The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Chevron Doctrine

Whether Chevron Stands or Falls, Any Deference Should Be Based Upon Delegation, Not Ambiguity

Some thoughts on the most important issue in Relentless and Loper Bright.

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The Supreme Court recently heard argument in two cases in which the petitioners have asked the justices to reconsider the Chevron doctrine. The Court's willingness to reconsider Chevron has been a long time coming. As I explained in my opening remarks at a recent Solomon Center panel at Yale Law School, concern about Chevron, and in particular how it has been applied in lower courts, has been building for some time. 

Recall that in 2018, in Pereira v. Sessions, in what would be one of his last opinions on the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy raised deep concerns about the way Chevron has been understood and applied in lower courts.

At issue was the timing and amount of notice the federal government must give non-citizen, non-permanent residents to trigger the stop time rule, which can affect whether such individuals are allowed to remain in the United States.

Lower courts had initially adopted a rule requiring complete notice to trigger the rule. Ultimately, however, in the context of individual adjudications, the Board of Immigration Appeals disagreed. This prompted multiple circuit courts to adopt the contrary rule - a rule contrary to what courts had previously determined was the best interpretation of the statute (and the interpretation eight of nine justices would later conclude was compelled by the statutory text.)

Even though there was little statutory basis for the BIA's stingy, late-developed, pro-deportation interpretation, a majority of circuit courts had upheld it because the statute was ambiguous. 

As Justice Kennedy remarked, the sort of analysis courts conducted in these cases to justify upholding the BIA's interpretation, relying upon Chevron, constituted "an abdication of the Judiciary's proper role in interpreting federal statutes."

Wrote Kennedy:

The type of reflexive deference exhibited in some of these cases is troubling. And when deference is applied to other questions of statutory interpretation, such as an agency's interpretation of the statutory provisions that concern the scope of its own authority, it is more troubling still. 

Given the concerns raised by some Members of this Court, it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision. The proper rules for interpreting statutes and determining agency jurisdiction and substantive agency powers should accord with constitutional separation-of-powers principles and the function and province of the Judiciary. 

If Justice Kennedy expressed such concerns in 2018, it should not surprise us that–some five years later with little evident change–the Court has is reconsidering Chevron.

As I see it, the Court has reached this point because of a range of concerns, some (but not all) of which Kennedy identified in Pereira.

First, in practice, Chevron is often used to uphold agency interpretations that have little to do with allowing agencies to exercise their delegated authority to make policy judgments based upon agency expertise. The procedural issue in Pereira would seem to be a good example of this.

Second, despite Supreme Court decisions suggesting that ambiguity alone is insufficient to trigger Chevron deference, lower courts often fail to engage in any meaningful "step zero" analysis in order to make sure that Congress had delegated the relevant authority to the agency. Instead, Chevron has become an excuse for courts to abdicate their responsibility to resolve legal questions in favor of agencies.

Third, as highlighted in the various recent major questions cases, agencies increasingly view Chevron as a license to go on a scavenger hunt for plausible statutory authority to implement policies favored by the executive branch, whether or not such policies have been authorized by Congress. Put another way, rather than facilitating the ability of agencies to faithfully execute the law Congress enacts, Chevron is used to enable agencies to go their own way.

A fourth concern, most acute in areas in which agencies make policy through adjudication (as in immigration and labor policy) is that agencies are able to change their interpretations–and thus change the applicable law– without going through the sort of open and deliberative rulemaking process that ensures those who will be subject to the rule have notice and an opportunity to be heard. 

What these concerns have in common is that they all represent a failure of agencies and lower courts to take seriously the idea that Chevron deference is grounded in delegation, and that this idea necessarily entails limits on Chevron's domain.  While some initially sought to justify Chevron on separation of powers or broad policy grounds, the Supreme Court's post-Chevron jurisprudence (including, but not limited to, cases like Mead) make clear that if Chevron is to be justified, it must rest on the conclusion that Congress delegated such authority to the agency in question, and that where there is no indication that such a delegation occurred, there is no basis for courts to defer to an agency interpretation. Put another way, Chevron deference should apply only in those instances where it can be presumed that Congress delegated authority to an agency to resolve what is essentially a policy choice – e.g. whether an air pollution "source" should be defined so as to accommodate "bubble" policies – and not because agencies have any inherent authority to make such choices. 

A key question in Relentless and Loper Bright is whether the concerns outlined above require overturning Chevron. For myself, I am skeptical. I am on record suggesting that, in addition to the failure of courts to respect the limits of Chevron's proper domain, that the underlying issue is the scope of authority that Congress delegates to agencies. In other words, a doctrine that focuses on delegation as the source of deference – as opposed to mere ambiguity – would likely do the trick, but this requires clarifying how many understand Chevron. As Thomas Merrill noted on this blog, while parts of Chevron stress the need to determine whether Congress delegated a given policy choice to the agency in question, other parts of the opinion suggest ambiguity or silence is sufficient to justify deference. Some subsequent opinions, such as that in City of Arlington v. FCC, further muddied the waters.

As it happens, the question presented in both Loper Bright and Relentless gives the Court ample space to navigate these questions.  The question presented deliberately and carefully presents two possible ways to resolve the case and address Justice Kennedy's concerns. Here's the QP for both cases:

Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.

The QP suggests the Court overturn Chevron, but it also gives the Court room to clarify (and perhaps reorient) Chevron to focus on the delegation question–and to do so in a way that aligns nicely with the Court's recent major questions doctrine decisions. Specifically, the Court could emphasize that, before even considering whether to defer to an agency, they must first conclude that Congress delegated authority to the agency in question to resolve a policy issue with the force of law, and that when a statute is silent on the existence of agency of authority, courts should presume that such authority does not exist. Statutory silence is just that: Silence. It is not a delegation of power. (Admittedly, this is a position I have held for some time, and urged (unsuccessfully) in Arlington.)

As I see it, imposing this sort of limitation is the key step. Whether this is done by overturning Chevron, "Kisor-izing" Chevron, or merely adopting the Chief Justice's Arlington dissent is almost a stylistic choice. There is plenty in Chevron and subsequent cases to justify this outcome, even if it would overturn or repudiate some of the ways that Chevron has been applied.

Note that so long as the Court focuses on delegation as the source of agency authority, neither overturning nor modifying Chevron would limit the ability of Congress to entrust agencies with discrete policy questions in areas informed by agency expertise. As Chief Justice Roberts noted early in the Relentless argument, deferring to an agency on whether scientific or other evidence supports a particular conclusion is distinct from deferring to an agency's interpretation of statutory text. Indeed, even if the Court were to fully overturn Chevron in favor of a Skidmore-like regime, this need not foreclose reliance upon agency expertise, nor need it have any direct effect on how courts conduct arbitrary and capricious review and apply cases like State Farm.

This would suggest that some of the horror stories about a post-Chevron administrative state are quite overstated. The administrative state was able to operate before Chevron was decided (and before it was made the basis of a doctrine), and the administrative state will persist no matter how these cases are resolved. 

Donald Trump

What If Trump v. Anderson Is Treated Like an Election Law Case?

An interesting analysis of the former President's brief challenging his disqualification from the ballot in Colorado.

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Most folks commenting on whether Section 3 of the 14th Amendment disqualifies Donald Trump from serving as President again approach the question as a constitutional law question. But as the question is emerging, and is being litigated, it also raises a range of traditional election law questions, such as when and whether candidates for federal office can or should be removed from the ballot under federal or state law and the like, even if few are focusing on the underlying election law issues. (Anderson-Burdick anyone?)

Over on the Election Law Blog, Derek Muller has a post examining Trump's merits brief in Trump v. Anderson, noting that, whatever the Court does with regard to Trump and the 2024 election, the case  has "the potential to be the most significant ballot access case in over 30 years." Moreover, while Trump has not leaned into the election law questions, Muller suggests that election law doctrines may offer more support for Trump's position (at least in the posture in which Trump v. Anderson arises) than the constitutional claims he is trying to make.

it seems increasingly likely, to me, that if the Supreme Court rules in Trump's favor (and by if, the likelihood seems to be declining), it will be on an election law ground related to ballot access rather than a substantive Section 3 analysis.

If one goes back to see how Madison Cawthorn and Marjorie Taylor Greene handed the challenges to their eligibility back in 2022, it was a very different strategy. The original challenges, citing Section 3, were filed in state court. The defendants then went on the offensive. They filed collateral cases in federal court; they secured some delays and temporary victories; they secured sympathetic opinions from judges at the courts of appeals that leaned into some of their arguments on election law issues on the power of Congress to judge qualifications of its members, squarely the kind of election law issue that is a threshold to any substantive Section 3 analysis.

Trump, however, has handled the cases very defensively. He never filed collateral proceedings in federal court on election law issues. He's largely settled into framing the case along the lines the plaintiffs have framed it, as a constitutional law case under Section 3. . . .

It would seem that this significant ballot access dispute would attract a lot more election law attention. But it has not. Indeed, very few election law scholars have weighed in and the amicus briefs, and those that have with in support of neither party, reflecting some hesitation, to some degree, and some questions about the underlying merits. (Disclosure: I'm one of them.) [Here is Muller's brief.]

But I want to focus on Trump's arguments in the merits brief. And I think it seems increasingly likely (in my judgment, anyway) that while this case has not been principally litigated as an election law one, it might end up that way, if the court is inclined to rule in Trump's favor. But if it does not move in that direction. I think it's going to be very difficult for Trump to succeed on the merits, and it seems increasingly likely that the Court will hold that he could be barred from the ballot on the merits of Section 3. Indeed, watching the litigation unfold, my sense today is that Trump's chances of success are lower than they've ever been.

As Muller sees it, most of the arguments presented in Trump's brief do not have much force, but we will see how the justices respond when the Court hears oral arguments in Trump v. Anderson this coming week.

 

Post-Script: I have made no secret of my feelings about Trump, and those feelings have not changed. I did not support his election in 2016 or his reelection in 2020. I believe he should have been convicted and disqualified from holding future office after his impeachment (either one), and do not believe there is any constitutional bar on "late impeachment." And I would love to seem him disappear from our nation's political life altogether. I am nonetheless not (yet) convinced that he is disqualified from holding office again under Section 3, and I am quite skeptical that Section 3 bars him from appearing on the ballot.

Citizenship

Florida Limits on Ownership of Real Property by Chinese Citizens Are Preempted by Federal Law

So an Eleventh Circuit panel tentatively concludes, preliminarily enjoining the statute; one judge would hold that the limits violate the Equal Protection Clause.

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From Shen v. Commissioner, decided yesterday by the Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judges Adalberto Jordan, Kevin Newsom & Nancy Abudu:

In our view, the plaintiffs/appellants have shown a substantial likelihood of success on their claim that Florida Statutes §§ 692.201–692.204 are preempted by federal law, specifically 50 U.S.C. § 4565, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 ("FIRRMA"), and 31 C.F.R. § 802.701….

The defendants/appellees are preliminarily enjoined from enforcing the challenged statutory provisions against Ms. Shen and Mr. Xu. The motion for a preliminary injunction is otherwise denied.

Our decision, of course, does not bind the merits panel, which will hear oral argument in April.

Judge Abudu concurred:

While I agree with the above partial grant of the preliminary injunction, I write separately to explain why I also would have granted the preliminary injunction based on the Plaintiffs/Appellants' substantial likelihood of success on their argument that Fla. Stat. §§ 692.201–692.204 violate the Equal Protection Clause….

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Race Discrimination

Court Refuses to Block West Point Use of Race in Admissions, Doesn't Express Any Substantive Opinion on Question

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From today's order in Students for Fair Admissions v. USMA at West Point:

The application for writ of injunction pending appeal presented to Justice Sotomayor and by her referred to the Court is denied. The record before this Court is underdeveloped, and this order should not be construed as expressing any view on the merits of the constitutional question.

The District Court denied a preliminary injunction on Jan. 3, so the case remains pending there; part of the District Court's rationale was:

A full factual record is vital to answering this critical question whether the use of race in the admissions process at West Point furthers compelling governmental interests and whether the government's use of race is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The Court cannot enjoin West Point's use of race in admissions without a full understanding, informed by a complete factual predicate, as to what exactly are the compelling interests asserted, to whom those compelling interests belong, and how in this specific case they are or are not narrowly tailored to achieve those interests. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met its burden, on the present record, to show a clear, or otherwise preponderant, likelihood of success on the merits.

There thus hasn't been either a final District Court decision nor a Court of Appeals decision.

Open Beaches Constitutional Amendment Challenge to Closing Beaches for SpaceX Launches Can Go Forward

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From yesterday's decision in SaveRGV, Sierra Club & Carrizo/Comecrudo Nation of Texas v. Texas General Land Office, decided yesterday by the Texas Court of Appeals (Corpus Christi-Edinburg), in an opinion by Justice Clarissa Silva, joined by Chief Justice Dori Contreras and Justice Nora Longoria:

The Texas Constitution provides that "[t]he public, individually and collectively, has an unrestricted right to use and a right of ingress to and egress from a public beach. The right granted by this subsection is dedicated as a permanent easement in favor of the public." This provision, commonly referred to as the Open Beaches Amendment, permits the legislature to "enact laws to protect the right of the public to access and use a public beach and to protect the public beach easement from interference and encroachments" but "does not create a private right of enforcement." In 2013, the legislature enacted Texas Natural Resources Code § 61.132, which permits the commissioners in a county bordering the Gulf of Mexico or its tidewater to temporarily close a beach in reasonable proximity to a space flight launch site or access points to the beach in the county on launch dates.

According to SaveRGV's first amended petition, following the passage of § 61.132, appellees have allowed the closure of Boca Chica Beach in Cameron County for up to 450 hours per year to allow Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) to conduct activities related to space flight launches. Such closures prompted SaveRGV to file a suit seeking declaratory judgment that § 61.132 violates the Open Beaches Amendment and is thus unconstitutional….

The court rejected various procedural challenges, and remanded to the trial court to consider the merits. The court noted that it wasn't deciding what substantive test should be applied under the Open Beaches Amendment to evaluate beach closures. I look forward to seeing how open beaches jurisprudence evolves in the Texas courts—not a constitutional inquiry that you hear about every day.

Prof. Marty Lederman (Georgetown) on Trump v. Anderson: "Two Important Things All the Parties Get Wrong, …"

"and One Other Important Thing They Don’t Address."

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The post (at Balkinization) is here; as I've mentioned before, I haven't studied the issues in this case closely enough to speak to this myself, but Prof. Lederman is a leading constitutional expert, and his thoughts struck me as much worth passing along:

1. Colorado Is Not "Enforcing" or "Implementing" Section 3.

The briefs of all four of the parties in the Supreme Court (and those of many amici, as well) proceed on the assumption, articulated repeatedly in their briefs, that if Colorado were to omit Donald Trump's name from its presidential primary ballot—something that, as I explain in this post, Colorado has not in fact done and is unlikely to do—the state would acting to "enforce" or "implement" Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, some of the parties' arguments take this as a jumping-off point, and depend upon it.

But it's wrong. Colorado isn't purporting to "enforce" Section 3, and states don't have any power to enforce its disqualification directive with respect to federal officers.

To be sure, a state has the power to enforce Section 3 with respect to state officers who are subject to Section 3's disqualification rule. Relevant state officials or courts with statutory or state constitutional authority, for example, can refuse to appoint a Section-3-disqualified person, or remove such a person from office. And, if state law prescribes it, a state legislature might be able to remove state legislators, as well as other state officers by way of impeachment, etc.

But a state does not have any legal authority—nor, to my knowledge, has any state ever claimed such power—to enjoin a disqualified federal official from holding office, or to remove him or her from such office….

Once one understands that Colorado is simply enforcing its own state-law rule prescribing exclusion of ineligible candidates from primary election ballots for purposes of state election management—a rule not confined to presidential candidates—one can see that Trump's argument that Colorado is imposing an additional "qualification" for Trump to hold office (according to Trump, Colorado has effectively required a candidate not to be subject to Section 3 ineligibility at the time of the primary election rather than on January 20, 2025) rests upon a category error: By declaring that candidates for President may not appear on its presidential primary ballot unless they meet certain conditions (including apparent eligibility to hold the office), Colorado is no more imposing extraconstitutional "qualifications" on persons holding that national office than Virginia did in 2012 when it excluded Rick Perry from its presidential primary ballot because he failed to timely submit the necessary number of voter signatures. See Perry v. Judd, 471 F. App'x 219 (4th Cir. 2012). (I pulled that example from Derek Muller's excellent amicus brief.)

2. Colorado Also is Not (Yet) Exercising Its Authority Under Article I's "Electors" Clause

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Donald Trump

Fighting the Meaning of Section Three

Preparing responses to some objections

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Five and a half months ago, in August 2023, our article on Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, The Sweep and Force of Section Three, was accepted for publication by the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.

The article's core thesis – that Section Three's disqualification of insurrectionists from office is legally operative, self-executing, sweeping in scope, and likely disqualifies numerous participants in the efforts to overturn the 2020 presidential election – obviously has enormous implications for our national political life today.  Among other important consequences, it means that former president Donald J. Trump, who is running for president again in 2024, is constitutionally disqualified from holding that or any other covered office, unless and until two-thirds of both houses of Congress vote to remove his disqualification.

Shortly after being accepted for publication, we posted the draft manuscript of the article on the Social Sciences Research Network (SSRN).  The article (and its thesis) immediately attracted wide interest:  For an academic article, The Sweep and Force of Section Three has provoked an unusual amount of interest and attention.  It has been widely discussed on air, in print, online, and in the academy. And it has been widely cited in the current litigation about the enforcement of Section Three. As readers surely know, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Mr. Trump is indeed disqualified by Section Three from future office as a matter of federal constitutional law; and that this renders him ineligible for inclusion on the state primary ballot for election to that office as a matter of Colorado state law.  The U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review that decision in what is sure to be one of its most important cases of the term.

For the most part, we have been content to let the analysis and arguments of The Sweep and Force of Section Three speak for themselves and have not participated in the subsequent public debate and litigation over its thesis.  The manuscript itself is quite detailed – it runs 126 pages in its pre-publication form – and frankly it anticipates many of the objections that have been raised against its legal conclusions.  Up until now, we have not elsewhere responded to these objections in print, at least not systematically.

But the occasion of the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Anderson v. Griswold, and the Supreme Court's pending review of that decision in Trump v. Anderson, provides, we think, an appropriate occasion for us to address some of the arguments that have been made about Section Three.  As noted, we discuss some, even many, of these points in our original article.  The article is now in the final stages of editing with the excellent staff of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.  In the editing process, we decided against burdening the article's discussion with many responses to specific objections that have been made to its thesis, as those objections have arisen in public debate over the last four months, for two reasons: First, the version from last fall, as edited, largely stands on its own and has already been read by many in that form, which would makes it somewhat awkward (and perhaps irritating to some readers) to revise that text significantly to respond to assertions or critiques offered since September.  Second, and relatedly, responding on the fly in the main text to objections as they arose would have made the article something of a moving target, and perhaps further delayed publication.

We adhere to all the points we made in that manuscript and have changed little.  Nothing in the ensuing commentary, discussion, and litigation has caused us to revise our core propositions:

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Free Speech

Florida Student Arrested for Threatening to Shoot Jewish Students

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From WFLA (Kaycee Sloan) Monday:

According to documents, Palestinian-American student Seif Asi, 21, approached a table of Jewish students and got into a one to two-minute "heated conversation" during a UCF Office of Student Involvement approved pro-Israel free expression event on Jan. 23….

When UCFPD stopped Asi, he told them that he was Palestinian and had family in Palestine, adding that he was tired of seeing Jewish supporters on campus and complained about a pro-Israel match that occurred last week.

The arrest report shows that Asi told police he saw the same group of students at the march, and it made him upset when he saw them setting up their table on Tuesday. He also told police that he's "tired of seeing students on campus defend the killing of Palestinian people."

The 21-year-old said he was on his way back from working out when his "emotions got the better of him." … The three victims, who are part of a group called "Students Supporting Israel" or SSI, provided sworn verbal and written statements consistent with each other. The students said Asi accused them of supporting the death of his family members back home. Then, all three students allegedly heard Asi say, "You won't be here anymore when I come back and shoot you."

Asi was charged with three counts of intimidation based on display of indicia of religious or ethnic heritage, under Fla. Stat. § 784.0493, which reads:

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Free Speech

Missouri Student Pleads Guilty for Damaging Display Supporting Israeli Hostages

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From University of Missouri's The Maneater (Sophia Anderson & Vivi Hirshfield) last Friday:

On Wednesday, Jan. 17, an MU student pled guilty to second degree property damage in Columbia Municipal Court for flipping a display Shabbat table with symbolic place settings for Israeli hostages in Speakers Circle in November 2023….

[Students Ilay] Kielmanowicz [of Mizzou Students Supporting Israel] and [Daniel] Swindell had set up two tables — one of which was arranged like a Shabbat table to show support for Israeli hostages. The other had "books and pamphlets about Israel and Jews and Zionism and the Israeli Palestinian conflict, which students were able to take," Kielmanowicz said. The Shabbat table included fliers with photos of Israeli hostages that read "KIDNAPPED" above them….

The police report states that the student approached Swindell because he was wearing a garment that said "Zionist." Swindell confirmed this detail, and Adam Kruse, Assistant City Prosecutor, cited it in court.

The student stated they found the display "insensitive and offensive," according to Kielmanowicz. The two engaged in a conversation about display and the Israel-Hamas war until the student reportedly flipped over the volunteers' Shabbat table, breaking the place settings consisting of Swindell's dishes….

"The university is committed to ensuring everyone on our campus continues to have the right to demonstrate in a peaceful manner," Christian Basi of the MU News Bureau wrote in a statement to The Maneater. "We will not tolerate actions that disrupt others['] rights to demonstrate or exercise their free speech rights." …

UPDATE: I erroneously omitted the sentence: "a year of probation, 20 hours of community service and a court fee of $31.50."

Free Speech

"Ohio Man Sentenced to 18 Years in Prison for Firebombing a Church that Planned to Host Drag Show Events"

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From a Justice Department press release Jan. 30:

Aimenn D. Penny, 20, of Alliance, Ohio, was arrested and charged last year with one count of violating the Church Arson Prevention Act, one count of using fire to commit a federal felony, one count of malicious use of explosive materials, and one count of possessing a destructive device. On Oct. 23, 2023, Penny pleaded guilty to the church arson hate crime and using fire and explosives to commit a felony.

According to court documents, on March 25, 2023, Penny made Molotov cocktails and drove to the Community Church of Chesterland (CCC), in Chesterland, Ohio. Angered by the church's plan to host two drag events the following weekend, Penny threw two Molotov cocktails at the church, hoping to burn it to the ground. Through Penny's guilty plea, he admitted to using force through fire and explosives, intending to obstruct CCC congregants in their enjoyment and expression of their religious beliefs….

Free Speech

Disney Loses First Amendment Claim over Florida's Cancellation of Special Government District that Disney Controlled

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From yesterday's decision by Judge Allen Winsor (N.D. Fla.) in Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc. v. DeSantis; I expect Disney will appeal (see also Adam Schulman's and Dilan Esper's analyses of this in April 2022, which proved prescient, and also my April 22 discussion of some alternative arguments):

In 1967, Florida's Legislature created the Reedy Creek Improvement District (RCID), a special improvement district in Central Florida. The district is perhaps best known as the home of Walt Disney World, which has operated there for decades. And as the district's largest landowner, Disney has effectively controlled the district's board, whose members were elected based on land ownership. That changed last year, after the Florida Legislature substantially amended the district's governing structure. Now, Florida's Governor selects the board members, subject to Senate confirmation. As a result, Disney no longer controls the special improvement district in which it operates. (That district is now called the Central Florida Tourism Oversight District, or CFTOD.)

This change—which works to Disney's significant detriment—came after Disney publicly criticized another Florida law, the Parental Rights in Education Act. In Disney's view, this timing was no coincidence. Disney alleges that the Florida Legislature changed the district's governing structure to punish it for its speech. The issue in this case is whether the Legislature's action constituted unlawful retaliation against Disney's speech in violation of the First Amendment….

"As a general matter, the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting individuals to retaliatory actions after the fact for having engaged in protected speech." But it is settled law that "when a statute is facially constitutional, a plaintiff cannot bring a free-speech challenge by claiming that the lawmakers who passed it acted with a constitutionally impermissible purpose." The Eleventh Circuit has "held that many times." And this settled law forecloses Disney's claim.

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Campus Free Speech

What Can Professors Say in Public?

My new article on the First Amendment and controversial faculty speech

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The new issue of the Case Western Reserve Law Review with a symposium on the First Amendment and classrooms has now arrived, and with it my article, "What Can Professors Say in Public? Extramural Speech and the First Amendment."

From the abstract:

Since the early twentieth century, academics have urged universities to recognize robust protections for the freedom of professors to speak in public on matters of political, social, and economic controversy—so-called "extramural speech." The U.S. Supreme Court eventually recognized First Amendment protections for government employees, including state university professors, who express themselves about matters of public concern. The Court has indicated that the state should be especially solicitous of the speech of government employees in an academic context, but it has not adequately elaborated on the nature of those protections and how courts and government employers should assess the state's interests relative to the extramural speech of professors employed at public universities.

This Article describes the state of the existing principles and doctrine surrounding extramural speech and examines the factors that private and public universities can reasonably take into consideration when responding to such speech—and what rationales for suppressing such speech or sanctioning faculty for engaging in such speech are inappropriate. Controversies surrounding the public speech of university faculty have only become more common and more intense in recent years, and both public and private universities need to be more self-conscious about the risk of stifling the intellectual environment of universities and chilling unpopular speech when responding to such controversies. If First Amendment values are particularly weighty in the context of the marketplace of ideas on university campuses, then many of the rationales for disciplining government employees for controversial speech that may make sense in some governmental workplaces should be rejected if applied in the university context.

The article focuses on the balancing test in the Supreme Court's Pickering doctrine for government employee speech, and how that balancing test should be conducted in the specific context of universities and faculty speech. Although the constitutional test is specific to state universities, it works well for thinking through protections for free expression at most private universities in the United States as well.

From the conclusion:

There are very few occasions when university officials can properly sanction a university professor for his or her extramural speech. . . . Professors may say things in public that are mistaken, offensive, or even repugnant and vile—or they may simply say things that threaten the interests of powerful groups and individuals or run contrary to prevailing sentiment—but general principles of free speech protect their right to say such things and university employers should refrain from penalizing them for such speech. When universities claim that firing professors who say controversial things is justified, courts should stand ready to closely interrogate such claims. When the extramural speech of professors is weighed in a Pickering balance, the university's legitimate interest should not include an interest in suppressing speech because it is unpopular or uncivil or gives rise to the commotions that unpopular or uncivil speech can trigger.

You can read the whole thing here.

Thoughts on the Declining Numbers of SCOTUS Clerks Becoming Law Professors

One track became two.

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From 1940 to 1990, about one third of Supreme Court law clerks became law professors.  But in recent years, Brian Leiter and Jeff Gordon note, that percentage has dropped considerably.  Sarah Lawsky has some numbers of clerks entering legal academia in the last decade or so that Brian recently posted:

Even if Sarah is missing some former clerks in her numbers, that's a noticeable drop. What explains the trend?  Over in the comments to Brian's post, Professor Dan Epps has a suggestion that I think explains a lot: The increasing separateness of the law clerk and law professor track.

I realize this is a niche topic, but here's a little background to explain that increasing separateness for those who may be interested.  It used to be, decades ago, that getting a top clerkship and getting a top professorship were the same track.  If you were a law student and you wanted to be a law professor, you got the highest grades you could and tried to use your grades to get a clerkship with the most prestigious judge you could.  The clerkship acted as a sort of graduate degree in law.  If you hit the jackpot and clerked on the Supreme Court, that was reasonably likely to lead to a  professorship at a very good law school. The top schools tried to hire former clerks, with some law school Deans visiting the Supreme Court to meet with clerks and pitch becoming a professor at their schools.  This was the era of 1940 to 1990, noted at the top of the post, when about one third of clerks later became professors.

These days, by contrast, the paths are a lot more separate.  First, there's more of a multi-year process of planning for a Supreme Court clerkship. Most Supreme Court clerks now have multiple prior clerkships before starting at the Supreme Court—according to David Lat, 29 of the current 36 clerks had two or more clerkships before their current positions.  And those are often spaced out, too. Just skimming the list at David's site, it looks like a typical clerk graduated about 3-4 years before starting at the Supreme Court.  By the time you're done with the Supreme Court, you're 4-5 years out of law school and you may still only have a year or so of actual legal practice. Meanwhile, biglaw firms await with what are now apparently $500,000 clerkship bonuses if you join them.

If you want to become a law professor, on the other hand, the pathways today tend to be different.  Law schools are now evaluating potential entry-level professors much more on their scholarship than on their grades or clerkships.  As a practical matter, you need to have spent a few years researching and writing scholarship to get ready to go on the market for a tenure-track job.  Getting a Ph.D. has become a very common way to develop a scholarly methodology and start to write some articles. At most top schools I am aware of, a clear majority of recent entry-level hires have one.  And even if you don't have a Ph.D., you will probably need to spend two years at a law school as a Fellow or Visiting Assistant Professor (VAP), learning the quirky ways of academia and working on an article or two to get ready for the entry-level market.  As Sarah Lawsky has found, about 90% of new entry-level hires have either a fellowship or a doctorate.  Many have both.

The takeaway of all this, I think, is that the single path of decades ago has largely divided into two separate paths.  Once you're in law school, the way to maximize your odds of getting a Supreme Court clerkship is different from the way to maximize your odds of getting a professorship, especially at a top school.  I think this largely explains why we see fewer people today succeeding on both tracks, first clerking at the Supreme Court and then later becoming an academic.  It's not the only explanation. But I think it's the main one.

As I said earlier, this is a niche topic.  Some readers (if anyone is still reading) may be wondering, "Who cares?" And totally fair if you don't. This may just be navel-gazing that has no significance outside the faculty lounge.  But I wonder if it may also be a small signal of a broader change of the role and background of law professors, and in turn, of law schools.  As Richard Posner noted in the 2007 essay I blogged about last month, there has been a switch over the decades from the model of the law professor as top lawyer steeped in lawyering to the model of the law professor as academic who writes and teaches in the field of law.  I wonder if the declining number of former Supreme Court clerks entering academia might be one small indicator of that switch continuing.

UPDATE: If there are recent clerks or recently-appointed profs (or both) who want to weigh in on this, I'd be happy to post reactions as to their sense of this and whether they agree.  Happy to remove names if requested, too.  Just send me an email, orin at berkeley dot edu.

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