The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Politics

Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions

Hauling timber, planting drugs, and barring bologna.

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Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

New on the Short Circuit podcast: a pretextual traffic stop turns deadly and standing to sue under the ADA.

  • Beauty may only run skin deep, but the circuit split on the interplay between the First Step Act and "compassionate release" is getting close to the bone. Add the D.C. Circuit to those holding that the Act's changes to "stacking" may not be considered for whether a prisoner who was sentenced before the Act may now qualify for compassionate release. (The Ninth Circuit is on the other side. You can hear our discussion of that case and this issue on last week's edition of the podcast.)
  • Last year, Maine legislators barred motor carriers and landowners owning at least 50k acres of forest land from employing non-residents to haul timber in-state—lest Canadian truck drivers depress the wages of in-state timber truckers. First Circuit: Enjoined! Employers must run a gauntlet to secure H-2A visas for the truckers from the feds, and any additional state regulatory burdens are probably pre-empted. (And there's no need to reach the equal protection arguments, which the district court found persuasive.)
  • In flagrante delicto: In 2009, man is caught in the act of Philadelphia home invasion, but his trial does not commence for over four years. A violation of his fundamental right to a speedy trial? Applying the requisite four-factor test, the Third Circuit says yes; release him forthwith.
  • Haitian opposition party activist flees to the U.S. after he receives death threats and his house is burned down by, he says, members of the government. But his lawyer fails to present easily obtainable and relevant evidence, and he's ordered removed. Third Circuit: Vacated. He received ineffective assistance of counsel. Concurrence (via Ambro, J.): The immigration judge messed up as well.
  • Allegation: To interdict suspected marijuana possessor, phalanx of Harris County, Tex. officers jump curb, drive vehicles through park that is crowded with families. The suspect quits the park but eventually stops and raises his hands. Without warning or command, an officer tases him. He falls and hits his head on the asphalt, suffering a traumatic brain injury. After which, though he's writhing on the ground in pain and bleeding from the ears, nose and mouth, the officer tases him again. Fifth Circuit: Don't run from the police.
  • In the latest "give me a refund for a lousy Spring 2020 educational experience" case, the Fifth Circuit says that some Tulane students might have claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion under Louisiana law resulting from the university shutting down in-person services due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • Is it a Fifth Amendment "taking" for Oakland County, Mich. officials to take title to a woman's ~$300k home to satisfy a ~$22k tax debt—and refuse to refund her any of the difference? Sixth Circuit: Quite possibly. And what we know for sure is that the government can't circumvent the Fifth Amendment simply by "exclud[ing] from its definition of property any interest that the state wishe[s] to take." The takings claim may proceed.
  • Sixth Circuit (last month, unpublished): A Colerain Township, Ohio woman doesn't have standing to challenge the local police department's prohibition of posting "inappropriate" comments on its Facebook page because her Facebook comments were deleted for totally different reasons. Sixth Circuit (this week, published): We now deem this opinion suitable for publication.
  • Pulaski County, Ky. constable, an elected official, planted evidence, lied on warrant applications, threatened suspects, and kept heaps of meth in his house (for planting to get false arrests). He's convicted and sentenced to (a below-guidelines) 140 months. Sixth Circuit (via Sutton, C.J.): Conviction and sentence affirmed. Concurrence (via Sutton, C.J.): I'm not sure that planting drugs counts as distributing them under the statute. But the constable didn't raise quite that argument, so we'll leave it for another day.
  • Spooky! On Halloween 2018, two St. Louis men distributed bologna sandwiches and bottled water to the homeless without a permit. Police cite them for violating the city's food code despite their protestations that they're fulfilling a religious duty. Eighth Circuit: The ordinance does not run afoul of the First Amendment.
  • Allegation: Inmate at Atwater, Calif. federal prison is beaten up after a guard tells other inmates he's a snitch and offers a bounty to assault him. An Eighth Amendment violation? Can't say, says the Ninth Circuit; except for some exceptions not relevant here, you can't sue federal officials for violating the Constitution.
  • Under California law, professional door-knockers and signature gatherers are regulated as employees with all the attendant benefits, while door-to-door salesmen are regulated as independent contractors. But wait! Isn't there a First Amendment problem with imposing additional burdens on employers just because their workers tout candidates and ballot initiatives instead of vacuum cleaners and knife sets? Ninth Circuit: Nope, the law distinguishes based on the work they do. Dissent: Which you determine based on what they say.
  • Until recently, the state of Oregon automatically suspended the driver's licenses of folks with unpaid traffic debt, which has the rather perverse effect of making it even harder to pay off that debt. But if the state can't jail debtors who lack the ability to pay, can it nevertheless take their transportation to and from work? Ninth Circuit (over a dissent): Yes it can, though Oregon repealed this law while the case was ongoing. (IJ filed an amicus brief in this case.)
  • Oregon prisoner has a grievance: Prison officials improperly confiscated mail from his lawyer. He wants to complain, but the prison has a policy of not entertaining more than four simultaneous grievances from any prisoner. To proceed, he has to dismiss one of his pending grievances and forgo any remedy on it. Ninth Circuit: Which means that administrative remedies were unavailable to him, and he can come to federal court.
  • Florida couple marries. Husband freezes sperm, dies. Wife later conceives through in vitro fertilization, gives birth to child. Does the child qualify for child's insurance benefits under the Social Security Act? Well, it depends on whether Florida law lets the child inherit a share of the father's intestate personal property. Eleventh Circuit: What a chewy, super-interesting question for the Florida Supreme Court to sort out. Certification!
  • And in en banc news, the Fourth Circuit will not reconsider its decision that a trans woman can sue Fairfax County, Va. prison officials under the ADA for failing to accommodate her gender dysphoria.
  • And in more en banc news, the Fifth Circuit will reconsider its decision (and, one expects, its precedent) requiring female Dallas jail officers to be fired, demoted, or otherwise adversely treated before they can challenge a policy whereby they cannot have full weekends off work but male officers can.
  • And in further en banc news, the Ninth Circuit will not reconsider its decision that the Board of Immigration Appeals must send noncitizens notices to appear that include both the date and time of their removal proceedings, or else any in absentia proceedings are invalid.
  • And in additional en banc news, the Ninth Circuit will not reconsider its decision that a Muslim inmate did not have a right under RLUIPA to be housed exclusively with other Muslim inmates in order to avoid harassment by non-Muslim inmates during his daily prayers.

Chemerinsky and Marcus Go Another Round Re Antisemitism at Berkeley Law

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Re the controversy over nine student groups banning speakers who think Israel should exist.

Chemerinsky:

The Jewish Law Students Association can refuse to invite Holocaust deniers. The Black Law Students Association can refuse to invite white supremacists. I may not like the choices they make about what viewpoints they invite or not invite, but that is their First Amendment right.

What is not allowed is excluding a speaker based on religion or race or sex or sexual orientation. And that has not – and I am confident will not happen at Berkeley Law. To be clear, the law, and campus policies, distinguish between word and deed, expression and action. To date the offending student groups have issued statements, declarations, and intentions. Those are constitutionally protected forms of expression. To date, no student has been excluded, cancelled, disinvited, or interrupted. To date no student has been denied the right or the ability to express themselves, to exercise their freedom of speech. Should that happen—and we are working hard to make sure it does not—that would represent a cross-over from expression to conduct and that would be subject to serious discipline.

Marcus:

if he had reached out, Dean Chemerinsky would stop denying that "no speaker has been excluded on account of these or any other views." With due respect to the good dean, this is absurd. Mr. Chemerinsky and his Berkeley Law colleagues now acknowledge that these nine groups' bylaws "impermissibly exclude a large majority of [Berkeley's Law] faculty from participating in the work of these organizations, including [him]." Since he acknowledges that this is impermissible, he should stop permitting it. More to the point, he should stop funding it.

In addition, we all know what happens when campus groups announce "no Zionists"– Jewish students either stop participating or they suppress that part of their Jewish identity to be accepted. Dean Chemerinsky suggests he will act once a Jewish speaker is turned away or a Jewish student is formally excluded. Once the bylaws were formalized that ship sailed. By not acting now, the damage is done.

And if student groups take further discriminatory action by excluding Zionists in the future, there will be no way for Chemerinsky to know that they have done so. It is not as if they will tell the dean that they are doing what he has described as "impermissible."

Comment: Parsed closely, Chemerinsky is arguing that the students have a First Amendment right to ban "Zionist" speakers, but no such right to ban or discriminate against "Zionist" students. I'm not sure that's right for reasons I expressed in a previous post, but let's assume it is. In practice, there would be only one way for a student group to ban "Zionist" speakers (i.e., speakers who believe that Israel should continue to exist), and not in practice discriminate against Jewish speakers--given that, in practice, campus groups' hostility to "Zionists" has fallen entirely on Jews. That would be to ask all speakers, Jewish or not, to sign a pledge that that don't think Israel should exist. Would *that* be ok? Would the campus groups be willing to require such a pledge, including for law firm recruiters who would like to speak with them?

Indeed, I think this should, perhaps must, be the compromise. If the law school determines that it's legal and within school policy for clubs to ban speakers who believe Israel should exist, that policy needs to be transparent, and enforced uniformly. No Dean Chemerinsky or other faculty who support Israel's existence at club events. No law school recruiters who support Israel's existence. No speakers on abortion rights, trans rights, or anything else within the clubs' purview unless they avow that they support Israel's destruction. These groups have made the policy, make them live with it in a way that won't be selectively enforced against Jewish speakers.

As an aside, Dean Chemersinsky is incorrect that expressing discriminatory "intentions" is protected by the First Amendment. It's illegal for an employer to announce that he won't hire a protected group, for a landlord to announce that he won't rent to a protected group, and so on, regardless of whether they follow through if they get applicants from those groups.

Law & Government

Greg Ablavsky Responds to Rob Natelson's "Cite Check"

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I'm glad to see co-blogger David Kopel following the very fruitful exchange between Greg Ablavsky and Rob Natelson about the original scope of federal power over Indian affairs (an exchange I tracked earlier here). David mentions and quotes a "cite check" that Natelson recently published taking issue with a number of the citations and quotations in Ablavsky's 2015 article.

I thought readers might also be interested to know that a couple of days ago, Ablavsky published a detailed 40-page response to Natelson's cite check, which you can download here. Here is an abstract:

As part of an ongoing and often heated academic disagreement, Robert Natelson recently purported to "cite check" my 2015 Yale Law Journal article Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause. He claims that the article had a "disturbing number of inaccurate, non-existent, and misleading citations, as well as deceptively-edited quotations," and suggested that the article was likely published only to placate a faculty member or due to left-wing bias.

Given Mr. Natelson's earlier ad hominem attacks, no one could mistake him for a good faith critic of my work. However, because of the stakes of this dispute, which takes place in the shadow of the upcoming Brackeen v. Haaland case at the Supreme Court, I have taken the time to respond thoroughly to each of his concerns about my article. I group his critiques into three categories:

1) Plain Error: Every single one of the sources Mr. Natelson claimed was "non-existent" is readily available online and confirms my original citation. Unaided by me, my law student research assistants were able to find them in mere moments. I'm honestly quite surprised that a scholar would risk their reputation by making such obvious and easily proven errors in levying serious charges against another scholar.

2) Misleading Use of Context: Mr. Natelson repeatedly argues that the full context of quotations vindicates his position and rules my interpretations not only invalid but deceptive. He does this by writing limiting principles into the plain text of sources that do not contain them, expressing certainty on what the sources really meant even in the face of silence. At best, he has floated possible alternate explanations that I find highly implausible given the evidence. But, though I think my interpretations stronger, I cannot "prove" Mr. Natelson's view wrong any more than Mr. Natelson can "prove" my view wrong: no responsible historian would assert such certainty in the face of a silent source. The only claim here that I think can be deemed objectively wrong is Mr. Natelson's claim to definitive authority and knowledge.

3) Asserting Interpretive Disagreements Are Factual Errors: Many of the critiques that Mr. Natelson makes are actually interpretive disagreements that he claims are factual errors. Mr. Natelson is free to dispute my views, which he clearly does. But the idea that I committed scholarly misconduct by offering my interpretations in my own article is laughable. This standard of "cite-checking" decrees as sound scholarship only the interpretations that Mr. Natelson deems correct—a standard ultimately subversive of scholarship itself.

I have not repaid Mr. Natelson's article with the attention that he has lavished on mine. However, in the course of researching this response, I asked my RAs to examine his evidence from Eighteenth-Century Collections Online that the phrase "commerce with Indians" and its analogs "almost invariably meant 'trade with the Indians' and nothing more." Without any involvement by me, my RAs disagreed with this assessment. They concluded that the phrase only clearly meant trade in a little more than half (58%) of the instances that Mr. Natelson relied on.

I admire the patience both scholars have had for this exchange, and I'd recommend anybody reading Natelson's critique to read Ablavsky's response along side it.

Guns

Public Housing Complexes May Not Ban Gun Possession by Tenants

So holds the Tennessee Court of Appeals.

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From today's decision in Columbia Housing & Redevelopment Corp. v. Braden, decided today by the Tennessee Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr., joined by Judges Andy D. Bennett & W. Neal McBrayer:

On April 19, 2018, Kinsley Braden signed a lease agreement with Columbia Housing for the privilege of residing at 103 West Willow Street in Creekside Acres. The lease agreement incorporated by reference the Community Housing Rules, which prohibited, inter alia, any resident from possessing a firearm on the premises. In relevant part, the Community Housing Rules read: "No Weapons & Firearms. The possession or use of any type of weapon, firearm, or dangerous object is strictly prohibited within the boundaries of the property."

On November 4, 2020, Columbia Housing learned that Mr. Braden had been keeping a handgun in his residence. As a result, Columbia Housing filed a Detainer Summons against Mr. Braden, seeking to evict him ….

The lower court ruled for Columbia Housing, but the appellate court ruled for Braden, reasoning:

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Donald Trump

Supreme Court Turns Away Trump Effort to Keep Government from Reviewing Documents Seized from Mar-a-Lago

An unsurprising development in the former President's latest legal doings.

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Today the Supreme Court rejected former President Donald Trump's effort to reimpose a district court order blocking the Department of Justice from continuing its review of classified documents seized by federal agents at Mar-a-Lago. This is another (unsurprising) legal setback for the former President.

To recap, a federal district court had issued an order blocking the Justice Department from reviewing the seized documents. A unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stayed this order, allowing the Justice Department's review to continue. As I explained in my prior post, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion was a thorough rebuke of Judge Cannon for issuing the disputed order.

On October 4, Trump's attorneys filed an application to vacate the Eleventh Circuit's stay with the Supreme Court. This application was submitted to the circuit justice for the Eleventh Circuit, Justice Thomas, who requested the Justice Department respond to the request by October 11. This was an early sign that the Court was skeptical of Trump's filing, as it demonstrated no sense of urgency.

Today, without comment or noted dissent, the Supreme Court denied Trump's application with a single sentence order: "The application to vacate the stay entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on September 21, 2022, presented to Justice Thomas and by him referred to the Court is denied." There was no noted dissent.

The Supreme Court's action should not have been a surprise, as Trump's filing (like the initial trial ourt order it sought to restore) lacked legal merit. It is a shame that some folks at either extreme of the political spectrum who somehow thought this motion had a chance.

Property Rights

Sixth Circuit Finds Government Seizure of Home's Equitable Title to Satisfy Tax Debt Was a Taking

An important victory against "self-dealing" by state and local governments.

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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit released a potentially important decision concluding that a Michigan county over-reached when it seized an individual's property to satisfy a tax debt and did not refund the surplus to the property owner. Judge Kethledge wrote for the court in Hall v. Meisner.

Here is the brief summary from Judge Kethledge's introduction:

In this case the defendant Oakland County took "absolute title" to plaintiff Tawanda Hall's home—worth close to $300,000, on the facts alleged here—to satisfy a $22,262 tax debt, and then refused to refund any of the difference. The other plaintiffs shared a similar fate with their homes. Under Michigan law—and the law of virtually every state for the past 200 years—a creditor can divest a debtor of real property only after a public foreclosure sale, after which any surplus proceeds in excess of debt are refunded to the debtor. The return of that surplus compensates the debtor for her equitable interest in the property—which in common speech is called the "equity" in real property, and which English and American courts for centuries have called "equitable title." Yet the Michigan General Property Tax Act created an exception to this rule for just a single creditor: namely, the State itself (or a county thereof), which alone among all creditors may take a landowner's equitable title without paying for it, when it collects a tax debt. In that respect the Michigan statute is not only selfdealing: it is also an aberration from some 300 years of decisions by English and American courts, which barred precisely the action that Oakland County took here.

The government may not decline to recognize long-established interests in property as a device to take them. That was the effect of the Michigan Act as applied to the plaintiffs here; and we agree with the plaintiffs that, on the facts alleged here, the County took their property without just compensation. We therefore reverse the district court's dismissal of their claim against the County under the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Judge Kethledge was joined by Judges Bush and Nalbandian. The Pacific Legal Foundation represented the homeowners.

Shifting the Hoverton Window

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As a general matter, lawyers tend to be conservative. Not in the sense that they are right-of-center. Indeed, lawyers skew left. Rather, attorneys favor stability: support ideas they know, approved by people they trust, that are communicated through established channels. That preference for the status quo can be altered in one of two ways. The first approach is familiar: a slow, iterative process, in which marginally-revised ideas percolate by established elites, who then use traditional mediums to reflect the fact that the idea has gained mainstream support. After the idea reverberates around the echo chamber long enough, the idea is now part of the new normal. By contrast, the second approach bypasses all of those traditional trappings: a person with the requisite clout proposes a radical new concept, which shocks the elites into fierce oppositions, thus legitimating the idea, and bringing the idea into the mainstream. In politics, this process is known as shifting the Overton window. In law, we can call it shifting the Hoverton window.

Of course, I write about Judge James Ho. Two weeks ago, Judge Ho delivered a short speech at the Kentucky Chapters Conference of the Federalist Society. His proposal shocked the mainstream conscience: going forward, he would no longer hire graduates of Yale Law School. Ho's remarks, which have now been published by the Texas Review of Law & Politics, anticipated and addressed most of the criticisms he would ultimately receive. Indeed, it is apparent that Judge Ho recognized that he would be attacked for his views. But such withering criticism is a feature, not a bug to change the discourse.

In the abstract, if a person has an awful idea, the most effective strategy is to ignore the apostasy, and marginalize the speaker. (Several academics openly employ this strategy against me.) In time, the disruption will die down, and the status quo will resume. But disruptive ideas are hard to ignore. First, you have the social media hot takes. Blue check marks looooveeee to dunk on some crazy new idea that conflicts with their priors. Anyone with thumbs and a spool of thread emoji can become a self-proclaimed expert on anything. Second, you have the more sober responses that take the idea seriously, but ultimately reject it out of hand. These pieces invariably find some common ground, and in the process, strengthen the proposal. And third, you have the peers, who call their colleague out for heresy. Along the way, the mainstream press writes about the firestorm. Of course, they quote all the critics, but most journalists have some responsibility to seek out sources from other side. This balancing creates what Linda Greenhouse derided as a "false equivalency." And in time, the radical proposition makes its way into the realm of reasonableness.

Now, not every idea can traverse this labyrinth. In my mind, there are three prerequisites to shift the Hoverton window. First, the speaker must have sufficient intellectual gravitas. Specifically, he must be able to generate a novel idea, that departs sufficiently from conventional wisdom, but also anticipates and preempts the most likely response. He must also have a reputation which warrants his ideas being taken seriously. Second, the speaker must have secure tenure-in-office. To challenge the status quo, you need decisional independence. No one can override your position, or worse, tell you to stand down after an uproar emerges. (Tenured academics and Article III judges are among the few people who fit in this category.) Third, the speaker must have courage. You must be willing to publicly articulate your principle, knowing full well that you will be savagely attacked from all corners. (Very few academics and Article III judges fit in this category.) As a frequent target of social media firing squads, I can attest how unpleasant the feeling is. For good reason, I no longer look at Twitter or my mentions.  I am nearly three years Twitter sober. I take some satisfaction knowing that my Twitter detractors are yelling into an empty void.

This background brings me back to Judge Ho's proposal. He announced it on September 29, 2022. Shortly thereafter, a dozen anonymous judges signed onto his program. Judge Lisa Branch (CA11) publicly agreed to join the boycott. Judge Edith Jones (CA5) voiced support for Ho's proposal. Judge Jerry Smith (CA5), who was Ho's boss in a bygone era, criticized Ho, and invited more Yalies to apply for clerkships. Judges McKee (CA3) and Wilkinson (CA4) lined up with Smith. Some judges privately supported Ho. Even more judges privately seethed at Ho.

But the message apparently got through to its intended audience, Dean Gerken. On October 12, Yale Law School issued a statement to alumni at Yale Law School concerning free speech. The timing of this statement seems related to Ho's proposal. Eugene wrote that "calls [for a boycott] might have helped prompt this message." Brian Leiter was more direct: "This seems a victory for Judge Ho." It is impossible to know what impact Ho's speech had on Yale Law School. But his willingness to be the first to speak, and change the conversation, likely nudged Gerken to speak out.

The Hoverton window has been shifted here. It was not the first time. (See pp. 374-376 of my article Judicial Courage.) And it will not be the last time.

Free Speech

No Pseudonymity in Doctor's Disability Law Case

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From Judge Dan Polster's opinion today in Koe v. Univ. Hospitals Health Sys., Inc. (N.D. Ohio):

Plaintiff states that he was a resident physician in the Case Western Reserve University/University Hospitals Cleveland Medical Center residency program beginning in June 2019. He also states that he is a qualified individual with a disability as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act ….

Plaintiff alleges that in the course of his residency, other residents and nursing staff repeatedly questioned Plaintiff regarding his health and the health of his family. During a year-end performance review, Plaintiff advised his program director that he believed this action constituted harassment on the basis of disability and created a hostile work environment, and he asked the program director to stop the behavior. Plaintiff contends that the program director failed to take corrective action. According to Plaintiff, during the next performance review, the program director advised Plaintiff that he must have an EAP (Employee Assistance Program) assessment but neglected to explain why. Plaintiff continued to reach out to the program director to inquire as to her rationale for mandating the assessment to no avail. Plaintiff contends that, fearing discharge, he reluctantly met with a University Hospitals clinician for the assessment and a follow-up assessment. Plaintiff alleges that after the assessment, he was forced, under verbal and written threat of discharge, to sign a "Compliance Contract" that conditioned Plaintiff's continued employment on his submission to ongoing compulsory counseling. He claims that Defendants subjected him to ongoing discriminatory and retaliatory harassment.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' behavior constituted a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Title I of the ADA; and Title II of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008….

Plaintiff moves for leave to file this action anonymously. In support, he alleges that he is compelled to disclose information of the "utmost intimacy," including "conversations pertaining to counseling sessions." He alleges that medical decisions relating to his health care and treatment are sensitive and personal matters warranting the use of a pseudonym….

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Free Speech

Renaissance Faire King & Queen are Limited-Purpose Publick Figures

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From Amor v. Conover, decided yesterday by Judge John Gallagher (E.D. Pa.):

[Plaintiffs'] allegations arise following Defendant's participation in the Pittsburgh Renaissance Festival as a paying guest. Plaintiffs Dr. Amor and Ms. Amor are both performance directors at the Pittsburgh Renaissance Festival. In addition to his Renaissance Festival involvement, Plaintiff Dr. Amor is a dentist with a business practice located in Pennsylvania.

Defendant's statements allege that Plaintiffs refused to take seriously allegations that renaissance festival cast members/employees under their supervision committed sexual misconduct against other renaissance festival cast members/employees, some of whom were minors under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged abuse. According to Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant's statements further allege Plaintiffs "retaliated against said rape and/or sexual assault victims by, amongst other things, publicly humiliating them, calling them crazy, refusing to rehire them, and/or terminating them from employment." …

Plaintiffs sued for libel, and the question before the court at this point was solely whether they are limited-purpose public figures and must therefore prove that the defendant knew her statements were false (or likely false), rather than just that the defendant was negligent as to their falsehood:

"The question of whether a plaintiff is a public or private figure is a question of law to be decided by the Court." … "In a defamation action, the designation of an individual as a limited purpose public figure has significant ramifications: whereas a private individual need only prove negligence on the part of the defendant to prevail, a limited purpose public figure must establish actual malice by the defendant." This distinction between private individuals and limited purpose public figures is justified on two grounds: "First is the rationale of self-help," as public figures have "greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy." "Second, and perhaps more important, is the notion of assumption of the risk. Public officials and public figures in some sense voluntarily put themselves in a position of greater public scrutiny and thus assume the risk that disparaging remarks will be negligently made about them."

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Guns

Requirement of Serial Numbers on Guns Violates Second Amendment

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From U.S. v. Price, decided yesterday by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin (S.D. W. Va.):

Section 922(k) states, in pertinent part,

It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to transport … in interstate or foreign commerce, any firearm which has had the importer's or manufacturer's serial number removed, obliterated, or altered or to possess … any firearm which has had the importer's or manufacturer's serial number removed, obliterated, or altered and has, at any time, been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce….

18 U.S.C. § 922(k).

The threshold question [under Bruen] is whether Section 922(k) prohibits conduct that is protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment. The Government argues that it does not because the requirement that firearms bear serial numbers is, in its view, a "commercial regulation" that does not "infringe" on one's right to keep and bear arms. The Government's argument relies mainly on its contention that no relevant Supreme Court precedent casts "doubt on laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms." In his concurring opinion in Bruen, Justice Kavanaugh explained that the Court did not intend "to cast doubt on … laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms." This idea is rooted in Heller and McDonald—precedent that Bruen reaffirmed—which also left commercial regulations untouched. This makes sense because commercial regulations that apply only to manufacturers and sellers do not implicate an individual's right of possession.

Importantly though, the statute at issue here is not a commercial regulation. Rather, 18 U.S.C. § 923(i) is the commercial regulation that requires manufacturers to place serial numbers on firearms: "Licensed importers and manufacturers shall identify by means of a serial number engraved or cast on the receiver or frame of the weapon … each firearm imported or manufactured by such importer or manufacturer." Other commercial regulations may well require that any firearm sale only involve firearms bearing a manufacturer's serial number. Section 922(k) goes farther. It criminalizes the mere possession of a firearm after a serial number is removed, obliterated, or altered in any way, whether or not the firearm is then placed into commerce.

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Law & Government

The Constitutional State Legislature Doctrine

The middle ground in Moore v. Harper (plus a few additional thoughts on redistricting remedies)

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On Tuesday, Michael McConnell and I published a piece in The Atlantic about the Supreme Court's pending case of Moore v. Harper, currently headlined The Supreme Court Has A Perfectly Good Option in Its Most Divisive Case.

It begins:

Later this term, the Supreme Court will decide Moore v. Harper, a case that has been pitched as a seismic clash between two troubling positions. One side asks for state legislatures to be freed from the traditional safeguards of state constitutional law, while the other asks the Court to effectively ignore the text of the Constitution. The Court should look beyond these unsupportable positions and take a commonsense middle ground. Fortunately, one is readily available: an approach that maintains the Constitution's emphasis on state legislatures without divorcing them from their traditional constitutional constraints.

and continues:

Missing from the debate has been a key principle that points to a sensible middle ground: A state constitution may limit a legislature's power over federal elections, but it may not give that power to somebody else. We need not an independent-state-legislature doctrine, but a constitutional-state-legislature doctrine.

and more specifically:

What does this principle mean for concrete cases?

It means that state constitutional provisions can restrain legislative districting, such as by limiting the use of partisan gerrymandering. The broad challenge to state constitutional law in Moore therefore should fail. But it also means that the North Carolina courts do not have independent constitutional power to adopt their own map.

There is much more at the link.

Now, if you agree with our core points (which would be great) there is much more to say about how to approach the remedy when a legislature draws a legally impermissible map. Some have pointed to a recent redistricting standoff in Ohio, others to the many decades in which the Minnesota legislature has apparently refused to draw maps, happy to let the courts do the hard work.

I think it might be premature to get into these weeds, and I certainly can't speak for my co-author about any of this. But I thought I'd offer a few modest observations for now.

  1. The piece notes that Congress retains power to solve standoffs over congressional redistricting. It is also worth mentioning that Congress has in fact enacted some legislation on this subject already, codified in 2 U.S.C. 2a through 2c. These statutes are somewhat old, and therefore somewhat complicated to apply today, but an amicus brief by Jonathan Mitchell and Adam Mortara argues that these statutory provisions could resolve Moore.
  2. Additionally, there might be the possibility of state legislation that authorizes a fallback approach for unconstitutional redistricting. This possibility triggers another constitutional question. Some might see such legislation as simply an instance of the state legislature exercising its constitutional power. Others might see such legislation as subject to a sort of non-delegation doctrine. The Atlantic piece doesn't explicitly address this question, and depending on the answer, one might resolve Moore by turning to various provisions of North Carolina law that the parties dispute.
  3. In the absence of any specific legislative response, what to do when the enacted law tries to require something unconstitutional is a severability problem, something I've written about recently in Severability First Principles: when a legislative enactment is not the law because it is unconstitutional, what is the law instead? These questions can be intricate and technical in particular cases, but I am not convinced they are generally intractable.
  4. For instance, the federal statutes mentioned above might point toward either at-large elections (as provided in 2a(c)) or "hewing as closely as possible" to an older legislative map (or both, as the Mitchell/Mortara brief above argues). Other statutes or severability principles might point to something similar. Or to a starker remedy like nullity, refusing to recognize a valid method of election until one is passed that complies with the law.

Again, these issues all seem slightly premature to me, and they would deserve further study once the more basic principles are determined, but I don't think they are mysterious.

A Paradoxical Defense of Berkeley Law School

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Two 2019 alumni of Berkeley Law School, Nir Maoz and Olivia Wittels, are concerned that the recent attention given to the "no speakers who support Israel's existence" rule adopted by nine student groups at the law school is giving people a false impression of the school. Jewish and Zionist students at Berkeley Law, they write, are thriving. They describe their own experiences in support of that claim.

I don't doubt they are right about the thriving part, but after I finished the article I wound up more concerned about the environment at Berkeley Law than I was before I read it. Sometimes, incidents like the current speaker boycott are short-term phenomena, spurred by an especially charismatic student activist who temporarily rallies other groups to his side. But Maoz and Wittel's article suggests that the problem is much more deep-rooted and longstanding. They write: "We won't deny that in our three years at Berkeley Law, we experienced a number of antisemitic incidents that contributed to what was, at times, a hostile climate for many Jewish students."

They don't describe what these incidents were, but I find it striking that in a defense of their alma mater, with perhaps the most "progressive" student body of any law school, they describe antisemitism sufficiently serious to at times create a hostile environment. Good for them for not letting it interfere with their activism, nor for falling into a victim mentality. But something seems to be seriously amiss at Berkeley Law.

Supreme Court

President Likens Supreme Court to an "Advocacy Group"

As the election approaches, the President sharpens his criticism of the Supreme Court.

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Several news outlets, including CNN, NBC, and the Washington Post, are reporting on comments President Biden made last night during a "virtual fundraiser" for a Democratic congressional candidate in which he likened the Supreme Court to an "advocacy group," though the precise words of his remarks vary slightly across the various accounts.

From the NBC account:

"I view this off-year election as one of the most important elections that I've been engaged in because a lot can change because the institutions have changed," he said. "The Supreme Court is more of an advocacy group these days than it is … evenhanded about it," Biden said when speaking about the upcoming midterm elections on Nov. 8.

CNN deletes "of" from the quote, and adds "an" in the ellipsis. I have not seen video of the remarks, which apparently focused on the stakes in the upcoming election.

Historically, making the federal judiciary into a campaign issue has tended to help Republican candidates more than Democratic ones. Some Democrats--apparently including President Biden--are trying to change that in the wake of Dobbs. We will see whether these efforts are successful.

Campus Free Speech

Yale Law School Dean's "Message to Our Alumni on Free Speech"

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Just released today:

Dear members of our alumni community:

Yale Law School is dedicated to building a vibrant intellectual environment where ideas flourish. To foster free speech and engagement, we emphasize the core values of professionalism, integrity, and respect. These foundational values guide everything we do.

Over the last six months, we have taken a number of concrete steps to reaffirm our enduring commitment to the free and unfettered exchange of ideas. These actions are well known to our faculty, students, and staff, but I want to share some of them with you as well.

  • Last March, the Law School made unequivocally clear that attempts to disrupt events on campus are unacceptable and violate the norms of the School, the profession, and our community.
  • The faculty revised our disciplinary code and adopted a policy prohibiting surreptitious recordings that mirrors policies that the University of Chicago and other peer institutions have put in place to encourage the free expression of ideas.
  • We developed an online resource outlining our free speech policies and redesigned Orientation to center around discussions of free expression and the importance of respectful engagement. Virtually every member of the faculty spoke to their students about these values on the first day of class.
  • We replaced our digital listserv with what alumni fondly remember as "the Wall" to encourage students to take time to reflect and resolve their differences face-to-face.
  • We welcomed a new Dean of Students who is focused on ensuring students learn to resolve disagreements among themselves whenever possible rather than reflexively looking to the institution to serve as a referee.

This important and ongoing work takes place against the backdrop of long-standing efforts to encourage the robust exchange of ideas that is essential to any academic community. In all of these efforts, our core model remains the same — we know that the best way for our students to learn is by engaging with their peers and faculty in small, iterative conversations within our community. While this work often is not visible to the wider world, the Law School is moving forward on its central commitments and we are focused on educating the next generation of lawyers and instilling them with the values so many of us hold dear. I'm grateful for your unfailing support and love of the School.

Of course, all depends on the implementation, but I thought I'd pass this along. I should also note that, while I disagree with the calls to boycott Yale Law School graduates because of the school's past lack of support of free speech, I have to acknowledge (as a practical matter, whatever one might think of the purely ethical questions) that those calls might have helped prompt this message—though one can only speculate—on that and might prompt Yale to adhere to these principles in the future.

Campus Free Speech

Yale Law School, Judge Ho, Neutrals, and Secondary Boycotts

Even when there's good reason to criticize universities, we should keep the students out of our battles.

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I've been following with great interest the public discussion of Fifth Circuit Judge James Ho's speech on "Restoring America by Resisting Cancel Culture," and had a chance to read a draft of it. My interest both from the importance of the underlying issue and from my having known Judge Ho for over 25 years, indeed since before he went to law school (he was working for a California State Senator at the time).

I've also much appreciated Judge Ho's perspective on free speech issues, for instance in Oliver v. Arnold (5th Cir. 2021), where he wrote in support of the First Amendment rights of a high school student who objected to a requirement that she "transcribe the Pledge of Allegiance and listen to the Bruce Springsteen song 'Born in the U.S.A,'" and in Villareal v. Laredo (5th Cir. 2022), where he wrote in support of the First Amendment rights of journalists to ask questions of the police (even about confidential matters). I think Judge Ho is seriously concerned about free speech for everyone, left or right, and objects to Yale Law School's practices because of this concern. Even if I hadn't known him or his work, I would still want to focus on the merits of his proposal rather on any supposed ulterior motivation. But given my respect for him, I especially want to focus on the proposal's substance.

And while I found myself agreeing with much of Judge Ho's substantive diagnosis of the problem, I differ on the solution, and in particular on the suggestion that drew the most attention—that judges boycott law clerks who go to Yale Law School until that school does more to protect free speech, and to prevent disruptions of unorthodox speakers. (I appreciate that the proposal would only start with students who go to law school starting Fall 2023, so they are on notice of the possible boycott, but for reasons I note below, I don't think this justifies the proposal.)

[A.] First, a few words on the problem that Judge Ho is trying to solve: I agree that Yale Law School has done too little to protect free speech there, and indeed has at times affirmatively undermined it. I agree that this makes Yale less effective at training lawyers, and, precisely because of its prominence, sets a bad example for other law schools.

I also share Judge Ho's sense that many students and lawyers are finding themselves facing ideological discrimination based on their beliefs and statements, including ones that are very much part of mainstream discourse. That too is bad for our legal system, bad for democracy, and bad for our culture of free speech.

And I agree that judges are entitled to choose whom to hire, and that they indeed often prefer some law schools over others for many reasons that are often only weakly correlated to the school's relative academic quality. (Yale students may well have been the beneficiary of such preferences far more often than they have been handicapped by such preferences.)

Indeed, I think that judges are even entitled, if they so choose, to hire clerks based in part on the clerks' ideological views, though I do not see Judge Ho's proposal as calling for that. Clerkships are the unusual sort of job for which ideological compatibility as to legal matters (e.g., originalism vs. living constitutionalism, textualism vs. purposivism, the interpretation of various controversial constitutional and statutory provisions, and the like) should generally be seen as a legitimate hiring criterion, cf. Elrod v. Burns and Branti v. Finkel. To my knowledge, many judges, both liberals and conservatives, have considered ideological compatibility in hiring clerks, though many others, both liberals and conservatives, have generally not considered it.

[B.] But here's the heart of my disagreement, not as a matter of legal command but as a matter of what one might loosely call the ethics of American freedom and democracy: My view is that we shouldn't threaten innocent neutrals as a means of influencing the culpable.

Future Yale law students aren't the ones who set Yale policy. They may disagree with that policy, or they may not know enough about the subject to have a view. Even if they go to Yale knowing about Yale policy (and about the boycott), they shouldn't be held responsible for what Yale does, and they shouldn't be retaliated against as a means of trying to pressure Yale to change. Such "secondary boycotts," as labor law refers to them in a somewhat different context, are both unfair to the "neutral[s]" that are being boycotted, and likely to "widen[] … strife." (I'm not claiming here that there's anything illegal about the proposed boycott of Yale graduates, but only that some of the reasons labor law disapproves of secondary boycotts also carry over to this situation.)

[1.] Let me offer an analogy. As I understand it, BYU apparently forbids same-sex sexual or even romantic behavior by its students. (The precise rule changed recently, but it appears that it still forbids same-sex romantic relationships even if they do not include sexual conduct.) Let's say that some judges or law firms organized a boycott of all BYU law graduates—or for that matter all BYU graduates, including those who went to BYU for undergrad—on the theory that this may help pressure BYU to change its policy. Assume that such a boycott would be sincerely motivated by opposition to anti-gay policies generally (the boycotters would gladly add other universities if it were publicly known that they have similar policies), not to Mormons as a religious group.

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