Prof. Jane Bambauer and I discuss Murthy v. Missouri (the former Missouri v. Biden).
under California statutes that protect private employees' political activity; the plaintiff claimed that "[s]he listened to speeches being made and walked to the Capitol, and then she left," and "did not participate in any rioting."
This used to be possible under the old "alienation of affections" tort, but all but a handful of states have abolished it, and the tortious inducement of breach of contract tort can't fill that gap.
Florida appellate courts are pretty good about reversing unconstitutional injunctions against speech (though Florida trial courts seem to be pretty willing to enter such injunctions).
The lottery winner is suing an ex-girlfriend based on a non-disclosure agreement aimed at concealing his identity. (The intervention, at this point, is aimed at just unsealing various sealed documents in the case, not at disclosing the parties' names.)
at least when the license requires 6000 hours of training on matters far removed from his expertise.
and so can the professor's Title VII and Title IX discrimination claims against the university.
Justice Jackson, like Justice Breyer (whom she replaced and for whom she clerked), seems to be considering an approach that is more embracing of speech restrictions that she views as especially urgent—including perhaps ones that departs from precedents such as the Pentagon Papers case.
The government can't block viewpoints it condemns from its own property that has been opened to publicspeech. Should there be limits on government systematically and substantially encouraging private entities to block the same viewpoints from their property—which may be much more important to public debate than the government property where speech remains free?
Such speech can be found to be "impermissible harassment," the court says, partly because "deference to schoolteachers is especially appropriate today, where, increasingly, what is harmful or innocent speech is in the eye of the beholder."
A black resident called the police to complain about alleged racial harassment by white neighbor; the resident alleges the police arrested him for leaving the scene after the police arrived, but didn't arrest the neighbor for doing the same thing.
The Indiana Court of Appeals, though, reverses the order, concluding the judge wasn't allowed to issue such an order on his own initiative; it doesn't decide whether such an order would violate the First Amendment.
This bears on when the official's comment deletion or blocking decisions may violate the First Amendment.
What's on your mind, other than the open thread being late today?
and also because private clubs generally have broad discretion in interpreting their internal rules.
The Fifth Circuit leaves room for possible retroactive pseudonymization of the case, however, though it doesn't decide for certain whether such retroactive pseudonymization is proper.
Part of the facts in an interesting recent case, dealing with plaintiff's claims that the police retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights to report crime.
when in context the statement just expressed "an intention to file a complaint against the conduct of government officials."
The culture of public accusation and shaming, in high school (and stemming from a relationship that apparently happened when the accuser and accused were sophomores).
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