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Steve Calabresi on Moore v. Harper
Leading originalist constitutional law scholar comments on the Supreme Court's recent rejection of independent state legislature theory.

I am putting this post up on behalf of Northwestern University law Prof. Steven Calabresi, at his request. While Steve is a contributor to the Volokh Conspiracy blog, he has been having difficulty accessing his account. In the interests of getting this post up as quickly as possible, I am posting it for him. Everything that follows this sentence was written by Steve, not me (Ilya Somin):
In Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. ____ (2023), the Supreme Court in a landmark opinion issued yesterday rejected the Independent State Legislature Doctrine. At issue was the meaning of the word "legislature" in the Elections Clause of Article II. That Clause provides that: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators"
Proponents of the Independent State Legislature Theory believed that after President Trump's rejection by the voters in the 2020 presidential election in Pennsylvania, Georgia, Wisconsin, and Arizona, the Republican State Legislatures of those four states, acting alone without the Governor or judicial review by the State Supreme Court, could have awarded Pennsylvania's, Georgia's, Wisconsin's, and Arizona's Electoral College votes to Trump, which would have caused him to win a second term in 2020. Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 in the Presidential Electors Clause says that "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct."
The issue for the Supreme Court in Harper v. Moore is does the word "legislature" in these two clauses mean "the state senate and house of representatives" or does it mean "the lawmaking process in the state including the governor, who in all 50 states has a veto; the state supreme court, which in all 50 states have the power of judicial review under state constitutions; and popular initiatives and referenda, which exist in about half the states, and which in some states have set up Non-Partisan Redistricting Commissions, which would be unconstitutional under the Independent State Legislature Theory."
The original public meaning of the word "Legislature" in 1787 and 1788, when the U.S. Constitution was ratified, is set out in Samuel Johnson's 1755 Dictionary of the English Language. Here it is, with examples of the correct usage in Italics:
"Legisla'ture. n.s.
[from legislator, Latin.] The power that makes laws.
Without the concurrent consent of all three parts of the legislature, no law is or can be made.
Hale's Com. Law.In the notion of a legislature is implied a power to change, repeal, and suspend laws in being, as well as to make new laws.
Addison's Freeholder, №. 16."
The Hale's Com. Law definition refers to the fact that in Great Britain, in 1755, the enactment of a law required the approval of the House of Commons, the House of Lords, and the King. The Addison's Freeholder, No. 16 definition makes it clear that in half of the United States popular initiatives and referenda are legislatures, because they can change, repeal, and suspend.as well as to make new laws.
Samuel Johnson's 1755 Dictionary of the English Language makes it crystal clear that the Independent State Legislature Doctrine is just plain wrong on originalist grounds.
Chief Justice Roberts' superb opinion for six justices of the Supreme Court emphasized that state senates and state houses of representatives are merely creatures of state constitutions. They share the power to make laws with governors who in all 50 states have the veto power and with state supreme courts, which in all 50 states have the power of judicial review. In addition, in half the states elections laws can be made by popular initiatives and referenda. By 1787 and 1788, state supreme courts had, as Chief Justice Roberts points out, exercised the power of judicial review. Executive vetoes were also constitutionally provided for in Massachusetts and New York.
It is thus inconceivable that the conventions that ratified the Constitution would have meant the word "Legislature" to mean only state senates and state houses of representatives as opposed the whole lawmaking process of a state. Chief Justice Roberts also notes that the Independent State Legislature Doctrine conflicts with several Supreme Court precedents and finds support only in a three-justice concurrence in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), an opinion that was written with great haste and insufficient briefing.
Chief Justice Roberts' opinion notes that ordinarily the Supreme Court defers to state supreme courts as having the last word on questions involving the meaning of state law as was held in Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1875). Quite importantly, however, Chief Justice Roberts qualified the deference federal courts should give to state court interpretations of state law by suggesting that such state court decisions must be the product of an ordinary course of judicial review. Cf Bush v. Gore? I wrote an amicus brief in this case with Yale Sterling Professor of Law, Akhil Reed Amar and Professor Vikram D. Amar, which is linked here.
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The result reached in this case is right, though I agree with Thomas that the court shouldn't have been hearing it. I'd love to hear Prof. Calabresi address the mootness issue. I'll add that he and Amar^2 wrote a great brief.
That's where I end up too. It has to be this way, but Calabresi is utterly unconvincing.
I love hearing a judgement based on the original meaning of a term/word used by those who created our Constitution and laws. Changing the meaning of a term can have devastating results within states and the nation.
Curb your enthusiasm. Samuel Johnson's definition does not in fact support Calebrasi's claim that in Article 1, Section 4, paragraph 1 (”The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”) "Legislature" includes the State's courts, the Governor in his function as Executive (see Thomas' dissent on this distinction), the citizenry when voting in referenda, or... God help us... Non-Partisan Redistricting Commissions. Dictionary definitions, given their brevity when in normal form, just can't be deployed the way Calabresi does hear, working all his preferences (and TDS!) into what they leave unsaid.
"Legislature" now apparently includes the US Supreme Court.
Like when Scalia changed the meaning of two words in the 2A??
What are you gibbering about?
Interesting to compare Calabresi's direct analysis with the garbage put out by Thomas to make the same point.
Repeating in small part my observations about your spew to this effect on the other thread (https://reason.com/volokh/2023/06/28/what-is-the-effect-of-the-judgment-from-harper-i, you are full of shit.
Article I, section 2 says that "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."
Seems like that's pretty clearly talking about a representative body, not the people collectively.
The obvious rejoinder is that the section you quote refers to "the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature", not "the Legislature". So, yeah, of course this section is "clearly talking about a representative body", specifically the "most numerous Branch of the State Legislature". That says nothing about whether "the Legislature" is limited only to the House and Senate or, instead, includes a governor's veto power and judicial review.
The issue is not whether "the Legislature" refers to "the people collectively." No one claims that.
The issue is whether, in creating the legislature (and it does have to be created), the people (via the state constitution) may create a legislature that is subject to certain limits in its conduct. And, as Calabresi succinctly notes, an originalist interpretation pretty clearly and obviously answers that question in the affirmative.
Common sense also suggests the Constitution wouldn't have mandated uncheckable power of state legislatures to choose electors unconstrained by any limits placed on the legislature in its very creation. For that, you'd need U.S. Constitutional text prohibiting states from defining the contours of a legislature's power. And, no, Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 does not, in any way, do that, unless you're suddenly a huge fan of penumbras that only you, Thomas, Alito, and Eastman see.
Remember too that they had the experience of the Articles of Confederation and the largely identical Congresses that proceeded them -- a dozen years of only a legislative body, the President being the head of the body.
"The issue is not whether “the Legislature” refers to “the people collectively.” No one claims that."
That crazy contention is in fact Calabresi's claim: "The Addison's Freeholder, No. 16 definition makes it clear that in half of the United States popular initiatives and referenda are legislatures, because they can change, repeal, and suspend.as well as to make new laws." And if they are, do they not constitute a "Branch", and hence "the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature”?
As I said, crazy. The "Branch[es] of the State Legislature" instead undoubtedly referred to exactly what a normal person would, and did, understand that term refers to. And, no, the Constitution's drafters simply didn't think of, still less address, what to do about the State Legislatures "chusing" Electoral College delegates in a process unmoored from their constitutions. That is anyway of no relevance here, where the subject is House and Senate districting, not Presidential elections, and dragging in his TDS, as Calabresi does, is quite unnecessary.
“And if they are, do they not constitute a “Branch”, and hence “the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature”?”
Quite simply, no.
That some state constitutions allow legislative power to be exercised via referendum or ballot initiative does not make the entire public a “branch” of the legislature. You’re trying too hard to make the point seem ridiculous, which makes you ridiculous.
Like a veto, it’s one way legislative power can be exercised and can be exercised by (or limited by) something other than the legislative body. Again, the legislative body is created by the constitution, it’s powers are limited by the state constitution and the legislative powers are distributed through the government by the constitution, notwithstanding there is a legislative body which typically exercises most of those powers.
You, again, have to establish the extraordinary claim that, once created by a state constitution, a legislative body exists as “the Legislature” apart from and above the state constitution. This seems quite fanciful to me.
You surely don’t deny that the state constitution could divide the state legislature into three house, with one presided by the governor and another the supreme court. Or simply one house of which the governor is a members. Or any number of other forms, including two houses which must get approval of the governor and the supreme court to pass any legislation.
Conceding that, you have the burden to show why it is not fact that, as is more typically done, the NC legislature is composed of two houses (Senate and House of Reps) that are subject to a governor’s veto and judicial review.
Yes, odd that he cites a British dictionary and not closer authorities.
I did a quick search of The Federalist Papers, an the term Legislature always appears to refer to the lawmaking bodies at the national or state level.
There are many other examples.
He cites a British legal dictionary because, like it or not, British law as it existed in 1775 is (with some modifications dealing with the whole ‘King’ situation) the source of American law.
If you want to divine the *original* meaning, you have to look at how it was done before the revolution kicked off - and how that was modified by the Constitution when it was adopted.
Looking at the law as-it-was-practiced in the beginning is a far better source, than referencing the writings (no matter how eminent) of someone on how it theoretically could/should operate.
Again, it is completely impermissible to exempt elections legislation from checks-and-balances/separation-of-powers.
And to do it because it grants a temporary Republican partisan advantage in a handful of states is even worse, as this guarantees that the same thing will be done to Republicans at some point in the future, when Democrats are in the majority in these jurisdictions.
Not. The dictionary he cites is a general dictionary, not a legal one. And certainly not a legal decision of a British or American court.
The Constitution was adopted in 1789, well after the Revolution was over. The Federalist was written to persuade people that the Constitution should be adopted. It's use of language, particularly when discussing the very clauses at issue, is more probative of the original understanding at the time of the Founding than a British dictionary some 20 years prior to the Revolution.
The problem being, you have cited any language used in the Federalist that even hints at whether the definition of "the Legislature" as used in Art. 1, Section 4, Clause 1 refers to the lawmaking power of the state as defined by the state constitution or, instead, refers only to the House and Senate (for states organized that way, such as NC) with no checks via governor's veto or judicial review, regardless of whether the state constitution creating the legislature explicitly made it subject to those limits.
Bullshit. There is zero reason to believe "Legislature" as used in Art. 1, Section 4, Clause 1 refers to anything different than what it refers to in the Federalist Papers, which is THE perfectly ordinary understanding of the word. Calabresi's claim that it does not is extraordinary, and requires extraordinary proof, and he has provided essentially none. That this leaves certain questions unanswered and could produce results you deem objectionable is neither here nor there.
Nobody has cited anything in the Federal Papers that contradicts Calabresi or common sense. Talking about the qualifications for being a member of the House or Senate doesn't address the meaning of what a state "Legislature" is (or how it can be created/defined/limited by a state constitution).
Bloviate all you want about inconsistency with the Federalist Papers but neither you nor anyone else has shown anything remotely contrary to the vast evidence of what "legislature" meant at the time.
FWIW, Federalist No. 54 discusses the very clause at issue at length. The issues it discusses is the second clause, "but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations" and why it is important that Congress be able to override State legislatures on this point.
https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-51-60
I don't think the use of the term there is dispositive of the issue being discussed here.
So, I don't see you have cited anything from the Federalist Papers that even purports to speak to the question at hand (to include the definition of "the Legislature").
In Federalist#54 the word "legislature" is exclusively used in its ordinary sense, and NEVER with the expanded meaning which Calabrasi contends is its "real" meaning. E.g., "Were elections for the federal legislature to be annual..." But, "There is none so blind as he [^^^^^] who will not see."
Again, this quote does none of the work you think it does. Qualifications for holding office in the House or Senate, when elections are held for the federal legislature (e.g., the House and Senate) says nothing about whether the Presidential veto is a legislative power, i.e., a President or governor acting as part of "the legislature" when s/he uses the veto power to strike down legislation.
Further, as Calabresi points out, the U.S. Constitution doesn't say for every power granted the federal legislature that the power is limited by other parts of the Constitution including judicial review, but it is long established that those powers are limited by other parts of the Constitution, including judicial review. The assumption absent explicit text to the contrary is that the same dynamic is true of grants to state legislatures. They are creatures of their constitution and, so, are subject to the constraints on their power in state constitutions. There is no legislature independent of a constitution that creates it. Hence, it necessarily is subject to the constitution.
Your extraordinary claim to the contrary requires extraordinary evidence.
What Dave said, but if those are your best examples, they just refer to the qualifications for a particular branch of the legislature, which as I pointed out to Noscitur, says nothing about the meaning of "the Legislature".
Wholly unconvincing.
Declaring repeatedly that the universal actual use of "legislature" to refer to a body that pass legislation as "Wholly unconvincing" that it means that in Article I, Section 4 is what is in fact wholly unconvincing. If you have anything other than the penumbras of and interstices in Samuel Johnson's definition it is past time for you to produce it.
Your claim is that the state legislature somehow operates above and separate from the state constitution that creates it. That makes no sense, particularly given the historical understanding of “the legislature” to include not only the elected bodies, but the entire legislative power of a state which is not wholly limited to those bodies as Calabresi and Roberts make clear. Among other arguments, read section IV.D. (pp. 24-26) of the Roberts opinion, pointing out that the powers granted to the state “Legislature” by the Elections Clause were, from jump, subject to constraint and definition by the state constitution.
The burden to show that the state “legislature” referred to in Art.1, Section 4, Clause 1, is not a creation of state constitutions and, therefore, subject to the form defined by and constraints placed on it by the state constitution.
I believe the Independent State Legislature Theory in question refers to state legislatures as defined in fifty different individual state constitutions, not the U.S. Congress as defined by Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution.
That Calabresi doesn't like what it says is perhaps reason to amend it to exclude the result he abjures, but it's no good reason to assign a new meaning to the word as if it didn't have a perfectly good and understandable common meaning already. This is "lets redefine gender to mean whatever 'they' 'identify as'" stuff. It's convenient to his cause, but it's bullshit
I don't see how that could be, since even under ISLT, Congress has the power to declare the day on which the electors are chosen, election day is that day, and once they've been chosen, it's kind of too late to chose somebody else.
This isn't to say that the state legislature, acting BEFORE election day, couldn't designate a different way of selecting electors. They certainly could, the question there would be whether it would be entirely a matter for the legislature, or subject to veto and judicial input.
This ruling will make the seditionists here unhappy. Checks and balances are so aggravating
Not nearly as annoying as pests like you who attempt to force on the rest of us redefinitions of common words as a shortcut to to getting your way.
Leaving aside the obvious ‘no court will ever grant a legislative body immunity from judicial review’…
It is incredibly odious to the entire design of the United States government, for the acts of any branch of government to be beyond the reach of the courts.
If elections cases are not reviewable, what happens when (not if, when) a legislature violates enumerated citizen rights with their enactment of any given elections law?
Agreed. The ISL people are very short sighted, results oriented. It's just bad government to give any entity unreviewable authority. The whole premise of the Constitution is checks and balances.
Not really the whole premise. A major premise of the Constitution—one which has gone largely unremarked in the decision, and in this discussion—is that the Constitution is a decree made at pleasure by the People of the United States, who are jointly sovereign. That means, among other things, that the Constitution is about regulating governments to keep them in constraints, so that the People remain free to do as they please, while they use elections to constitute government without constraint.
What a mush of a sentence:
"That means, among other things, that the Constitution is about regulating governments to keep them in constraints, so that the People remain free to do as they please, while they use elections to constitute government without constraint."
Actually the constitution constrains the people too, not that they can't eventually batter down the constraints, but for instance it takes 2/3 of both houses of Congress and 3/4 of the legislatures to repeal the 2nd amendment.
And no vote of the people or amendment will give California more Senators than Wyoming, amendments or no, at least not without Wyomings consent, and also Vermont's, Alaska's etc.
Not the premise. But it is the primary method for achieving the premise of self-government.
Then why was Marbury v. Madison so precedent setting?
IF SCOTUS always had the power of judicial review, then why did John Marshall have to establish that it had it?
I argue that (a) Article III was third because the courts were intended to be the least powerful branch of government and (b) the Constitution would never have been ratified if people realized that it had the powers that Marshall would assume.
What is incredibly odious to the entire design of the United States government is for the kritarchy to be so emancipated from the mechanisms of democratic control as it has become. It is beyond comprehension that you could imagine that deeply flawed tyrants in robes will be guardians of OUR liberties when they are so unrestrained in the exercise of their supposed powers as they are.
" after President Trump's rejection by the voters in the 2020 presidential election in Pennsylvania, Georgia, Wisconsin, and Arizona,"
No. After massive widespread fraud in those four states, the legislatures of those four states (possibly with the approval of the Governor if you wish) had the power to throw out the slate selected by the unelected bureaucrats and replace it with another.
"Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 in the Presidential Electors Clause says that "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct."
Regardless of how one may define "legislature", it definitely does not mean "unelected bureaucrats." And if you want to split hairs, Massachusetts doesn't have a legislature and never did -- it has a "Great and General Court" and if you want to include the Governor, then you gotta include the Governor's Council and that makes your whole argument fall apart.
Furthermore, to define what "legislature" meant in 1787, you have to look at the Continental Congresses and then the Congress of the Confederation. There was no President -- the presiding officer of the Congress was called the President -- and it was the "State Legislatures" that appointed the members of Congress.
Did the governors and state courts have veto power over who represented the state in the Continental Congress? I don't believe so, and that's far more relevant than some British dictionary because that was the government that the Constitution modified.
Meh, George W Bush stole the 2000 election and then failed to prevent 9/11 and then lied us into an asinine war all the while selling us out to China. Biden on the other hand has done a better job implementing the America First platform than Trump…and for that you hate him!?!
Like Calabresi you put your irrelevant TDS and other fixations on full display. Go fuck yourself.
Irrelevant.
“Massive widespread fraud…”
Clearly all the Trump-appointed judges who found there was no fraud don’t matter a hill of beans to you. Facts just don’t matter.
There’s this very nice bridge in Brooklyn that haappens to be up for sale. And you’re just thre perfect person to buy it!
In what court was there a "finding" of "no fraud"? Be specific.
There were a lot of courts where any examination of the evidence was denied, but that is not the same thing.
And just stop with this "Trump-appointed" shit. Most of the kritarchs involved in the cover-up weren't Trump-appointed, and those that were were almost invariably Federalist Society-approved Establishment hacks. Trump was better than the alternatives, but a shitty choice for all that, and will be a shitty choice in 2024 too, though I expect I'll have to vote for him again. Hopefully he'll have woken up a bit.
There were essentially two parallel sets of litigation after the election. There were a set of delusional/dishonest claims of fraud, pushed especially by the Kraken team, pursued in large part in state court and to a lesser extent in federal court. All of those were rejected on the merits because there was zero — nil, none, zilch — evidence of fraud presented. And then there were a set of challenges to election procedures, pursued mostly in federal court. Those claims were mostly rejected on grounds like mootness, laches, and standing.
As to the first group, the ones you're asking about, there's Bower v. Ducey, in federal court in Arizona; King v. Whitmer, in federal court in Michigan; DJT for President v. Benson, in the Michigan Court of Claims; Stoddard v. City Election Commission of The City of Detroit, in Wayne County Circuit Court; Costantino v. City of Detroit, in Wayne County Circuit Court; Arizona Republican Party v. Fontes, in Maricopa County Superior Court; Ward v. Biden Electors, in Maricopa County Superior Court. That's just a small sampling.
Gandydancer is a big fan of Trump Election Litigation: Elite Strike Force and of the delusional, incompetent, unprofessional, unlawful, vividly refuted claims advanced by those losers. In his QAnon-MAGA mind, the system treated Trump and the silly claims unfairly in those courtrooms, preventing the truth from being revealed.
I doubt Mr. Nieporent's list of decisions will influence Gandydancer's judgment. You can't reason with bigotry, superstition, or belligerent ignorance -- let alone all three.
Carry on, clingers. But, as the Trump election lawyers are learning in a costly manner, only so far as better Americans permit.
In the second group was a ruling by Brett Luttwig, Trump appointee, in Trump v Wisconsin Election Commission. From the opinion: "This
Court has allowed plaintiff the chance to make his case and he has lost on the merits."
And just stop with this "kritarchs" shit. Now the Federalist Society isn't good enough for you, because you're not a Republican or conservative, but just a fucking fascist lunatic.
After massive widespread fraud in those four states,
that never occurred. And note that once in court, Trump's own attorneys denied fraud, nor did Trump's amicus brief in the Supreme Court for the Texas suit allege fraud.
There was, of course, zero fraud. (By that I mean organized fraud. There were a handful of Trump voters who illegally voted more than once or cast ballots for other people. But that's meaningless to the outcome.)
No slates were selected by "bureaucrats," and, no, state legislatures do not have the authority to "throw out" the election results. Legislatures could, before the election, have decided to eschew a popular vote and appoint their own slate of electors. But they could not wait until after the election and do so.
As for the rest, I suggest you read Calabresi's amicus brief.
With all the shit you think is going on in America, and will soon go on in America, you aren't leaving.
Because you don't have the courage of your posting convictions.
I disagree with Professor Calabresi’s interpretation. The court didn’t adopt the idea that a state’s “legislature” is its entire law-making process.
The decision flatly contradicts that idea. The Court said that the Election Clause empowers federal courts to review state judicial decisions on elections, and in particular, that “state courts may not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review such that they arrogate to themselves the power vested in state legislatures to regulate state elections.”
That makes nonsense of Professor Calabrisi’s claim. If the “legislature” is the entire lawmaking process, including courts, then it would be indifferent to federal courts if the state’s constitution vested the legislative power primarily in the elected assembly or mostly in the judiciary. But when federal courts are open to stop state courts from “arrogating” too much power away from the legislature, that can only mean they are open to stop them from taking it away from the legislature in a traditional sense – elected assembly, possibly subject to a governor’s veto, constrained only by reasonable state constitutional constraints based on some yet-to-be-articulated standard of reasonableness.
I think Roberts is correct in saying "state courts may not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review such that they arrogate to themselves the power vested in state legislatures to regulate state wlwctions (sic).”
I think courts are not part of the legislative process, they don't strike or make laws, they enjoin officials from enforcing laws, or they may issue writs to compel actions, but they are neither making or repealing laws.
As an example the governor is part of the legislative process, but does that mean its legitimate for him to as part of his veto message to order use of his own set of redistricting maps? Nor is it permissible for the court to go beyond saying: these legislatively drawn maps do not comport with the NC constitution, and then enjoin their use. Drawing their own maps and ordering their use goes beyond the judicial power, whether you use the elections clause or the Republican form of government clause.
Your answer assumes the existence of a federal conception of what a legislative process is. That’s what makes it meaningful to say “the legislative process” includes the governor but not the courts.
I read Professor Calibrisi as saying a state’s “entire legislative process” means whatever the state says it means.
Let me give two examples. Can a state assign districting to a commission? Roberts vigorously dissented from that proposition. I don’t see this case as supporting it. I see it as rejecting the proposition that a state’s legislative process for Elections Clause purposes is whatever the state wants it to be. I see this case as one that could potentially be cited if a future majority overturns the constitutionality of commissions handling districting.
A second example is judicial law-making. That’s what common law is. But for the Elections Clause, a state constitution could say a state’s election law would be determined by the judiciary developing election common law. This case makes clear that that option is unavailable.
What’s the constitutional difference between a bipartisan commission and a court? Arizona Legislature v. Arizona Independent Elections Commission said there’s no problem districting decisions to a commission, in an opinion suggesting that a state’s “legislature” is whatever body makes the applicable decisions, the position Professor Calibrisi indicates says was reaffirmed here. But I don’t see that. This case says a state cannot assign redistricting decisions to its courts. The federal constitution assigns it to legislatures, and the federal constituiton say state courts cannot “arrogate” that power regardless of what the state constitution permits them to do.
I see that as casting significant doubt on the proposition that independent commissions can “arrogate” that power. Even though this case doesn’t actually overrule overruling Arizona Legislature, it limits its holding and opens up the door to eventially overruling it.
No. You misunderstand the meaning of the word "arrogate."
And you're confused about what the issue was in the Arizona case. It wasn't that the commission was a legislature for constitutional purposes. It was that the voters that established the commission were. Nothing here is remotely inconsistent with that.
This case does not say what you seem to think. It says that when the Constitution says that the states' legislatures have the authority to dictate the time/place/manner of elections, the phrase "legislature" should be understood to mean the entire legislative process, rather than one specific body. So it means that the governor can veto a bill, because that's part of the normal legislative process. And the state's courts can find a bill unconstitutional (under the state constitution) because that's also part of the normal legislative process.
I am inclined to agree that Calabresi goes way too far in suggesting that the courts are included within the meaning of “Legislature”. Courts might review the laws, but they don’t legislate. They operate post legislation.
This is what Hale says :
Without the concurrent consent of all three parts of the legislature, no law is or can be made.
Hale's Com. Law.
The three parts of the British Legislature are the House of Commons, the House of Lords, and the King. If the courts were included, there’d be four parts.
And Roberts :
“state courts may not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review such that they arrogate to themselves the power vested in state legislatures to regulate state elections.”
If the state courts were part of the legislature, then their exercise of judicial review would be merely exercising the share of the legislative power, not arrogating the power vested elsewhere – the state legislature.
Ultimately Roberts' opinion makes sense – the state courts can do judicial review. They’re not in the legislating game.
The control on state courts is review by federal courts – are you doing an honest justifiable judicial review, or are you legislating without authority, under a false flag ?
UK does not have a written constitution. Based on the differences between the British system and the US system, a reference to British law is persuasive authority but not mandatory authority.
If Calabresi is allowed to refer to 18th century British law to advance his theory, I'm allowed to point out that his own source contradicts him.
I agree that there's an important difference between the British constitutional structure and the US federal constitutional structure (I can't comment on individual states.)
In the British (originally Engish) system, the King was the lawmaker, whose lawmaking power was, over time, constrained by the role given to Parliament - ie the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Here is a standard preamble :
WE, Your Majesty’s most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom in Parliament assembled, towards raising the necessary supplies to defray Your Majesty’s public expenses, and making an addition to the public revenue, have freely and voluntarily resolved to give and to grant unto Your Majesty the several duties hereinafter mentioned; and do therefore most humbly beseech Your Majesty that it may be enacted, and be it enacted by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—
Note the structure. The Lords and the Commons humbly beseech that the Act be enacted (by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty), noting that they give their consent.
Thus the lawmaker is "The King in Parliament" - the two Houses consent and the King enacts.
The US system flips that round :
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled
It is the Congress which enacts, subject - sometimes - to the President's consent. Indeed it is unnecessary for the President to consent. He actually has to object to prevent the law being enacted.
So I agree that there is - and never was - any simple read across from the British constitutional system to the US federal one. In the US system it's perfectly possible to argue that the President is not part of the legislature at all. He simply has power to prevent Congress from exercising its legislative power*. There is no such argument in the British system. No King, no law.
*in the same way the judiciary can prevent the President from exercising his executive power, without itself having executive power.
Thank you for making an argument and not insulting the people who disagree with you. I have been guilty of that and I need to do better.
Keep this in mind the next time someone starts gibbering about how it would be a good idea for the feds to tell states what laws their own cities and counties can pass, like provide city wifi.
I expect assaults on the popular will in the U.S. to grow even more creative and frequent as the most religiously dogmatic feel increasingly squeezed by the pincers of demographic change, secular rationalism, progressive thought, and continued minority empowerment.
If I had been raised to think faith the highest virtue and its articles therefore both certain and immune from critical scrutiny, what would I not do, and who would I not make common cause with, in order to safeguard those sacred beliefs?
You mean the marxist March through the institutions turning them wholly against the founding principles and beliefs.
He's talking about state legislatures overturning the will of the people.
Not seeing a lot about Marxists marching in there.
Indeed. Since time immemorial (literally) laws have been made in England by the King in Parliament, and the legislature includes the King/government. The fact that Montesquieu came up with a pretty diagram that assigned different tasks to different institutions is neither here nor there.
Like I said about the Indian cases and Gorsuch, people are overanalyzing the decision. The court has issued an advisory opinion stating that there are currently six votes supporting state judicial review of state election laws when a liberal state court makes a decision that turns out not to matter a year later.
I don't disagree with Calabresi's conclusion, but he really tips his hand when his second paragraph focuses on his opinion of the goals of the ISLT people. No, they are not all rabid make-Trump-win-at-all-costs people. The theory's been around a lot longer than that.
…and gained no traction until Trumpkins perceived it as the way to help their Dear Leader steal the 2020 election.
Name a song, tkamenick.