The Volokh Conspiracy
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Trump Administration Appeals Special Counsel Case to SCOTUS—No, Not The Jack Smith Case.
There are two sides to the constitutional crisis coin: if the president seeks a timely appeal, courts should consider those appeals in a timely fashion.
On Thursday, I wrote about the case of Hampton Dellinger, who served as the sole director of the Office of Special Counsel. (I use the past tense quite deliberately.) This position has nothing to do with DOJ special counsels, like Jack Smith, who are appointed to investigate the executive branch. Dellinger's position concerns civil servants, whistleblowers, the Hatch Act, and other employment-related matters. Trump removed Dellinger from office.
The District Court entered an "administrative stay" ordering Trump to allow Dellinger to remain in office. The D.C. Circuit did not allow the government to appeal the administrative stay. Then the District Court entered a Temporary Restraining Order, requiring Trump to continue recognizing Dellinger as the Special Counsel. Generally, a TRO lasts for fourteen days, and is not appealable. Courts can only grant a writ of mandamus to dissolve a TRO.
A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit declined to dissolve the stay. The majority found that the opinion was not subject to immediate review. Judge Katsas dissented. He found the order should be subject to immediate review, especially where it arguably infringes on the President's removal power. Katsas points out that in past cases, removed officers sought to challenge their removal by seeking backpay. There is no recorded case where a federal court ordered the reinstatement of a removed officer. Moreover, the injunction seems to squarely run against the President, as it requires him to recognize Dellinger as the head of the department, even though Trump has appointed someone else. There is a long-running dispute under Mississippi v. Johnson about whether the federal courts have the power to enjoin the president. This case screams for urgent appellate review, but the D.C. Circuit said "Come back in two weeks."
The Trump Administration has now filed its first emergency application to the Supreme Court. Acting Solicitor General Harris lays out the stakes:
Until now, as far as we are aware, no court in American history has wielded an injunction to force the President to retain an agency head whom the President believes should not be entrusted with executive power and to prevent the President from relying on his preferred replacement. Yet the district court remarkably found no irreparable harm to the President if he is judicially barred from exercising exclusive and preclusive powers of the Presidency for at least 16 days, and perhaps for a month. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(2) (authorizing courts to extend TROs so that they last up to 28 days). And, when the United States sought a stay or, alternatively, mandamus, the D.C. Circuit issued a 27-page decision denying relief late on Saturday night, over Judge Katsas's dissent. App., infra, 33a-59a. . . .
This Court should not allow lower courts to seize executive power by dictating to the President how long he must continue employing an agency head against his will. "Where a lower court allegedly impinges on the President's core Article II powers, immediate appellate review should be generally available." App., infra, at 52a (Katsas, J., dissenting). Yet the D.C. Circuit majority described "[w]aiting two weeks" to exercise the executive power vested by Article II as "not so prejudicial." Id. at 41a. If that reasoning is allowed to stand, it is hard to conceive of any TRO that would trigger appellate review. Such a ruling risks further emboldening district courts to issue TROs enjoining the President from undertaking myriad other actions implicating executive powers.
I'm sure the narrative will be that Trump is the one flouting the rule of law. But the District Court issued an "administrative stay" (of what I do not know), and then issued a non-appealable TRO, that constrains the court removal power. The D.C. Circuit twice declined to review an urgent appeal.
The "constitutional crisis" coin has two sides. On one side, the executive branch is expected to follow adverse court rulings. But on the other side of the coin, the judiciary is expected to allow the President to promptly appeal those adverse rulings. It cannot be the case that one court can strangle the executive branch for two weeks without any sort of appeal rights. Both sides have to play the game. There cannot be unilateral disarmament. And as the Acting SG points out, there is a "trend" of such rulings:
That is no mere hypothetical. The district court's order exemplifies a broader, weeks-long trend in which plaintiffs challenging President Trump's initiatives have persuaded district courts to issue TROs that intrude upon a host of the President's Article II powers. A district court in New York issued an ex parte TRO requiring that access to certain Treasury Department data be limited to "civil servants" and be de-nied to "political appointees." New York v. Trump, No. 25-cv-1144, 2025 WL 435411, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2025). A district court in the District of Columbia issued a worldwide TRO that prohibited the government from "suspending, pausing, or other-wise preventing the obligation or disbursement" of any "federal foreign assistance award that was in existence as of January 19, 2025." AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coali-tion v. United States Department of State, No. 25-cv-402, 2025 WL 485324, at *7 (D.D.C. 2025). Many other district courts have issued universal TROs that sweep far beyond the parties to those cases and effectively enjoin the President's Executive Or-ders even before agencies have decided how to implement them.1
None of these cases, you'll note, arose from the Fifth Circuit. As best as I can recall, district judges in Texas routinely stayed their injunctions to permit appellate review. Not so here.
Harris asks the Court to vacate the TRO, or in the alternative, grant an "administrative stay."
Let's talk turkey here. The "administrative stay" is the ballgame. If the Court denies relief here, the fourteen days will run, and the case can proceed through the usual appellate process. All too often, the Court will say that relief at this early juncture is inappropriate, but we reserve the right to step back in at some future time. I'm sure the Court will be inclined to say that here, especially since Justice Barrett has complained about administrative stays. She is loathe to consider a constitutional question until the issues are fully developed. And even when they are fully developed, she faults lawyers for not laying out comprehensive constitutional theories. It's caution all the way down.
What about the Chief Justice? In a previous lifetime, White House Attorney John Roberts would have personally walked over to Hampton Dellinger's office and changed the locks. But not now, Roberts cannot be seen as giving into to Trump's DOGEing of the federal government.
I think the Court denies the administrative stay by a 5-4 vote, with Roberts and Barrett in the majority. There will be a short statement urging the lower courts to move with promptness, but stating that relief is not appropriate at this time. Barrett will write a concurrence chastising the lower courts for issuing administrative stays of executive orders, and then declining to stay their rulings. But she will say the issues are not clearly defined enough at this point for the Supreme Court to intervene. Justice Kagan might even join Barrett to give her some backup because why not. Roberts will say nothing more because he doesn't have to. We will get a full-throated dissent from Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch urging the Court to overrule Humphrey's Executor. Justice Kavanaugh will also dissent, suggesting that the time has come to reconsider Humphrey's Executor.
My predictions are usually wrong, so take them for whatever they are worth.
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For the first time I can recall, Prof. Blackman shows a glimmer of both self-awareness and persona growth.
Maybe there is hope for us all.
I am sure at least 75% of why he wanted Trump reelected was to put the 'Officers stuff' back on the agenda.
Thank you, pot.
Dellinger's position concerns civil servants, whistleblowers, the Hatch Act, and other employment-related matters. Trump removed Dellinger from office.
Of course he did.
Dellinger is not some dedicated non-partisan. Political appointments from Democrat president and governor are in his resume.
So what?
So its up to the President to decide whether he remains as a subordinate in the executive branch.
The same Roberts who wrote Seila Law and Trump v US is not going to roll over for the lower courts hamstringing the President like this.
These are core Article 2 powers.
Seila Law is on point, IMO. Can't see how any law barring Trump from removing Dellinger from office passes Constitutional review under that case.
Oddly, for entirely different reasons, I was just reading Seila Law today, and it specifically mentions this officer. It seemed to distinguish that officer from the head of the CFPB. Not sure if it’s dispositive of this issue, though.
There are a couple of mentions, the first to distinguish it from Morrison, which along Humphrey's are the only prominent outliers.
"The OSC should not be confused with the independent counsel in Morrison or the special counsel recently appointed to investigate allegations related to the 2016 Presidential election. Despite sharing similar titles, those individuals have no relationship to the OSC."
And:
"Second, the supporters of the CFPB point to the Office of the Special Counsel (OSC), which has been headed by a single officer since 1978.[6] But this first enduring single-leader office, created nearly 200 years after the Constitution was ratified, drew a contemporaneous constitutional objection from the Office of Legal Counsel under President Carter and a subsequent veto on constitutional grounds by President Reagan. See Memorandum Opinion for the General Counsel, Civil Service Commission, 2 Op. OLC 120, 122 (1978); Public Papers of the Presidents, Ronald Reagan, Vol. II, Oct. 26, 1988, pp. 1391–1392 (1991).[7] In any event, the OSC exercises only limited jurisdiction to enforce certain rules governing Federal Government employers and employees. See 5 U. S. C. §1212. It does not bind private parties at all or wield regulatory authority comparable to the CFPB."
"Oddly, for entirely different reasons, I was just reading Seila Law today, and it specifically mentions this officer. It seemed to distinguish that officer from the head of the CFPB. Not sure if it’s dispositive of this issue, though."
That seemed to be important to the District Court here, who noted it at pp. 12-13 and footnote 3 of the temporary restraining order. https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.277297/gov.uscourts.dcd.277297.14.0_5.pdf
If the court is reading the news, the court will know this is the first of several lawsuits where the courts issued an order in a case that looks like it is only about money. If the court wants to rein in injunctions a quick and clear order in this case may help.
I am not sure Roberts wants to explicitly overrule Humphrey's Executor, its more like he would narrow it into oblivion.
From his majority opinion in Seila:
"But text, first principles, the First Congress’s decision in 1789, Myers, and Free Enterprise Fund all establish that the President’s removal power is the rule, not the exception. While we do not revisit Humphrey’s Executor or any other precedent today, we decline to elevate it into a freestanding invitation for Congress to impose additional restrictions on the President’s removal authority."
But then again, if the lower courts want to claim its still alive to delay the inevitable he might indeed think a stake through its heart is the cleanest path to normalcy.
So your saying Roberts might grow a pair?
I doubt that is possible now.
Roberts showed his pair when he wrote Trump v US, maybe you could point to where he wimped out in that decision.
Easy, The decision itself.
Lol are you adopting the Blackman definition of courage?
Sure, courage is often subjective depending on your viewpoint of what was accomplished or being defended.
But it certainly it was the path of least resistance to Roberts to affirm the DC Circuit, Trump was narrowly trailing in the polls, Chutkan and Smith had Trump in their crosshairs, and just enough time to pull off a conviction, Democratic Senate, the House in disarray.
He got a lot of heat for the decision, and hard to deny the Washington establishment would have enthusiastically embraced a contrary decision.
Ditto for Trump v Anderson.
I don't know enough to opine on the merits of this case in the OP.
But courage as 'agreeing with me and owning the libs' remains just hilariously lame.
You and Blackman both.
Hmmm, a Palestinian walks onto a Jerusalem bus and detonates a suicide bomb.
I am thinking one's viewpoint defines whether it is courageous--could be wrong.
I wonder why we the sole argument is whether the law violates Article II powers and there is not a due process argument being made. Are all Article II actions free from the need to afford process?
Also, it is not all about money. This could also be about putting the parties status qup ante.
Who's is being deprived of "life, liberty, or property"?
I can't see anyone's 5th amendment due process rights being abridged.
Its long been settled law that back wages are adequate compensation for unjust termination.
It could be argued that the law establishling the Special Counsel was the grant of a property right in the job. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Loudermill.
You could argue it, and a fired U.S attorney did argue it 130 years ago in a case called Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897). The Supreme Court rejected it.
I’m also not sure why, even if the argument had merit, it would support preliminary relief.
I just skimmed Parsons. The case involved an appointment pursuant to a law without a for cause removal provision. As such, it may not be on point,
To the contrary, in what might be dicta, the opinion seems to find the Tenure of Office Act (which limited the president's right to remove officials) was constitutional. I think that Act was passed into law in 1789 overriding President Washington's veto. I don't think the law was ever found to be unconstitutional. I could be wrong.
"I’m also not sure why, even if the argument had merit, it would support preliminary relief."
I had the same thought. Isn't this the same issue that came up during COVID with various employees seeking equitable relief when threatened with termination for failure to get vaccinated, just with the party affiliations reversed?
Who's is being deprived of "life, liberty, or property"?
I can't see anyone's 5th amendment due process rights being abridged.
A "property" interest in government employment can be created and defined by the terms of the employee's appointment. See, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972).
Mr. Dellinger's appointment to a fixed five year term of employment, from which he may be removed by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, 5 U.S. Code § 1211(b), created a property interest in continued employment during that five year term (but not a right to renewal after expiration of the term).
Yeah, to stretch that case into any sort of relief for Dellinger would require cosmic silly putty:
Not only did he lose, it was a 14th amendment case that implicated state law:
"Held: The Fourteenth Amendment does not require opportunity for a hearing prior to the nonrenewal of a nontenured state teacher's contract unless he can show that the nonrenewal deprived him of an interest in "liberty" or that he had a "property" interest in continued employment, despite the lack of tenure or a formal contract. Here, the nonretention of respondent, absent any charges against him or stigma or disability foreclosing other employment, is not tantamount to a deprivation of "liberty," and the terms of respondent's employment accorded him no "property" interest protected by procedural due process. The courts below therefore erred in granting summary judgment for the respondent on the procedural due process issue."
The court isn't going to take a case where they found no property interest under state law that implicated the 14th amendment, then say there is a 5th amendment due process right, especially after Myers already dealt with federal employees with removal protections.
Especially since it was a Burger court decision which should all have warning labels on them.
Perhaps you should reread the case. (Don't rely just upon a summary or someone else's characterization.) David Roth had a property interest in employment during the term of his one year contract. He did not have such an interest in renewal of the contract after it expired:
408 U.S. at 578.
Hampton Dellinger has a property interest in employment for the full length of his five year term.
That seems like the argument advanced, and rejected, in the Parsons case I mentioned above. How do you distinguish it?
Assuming the for cause requirement is unconstitutional, what additional process do you think is due?
Unless you’re a conservatively-aligned plaintiff in the Fifth Circuit wrongful termination isn’t generally deemed an irreparable harm justifying preliminary equitable relief: the remedies available if your prevail on the claim are considered sufficient to make you whole.
Notice and opportunity to respond.
That sounds reasonable when cognizanle rights are implicated.
But what rights are at issue here? No one has a right to be an officer under the United States.
Noone has the right to anything, unless allowed by law. Four example, without a law allowing you to own your house, do you have a property right in the house? Once you have the property right under the law, you are entitled to due process before the government can take it away.
Why is that any different for an officer of the US?
You’re begging the question, which is why your due process argument ends up collapsing into the removal power argument itself.
If the law gives the right to be an officer of the US, then due process is required to take it away. In this case, the law gave the property right.
Again, that’s pure question-begging. If Congress had no power to bestow such a property right, then Dellinger never had it and can’t complain about “losing” it. And if Congress was allowed to restrict the special counsel’s removal, then there’s no need to reach the due process question, since Trump clearly didn’t comply with the statute.
If the Tenure of Office Act was constitutional, Congress had the right to do it for the Special Counsel.
Also, in the case of the Special Counsel legislation , it was signed by the President. Surely, the president could bestow that property right.
1. The tenure of office act is almost universally considered unconstitutional.
2. I dont see any argument that the president can unilaterally prevent a future president from removing an officer.
Like I said above the 5th amendment only guarantees due process for "life, liberty, or property", same with the 14th, although there is the made up "substantive due process" and the dormant "privileges and immunities", but of course that clause of the 14th amendment does not apply to the federal government or modify any Article 2 power of the President:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Yup. Which is why any TRO is improper. Dellinger can ask for backpay if he prevails. I don't see the irreparable harm.
Yes. The only "irreparable" harm is political, to some of The Resistance™ who do not wish to see Trump succeed on his policy and governance agenda, that can for now proceed less encumbered by removing a potentially problematic IG. As others have said, there is no property interest in the political power of a government office to potentially obstruct a political opponent.
I was assured that Trump was defying the courts.
He is, just not in a way that attracts media attention. Many grants that were ordered to be distributed are still frozen. A friend of mine might lose her job because Musk refuses to honor a signed grant contract.
Tell her to learn to code.
Probably right on Roberts, whom I suspect will arrogantly claim he is somehow acting in accordance with his Constitutional authority when he himself participates in the judicial infringement of executive prerogatives by acting so as not to "be seen as giving into to Trump's DOGEing of the federal government."
Or will Roberts "switch in time"?
In time for what?
I think Ed's got the wrong Justice Roberts.
Roberts is not the most conservative justice, but when it comes to the President's Article 2 authority he is pretty solid.
Nobody who has read Trump v US should be able to say with a straight face "he himself participates in the judicial infringement of executive prerogatives", when he himself wrote one of the opinions most deferential to executive power in SCOTUS history.
Yeah, I remember that. It's not showing inordinate judicial courage to just follow the bleeding constitution and I won't give him excessive praise when he's just doing his job. I also remember National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. He's an untrustworthy political animal and I can very well imagine him acting so as not to "be seen as giving into to Trump's DOGEing of the federal government."
Oh no doubt Roberts is a squish when it comes to upholding rights of the people against overreach by Congress or the executive, but don't confuse that with not having a firm vision of where the division of power is between the executive and legislative branches.
My own view is Congress has ceded too much power to both the President and bureaucracy, and should claw back some of that power. But the constitution while it acknowledges the necessary existence of a bureaucracy does not give it, nor even allow it any independent powers. Any power of the bureaucracy only exists under the direction of the President and his congressionally confirmed officers that serve at the presidents will.
Even if you have to make up words that aren't in there!
I think the "non-appealable" TROs represents a major problem.
There are 677 District Court Judges in the United States. The concept is, that at any time, any one of these judges can just say "halt" to any executive branch action for 14 days, and it can't be appealed...at all... represents a gross imbalance of power.
Let's hypothesize how this goes....
Trump orders the US Military to the Mexican Border. One District Court issues a TRO stopping the military from moving. Can't be appealed. 14 days run out. Then a different court issues a TRO that stops the military from moving. Or stops it from "using fuel" to move. Technically a different TRO...same in practice, but technically different. Still can't be appealed. Another 14 days. Then a third district court (or maybe the first one!) issues another TRO preventing the use of roads or railroads to move the military.
It's a Constitutional Crisis ready to happen.
If you’re subject to a TRO you can’t file an appeal of right; you can still seek mandamus relief.
What irreparable harm did Dellinger suffer? Other than his salary for the time he was removed (which is money damages), what harm has he suffered?
Getting to play lawyer and screw Trump.
BTW, Rule 65(a) provides:
(3) Expediting the Preliminary-Injunction Hearing. If the order is issued without notice, the motion for a preliminary injunction must be set for hearing at the earliest possible time, taking precedence over all other matters except hearings on older matters of the same character. At the hearing, the party who obtained the order must proceed with the motion; if the party does not, the court must dissolve the order.
(4) Motion to Dissolve. On 2 days’ notice to the party who obtained the order without notice—or on shorter notice set by the court—the adverse party may appear and move to dissolve or modify the order. The court must then hear and decide the motion as promptly as justice requires.
No, that verbiage is not in Rule 65(a).
It is in Rule 65(b). The TRO in Mr. Dellinger's case was not issued without notice. A preliminary injunction hearing is scheduled for February 26. https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.277297/gov.uscourts.dcd.277297.14.0_5.pdf
1. The OSC is charged with protecting whistleblowers and those who refuse to violate the law and other protected activities. Why would Trump kneecap an office that promotes good government? There is no indication that the Dellinger was not up for the task.
2. The President has no independent authority under the Constitution (other than pardons). Every authority the President has comes from Congress. Every position in the Executive branch (other than P and VP) were created by Congress. The proponents of the imperial presidency take a few words out of Article II and ignore the rest of the document.
The whole "core Article II powers" do not exist.
The Supreme Court has disagreed with you for 100 years.
Longer than that. But their rulings do not jive with the text of the Constitution.
There is no doubt that under the constitution Congress is supreme. But the only way to effectively wield that supremacy is to reduce the size of government to limit its reach, through the its power of the purse.
And if that is done by Congress using the proper procedures, that is cool by me.
And if Congress does not constrain the executive by restricting its resources and authority then:
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."
What Congress can not do is say: "the executive branch shall be all seeing, all knowing, all deciding, but the President shall have no power over the civil servants that execiute the law."
But MAGA doesn't think that this exists either! They think the president can spend money or not, regardless of what Congress says.
Not MAGA, but surely an appropriation of money does not *require* all the money to be spent. That way lies madness.
The executive's charge to faithfully uphold the law should mean that it need accomplish the *purpose* for which money was appropriated, or try to do so, at a cost no greater than the amount appropriated. But if it may achieve the aim by spending less, it may do so.
Now, this means that the president should not be able to elect to forfeit pursuit of those aims (and thus withhold appropriated funds which would have been used in pursuit thereof), but the president isn't obligated to expend all the appropriated funds either if doing so is unnecessary.
An underlying problem here is that congress's aims are frequently muddled or subject to significant interpretation, or entirely lacking, and it is merely supplying funds for a thing with insufficient express purpose. If it's a matter of interpretation what the purpose is, or when it's been fulfilled, then there is ample room for the president to make decisions about what is necessary or unnecessary. (The USAID example is on-point here. Certain USAID functions being moved into the State Department means that, arguably, the purpose to which funds were appropriated is still being pursued. It is doubtful every single program of USAID was expressly authorized by Congress, and to the extent they weren't, those programs can be modified or eliminated, and potentially new ones created, by the President with no threat to Congress's power).
Maybe if Congress didn't give the executive so much discretion...
Not "surely." If Congress wants to authorize up to a certain amount to be spent, it can; it knows how to do that. If the text and/or context makes it clear that this is what Congress is doing, then the president doesn't have to spend the money. The obvious example for when the context makes that clear is if/when an appropriation is for a discrete purpose and that purpose can be accomplished for less. In that case, I would agree it would indeed be bizarre to claim that the president had to spend more anyway. So, e.g., if Congress appropriates $5 billion for a bridge over the Ohio river near Cincinnati, and the bridge can be built for $4.5 billion, nobody thinks the president must set the last $500 million on fire.
But when Congress appropriates money for more general objectives, that doesn't apply. When Congress appropriates $5 billion for transportation improvements, or for AIDS prevention, or for foreign goodwill, they are not authorizing the president to decide that $4.5 billion is actually enough infrastructure or enough AIDS preventing or enough diplomacy.
If all they do is authorize $5 billion for transportation improvements and leave it up to the Department of Transportation to decide what transportation improvements are, then the President can tell DoT not to spend money painting rainbow flags on roads and instead to spend the money on something else instead.
If it were really that open-ended, yes. (Congress does delegate a lot of discretion, but not quite at that level of generality.) But the administration still has to spend it on transportation improvements. It can't spend it on arresting immigrants or on nothing at all.
There obviously are core powers, like the ones explicitly mentioned in the constitution (e.g. granting pardons, serving as command in chief of the military).
Congress establishes, funds, and writes the laws for the military, and has the power to declare wars. Congress has more power of the military than the President.
The power to declare war is very different than the power to wage war. Congress cannot order the military to go bomb Iraq. It can't even pass a law requiring the military to go bomb Iraq.
Trump should keep firing people until everyone agrees that he has the power. He was elected to fire people.
Not relevant. Trump is still obligated to follow federal law. Running on a platform and winning does not automatically make that platform legal.
Certainly the executive branch officials under the president are creations of law and regulated by law. But you misunderstand the history of executive power. Just like in Britain, where the Crown came to rely on Parliament to fund the government, thereby asserting control of the power of the purse, Congress funds the executive branch, but cannot manage and direct it. Oversight may seem like directing, but that is just an ongoing condition for granting or withholding next year's appropriation. I leave it to the reader to decide whether it is wise to bite the hand that feeds you.
Congress certainly may attach many strings to how money is spent. It cannot formally mandate who occupies and continues in the offices it creates (excepting the quasi agencies for the moment, Humphrey's Executor TBD), beyond the advice & consent for Senate confirmed positions.
The way to control executive overreach is by defunding it. Make Government Shutdowns Great Again!
This farce recalls the heady days of President Andrew Johnson's fight with Congress and War Secretary Stanton barricading himself in his office to prevent his removal by the President. That one, of course, did not include a gaggle of lawless, activist "resistance" judges.
And now we even have a district judge presuming to dictate the foreign policy of the United States. I don't think that's happened since District Judge Orrin Judd ordered President Nixon to stop bombing Cambodia. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). Judd issued that order on July 25, graciously giving Nixon two days to comply. On July 27, the Second Circuit granted a stay. Congresswoman Holtzman then asked Justice Marshall to dissolve the stay, but he declined. 414 U.S. 1304 (1973) (Marshall, J., in chambers). She then reapplied, this time to Justice Douglas, who granted her application on August 3. 414 U.S. 1316 (1973) (Douglas, J., in chambers). Nixon and the military ignored Douglas' order. On August 6, Justice Marshall, noting the agreement of all the other justices except Douglas, reinstated the stay. 414 U.S. 1321 (1973).
It is well to remember the words of Justice Marshall, no great fan of Nixon or the Vietnam War:
. 414 U.S. at 1315.
Wow. Today Marshall would be called a MAGA stooge. Good for him.
Was that from when Justice Marshall and the full court overruled Justice Douglas' perverse order to stop the bombing of Cambodia?
The Justice Marshall quote doesn't say anything but that judges shouldn't hand down illegitimate orders.
The federal courts rule on many things that in some fashion affect foreign policy. There is no "foreign policy" exception to judicial power. They interpret treaties and various other FP-related questions. They have done so since the 1790s.
The specific case involving the bombing interfered with the legitimate discretion of the president. Marshall, meanwhile, was part of the majority in U.S. v. Nixon. I am not aware that he opposed Humphrey's Executor.
President Johnson supported settling the Tenure of Office question in the courts. If so, ultimately, the courts would have had a role in settling the question as they regularly do, and did in determining if a person could be removed from office.*
The "farce" is in Trump's court.
==
* "Johnson was anxious to challenge the constitutionality of the Tenure of Office Act in court, but to do so he would have to replace Stanton and defy the Senate."
https://www.famous-trials.com/johnson/488-home
Yes, I'm sure we're all surprised that's your take. When Trump is one party in the case, always side with the opposing party. It's easier than thinking about an issue. When it comes to Trump, he broke so many baby brains, that his haters, even those of reasonable intelligence, are literally incapable of applying neutral principles.
These fulminating, Trump-hating activist judges are bringing disrepute on the judiciary by making up heretofore unknown rules and procedures. But "DRUMPFFF!" Everybody with even a rudimentary grasp of constitutional law knows that Trump will ultimately win the case against Dellinger. And, sorry, the judge's ruling is farcical, as is denying a stay. If, indeed, Dellinger was illegally dismissed, he can always get his backpay. But a district judge, for the first time in history as far as I am aware, insists he must have complete access to his office as well. The potential damage to Trump of having to tolerate a saboteur is patently obvious. But that's rather the point to the defenders of judicial lawlessness.
FD,
Respectfully, your TDS (pro-Trump) is on full display here, and you seem incapable of seeing the numerous rational reasons for thinking Trump is on the wrong side here. In other words; I think you are projecting.
You're confusing "pro-Trump" with "pro-Constitution", though, given the current state of the Democrat party, I can easily understand how one could make that mistake.
Democrat Party? Lol.
Can you pretend you are writing a Day in Supreme Court History post? You (mostly) seem not to be an unhinged partisan there.
I did not specifically address the case cited in the OP & suggest people read Steve Vladeck's substack today on that.
We do? Which judge, and what foreign policy?
"She is loathe to consider a constitutional question until the issues are fully developed."
Should be "loath", not "loathe".
Merriam-Webster lists "loathe" as a variant spelling of "loath".
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/loath
Regardless, don't be a pedant. You're better than that.
I think pedant is fair, but he reserves it for people he disagrees with on matters other than grammar and usage.