The Volokh Conspiracy

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Politics

Judicial Boycotts of Non-Elite Schools

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In April 2009, a law student at American University asked Justice Scalia how a student from her school could become "outrageously successful" without "connections and elite degrees." (The clip begins around 52:00.) Scalia laughed out loud. He answered, "Just work hard and be very good." But then he digressed to a story about Judge Jeff Sutton.

Let me tell you a story. By and large, unless I have a professor on the faculty who is a good friend and preferably a former law clerk of mine whose judgment I can trust--I'm going to be picking for Supreme Court law clerks, I can't afford a miss. I just can't. So I'm going to be picking from the law schools that are the hardest to get into, they admit the best and the brightest. They may not teach very well, but you can't make a sow's ear purse out of a silk purse. If they come in the best and the brightest, they are probably going to leave the best and the brightest. One of my former clerks [Judge Jeff Sutton] who I am the most most proud of, now sits on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  And I always refer to him as one of my former law clerks. He wasn't one of my former law clerks. [Sutton] was Lewis Powell's clerk. After Lewis took senior status, Lewis didn't have much work. [Sutton] worked full time for me. So I couldn't tell the difference between [Sutton] and my other clerks. But I wouldn't have hired Jeff Sutton. For G-d's sake, he went to Ohio State. [Scalia laughs.] And he is one of the very best law clerks I've ever had. He is just a brilliant guy. So don't tell me this stuff about "what do you have to do to be successful." You have to be good. I think we're done.

Scalia relayed this story several times over the years, and he was fond of telling it. The upshot is that under his own policy, he would have never hired one of his favorite law clerks.

In November 2008, during my 3L year, Justice Thomas visited the George Mason University School of Law. After a lecture in then-Professor Rao's class, I asked Justice Thomas what it would take for a GMU grad to clerk on the Supreme Court. (Apparently I had a similar thought as the American student would some months later.) Justice Thomas answered, matter-of-factly, "I hired Will Consovoy, ask him," and pointed at his clerk. I don't think I had met Will Consovoy before, but I would never forget him. (Justice Thomas also signed my pocket Constitution that day, which still hangs on my wall.)

There were many differences between Justices Scalia and Thomas. One of them concerned clerk hiring. In OT 2008, Thomas hired law clerks from Creighton, George Mason, George Washington, and Rutgers. Thomas told students at the University of Florida, "They referred to my clerks last year as TTT, third-tier trash. That's the attitude that you're up against."

Things have gotten slightly better over the past decade. Justice Thomas still routinely hires outside the T14 (top 14, roughly defined). Justice Alito has joined the mix with clerks from BYU, George Mason, LSU, Minnesota, Ohio State (yes, THE Ohio State University), and a few others. Justice Gorsuch has hired grads from Iowa, Mississippi, and BYU. And Notre Dame, which is skyrocketing in the clerkship rankings, is consistently placing grads at the Court. But otherwise, the Justices exclusively hire from elite, T14 law schools. Would anyone say that the non-T14 clerks hired by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch, are inferior to the regulars from Harvard, Yale, and Stanford? I personally know many of these clerks, and they have gone on to great accomplishments.

Could one say that the Justices have imposed a boycott of every other law school outside the T14? I'm sure they would resist the characterization. For sure, they have not announced any public boycott. But the practical consequences of their hiring pattern is that students who graduated from non-elite law schools are persona non-grata. How many Jeff Suttons were missed by having such a restrictive view of hiring? On a related note, Justice Ginsburg had a de facto boycott of all HCBUs.

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Second Amendment Roundup: Just in Time for the Supreme Court to Consider in Rahimi

The Ninth Circuit invalidates the felon gun ban for non-violent offenses with no Founding-era analogues.

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The Ninth Circuit, in U.S. v. Duarte, has joined the Third Circuit's Range decision in holding the Gun Control Act's ban on firearm possession by felons (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) in violation of the Second Amendment as applied to convictions for non-violent offenses that have no Founding-era analogues.  Prof. Volokh summarized the decision when it was released on May 9.  The court's opinion is extraordinarily thorough and deserves a deeper dive.

The opinion was written by Senior Judge Carlos Bea and joined by Judge Lawrence VanDyke.  Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr., dissented and expressed hope for an en banc rehearing, which is all but automatic when a Ninth Circuit panel renders a decision favorable to the Second Amendment.  The decision will undoubtedly be considered by the Supreme Court Justices in deciding Rahimi, which involves the ban on gun possession by a person subject to a domestic violence restraining order, and in disposing of Range, another felon case which may be taken up by the Court or remanded for reconsideration in light of Rahimi.

At the textual level, Durate states, the right to bear arms is guaranteed to "the people," which per Bruen refers to "all Americans," not an "unspecified subset." While Heller stated that the Amendment protects "the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms" for self-defense, the universe of "the people" is larger.  (I suggest thinking of the two-circle Venn diagram – law-abiding citizens are the subset and they are within the larger superset of "the people.")

While Heller referred to "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons" as among the "presumptively lawful regulatory measures," Bruen expressly requires courts to assess whether a restriction "is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation."  The felon ban was not an issue in Heller, and "the Court has yet to explore this country's history of banning felons from possessing firearms."

That's where the Duarte panel hits a home run, noting the need for "distinctly similar" historical regulations given that violence with firearms is a "problem that has persisted [in this country] since the 18th century."  The government sought historical regulations from three sources: proposals in three of the state ratifying conventions, laws disarming classes of persons, and the historical practice of executing felons.

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Free Speech

No Pseudonymity for Student Challenging University Discipline in Non-Sexual-Assault/Harassment Case

"The disciplinary proceedings arose from Plaintiff's development of an 'artificial intelligence-based learning tool,' with another student, which the University's Honor Council eventually concluded 'was offensive to Emory's community standards' as it might result in academic dishonesty and cheating."

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From Doe v. Emory Univ., decided Friday by Judge Steve Jones (N.D. Ga.):

Plaintiff … alleges that Defendant, Emory University, breached its contract with him as a student in the disciplinary proceedings against him, which resulted in his suspension. The disciplinary proceedings arose from Plaintiff's development of an "artificial intelligence-based learning tool," with another student, which the University's Honor Council eventually concluded "was offensive to Emory's community standards" as it might result in academic dishonesty and cheating….

Plaintiff seeks to proceed anonymously in this litigation, as well as to keep the identity of Emory Student 1 anonymous….

Generally, all pleadings filed in federal court must "name all the parties[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)…. The Eleventh Circuit has approved of parties proceeding anonymously when cases involve governmental activity, the disclosure of information of "utmost intimacy," or would require admitting to illegal conduct and risk of criminal prosecution. …

The Court acknowledges Plaintiff's concerns regarding his reputation. The Court, however, disagrees that Plaintiff should be allowed to proceed anonymously in this case. The ordinary factors permitting a party to continue under a pseudonym are absent: Plaintiff is not challenging government activity, is not a minor, has not identified any threat of physical violence against him, and has not specifically shown his accusations require the disclosure of intimate information.

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Free Speech

Washington Post Criticizes Diversity Statements in Higher Education

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An excerpt from yesterday's editorial:

[J]obseekers who disagree with the ideological premises of such inquiries have an overwhelming incentive to suppress their true beliefs, or pretend to have the "right" ones, lest they be eliminated from consideration. It's a dilemma, especially given the high stakes: As the University of California at Davis's vice chancellor for DEI explained, "In these searches, it is the candidate's diversity statement that is considered first; only those who submit persuasive and inspiring statements can advance for complete consideration." In one faculty search at University of California at Berkeley, around 75 percent of applicants were screened out of consideration — irrespective of criteria such as teaching ability and research skills. Small wonder that many applicants engage in what Daniel Sargent, a history professor at UC Berkeley, calls "performative dishonesty."

The last thing academia — or the country — needs is another incentive for people to be insincere or dishonest. The very purpose of the university is to encourage a free exchange of ideas, seek the truth wherever it may lead, and to elevate intellectual curiosity and openness among both faculty and students. Whatever their original intent, the use of DEI statements has too often resulted in self-censorship and ideological policing….

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On Sex and Gender

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The last time I blogged for the Volokh Conspiracy was in March 2019, following my testimony in the Semenya case at the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). That case was one of the first—if not the first—to raise two questions which have since become central features of our culture wars:

(1) Whether 'female' still means a person with a female body—or more generally whether 'sex' still means biological sex, e.g., per the NIH, 'the differences between males and females caused by differential sex chromosome complement, reproductive tissues, and concentrations of sex steroids' (emphasis mine); or per Oxford via Google, 'either of the two main categories (male and female) into which humans and most other living things are divided on the basis of their reproductive functions.'

(2) Whether it's still permissible to have (biological) sex classifications and then to sort people in and out of those categories on the basis of (biological) sex differences—or whether gender (here as legal gender or gender identity) is the better sorting tool.

(I emphasize caused by because sex isn't our chromosomes, our gonads, and/or our gonadal hormones. Rather, these are part of a much larger set of sex characteristics two of whose functions are to drive human sexual development and to sustain our bodies thereafter.)

In line with some progressive positions on these questions, at the CAS in 2019, two-time Olympic Gold Medalist Caster Semenya claimed—unsuccessfully in that forum—that she has a human rights-based reliance interest in her (female) legal gender that trumps her (male) sex so that she should have unconditional access to the female competition category.

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Politics

An Interview with Judge Matthew Solomson About the Columbia Boycott

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In the wake of the announced boycott against Columbia University, I posed several questions to Judge Matthew Solomson of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. I provide his answers, with light editing, below:

Q: Shortly after October 7, you announced that you would not hire clerks who signed a letter supporting the Hamas attacks. Why did you make that decision?

The pro-Hamas letter you reference, signed by many Harvard student groups, engaged in extreme victim-blaming, assigning all culpability to Israel for the October 7th Hamas-led massacre.  Justifying Hamas's murderous pogrom by saying Israel deserved what it got is nothing less than supporting a terrorist organization – the same as blaming the United States for 9/11.  And I simply made the point that supporting Hamas – a terrorist group designated as such by the United States government – is inexcusable and should be disqualifying for a federal clerkship (just as supporting Al-Qaeda or ISIS would be).  

Particularly in the wake of the Hamas-led butchering, raping, and kidnapping of civilians – including Americans – living peacefully within Israel's 1948 borders, the Harvard letter truly disgusted me.   

Of course, there is literally zero doubt that if someone signed a letter supporting the KKK, they wouldn't get a clerkship (or any job with any law firm of significance). The letter justifying the Hamas terrorist attacks on 10/7 was no different. The only reason anyone would consider my statement controversial is if they think Hamas is not comparable to the KKK.  The two groups, of course, are both abhorrent.  

Judge Lee Rudofsky (E.D. Ark.) also issued a statement similar to mine (but addressed to his future clerks and interns).  Both our statements received a fair deal of news coverage but no criticism of any note.

The most pushback I received was from a colleague who said that the disqualification was so obvious, I need not have said anything. 

Q: Although you boycotted particular students who signed the Hamas letter, you refused to support a boycott of an entire school, like Judges Ho and Branch proposed. You said, "There's just a big difference between saying someone should quit Stanford, Yale and go to a different school and saying that you should resign from a student organization." Why did you reach that position in October?

It wasn't a "position," as much as an off-the-cuff reaction distinguishing between what the other judges had done with respect to Yale and Stanford, and what I had said with respect to pro-Hamas students.  But the Ho-Branch boycott wasn't really on my mind at all.  I hadn't considered it in any detail (and didn't realize, for example, that it was prospective only).  

That said, my reaction to the Harvard letter was that a localized problem warranted a limited response.  Since then, the pro-Hamas, anti-American, intellectual rot has proven pervasive.  The full extent of the campus problems Judges Ho and Branch were trying to address is obviously much worse than anyone thought, including me.

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Zoning

Indiana Court Rules Burritos and Tacos Qualify as Sandwiches

The decision exemplifies a longstanding issue in legal theory. It also highlights the absurdity of zoning rules.

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Burritos. (NA)

 

An Indiana court recently touched off a firestorm of media attention and online debate by ruling that burritos and tacos are sandwiches. The decision exemplifies a longstanding issue in legal interpretation: how to figure out the "ordinary meaning" of words in a statute or regulation. It also highlights the absurdity of zoning rules restricting the development and use of property.

The case arose because developer Martin Quintana wanted to use a property he owned in Fort Wayne, Indiana for commercial purposes. In order to be able to do that, he had to get the Fort Wayne Plan Commission (a local government agency) to "upzone" the area from allowing single-family residential housing only, to allowing some types of commercial uses. The Commission was only wlling to do that in exchange for Quintana signing a "Written Commitment" (required at the behest of a local NIMBY group) under which only certain types of restaurants would be allowed in the area.  The restrictions imposed by the Commitment became new zoning rules for these tracts. Specifically, the Commitment bars "restaurants, including fast food-style restaurants," except for the following:

A sandwich bar-style restaurant whose primary business is to sell "made-to-order" or "subway-style" sandwiches (which by way of example includes, but is not limited to, "Subway" or "Jimmy John's", but expressly excludes traditional fast food restaurants such as "McDonalds", "Arbys" and "Wendys"), provided that any such restaurant shall not have outdoor seating or drive—through service….

One of the businesses Quintana recruited as a tenant for the new development is a Famous Taco establishment - a Mexican restaurant that (as the name implies) serves tacos and burritos. The Plan Commission contended the Famous Taco should be barred because these food options are not "sandwiches." Indiana Superior Court Judge Craig Bobay rejected that argument, concluding that burritos and tacos are, in fact sandwiches:

The proposed Famous Taco restaurant falls within the scope of the general use approved in the original Written Commitment. The proposed Famous Taco restaurant would serve made-to-—order tacos, burritos, and other Mexican-style food, and would not have outdoor seating, drive-through service, or serve alcohol. The Court agrees with Quintana that tacos and burritos are Mexican—-style sandwiches, and the original Written Commitment does not restrict potential restaurants to only American cuisine-style sandwiches. The original Written Commitment would also permit a restaurant that serves made-to-order Greek gyros, Indian naan wraps, or Vietnamese banh mi if these restaurants complied with the other enumerated conditions.

In Indiana, as in most jurisdictions, courts are generally required to interpret laws  (or, in this case, an agreement that has the force of law, by virtue of being embodied in a zoning restriction) in accordance with their "ordinary meaning." The Supreme Court of Indiana recently reiterated that rule in its February decision in Spells v. State.

Do tacos and burritos fall within the ordinary meaning of "sandwich"? It's hard to say. I think most Americans would not usually refer to these items as sandwiches. On the other hand, it's not hard to see why a taco or a burrito would fall under what most ordinary people would understand to be the general concept of a sandwich: meat and/or vegetables encased in bread or some other similar wrap. Thus, it may be that Judge Bobay was right to conclude that tacos and burritos are "Mexican-style sandwiches," even if few people would actually refer to them in that way. It all depends on whether ordinary meaning depends on usage or on people's intuitive theoretical understanding of the concept in question.

This ruling diverges from a controversial 2006 Massachusetts state court decision, which held that tacos, burritos, and quesadillas do not fall within the ordinary meaning of "sandwich," because that term normally refers to a food item encased in two pieces of bread, while these Mexican foods usually only feature one. Judge Bobay does not cite the Massachusetts precedent, which - in fairness - isn't binding in Indiana. He also doesn't consider the issue of whether a sandwich must have two pieces of bread, as opposed to just one.

To my mind, food encased in a single continuous piece of bread (or tortilla roll) still counts as a "sandwich." The top and bottom of a hamburger bun or hot dog roll are sometimes connected to each other. But that doesn't mean hamburgers and hot dogs can't qualify as sandwiches. My wife (who is both a lawyer and much more knowledgeable about food than I am) points out there are "open-face sandwiches" that use only one piece of bread.

Perhaps these kinds of issues reveal the limits of "ordinary meaning" interpretive rules. Ordinary people (at least those who aren't lawyers) usually just don't think about these kinds of conundrums. Thus, when an issue like whether burritos qualify as sandwiches comes up, there may not be any unequivocal "ordinary meaning" answer to the question at hand.

Whichever way you come down on the definition of "sandwich," this case also highlights the absurdity of zoning restrictions on development. Barring some kind of significant danger to public health or safety (of which there is no evidence here), Quintana should not have had to get special permission to use his property for commercial purposes in the first place. It makes even less sense to allow restaurants that serve "'made-to-order' or 'subway-style' sandwiches," but not those that serve other kinds of food. This distinction appears to be based on little more than the esthetic preferences of the Covington Creek Association, the NIMBY group that pressured the Plan Commission into imposing this restriction on the development.

Such NIMBYism causes real harm to both property owners (who are deprived of the right to use their own land as they see fit) and consumers who wish to patronize their services. I don't especially like tacos and burritos, myself. But many people do, which is why there is a substantial demand for restaurants like Famous Taco.

In a forthcoming Texas Law Review article, Josh Braver and I argue that exclusionary zoning rules restricting housing construction violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Restrictions on commercial development are a more complicated case. But under the originalist theories discussed in Part II of the Article, such restrictions also violate the right to use property protected by the Takings Clause, unless they protect against a serious threat to public health or safety, and thereby fall within the "police power" exception (see Section II.C). Things may be different under the living constitution approaches covered in Part III of the article.

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Prof. Doriane Coleman (Duke), Guest-Blogging About "On Sex and Gender: A Commonsense Approach"

"'An ideological preference for characterizing sex as a social construct, a stereotype, and a myth,' she asserts, denies the science of sex differences as well as common sense."

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I'm delighted to report that Prof. Doriane Coleman (Duke Law School) will be guest-blogging this week about her new book, On Sex and Gender: A Commonsense Approach, which will be out Tuesday from Simon & Schuster. (Readers may be familiar with her past guest posts, chiefly on who should count as a woman in women's sports.) Here's the publisher's summary of the book:

On Sex and Gender focuses on three sequential and consequential questions: What is sex as opposed to gender? How does sex matter in our everyday lives? And how should it be reflected in law and policy? All three have been front-and-center in American life and politics since the rise of the trans rights movement: They are included in both major parties' political platforms. They are the subject of ongoing litigation in the federal courts and of highly contentious legislation on Capitol Hill. And they are a pivotal issue in the culture wars between left and right playing out around dinner tables, on campuses and school boards, on op-ed pages, and in corporate handbooks.

Doriane Coleman challenges both sides to chart a better way. In a book that is equal parts scientific explanation, historical examination, and personal reflection, she argues that denying biological sex and focusing only on gender would have detrimental effects on women's equal opportunity, on men's future prospects, and on the health and welfare of society. Structural sexism needed to be dismantled—a true achievement of feminism and an ongoing fight—but going forward we should be sex smart, not sex blind.

This book is a clear guide for reasonable Americans on sex and gender—something everyone wants to understand but is terrified to discuss. Coleman shows that the science is settled, but equally that there is a middle ground where common sense reigns and we can support transgender people without denying the facts of human biology. She livens her narrative with a sequence of portraits of exceptional human beings from legal pioneers like Myra Bradwell and Ketanji Brown Jackson to champion athletes like Caster Semenya and Cate Campbell to civil rights giants like Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Pauli Murray. Above all, Coleman reminds us that sex not only exists, but is also good—and she shows how we can get both sex and gender right for society.

The Kirkus Review:

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Free Speech

Delaware Court on the First Amendment Exception to "Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct"

"Some courts have incorrectly used this exception to rationalize upholding a statute that criminalizes speech ... simply because their legislature passed a law labeling it criminal. The limited line of United States Supreme Court cases that have addressed this exception in no way supports such a broad reading."

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Friday's decision in State v. Reeves, decided by Judge Jeffrey Clark (Del. Super. Ct.), evaluates the Delaware stalking law under which

he or she (1) "threatens, or communicates to or about another" on 3 or more separate occasions, (2) in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to fear for their safety or experience significant mental anguish or distress.

The court concluded that the statute would be unconstitutional as applied to certain contexts:

[T]he Statute would enable the prosecution of a doctor who tells a patient on at least three occasions that, although an operation may be necessary to save the patient's life, the effect of the operation will cause accompanying physical pain or injury. Likewise, the Statute would criminalize three complaints by a restaurant's customer on social media about poor service at the restaurant, that in turn, causes the owner severe mental anguish because his business failed as a result. The Statute would also criminalize when a person posts critical comments about another, at least three times, on social media when those comments would reasonably cause significant mental distress to another….

And the court had this to say about the state's argument that the law was constitutional because it only applied to "speech integral to criminal conduct":

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Trump Should NOT TESTIFY at MANHATTAN WITCH HUNT OF A TRIAL

the lying liberal jurors and new york state democrats will twist his words to convict him for lying under oath just like they did with Michael Flynn

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Any conviction obtained at the so-called "trial" of former President Donald Trump's alleged alteration of financial records will be reversed on appeal, if necessary by the U.S. Supreme Court, because altering financial records is only a crime in New York if you do it to conceal some other crime. Paying Stormy Daniels money is NOT a crime. The purpose of this whole case was just to give Daniels a megaphone to blast her allegations into nationwide. It is an outrage that the District Attorney brought this case and that the judge did not declare a mistrial.

The one thing that could really cause this case to destroy Donald Trump is if he testifies truthfully at this Kangaroo Court trial. Lying liberal District Attorneys, liberal Democrat jurors, and the judge will give Donald Trump the "Michael Flynn treatment."  Michael Flynn was Donald Trump's first National Security Advisor who gave a truthful deposition to Special Counsel Robert Mueller, and he was then indicted and kicked out of the White House for it. And that is exactly what will happen to Donald Trump if he testifies at this mockery of a trial. Trump should treat this trial as if it was a smutty street art presentation and say that it is beneath him to respond to such garbage.

Free Speech

Apparent Suspension of Student Groups at Wisconsin for Pro-Hamas Chalking

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From FIRE's letter sent yesterday to the University of Wisconsin (you can see the citations here); I generally trust FIRE's factual summaries, but if there is any error in the below, I'll of course be very glad to correct it:

FIRE is deeply concerned that UW-Madison has suspended two registered student organizations—Anticolonial Scientists and Mecha de UW Madison—amid criticism of chalk messages some group members allegedly wrote at an off-campus event earlier this month. Some of the messages expressed support for terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas's Al-Qassam Brigades, and advocated the use of violence against Israelis and Zionists in the Middle East.

The student groups are currently under interim suspensions, pending investigation, with UW stating that, because "[s]ome chalkings endorsed violence, supported terrorist organizations and/or contained antisemitic comments," they could qualify as prohibited discriminatory harassment under the university's RSO Code of Conduct. But that conclusion cannot constitutionally stand. The off-campus chalk messages constitute political speech wholly protected by the First Amendment, which requires UW, as a public institution, to respect the groups' expressive and associational rights—even if some, many, or most people dislike their message.

There is, more specifically, no First Amendment exception that would remove protection from speech simply because it is deemed "anti-Semitic" or otherwise bigoted based on race or religion. Regardless of the viewpoint expressed, the rule is the same: Government officials cannot circumscribe expression on the basis that others find the ideas offensive or hateful.

This is particularly true at public colleges, where "conflict is not unknown," and "dissent is expected and, accordingly, so is at least some disharmony." The First Amendment instead "embraces such heated exchange[s] of views."

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Housing Policy

Compendium of Bryan Caplan's Guest-blogging Posts on His New Book "Build, Baby, Build: The Science and Ethics of Housing Regulation"

A listing of his four posts on different aspects of the book and the issues it raises.

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Bryan Caplan

Bryan Caplan's guest-blogging stint has come to an end. We thank Bryan for his excellent contributions to the blog!

Here is a listing of his posts about his book Build, Baby, Build: The Science and Ethics of Housing Regulation. I myself also wrote a post introducing Bryan and the book.

1."Trillions"

2. "*Build, Baby, Build*: My Most Inexcusable Omission"

3. "The YIMBY Napkin"

4. "*Build, Baby, Build*: Responses to the Best Objections"

I think my forthcoming Texas Law Review article, "The Constitutional Case Against Exclusionary Zoning" (coauthored with Josh Braver), in some ways serves as a complement to Bryan's book. In the book, Bryan suggests that judicial review is "probably the best shot [at] radical housing deregulation," but doesn't elaborate further. Braver and I explain how such judicial intervention can happen, and why it should be done.

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Recent Volokh Posts

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Judge Richard Posner, RIP

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Who Is Left On The Bench For 2033?

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The President Nominates Circuit Judges, Not Senators

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School Board Can Order High School Teacher to Remove "Hate Has No Home Here" Rainbow Poster

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Why Not Seek the Win/Win?

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Indirectly Inciting "Followers to Flood" Business "with False Reviews, Calls, and Emails" May Be Tortious

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Prosecution for Alleged Threats to ICE Officer's Children (Sent to Officer's Wife) Can Go Forward

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Today in Supreme Court History: November 11, 1975

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Open Thread

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The Hegseth Impeachment is Far From Over

The All-Argentina Issue is Here

New from Reason: a look into what Javier Milei has accomplished and what it will take to make the most of Argentina’s window for real change. Out now for subscribers.

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