Some excerpts from Sandmann v. N.Y. Times Co., decided yesterday by the Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Jane Stranch, joined by Judge Stephanie Davis (for more details, read the full opinions):
On January 18, 2019, then-sixteen-year-old Nicholas Sandmann and his classmates had an interaction with a Native American man named Nathan Phillips by the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C. Video of the incident went viral, and national news organizations, including the five Defendants (Appellees, or News Organizations) published stories about the day's events and the ensuing public reaction. Sandmann sued, alleging that the Appellees' reporting, which included statements from Phillips about the encounter, was defamatory…. [We agree with the district court that] the challenged statements were opinion, not fact, and therefore nonactionable….
Videos of the confrontation between a white male teenager in a "Make America Great Again" hat and an elderly Native American man went viral on social media. National media, including the five News Organizations, covered the incident at length over the following days, with most outlets quoting a statement Phillips made to the Washington Post:
It was getting ugly, and I was thinking: I've got to find myself an exit out of this situation and finish my song at the Lincoln Memorial. I started going that way, and that guy in the hat stood in my way and we were at an impasse. He just blocked my way and wouldn't allow me to retreat.
This statement and others like it asserting that Sandmann blocked Phillips are referred to as "blocking statements." …
"Whether a statement qualifies for protection under the constitutional pure opinion privilege is a legal question to be decided by the court, not a question for the jury." … The First Amendment protects statements that "cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual" in "recognition of the Amendment's vital guarantee of free and uninhibited discussion of public issues." In other words, "a viable defamation claim exists only where a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the challenged statement connotes actual, objectively verifiable facts."
Professor Bradley Rebeiro has an interesting new paper on the constitutional thought of Frederick Douglass, "Frederick Douglass and the Original Originalists." The article is forthcoming in the BYU Law Review, but a draft is available on SSRN.
Here is the abstract:
Constitutional scholars incessantly grapple over the significance of the Constitution's original meaning. More specifically, they are preoccupied with, on the one hand, what that meaning is (if such meaning exists) and, on the other hand, the exact nature of that meaning's authority (if any) over the Constitution and its interpreters. But this debate is hardly novel. In fact, one of the most compelling voices in U.S. history was immersed in similar debates and, out of the constitutional sparring of his time, forged an arresting theory of constitutional interpretation. Frederick Douglass, once a fierce opponent of the U.S. Constitution, evolved into a defender of the Constitution with a robust theory of constitutional interpretation that addressed the constitutional evil of slavery. For example, in 1847, Douglass stated: "The Constitution I hold to be radically and essentially slave-holding . . . [t]he language of the Constitution is you shall be a slave or die." Yet, five years later in his famous speech, "What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?", Douglass declared: "interpreted as it ought to be interpreted, the Constitution is a glorious liberty document." Because Douglass was primarily a political and constitutional actor that never wrote a treatise of jurisprudence, his understanding of constitutionalism must be gleaned from his many speeches and other writings. I therefore take on the task of welding together these speeches and writings to demonstrate how Douglass's theory fuses historical meaning, established legal rules of interpretation, natural rights principles, and a conception of justice into a cohesive approach that addresses the problem of constitutional interpretation and construction.
Though Douglass was one of the most prominent political thinkers and constitutional actors of the 19th century, his constitutional thought has been overlooked by most legal scholars and mostly mischaracterized by political scientists. Due to the aforementioned lack of a singular treatise on the subject, as well as Douglass's constitutional transformation over the course of his life, this comes as no surprise. Legal scholars tend either to dismiss his constitutional theory as incoherent or to assume that Douglass's reformed theory was not sincere, but merely a smokescreen for political purposes. Others have referred to Douglass as a living constitutionalist or offered wholly new categories to explain Douglass's position, such as "reform textualism." However, Douglass's theory, similar to his contemporaries, may be seen as anticipating the modern shift to originalism. But this claim challenges the conventional scholarly wisdom in two ways. First, the current literature mostly characterizes Douglass as, at the very least, anti-originalist. Second, though Douglass's theory shares many elements with originalism, originalism's current formulations leave little room for philosophical inquiry, which Douglass's theory admittedly does. His theory does not fit perfectly into any of the many variations of originalism today, thereby offering present-day originalists new possibilities. I will thus refer to Douglass's theory as "natural rights originalism." Natural rights originalism deviates most importantly in not abandoning the original philosophical principles that animated the Constitution's framing. This theory, the product of an insatiably inquisitive mind, transformed Douglass's constitutional thinking—no longer was the Constitution an instrument of oppression, but one of freedom.
From Tuesday's decision of the Texas Court of Appeals (Amarillo) in Boes v. State, written by Justice Alex Yarbrough, and joined by Chief Justice Brian Quinn and Justice Larry Doss:
[Following an arrest of Boes for assaulting his then-wife, a court issued an emergency protective order that] prohibited Appellant from the following:
communicating directly with a family member of the family or household or with the person(s) protected under the Order in a threatening or harassing manner; communicating a threat through any person to a member of the family or household or to the person(s) protected under the Order;
communicating in any manner with a person protected under the Order or a member of the family or household of a person protected under the Order, accept through the party's attorney or a person appointed by the court, because the Court finds good cause exists; and
going to or within 500 feet of the residence of the victim.
The order was signed on February 5, 2020. In March 2020, Appellant posted on Facebook on at least three occasions and "tagged" [his wife]…. The crucial inquiry to resolve is whether those Facebook tags constitute "communications" in violation of the protective order. We hold under the facts presented herein they do….
On this Breaking News episode, I interview Christa about her sexual harassment allegations against just-departed George Mason University antitrust law professor and former FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright. In a tweet (accompanied by a screenshotted email) viewed by hundreds of thousands of people, Christa described how Josh asked her out on a date while GMU hiring chair when he knew that she was desperate to remain in the DC area to maintain custody of her two children. Christa's tweet prompted multiple former students and employees of Josh's to come out publicly with allegations of his having (successfully) pressured them into inappropriate sexual relationships when he held their careers in his hands.
Christa and I discuss the possible professional repercussions against female "troublemakers" who call out rule- and law-breaking at their institutions. We also analyze how and why legal academia breeds predatory and discriminatory behavior, how allies can help, and what reform might look like in light of this #metoo moment.
Note: According to a statement printed in the media by Lindsay McKasson, counsel to Joshua Wright at Binall Law Group "all allegations of sexual misconduct are false," "These false allegations are being made public after unsuccessfully demanding millions of dollars behind closed doors," and "We look forward to total vindication in court." According to a tweet by Christa, "I don't appreciate that his attorney falsely suggests we are all lying (1/2 was in writing!) & want $ (this is a lie--I only want him gone)."
This enforcement guidance explains how the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General and the Division on Civil Rights (DCR) will apply the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) to prohibit discrimination by places of public accommodation following the U.S. Supreme Court's recent ruling in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis. {The purpose of this guidance document is to clarify and explain DCR's understanding of existing legal requirements in order to facilitate compliance with the LAD. This guidance document does not impose any new or additional requirements that are not included in the LAD, does not establish any rights or obligations for any person, and will not be enforced by DCR as a substitute for enforcement of the LAD. This document does not provide legal advice and should not be treated as providing legal advice. Owners of places of public accommodation and others with questions about the LAD are encouraged to speak with a qualified attorney to address their specific questions.}
The LAD prohibits places of public accommodation— that is, places open to the public—from discriminating on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, gender expression, race, color, national origin, ancestry, religion, disability, and other protected characteristics. The ruling in 303 Creative does not change how the LAD applies to the vast majority of public accommodations across the State, and DCR remains firmly committed to enforcing the LAD and safeguarding the rights of all New Jerseyans.
In 303 Creative, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the First Amendment barred the application of a Colorado anti-discrimination statute, which prohibited places of public accommodation from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, to a web designer who intended to make customized websites for weddings but not to do so for same-sex weddings. The parties agreed that the web designer's websites were "original" and were "customized and tailored" for each customer, and that the websites the business designed were "expressive" and expressed the designer's own speech and message regarding her clients' weddings. The parties also stipulated that the web designer was willing to work with all people regardless of their protected characteristics and, in particular, would create custom graphics and websites for clients of any sexual orientation. Based on those specific facts and stipulations, the Supreme Court held that the web designer had a First Amendment right not to make her customized website designs for same-sex weddings.
On June 16, 2023, Petitioner St. Joseph's Hospital Health Center … filed an emergency application to retain Respondent B****** V******* … as a patient and provide treatment pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law ("MHL") § 9.33….
MHLS [Mental Hygiene Legal Service] on behalf of Respondent moves for an order mandating an in-person hearing on the Petition for treatment over objection pursuant to MHL § 9.27. The argument proffered by MHLS is that with the recission of COVID-19-era administrative orders mandating virtual appearances in MHL Article 9 proceedings, the Court must hear such matters in-person….
Since the onset of COVID-19, this Court has conducted many motion arguments, hearings, and non-jury trials via Microsoft Teams without significant issue. Those issues that have arisen mostly involve matters which would occur with in-person appearances, namely timeliness and outside noises. As Counsel for St. Joseph's pointed out, it is not an uncommon occurrence for an emergency siren or exterior shouts or air conditioning turning on to be so loud as to interrupt a witness testifying or attorney arguing. In both cases, virtually or in-person, the Court or Court Reporter have simply asked the individual to repeat themselves and the proceedings moved on.
Due Process does not command that the hearing be conducted in-person either.
Officials at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services advised hundreds of employees in San Francisco to work remotely for the foreseeable future due to public safety concerns outside the Nancy Pelosi Federal Building on Seventh Street…. The area is … home to one of the city's most brazen open-air drug markets, where dozens of dealers and users congregate on a daily basis….
"In light of the conditions at the (Federal Building) we recommend employees … maximize the use of telework for the foreseeable future," [HHS Assistant Secretary for Administration Cheryl R. Campbell] wrote in [an Aug. 4] memo, a copy of which was obtained by The Chronicle.
As many VC blog readers know, several state legislatures have passed or are considering passing legislation to restrict or abolish tenure for professors at public universities. Among them is Texas, which recently weakened tenure protections and is seeking to pass further restrictions on what professors can teach.
To give VC blog readers a more personal perspective on the impact of these policies, I interviewed patent law scholar Professor Sapna Kumar on her decision to leave the Texas public university system. Until recently, Professor Kumar held the John Mixon Chair in Law at the University of Houston Law Center. She is now the Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School.
What first drew you to Houston and to teaching at a public university there?
I grew up in the Houston area, and I have both family and close friends there. So I knew that Houston had a lot to offer in terms of culture, restaurants, and an affordable cost of living.
I also really liked the idea of working for a public university. I am not religious and was therefore reluctant to join a religiously-affiliated private university. I also view public law schools as being more financially stable compared to most private ones, given that state funding can allow a public school to weather downturns in the economy. Working for the University of Houston seemed like a smart choice.
What was your time at the University of Houston Law Center like?
UHLC was a great choice for me. They have a large intellectual property program with several professors in my field who provided mentoring. I had a lot of financial support to attend conferences and to conduct research abroad. I also appreciated the politically diverse faculty, with professors who have a range of viewpoints.
After Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick vowed to abolish tenure in Texas in 2022, the faculty started getting nervous about what the impact would be. Many of us were concerned that the state would interfere with the content of our classes and would limit what we could research and publish. I became aware of faculty both at UHLC and at other Texas public universities who were looking for jobs out of state. That's when I started considering leaving Texas.
Were there other political developments that influenced your university's ability to recruit or retain people?
Yes, when the U.S. Supreme Court issued the Dobbs decision, striking down Roe v. Wade, a number of restrictive abortion laws took effect in Texas. This immediately impacted our ability to hire younger professors. Friends at other Texas universities reported similar difficulties as well. Even though jobs were well compensated and tenure-track positions are hard to come by, positions in Texas law schools went unfilled. Read More
The 38th episode (Apple Podcasts link here and Spotify link here) of Strangers on the Internet with co-host and psychologist Michelle Lange delves into whether it's wise to matchmake your friends and how to minimize the risks to your own friendships if you're going to do it.
Michelle Lange
How do you choose whom to match? Should you remain involved after the initial introduction? We dish about how we ourselves have been matchmade (but both only sort of) and what would make us reluctant to matchmake others. We also discuss the problem of flakiness in people being matchmade and beyond. Join the conversation!
I had asserted the contrary, arguing that the state allowance of pseudonymity in trying to get removal from the list didn't justify pseudonymity in a federal court lawsuit seeking damages for such placement; but the court disagreed.
From Doe v. Volokh, decided today by the First Circuit, in an opinion by Judge William Kayatta, joined by Judges Gustavo Gelpí and Lara Montecalvo:
Intervenor Eugene Volokh challenges the district court's decision to allow a former New Hampshire police officer to proceed pseudonymously in challenging the inclusion of his name on New Hampshire's "Exculpatory Evidence Schedule" (EES)…. Because Doe's reasons for proceeding pseudonymously place his case within the category of "exceptional cases in which party anonymity ordinarily will be warranted," Doe v. MIT (1st Cir. 2022), we affirm the district court's exercise of its discretion in denying Volokh's motion….
The EES is a list maintained by New Hampshire's Department of Justice identifying law enforcement officers "who have engaged in misconduct reflecting negatively on their credibility or trustworthiness." … New Hampshire's Supreme Court classified the EES as a public record that did not fall into the disclosure exemption carved out for police personnel files. However, that holding did not require the public disclosure of the names of officers with pending challenges to their listing.
A year later, New Hampshire enacted a statute that more or less codified the status quo in the wake of the decisions by New Hampshire's highest court. In this manner, New Hampshire sought to provide the public with important information concerning police misconduct while also affording officers notice and an opportunity to show that they should not be included on the list before their inclusion is made public.
From Marriage of Cochener & Metcalfe, decided yesterday by the Washington Court of Appeals (Judge Ian Birk, joined by Judges Stephen Dwyer & Janet Chung):
Metcalfe challenges a provision of the parenting plan that reads in part: "No parent will put down Christianity to or in front of the children, or allow other members of their household to put down either parents' spirituality." Metcalfe argues the trial court's wording of the religious upbringing provision violates the First Amendment.
The provision was not discussed until a posttrial hearing. Cochener's counsel stated, "Ms. Cochener just wants to be sure that Mr. Metcalfe does not have the ability to block her from teaching the children about her religion." The Court inquired as to the parents' religious practices. Cochener identified herself as "a practicing Christian," and Metcalfe stated, "I don't identify with any particular religion." Metcalfe stated it would not be a problem for him to teach the children to respect Cochener's religion, and "I think we should both expose the kids to different things so they can find their own way in life and be respectful to the other's views." Cochener stated, "[M]y only concern is that my children have expressed that they have been told denigrating things about Christianity in their dad's house. … I have no concern about raising my children with a respect for all religions and beliefs and non-beliefs."
The Court responded, "So any negative comments about Christianity made to the children or in front of the children … will be adequate cause to change the position to sole decision-making." The trial court subsequently incorporated Metcalfe's and Cochener's agreements in the written order: "Parents have agreed to raise their children to affirm all religious traditions, appreciate the good in the practice of other faiths, and respect those who have no religious preference. No parent will put down Christianity to or in front of the children, or allow other members of their household to put down either parents' spirituality."
People may be able to successfully sue based on allegedly false and defamatory statements about themselves, or about very small groups of people that include themselves—but not based on statements about whole countries or ethnic groups.
From Otto v. Chicago Public Media, Inc., decided Friday by the Appellate Court of Illinois, in an opinion by Justice Mathias Delort, joined by Justices Freddrenna Lyle and David Navarro:
The factual allegations of the complaint, which we take as true for the purposes of this appeal, are straightforward. Plaintiffs alleged that in 2021, defendant Neil Steinberg wrote an article published in the Chicago Sun-Times. The piece contrasts Black History Month with recent Polish governmental censorship of certain historical perspectives of atrocities committed against Jews in Poland in World War II. The key language in the article at issue in this appeal reads:
"Poland has a long history of anti-Semitism. It was anti-Semitic before World War II…. During the war, while there was certainly heroism — the unprepared Polish Army did charge German tanks on horseback — there was widespread collaboration in the form of killing off Jews, including my grandfather's entire family and his brother Zalman. The above paragraph is true, and the whole truth is far worse. Poles were killing Jews after the war, out of habit, when they tried to return to their villages."
In response to this piece, plaintiffs filed a two-count complaint which contained detailed factual allegations of brave and valiant acts taken by Poles to fight against Nazi Germany and prevent the genocide of Jews in World War II. Count I was a claim for defamation per se, focusing on this sentence: "[P]oles were killing Jews after the war, out of habit, when they tried to return to their villages."
The plaintiffs alleged that they lived in Poland during World War II and did not take part in any atrocities against Jews. In fact, they claimed, they witnessed Poles taking heroic actions to help Jews during that time. Accordingly, they contend, Steinberg's article defamed them in their roles as Polish nationals living in Poland during the relevant time period. The second count was a claim of false light based on the same operative facts….
Here's a slightly edited version of my post on the decision below, which the Fifth Circuit affirmed last week without a detailed opinion, on the afternoon of the day the case was argued. (My First Amendment Amicus Brief Clinic students Valentino Gorospe, Katarina Rusinas, and Asim Zaidi and I filed an amicus brief supporting plaintiff, who ultimately prevailed.) Plaintiff is represented by William Most and Hope Phelps of Most & Associates.
[* * *]
Louisiana's criminal libel law was repealed in 2021, but even before that it had been held unconstitutional as to prosecutions for libels of public officials, and more broadly as to prosecutions for libels on matters of public concern. Judge Jane Triche Milazzo's opinion in Rogers v. Smith (E.D. La.) held that an arrest for allegedly libeling a police officer violated the Fourth Amendment (and also allowed a First Amendment retaliation claim and some other claims to move forward):
This case arises out of the arrest of Plaintiff Jerry Rogers for criminal defamation. Defendants are St. Tammany Parish Sheriff Randy Smith, Chief Danny Culpeper, and Sergeant Keith Canizaro in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff alleges that he worked for the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office ("STPSO") from 1998 to 2009 before leaving for other employment. On July 14, 2017, Nanette Krentel was murdered in St. Tammany Parish, and her murder remains unsolved. Plaintiff followed the news coverage of the murder investigation and, based on his personal experience, became critical of some of the actions taken by the STPSO. He began communicating with Krentel's family members by email about his concerns. Specifically, Plaintiff was critical of the lead investigator, Detective Daniel Buckner.
At some point, the STPSO became aware of the emails and began investigating their source. Plaintiff alleges that upon discovering that Plaintiff was the author of the emails, the STPSO sought the advice from the district attorney's office ("the DA") and was advised that Louisiana's criminal defamation law, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:47, had been declared unconstitutional as to public officials and therefore charges against Plaintiff would be unconstitutional. Despite this, Defendants arrested Plaintiff for criminal defamation anyway.
8/16/1933: President Roosevelt adopts the Code of Fair Competition for the Governance of the Petroleum Industry. The Supreme Court declared those codes unconstitutional in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935).
Yesterday's Georgia state indictment against Donald Trump for his efforts to overturn the 2020 election in that state includes charges similar to those in the recent federal indictment filed by special counsel Jack Smith. But it also breaks considerable new ground. To the extent that the charges deal with similar issues, Georgia is - in my view - well-justified in prosecuting Trump, for much the same reasons as the federal government is. But some of the charges raise technical legal issues I prefer to leave to commentators with greater relevant expertise.
Some of the charges against Trump and 18 other defendants in the Georgia indictment are similar to recently filed federal charges. For example, both feature charges of fraud related to Trump's scheme to replace Georgia's electors with slates of fake electors, and pressure state officials into falsifying vote counts. While some technical details diverge, there legal case against Trump on these issues is strong (see my discussion of the relevant federal issues here and here), and there is a strong rationale for prosecution based on the need for retribution and deterrence.
As in the federal case, the relevant Georgia fraud statutes (which focus on defrauding the government and election fraud) are not confined to property crimes. And, as in that case, Trump is not being prosecuted merely for claiming he won the election or that fraud occurred. Rather, the indictment details a long list of schemes to substitute fake electors for real ones and otherwise coerce and defraud state officials.
Some might wonder why state officials can prosecute Trump for much the same as crimes as the feds. After all, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars defendants from being twice "put in jeopardy" for "the same offence." Part of the answer is that Trump has not yet been tried (much less convicted or acquitted) on the federal charges.
But in addition, the Supreme Court has long held that there is a "dual-sovereignty" exception to the double jeopardy clause - a rule recently reaffirmed by the Court in its 7-2 decision in Gamble v. United States (2019). Because states and the federal government are separate sovereigns, the Court reasoned, they are permitted to each try the same person for what is substantively the same offense.
In my view, there is a lot of merit to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's and Neil Gorsuch's dissenting opinions, in Gamble, arguing that the dual-sovereignty doctrine is wrong. But the Court is unlikely to overturn that rule anytime soon. Thus, Georgia and the feds can both prosecute Trump (and perhaps others) for similar election-related offenses. If Trump gets acquitted in one proceeding, that doesn't give him a pass on the other. Conservatives and others who don't like that can blame the Supreme Court.
Along with these similarities to the federal charges, there are also key differences. Many of the counts against Trump and other defendants are under Georgia's state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). I am sure there are lots of newly minted RICO experts commenting away on Twitter and elsewhere. But I'm not going to pretend to be one of them, and so will have to leave this issue to others.
Perhaps the biggest difference between the federal and Georgia indictments is that the latter features 19 defendants, while the former is limited to Trump (though the feds may well file charges against others in separate proceedings).
Some of the Georgia co-defendants are the same people as Trump's unindicted co-conspirators from the federal indictment, most notably Rudy Giuliani, Jeffrey Clark, John Eastman, and Sidney Powell. Others are lesser-known figures, including some whose involvement in election skullduggery appears to have been limited to Georgia. The inclusion of 19 total defendants is likely to make for a longer and more complicated trial and appellate process. Jack Smith may have chosen to charge Trump separately to avoid such problems.
If time permits, I may have more to say about some of Trump's co-defendants in future posts. One of them - Eastman - is a person I knew for many years in his capacity as a law professor; but I should emphasize (in case prosecutors are reading this!) that I have no inside knowledge of his involvement in Trump's schemes to overturn the election.
Experts are divided on whether Trump can potentially force the removal of the Georgia case to federal court. If he can do so, he might potentially get a more favorable jury pool, and also possibly claim immunity to some or all of the charges on the grounds that he was just engaged in his official duty. I highly doubt the latter gambit will work, even if the former succeeds. Trump was pretty obviously acting to advance his private interests as a candidate, not discharge his official responsibilities. But this too is an issue best left to those with greater expertise.
In sum, the Georgia case against Trump deepens his legal jeopardy, and at least some of the charges seem compelling. On others, I must defer to the assessment of commentators with greater expertise.
Judge Jeffrey M. Brown's opinion in James E. Arnold & Associates, LPA v. Croce(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Franklin County, July 12), notes that the professor had given his then-lawyers a promissory note, secured by the house. Retraction Watch reports:
A law firm that holds a mortgage on the house of Carlo Croce, a cancer researcher at The Ohio State University, may foreclose on the property, a judge has ruled.
Croce hired James E. Arnold and Associates to represent him in a libel case against the New York Times and a defamation case against David Sanders, a professor of biological sciences at Purdue University who became something of a public nemesis for the Ohio scientist after pointing out problems in Croce's published work. Croce also needed representation for Ohio State's research misconduct investigation, and a suit attempting to stop the university from removing him as chair of the department of cancer biology and genetics.
Croce lost each case. Ohio State's investigation found problems with how he managed his lab that did not amount to research misconduct.
Arnold and Associates was the second firm Croce hired, after his original lawyers at Kegler Brown Hill & Ritter dropped his cases and sued him because he wasn't paying his bills. Last December, a judge ordered Croce to pay Kegler Brown nearly $1.1 million. To enforce the judgment, Ohio State has been garnishing his wages, and Kegler Brown has filed a motion for the court to allow Sotheby's to handle the sale of pieces from Croce's collection of Renaissance artwork, which the county sheriff seized….
See also this 2021 post on the Sixth Circuit opinion rejecting Croce's libel claim. Thanks to the Media Law Resource Center (MLRC) MediaLawDaily for the pointer.
Is the output of generative AI entitled to First Amendment protection? We're inclined to say yes. Even though current AI programs are of course not people and do not themselves have constitutional rights, their speech may potentially be protected because of the rights of the programs' creators. But beyond that, and likely more significantly, AI programs' speech should be protected because of the rights of their users—both the users' rights to listen and their rights to speak. In this short Article, we sketch the outlines of this analysis.
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The All-Argentina Issue is Here
New from Reason: a look into what Javier Milei
has accomplished and what it will take to make the most of Argentina’s window for real change. Out now
for subscribers.
