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Interesting Standing Dispute in Fourteenth Amendment Section 3 Case Against Trump
Also, "The Court's docket is not a social media feed."
From today's decision in Castro v. Warner, by Judge Irene Berger (S.D. W. Va.):
The Plaintiff, John Anthony Castro, brought this litigation seeking an injunction to prevent Secretary of State Andrew "Mac" Warner from placing Donald John Trump's name on the West Virginia Republican Primary ballot. He asserts that former President Trump is disqualified from serving as President pursuant to Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Mr. Castro asserts that he has competitor standing as a candidate for the Republican nomination for President and based on his intention to continue as a general election candidate.
The Defendants move to dismiss on various grounds, including lack of standing. The arguments asserted by each Defendant with respect to standing overlap. In short, they contend that Mr. Castro has not suffered a concrete injury because there is no indication that he is in genuine competition for voters in the Republican presidential primary contest. They further contend that any injury is not traceable to Mr. Trump's placement on the ballot or redressable by the relief sought, because there is no indication that third-party voters would choose to support Castro if Mr. Trump did not appear on the ballot. Mr. Castro opposes the motions to dismiss and maintains that he alleged sufficient facts to establish standing….
To establish standing, "[t]he plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." An injury in fact must be "an invasion of a legally protected interest that was concrete, particularized, and not conjectural or hypothetical." ... "At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice," but at summary judgment, "the plaintiff can no longer rest on such mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts."
Although the Defendants present their motions to dismiss as facial challenges, many of their arguments rest on whether the Plaintiff's allegations are plausible. For example, Mr. Trump's memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss argues that the "Plaintiff does not allege that he appears on any national polling" or "has secured a single dollar in campaign contributions," {The Defendant included reference to FEC campaign contribution records with respect to this argument} and that "there is no plausible claim that President Trump's inclusion on the ballot materially reduces Plaintiff's chances of being awarded West Virginia's delegates to the Republican National Convention." {The Court is aware that jurisdictional discovery and hearings have been conducted in similar case(s) filed by Mr. Castro. See, e.g., Castro v. Scanlan, et al., 23-cv-416-JL (D. N.H.). Accordingly, the Court anticipates that any necessary discovery can be completed in a brief period.} But the Plaintiff's polling position, campaign finance disclosures, and campaign activities are not part of the record in this matter.
West Virginia law establishes that candidates must file certificates of announcement for the upcoming primary between January 8 and January 27, 2024. If the Court has jurisdiction, further proceedings will be necessary to determine whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the injunctive relief he seeks. In the interests of reaching a conclusive resolution with respect to standing as expeditiously as possible, the Court finds that the pending motions to dismiss should be converted to motions for summary judgment, and the parties should be provided the opportunity to submit evidence in support of their positions. The Court will direct supplemental briefing to allow submission of evidence and further argument on the construed motions.
The court also added:
In directing supplemental briefing, the Court cautions the Plaintiff to focus on factual and legal arguments, rather than personal attacks. Although Mr. Castro receives some leeway in his filings as a pro-se litigant, despite his representation that he possesses a law degree, his filings contain numerous examples of clearly inappropriate attacks. {See, e.g., Document 24 (referring to "the U.S. Magistrate's willful blindness"); Document 28 (stating that "[i]f this Court had any self-respect, it would sanction WVGOP's frivolous filings"); Document 31 (expressing "serious concerns about the competency of the Clerk's Office" and "demand[ing] this Court have a discussion with the staff of the Clerk's Office to take their work more seriously" because a document filed by an unrelated party was briefly misidentified as being filed by Mr. Castro); Document 48 ("the U.S. Magistrate Judge's half-witted actions and inactions have brought to light the unconstitutional nature of the role of U.S. Magistrate Judges in our federal judicial system"); Document 53 ("Defendant Secretary of State is advised to read the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Document 54 ("WVGOP's filings have already exhibited a gross degree of intellectual deficiency" and "This Court should be ashamed of itself for allowing WVGOP to make a mockery of it."); Document 63 ("Once again, Third-Party Plaintiff West Virginia Republican Party exhibits their gross lack of understanding of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;" "WVGOP seems confused by this;" "WVGOP has exhibited a severe degree of intellectual deficiency"). This list is not exhaustive.} Discussion of the facts and the law will guide the Court's decisions, and derisive commentary is of little value to the Court in resolving motions. In several filings, Mr. Castro has attacked the character or intelligence of opposing counsel, as well as judges and court staff. The Court's docket is not a social media feed, and any future filing with ad hominem attacks, inappropriate statements about individuals involved in this litigation, or other snide and malicious comments will be stricken from the record.
Note that this is a separate matter from the Trump gag order dispute in the federal prosecution in D.C.; this relates to civility in court filings, a matter over which judges have much more authority than they do over public statements by the parties.
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Today I learned there may be a party more annoying to judges than Donald Trump.
I thought there was a custom or rule saying that if a complaint is totally nuts the judge can throw out out immediately. Is that only for in forma pauperis litigants, while the filing fee requires the judge to pretend you are a candidate rather than a troublemaker?
Indeed. I had assumed (wrongly) that the "social media feed" comment was about a filing from Trump, but it seems like Castro may be in it to out-Trump Trump.
Nope. As someone who has had to litigate a few cases against "Natural Born Citizens" in the past, I can tell you that while Judges will eventually get around to disposing of the cases (especially when the litigant starts showing up at the courthouse to try and "talk" to the judge), they will afford the litigant enough rope to hang themselves with.
Has a dispute over constitutional eligibility been found in the past to support a federal court's jurisdiction? If Trump were 25 years old, would a plaintiff be able to file in federal court to remove him from the ballot?
Federal courts have adjudicated suits for injunctive relief brought by putative candidates for president, who were ineligible to serve if elected, against state officials who denied them ballot access. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Bowen, 750 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2014)(affirming exclusion of underage candidate); Hassan v. Colorado, 495 F.App’x 947, 949 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming exclusion of candidate who was naturalized citizen); Socialist Workers Party of Ill. v. Ogilvie, 357 F.Supp. 109, 113 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (upholding exclusion of underage candidate).
No. Federal courts have declined to overturn a state officer's act of barring a plainly ineligible candidate from the ballot (as notguilty point out). But someone can't go to federal court and expect them to order removal. Federal law doesn't recognize it as an injury.
John F. Carr – this is John Anthony Castro on good behavior. Check out John Anthony on bad behavior (from when he was sued in 2020 by an elderly doctor in New Jersey who had used his tax preparation service): https://www.docdroid.net/UnQT2O9/komorowski-v-castro-first-amended-complaint-pdf
Kid is a pre-filing order waiting to happen.
Also, not sure what’s going on here but in Mr. Castro’s summons to Trump in his lawsuit in Colorado it’s signed by a “Celeste Doidge” who is a “Notary Public for the State of Texas.”
https://www.docdroid.net/Hnl9n2a/039110945977-pdf
However, there’s no licensed notary in Texas with that name, according to my search on the Texas Secretary of State’s directory [https://direct.sos.state.tx.us/notaries/NotarySearch.asp?:Ssearch_parm1=132203756]. This person also has basically zero Internet presence other than a LinkedIn page and her bio page on Mr. Castro’s company’s website.
Hoping someone can clarify.
Well, I was intrigued, and did some digging, and it looks like Celeste Doidge may be Texas notary Celeste Aguirre (listed in the Texas notaries' roll as being at the address she gives, which is also the one given for Castro on the docket). Public records suggest that Doidge might be, or have been, her married name.
That makes sense!
Given Mr. Castro's previous issues with signatures (i.e. the Dixon vs. Commissioner case and all the related cases that arose from it), I assumed something was amiss, but clearly not.
Interestingly, Castro and Doidge's signatures both have a "lingering line" terminus.
https://i.postimg.cc/Nf7cL0qx/Untitled.jpg
Interesting. I would probably be troubled if the court found that a properly registered candidate didn’t have standing because he was insufficiently likely to win.
No, I don't think his likely chances should enter in to it.
But I do think to show injury he needs to show that a voter would be prevented from voting for Castro, not that a voter would be less likely to vote for Castro if Trump is on the ballot.
What possible injury can Castro sustain allowing the voter to make his choice among the widest amount of challengers?
Castro only sustains an injury if a voter would like to vote for him and isn't allowed to.
I tend to agree. The presence of another candidate on the ballot in a democratic election can scarcely ever be a legally relevant "injury". I say "scarcely" only because you might be able to make a case for a paper candidate of a similar name recruited solely to confuse voters, as occasionally happens.
But Trump is scarcely just a paper candidate. That would be Castro, at this point...
This is very well put.
What possible injury can Castro sustain allowing the voter to make his choice among the widest amount of challengers?
He would have to show that Trump voters would disproportionately swing to him, I suppose.
Even if he could show that, it would scarcely qualify as an "injury", unless he had some legal right to those votes.
So you're saying that nobody would ever have standing to challenge an ineligible candidate's placement on the ballot. (To be clear, that's only in federal court; various states' rules about standing can be different, and may not require the same showing of injury-in-fact.)
Pretty much, but I don't see this as a problem.
Look, I'm not going to put to fine a point on this, but I distinctly recall that you have previously argued against standing doctrines in a number of cases (and you know just what kind of cases!), and in particular the requirement for injury-in-fact, with the argument that "someone has to be able to enforce the law/Constitution/what I want!"
At a certain point, you need to understand that you can't just embrace and discard rules depending on the results that you want.
Or, you can, I guess. But then they're not actually rules.
I don't see a problem here because I think keeping candidates off the ballot is a voting rights violation. The parameters of the right to vote were established long before government in the US started printing ballots, and it is the right to vote for anyone you damned well please. Qualified or not.
Again, rules have meanings. We are discussing standing. Not the merits of whatever you want it to be.
Standing can't simply be, "I think there should be strict standing rules when I don't like cases, and I don't think that there should be any standing rules when I want people to sue." That's not how rules work.
If you're arguing about the merits (which you are already doing), you're not talking about standing.
Can you explain what would be the origin or basis of a 'right to vote for' someone who isn't eligible for the office in question? And when and where such right was "established"?
(And no, you don't get to answer that by repeating your same wikipedia-level knowledge of the adoption of the Australian ballot. The fact that before pre-printed ballots one could vote for whoever one wanted, eligible or not, does not mean that one had the right to vote for whoever one wanted.)
"(The fact that before pre-printed ballots one could vote for whoever one wanted, eligible or not, does not mean that one had the right to vote for whoever one wanted.)"
As originalist evidence of what the right to vote was understood to mean, actually it does mean just that.
Originalist-level "understanding" (and I am using the term loosely for whatever you are proposing) would also realize that the "right to vote" (whatever that might have been) was not a "right," but something granted by state law, restricted to a small group of people based on varying criteria (race, gender, ownership of property, other wealth, etc.), exercised in public, and freely transferable to other people and/or organizations.
But sure. This has been another in a long line of, "Area Man Passionate Defender of What He Imagines the Originalist Understanding of the Constitution to Be."
I saw that.
But you know, the sum total of what all of the area men together think carries a lot of authority. Mostly moral and indirect, but still.
To take the famous Pauli quote: that's not right. That's not even wrong. That's certainly something, but it is not originalism.
In fact, it's not even clear what you mean by "the right to vote." There wasn't any such thing, "originally."
On the contrary, there absolutely was such a thing. It's just that not everybody HAD it.
Do courts have nothing better to do than adjudicate the claims brought by a lunatic?
Castro to the Democrats:
You may be right
I may be crazy
Oh, but it just may be a lunatic
You're looking for
Once the courts don't have to adjudicate claims brought by lunatics, everybody who brings a claim the courts don't want to adjudicate will "be a lunatic".
Besides, even lunatics can be genuinely wronged.
But this case should be swiftly dealt with on the basis that the presence of another candidate on the ballot can not be a legally cognizable "injury".
As far as purely *federal* issues are concerned, the focus should be on the qualifications of those who are running for Presidential elector. So long as they’re qualified to be electors, the voters should be able to vote for them, and the fact that they’re pledged to vote for someone unqualified for Pres (if, indeed, that’s what they’re pledged to do) doesn’t affect *their* right to stand for elector.
It would be like, say, someone running for Congress on a promise to do something illegal (like violate the Bill of Rights). Votes for such a Congressional candidate should still be counted.
A state-law question may step in if candidate for elector must promise, in exchange for ballot access, to support a qualified candidate for President. But that would be state law, not federal.
I agree. Section 3 explicitly applies to electors, and it is a reasonable inference that it applies to Presidents, but we can't avoid the question of who applies it.
Historically, the only body that applied Section 3 to members of Congress was Congress itself, pursuant to each chamber's power to judge the qualifications of its members. Not elections officials, or anybody else.
I'd suggest that Section 3, if it applies to Presidents, is supposed to be applied by the electors themselves.
I think Congress ought to reject electoral votes for a candidate who is ineligible. For example, any members of Congress who thought Obama was not a natural-born citizen should have made their objections during the formal counting on January 8, 2009.
I think Congress counting electoral votes is a ministerial act, not discretionary; The choice of President is constitutionally given to the EC, period. But I'm sure Trump's legal defense would like the opposite view to be adopted by the courts.
"I’d suggest that Section 3, if it applies to Presidents, is supposed to be applied by the electors themselves."
Bingo.
Many if not most states do not even print the electors on the ballot; they print only the name of the presidential candidate for whom they've pledged to vote.
While thinking of Mr. Castro, my mind wandered and my thoughts turned to a totally unrelated subject:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hr9HKqr2s_c
I have to admit, I am a little confused by this statement (and lack the time or inclination to dig into it further)-
"Although Mr. Castro receives some leeway in his filings as a pro-se litigant, despite his representation that he possesses a law degree"
Generally, attorneys who represent themselves (regardless of any old-timey sayings) are still attorneys. Is the Judge referring to the fact the Mr. Castro has stated he has a law degree in filings, but presumably is not licensed to practice law anywhere?
Correct. And apparently has never been licensed to practice law anywhere, which seems to be another story worth exploring if this person were more important.
loki13 – according to these two articles, Mr. Castro markets his tax returns preparation business as being that of a “tax attorney” but he is not licensed to practice law.
https://www.politicspa.com/lawsuit-seeking-to-prevent-trump-from-appearing-on-2024-pa-ballot-filed-in-commonwealth-court/125012/
https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2022/09/lesson-from-the-tax-court-the-finality-of-closing-agreements-.html
He also calls himself “Dr. Castro,” because … JD!
From reading his website, he seems to be contending that because he has an IRS Enrolled Agent license and a JD he is a "tax attorney." I'm not sure I buy that as the only educational requirement to be an Enrolled Agent is a high school diploma. It seems to me rather like saying because you have a JD and a cosmetology license you are a "beauty attorney," or a JD and a bartending license you are an "alcohol attorney."
"He also calls himself “Dr. Castro,” because … JD!"
That, right there, tells you everything you need to know.
I think I'm one of those.