seen as another judiciary effort at delinkage from congressional pay which even our best friends have refused to do, although it would be limited solely to justices which might make it more palatable. But I am not at all sure.

There is a far greater problem. Congress could wield this power to nudge Justices off the Court by refusing any pay increases. As a matter of realpolitik, Rep. Stearns's proposal carried a real risk: would Democrats really vote to increase salaries for the Justices, when the members most likely to retire would be conservatives?

From a tactical point of view, given the public statements made largely by Democratic lobbyists, it will not take the Democrats and liberals in Congress very long to figure out that the prime beneficiaries who might otherwise leave the Court presumably are Justices Thomas and Scalia. The Democrats might be perfectly happy to have them leave and would see little incentive to act on separate legislation devoted solely to Supreme Court Justices if the apparent purpose is to keep Justices Scalia and Thomas on the Court. Moreover, the fact that Representative Stearns is a conservative Republican may not help dissuade the Democrats and liberals from this view.

This political point seems so brazenly obvious. Would the Democrats really go out of their way to make the lifestyles of Justices Scalia and Thomas more comfortable? Of course not. If they could, the Democrats would have cut the electricity in Scalia and Thomas's chambers. Still, it is unusual to see an official correspondence to the Chief Justice that speaks in such overtly partisan terms.

There is one historical callback, as I recall. Before FDR's Court Packing scheme, Justice Van Devanter lobbied Congress to increase the pensions for Justices. Indeed, that supplemental income could have created incentives for Van Devanter to retire early. Congress did not increase the pensions, so Van Devanter stuck around. Those few thousand dollars could have created a vacancy far more easily the Court packing scheme. Eventually, Congress did increase the pension in 1937, which lead to Van Devanter's retirement.

Under the Presidential Compensation Clause, the President's salary can neither be increased nor decreased during the President's term in office. That prohibition is acceptable for a four-year term. I sometimes wonder whether a similar prohibition would make sense for the judiciary. It is problematic for members of the courts to lobby Congress for increases in their salaries. In light of the separation of powers, I see this sort of lobbying as an actual conflict of interest, and not like one of those manufactured ones that ProPublica likes to write about. Of course, given the fact that judges serve for decades, and inflation is rampant, a fixed salary would be untenable. Perhaps a Constitutional amendment to provide a cost-of-living adjustment would work.  During the Constitutional Convention, Madison actually proposed pegging judge's salary to the price of a commodity like wheat. That could work also.

Free Speech

Legislators Don't Have First Amendment Right Not to Show Up to Legislature

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From Linthicum v. Wagner, decided Wednesday (correctly, I think) by Judge Ann Aiken (D. Ore.):

The Oregon Constitution requires that each chamber of the Oregon legislature have a quorum of two-thirds of the members to conduct business. Or. Const. art IV, § 12. In recent years, the legislature has been intermittently paralyzed by walkouts in which members of the minority party absent themselves to deny the legislature a quorum.

In response to these walkouts, Oregon voters overwhelmingly approved Measure 113 in 2022 to amend the Oregon Constitution to penalize excessive absences by legislators. Following the passage of Measure 113, Article IV, section 15 of the Oregon Constitution was amended to read as follows:

Either house may punish its members for disorderly behavior, and may with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member; but not a second time for the same cause. Failure to attend, without permission or excuse, ten or more legislative floor sessions called to transact business during a regular or special legislative session shall be deemed disorderly behavior and shall disqualify the member from holding office as a Senator or Representative for the term following the election after the member's current term is completed.

Beginning on May 3, 2023, a group of Oregon state senators belonging to the minority party staged a walkout which deprived the chamber of a quorum…. The walkout lasted until late June 2023 and, by the time it came to an end, ten state senators, including the Senator Plaintiffs, had accrued more than ten unexcused absences. The state senators were disqualified from running for reelection based on Measure 113 and a challenge to that determination is currently pending before the Oregon Supreme Court….

For purposes of this motion [for a preliminary injunction, the parties focus their dispute on … whether participation in the legislative walkout by the Senator Plaintiffs is constitutionally protected activity. The First Amendment "has no application when what is restricted is not protected speech." … [T]hese walkouts were not simply protests—they were an exercise of the Senator Plaintiffs' official power and were meant to deprive the legislature of the power to conduct business.

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Free Speech

"Keeping Your Mouth Shut: Spiraling Self-Censorship in the United States"

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A very interesting new article, by Profs. James L. Gibson (Wash. U.) and Joseph L. Sutherland (Emory). Here's the key chart, updated to include 2023 data, gathered before the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel (the 2023 data is credited to Peter Enns and Verasight):

Here's the breakdown of the 2020 data by ideology (with the usual cautions about the small size of some of the subsamples, especially on the extremes, and the fact that different people will interpret vague terms such as "free to speak your mind" differently). What struck me is the magnitude of the felt lack of freedom among the three most moderate segments, even setting aside the different reactions on the extremes:

And here's an excerpt from the introduction to the article (read the whole thing here):

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