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The First Geofence Warrant Case Reaches the Federal Court of Appeals
United States v. Chatrie is heard in the Fourth Circuit.
In March 2022, I had a long post on the district court's ruling in United States v. Chatrie, the first federal district court ruling on geofence warrants and the Fourth Amendment. Today the Fourth Circuit held oral argument in the case, which you can listen to here starting at about 1:10:
I posted my oral argument impressions on X, and I thought I would summarize my thoughts here, too.
It was a somewhat unusual argument, in that the judges spent a lot of time expressing their views and arguing amongst each other. In general, though, I thought it went well for the government. I would guess they prevail 2-1.
Judge Richardson seemed to be a vote on the government's side, and on the broadest ground. He suggested that there was no Fourth Amendment protection in the specific records known as "Google Location History" because you need to opt in to have Google collect them. Only about 1/3 of Google customers opt in to that. And to Judge Richardson, that was outcome determinative: If Google only keeps these particular records if you opt in, then you have volunteered to have those records and the third party doctrine applies.
I happen to think that's right, as I argue briefly in a forthcoming book (more on the book project later). I realize some are skeptical that Google really doesn't keep these records about everyone, but I understand Google's claim to be not that they can't figure out where phones are, but that they have a specific service called Google Location History that is at issue here. Those are the records that the government turned over, and those are the records that (Google claims) they only collect from the 1/3 or so of their users who opt in.
Judge Wilkinson was clearly on the government side, although quite possibly on a different basis. Judge Wilkinson was very concerned about limiting law enforcement use of this useful tool. He suggested he might want to rule for the government without deciding anything except the good faith exception. That way, the law could develop slowly without grand rulings from appellate courts trying to settle too much.
Judge Wynn was clearly on the defense side. He thought this was extremely disturbing surveillance. He analogized this authority to what you might expect in Nazi Germany. He also argued that that opting in is a fiction. There is no real option, in his view.
Looking ahead, an interesting question is whether Judges Richardson and Wilkinson will agree on a rationale to make a majority opinion. It's not clear they'll be able to find a common ground. We could end up with a narrow majority opinion on good faith with both Richardson and Wilkinson writing concurrences—with Judge Richardson writing on opting in and Judge Wilkinson hitting his usual themes of the need to go slowly in this area.
Speaking for myself, I hope the court doesn't decide the case on the good-faith exception without deciding at least some of the merits issues. We've been waiting for years for a geofence case to get to a federal court of appeals. There's almost no law from any court on what is a search in geofence cases, and the law on the particularity of warrants has so far only consisted of really weak and unilluminating decisions from trial courts. For the big case to finally reach a federal court of appeals, and to not get a ruling on any of the merits issues, would be the good faith exception at its worst. It would make sure no one ever knows what the law is.
That would be particularly problematic here, I think, because right now geofence investigations are conducted in the alternative universe of Google Policy. Google has the records, and it won't turn them over without a warrant. The company has come up with a complex procedure for how it will comply with the warrants. That procedure doesn't reflect law; it just reflects Google policy. And Google is very hard to sue about this stuff, as law enforcement would have to stop its investigation for a few years to litigate procedural issues just to try that. As a practical matter, right now Google sets the rules.
But it's hardly clear that Google's corporate policy is the right framework. First of all, if it's really the case that only 1/3 of Google users opt in to turning Location History on, then I am skeptical that there is probable cause to support a warrant in these cases. And if the same opt-in requirement that generates that skepticism means that such records are not protected by the Fourth Amendment, as Judge Richardson (I think correctly) suggested, then there is no legal basis on which Google can demand a warrant anyway.
So it may be that the whole warrant regime that Google has created is the wrong framework. It may be that warrants not only can't be demanded, but can't be obtained. Geofencing would instead take place under the statutory regime of 18 U.S.C 2703(d). And that would raise all the issues I wrote about in this article about how to do particularity for non-content records under the Stored Communications Act.
Anyway, it seems to me that a working system would feature courts ruling about the constitutional issues potentially raised by geofence warrants and then Congress legislating in response to those constitutional rulings— with Google's input, certainly, but not with Google calling the shots. On the other hand, if we're just muddling through under the good faith exception, it may be that the strange world of Google Policy continues on for a long time.
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Three questions about Google:
1. For each Google product you can buy, does the product come with location history turned off, or turned on?
2. If an app developer wants to do it, can it make turning on location history a condition for using the app?
3. What security does Google provide to prevent third parties from using their own software (or an app) to turn on location history?
And one question about the law:
If perfectly innocent Joe Schmoe has long been a person of interest to the FBI, perhaps a suspected terrorist, and due to bad luck a geofence search shows a terrorist incident occurred in his proximity, does Joe’s likelihood of being arrested increase or remain as it was? Or, to put it another way, is there any theory of law which posits Joe will be protected in some way from being arrested based only on his proximity and the coincidence of previous suspicion?
Third party doctrine is bullshit. The only third party here is the government itself, the only real question is who the warrant is directed to, not whether one is needed.
But the government is forever inventing excuses for not complying with the 4th amendment.
Thank you! Yes it is bullshit. The 4th amendment exists to keep the government police from getting too nosy.
I always like to think, could I do this to them? If I, as an ordinary Joe Blow, cannot do this to them, then they need a warrant to do it to me. I imagine quite the hissy fit if I were to sue Google for not giving me the location history of the local cop.
That is the test that ought to be applied: If a regular citizen couldn't demand it, then the government needs a warrant to demand it.
I disagree with you on practically everything you bother to comment on.
Toss my hat into the 'fuck the 3rd party doctrine' camp.
No one is suggesting that the government should be able to get this information without a warrant. Rather, the defendant is arguing that the government should not have been able to use a search warrant to get this information.
Other than that, great post!
Sorry, The People should not lose warrant and surveillance protection as the cost of participating in cool modern conveniences.
Would the Tyrant King George III have used it to help round up the Founding Fathers? Yes? Then they would have gated it behind warrants. Same for “phone metadata”, where the facetious ones brag they don’t record the contents, just who you called and when.
Well. Thanks for nothing. Step away from the Constitution. Joyously leaping to conclusions you get to get away with violating the spirit (to say nothing of the letter) of it shows a lack of proper stewardship, very unlike, umm, the old man guarding the Holy Grail in Indiana Jones And The Last MacGuffin.
Capturing prosaic crime isn’t the main criminality problem of humanity. Dictatorship is.
Even if these searches are ultimately deemed constitutional, I would hope Congress would take action to limit them. Of course, Congress is the laziest branch of government and is always eager to foist as much of its responsibility as possible onto the executive or judiciary.
Is it OK for cops to open and read your snail mail while in transit?
It is in the hands of a third party, and you voluntarily put it there.
I wouldn't be surprised if they are allowed to record the envelope but not open it, similar to wiretapping.
They not only can but do - the P.O keeps the images of all mail for some time: Mail Isolation Control and Tracking.
That says they retain for up to 30 days. Through the fog of my senility ISTR cases of e.g. letter bombers where it seemed like they were keeping it longer than that.
This article says they have been happy to scan individuals mail for LE long before MICT.
You would think that a letter bomb delivered through postal service would prompt the USPS to preserve any records, which would presumably still exist (unless the letter bomb only went off 30 days after delivery), so that letter bomb records still existed for more than 30 days would not be surprising. If they had records from significantly earlier, it might be an abuse, or it might be that investigation of that individual started much earlier.
Not to say that records aren't kept longer or that the system isn't abused, especially if they don't have to go through a judge. Even if judges would grant these requests too easily, there would still be some record on the investigators to examine, not just the investigated.
Your ideas deserve better than Twitter and the Volokh Conspiracy, Prof. Kerr.
At some point, associations reflect judgment and sometimes character.
Just wondering, as a non-lawyer, how can a geofence warrant be "particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized"?
Also a non-lawyer, but I expect the place to be searched would be wherever the data already collected are stored, and the things to be seized would be the data relevant to the investigation prompting the warrant (e.g., specified as related to certain locations and individuals for which there is justification for a warrant).
All of DC, and every phone in use on January 6th?
You really think that is particular enough to meet those conditions?
Maybe, in the investigation of criminal acts committed by more than 2000 insurrectionists? Maybe first more specific information needs to be obtained otherwise; they identified a large number of them from pictures, and certainly obtaining their phone information would be appropriate. In addition to being not a lawyer, I am also not a judge, and the judge would need to be presented the justification for such a warrant and, you know, judge it.
The place to be searched is a Google server. The things to be seized are electronic records.
Now, I would argue that Google has servers all over the place, and unless the police have probable cause to believe that the records are at a particular address, the warrant shouldn't be valid. "You guys have this on a server somewhere" is not a particular place; "you guys have this on a server at this address" is, but I don't see how the police could know that without Google telling them - and since they're requesting records of random people whose only commonality is that they were near a particular location at a particular time, the odds are good that the data is actually in multiple datacenters. I don't have high hopes of the courts seeing it that way, though, and if Google tried to push this the government would certainly switch to subpoenas if possible.
Whenever I run across Kerr, he always seems to be providing reasons that search and seizure can be expanded by government, regardless of the 4th.
When did it become opt-in?
I remember having to "Pause" my location history if I wanted them to allegedly stop collecting it, then check back every so often to see if it somehow unpaused itself.
In any case, it strikes me as arguing you don't strictly need the internet, so by using it at all, you've opted in to data collection and therefore have no expectation of privacy. I have no idea why opting in should lower an expectation of privacy when opting in is required for numerous services. What does agreeing to allow a business to provide a service have to do with the expectation that they'll keep your data private?
Disappointed in your extremely narrow reading of the 4th Amendment and specious argument about whether opt in is material.