The Volokh Conspiracy
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More on the Outrageous Eric Adams Deal
Co-blogger Josh Blackman gets the Eric Adams Affair all wrong
Co-blogger Josh Blackman disagrees with my take (here and here) that the DOJ's arrangement with Eric Adams is an outrage and a grave threat to those of use who care about liberty. No, no, no, he says; this is "the sort of thing DOJ does all the time." There's "no 'quid pro quo'" involved, because "there is no bribery if a public act is exchanged for another public act."
He's wrong, and it's not too difficult to demonstrate why. Here is his argument, broken down into its basics.
First, he observes (correctly) that "the Department of Justice routinely uses carrots and sticks to 'induce' defendants to support DOJ policy objectives." He writes:
More than 90% of federal criminal cases end up in plea bargains. … Usually, the deals take a similar form: plead guilty, waive appeal rights, and the government will recommend a reduced sentence, or perhaps no sentence at all. … In many cases, a plea deal is conditioned on a defendant doing more than pleading guilty. The United States can condition a plea deal on a defendant testifying against a co-defendant. DOJ can condition a plea deal on a defendant providing information to some government entity, in open court, before a grand jury, or in some other confidential form.
All true.
Of course, as he recognizes, Eric Adams is not an ordinary defendant, but a public official, and the conditions he has accepted in return for the DOJ dropping the case against him all refer to his actions as a public official, i.e. actions he is to take as Mayor of NYC. Blackman asks: Should that matter?
Nope, he says. "This is the sort of thing DOJ does all the time."
Hmmm. His evidence for that startling proposition is, it turns out, completely non-existent: one case, United States v. Richmond, in which the DOJ's attempt to condition the dropping of charges against a public official on that official taking a particular action in his capacity as a public official was invalidated by the district court.
Not the strongest foundation for the idea that the DOJ does this "all the time."
The only other evidence he brings forward is an article written on the Lawfare website by legal scholar Seth Tillman.
That's it, you ask? Yes, that's it.
So I'll ask Josh the same question I asked the commenters on my earlier postings: If the DOJ uncovers evidence that Amy Barrett has cheated on her income taxes, and convinces a grand jury to indict her, and then offers her a deal: we'll defer prosecution (but keep the possibility open), as long as you vote in the government's favor in all cases coming before the Supreme Court.
You're OK with that? Is that the sort of thing the DOJ does "all the time"? If you're not OK with that (and I sure hope you're not), how is that different from what's happening here?
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No. That would be Barrett showing courage!
An absurd comparison doesn’t merit a response. And discontinuing the politically abusive Adams’ prosecution should be applauded, not criticized.
I can’t be the only one here who thinks someone should have a chat with him. There are plenty of influential law blogs he can latch onto, especially now, when the wind is blowing his way.
I bet you guys really wish you were in Germany and didn’t have to contend with opposing viewpoints.
Co-blogger Josh Blackman gets the [fill in the blank] all wrong.
But writing for VC is all Josh has wanted since he was in college! Fact it, this blog created him. He is this blog’s responsibility.
I ultimately believe you have a much stronger case than Josh (the coercion extracted by the DOJ should be on the defendant in his personal capacity as his official capacity impacts the public).
But as far as the US v. Richman case goes, it seems as if Josh‘s point is that because the DOJ has not changed their policy in light of the decision… it would be hypocrisy to claim that they could impact the official capacity of a representative in the case of their resignation as part of a plea deal, but not in their official capacity to act in other ways.
I don't see how those situations are sufficiently close to make an argument of hypocrisy.
The DOJ cuts a deal with an elected official or candidate for office exchanging lesser charges (or maybe even none) in exchange for a guilty plea (or at least no contest) and resigning office or quitting the campaign. Presumably, the DOJ has a case which could land the official or candidate in prison for at least parts of their term of office. They might be compelled by law to resign or subject to removal under the laws of their state. The DOJ is seeking to get one of the benefits of conviction as part of the deal. Having an elected official make decisions under threat of future prosecution isn't at all similar to that.
" They might be compelled by law to resign or subject to removal under the laws of their state."
I suppose that's part of the answer, is that states can adopt policies removing politicians from office if they are convicted of certain things.
But why should it be left to the discretion of prosecutors? Can you imagine two politicians, a Democrat and a Republican, charged with similar offenses, and one has to agree to resign and the other doesn't?
And I don't see any excuse for purporting to require someone not to run for office again after conviction. If the voters don't want him, they don't have to vote for him.
Why should prosecutors have discretion? You seem to have a disagreement with the way the USA legal system works.
Why should prosecutors have discretion over whether or not public officials stay in office, or are eligible to run again?
It's not left to the discretion of the prosecutors. It's just something they can make part of the plea deal to keep a convict out of offices of power in these United States. Just as they can make a cop surrendering his law enforcement certification part of the plea deal, or, for that matter, make anyone promise not to work in whatever field they do if that's related to their crime (like a banker or stock trader facing financial crimes).
I don't think any judge would allow a plea deal in which a member of Congress or a state legislature agreed to take orders from the DOJ or, well, anyone else. It's especially odious when it's not a plea agreement: it's just extortion out in the open.
"It's not left to the discretion of the prosecutors. It's just something they can make part of the plea deal to keep a convict out of offices of power in these United States."
Um, or not make part of a plea deal.
Any "Conspirator" (Doesn't it require 2 "Conspirators" to comprise a "Conspiracy"? and at least a number of "Overt" Acts in preponderance of the "Conspiracy") who hasn't committed 1/10 of 1/10 of 1/10 of 1/10 (I think that's a millionth) of whatever "Adams" is accused to have done, isn't worth the Ball Sack-ness, to be considered here (I'm talking you, Hobie-Stank, who even lives in Ohio anymore? I mean if they don't have to (Income, Familial, Probation Limitations)
Frank
Keith: But according to Josh, the DOJ has changed its position:
"For its part, the Justice Department has previously described Richmond as "incorrectly decided" and "particularly troublesome" in that it "purports to limit, without adequate legal justification, the latitude of federal prosecutors to reach voluntary settlements with defendants in significant corruption cases which equitably address and protect the important public interests that such prosecutions normally entail." But the Justice Department's current guidance is somewhat more equivocal, in that it cites Powell and Richmond for the assertion that "withdrawal or forbearance with respect to Congressional or federal judicial office may not be imposed involuntarily against the will of the [defendant] judge or Member of Congress involved because of the separation of powers doctrine" without further explanation. "
No doubt, there’s a bit of nuance there.
My only quibble is that your post here tended to give no credit to the idea that any evidence of coercion vis-à-vis public office acts existed, whereas there was certainly a foundation for that argument (ultimately one I don’t think is as strong as it once was).
Keith: Fair enough. But even if there was a foundation to the argument (that you could use a plea bargain to "coerce" public officials), this particular use - in which the potential for prosecution will hang over Adams' head for as long as he's the mayor - is particular egregious, more so even that the Richman case (where one act - resignation - was required).
The Justice Department takes the position that the public officials are not being coerced, even if there's an explicit quid pro quo that keep the public official out of jail.
If that's their position, why should they have any qualms about a case like this, where there is no explicit quid pro quo and the DoJ denies that dropping the charges is even intended to influence Adams?
Were you complaining when the Biden DoJ prosecuted Trump as long as he was running for President? Trump could have dropped out of the race, and the charges would be dropped.
If Trump had dropped out of the race, the charges against him would not have been dropped.
The charges against Trump began when he announced his candidacy, and ended when he won the election. It was Biden administration policy to prosecute him to block him from running for President.
Is it your view that the charges against Trump would have been dropped if he had lost the election, since the charges would no longer have been necessary to prevent him from becoming President? If so, what evidence do you have to support that? It appeared to me that Smith had no intention of dropping the charges, and that the charges were dismissed only because of the impossibility of bringing a sitting President to trial.
[Citation needed]
(NB: your opinion that it really really feels like that’s what probably happened isn’t a citation.)
Wait what‽‽‽ When was Prof. Tillman a prosecutor? His CV only lists a couple of law firms for actual legal experience, and he … doesn’t exactly present as a litigator, to put it mildly.
Noscitur: I think you're correct and I'm wrong - I was confusing him with someone else. I'll make the correction.
It makes Josh's argument, by the way, even more ridiculous - it's not even a former prosecutor, but just a law prof, who's making the suggestion that this would be OK.
Oh my! Did you take a break from googling yourself and updating your own Wikipedia page to make yet another comment on one of your own posts?
If you're going to be this vain in retirement, maybe there's a mall-walking group you could join to distract you from sitting on the computer gooning your own work product.
Jeez.
Coming in a bit hot, eh?
So the plea bargain post could have been edited way down to say it's more like a deferred prosecution not a plea bargain. Your big gripe was #3 (the bit about the official position) and is why this is troubling.
Now you have to use half of this post agreeing that the crap you complained about in 1 and 2 of your previous post is routine (just improperly termed by commenters) and not what you wanted to talk about in the first place.
As I previously observed, the situation may be very slightly more like a deferred prosecution than it is like a plea bargain. But it is most assuredly not like one.
"DOJ uncovers evidence that Amy Barrett has cheated on her income taxes, and convinces a grand jury to indict her, and then offers her a deal: we'll defer prosecution (but keep the possibility open), as long as you vote in the government's favor in all cases coming before the Supreme Court."
WHISKEY TANGO FOXTROT?!?
Adams is a political official free to exercise discretion, Barret is a JUDGE who (in theory) is NOT! Do you not see the difference here?!?
Second, cooperating with ICE is not a violation of Federal law -- a judge tossing decisions IS, even if done to the government's favor. Look at it this way -- you'd be raising ethical issues about her doing this while no one is raising ethical issues about letting ICE into Riker's Island. Furthermore, Adams WANTS to do this...
Third, you've gotta admit that this is a unique situation because Justice is suing everyone else in NY... It's civil right now, but I wouldn't be surprised to see criminal indictments follow. And there is a solid case to be made that Adams wouldn't have been indicted but for his desire to cooperate with ICE -- so why should the prosecution continue?
Maybe Trump should pardon him -- but without knowing what he might actually be guilty of, that's dangerous.
But how many times has Justice sued a Governor? My guess is not many, QED no relevant past precedent on this.
Replace Barrett with, say, Lisa Murkowksi or Susan Collins (or Bob Menendez), if that helps you.
The difficulty with Senators (and the same with judges) is that it's difficult to see what a Senator could do to assist law enforcement's legitimate objectives. Unlike an executive official.
By legitimate I mean that I do not see that law enforcement has any legitimate interest in what the law is, either substantively, or as to legally permitted procedures. Law enforcement's role is to enforce the law as it is, using the methods permitted by law. Not to get the law changed. Nor to get the legislators to vote it a bigger budget. They are supposed to work with the law, the procedures and budget as they are. Changing those is none of their business.
Thus it is difficult to see what a Senator could do to advance law enforcement's legitimate interests. Of course a Senator can always call an executive pal, say a Governor or a Mayor and urge him or her to do something - like letting the Feds into Ryker's Island - that clearly is within law enforcement's legitimate objectives. But I expect David Post would say that that isn't the Senator acting in his "official capacity" it's just using his political and personal persuasion, and so doesn't count.
But if you can think of stuff that does fall within a Senator's "official capacity" which can assist law enforcement achieve its legitimate objectives, under the law as it is, then cough it up and I'll think about it.
But for now I can think of plenty of stuff that the law enforcement authorities can ask of an executive official that is legitimate, and nothing that they could ask of a legislator or a judge.
But that's because you're retarded. They're being sued in their official capacities to establish that a particular state law is unenforceable. They are not being sued for wrongdoing, and a criminal prosecution would not in fact be possible on these facts.
I think that I'm missing something about the Richmond analogy. Wasn't the condition of resignation from Congress and not running for re-election related to the corruption charges and made to prevent further corruption? Isn't it analogous to a plea bargain with a licensed professional who abused their position and was forced to give up their license to practice as part of the plea deal? It is not about politics, but an agreement to limit punishment in exchange for actions by defendant that would make it harder for them to commit similar crimes in the future. So I understand that this was deemed improper because it violated the rights of the voters, but even if that was not the case, and that was considered a valid plea agreement, it doesn't seem to have anything to do at all with coercing any specific political position.
David Ohsie: I basically agree with you - Richmond is not a terribly helpful analogy for understanding the Adams case. I wouldn't have dealt with it, except that Josh raised it as some kind of backwards support for his position. I guess the idea is that part of the reasoning behind invalidating the deal in Richmond is the requirement that the defendant take an official action of some kind. It's a little different than de-licensing someone so they can't continue their illegal activity - but only a little ...
""For its part, the Justice Department has previously described Richmond as "incorrectly decided" and "particularly troublesome" in that it "purports to limit, without adequate legal justification, the latitude of federal prosecutors to reach voluntary settlements with defendants in significant corruption cases which equitably address and protect the important public interests that such prosecutions normally entail."
We all know, of course, that the DoJ is lying when it claims that conditions attached to plea bargains are voluntary.
How is the DoJ's purported coercion of Adams any worse than the DoJ's routine practice of coercing defendants into waiving their right to trial? I understand that it's different in that there's no plea involved, but how is it worse?
Why should I be particularly exercised about this when it seems no more corrupt than most of what the DoJ routinely does?
If we're going to pretend that defendants voluntarily waive their right to trial, why shouldn't we pretend that Adam's giving the ICE access to Rikers is voluntary?
The Volokh Conspiracy is a high-quality legal blog except when Blackman posts. He's a political hack who generally writes as if he's auditioning for a job with Trump's legal team.
As opposed to Ilya?
Yes. This has been yet another episode of Simple Answers to Stupid Questions.
There were other egregious contributors in the past.
Watching David and Josh froth at each other over the handling of the Adams prosecution is nice distraction from the usual Ilya "from the river to the sea, unmonitored immigration of antisemites will make the US free" shtick. It's like flipping away from The Actor's Studio to cleanse your palette with some Jerry Springer.
Yes. they are being trolled. They are making silly arguments about a triviality.
Trump is the President. He was elected to make deals. He made a deal. It is as simple as that.
We elected Trump to help corrupt demcocrats escape accountability for their actions? I missed that part of the platform, but admittedly I didn’t make it to any rallies.
Trump did say, prior to the election, that Adams was being persecuted for speaking out against open borders. So I'm not sure why people are surprised that his DoJ is seeking to drop the charges.
So you're calling Trump a liar? Because that's not what he says.
Shorter Blackman - people take money out of banks all the time, why is it a problem that Trump’s DOJ took money out of the bank with a gun? The difference between what they’re trying to do with Adam’s and a routine plea bargain should be as obvious as the difference between withdrawing my money and armed bank robbery.
"The difference between what they’re trying to do with Adam’s and a routine plea bargain should be as obvious as the difference between withdrawing my money and armed bank robbery."
Which one is the armed bank robbery?
I rarely agree with Ruth Marcus, but she got this one right: The deal is odious, the judge should require full and specific disclosure of the Administration's reasons in open court (for maximum exposure and embarrassment (if the latter is even possible), and make the dismissal with prejudice, as conditions of approving the motion to dismiss. https://wapo.st/3ERbbbg.
The DoJ is not saying that there is a deal - that's David Post.
The DoJ's specific disclosure need be no more complicated than :
"We are intending to review whether this prosecution is tainted by political considerations, since we consider the previous management of the DoJ was tainted by corrupt motives. We do not allege that political motives have tainted this prosecution - we will be reviewing it when we are properly staffed. But as for now, we do not wish to proceed. Dismiss without prejudice, please."
If the court then dismisses with prejudice it is saying "No, sorry DoJ, you may not review whether you are satisfied with the probity of this prosecution. Either proceed now while you are unsatisfied, or we'll kill it." It would be interesting to see what SCOTUS would make of that.
But as Danielle Sassoon pointed out in her letter, Bove expressly compared this to the Viktor Bout deal.
To which Bove replied :
You have also strained, unsuccessfully, to suggest that some kind of quid pro quo arises from my directive. This is false, as you acknowledged previously in writing.
Ah, well, that's just Bove being tricky. The directive is the result of the quid pro quo; the quid pro quo doesn't arise from the directive.
This empowers Trump, who can then say that he pardoned Adams because of a corrupt judge.
From the post:
I'm not OK with it, but I'm also not OK when an incarcerated defendant gets told that he can go home today if he confesses, but he has to remain incarcerated indefinitely if he wants to hold out for an acquittal. If you're OK with that, how can you object to what is happening here?
Barrett has the choice of not being in prison so long as she carries Trump's water in her decisions. Your person has the choice of not being in prison if he confesses.
I am not seeing how carrying Trump's water is even close to being comparable to confessing.
"I am not seeing how carrying Trump's water is even close to being comparable to confessing."
Huh? Here's how they're comparable: You're not supposed to coerce a judge to carry Trump's water, and you're not supposed to coerce a defendant to confess.
There is an element of coercion in both the Barrett hypothetical and a plea deal. But the two are easily distinguished because the latter is given in exchange for something related to the crime (e.g., testifying against the ring leader), while the former is given to advance a totally unrelated policy by a government official carrying out their duties.
Plea bargains are conditioned on the defendant waiving his right to a trial. We're not supposed to coerce defendants to waive their right to a trial, but we allow this on the theory that the defendant's waiver is voluntary.
If you buy that, why wouldn't you buy that Barrett's voting for the government every time is also voluntary?
The objection isn’t that it’s involuntary.
Right! The objection is what the person has to do as part of the deal. The two cases are vastly different.
If the DOJ uncovers evidence that Amy Barrett has cheated on her income taxes, and convinces a grand jury to indict her, and then offers her a deal: we'll defer prosecution (but keep the possibility open), as long as you vote in the government's favor in all cases coming before the Supreme Court.
Not to defend Trump, but this doesn't seem like the same kind of thing. Some years back, they tried to arrest or legally hassle Rick Perry, governor of Texas, for withholding funds by way of vetoing spending for a particular department, unless the head of some agency resigned.
There were all kinds of problems, not least of which was withholding did not apply until the law authorizing money passed. And that hasn't happened until he signs the law. And if he vetoes it, it will never get passed, and there is no withholding as far as that law was concerned.
But another problem was trying to attach legislation to the exercise of the executive's plenary power of veto, and that is not allowed.
Even bribary is illegal, but that is on the tit for tat agreement, and regardless of whether it's carried through or not. This leads to the odd situation an exec could veto something because of a bribe, get caught, but the veto cannot be reversed via court order or legislation (I presume an override would still be ok.)
Why is this level of arm twisting, using a plenary power to force another exec to help in immigration control, instead of refusing to help at all, wrong?
I'm not asking if it's terrible policy or smarmy or what have you.
Why is Josh Blackman even still allowed to be a contributor to this blog? He is completely disingenuous. If he's making the legal argument to bribery and extortion are totally appropriate so long as Trump is doing it, he's not an honest legal scholar - just a hack.
Being a hack has not been a barrier to posting on this blog in the past.
I’m going to have a go at stating the principles that I think ought to apply, in a reasonably orderly fashion, since these discussions so far have been a bit scattershot as different folk toss in different curveballs as we go along.
So basic scenario :
Law enforcement offers X some kind of deal involving softer treatment in exchange for services rendered by X to law enforcement. Is this OK ?
I’m considering this wholly from an ethical point of view, not a legal point of view.
1. Does it matter who X is ? NO.
2. Does it matter in what capacity X is doing the deed that is rendered ? ie does it matter if the act is done “in an official capacity” – so different ethical principles for government folk and private sector folk ? NO.
3. Does it matter if it is lawful for law enforcement to request the service ? YES.
4. Does it matter if it is lawful for X to perform the service requested. YES.
5. Does it matter if X performing this service breaches X’s contractual or ethical duty to others ? (NO, unless that in itself makes the act illegal.)
6. Does it matter if the service requested is honestly believed by law enforcement to advance legitimate law enforcement objectives (greater in value than the cost of any leniency to X) ? YES
7. Do legitimate law enforcement objectives include achieving changes to the law, budgets or other legislative acts, elections, confirmations, or judicial rulings ? NO.
So, to illustrate. Imagine law enforcement has the goods on Senator Blutarsky and offers to go easy if Blutarsky wears a wire to get evidence against the folk who have been bribing Blutarsky. Is this OK ? Sure. It’s no different to law enforcement doing the same thing for a senior executive in Megadrugs Corp.
What if law enforcement wants Blutarsky to vote “yes” on the confirmation of Jack HardasNails as FBI Chief ? No that’s not OK. Fails 7.
What if law enforcement wants the senior executive of Megadrugs Corp to make a campaign contribution to Jack HardasNails campaign to be AG of North Carolina ? No. Also fails 7. Law enforcement has no legitimate interest in who the AG of North Carolina is.
Law enforcement now has the goods on Governor Blutarsky. They want him to veto a Bill. No. Fails 7. They want him to co-operate in rounding up illegal immigrants. No problem. Within 6 and not ruled out by 7.
Law enforcement wants the Megadrugs Corp exec to allow a witness against a cocaine distribution gang to hide out in his Steamboat Springs pad for a month, to avoid him getting iced before he gives testimony. No problem. Within 6 and not ruled out by 7. Would this be OK for Senator Blutarsky too ? Sure.
The Adams deal violates #7, assuming Adams would otherwise have a policy of non-cooperation, because the deal changes how the law is carried out in New York City.
No. Changing "how the law is carried out" is changing the executive's implementation of the law, within the executive's discretion. It changes none of :
"the law, budgets or other legislative acts, elections, confirmations, or judicial rulings"
How the enforcement of law is implemented (within the relevant legal and procedural constraints) is absolutely within the legitimate interests of law enforcement.
Do we go for Bugsy in his office or at home at 4am ? Do we get a warrant for Megacorp's warehouse ? Do we ask the state police to help with the docks job ? These are all well within law enforcement's legitimate interests.
Changing the law is not.
The timing of Bugsy's arrest or going for a warrant are not comparable to cooperating with the feds. The former two are implementation choices. The latter is a policy, akin to a law.
We will have to agree to differ. Policy is not law, policy is the discretionary choice of executives. If Adams, for example, were facing no criminal charges, but decided that it was both legal, and in his political interests (eg might help him in the NY Mayor primary) to let the Feds into Rikers Island, he would not be doing anything remotely akin to changing a law.
This would be no different to the Megadrugs Corp executive letting ICE comb through company records, and search the Megadrugs factory, in search of illegal immigrants. Megadrugs executives cannot change the law any more than Adams can. All Megadrugs executives can do is control the access to Megadrugs property.
You might say that you don't think the revised Adams policy, or the revised Megadrugs policy is in the interests of NYC voters, or Megadrugs stockholders. But that is for NYC voters and Megadrugs stockholders to decide, not you.
In both cases, law enforcement seeking the asistance of Adams, or the Megadrugs exec, is pursuing legitimate law enforcement objectives under the current law. It is not trying to amend the laws it is enforcing, nor the laws which govern how it may pursue its investigations. Those are the red lines, not the legal means by which it seeks to implement law enforcement.
Yes, we disagree over what it means for a mayor to set the policy of cooperating with the feds. But even if I were to concede your point, I think you missed one other consideration: is law enforcement's request related to the benefit given to X for agreeing to the request?
Is it OK to condition the issuance of driver's license on testifying against somebody? Plea deals typically ask for testimony related to the crime the person is charged with. In contrast, Adams is being asked to do something unrelated to his alleged crime.
As to your first point, I think you need to address the Megadrugs comparison. Is pressuring the exec to adjust Megadrugs policy so as to permit ICE into the factory akin to trying to change the law ? Is it also a no no ?
As to the second point, a thousand cop shows agree with me. They would never have been able to make a single episode of Kojak with your rule.
If you can prevent the terrorists setting off a bomb in the plaza by going easy on a petty thief who shared a cell with one of them last year and knows where they live, that’s what you do. I don’t think a connection to the cooperator’s crime is relevant at all.
I take it the hypothetical is the feds will go easy on Megadrugs on some criminal charge if they let ICE in (or the police to get Bugsy). I think that is both a change in policy (the policy used to be we don't let ICE or the police in) akin to a law and a no-no under the unrelated standard (my morals are not driven by cop shows).
And speaking of cop shows, one more thing. Your #2 has a problem as well: separation of powers as explained below by Absaroka.
I think cop shows offer some useful hypos, even if they're not infallible as to the actual content of the laws.
There's a good Kojak one, in which :
1. Banker steals bearer bonds from his bank
2. High end thieves steal bearer bonds from banker
3. Banker wakes up as thieves are escaping and snips the rope by which one of the thieves is escaping, killing him.
4. Kojak investigates, rapidly concluding it's murder
5. But rather than arresting suspect (the banker) right away, Kojak decides to try to track down the other thief who he has been trying to catch for years
6. Banker discovers who the other thief is and hires a hitman to kill him (because if caught the thief will reveal what he stole and so the banker's own thievery will be discovered.)
7. Kojak discovers the hit plan with a wiretap, facilitated by the banker's wife who is on the hook as an accessory in the banker's thieving
8. Kojak decides he'd rather get the hit man (who has done lotsa hits) than the high end thief and
9. concocts a plan, which requires co-operation from the thief, to catch the hitman
10. hitman is cornered, shoots it out and is killed. Banker is arrested for murder (and stealing bearer bonds) , but high end thief is let go (though he has to divvi up the bonds he stole) because of his co-operation in getting the hit man
So we have :
(a) deferred arrest of murder suspect (no deal but Kojak delays the arrest so as to advance his thief-catching plan.)
(b) deal with wife to allow wiretap
(c) deal with thief to catch the hitman
As to (b) you could say the wife's crimes are related to her husband's - though only the thieving not the murder. But as to (a) and (c) - in neither case are the crimes related. The murder may have been provoked by the thieving, but the thief is not in any way involved in the murder. And the thief is not involved in the hitman's crimes, except as a target.
This all seems eminently ethical to me.
It's all related (the hitman was hired as a result of the theft). There is nothing that relates ICE and the charges against Adams.
A policy is not a law.
Which is closer to a law: a policy (e.g., cooperating with the feds) or a choice on the methods of implementation (when to arrest Bugsy)?
The difference is that the first requires the assistance of somebody else and the second doesn’t.
A valid comparison requires a scenario in which arresting Bugsy requires the cooperation of another perp. Like the Megadrugs example. If Bugsy may be in the Megadrugs factory and you pressure a Megadrugs exec who’s being investigated for fraud to let you into the factory, is that a foul ?
8. Does it violate the principle of separating powers?
The org chart of authoritarian governments is simple - El Supremo is the box at the top, and all the other boxes are under him; what he wants, he gets. This is bad because it is a single point of failure - if El Supremo turns out to be bad, the entire government is bad, from the top to the dog catcher (because El Supremo can control/hire/fire the dog catcher).
We quite deliberately designed things very differently. At the federal level we have the three branches. We have states. We have locally elected sheriffs and district attorneys and city councils. You need collective agreement to do a lot of things, and this is a feature not a bug[ if any one person goes rogue they can only do so much damage.
When one of those independent checks-n-balances players is in a position to say 'dance to my tune or go to jail' to another player, you now have N-1 independent players instead of N. That's bad. If you give the keys to the safety deposit box (or missile launch console) to two different people, you can't have one of them compelling the other to turn his key.
==========
To go off on a tangent, I get the utility of 'tell us who the other robber was and we'll give you a lighter sentence'. But you want to be really careful; it is playing with fire ('useful servant, terrible master'). It was perhaps ??Solzhenitsyn?? who said that you couldn't survive in the Soviet Union without breaking the law. You had to deal on the black market or fake factory output numbers or something just to survive. And the KGB routinely used that ..."Comrade, we have proof that you bought a bar of soap on the black market ... do you want to start informing on your neighbors or go to Siberia?".
While I get the utility, I think it is a practice that ought to be narrowly used.
(Randy Weaver is an example of abusing the process)
When Senator Blutarsky tells the President :
"You can have my vote for Josh Blackman for District Judge, provided that you nominate my friend Otter as Transportation Secretary"
is that a violation of the separation of powers ? Each party, you will note, is exercising a "separate" constutional power.
Or is it just tediousy routine political horse trading ?
"Or is it just tediousy routine political horse trading ?"
That is, alas, commonplace political horse trading.
It is not El Supremo making offers they can't refuse to people.
For another example, it's perfectly OK for Bob from State Farm to offer to sell you insurance. It's not OK for Guido from the mob to make the same offer on penalty of Bad Things Happening to you.
It's perfectly OK - subject to local insurance regs - for Bob from State Farm to refuse to renew your home owner's insurance unless you also buy car insurance. It's even OK for Bob - again subject to insurance regs - to refuse to sell you insurance unless you persuade your neighbor to buy some too.
And it's perfectly OK for Guido - if suitably regulated - to offer to sell you insurance on penalty of repossessing the car he sold you last year and on which you are behind on payments.
The problem with your hypo is that Guido's Bad Things are illegal things. I've ruled out law enforcement either doing illegal acts themselves, or seeking to procure illegal acts from those that they might wish to bully.
🙂
I'll go with your "if suitably regulated". But we seem to differ on whether a president/governor/DA saying 'if you don't dance to my political tune I will stick you in a cage' is 'suitably regulated'.
It's just not how to run a country. It is a tactic widely used by authoritarians. It has, well, should have, no place in America.
Fair enough, though:
if you don't dance to my political tune I will stick you in a cage
doesn't quite capture the boundaries I'm drawing. The tune has to be a lawful tune, falling within the proper responsibilities of the bully. And the caging (or letting out of the cage) has to be lawful too.
But I confess that a significant element of my, shall we say, mild animosity, against the David Post thesis (and its moral tone) derives from the implication that it is outrageous to expose a government official this kind of bullying ..... but perfectly OK to do it to anybody else.
I take your point, of course, about the separation of powers. But I suppose I am more realistic (or cynical - take your pick) about trading between political actors.
As to politics, the President and Senators have legitimate political interests of their own. Judges do not. Likewise minions within the executive branch do not have legitimate political interests of their own - they only have proper responsibilites. Which may sometimes include weighing up the importance of some responsibilities relative to others, but always subject to instruction on such matters by their political actor superiors.
Which is of course the reason why no federal executive branch official may lie outside the chain of command atop which sits the President.
To go off on a tangent, I get the utility of 'tell us who the other robber was and we'll give you a lighter sentence'. But you want to be really careful
I understand, but it is as you say, a tangent.
David Post's hair is on fire because Adams is (allegedly) being pressured to do something in his "official capacity".) He is not complaining about routine deals with petty thieves which, as I'm sure you accept, is business as usual. That is a windmill at which we can tilt on another day.
Your separation of powers thing is much more on point, but as noted above, I don't think trading official acts across the separated powers is ipso facto a breach of the separation. It's a trade.
Just for the avoidance of doubt, if Congress (or a state legislature) wishes to enact specific laws restricting the federal (or state) law enforcement authorities from making deals with specified classes of person (eg elected officials) in the interests of protecting the separation of powers, then they're free to do so, and law enforcement must respect them. One of my principles described above is that the proper role of law enforcement is to enforce the law. Including such bits of the law as might annoy them.
Yes, you previously said legal thumbscrews to elected officials till they make policy as the prosecutor wants is fine.
Post as much text as you want; you've already told us what you are.
sarcastro : "state your limiting principle !"
moi : "why don't you state yours for a change ?"
sarcastro : "don't dodge the question ! state your limiting principle ! yap yap yap "
sarcastro : "why haven't you stated your limiting principle ?
sarcastro " "yap yap yap .... limiting principle !"
moi : "I thought it would be helpful if i stated my limiting principles in an orderly fashion, here we are....."
sarcastro : " Waaaah ! How dare you write so much !"
Plus ca change.
> 2. Does it matter in what capacity X is doing the deed that is rendered ? ie does it matter if the act is done “in an official capacity” – **so different ethical principles for government folk and private sector folk ?** NO.
I disagree with your framing of point 2. Having "official capacity" be a relevant factor does not mean there are "different ethical principles for government folk and private sector folk". Government folk can take the same plea deals affecting their *private property and decisions* that private sector folk can. Such a distinction merely excludes coerced *public, official* acts from being part of ethical plea deals -- public, official acts that private sector folk have no power to make.
To use one of your examples: let's assume that Megadrugs Corp is privately owned. Then "Megadrugs Corp executive letting ICE comb through company records, and search the Megadrugs factory, in search of illegal immigrants" as part of a plea deal is completely fine. Similarly, it would clearly also be fine if law enforcement makes a plea deal where "[Governor Blutarsky] co-operates in rounding up illegal immigrants" on or relating to his own private property should they "have the goods on Governor Blutarsky". I would argue, however, that it would *not* be fine for law enforcement to make a deal where Governor Blutarsky commits to helping law enforcement round up illegal immigrants on public property or through public, official acts where he is otherwise not legally required to.
The source of disagreement between us seems to be that you see a public official's discretion over public affairs as identical to his control over his own private affairs. I would argue that these should be distinct for various reasons:
First: public officials are elected or appointed to represent either the public or whoever appointed them (who is ostensibly elected to represent the public), and their discretion is granted for this purpose and this purpose only. The property under the discretion of this official and the powers of their position are under the ownership of the public, not the public official. In this sense, the public official cannot simply exercise discretion as he wishes, just as the CEO of a publicly traded company cannot violate his fiduciary duty to his shareholders (and thus a plea deal that violates this fiduciary duty would not be valid). While in most cases it is hard to tell if an official is violating this duty, in the obvious cases, primarily where the clear, driving motivator behind his use of publicly delegated power is private interest, the law forbids this exercise of "discretion" (see bribery, for example). More importantly for our discussion, such use of public power for private interest is commonly regarded as unethical. The use of public power to avoid private prosecution would be just such a case. Public officials cannot ethically commit to utilizing public power for a purpose other than benefiting the public.
Second: the public has delegated a specific amount or scope of discretion to a public official. While it might be argued that a public official is (mostly) free to do as he wishes in the scope of his discretion, he surely does not have discretion over the legal scope of his discretion. He then surely cannot ethically enter a plea deal that legally binds and restricts his discretion, reducing the scope of his discretion and signing away public control over public affairs. This argument rests on the same ground as the non-delegation doctrine.
You might note that these are all arguments for why it would be unethical for one public official to take a plea deal, not why it would be unethical for another public official to offer that plea deal. But if taking the plea deal is unethical, how can it be ethical to coerce, encourage, or even simply enable another to take this unethical course of action? Both public officials, after all, serve the public, and the public is the party ultimately harmed.
The only "plea deal"ish situations I can think of where public powers are implicated are consent decrees. In such cases, however, Josh R's condition that "law enforcement's request" be "related to the benefit given to X for agreeing to the request" becomes relevant. Consent decrees are specifically agreements where a party not in compliance with the law avoids prosecution in exchange for executing a plan meant to bring them in compliance with the same law. This does not raise any ethical issues, as the public official does not have power or discretion to take actions the public has decided are illegal.
I would finally like to ask for some clarifications on condition 7, given that coerced public actions are not wholly outside "legitimate law enforcement interests" for you. Can law enforcement coerce a state attorney general or other government attorney to sabotage cases where a ruling might be unfavorable for law enforcement/make their job harder? Can law enforcement coerce a federal agency head to push for changes in administrative rules to make law enforcement's job easier, or do the same for an official on the state level? If no for either of these two cases, why not? Perhaps law enforcement has no legitimate interest in administrative rules or the government's position on specific legal cases even if they might make law enforcement's job easier/harder, but then what differentiates executive policymaking from these cases? Administrative rules, for example, are a simple exercise of executive power; agencies interpret and enact congressional legislation within their discretion as part of the executive branch, the same way a governor might. A final hypothetical: can law enforcement coerce a low level bureaucrat to stall or otherwise inhibit unfriendly executive policy as much as legally possible?
Before I end off, I would like to say that you seem like an earnest, reasonable person who argues in good faith. I wholeheartedly hope for a friendly, productive discussion between us.
I don’t think I’ve ever been called “earnest” before ☺
Nor “conscientious” and unfortunately you have come in at the end of a couple of days of internet yacking on an entertaining subject, but which I have more or less reached my fill on, for the present. So I’ll rattle off a swiftish reply, but please don’t count on a continued discussion. I am a low attention span kind of yacker.
At the last minute I compressed my 2 into a single point. It had originally been two – one about government and private folk and one about “official capacity.” So I understand your point. Bullying government officials as regards their private affairs is fine, or at least as fine as bullying anyone else, as I think we agree, the question is about acts done in an “official capacity.”
Here I think the essential question is whether the official (which here includes employees of a private company) would be in breach of his duty. This is why bullying a judge to make a bad ruling is necessarily a foul, since a judge who does that is always in breach of duty. But if the official has discretion and the act requested is not a breach of duty then I think the same applies to a government official as to a private executive. If letting the Feds into Rikers Island is plainly against NYC’s interests then the Mayor shouldn’t do it, and the feds should not bully him into doing it. But what is in the interests of NYC is a political question, open to many opinions, and there will be few cases in which an external observer can say with confidence that no reasonable Mayor could believe this is in NYC’s interests. But the same applies to the Megadrugs executive. If it is clear that letting the Feds into the factory will probably cause the workforce to riot, destroy all the expensive machinery, burn down the factory – and cause the insurance company to refuse payment because the exec caused the riot - then the exec is in breach of his duty to Megadrugs Inc and the Feds should not be bullying him into such a breach.
So I’m not buying the government v private distinction. But I am saying that in either case, depending on the facts of course, it’s likely to be hard to prove a breach of duty. Absent finding an Adams memo from a month or two ago saying – “it would be totally crazy to let the Feds into Rikers Island. We must oppose it at all costs.”
As to your second point about the official binding his discretion, I don’t think it belongs in a separate category. If as a matter of law the discretion contains the discretion to bind his discretion, then it’s still just discretion. The question remains – is it obviously against NYC / Megadrugs interests ? You mention the lively trade in consent decrees – these are also used precisely to curtail the discretion of future election winners, and are typically gained after a very careful search for the right judge. And they’re hard to appeal because the two parties are on the same side. If you would favor the law limiting the duration of consent decrees binding on a government unit to the period until the next election, you may count on my support.
As mentioned elsewhere as a general matter I do not agree with Josh R’s insistence on a close nexus between the crime that law enforcement may wish to be lenient about, and the other law enforcement goal they are after.
I’m afraid I am too lazy to attack your hypos. I will merely say that one or two of them seem to involve, or potentially involve cases of trying to bully someone into a fairly clear breach of duty – eg “can law enforcement coerce a low level bureaucrat to stall or otherwise inhibit unfriendly executive policy as much as legally possible?” whereas “can law enforcement coerce a low level bureaucrat to argue to his boss to change unfriendly executive policy ?” would be less clear cut, whereas “can law enforcement coerce a low level bureaucrat to argue to his boss to change unfriendly executive policy, by deliberately fiddling the figures in a report on the matter ?” would be back in clear breach of duty territory.
I’m going to retract a chunk of that. Memo to self - don’t publish a long ramble just before hitting the hay.
So.
1. It is unethical for X to agree to do an act that is a breach of duty to another, in response to a request from law enforcement, whether the request is accompanied by carrots or sticks.
2. It is NOT unethical for law enforcement to use carrots or sticks to encourage X to perform an act that would be a breach of duty for X to do, unless
3. it is either illegal for X to do the act or for law enforcement to procure it
Lawmakers are of course entitled to flip 2s into 3s by making it illegal to procure a breach of duty, even when the breach of duty is not itself illegal.
Also if I would be liable in tort for procuring X to do an act that breaches his duty to an employer etc, then so should law enforcement be liable.
Lee Moore:Does it matter in what capacity X is doing the deed that is rendered ? ie does it matter if the act is done “in an official capacity” – so different ethical principles for government folk and private sector folk ? NO.
I disagree. Eric Adams, in his official capacity, has taken an oath to act in the best interests of the people of NYC. If the deal was that they'd defer prosecution as long as he checks in with a probation office every Tuesday, that's one thing. If it's that he has to fire the Police Commissioner, or eliminate congestion pricing, or let ICE agents into Rikers, that raises completely different ethical concerns.
Would you take the same view if Adams was an executive of a private company who had taken an oath to act in the best interests of the company ?
Or if he was the Mayor of Toronto ?
"Do legitimate law enforcement objectives include achieving changes to the law, budgets or other legislative acts, elections, confirmations, or judicial rulings"
This is an artificial rule. Why are executive actions relevantly different from legislative acts or judicial rulings?
A legislator has "discretion" whether or not to vote to confirm someone. They can choose not to because they had something bad for breakfast that morning. It still would be illegitimate for them to do so as a quid-pro-quo for not being prosecuted.
Mayor Adams has a duty to follow the law. His executive policy actions have official consequences. Changes in executive policy result in "changes to the law" in practice.
Executive and judicial officers sometimes have the discretion to do that. For instance, an agency has the power to hand down a policy that has legal consequences. It is a sort of "law."
Mayor Adams is not "Bugsy." He is a public official & coercion for public officials, not some narrow subset, to change public policy (not some subset) is problematic.
Heavy lifting is made to find some reason for a difference that is not there. Yes, agree to disagree.
==
The issue of resignation was raised. I'm reminded of Spiro Agnew. I think the comment that noted that resignation is different since it is a way to remove the problem (like a corrupt doctor giving up their license) makes sense. It might be inappropriate for some other reason, but it is not the same thing.
Also, it would not be the same thing as here since the possibility of future prosecution as a sword of Damocles is not similarly in place.
Why are executive actions relevantly different from legislative acts or judicial rulings?
The reasons are different.
A judge has no discretion. As I have explained elsewhere. Consequently any thumbscrewing of a judge to get him to arrive at a different answer, necessarily involves the judge doing something other than rendering a decision according to the law (as he understands it.) Consequenly law enforcement should not be coercing it.
A legislator has discretion. Thus the objection is not that he is being thumbscrewed to do something illegitimate. It is that law enforcement's proper role is to enforce the law as they find it. Not to adjust the law to something more to the liking of those working in law enforcement. The desire to enforce different laws from those which in fact obtain may be understandable, but it's not their business. (Whereas the desire to enforce the existing law by encouraging a change of executive policy that obstructs the enforcement of existing law is their business.)
Thus in the judicial case, the objection is that law enforcement is demanding that the judge do something that the judge does not have any power - properly - to do. ie render a judgement that is not in accordance with the law as the judge understands. The foul is by the judge, but law enforcement may not coerce such a foul.
In the legislator case, the foul is not by the legislator, but by law enforcement itself. Its responsibility is enforcing the law. Whatever the law is. It has no legitimate interets in changing the law to something else.
These (different) objections do not apply in the executive case. Where he has lawful discretion - unlike a judge - law enforcement is not inducing a foul. And where it is merely a policy that is sought to be changed, law enforcement is not exceeding its brief. Law enforcement's job is to enforce the law. if policy gets in the way of that, they're still within their lane if they try to get the policy changed.
For instance, an agency has the power to hand down a policy that has legal consequences. It is a sort of "law."
I'm not a Chevron fan.
The only people hysterical about this are the people who have reacted with unhinged hysteria to every single thing Trump has said and done for the last ten years. Never having learned the lesson of the Little Boy Who Cried Wolf, they can't understand why nobody listens to them anymore. At this point, the hysteria is a Pavlovian reaction; they can't control it, even if they wanted to.
Why is Post so upset? He has told us. Adams may stop obstructing the deportation of criminal aliens. O, the horror, the horror... New York Democrats, at the forefront of the years of lawfare against Trump have more acute reasons to be terrified, as Adams no doubt has insight into their criminality.
Post may take some solace in the fact that Adams has zero chance of being re-nominated, so in 11 months, New York City will be back to protecting that flow of illegal cheap labor he and his CATO buddies find so sacrosanct. In fact, he may not last that long, as Gov. Kathy Hochul is reportedly considering using her constitutional authority to remove him from office. I suspect Post and the Defenders of Democracy will have no issue with that.
Danielle Sassoon, who agreed to work for Trump just one month ago, has "reacted with unhinged hysteria to every single thing Trump has said and done for the last ten years"? [Citation needed.] Hagan Scotten has "reacted with unhinged hysteria to every single thing Trump has said and done for the last ten years"? [Citation needed.] Kevin Driscoll and John Keller have "reacted with unhinged hysteria to every single thing Trump has said and done for the last ten years"? [Citation needed.]
The difference exists only if DOJ's deal (or DOJ, as a condition whether explicit or not) were demanding Adams behave in ways that compromise any of his independent executive powers as Mayor.
I don't buy that DOJ did that. They demanded cooperation they should be getting anyway, whether Adams held local office or not.