The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Property Rights

Pacific Legal Foundation Symposium on the 100th Anniversary of Euclid v. Ambler Realty

The symposium is seeking submissions.

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Illustration: Lex Villena; Lev Kropotov

Next year is the 100th anniversary of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, the Supreme Court decision upholding exclusionary zoning. I think Euclid is one of the worst supreme Court decisions ever, and exclusionary zoning - and the resulting massive housing shortage of which it is the biggest cause - is the biggest property rights issue of our time. In a recent article, In a recent Texas Law Review article, Josh Braver and i argue that exclusionary zoning  violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and outline ways in which a combination of litigation and political action can be used to combat them.  See also our much shorter non-academic article  in the Atlantic.

Even many who don't agree with that position can recognize now is a good time to reconsider Euclid and its legacy. Thus, I am happy to announce that the Pacific Legal Foundation - a major public interest law firm specializing in property rights issues - is sponsoring a symposium on the 100th anniversary of Euclid, and soliciting proposals. They are organizing it together with the Mercatus Center and the Journal of Law, Economics, and Policy.  Here is the announcement:

Next year marks the 100th anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., where the Court approved of municipalities' use of their "police powers" to enact zoning ordinances excluding lawful activities from certain districts and segregating residential housing based on the housing's effects on neighboring properties. The effects of Euclid have been pervasive, since virtually all American cities and towns divide themselves into land-use districts through these public-welfare zoning ordinances.

In Euclid, land that an owner had intended to sell for industrial purposes was rezoned for residential use by a Cleveland suburb, resulting in an alleged decrease in land value of approximately 75 percent. The Court's decision provided an unqualified endorsement of the practice of land-use regulation under the government's police powers using a creative application of nuisance principles. The Court noted that "a nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard," and, going beyond the facts of the case, singled-out apartment buildings as "parasites" amidst neighborhoods of "private" family homes.

For the past 100 years, scholars have debated Euclid's effect on housing in America and the resulting tension between states' police power protection of public welfare and constitutional property rights, due process, and equal protection. The approaching 100th anniversary of the Court's decision presents a new opportunity to take a fresh look at the decision, its significance, and legacy, and particularly what a new American land-use and zoning paradigm might look like for the next 100 years.

It's also a fitting time to assess the economic impact of zoning, how state and federal environmental regulations have contributed to driving up the costs of building, and what the future may hold for land-use regulation. Pacific Legal Foundation, the Mercatus Center, and the Journal of Law, Economics & Policy seek papers from a variety of disciplines building on the past 100 years of research and commentary to re-evaluate the foundations of American zoning and look toward the future.

Some additional details:

  • Authors of accepted papers will receive a $4,000 honorarium.

  • Papers will be presented at a symposium at George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School in early 2026.

  • Cost of hotel accommodation and reasonable travel expenses to the symposium will be covered.

  • Papers will be published in the Spring 2026 issue of the Journal of Law, Economics & Policy.

Instructions on how to submit are available here. The submission deadline is August 15.

Here is the organizers' list of suggested topics:

POSSIBLE TOPICS

The following are possible topics of potential research papers and are not intended to be an exclusive or exhaustive list.

  1. How should Euclid be interpreted and what is its legacy in light of the pervasive racially-discriminatory use of zoning over the decades after Euclid?

  2. Did the Supreme Court expand state police powers in Euclid beyond their constitutional limit? If Euclid were to be reexamined today, would the Court's former holding stand up to review under the Court's reinvigorated history-and-tradition analysis?

  3. Writers from the 1920s optimistically imagined that zoning as it was initially conceived might suffice to carry American cities forward for 100 years. Looking past Euclid and thinking broadly, what might a new land-use paradigm for American cities look like for the next century?

  4. What has been Euclid's relationship with or contribution to America's housing crisis and how could its effects be remediated?

  5. Should Euclid, which had been initially interpreted narrowly by some state courts, have been construed differently in light of the subsequent Nectow v. City of Cambridge case and later land-use jurisprudence?

  6. What should be the future of Euclid on federal and state regulatory takings jurisprudence, given the arguments presented in articles like, "The Constitutional Case Against Exclusionary Zoning" by Ilya Somin and Joshua Braver?

  7. What legislative options for zoning reform could supersede the holding in Euclid, particularly in light of bills introduced and/or passed at the state and federal levels in recent years?

  8. Considering examples from other countries with different zoning systems, as discussed in Sonia Hirt's book, Zoned in the USA, should the United States consider a more limited form of zoning, and what might that look like?

  9. Relatively little scholarly attention has been paid to the zoning enabling acts, which largely derived from the federal Standard State Zoning Enabling Act. What is the current status of these acts, the substance of which predates the Euclid decision, and what are some potential reforms and/or alternatives.

Since this is a PLF event, I must make the standard disclaimer that my wife is a PLF employee. However, she is not involved in the organization of this symposium, nor in the evaluation of paper proposals. Nor am I! So don't send your proposals to me (or her). Send them to Stephen Davis of PLF and Andrew Cannon (JLEP), as instructed at the website linked above.

I suppose I should also add that it was not my idea to make the issues raised in my article with Josh Braver one of the possible suggested paper topics. I didn't even know about this symposium until PLF announced it, and asked me to help promote (which I am happy to do). Conspiracy theorists won't believe it (though Volokh Conspiracy theorists might!), but it's true.

Regardless, this is a hugely important set of issues, and I hope and expect the symposium will be a success.

Free Speech

Nothing New Under the Sun, Here as to Rules That Focus on a Defendant's Being Motivated by Ill Will

"[V]ery agreeable to the theorist, but utterly unfit for the practical purposes of society ...."

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From Thomas Starkie's 1813 libel law treatise, pp. 199-200 (some paragraph breaks added):

Were every malicious and oppressive act to be considered illegal, the law would be very agreeable to the theorist, but utterly unfit for the practical purposes of society, on account of the infinite perplexity and uncertainty which would occur in distinguishing between bad and good motives, where the act done might arise from either source.

The secret purpose of a man's heart is of too difficult ascertainment to be made the general criterion of legal right or wrong; and hence it is that the law, which must resort to more plain and certain evidence, on which it may found more precise prescriptions, may not unfrequently become the instrument of oppression.

For example: where a creditor, from motives of malice and revenge, and not with a view to his legal remedy, deprives his debtor of liberty; as a matter of conscience the act is criminal and unjustifiable; yet it must be sanctioned and tolerated by the law, in order to avoid consequences most pernicious and absurd; for were it otherwise, a man's security for his debt would depend on the temper and disposition of his mind, upon his motive for becoming a creditor in the first instance, and his reasons for enforcing his claim in the second; and, however pure his intention, he might be deterred from proceeding, by the apprehension of being involved in litigation, upon a suggestion of malice, by his adversary.

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Two Supreme Court Roundups In Two Cities In One Day

Or, from one swamp to another swamp.

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This morning, at 11:00 ET, I spoke at the "Scholars and Scribes" Supreme Court Roundup at the Heritage Foundation. And this evening, at 6:00 CT, I spoke at the Houston Federalist Society's Supreme Court Roundup. It has been some time since I did two events in two cities in the same day. (Back in 2012, I visited six airports in thirty-six hours.) Today's travel was not easy to execute.

The event at Heritage wrapped at 12:15. Approximately one minute later, I was in a waiting Uber, en route to Reagan National Airport. I placed the suitcase next to me to avoid having to waste time going to the trunk. Boarding for my flight began at 12:25, as I was crossing the Fourteenth Street Bridge. I arrived at the curb of Terminal 2 at 12:31. I made it through security and to my gate in about six minutes. I scanned my boarding pass at 12:38, just after they called my name before closing the boarding. I was in my seat by 12:40. I landed in Houston around 3:00, with plenty of time to spare before the evening event.

Why did I engage in this insane turnaround? As it turned out, today there were thunderstorms in both D.C. and Houston. (Summer travel is actually worse than winter travel, as airports can remain operational during snow, but not during lightning.) Looking at the radar, I realized there was a good chance that my original flight, which was slated to leave D.C. at 3 ET and land in Houston at 5 CT, would be delayed. So I called an audible and switched to the earlier flight. I would rather rush to the airport to try to catch the earlier flight. If I had missed it, I would just wait for the later flight.

As things turned out, my prediction was correct. My original flight would be delayed about two hours, and I would have missed most of the FedSoc event in Houston.

This may sound obsessive, but whenever I travel, I track the weather in both my departing and arriving city, and also keep an eye on all flights between those airports that day in case I can switch. I also track the inbound flights (that is, where my flight is coming from), and the weather in that city. And in rare cases, I will track the weather in the inbound's inbound city. I was recently flying from LaGuardia to Dulles, and by tracking three flights ahead, realized my late-night flight would likely get cancelled, so I switched to Amtrak and taxi'd to Penn Station. It is very, very rare that I am on a cancelled flight, in large part because I am proactive about getting off those flights. As Gary Leff from View from the Wing explains, inclement weather is like the Zombie Apocalypse--you have to keep moving.

You can watch the Scholars and Scribes event here:

Tariffs

Overview of the Amicus Briefs Filed in Our Tariff Case

The diversity and quality of the briefs opposing Trump's "Liberation Day" tariffs speaks for itself.

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Yesterday, the Liberty Justice Center and I  filed our appellate brief VOS Selections, Inc. v. Trump, the case challenging Trump's massive "Liberation Day" tariffs on behalf of five small businesses. We are working with Neal Katyal and Michael McConnell, both leading constitutional law scholars and appellate litigators. The case is before the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, consolidated with a related case filed by 12 state governments, led by Oregon. We are defending a unanimous ruling in our favor by the US Court of International Trade. The key issue, as before, is that the government claims the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA) grants the president unlimited power to impose tariffs on any nation, in any amount, for any reason, for any length of time. We contend IEEPA grants no such authority, and if it did it would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive.

Yesterday was also the deadline for amicus briefs filed in support of our side. This post is an overview of some of the most notable ones. The bottom line is that rarely has a case attracted such a broad and impressive range of amici from across the political spectrum, and different sectors of the economy and civil society.  Many of the briefs also make important points. By contrast, there are only two amicus briefs supporting the government, both filed by divisions of Stephen Miller's right-wing nationalist America First organization.

There are a total of eighteen briefs backing our position, so I can only comment on a few aspects of them. I have included links, so interested readers can get more detail from the briefs themselves.

Advancing American Freedom, et al.: AAF is a conservative organization founded by former Vice President Mike Pence. Together with them on the brief are several other conservative and libertarian groups, including the Independent Institute and the Mountain States Policy Center. The brief focuses on why the government's interpretation of IEEPA violates constitutional nondelegation constraints on the transfer of legislative power to the executive. It is particularly strong on the original meaning.

George Allen, et al.: This brief is on behalf of a bipartisan group of prominent legal scholars and former government officials. The legal scholars include Harold Koh (Yale), Richard Epstein (NYU), Alan Sykes (Stanford), and Gerard Magliocca (Univ. of Indiana). Epstein is probably the world's most prominent libertarian legal academic, while Koh is a prominent left-liberal scholar known for his work on national security law.  There are few, if any, other constitutional cases where both of them join the same amicus brief! The ex-government officials include former Republican Attorney General Michael Mukasey, former GOP Virginia Governor and Senator George Allen, former Senator and Secretary of Defense Charles Hagel, and more.  The brief especially focuses on the argument that IEEPA doesn't authorize tariffs, and that there is no genuine "emergency" here.

Brennan Center for Justice (NYU): The Brennan Center is a leading left-liberal research institute focusing legal issues. Among the co-authors are Elizabeth Goitein and Katherine Yon Ebright. Goitein is one of the nation's leading experts on emergency powers, and the brief gives a compelling explanation of why trade deficits do not qualify as an "emergency" or an "unusual and extraordinary threat" (both are necessary to invoke IEEPA). For those keeping track, Goitein also opposed President Biden's abuse of emergency powers in the student loan case, as did I.

Burlap and Barrel: This brief is on behalf of one the many thousands of businesses severely harmed by the tariffs. It's a great illustration of why protectionism makes no economic sense. Burlap and Barrel imports spices, many of which are difficult or impossible to produce in the US. Imposing tariffs on their products harms American consumers and businesses, for little if any gain to anyone else. Several of our own clients are in the same positions, include lead plaintiff VOS Selections, which imports wine; the wine they import, in many cases, simply cannot be produced in the US, given differences in climate and soil.

Cato Institute: Cato is the nation's leading libertarian think tank, and their brief focuses on the constitutional nondelegation issue, providing a strong overview of the relevant history and original meaning. In addition to my main job as a law professor at George Mason University, I am the Simon Chair in Constitutional Studies at Cato. But I had no role in writing the brief.

Consumer Watchdog: This group promotes consumer interests. The brief is co-authored by prominent legal scholar Alan Morrison (George Washington Univ.), who is a separation of powers expert. The brief focuses on nondelegation, and is notable for its analysis of how the Supreme Court's recent decision in FCC v. Consumers' Research bolsters our case on that issue.

Crutchfield Corp.: Crutchfield is another business severely harmed by the tariffs. They sell consumer electronics products.

Economists: This brief is on behalf of a large group of prominent economists spanning the political spectrum. They include 2024 Nobel Prize winner Daron Acemoglu, Gregory Mankiw (Harvard, former Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers under George W. Bush), Jason Furman (Harvard Kennedy School of Government, CEA chair under Barack Obama), Kimberley Clausing (UCLA, leading expert on international economic policy), and many more. The brief represents the consensus view of the economics profession, and explains why trade deficits are not an "emergency" or an "unusual and extraordinary threat" of the kind needed to trigger IEEPA. It also describes why the massive Liberation Day tariffs are a major policy issue triggering application of the major questions doctrine. The brief was drafted by a team led by big-name appellate litigator Adam Unikowsky.

Former Government Officials and Legal Scholars: This brief, on behalf of a group of mostly Republican former government officials, is coauthored by well-known legal scholar Mark Lemley (Stanford). Signatories include former Massachusetts Gov. Bill Weld, Peter Keisler,  several former members of Congress, and Ty Cobb - former special counsel to President Trump (not to be confused with the baseball Hall of Famer of the same name).

Goldwater Institute and Dallas Market Center: Goldwater is a libertarian-leaning public interest law group. Their brief focuses on the nondelegation doctrine, and is particularly strong on the history and original meaning, showing how the Trump tariffs replicate abuses perpetrated by 17th century British monarchs whose imposition of taxes without congressional authorization set dangerous precedents the Founding Fathers sought to avoid replicating.

191 Members of Congress: This brief is on behalf of 161 Democratic members of the House and 30 Democratic Senators, including both the House and Senate minority leaders. The principal authors - Georgetown law Prof. Jennifer Hillman and Peter Harrell, were among those who first developed the idea of challenging the IEEPA tariffs using the major questions and nondelegation doctrines. The brief does an excellent job of presenting these and related points.

New Civil Liberties Alliance: NCLA is a conservative public interest law group, which filed the first case challenging the IEEPA tariffs (albeit limited to those focused on China). Their brief explains why IEEPA does not authorize tariffs, and should not be interpreted as granting that power merely because the predecessor Trading With the Enemy Act might have done so.

NYU School of Law Institute for Policy Integrity: IPI is a research institute focused on administrative law. Professor Richard L. Revesz (NYU), the principal author is a leading expert on administrative law and regulation. The brief is a thorough and compelling discussion of why Trump's use of IEEPA to impose massive tariffs runs afoul of the major questions doctrine.

Peter Sage: Mr. Sage is a retiree harmed by the tariffs, primarily in his capacity as a consumer.

Princess Awesome, et al (Pacific Legal Foundation): PLF is a leading libertarian public interest law firm, and they filed this case on behalf of their clients in Princess Awesome v. CBP - a case challenging Trump's tariffs similar to our own. The brief is notable for its compelling analysis of different variants of nondelegation doctrine. PLF is also my wife's employer; but she is not one of the authors of the brief, nor is she working on their tariff case.

Protect Democracy Project: This brief focuses on the abuse of emergency powers, and why emergency powers issues are subject to judicial review. PDP is a bipartisan group focused on constraining abuses of executive power.

US Chamber of Commerce & Consumer Technology Association: Many have asked me why major business organizations weren't supporting our case. Well, the Chamber of Commerce - the nation's  biggest business federation - decided to step up! Their brief explains why IEEPA doesn't grant tariff authority, and outlines the grave harm Trump's trade war inflicts on the business community, and the American economy generally.

Vikram Amar & Mickey Edwards: Amar is a prominent constitutional law scholar, and Edwards is a former Republican member of Congress. Their brief emphasizes that delegations of legislative power to the executive should be narrowly construed, because the president's veto power makes them difficult to "retrieve" after the fact, creating a dangerous "one-way ratchet."

There were only two amicus briefs supporting the government, generated by different divisions of America First:

America First Legal Foundation: This one mostly just echoes the government's arguments.

America First Policy Institute: This one makes the weak argument that all of Trump's tariffs are authorized by Section 338 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. The Trump Administration chose not to rely on this claim, and for good reason.

Alien Enemies Act

Courts Can Check, and Have Checked, Executives' Military Judgment

Katherine Yon Ebright and Leah Tulin of the Brennan Center make the case against judicial deference to Trump's invocation of the Alien Enemies Act of 1798.

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A prison guard transfers Alien Enemies Act deportees from the U.S., alleged to be Venezuelan gang members, to the Terrorism Confinement Center in Tecoluca, El Salvador. Mar. 16, 2025 (El Salvador Presidential Press Office)

 

Last month, Brennan Center attorneys Katherine Yon Ebright and Leah Tulin, and I submitted  an amicus brief in the Fifth Circuit case of W.M.M. v. Trump, opposing the Trump Administration's use of the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 as a tool for peacetime detention and deportation of immigrants. Katherine is a leading expert on the AEA and its history. The brief was filed on behalf of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU, the Cato Institute, prominent law-of-war scholar Prof. John Dehn, and myself.

Our brief was favorably cited by Fifth Circuit Judge Leslie Southwick in last week's oral argument in the case. Katherine and Leah have written this guest post addressing some key issues raised in the argument, and the AEA litigation more generally. I agree with virtually all their points! But what follows in the block quote is their work, not mine:

Last Monday, the Fifth Circuit heard oral argument in W.M.M. v. Trump, the first Alien Enemies Act challenge to make it to a circuit court in (somewhat) regular order rather than on an emergency motion.  Among the issues raised in the case — which finds its way to the Fifth Circuit at the Supreme Court's direction rather than on a standard appeal — is the propriety of President Trump's invocation of the 1798 law to deport scores of immigrants he alleges are members of Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan gang.  As oral argument made clear, a central question is whether the judiciary may second-guess the president's determination that an "invasion" or "predatory incursion," a prerequisite for the law's use, is ongoing.

The Alien Enemies Act is a wartime law that affords the president tremendous regulatory, detention, and deportation power over noncitizens from hostile nations.  It can be invoked when Congress declares war or when a "foreign nation or government" has perpetrated or threatened an "invasion" or "predatory incursion" against U.S. territory.  On March 15, the president proclaimed that Tren de Aragua had perpetrated such an attack by facilitating unlawful migration and committing drug trafficking and other crimes.  He referred to these acts as "irregular warfare" and attributed the gang's activities to the nation of Venezuela, which he called a "hybrid criminal state."

Common sense, of course, tells us that the nation is not being invaded by Venezuela and that gang violence, while a serious issue, is not war.  Moreover, top administration officials, ranging from the CIA Director to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, have repeatedly told Congress the same thing.

No matter.  In the Fifth Circuit, the government is arguing that the courts "must defer" to the president's proclamation, even if they disagree that an invasion or predatory incursion is underway.  These matters, the government contends, are so heavily infused with political judgment that the courts are powerless to intervene.

The "political question doctrine" and other judicial deference doctrines have often precluded the courts' intervention in cases involving sensitive foreign policy and national security judgments.  To that end, the Fifth Circuit judges expressed uncertainty about the permissible scope of review.  Judge Oldham, in particular, asked whether any Supreme Court opinion supported the authority of the courts to "countermand the president of the United States in his determination regarding armed conflict" or to second-guess a chief executive, whether the president or a governor, in his identification of "an insurrection, an invasion," or other such events.

Petitioners' counsel, Lee Gelernt of the ACLU, rightly responded that the Supreme Court has repeatedly and specifically said that the judiciary may evaluate whether the Alien Enemies Act is properly invoked.  Gelernt also discussed the Court's cases regarding law-of-war detention at Guantanamo Bay, in which the judiciary has carved out for itself a role in assessing whether detainees are in fact enemy combatants.

Beyond these examples, there is another line of cases that affirms the courts' power to overturn executive decision-making in sensitive matters of war, peace, and public safety.  That caselaw begins with Sterling v. Constantin, a 1932 case in which the Supreme Court rejected a Texas governor's imposition of martial law.  While acknowledging that the governor had broad discretion to proclaim an "insurrection" as "chief executive officer of the state and commander in chief of its military forces," the Court ruled that the governor's proclamation exceeded his authority.  Because there was "never any actual riot, tumult, or insurrection" in reality, the governor's imposition of martial law fell beyond the "permitted range of honest judgment" an executive has for carrying out his constitutional obligation to faithfully execute the law.

Since 1932, Sterling's "permitted range of honest judgment" rule has been applied rarely but with great consequence.  As those following the Alien Enemies Act invocation may know, the law was last used in World War II to intern 31,000 noncitizens of Japanese, German, and Italian descent.  Several months after the United States entered the war, the Alien Enemies Act was complemented and quickly overshadowed by Executive Order 9066 — the authority used to incarcerate more than 120,000 Japanese Americans, including tens of thousands of U.S. citizens, on the West Coast.  Applying the rule in Sterling, the courts prevented this second authority from being applied to German Americans on the East Coast.

In Schueller v. Drum and Ebel v. Drum, courts rejected claims of military necessity made by General Drum of Eastern Defense Command, who sought to apply Executive Order 9066 to target German Americans in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts.  The judge in Schueller observed, "The normal civilian life of the area was being pursued . . . and it could not be honestly said that ordinary law did not adequately secure public safety."  The military could not use an exceptional wartime authority — even one signed by the president and backed by the Congress — to dislodge constitutional rights when no "exigency of war" existed in fact.

Schueller and Ebel were decided in 1943, at a time of immense concern and uncertainty regarding the national security.  They stood in stark contrast to the reflexive judicial deference on display in Korematsu v. United States, the 1944 Supreme Court case upholding Japanese incarceration on the West Coast that has since been rightly and roundly condemned as "wrong the day it was decided." Indeed, Schueller and Ebel have since been held out by some as evidence that German Americans were treated more fairly than Japanese Americans because of racial prejudice.  But those decisions also stand out as powerful examples of the critical role that the judiciary can and should play in protecting individual civil liberties against unsupported claims of a national security threat.

There are other cases that support the authority of the courts to check "manifestly unauthorized exercises of power," even in wartime.  Notably, Ex parte Milligan countermanded the president's approval of the use of military commissions in Indiana, citing "judicial knowledge that in Indiana the Federal authority was always unopposed."  We discuss Sterling, Milligan, and other relevant cases in an amicus brief filed in the Fifth Circuit on behalf of the Brennan Center, Cato Institute, and law professors Ilya Somin and John Dehn.

But Sterling, and particularly Schueller and Ebel, should weigh heavily in this case, given the Alien Enemies Act's role in World War II internments and the breadth of the power the administration is trying to unlock through its use of the law in peacetime.  A Department of Justice memorandum on the current Alien Enemies Act invocation mentions the possibility of warrantless house raids and summary deportations that bypass protections for refugees.  When the facts are so clear, and the stakes of judicial deference are so high, the courts must exercise their independent judgment lest they sanction another mistake that will echo through our nation and legal community for generations.

I (Ilya Somin) have previously criticized Trump's invocation of the AEA as beyond the scope of the statute in a variety of writings. See, e.g., here, here, here, and here. I have also explained why Trump's AEA deportations violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

"Why Jack Daniel's Can't Stop #WestElmCaleb and What Now?" Published

How Changes in SCOTUS Trademark Doctrine Affect Viral Hashtag Campaigns (or Not)

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Together with my coauthor and former student Kavita Balchand, I recently published a law review article entitled "Why Jack Daniel's Can't Stop #WestElmCaleb and What Now?" in the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal. It is available for download here, and this is the abstract:

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Jack Daniel's Properties v. VIP Products was hailed as a victory by trademark owners worried about infringement and dilution. Its holding weakened the potential protection that trademark parodies would receive via the fair use defense. That said, it remains difficult to use trademark law to stop many uses of marks that harm a brand, in an era in which a single negative viral hashtag campaign could spell disaster. Notably, hashtags including trademarks such as "#WestElmCaleb" and "#TinderSwindler" have spread in recent years and arguably brought disrepute to the named companies by connecting them to alleged predators of various stripes. Even with the Jack Daniel's holding going their way, trademark owners are unlikely to be able to act against most third parties who use their marks on social media in this manner, mainly because the use is descriptive and not for financial gain. Things are murkier when commercial entities make use of a hashtagged or previously-hashtagged term, as happened with "West Elm Caleb" when other companies began making references to the term in their messaging. West Elm would be going down an uncertain legal road by pursuing those claims, however, and meanwhile any claims against individual social media users would likely not only lose but also hurt the company with consumers. The solution for optimal brand management may largely lie in self-help: companies such as West Elm should prevent harassing and other unsavory behavior on the part of their employees on social media and in other communications in the first place, and companies such as Tinder must overhaul their safety practices to rein in predatory users. This Article proposes advances in employee policies and training to prevent trademark harms arising from employees' online behavior, and also gives guidance on dating apps' user problem. While Jack Daniel's might not be able to stop West Elm Caleb or the Tinder Swindler, the companies involved can take a real "shot" at it.

More on Coercion in Mahmoud

Implications for the Ten Commandments cases

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Some quick thoughts occasioned by Josh Blackman's post on coercion in Mahmoud v. Taylor, last Term's parental rights case.

As readers will recall, Mahmoud held that a Maryland school district violated the Free Exercise Clause when it rescinded an opt-out policy that had allowed parents to have their children excused from elementary school lessons featuring LGBTQ+-inclusive storybooks. The Court reasoned that the storybooks, along with classroom discussions that encouraged teachers to reinforce their messages, imposed psychological pressure on students to accept a normative view of sexuality—one that directly conflicted with the religious teachings the parents sought to instill. That pressure, the majority concluded, amounted to a substantial burden on the parents' religious exercise.

In a post yesterday, I noted what seemed like an ideological reversal in the case. In the school prayer context—for example, Kennedy v. Bremerton School District—it's typically progressives who emphasize the dangers of subtle coercion and impressionable students, while conservatives downplay those concerns. In Mahmoud, the roles flipped. The conservative majority focused on the psychological pressure placed on young children by state-endorsed messaging, while the progressive justices appeared less troubled by that dynamic.

So which side is being inconsistent? Perhaps both are simply responding to context. Or perhaps the concept of "coercion" is more manipulable than either side tends to admit.

Josh offers one way to reconcile Mahmoud and Kennedy: by distinguishing between pressure on students' religious beliefs versus their non-religious beliefs. Under this reading, Mahmoud bars the state from pressuring students to abandon religious teachings, but Kennedy permits exposure to religious ideas, even if the state implicitly favors them, so long as there's no coercion into belief.

I wonder if another, simpler distinction might do more work: the age of the students involved. Mahmoud concerned very young children—kindergarten through fifth grade—who are especially vulnerable to subtle cues from teachers. Kennedy, by contrast, involved high school students, who, in theory at least, are better equipped to resist classroom pressure—or have already learned to tune out much of what their teachers say. In other words, the Court might be drawing an implicit line based not just on the nature of the message but on the susceptibility of the audience.

Josh also rightly highlights a doctrinal frontier: the Ten Commandments display cases currently working their way through the lower courts. These raise hard questions for conservatives post-Mahmoud. In Stone v. Graham (1980), the Court struck down a classroom display of the Ten Commandments under the Lemon test. But since Kennedy, Lemon is out, and the Court has instructed lower courts to apply a "history and tradition" framework to Establishment Clause claims.

Even under that revised test, though, the state may not coerce religious belief. And if Mahmoud teaches that distributing LGBTQ+-affirming storybooks to elementary schoolers is too coercive, might a Ten Commandments display in the same setting pose a similar problem?

Courts may try to draw a line between passive and active messaging. One possible distinction appears in the European Court of Human Rights' decision in Lautsi v. Italy (2011), which upheld the display of crucifixes in public school classrooms. The Court reasoned that crucifixes were "passive symbols" and unlikely to indoctrinate students, unlike formal instruction. U.S. courts might adopt a similar distinction here. In Mahmoud, teachers were not just presenting material; they were encouraged to affirm the books' messages and correct students who disagreed. A silent wall display may strike courts as less coercive.

Free Speech

Words "So Indefinite, Ambiguous and Incertain" That They Aren't Treated as Slanderous

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This is a familiar principle in modern defamation law: Some words, however pejorative, are treated as too general to be the sorts of factual allegations that can count as defamation. I just came across the same principle in Marshall v. Addison (Md. Provincial Ct. 1773), and thought it formed a good illustration of how long Anglo-American law has been dealing with these questions:

THIS was an action of Slander. The declaration contained three counts. The first and second counts, for saying the plaintiff was "a rogue and villain, and that he had ruined many families, and the curses of the widows and children were on him," &c. "that he had wronged the defendant's father's estate, and cheated the defendant's brother Thomas." …

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Free Speech

Court Upholds Anti-Stalking Injunction Stemming from Public Pressure Campaign Over Allegedly Wrongly Withheld Cat

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From the N.H. Supreme Court Thursday in D.V. v. R.G. (see also the newspaper coverage of the initial controversy; court records reflect that the parties are Valente v. Garcia):

The plaintiff owns a business near an apartment building in Manchester where the defendant lives. In June 2024, the defendant let her cat outside. The cat was apparently sick and dying. On the same day, the plaintiff's daughter found a cat on the plaintiff's property that appeared to be in poor health. The plaintiff took the cat in and spent several thousand dollars on veterinary care. [Note that defendant argues, in her appellate brief that the cat was "an indoor-outdoor cat who would wander the neighborhood"; she had taken the cat to the vet, who told her that the cat "may die in the upcoming weeks"; she brought the cat "home so he would live his last days with his family"; and she let the cat continue his daily routine, including his outside time, "because at the time, he was not in distress." -EV]

On Friday, June 28, the plaintiff learned that the defendant had lost a cat and went to the defendant's apartment to inquire whether the cat belonged to the defendant. Although the parties dispute what the plaintiff said or promised during that meeting, there is no dispute that, by the end of the day, the plaintiff refused to return the cat to the defendant. According to the plaintiff, she was concerned that, if the cat were the defendant's cat, the defendant had abused or neglected it. The plaintiff communicated to the defendant that she planned to consult with Manchester Animal Control when it opened the following Monday morning.

By Saturday, the defendant had made claims on social media that the plaintiff and her daughter had stolen her cat. [More facts below. -EV] The defendant also organized a protest outside the plaintiff's business. [Again, more facts below. -EV] … On Tuesday, when the plaintiff's daughter brought the cat, at the suggestion of the police, to the animal shelter, the cat had died. The defendant then claimed on social media that the plaintiff had killed the cat….

New Hampshire law allows courts to issue anti-stalking orders of protection, aimed at stopping defendants from

  1. "[p]urposely, knowingly, or recklessly engag[ing] in a course of conduct"—defined to include at least two acts of communication—
  2. "targeted at a specific person"
  3. "which would cause a reasonable person to fear" for the person's or family members' safety
  4. when such fear has indeed been caused.

Plaintiff sought such an order, and the trial court issued it, banning defendant from "further acts of stalking"—which presumably forbade the defendant from repeating the behavior that she engaged in—and specifically banning defendant "from posting about Plaintiff and her business on any public social media accounts." The trial court reasoned (see pp. 22-23 of this PDF):

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Justice Thomas Avoids Substantive Due Process with Meyer and Pierce

Thomas may attempt to recast Pierce as a Free Exercise case, but it cannot be understood in that fashion.

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On June 26, the Court decided Gutierrez v. Saenz. Justice Thomas wrote a thoughtful concurrence that explored the meaning of "liberty" in the Due Process Clause. In that concurrence, Thomas cast doubt on the doctrine of substantive due process. Yet, as I noted, Thomas was a bit cagey about Meyer v. Nebraska, and the right to raise children. I suspect that Mahmoud was on Thomas's mind.

On June 27, the Court decided Mahmoud. As I explained in this post, the Court resolved this case about parental rights with barely any mention of substantive due process. The Court is still suffering from Lochner-phobia. Everything was grounded in the Free Exercise of Religion. For example, Justice Alito wrote:

"[W]e have long recognized the rights of parents to direct 'the religious upbringing' of their children." Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591 U. S. 464, 486 (2020) (quoting Yoder, 406 U. S., at 213–214).

Meyer and Pierce were not limited to "religious upbringing." Those precedents referred to upbringing of children, in all contexts.

Justice Sotomayor's dissent describes the majority opinion accurately:

Here, however, the Court's analysis makes no mention of substantive due process rights or the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. It instead asserts, simply, that "the burden in this case is of the exact same character as the burden in Yoder."

Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence in Mahmoud that hinted at substantive due process, briefly. Thomas explains that Yoder was based on Pierce v. Society of Sisters:

In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied heavily on its earlier decision in Pierce, which articulated "perhaps the most significant statements of the Court in this area."

And Pierce, in turn, was a substantive due process case:

While the Court did not decide Pierce on free exercise grounds,[FN4] the context in which Pierce arose confirms that it "stands as a charter of the rights of parents to direct thereligious upbringing of their children." Yoder, 406 U. S., at 233.

[FN4] The Court decided Pierce 15 years before it recognized that the First Amendment's free-exercise guarantee applies against the States. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).

Griswold and other Warren Court cases tried to recast Pierce as a Free Exercise case, but that doesn't work. Lochner and Pierce are cut from the same cloth.

For reasons I do not understand, Justice Thomas doesn't cite his Gutierrez concurrence, or talk about Lochner. He may have made peace with a substantive due process right to raise children, but his cagey about the basis.

At bottom, the Justices don't want to talk about Smith, and they don't want to talk about substantive due process. But now that Dobbs overruled Roe, I do think there is some space to talk about facets of substantive due process that may be correct.

The Status of Smith and Yoder After Mahmoud

The Court continues avoiding the Smith issue, but in an unexpected way.

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A few days ago, I asked if the moment for overruling Smith had passed. At the time, I had not yet read Mahmoud. (I am still making my way through the opinions.) Now, having read Mahmoud, I see a Court that is desperately trying to stay away from resolving the validity of Smith.

Let me lay out some salient facts from Mahmoud. The government initially allowed parents to opt-out their children from being exposed to certain books. However, that opt-out was later removed. And, as Justice Alito observed, "[t]he Board member went on to suggest that the religious parents were comparable to 'white supremacists' who want to prevent their children from learning about civil rights and 'xenophobes' who object to 'stories about immigrant families.'" Yet, the school permits other types of opt-outs for non-religious reasons.

Based on the Court's precedents, I could see two possible ways to avoid Smith. First, the Court could follow Masterpiece Cakeshop, and find that the statements from the board member were impermissible animus against religious parents. This policy would not be neutral towards religion. That finding would trigger heightened scrutiny under the rubric from Church of the Lukumi. Then again, Justice Sotomayor suggests in Footnote 15 that the Board Member was not actually expressing hostility towards religion, so that argument may not have worked.

Second, the government allowed an exemption for religious parents, but then removed that exemption, even as other exemptions are present. These facts resembles Roman Catholic Diocese, Tandon, and Fulton, under the "most favored nation" approach. In other words, religion is being treated worse than non-religion. This policy would then not be generally applicable, so would be reviewed with heightened scrutiny. The Court even cited Fulton:

This robust "system of exceptions" undermines the Board's contention that the provision of opt outs to religious parents would be infeasible or unworkable. Fulton, 593 U. S., at 542.

But Alito discussed the exemptions at the back-end scrutiny analysis, and not at the front-end to determine whether strict scrutiny applies.

Yet, the Mahmoud Court did not take Door #1 or Door #2. Justice Alito expressly said he wouldn't even consider these arguments:

We acknowledge the many arguments pressed by the parents that theBoard's policies are not neutral and generally applicable. See Brief for Petitioners 35–44. But we need not consider those arguments further given that strict scrutiny is appropriate under Yoder.

Instead, Justice Alito took Door #3: Yoder. Alito explains that Mahmoud has the same "special character" as Yoder, so the Court follows that precedent.

Here, the character of the burden requires us to proceed differently. When the burden imposed is of the same character as that imposed in Yoder, we need not ask whether the law at issue is neutral or generally applicable before proceeding to strict scrutiny. That much is clear from our decisions in Yoder and Smith. . . .  And we explained that the general rule did not apply in Yoder because of the special character of the burden in that case. 494 U. S., at 881. Thus, when a law imposes a burden of the same character as that in Yoder, strict scrutiny is appropriate regardless of whether the law is neutral or generally applicable.

Therefore, given this "special character," Yoder does not fall under the Smith rubric. Thus, you get to heightened scrutiny without discussing whether the law is neutral or generally applicable. I suspect this indirect route was necessary to keep Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett on board. They do not want to revisit Smith, and this approach allowed the Court to avoid that precedent.

Yoder has long been a favorite case for religious liberty litigants to cite, but I was always uncertain about its status. In Smith, Justice Scalia had to bend over backwards to distinguish away Yoder. Accordingly, I did not think Yoder had much play outside the narrow confines of that decision. The Burger Court was sympathetic to the Amish, but I doubt other religious groups would have gotten similar treatment. This case doesn't appear in the Barnett/Blackman casebook.

In Mahoud, the lower court limited the case to the unique circumstances of the Amish. The District Court "dismissed Yoder as 'sui generis and 'inexorably linked to the Amish community's unique religious beliefs and practices.'" Justice Alito, however, explained this was an error:

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Contrasting Coercion for the Free Exercise Clause in Mahmoud and Coercion for the Establishment Clause in Kennedy

The Court finds that the government cannot indirectly coerce children who are exercising their religious beliefs, but the government can indirectly coerce children who are not exercising their religious beliefs.

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Mahmoud v. Taylor followed naturally from Skrmetti. Indeed, you could imagine a Court that decided Skrmetti the other would also flip Mahmoud. But given the fact that Skrmetti allowed the state to shield minors from gender transitioning, it makes sense that Mahmoud allowed parents to shield minors from information about gender transitioning.

Still, even though the outcome of Mahmoud was not hard to predict, the Court took a somewhat circuitous route to get there. First, the Court relied almost exclusively on Yoder, and used that precedent to get around Smith. Second, the Court, and Justice Thomas in particular, said almost nothing about substantive due process, even though the right to raise children was grounded in Lochner-era decisions like Meyer and Pierce. I'll address these two topics in other posts.

Here, I will discuss a third topic that requires some unpacking. How can Mahmoud be reconciled with Kennedy v. Bremerton School District? In particular, how can you line up the Court's treatment of coercion in these two recent decisions?

Recall that in Kennedy, the school district argued that the coach's prayers could coerce students, and thus violate the Establishment Clause. But according to the school district, there was "no evidence that students [were] directly coerced to pray with Kennedy." I have read Kennedy to stand for the proposition that only direct evidence of coercion would violate the Establishment Clause. As Justice Gorsuch explained, "[o]ffense . . . does not equate to coercion." Stated differently, merely being exposed to the prayer is not enough.

However, in Mahmoud, Justice Alito's majority opinion discussed coercion in a different fashion. Justice Alito reads Yoder as holding "that the Free Exercise Clause protects against policies that impose more subtle forms of interference with the religious upbringing of children." The Court goes on to say that the government can violate the Free Exercise Clause, even if there is only evidence of indirect coercion. Justice Alito writes:

According to the dissent, parents who send their children to public school must endure any instruction that falls short of direct compulsion or coercion and must try to counteract that teaching at home. The Free Exercise Clause is not so feeble. The parents in Barnette and Yoder were similarly capable of teaching their religious values "at home," but that made no difference to the First Amendment analysis in those cases.

Justice Sotomayor's dissent explains that the Roberts Court has in fact required such a heightened pleading standard.

Consistent with these longstanding principles, this Court has made clear that mere exposure to objectionable ideas does not give rise to a free exercise claim. That makes sense: Simply being exposed to beliefs contrary to your own does not "prohibi[t]" the "free exercise" of your religion. Amdt. 1. Nor does mere "'[o]ffense . . . equate to coercion.'" Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 597 U. S. 507, 539 (2022) (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U. S. 565, 589 (2014) (plurality opinion) (alteration in original).

Justice Sotomayor returns to Kennedy later in her dissent.

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Free Speech

Administration's Filings in Support of Defunding of Voice of America Are Inadequate, Federal Judge Says

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From Judge Royce Lamberth (D.D.C.) today in Widakuswara & Abramowitz v. Lake:

On April 22, 2025, upon finding that the defendants likely violated several provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), this Court ordered the defendants to "restore VOA programming such that USAGM fulfills its statutory mandate that VOA 'serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news.'" This portion of the Court's preliminary injunction remains in full effect.

On June 23, 2025, the Court held a hearing on the pending Motions for an Order to Show Cause … regarding the defendants' alleged noncompliance with this part of the preliminary injunction. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court ordered the defendants to file a "supplemental memorandum with additional information regarding USAGM's recent activities, including any relevant information about USAGM [U.S. Agency for Global Media] funding decisions, personnel updates, and submissions to Congress." …

The Court, having now reviewed all filings, is still unable to get a clear picture of how VOA is operating or how the agency plans to operate VOA moving forward.

For example, the defendants cite VOA's ramped-up Persian news programming in the aftermath of the recent Israeli air strikes against Iran as a successful demonstration of VOA's capacity to report the news. The defendants emphasize their ability to "exercise[] recalls, as appropriate," and maintain their "access to critical talent" to carry out operations as needed. But at the same time, the defendants also attach their submission to Congress on June 3rd, showing their intent to fire those very Persian News Network staffers as part of the impending reduction-in-force (RIF). See June 3 Notification to Senator Graham (indicating plan to retain only 11 VOA positions and 2 Farsi language positions). Faced with this record, the Court cannot rely on the defendants' latest representation of the Persian News Network "surge operation" as any measure of compliance.

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