The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Emergency Powers

Federal Circuit Appellate Brief Filed in Our Tariff Case

Our brief explains why the Federal Circuit should uphold the Court of International Trade decision striking down Trump's "Liberation Day" tariffs.

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Today, the Liberty Justice Center and I filed our appellate brief in VOS Selections, Inc. v. Trump, the case challenging Trump's massive "Liberation Day" tariffs. Our litigation team also now includes Neal Katyal and Michael McConnell, leading constitutional law scholars and appellate litigators on different sides of the political spectrum. It is an honor to work with the two of them and their teams, and with the LJC team led by Jeffrey Schwab.

The case is now before the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and we are defending a unanimous ruling in our favor by the US Court of International Trade. As before, the key issue in the case is that the  government claims the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA) grants the president unlimited power to impose tariffs on any nation, in any amount, for any reason, for any length of time. We argue IEEPA grants no such power, and if it did it would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive. The Court of International Trade rightly ruled that IEEPA does not "does not authorize the President to impose unbounded tariffs" and that such "an unlimited delegation of tariff authority would constitute an improper abdication of legislative power to another branch of government." We hope the Federal Circuit will reach the same conclusions.

Many of the arguments at the appellate level are the same as those that prevailed below. But we have made a variety of improvements. For example, we explain how the Supreme Court's important recent decision in FCC v. Consumers' Research bolsters our argument that the government's claim to virtually unlimited tariff authority violates the nondelegation doctrine.

Our case is consolidated with one filed by 12 states, led by Oregon, which was decided by the Court of International Trade in the same ruling as ours.

I have written about the issues at stake in this case, in greater detail, here and here. For a complete list of links to my writings about the tariff litigation, see here.

The Liberty Justice Center has issued a statement about today's filing, which I reprint:

On July 8, the Liberty Justice Center continued its legal battle against the Trump Administration's unconstitutional "Liberation Day" tariffs by filing a response brief with the U.S Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

The Liberty Justice Center filed a lawsuit against the "Liberation Day" tariffs on April 14, arguing that the Trump Administration cannot use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to justify the imposition of across-the-board tariffs. IEEPA does not mention tariffs at all, and even if the legislation did authorize some tariffs, it is limited to emergencies involving an "unusual or extraordinary threat." Trade deficits—the President's alleged basis for the tariffs—are not unusual, extraordinary, or an emergency. Furthermore, if IEEPA was interpreted to justify the broad tariffs claimed by the President, then it would raise constitutional separation of powers issues.

In May, the Liberty Justice Center secured a major legal victory when the U.S. Court of International Trade unanimously ruled in favor of its clients, holding that the Trump Administration had unlawfully imposed the tariffs under the guise of emergency economic powers. The federal government has since appealed that ruling to the Federal Circuit—and today's filing is the LJC's formal response to that appeal.

The Liberty Justice Center's legal challenge is joined by leading appellate lawyers and constitutional scholars Judge Michael W. McConnell, Neal Katyal, and Ilya Somin.

"The 'Liberation Day' tariffs would be devastating to the economy, to the small businesses we represent, and to the rights of all Americans. The executive branch cannot usurp Congress's authority to impose tariffs without blatantly violating the separation of powers—and it especially cannot fabricate emergencies to justify that violation. We are proud to continue our fight to hold all levels of government accountable to the people and the nation they serve," said Jeffrey Schwab, Senior Counsel and Director of Litigation at the Liberty Justice Center.

Oral arguments in the government's appeal are scheduled for July 31 at 10 am EDT before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The arguments will be available via livestream here. Following the hearing, the Liberty Justice Center will host a media roundtable to discuss next steps in the case and answer questions from members of the press. To RSVP for the roundtable, visit the Liberty Justice Center's media reservations page here.

The government's opening appellate brief is available here.

Discrimination

If Companies Set Up Ethnic Affinity Groups for Employees, Must They Also Set Them Up for Jewish Employees? [UPDATE: Microsoft Has Changed Its Policy to Include "Jews at Microsoft"]

Yes, argues the Brandeis Center in a letter to Microsoft.

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UPDATE 7/8/2025: The Brandeis Center sent out a press release, stating:

The Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law today commended Microsoft on its decision to equalize its treatment of its Jewish employee network, "Jews at Microsoft" (JAMS), alongside other recognized and funded ethnicity-based employee networks ….

Microsoft's nine top-tier employee networks, designated as Employee Resource Groups (ERGs), were company-recognized, sponsored, and supported organizations of employees within Microsoft based around a particular identifying characteristic, such as ethnicity, that afforded members of that ethnic group extra opportunities for professional development, career advancement, and the ability to collectively oppose discrimination in the workplace. Microsoft hadn't recognized religion as a category of identity permitted to establish an ERG, and refused to recognize the ethnic characteristic of Jewish identity; thus, Microsoft refused to recognize a Jewish ERG, denying Jewish Microsoft employees benefits that are provided to others. This violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Microsoft advised its various employee groups today that it is restructuring its employee network program so that all employee groups are equally recognized and funded, including JAMS.

ORIGINAL POST, 5/16/25: From the letter:

We write on behalf of Jewish employees of Microsoft who are also members of the Louis D. Brandeis Center Coalition to Combat Anti-Semitism ("the Coalition") to explain why Microsoft's refusal to establish a Jewish Employee Resource Group (ERG) alongside its existing network of ERGs has resulted in distributing very real professional benefits and advantages on the basis of ethnic or racial identity, while denying these benefits to Jewish and other employees. Providing all employees equal access to professional benefits and opportunities, including Microsoft's Jewish employees, is the right thing to do and is compelled by various federal and local anti-discrimination statutes. Moreover, by denying Jewish employees the very real advantages that Microsoft claims its ERGs bestow, Microsoft has allowed anti-Semitism to fester at Microsoft.

Microsoft's refusal to acknowledge its Jewish employees' right to an ERG seems to stem from a mistaken pigeonholing of Jewish identity as merely "religious," a category of identity that Microsoft excludes from its ERG program. In fact, Jews are a people with a shared ethnic and ancestral heritage. Irrespective of any shared creed or belief in a deity, Jews share a common lineage, history, culture, and language(s). This is the dictionary definition of ethnicity. Jews who never attend synagogue, observe Jewish holidays, practice Jewish religious rituals, or even believe in the religious tenets of Judaism are still ethnically Jewish, an understanding that is widely supported in academic literature and surveys of Jewish American life.

More importantly here, the law recognizes that Jewish identity isn't protected from discrimination based merely on its religious character, but also on its shared ethnic and ancestral heritage (including where protections based on race incorporate ethnicity).

Microsoft's ERGs share common features of ERGs at most Fortune 500 companies. They are employee-led and driven, so that topics of conversation and action come from the employees themselves based on their lived workplace experiences. They connect employees to company  leadership, making it easier to collectively communicate broader workplace equity and inclusion concerns to those with the power to do something about them. They allow employees to represent and express themselves on their own terms, both to corporate leadership and to their colleagues. They facilitate corporate charitable giving to organizations that do work in their communities. And they foster networking and career advancement within the company.

In short, Microsoft's ERGs are a material "term and condition" of employment for Microsoft's workforce and distribute valuable benefits on the basis of identity.

Jewish Microsoft employees are no less deserving or in need of an ERG than other ethnic groups at Microsoft. Currently, Jewish (and other) Microsoft employees are denied various benefits of Microsoft employment:

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Free Speech

No Sealing of Opinion Related to Guantanamo Detainee (Now Released to Oman)

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From Abdullah v. Trump, decided in March by Judge Emmet Sullivan (D.D.C.), and reaffirmed Sunday (with a comment that "in the nearly four months since the Court gave Mr. Abdullah that opportunity, he has not sought to redact any information"):

On December 31, 2024, this Court denied two motions filed by Mr. Abdullah seeking his immediate release from Guantanamo Bay. The Court posted the Order accompanying the Memorandum Opinion on the public docket but posted the Memorandum Opinion under seal and directed the parties to post a public version on the public docket within fourteen days.

On January 6, 2025, Mr. Abdullah appealed the Court's denial of his two motions …. On January 7, 2025, the government filed a notice that it had transferred Mr. Abdullah to Oman. The same day, this Court entered an order denying Mr. Abdullah's Motion for Order Granting Writ of Habeas Corpus as moot ….

On January 28, 2025, [having gotten an extension,] the government filed the redacted public version of the Memorandum Opinion [available here -EV]. Two days later, Mr. Abdullah filed his Motion to Seal in which he asks the Court to permanently seal the Memorandum Opinion ….

Mr. Abdullah's two main arguments for the Court to seal its Memorandum Opinion are that public release after the Memorandum Opinion became unreviewable as moot would: (1) be an impermissible advisory opinion under Article III of the United States Constitution; and (2) "shred what remains" of Mr. Abdullah's privacy interests….

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Magistrate Judge Recommends Not Dismissing Prosecution of Wisconsin Judge Hannah Dugan for Allegedly Interfering with Immigration Arrest

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From yesterday's report and recommendation by Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph (E.D. Wisc.) in U.S. v. Dugan:

The indictment charges as follows:

[Count One:] On or about April 18, 2025, Dugan knowingly concealed E.F.R., a person for whose arrest a warrant and process had been issued under the provisions of the law of the United States, so as to prevent the discovery and arrest of E.F.R., after notice and knowledge of the fact that a warrant and process had been issued for the apprehension of E.F.R., in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1071[.]

[Count Two:] On or about April 18, 2025, Dugan did corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct, and impede the due and proper administration of the law under which a pending proceeding was being had before a department and agency of the United States, namely the administrative arrest of E.F.R. for purposes of removal proceedings conducted by the United States Department of Homeland Security, by committing affirmative acts to assist E.F.R. to evade arrest, including:

  1. confronting members of a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Task Force and falsely telling them they needed a judicial warrant to effectuate the arrest of E.F.R.;
  2. upon learning that they had an administrative warrant for E.F.R.'s arrest, directing all identified members of the ICE Task Force to leave the location of the planned arrest (a public hallway outside of Courtroom 615 of the Milwaukee County Courthouse) and go to the Chief Judge's office;
  3. addressing E.F.R.'s Milwaukee County Circuit Court criminal case off the record while ICE Task Force members were in the Chief Judge's office;
  4. directing E.F.R. and his counsel to exit Courtroom 615 through a non-public jury door; and
  5. advising E.F.R.'s counsel that E.F.R. could appear by "Zoom" for his next court date

[i]n violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505….

Dugan sought to dismiss the indictment, on the grounds that her actions were protected by judicial immunity; the Magistrate Judge went through a long analysis of the precedents on judicial immunity (dating back to 1607), and summarized it thus:

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Politics

"Actions of Slander, Founded on Trifling Causes, to Gratify a Petulant and Quarrelsome Disposition"

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From Judge Edward Shippen in Rue v. Mitchell (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. County 1790):

Generally speaking, indeed, actions of slander, founded on trifling causes, to gratify a petulant and quarrelsome disposition, will not be encouraged by the court; but when the reputation, trade, or profession, of a citizen it really affected, for the sake of doing justice to the dearest interests of individuals, as well as for the sake of preserving public order, and tranquillity, every appeal to the tribunals of our country ought to be liberally sustained.

Religion at the Supreme Court

Three Cases from OT 2024

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Last month, the Supreme Court wrapped up its October 2024 Term, which included three church-state decisions. Each touched on long-running issues—public funding for religious schools, the definition of "religious" for purposes of exemptions, and parental rights in public education. But only one case, Mahmoud v. Taylor, resulted in a major ruling. The two others, for different reasons, turned out to be less eventful.  

Start with Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond, a case that could have clarified whether religious charter schools are permissible under the Establishment Clause. The Oklahoma Supreme Court had barred a proposed Catholic charter school, St. Isidore, reasoning that it qualified as a state actor. St. Isidore argued it was more akin to a private contractor participating in a public program—like in Espinoza and Carson, two earlier school funding cases—and thus eligible for equal treatment. 

The Supreme Court granted cert, but Justice Barrett recused herself—most likely because Notre Dame's Religious Liberty Clinic was deeply involved in the litigation. That led to a 4–4 split, affirming the Oklahoma ruling without setting precedent. Had Justice Barrett participated, she likely would have sided with the conservatives, and the case might have opened the door to religious charter schools nationwide. As it stands, the issue remains unresolved and will likely return. 

Catholic Charities Bureau v. Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission also failed to result in a major holding. The case concerned tax exemptions for religious organizations. Wisconsin exempts nonprofits that operate "primarily for religious purposes," but denied the exemption to certain Catholic social service agencies because, as matter of belief, they didn't proselytize or limit aid to co-religionists, and so could not be considered to operate for "religious" purposes. 

The Court unanimously rejected that reasoning. Writing for the Court, Justice Sotomayor explained that Wisconsin's test amounted to theological discrimination—treating some religious groups less favorably because of their faith commitments. The Court's narrow decision avoided broader questions about when religious exemptions are constitutionally required or how to define religious exercise under the Free Exercise Clause.   Read More

Another Boston Judge Enters Ex Parte TRO Hours After Filing, Without Any Time To Actually Read Filings

The judge also granted TRO of a statute without even addressing any of the usual factors.

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Today, Planned Parenthood challenged the constitutionality of the Big Beautiful Bill, which cuts funding for the organization. Planned Parenthood chose the District of Massachusetts. The Motion for a TRO was fifty-three pages long. According to press reports, the District Court granted the ex parte TRO within a few hours. (ECF should really start including time stamps, now that the Supreme Court has ruled constructive denials can be measured in minutes.)

Was this even enough time to read the entire brief? To consider it? To give it some thought? Or was this just a reflexive TRO that was granted because the Defendant is the Trump Administration? We saw a similar immediate TRO granted by another Federal District Court Judge in Boston who ruled in favor of Harvard, without any opportunity to actually review the pleadings. Then again, when the Supreme Court holds that District Courts are deemed to constructively deny TROs when they don't rule in a few hours, lower courts take notice. There are no Denny's in Boston. But for those curious, the one Denny's in Lubbock is open 24x7.

You can tell the Judge in the Planned Parenthood case rushed. The order didn't even address any of the usual factors. There was zero analysis whatsoever. I don't see how this is a valid TRO. You need to at least gesture to the four factors.

Worse still, this was a TRO not of an executive action, but of an actual statute that passed bicameralism and presentment. And the judge ordered the executive branch to appropriate money that was expressly unappropriated.

Defendants, their agents, employees, appointees, successors, and anyone acting in concert or participation with Defendants shall take all steps necessary to ensure that Medicaid funding continues to be disbursed in the customary manner and timeframes to Planned Parenthood Federation of America and its members; Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts; and Planned Parenthood Association of Utah.

This is basically an administrative stay of an appropriations statute!

It is not even clear the court's equitable powers supports such a remedy.

Lower court judges are misbehaving. The Supreme Court sent a clear signal on universal injunctions. I think a similar message needs to be sent about ex parte TROs. You should at least take enough time to "pretend" to read the complaint.

Update: A colleague found a transcript from the Boston Judge in 2023. At the time, she suggested she could not read a brief the same day it was filed:

"I don't think I can read the papers on Monday if you file them on Monday." [apparently she's gotten faster at reading] . . . I haven't read the papers. . . . I haven't read the papers yet.

"Book on Machine Learning Is Full of Made-Up Citations"

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So alleges Retraction Watch (Rita Aksenfeld):

Based on a tip from a reader, we checked 18 of the 46 citations in the book {Mastering Machine Learning: From Basics to Advanced}. Two-thirds of them either did not exist or had substantial errors….

The book's author, Govindakumar Madhavan, asked for an additional "week or two" to fully respond to our request for comment. He did not answer our questions asking if he used an LLM to generate text for the book. However, he told us, "reliably determining whether content (or an issue) is AI generated remains a challenge, as even human-written text can appear 'AI-like.' This challenge is only expected to grow, as LLMs … continue to advance in fluency and sophistication." …

When asked about the potential use of AI in the work, [Springer Nature senior communications manager Felicitas] Behrendt told us: "We are aware of the text and are currently looking into it." She did not comment on efforts taken during Springer Nature's editorial process to ensure its AI policies are followed….

The Texas Law Deans Provide A Weak Defense of the ABA's Accreditation Role

If this is the best the law deans can muster, SCOTX should seriously reconsider what value the ABA provides.

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Last week, I submitted a comment to the Supreme Court of Texas. In short, I argued that SCOTX should discount the opinions of the law school deans, as they do not represent the public interest. I've now reviewed the letter signed by deans from eight law schools, including my own. With respect, I did not find this letter very persuasive. Indeed, if this is the best the law deans can muster, then SCOTX should seriously reconsider what value the ABA provides. By contrast, the letter from University of Texas Dean Bobby Chesney offers a candid and realistic assessment of the costs and benefits of the ABA.

Let's walk through the primary letter, which I suspect was drafted by Dean Leonard Baynes at the University of Houston Law Center. (As a general rule, the lead signature usually belongs to the primary mover.)

First, the letter states that the ABA provides a "baseline of educational quality that correlates with higher bar passage rates." Baylor Law School, which signed the letter, consistently leads the state with a bar passage rate over 90%. Other schools that signed the letter routinely have a passage rate in the 70% range. Does anyone think that the ABA accreditation provides a "baseline" to determine bar passage? No. Bar passage is a combination of incoming class credentials, combined with the "secret sauce." The ABA does require that law schools maintain a minimum level of bar passage. The Supreme Court of Texas could easily impose the same requirement.

Second, the letter contends that removing the ABA's role would harm "the unserved and underrepresented, exacerbating existing access to justice challenges in Texas." Quite the opposite. The ABA is a cartel, which creates massive barriers to entry, and increases the cost of legal education. There are currently no law schools in the Rio Grande Valley, parts of East and West Texas, and the Panhandle. Those markets could be served through innovative approaches. If SCOTX moved on from the ABA, law schools could innovate, and there would be more opportunities to promote access to justice.

Third, the Deans actually complain that removing the ABA's role would make it harder for U.S. News to calculate rankings. This argument may seem persuasive to Deans, but I doubt the Supreme Court of Texas will care much about what a (former) magazine publishes. And it wouldn't be hard for SCOTX to require law schools in Texas to publish these numbers. Indeed, I agree with Seth Chandler that accreditation should move to a formula based on such outputs.

Fourth, the Deans assure SCOTX that the DEI standards are "suspended" Yet, after Students for Fair Admissions, but before Trump's elections, many of these Deans vigorously defended the DEI standards. I am not at all confident the ABA can be trusted if the Damoclean sword is eliminated.

At bottom, all the Deans have to rely on is portability. They worry that students who do not plan to practice in Texas will not attend their schools. But as I explained in my comment, accommodating the needs of students who wish to leave Texas is not exactly in the best interest of Texas.

I think a far better statement comes from UT Law Dean, Bobby Chesney. (It does not seem the Dean of Texas A&M submitted a letter). Chesney explains how the ABA's standards do not simply set a minimum baseline, but instead try to impose "best practices." For example, the current "experiential learning" rule would impose handcuffs on law schools:

Even so, when the ABA Standards not long ago were amended to require every law school to change their graduation requirements such that every student (no matter their career goals and no matter the school's resources) must spend at least six of their credits taking experiential courses, it seemed to many to be an example of the Council growing increasingly comfortable imposing its conception of best practices rather than confining itself to policing the baseline adequacy of the schools. But that original intervention was minor compared to the proposed expansion of this rule currently on the table.

Chesney closes with a call for change:

From that perspective, a well-designed alternative pathway should turn on an intentionally-parsimonious set of benchmarks for baseline adequacy, thus leaving maximum room for innovation. If well chosen, those benchmarks might actually be relatively administrable. They might consist, for example, of relatively-objective input measures such as the credits and particular courses required for graduation, the quantity and qualifications of the faculty, grading policies, etc. But in the spirit of innovation, they probably should as much or more emphasize outcome measures, especially bar passage, employment percentages, and cost-to-salary ratios.

One could err on the side of taking great risk in this way, in hopes of unleashing exciting innovations. Or one could err the other way, cracking the door open only to a limited degree by keeping the benchmarks (particularly requisite bar passage levels) demanding. Either way, however, it would be fascinating to see what might arise should the Court reopen such a pathway given the current climate of innovation, change, and cost concerns. I hope the Court will give some version of it a shot; it seems the Texas thing to do.

I agree with Chesney.

SCOTUS Bends The Law In Yet Another Obamacare Case

Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc. follows in the ignoble tradition of NFIB, King, and California.

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For more than a decade, it seems that different rules apply to Obamacare cases. In NFIB v. Sebelius (2012), a penalty was rewritten into a tax, and a mandatory Medicaid expansion was rewritten into a voluntary program. In King v. Burwell (2014), "established by the State" was rewritten as "established by the federal government." In California v. Texas (2021), the Court found that the plaintiffs waived a standing argument that was clearly invoked. And so on. When health care is at issue, all the usual rules go out the window.

The latest ACA case continues the trend. Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc. is an Appointments Clause case. Yet, the Court resolves this dispute based on a theory not developed below. Justice Thomas's dissent explains what happened:

This case concerns the U. S. Preventive Services Task Force, a body that issues legally binding recommendations regarding preventive healthcare treatments. At the beginning of this suit, a subordinate official within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had for years appointed the Task Force's members. Everyone now agrees that this practice was unlawful. Everyone further agrees that no one statute provides for a department head to appoint the Task Force's members. But, rather than accept that the default mode of appointment applies, the Government invented a new theory on appeal, arguing that the combination of two ambiguously worded statutes enacted decades apart establishes that the Secretary of HHS can appoint the Task Force's members. The Court today rushes to embrace this theory. I cannot. To begin with, I would not rule on the Government's new theory before any lower court has done so.

Thomas writes that two questions are presented, but the Fifth Circuit only considered the latter question:

I would remand for the Fifth Circuit to consider the important threshold question that it skipped: whether the Secretary has the statutory power to appoint the Task Force. The Secretary may appoint the Task Force's members only if (1) Congress has vested in the Secretary the power to appoint them, and (2) the members are inferior officers under the Appointments Clause. The answer to the first question significantly affects the analysis of the second question. But, no court has passed on the first question, and this Court has had only a limited opportunity to consider it.

And the novel theory the Court relied on was based on the Reorganization Plan of 1966 (not a statute). This Plan could not vest the Executive with new powers that did not exist in 1966. Yet, that is exactly what the government argued here.

Thomas explains:

Here, the purpose of a "reorganization" plan is to "give a definite and orderly structure to" a department's existingfunctions, not to create new functions that a departmentcannot otherwise lawfully perform. Oxford English Dictionary 923–924 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "organize"). A plan may not, "under the guise of consolidating and rearranging, . . . creat[e] authority in the Executive Branch which had not existed before." Dept. of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel,Memorandum of William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Atty.Gen. (Sept. 11, 1969), in Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1969 (ICC): Hearing before the Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1969) (Rehnquist Memorandum). Yet, that is precisely what the Government'sreading accomplishes, since, without the ReorganizationPlan, the Executive has no power to appoint the Task Force outside the gauntlet of Senate confirmation.

Seth Barrett Tillman and I wrote about the Rehnquist opinion here.

Justice Thomas also gets a good dig in about how Justice Kavanaugh focus on executive branch practice:

The intervening passage of the ACA also makes the majority's appeals to "consistent Executive Branch practice" fall flat. Ante, at 31 (citing Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 394 (2024)).The Government concedes that its practice from 2010 until its appeal inthis suit was for the AHRQ Director to appoint Task Force members invalidly, based on the mistaken view that the members were not officers. See Brief for Federal Defendants in Braidwood Mgmt., Inc., No. 23– 10326 (CA5), ECF Doc. 159, pp. 31, n. 2, 41. The practice thus sheds no light on whether the Director's convening power constitutes an express vesting of appointment authority that overcomes the constitutional default. And, surely this Court did not overrule Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), only to defer to concededly unlawful executive action.

There is a big problem with Justice Kavanaugh's fixation on tradition. At bottom, it is a deference doctrine, where unlawful conduct can become lawful if it continues.

In the normal course, the Supreme Court would have remanded the case to the lower court. But it seemed pretty clear that the Supreme Court did not want to give the Fifth Circuit another crack at this case, so the majority went ahead and decided this novel issue from scratch.

Here is your regular reminder that President Trump could have, but didn't, elevate his Fifth Circuit appointees to the Supreme Court.

AI in Court

$6K Sanctions for Apparent AI Hallucinations in Coomer v. Lindell / My Pillow Election-Related Libel Suit

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From Judge Nina Wang (D. Colo.) today in Coomer v. Lindell:

In preparation for trial in this matter, the Court issued a Trial Preparation Order that set certain deadlines, including for the filing of motions in limine. The Trial Preparation Order further informed the Parties that any pending motions in limine would be discussed at the Final Pretrial/Trial Preparation Conference…. Defendants … filed a Brief in Response to [a] Motion in Limine ("Opposition") [Doc. 283] … [that] contained … "nearly thirty defective citations" ….

[At a hearing,] Mr. Kachouroff [lead counsel for Defendants] was unable to respond [about the defective citations] in a manner that was satisfactory to the Court. Specifically, Mr. Kachouroff indicated that he had delegated citation checking for the Opposition to his co-counsel, … Ms. DeMaster …. [T]he Court ordered Mr. Kachouroff and Ms. DeMaster to show cause why they should not be sanctioned and referred to their respective state bars for disciplinary proceedings….

In [their] Response, Defendants represented that counsel "was unaware of any errors or issues with his response filed 55 days earlier, and had no reasonable opportunity to investigate any problem to be able to engage in constructive discussion about Doc. No. 283." Defendants further asserted that "[a]fter the hearing and having a subsequent opportunity to investigate Doc. 283, it was immediately clear that the document filed was not the correct version. It was a prior draft. It was inadvertent, an erroneous filing that was not done intentionally, and was filed mistakenly through human error. Counsel acted swiftly to rectify the error." Defendants submitted additional materials for the Court's consideration and certified that the record is complete with respect to the Order to Show Cause….

The court was unpersuaded by the Response, and concluded:

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Politics

"Too Often," Requests to Seal Are "Granted Because It Is Easier to Leave Something Sealed Than It Is to Explain Why It Should Be Unsealed"

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From Tuesday's decision by Judge Richard Seeborg (N.D. Cal.) in In re: Xyrem (Sodium Oxybate) Antitrust Litigation:

In the course of this complex and hard-fought multidistrict litigation, the parties have moved to seal some component of nearly every motion they filed. Too often, in this case and others, such requests are granted because it is easier to leave something sealed than it is to explain why it should be unsealed. As a result, the records of the federal judiciary are replete with documents that the public cannot access simply because a party designated it confidential.

This order addresses the sealing motions pending on the docket. As explained in more detail below, such motions fail to meet the "compelling reason" standard that generally applies to merits-related materials in courts of the Ninth Circuit. The motions are therefore denied….

Federal courts are public. Their dockets should largely remain publicly accessible except in the relatively narrow instances where parties provide compelling reasons to the contrary. As to the above sealing motions, the parties' submissions to the court are neither compelling nor sufficiently weighty to overcome the presumption of public access. Thus, the motions are denied.

To his credit, Judge Seeborg writes over 5000 words dealing with the details of the attempts to seal many different kinds of filings; read the opinion for more.

Politics

May Judge Order Divorcing Parent to Include Disclaimer With All Future Child Abuse Allegations?

A trial judge had found that the mother had "intentionally weaponized" child abuse reports, and required her to so state in any future child abuse allegations made to authorities.

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In last week's Peterson v. Rush (Pa. Super. Ct.), the trial court had given shared legal and physical custody of a daughter to the mother and father, but also stated this:

I am, therefore, going to order Mother that, to the extent that she has concerns over child abuse, obviously any concerns regarding child abuse need to be reported to authorities, but they must now be reported with a disclaimer [(Disclaimer)]: "The [c]ourt made a finding of fact at the conclusion of a one-day trial on September 10, 2024, that Mother has intentionally weaponized the [Protection From Abuse], I[ndirect] C[riminal] C[ontempt], and child abuse process[es] in an effort to gain an advantage in custody proceedings." Mother should then further inform the providers that: "Nevertheless, all legitimate allegations or concerns of child abuse should be fully investigated as required by law." I am ordering Mother to make those two statements in any further child abuse reports so that a proper context is had….

On appeal, Judge Anne Lazarus, joined by Judge Timika Lane, upheld this condition:

Because Mother did not raise or even suggest a free speech claim in her Rule 1925(b) statement, the issue is waived on appeal. However, even if we did not find this issue waived, Mother would not be entitled to relief. {First Amendment protections historically encompass prohibitions on speech as opposed to compelled speech. See In the Int. of J.J.M. (Pa. 2021) ("First Amendment 'made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that 'Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech.'"); citing U.S. CONST. amend. I. In any event, the court was justified in requiring Mother to disclose the information contained within the Disclaimer where it bears directly upon "the important governmental interest of protecting the psychological and emotional well-being of Child[.]" S.B. v. S.S. (Pa. 2020).}

Judge Mary Jane Bowes dissented on this point:

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