The Volokh Conspiracy

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The Volokh Conspiracy

Free Speech

Universities Should Challenge Trump's Speech-Based Deportations of Students in Court [Updated]

A lawsuit brought by universities could potentially be much more effective than leaving individual students to fend for themselves.

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Tufts University.

 

The Trump administration has been detaining and trying to deport immigrant and foreign students for their First-Amendment protected speech. That includes even speech that does not actually support terrorism, as in the case of a Tufts graduate student detained for an anti-Israel op ed that, however flawed, does not endorse Hamas terrorism, or indeed even mention it. Such detention and deportation is an assault on freedom of speech, and violates the First Amendment, which has no exception for immigration restrictions.

In a recent public letter, the faculty of Tufts' Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy propose universities take action to stop this travesty:

Resolved: That the undersigned Executive Faculty of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy urge and would support Tufts University commencing legal action, without delay and in concert with other universities if possible, to enjoin the government and its agents from arresting, detaining, or deporting university students, staff, or faculty based upon their engagement in constitutionally protected expression.

The signatories below constitute a majority of the Executive Faculty.

This is a good idea, and schools should pursue it.  I am just a rank-and-file academic and do not speak for my university. But I will do what I can to persuade relevant authorities to act on the Tufts Fletcher School faculty's suggestion. I urge other academics and university officials to do the same.

Up till now, students and university employees targeted for deportation based on their speech have been largely left to fend for themselves, trying to challenge the deportations after they have already been detained. A lawsuit brought by a coalition of universities would have important advantages over this case-by-case approach.

Most obviously, the universities could file a class action lawsuit or seek a nationwide injunction. This could block such detentions and deportations throughout the country in one fell swoop. By contrast, under the status quo, individual students and employees targeted for deportation for their speech often have to spend weeks or months in cruel detention. Even if they ultimately prevail in court, they will have undergone considerable suffering, and potentially significant losses to their education and career prospects. Moreover, freeing one such detainee won't necessarily protect others. Thus, the "chilling effect" on other students' and employees' speech could continue.

A class-action lawsuit or nationwide injunction could solve these problems. If successful, it could preemptively block speech-based detention and deportation of university students and employees throughout the country. This would save targeted immigrant and foreign students from enduring weeks in detention, and lift the cloud of fear that has descended on campuses.

Moreover, universities have far greater resources to conduct litigation than individual students and employees do. They could much more easily employ topnotch legal talent, and expend the resources needed to prevail.

The case for a nationwide injunction here is similar to that which led to the grant of multiple nationwide injunctions against Trump's birthright citizenship executive order. In both situations, the unconstitutional policy in question is categorical and nationwide in scope, and affects large numbers of people, many of whom cannot easily protect themselves.

I would add that the First Amendment context provides additional support for systematic nationwide relief. Courts have long recognized that the Free Speech Clause protects against "chilling effects" on speech, as well as direct speech restrictions. The Trump administration's deportation policies are an obvious example of this problem. The standards of what counts as speech supporting "terrorism" or having "potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States" are incredibly vague. So much so that the late Judge Maryanne Trump Barry (Donald Trump's sister) ruled in 1996 that the law authorizing deportation for the latter type of speech was unconstitutional because of its extreme vagueness.

Allowing deportation based on these types of vague standards could easily chill speech on a wide range of issues involving armed conflict, international relations, US foreign policy, and much more. And it isn't just immigrant and foreign students' speech that would be affected. Other students and faculty may be chilled in discussing these subjects on campus, for fear of exposing international students or non-citizen immigrants to danger, if the latter participate in the relevant discussions.

For example, in my constitutional law classes, I teach segments on the use of racial profiling in the War on Terror, executive war powers, immigration, and other issues related to foreign and security policy. If a non-citizen student participates in class discussion or writes a paper on one of these topics, there is a chance they might say something the administration defines as supporting terrorism or having "adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States," and thereby be targeted for deportation. To completely forestall that danger, instructors must either avoid such topics altogether, or forego discussing them with non-citizen students. Similar points apply to scholars researching and writing on such issues in collaboration with non-citizen students or faculty.

These kinds of chilling effects are an obvious threat to free speech on campus, and the academic enterprise of teaching and research. Universities owe it to their students and faculty to protect them against this menace.

If commitment to principle isn't enough to motivate schools to fight, perhaps financial self-interest might do so. International students are an important source of revenue for many schools. The risk of deportation for speech may well deter many from coming, thereby hurting universities' bottom line.

Success in a lawsuit like the one I advocate isn't guaranteed. While the Supreme Court ruled in  a 1945 case that "Freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country," later decisions have upheld some speech-based deportations and entry restrictions. However, none of these have endorsed the idea that immigrants or students can be excluded or deported based solely on speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment. For example, in the 1952 Harisiades decision, the Supreme Court  only upheld deportation of Communist Party members on the ground that - under then-current precedent - membership in the Party wasn't protected by the First Amendment at all, even for US citizens.

Today's Supreme Court is often hostile to immigrants' rights, but it also provides strong protection for freedom of speech. The latter tendency might well prevail over the former, especially when the speech restrictions in question are as vague and sweeping as those the Trump Administration seeks to implement.

In any event, the courts are going to address Trump's speech-based deportations one way or another, since students targeted for deportation are raising First Amendment defenses. A lawsuit brought by universities maximizes both the odds of success, and the potential payoff from prevailing.

I will not, in this post, try to address all the various procedural issues that might come up in such a lawsuit. But I will note one: Universities should be able to get standing to sue on the grounds that deportation of students and employees affect their economic interests. In addition, they also have a chilling effect on the free speech rights of other university students and employees, and ultimately those of universities as institutions.

I would add that state governments might be able to get standing to sue on behalf of their state university systems. Blue state attorneys general should consider that possibility.

As I have previously noted, I have little sympathy for recent anti-Israel campus protests, and for the views of many of the students now targeted for deportation (many of those views are awful in various ways). I also think students and others who engaged in violence, intimidation, or property damage during protests should be punished.

But a principled commitment to free speech requires protecting even those viewpoints we believe to be badly wrong. And the vague standards used by the Trump administration create an obvious slippery slope risk. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is far from the only issue discussed on campus that involves terrorism or impinges on US foreign policy interests.

And, yes, I know some universities have fallen short on free speech issues themselves, with policies such as speech codes and mandatory "diversity statements" for faculty candidates. Such failings should be remedied. But they don't justify caving to the Trump Administration's much more sweeping speech restrictions. Among other things, a  censorship regime imposed nationwide by the federal government is much more dangerous than restrictions adopted by some individual universities, but rejected by others.

If universities want to protect free speech and academic freedom on campus, they should fight for it. The Tufts Fletcher School faculty have shown us the way.

UPDATE: Jameel Jaffer of the Knight First Amendment Institute informs me that, on March 25, his organization filed a lawsuit similar to the one envisioned above on behalf of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the Middle East Studies Association (MESA). I am glad to hear of it! It is also good that their complaint seeks a nationwide injunction against deportations based on speech.  But I don't think this obviates the need for a suit by universities. Among other considerations, I think the latter can more easily get standing than AAUP or MESA, as they likely suffer more extensive and more direct injuries from the deportation of students and employees.

Harvard Law School v. Vermeule

Dueling letters from 90+ members of the HLS faculty and Adrian Vermeule

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Yesterday, more than ninety members of the Harvard Law School faculty issued a statement concerning the rule of law:

We are privileged to teach and learn the law with you. We write to you today—in our individual capacities—because we believe that American legal precepts and the institutions designed to uphold them are being severely tested, and many of you have expressed to us your concerns and fears about the present moment. Each of us brings different, sometimes irreconcilable, perspectives to what the law is and should be. Diverse viewpoints are a credit to our school. But we share, and take seriously, a commitment to the rule of law: for people to be equal before it, and for its administration to be impartial. That commitment is foundational to the whole legal profession, and to the special role that lawyers play in our society. As the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide: "A lawyer is … an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice."

The rule of law is imperiled when government leaders:

• single out lawyers and law firms for retribution based on their lawful and ethical representation of clients disfavored by the government, undermining the Sixth Amendment;

• threaten law firms and legal clinics for their lawyers' pro bono work or prior government service;

• relent on those arbitrary threats based on public acts of submission and outlays of funds for favored causes; and

• punish people for lawfully speaking out on matters of public concern.

While reasonable people can disagree about the characterization of particular incidents, we are all acutely concerned that severe challenges to the rule of law are taking place, and we strongly condemn any effort to undermine the basic norms we have described.

On our own campus and at many other universities, international students have reported fear of imprisonment or deportation for lawful speech and political activism. Whatever we might each think about particular conduct under particular facts, we share a conviction that our Constitution, including its First Amendment, was designed to make dissent and debate possible without fear of government punishment. Neither a law school nor a society can properly function amidst such fear.

We reaffirm our commitment to the rule of law and to our roles in teaching and upholding the precepts of a fair and impartial legal system.

To be sure, this statement was not issued in the name of Harvard University, or the law school. But this statement was signed by a significant portion of the faculty. At quick glance, a few names are missing: co-blogger Steve Sachs, Jack Goldsmith, and Adrian Vermeule, among others. Quite fittingly, Vermeule has written a response.

Vermeule identifies a problem: how are students who agree with President Trump's policies to approach professors who have castigated Trump as antithetical to the rule of law?

Among you, the students of Harvard Law School, there is a surprisingly large and intellectually powerful contingent who are conservative in some sense or other, many of whom support the current President and the legal policies of his administration. What exactly are you supposed to think when an overwhelming supermajority of the faculty, although purporting to speak "in their individual capacities," jointly condemn those policies? You might be forgiven for wondering if you will get a fair shake during your time at the law school. Perhaps that concern will turn out to be objectively warranted, or perhaps it won't. But the concern in itself is entirely legitimate, and as the collective letter speaks to the "fears" of other students without asking whether those fears are objectively justifiable, it seems only fair to do the same in the other direction.

The professors are certainly concerned how students who agree with them will react. But what about students who disagree with them? Their concerns simply are not as important.

Vermeule writes further that these signatories were silent during breaches over the past four years:

Where were the letter's signatories when federal prosecutors took the unprecedented step of bringing dozens of criminal charges against a former president, who also happened to be the leading electoral opponent of the then-incumbent president? Where were the signatories when Jeff Clark, Rudy Giuliani, John Eastman, and other lawyers were disbarred or threatened with disbarment, and indeed prosecuted, for their representation of President Trump? Was this not a threat to the rule of law? Where were the signatories when radical activists menaced Supreme Court Justices in their homes, or when a mob hammered on the doors of the Supreme Court itself? Where were the signatories when the Senate Minority Leader shouted to an angry crowd outside the Court that "I want to tell you Gorsuch, I want to tell you Kavanaugh, you have released the whirlwind and you will pay the price. You won't know what hit you if you go forward with these awful decisions"? Were these not also literal threats to the rule of law?

As I recall, Professor Tribe, one of the signatories, urged President Biden to renew the eviction moratorium even after the Supreme Court clearly stated it was unlawful. Was this a breach of the rule of law?

Another one of the signatories of the Harvard letter is Richard Fallon. I think Fallon's joining this letter is especially striking in light of his important work on the problems with scholar amicus briefs. More than a decade ago, Fallon wrote that "many professors compromise their integrity by joining such briefs too promiscuously." He urged "standards that professors should insist upon before signing amicus briefs that they do not write." Fallon was and is right.

In December 2016, I discussed the relationship between scholar amicus briefs and scholar letters:

Fallon's critique about scholars' briefs applies equally to scholars' letters. Here, the 1,100 professors who signed the letter had absolutely no role in its drafting. Take it or leave it. To the extent that they all agree with every sentence of the letter, then the statement must be so anodyne that it adds little beyond what the New York Times editorial page has already said. Imagine an actual law school workshop attended by over 1,000 professors–would anything be agreed upon?!. Law professors would never add their name to a law review article they didn't write. Why are scholars' letters any different?

The more things change, the more they stay the same.

Donald Trump

Lee Kovarsky on the Venue Issue in the Alien Enemies Act Case

A leading expert on habeas corpus explains why the Trump Administration is wrong to claim the case must be heard in Texas, rather than Washington, DC.

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In my recent post on the DC Circuit's decision upholding a temporary restraining order blocking deportations under the Alien Enemies Act, I explained why the DC Circuit majority is right on the merits. See also my other writings on the subject, such as those here, here, and here. But I could not address Judge Walker's dissent arguing that the case should have been heard in a different venue (in Texas, where the five named Venezuelan immigrant plaintiffs are now being detained, rather than in DC). I lack expertise on that technical issue. Now the Trump Administration has made this issue the central focus of their attempt to persuade the Supreme Court to intervene to vacate the TRO.

Professor Lee Kovarsky (University of Texas School of Law) is one of the nation's leading experts on habeas corpus and associated jurisdictional issues. He has generously agreed to write a guest post for us on this issue. The rest of this post is his explanation of why the Trump Administration's position on venue is badly wrong. The material that follows is all by Prof. Kovarsky, not me (Ilya Somin):

JGG v. Trump is shaping up as a generationally important case. It features pretextually activated war powers, rendition of civilians to foreign sites of potential torture, and extreme noncompliance with judicial orders. But in the early stages of litigation, the case centers on an obscure habeas corpus question. Since I co-author the case book they use to teach habeas courses in most law schools, I want to address DOJ's (very bad) argument that JGG is a habeas case that can proceed only in Texas.

Start with some background. On March 15, 2025, President Trump invoked authority under the 1798 Alien Enemies Act ("AEA")—thereby unlocking emergency powers to remove alleged members of Tren de Aragua ("TdA"), a designated foreign terrorist organization based in Venezuela. The AEA requires that the United States be at war with, invaded by, or subject to the predatory incursion of a foreign government. For that reason, President Trump's proclamation asserted that TdA was an alter ego of the Venezuelan government, and that its transnational criminality was both an "invasion" and a "predatory incursion." The legality of the proclamation is dubious, but its legality vel non is not the subject of this post.

Five Venezuelan nationals who were already in removal proceedings got wind of the administration's plan to expel them, and they sued in a D.C. federal district court. Insisting that they were not TdA members, they asserted various grounds for relief, including claims under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). After issuing a temporary restraining order ("TRO") for the individually named Plaintiffs, the district court provisionally certified a class of all similarly situated noncitizens and issued a second TRO to protect them during the pendency of the litigation. The TROs are in effect until April 12, while the district court considers a motion for preliminary injunction. Before the district court, and in passing, DOJ argued that habeas was the exclusive remedy for the Plaintiff's grievances. And if habeas is the exclusive remedy, the argument goes, then the Plaintiffs had to litigate in Texas—which contains the detention center holding the Plaintiffs. DOJ lost appellate arguments on the TRO, but Judge Walker's dissent adopted the habeas-exclusivity argument. DOJ then made Judge Walker's position into its leading argument to the Supreme Court, where a request to stay the lower court relief remains pending.

Judge Walker and DOJ misunderstand habeas exclusivity, quite profoundly.

There is some doctrine making habeas the exclusive vehicle for certain remedies against certain custodians, but it doesn't apply in the JGG scenario. During the 1960s and 1970s, people serving state criminal sentences got creative with 42 USC § 1983, seeking relief that implied that their sentences were unlawful or otherwise required reduction. The problem was that, while habeas remedies for criminal convictions were subject to carefully tailored restrictions, § 1983 remedies weren't. In this context and in this context only, the Supreme Court told a subset of these § 1983 claimants to knock it off, and to stick to habeas as a means of challenging the lawfulness of criminal sentences. The "Preiser line" of cases specifying permissible § 1983 litigation in this context include: Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973), Wolf v. McDonnell (1974), Heck v. Humphrey (1994), Edwards v. Balisok (1997), Muhammed v. Close (2004), Wilkinson v. Dotson (2005), and Skinner v. Switzer (2011). All these cases involve the administration of state criminal sentences, and not one has anything to do with immigration detention—let alone removal or rendition to a foreign detention site.

The arguments that Judge Walker and DOJ make derive from the Preiser line, whether the line is cited directly or operates as precedent for the lower-court cases that are mentioned. The line's basic logic is that a challenge to a criminal sentence is a "core" habeas challenge, and any order that would directly invalidate or reduce a sentence is "core" relief. If either (1) the challenge or (2) the relief wasn't "core," then § 1983 remedies were available. Hence Dotson: "Section 1983 remains available for procedural challenges where success in the action would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner."

The JGG claims aren't "core" in any sense. The Plaintiffs aren't challenging state criminal sentences, or even their removability generally. In fact, they're not even seeking release. All the TROs and injunction seek is a bar on transfer under the AEA. The form of relief the plaintiffs seek isn't just "outside the core;" it's on the other side of the universe.

On whether this type of relief is "core," I'll cede the floor to Justice Alito. Here's his majority opinion in DHS v. Thuraissigiam (2020), on whether the Suspension Clause permitted Congress to strip habeas power over expedited removal procedure: "Rejecting th[e] use of habeas [to bar transfers to foreign sovereigns], we noted that habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention and that what these individuals wanted was not simple release but an order requiring them to be brought to this country. Claims so far outside the core of habeas may not be pursued through habeas." I'll also borrow from Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court in Munaf v. Geren (2008): "[H]abeas is not appropriate [when claimants seek to preclude transfer to another sovereign so that they may face criminal charges]. Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention. The typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release. But here the last thing petitioners want is simple release … ." Thuraissigiam and Munaf don't mean that habeas claimants can never stop transfer orders, but those decisions extinguish DOJ's argument that such remedies are "core" habeas relief.

The whole idea—that an order precluding foreign-prison rendition sits at some historical "core" of Anglo-American habeas tradition—is risible. The United States didn't even begin to exclude and deport noncitizens until the very end of the nineteenth century. Even then it sent the Chinese people it excluded back to China, and not to a prison in some other country.

DOJ makes a related-but-distinct exclusivity argument tracing to a D.C. Circuit case: LoBue v. Christopher (1996). I cannot understand why DOJ is emphasizing LoBue, which cuts in favor of the Plaintiffs. In LoBue, the prisoner sought a declaratory judgment that extradition was unlawful—state action for which, LoBue itself highlights, the APA didn't permit suit against the named defendants. LoBue quite explicitly distinguished declaratory judgment challenges to extradition, which had to go through habeas, from APA challenges to immigration removal, which didn't. In so doing, it flagged the two Supreme Court cases that had blessed the use of the APA to challenge removal orders: Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro (1955) (deportation) and Brownell v. We Shung (1956) (exclusion). DOJ's reliance on LoBue is nothing short of bizarre.

I'll note two other weaknesses in DOJ's habeas-exclusivity argument. First, the exclusivity holdings assume generally that non-habeas remedies can be displaced because habeas will adequately test the detention at issue. In this case, however, DOJ is arguing that the administration can remove the Plaintiffs the second the injunction lapses, and it will thereafter argue (I assume) that the Plaintiffs are beyond the scope of habeas power. The Venezuelan nationals would be shipped to a Salvadoran "mega prison," and DOJ will presumably argue that habeas power doesn't reach a foreign custodian that holds foreign nationals. I'm not sure that argument is correct because the United States seems to retain some control over the custody by way of contract with the facility, but the argument certainly cannibalizes the habeas exclusivity argument that DOJ is making right now.

Second, DOJ's argument for habeas exclusivity builds from the premise that, because the Plaintiffs are in Texas facility, a habeas case couldn't proceed in D.C. But that's not clear at all. The leading case on the question, Rumsfeld v. Padilla (2004), suggests otherwise. Padilla held that the "immediate custodian rule … does not apply when a habeas petitioner challenges something other than his present physical confinement." Separately, and even in cases that challenge "present physical confinement," Padilla indicated that the immediate custodian rule might lapse if "there was any attempt to manipulate behind [the prisoner's] transfer," or if the Government "attempted to hide from [the prisoner's] lawyer where it had taken him." And if the immediate custodian rule is inapplicable, then Kristi Noem could be named as a respondent in a D.C. lawsuit seeking habeas relief and there is no forum-selection issue.

All of this is to say that I do not think highly of DOJ's habeas arguments or of Judge Walker's dissent. They are invoking a rule of habeas exclusivity that the Supreme Court has never entertained—even remotely—and they are relying on D.C. Circuit precedent that supports the Plaintiffs.

 

A Rendezvous With Humphrey

The Justices have had plenty of time to think about how to resolve Humphrey's Executor and should not punt.

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Very soon, the Supreme Court will be asked to decide whether Humphrey's Executor should be overruled. Critics often assert that the Justices should not decide important questions on the emergency docket. Indeed, some Justices said these sorts of disputes are better resolved in the orderly process on the merits docket, as if "percolation" matters anymore.

I don't think this rationale holds up for Humphrey's Executor. Since Seila Law, everyone has been on notice that Humphrey's Executor was on life support. As we learned in Janus, parties should have taken notice that Abood was put on a death watch. Ditto for the Lemon test.

I seriously doubt that the members of the Supreme Court have not considered what to do with Humphrey's Executor. All of the arguments for and against Humphrey's Executor have been vetted for nearly a century. It is time.

Whatever the Court does here, it should not simply punt because the issue arises on the shadow docket. The nation is currently divided about whether the President can remove members of the NLRB, MSPB, FTC, and a jumble of more acronyms. Decide the issue, and move on. Indeed, I expect the emergency docket will implode over the next few months. If all of the national TROs and preliminary injunctions ripen to timely appeals, the Court will become overwhelmed with deadlines.

My previous posts on the issue are here, here, here, here, here, and here.

Coastal Judges Play Keep-Away From The Fifth Circuit

The Trump administration detains individuals in Texas and Louisiana, yet federal courts on the Amtrak Corridor continue to exercise jurisdiction.

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Fights over forums are not new. Long before national injunctions flew from Amarillo and San Francisco, the executive branch sought to control where legal challenges could be filed. Perhaps the most prominent such recent example was Guantanamo Bay. The Bush Administration detained enemy combatants on the military base to avoid federal habeas jurisdiction. That plan, however, did not work out. In a series of cases leading to Boumedienne v. Bush (2008), the federal courts in the District of Columbia asserted jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay.

However, the Bush Administration did secure a venue victory in another case: Rumsfeld v. Padilla (2004). At the time, the Fourth Circuit was considered the most conservative circuit in the country. And in that case, the Bush Administration detained Jose Padilla, a declared "enemy combatant," in a South Carolina military prison. A habeas suit was brought in the Southern District of New York. The Supreme Court held that the suit was not proper in New York. Rather, "for core habeas petitions challenging present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement."

That past brings us to the present. In two prominent cases, the Trump Administration has taken actions to keep legal challenges within the Fifth Circuit. And in both cases, judges on the East Coast have played keep-away from the Fifth Circuit.

The first case is Trump v. J.G.G. In this case, aliens were held at a facility in Texas. They were then loaded on a plane bound for El Salvador. Around the same time, Judge Boasberg in the District of Columbia ordered this operation to be halted immediately. Yet, there was a threshold issue: was the federal court in the District of Columbia the proper court to even bring this suit? Last time I checked, the federal courts in Texas remain operational--true, they are far less busy now then they were before the inauguration. The obvious response is that the ACLU did not want this case anywhere near the conservative Fifth Circuit. But sometimes a strategic choice can backfire.

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Tariffs

Challenging Trump's Tariffs Under the Major Question Doctrine

Georgetown law Prof. Jennifer Hillman explains why Trump's tariffs are vulnerable to challenge on this basis.

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Back in February, I explained why Trump's planned use of the  International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA) to wage a massive trade war against Canada and Mexico is vulnerable to challenge under the nondelegation and major questions doctrines. Georgetown law Prof. Jennifer Hillman has an excellent Lawfare article laying out the major questions argument against Trump's IEEPA tariffs in greater depth and detail:

The U.S. Supreme Court's articulation of the major questions doctrine may have created insurmountable hurdles to the president's desire to use IEEPA as the legal basis for sweeping tariffs. Congress frequently delegates authority to the executive branch to regulate particular aspects of society, but in a number of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has declared that for an agency to decide an issue of major national significance, its action must be supported by clear congressional authorization….

The major questions doctrine entails that the Court "expect[s] Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast 'economic and political significance'," looking at the "the history and the breadth of the authority that [the Executive Branch agency] has asserted." In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, the Court expressed skepticism when agencies claim to have discovered in a long-extant statute "an unheralded power to regulate 'a significant portion of the American economy'…."

There can be no doubt that using IEEPA to impose broad tariffs is a major question. It falls squarely within the Supreme Court's notion of a "novel" use of an "unheralded" power given that no other president has used IEEPA in its nearly 50-year history to impose tariffs. The decision to impose the new tariffs on the United States's three largest trading partners constitutes a "transformative power expansion" and carries "vast economic and political significance" as it has significant breadth, national impact, and an effect on large segments of the economy. In 2024, imports from Canada, China, and Mexico exceeded $1.3 trillion. U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico totaled $680 billion, and trade among the three USMCA parties supports over 17 million jobs. Chinese imports of goods in 2024 were $439 billion, and additional tariffs on China will impact smartphones, computers, furniture, shoes, toys, food, and more. The Peterson Institute for International Economics estimates that these tariffs collectively are the "largest tax increase in at least a generation" and will cost the typical U.S. household more than $1,200 a year. Moreover, much of the burden of paying the tariffs will fall on lower- and middle-income households. Trade historian Douglas Irwin has noted that these IEEPA tariffs "would constitute a historic event in the annals of U.S. trade policy."

Applying the major questions doctrine to IEEPA also shows that Congress did not "clearly authorize" the president to impose broad-based tariffs. IEEPA sets forth a wide array of actions that the president can take following the formal declaration of a national emergency, including the power to "regulate … importation or exportation" of any property in which a foreign government or foreign national has any interest. While the power to regulate importation can be read to include the imposition of tariffs, an argument can be made that this does not constitute a sufficiently explicit congressional authorization. If Congress clearly intended to delegate its tariff power, it would have used tariff terms ("tariffs," "duties," or "taxes") and called for a tariff-related process to establish the factual predicate for and the appropriate level of such duties. This is not the case with IEEPA.

As Hillman notes, Trump's abuse of the IEEPA is not limited to imposing tariffs against Canada, China, and Mexico. He also intends to use it to impose a variety of other massive tariffs, as well. Hillman makes several other good points, as well.  Anyone interested in this extremely important issue should read the whole thing.

The WilmerHale Complaint

Paul Clement and Erin Murphy brilliantly defend what shouldn't need defending, but does

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Further to Eugene's post about the TRO that was entered in the suit filed by WilmerHale against the Trump Administration Executive Order, I highly recommend taking a look at the Complaint filed by the Paul Clement-Erin Murphy firm.  The first six pages or so is as eloquent a defense of an independent legal enterprise as you are likely to read.

13. The Order violates the separation of powers twice over. The President's role is to enforce the law—not to create new law or adjudicate litigation conduct before the courts — and no statute or constitutional provision empowers him to unilaterally sanction WilmerHale in this manner. That is unsurprising; any legislative effort to restrict lawyers' access to government buildings, services, and materials just for representing disfavored clients or causes would be patently unconstitutional. And any executive-branch effort to deter private attorneys from representing particular clients or advancing particular arguments "threatens severe impairment of the judicial function," as courts depend on attorneys to "present all … reasonable and well-grounded arguments" on their clients' behalf. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545- 46 (2001).

14. On top of that, the Order flagrantly violates due process. It imposes severe consequences without notice or any opportunity to be heard; it uses vague, expansive language that does not adequately inform WilmerHale (or its clients) of what conduct triggered these extraordinary sanctions; and it unfairly singles out WilmerHale based on its perceived connections to disfavored individuals and causes.

Nicely put.

Free Speech

Court Temporarily Blocks Much of Executive Order Targeting the WilmerHale Law Firm

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[UPDATE 3/28/25 10:17 pm: See also a similar result, but with less explanation, from Judge John Bates (D.D.C.) in Jenner & Block LLP v. U.S. Dep't of Justice.]

From today's decision partly granting a temporary restraining order in Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP v. Executive Office of the President by Judge Richard Leon (D.D.C.) (see here for more details on plaintiff's arguments):

[P]laintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its First Amendment claims as to Sections 3 and 5 of the Executive Order. Undisputably, "the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting individuals to 'retaliatory actions' after the fact for having engaged in protected speech." Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson (2022).

This prohibition includes retaliatory actions based on perceived viewpoint. The retaliatory nature of the Executive Order at issue here is clear from its face-not only from Section 1, but also from the Fact Sheet published the same day. Indeed, the Executive Order requires government contracting agencies to disclose, review, and terminate all contracts with plaintiff—that is Section 3—and restricts WilmerHale employees from access to federal officials, buildings, and employment—that is Section 5. There is no doubt this retaliatory action chills speech and legal advocacy, or that it qualifies as a constitutional harm.

Regarding Section 2, however, plaintiff has not met its burden in showing a likelihood of success on the merits. Our Circuit has held that security clearance decisions are within the purview of the Executive Branch, see Lee v. Garland (D.C. Cir. 2024), and plaintiff has not pointed to persuasive authority that would support extraordinary injunctive relief at this early stage….

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Bill of Rights

Michael Ramsey's "The Originalist Case Against the Insular Cases"

An important new article explains why the Supreme Court's precedents denying many constitutional rights to residents of America's overseas territories are wrong.

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In the Insular Cases of the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court ruled that much of the Constitution does not apply to America's "unincorporated" overseas territories, such as Puerto Rico. Thus, the federal government could rule the people there without being constrained by a variety of constitutional rights.  In 2022, Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch urged the Court to overrule these decisions.

Prominent originalist legal scholar Michael Ramsey has an important new article explaining why Gorsuch was right. Here is the abstract:

Concurring in United States v. Vaello Madero, Justice Neil Gorsuch argued that the Insular Cases are contrary to the Constitution's original meaning and should be overruled. The Supreme Court's decisions in the Insular Cases, which created a second-class constitutional status for U.S. overseas territories, have also been criticized by leading originalist scholars such as Professors Gary Lawson and Michael Paulsen. However, there is no fully developed scholarly assessment of the Insular Cases from an originalist perspective; their inconsistency with an originalist approach is more assumed than proven. This Article fills that gap. Using the methodology of original public meaning, it considers the constitutional status of U.S. territories from the founding era through the early nineteenth century to the constitutionalization of U.S. citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment.

Although the matter is somewhat more complicated than Justice Gorsuch's concurrence may suggest, this Article finds no foundation in traditional originalist sources for the Insular Cases' differential treatment of overseas territories. To the contrary, it concludes that U.S. territories were widely understood to be broadly encompassed by the Constitution without differentiation until an academic and judicial reassessment at the beginning of the twentieth century, impelled by U.S. acquisition of territories with substantial non-white populations, set the stage for the Court's newly invented doctrine. This Article thus concludes that Justice Gorsuch's assessment is correct and should carry weight with the Court's originalist-oriented majority. Finally, this Article examines from an originalist perspective the implications for territorial government of overruling the Insular Cases, which it concludes would be significant but not substantially destabilizing.

At the Legal Theory Blog, Prof. Larry Solum gives this article his much-coveted "highly recommended" rating.  I agree! The article is both compelling and important.

I would add that the Insular Cases are not the only important nonoriginalist, atextual abrogations of constitutional rights blessed by the Supreme Court as a result of late-19th century racial bigotry. The same is true of the "plenary power" doctrine, which exempts immigration restrictions from many of the constitutional constraints that apply to all other exercises of federal power. While later decisions have called elements of this doctrine into question, enough remains that it is not completely clear whether, for example, the government can deport immigrants for speech protected by the First Amendment (though I argue the answer should be an emphatic "no").

The Supreme Court would do well to definitively repudiate both these pernicious legacies of the same era that gave us Plessy v. Ferguson.

Free Speech

Paul Clement's Argument Against the Executive Order Targeting the WilmerHale Law Firm

It's a lawyer's argument, not an attempt at objective analysis. But I think that on balance it is generally quite correct, and powerfully framed.

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I'll have a further post next week about the First Amendment and right-to-counsel problems with some of President Trump's Executive Orders. But in the meantime I thought I'd quote the introduction to the Complaint in Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP v. Executive Office of the President, filed by former Solicitor General Paul Clement and his colleagues Erin Murphy and Joseph J. Demott at Clement & Murphy, PLLC:

"[T]he right to counsel is the foundation for our adversary system," Martinez v. Ryan (2012), and the "courage" of attorneys who take on unpopular clients has long "made lawyerdom proud," Sacher v. United States (1952). John Adams famously embodied these principles by defending eight British soldiers in the "Boston Massacre" trial, an effort he described as "one of the best pieces of service I ever rendered my country." And British monarchs' practice of punishing attorneys "whose greatest crime was to dare to defend unpopular causes"—which threatened to reduce lawyers to "parrots of the views of whatever group wields governmental power at the moment"—helped inspire the Bill of Rights. Cohen v. Hurley (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). It is thus a core principle of our legal system that "one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit." F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co. (1974).

In an unprecedented assault on that bedrock principle, the President has issued multiple executive orders in recent weeks targeting law firms and their employees as an undisguised form of retaliation for representing clients and causes he disfavors or employing lawyers he dislikes. These "personal vendetta[s]" are so facially improper that the first court to address the merits of one of these orders concluded that it likely violates multiple foundational safeguards enshrined in the Bill of Rights.

The latest such directive …, dated March 27, 2025, targets Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP …. Titled "Addressing Risks From WilmerHale LLP," the Order avowedly punishes WilmerHale for various matters the Firm has handled, including some it has taken on pro bono, and for its employment of certain attorneys who participated in the Department of Justice's investigation of the 2016 presidential election. In particular, WilmerHale has been a professional home for public servants like Robert Mueller and represented (among many others) President Trump's political opponents, including in litigation on behalf of the Democratic National Committee and the Biden and Harris campaigns in the two most recent presidential elections. This past month, WilmerHale also filed a lawsuit challenging the President's sudden dismissal of eight inspectors general at major federal agencies.

The Order's declared purpose is to retaliate against WilmerHale—and certain of its clients—for WilmerHale attorneys' constitutionally protected advocacy in matters that President Trump perceives to be adverse to his personal and/or political interests. Among other things, the Order accuses WilmerHale of "abus[ing] its pro bono practice," specifically referencing the Firm's election- and immigration-related litigation and its defense of race-based college admission policies.

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Zoning

Federalist Society Webinar on "The California Wildfires and America's Housing Shortage"

The panelists included M. Nolan Gray, Jennifer Hernandez, and myself.

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Firefighters stand near a bulldozer as fire burns on a hillside.
Erin Donalson | Dreamstime.com

Earlier this week, the Federalist Society held a webinar on "The California Wildfires and America's Housing Shortage." I have posted the video below.

The participants were M. Nolan Gray (nationally recognized housing expert and author of Arbitrary Lines: How Zoning Broke the American City and How to Fix It), Jennifer Hernandez (prominent California land-use lawyer), and myself. It is notable that experts with widely divergent political views (Gray seems to be a political moderate, Hernandez is on the left, and I am a libertarian) largely agreed that a combination of exclusionary zoning and regulatory restrictions on building are impeding post-fire reconstruction and exacerbating a housing crisis that was already severe before the fires. Gray warns that, if regulatory barriers are not cut back, much of the destroyed area might still be in ruins years from now. Sadly, that is exactly what has happened in Maui, where only 3 of 2000 burnt-out homes have been rebuilt some 18 months after a devastating fire hit that area.  In Pacific Palisades, only four rebuilding permits have been issued some 75 days after the end of the fire there, which destroyed 6800 structures.

I previously wrote about how exclusionary zoning exacerbated the impact of the fire and makes recovery more difficult here. In a recent Texas Law Review article my coauthor Josh Braver and I argue that zoning restrictions on housing construction violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. For a  summary of our argument, see our June 2024 article in the Atlantic.

Here is the video:

Trans

Sixth Circuit Won't Hear Pre-Final-Judgment Appeal in Case Alleging Ohio School "Encouraged Young Children to Become Transgender …

and then lied to parents about what was happening." Because some claims remain undecided in trial court, the court of appeals holds it lacks jurisdiction over the appeal.

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From yesterday's opinion by Judges Eric Clay, Amul Thapar, and Stephanie Dawkins Davis in Kaltenbach v. Hilliard City Schools (6th Cir.):

Plaintiffs—several parents of children who are currently enrolled in the Hilliard City School District (the "In-District Plaintiffs"), and one parent, D.S., of a student who was previously enrolled in the school district—appeal the district court's dismissal, without prejudice, of the In-District Plaintiffs' claims and all but three of D.S.'s claims for lack of standing….

We have jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In the absence of a certification by the district court, an order or decision "that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action." Three of D.S.'s claims remain pending in the district court, which did not grant certification under Rule 54(b) for Plaintiffs to appeal its dismissal order.

Plaintiffs therefore attempt to invoke the collateral order doctrine, which vests us with jurisdiction over an appeal from a non-final order if it conclusively determines the disputed question, resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits, and is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. We have held that standing fails the final prong of the collateral order doctrine inquiry; thus, we lack jurisdiction to review a non-final order on the basis that it granted or denied standing. Because Plaintiffs appeal a non-final order dismissing their claims only on standing grounds, the collateral order doctrine does not apply. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Judge Thapar concurred, writing:

The allegations in this case are beyond troubling. The plaintiffs say that a school district in Ohio encouraged young children to become transgender and then lied to parents about what was happening. They also say this decision wasn't just the act of a rogue educator; it was district policy. For one child, T.S., the ramifications were tragic: she attempted to commit suicide. And she's getting her day in court.

Because the District hasn't been forthcoming about what is taking place inside its walls, other parents sued to protect their children, too. While the complaint paints a detailed and stark picture of what happened to T.S., it leaves these other parents as an afterthought.

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Free Speech

Black Student Expelled for Sexual Assault of White Classmate Seeks Pseudonymity Partly Because "Interracial Sexual Relationships …

between White women and Black men are the subject of heightened prejudice and violent responses that create a tangible risk of retaliation and animus against him."

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No, says the Seventh Circuit, in yesterday's Doe v. Young, decided by Judges Michael Brennan, Amy St. Eve, and Nancy Maldonado:

After the University of Illinois investigated and dismissed him for sexually assaulting another student [Jane Roe], John Doe sued, arguing that the University's investigation was discriminatory and violated his right to due process…. The University … charged [Doe] with sexual assault, as well as drug manufacturing, sale, and distribution. Both Doe and Roe reportedly ingested "molly" (a synthetic drug) prior to the events at issue….

Doe alleged that the University—throughout its investigation—subjected him to race, gender, and disability-based discrimination, and failed to provide sufficient due process. He further alleged that his dismissal from the University was a breach of contract….

[T]he [district] court reviewed {two recent decisions from this court addressing the use of pseudonyms by litigants in Title IX student litigation[,] Doe v. Trs. of Ind. Univ (7th Cir. 2024) and Doe v. Loyola Univ. Chi. (7th Cir. 2024)} …. The court rejected Doe's suggestion that his alleged disabilities (a visual impairment and learning disability) justified proceeding anonymously or that the allegations against him in this case would subject him to acts of violence and harassment….

District judges have the discretion to permit pseudonymous litigation when the balance of harms justifies it. Anonymity can be justified by a minor's status, a substantial risk of harm, or improper retaliation from a third party. However, plaintiffs may not proceed anonymously merely to avoid reputational damage or embarrassment. And while anonymity has been common in Title IX litigation, these cases are "not an exception to the norm that adult litigants are identified by name." We uphold a district court's anonymity decision so long as the correct legal standard was applied, and the decision was based on facts supported by the record….

[Doe] argues, first, that the court ignored the risk of substantial harm he faces if he cannot proceed anonymously. He elaborates that interracial sexual relationships between White women and Black men are the subject of heightened prejudice and violent responses that create a tangible risk of retaliation and animus against him. In support, he cites the dissenting opinion from Thomas v. Lumpkin (2022) (Sotomayor J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari), which discusses the history of racism and prejudice evoked by interracial intimacy between Black men and White women.

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