This state or a political subdivision of this state may not enact, adopt, or issue a statute, order, proclamation, decision, or rule that prohibits or limits religious services, including religious services conducted in churches, congregations, and places of worship, in this state by a religious organization established to support and serve the propagation of a sincerely held religious belief.
In Friday's Perez v. City of San Antonio, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that this provision, when it applies, "is absolute and categorical, meaning it forbids governmental prohibitions and limitations on religious services regardless of the government's interest in that limitation or how tailored the limitation is to that interest." It also concluded that it's a substantive protection, not just an antidiscrimination rule that bars "orders that treated religious services less favorably than secular activities." And it concluded that "the Clause protects not only the right to gather for religious services but also worship practices that are part of religious services."
But the court also concluded that the provision is limited in scope, in relevant part reasoning:
[T]he Clause protects only "religious services"; it does not, for example, purport to protect the broader concept of the "free exercise of religion." … [I]t [also] protects only religious services "conducted … in this state by a religious organization established to support and serve the propagation of a sincerely held religious belief." And … it forbids only government actions that "prohibit[] or limit[]" such services….
Because the Clause supplements and does not supplant the protections already provided by the Free Exercise Clause, the Freedom of Worship Clause, and the Texas RFRA, the linguistic context suggests that the Religious Services Clause does not attempt to independently and comprehensively address all governmental limitations on religious freedoms. And the historical context also confirms that those who drafted and proposed the amendment did not intend that its scope be unlimited.
For nearly a decade, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany has challenged New York's law mandating that insurance policies cover abortions. A cert petition was first filed in April 2021.But in November 2021, the Court GVR'd the case in light of Fulton. In May 2024, the New York Court of Appeals found that Fulton changed nothing.
In July 2024, the Diocese petitioned for cert a second time. The case sat on the docket for nearly a year. On June 5, the Court decide Catholic Charities Bureau. On June 9, the Court scheduled the Diocese petition for the June 12 conference. The Diocese urged the Court to summarily reverse in light of the Wisconsin case:
This Court's unanimous ruling in Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission, 605 U.S. ----, 2025 WL 1583299 (June 5, 2025), controls the initial question presented in this matter. Unless the Court wishes to grant the petition for other reasons, summary reversal is warranted. Granting the petition to vacate the decision below for a second time and remanding for yet further consideration would needlessly prolong this matter, imposing significant burdens on Petitioners and other religious organizations.
Unsurprisingly, New York sought a remand to keep the case on ice.
Today, nearly a year after the most recent cert petition was filed, and more than four years after the first petition was filed, the Court GVR'd the case in light of Catholic Charities Bureau.
It is difficult to describe how much time and effort has been spent on this case, amid two major landmark rulings. Yet, at least five members of the Court sent the Diocese back to New York purgatory. And I'm willing to bet that Justice Barrett, the Court's premier procedural formalist, was unwilling to grant a summary reversal. Much more on Justice Barrett tomorrow.
Last month I noted a provision in the "Big, Beautiful Bill" (sic) that would place limits on the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief against the federal government. The provision was apparently inspired (at least in part) by this Wall Street Journal op-ed.
Though largely a means to ensure compliance with FRCP 65(c), the provision may have also been overbroad and had a retroactive effect.
The Senate has adopted a similar measure, albeit one that is different in multiple respects. My co-blogger Ilya Somin notes Justice Clint Bolick's deep concerns about the provision here. Over at the Divided Argument substack, Samuel Bray offers a more sanguine take, calling the Senate provision a "vast improvement."
Here is the text of the Senate version:
No court of the United States may issue a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order against the Federal Government (other than a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued in a case proceeding under title 11, United States Code) if no security is given, in an amount proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by the Federal Government, when the injunction or order is issued pursuant to rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after the date of enactment of this Act. No court may consider any factor other than the value of the costs and damages sustained when making its determination of the proper value of such security, and that determination shall be appealable upon issuance of the preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under an abuse of discretion standard.
In Bray's view,
the Senate version is a dramatic improvement over the House version—it avoids the serious constitutional problems that were likely to doom the House bill, and it is more effective and harder to evade in requiring meaningful injunction bonds in suits against the federal government. The effect of that change will be to give more weight in the preliminary injunction calculus to the regulatory cost of preliminary injunctions to the federal government—not just in the current administration, but in future administrations, both Republican and Democratic.
That does not mean the provision is perfect. Bray also notes the effect of this provision (should it be adopted) will also depend on how it is interpreted and applied. It also remains to be seen whether this provision will be successfully included in the reconciliation bill. In any event, if this issue is of interest, Bray's analysis is definitely worth a read.
The Roberts court has long been characterized as a "probusiness" court, given the ostensible orientation of the court's Republican-appointed majority and assumptions that President Trump's appointments have magnified that orientation. But there are reasons to question this characterization. Quantitative analyses often fail to account for the relative importance of individual decisions, the broader legal context in which the court's decisions are made, or the ways in which decisions can alter or depart from preexisting legal baselines. I show that President Trump's appointments to the court have fairly consistently voted to restrain the power of administrative agencies, but they have not consistently supported outcomes that are beneficial to business. In cases involving state laws that may fragment or burden national markets, the Roberts court may actually be less sympathetic to business interests than it was prior to Trump's appointments.
The article is part of an interdisciplinary symposium edited by Lee Epstein and Rogers M. Smith on "Donald J. Trump, the Supreme Court, and American Constitutionalism." Other contributors to the symposium include Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Charles M. Cameron, Jonathan P. Kastellec, Adam Liptak, Rogers M. Smith, Gillian E. Metzger, Cristina M. Rodríguez, Olatunde Johnson, Terri Peretti, Linda Greenhouse, Vincent Phillip Muñoz, Rebecca L. Brown, Mitu Gulati, Keren Weinshall, and James L. Gibson.
Yesterday, there were massive nationwide "No Kings" protests against Donald Trump and his authoritarian tendencies. Like most political slogans, "No Kings" is an oversimplification. But it is in fact true that Trump is repeating many of the abuses of the British monarchs, which precipitated the English Civil War, and eventually the American Revolution.
A less widely recognized parallel between the Stuarts and Trump is that Trump is imitating King Charles in imposing taxes without legislative authorization, and in the process trying to convert an emergency power into a tool that the executive can deploy anytime he wants. As I have explained previously, Trump is trying to use the the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA) - a relatively narrow delegation of emergency powers - to wage a massive trade war over issues that are in no way an emergency, and impose up to $2.2 trillion in new taxes on Americans. Two federal courts have ruled (including one in a case brought by the Liberty Justice Center and myself) that IEEPA grants no such authority and it would be unconstitutional if it did, though the litigation continues on appeal.
Ship money… [was] a nonparliamentary tax first levied in medieval times by the English crown on coastal cities and counties for naval defense in time of war. It required those being taxed to furnish a certain number of warships or to pay the ships' equivalent in money. Its revival and its enforcement as a general tax by Charles I aroused widespread opposition and added to the discontent leading to the English Civil Wars.
After bitter constitutional disputes, Charles dismissed Parliament in 1629 and began 11 years of personal rule; during this time, deprived of parliamentary sources of revenue, he was forced to employ ship money as a financial expedient. The first of six annual writs appeared in October 1634 and differed from traditional levies in that it was based on the possibility of war rather than immediate national emergency. The writ of the following year increased the imposition and extended it to inland towns. The issue of a third writ in 1636 made it evident that Charles intended ship money as a permanent and general form of taxation. Each succeeding writ aroused greater popular discontent and opposition, and upon the issue of the third writ John Hampden, a prominent parliamentarian, refused payment.
His case, brought before the Court of Exchequer in 1637, lasted six months. The judges, headed by Sir John Finch (later Baron Finch), decided 7 to 5 in favour of the crown; but the highhanded opinions of Finch provoked widespread distrust of Charles's courts, whereas the narrowness of the decision encouraged further resistance…. In 1641, by an act of the Long Parliament, ship money was declared illegal.
Note the many parallels to our present situation: Like Trump, Charles I imposed massive taxes without congressional authorization, attempted to convert a narrow emergency power into "a permanent and general form of taxation," and provoked widespread resistance. And, like Trump, Charles I claimed he had an absolute, unreviewable prerogative to determine whether an emergency justifying the use of extraordinary authority existed. Trump claims he alone gets to decide whether there is an "emergency" and an "unusual and extraordinary threat" of the kind needed to invoke IEEPA. Similarly, King Charles I claimed he alone was entitled to determine whether there was threat of invasion or naval attack of the kind that could justify imposition of ship money.
Reading Henry Parker's 1640 Leveller Tract against Ship Money, "The Case of Shipmoney Briefly Discoursed," gives me a strong sense of de ja vu. Parker was a leading contemporary critic of royal absolutism and defender of civil liberties and parliamentary rights.
Parker notes that "[t]he Quaere then is, whether the King bee sole Judge of the danger, and of the remedy, or rather whether he be so sole Judge, that his meere affirmation and notification of a danger foreseene by him at a distance, or pretended only to be foreseene, shall be so unquestionable, that he may charge the Kingdome thereupon at his discretion, though they assent not, nor apprehend the danger as it is forewarned." Trump, too, is claiming to be the "sole Judge of the danger" and asserting that his "mere affirmation" is enough to impose massive taxes any time he wants.
Parker also emphasized "that in nature there is more favour due to the liberty of the subject, than to the Prerogative of the King, since the one is ordained only for the preservation of the other; and then to solve these knots, our dispute must be, what prerogative the people's good and profit will beare, not what liberty the King's absolutenes or prerogative may admit." He also notes that "in this dispute it is more just that wee appeale to written lawes, than to the breasts of Kings themselves." In our situation, too, the liberty of the people must take precedence over the asserted prerogatives of the executive, and the latter must be bound by written law. The people must be free to trade with foreign nations, and free of arbitrary detention, unless, at the very least, the executive can prove by overwhelming evidence there is a genuine emergency in which written law authorizes him to use extraordinary power.
Parker further emphasizes that "questionlesse sole judgement in matters of State, does no otherwise belong to the King, than in matters of Law, or points of Theology. Besides, as sole judgement is here ascribed to the King, hee may affirme dangers to be foreseene when he will, and of what nature he will." The same is true for us. If the president can "affirme dangers to be foreseene when he will, and of what nature he will," and use them as pretexts to wield vast emergency powers, there is no end to the abuses of power that are likely to occur.
Parker also warns against simply relying on the King's word about there being a genuine emergency:
It is ridiculous also to alledge… that it is contrary to presumption of Law to suspect falsity in the King…. Nay there is nothing more knowne, or universally assented to than this, that Kings may be bad; and it is more probable and naturall that evill may bee expected from good Princes, than good from bad. Wherefore since it is all one to the State, whether evill proceed from the King mediately or immediately, out of malice, or ignorance. And since wee know that of all kindes of government Monarchicall is the worst, when the Scepter is weilded by an unjust or unskilfull Prince, though it bee the best, when such Princes as are not seduceable (a thing most rare) reigne, it will bee great discretion in us not to desert our right in those Lawes which regulate and confine Monarchy, meerly out of Law-presumption, if wee must presume well of our Princes, to what purpose are Lawes made?
The parallel to our own situation is obvious. Presidents too may be "bad," and they too often try to exploit real and imagined emergencies to make dangerous power grabs. Politicians, like princes, are rarely immune to temptation and "seduction," and therefore - for us, too 'it will bee great discretion in us not to desert our right in those Lawes which regulate and confine" the executive power.
The American Founding Fathers, of course, were greatly influenced by the British experience, and shared many of the concerns of Parker and other English opponents of royal absolutism. For that reason, they made sure the power to impose taxes (including tariffs) was given to the legislature, and confined emergency powers to narrow circumstances (e.g. - the writ of habeas corpus can only be suspended "when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it" and "invasion" was understood narrowly as a military attack, not cross-border smuggling or illegal migration). Nor did they trust to the good will and discernment of the executive to decide for himself when extraordinary powers should be wielded. As James Madison (as if echoing Henry Parker) famously warned, "Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm." At least for originalist judges, this history - and its influence on the Founders - should also bolster the legal case against Trump's tariffs.
The British eventually defeated Charles I and curbed their monarchs' absolutist pretensions, albeit only after much oppression and bloodshed. The Founding Fathers learned from that awful experience. We would do well to learn from it, as well, and act accordingly.
From New York trial court judge Mary Rosado's opinion Thursday in Council of City of N.Y. v. Adams (see also N.Y. Times [Luis Ferré-Sadurní], Judge Blocks ICE Plan to Open Rikers Office Indefinitely):
This case, at its essence, seeks to maintain the rule of law. Plaintiff-Petitioner seeks to nullify an Executive Order issued allegedly because Mayor Adams negotiated away sanctuary city protections for a dismissal of his ongoing criminal prosecution. On January 31, 2025, Mayor Adams met with President Donald J. Trump's Deputy Attorney General, Emil Bove ("Mr. Bove"), to discuss Mayor Adams' ongoing criminal prosecution's impact on his ability to "work[] with the federal government on important issues of immigration enforcement" Danielle R. Sassoon, Esq., Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, attended the January 31, 2025 meeting, and said "Adams'[] attorneys repeatedly urged what amounted to a quid pro quo, indicating that Adams would be in a position to assist with [immigration] enforcement priorities only if the indictment were dismissed."
On February 3, 2025, Mayor Adams' criminal defense attorney, Alex Spiro, wrote to Mr. Bove that Mayor Adams' criminal prosecution will "become increasingly problematic as the Trump administration seeks to aggressively enforce immigration laws and remove undocumented immigrants …. [T]he federal government cannot possibly rely on Mayor Adams to be a fully effective partner in all situations in ongoing public-safety missions while he is under federal indictment …." Mr. Spiro further wrote that Mayor Adams' "abilities to exercise his powers have also been complicated by his indictment" including his powers to "prevent[] the Office of the Corporation Counsel from litigating challenges to immigration enforcement, prevent[] appointed city employees from taking public stances against enforcement efforts, [and to] re-open[] the ICE office on Rikers Island …." On February 10, 2025, Mr. Bove directed federal prosecutors to dismiss without prejudice the pending criminal charges against Mayor Adams.
On February 13, 2025, just after meeting President Donald J. Trump's "Border Czar," Thomas Homan ("Mr. Homan"), Mayor Adams announced he would issue an executive order allowing federal immigration authorities on Rikers Island. One day later, on February 14, 2025, Mr. Homan appeared alongside Mayor Adams on Fox & Friends, where he stated if Mayor Adams did not deliver "I'll be back in New York City, and we won't be sitting on the couch. I'll be in his office, up his b ___, saying, 'Where the hell is the agreement we came to?'" That same day, the Department of Justice filed a motion to dismiss all pending criminal charges against Mayor Adams.
While the motion to dismiss was pending, numerous deputy mayors resigned from Mayor Adams' administration. On March 20, 2025, First Deputy Mayor Mastro was appointed by Mayor Adams. On March 24, 2025, Mayor Adams issued Executive Order No. 49. This order provides First Deputy Mayor Mastro shall "[r]eport directly to the Mayor." It also delegated to First Deputy Mayor Mastro the authority to "[p]erform any function, power or duty of the Mayor in negotiating, executing and delivering any and all agreements, instruments and any other documents necessary or desirable to effectuate any of the matters" related to public safety.
On April 2, 2025, United District Judge Dale Ho dismissed the criminal charges with prejudice, writing "[e]verything here smacks of a bargain: dismissal of the [i]ndictment in exchange for immigration policy concessions." Judge Ho further wrote the suggestion "that public officials may receive special dispensation if they are compliant with the incumbent administration's policy priorities … is fundamentally incompatible with the basic promise of equal justice under law." Ultimately, Judge Ho found that he "cannot force the Department of Justice to prosecute a defendant" and did not have the authority "to appoint an independent prosecutor" which precluded him from denying the Department of Justice's motion to dismiss. Six days later, on April 8, 2025, First Deputy Mayor Mastro issued Executive Order No. 50, which authorized the Department of Correction to enter a Memorandum of Understanding with federal law enforcement agencies allowing them to maintain office space on Department of Correction property, specifically Rikers Island.
The court concluded that Mayor Adams' actions likely violated N.Y. conflict of interest law:
Today's New York Times features an extensive profile of Justice Amy Coney Barrett by Jodi Kantor. The article opens with a tidbit that I had not seen reported previously.
As President Trump was leaning toward appointing Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court five years ago, some advisers shared doubts about whether she was conservative enough. But he waved them away, according to someone familiar with the discussions. He wanted a nominee religious conservatives would applaud, and with an election approaching, he was up against the clock.
Soon after Justice Barrett arrived at the court she began surprising her colleagues. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. assigned her to write a majority opinion — among her first — allowing the seizure of state property in a pipeline case, according to several people aware of the process. But she then changed her mind and took the opposite stance, a bold move that risked irritating the chief justice.
PennEast was an interesting case in many ways. Among other things, it produced an interesting lineup. The Chief wrote for the Court, joined by Justices Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kavanaugh. The dissenters were Justices Barrett, Thomas, Kagan, and Gorsuch, and in my view they had the better of the argument, doctrinally and prudentially. (Indeed, if all you told me about a case was this lineup, I'd be inclined to assume the dissenters got it right.)
For those who forget, Justice Barrett's dissent began:
A straightforward application of our precedent resolves this case. Congress passed the Natural Gas Act in reliance on its power to regulate interstate commerce, and we have repeatedly held that the Commerce Clause does not permit Congress to strip the States of their sovereign immunity. Recognizing that barrier, the Court insists that eminent domain is a special case. New Jersey has no sovereign immunity to assert, it says, because the States surrendered to private condemnation suits in the plan of the Convention. This argument has no textual, structural, or historical support. Because there is no reason to treat private condemnation suits differently from any other cause of action created pursuant to the Commerce Clause, I respectfully dissent.
A provision inserted into the Senate GOP version of Trump's "Big Beautiful Bill" would, if enacted, pose a serious threat to federal courts' ability to protect your constitutional rights. It does so by requiring litigants seeking a preliminary injunction against a federal government policy to post potentially enormous bonds.
Arizona Supreme Court Justice Clint Bolick - who is also an experienced public interest litigator, having served as Director of Litigation at the libertarian Institute for Justice and VP for Litigation at the Goldwater Institute - has an excellent article outlining the danger this provision poses:
[The Senate bill] targets temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. These are rulings that demand that the government halt the enforcement or implementation of a policy immediately, pending the final outcome of the case, if the judge concludes that it is likely the plaintiffs will prevail against the government in the end.
Just imagine, for instance, that during Covid, courts could not stop executive orders closing down houses of worship unless millions of dollars were posted in bonds. Or an executive order confiscating guns. The basic idea of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is to prevent the damage to the rights and well-being of citizens from the government carrying out an action or policy that is likely to be found illegal or unconstitutional.
The new Senate version turns that logic on its head, instead seeking to protect the government from any costs that might be incurred from citizens asserting their rights.
This new version no longer tries to take away the power to enforce rulings through contempt. Nor does it apply retroactively, which could have caused chaos and brought settlements in many old cases into doubt. But it imposes a requirement that plaintiffs suing the federal government post a bond "in an amount proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by the Federal Government." Crucially, "No court may consider any factor other than the value of the costs and damages sustained." That could mean that they can't consider the potential damage to the plaintiffs from the government's actions, nor can they consider the plaintiffs' ability to pay.
Requiring potentially massive bonds to enjoin government action could prevent many or even most such lawsuits from being filed in the first place, because few would have the means to pay upfront. That is especially true in cases involving sweeping policies where the government could claim "costs" in the billions. Only state governments could conceivably post bonds in that amount, though they would also balk at the potential hit to their budgets.
This means that many parties would have no choice but accept violations of their rights rather than seek legal redress, severely undermining the Constitution.
As Justice Bolick explains, this Senate provision is actually worse than the previous House version of this idea, which targeted judges' contempt powers, though the latter was also bad, and likely unconstitutional. My Cato Institute colleague Walter Olson makes additional points along the same lines. As he notes, if this provision passes, the government could impose even blatantly illegal and unconstitutional policies for long periods of time, unless and until litigation reaches a final conclusion. That could inflict grave harm on the victims of illegality. Consider media subject to illegal censorship during a crucial news cycle, illegally deported immigrants, people imprisoned without due process, and more.
Right now, Republicans are seeking to enact these restrictions in order to block injunctions constraining a GOP administration's policies. But, as Bolick notes, under a more left-wing administration the same tool can easily be turned against rights conservatives value. Consider a left-wing president who targets gun rights or religious liberty rights, or tries to censor speech DEI activists consider offensive.
Ultimately, it is more important to ensure the vast powers of the federal government cannot be used to undermine the Constitution and take away our rights than to ensure an administration can swiftly implement all its preferred policies. And if a rogue district court does impose an injunction improperly, higher courts can quickly stay or overturn it, as has happened a number of times in recent months.
If this Senate provision gets enacted, there is a chance courts might invalidate it as an unconstitutional assault on the power of judicial review - which it is. But it would be better if Congress does not go down this dangerous road in the first place.
NOTE: Clint Bolick was one of my superiors at the Institute for Justice, when I worked there as a law student clerk in the summer of 1998.
From today's opinion by Judge Robert Pitman (W.D. Tex.) in Qaddumi v. Hartzell:
Qaddumi challenges his suspension from the University of Texas at Austin ("UT"), where Defendants currently work or previously worked as administrators, as a violation of his constitutional rights. Qaddumi was involved in planning a protest, to include a "walk out of class," "guest speaker," and two "teach-in[s]", about ongoing violence in Gaza in April 2024 as a member of the Palestine Solidarity Committee ("PSC").
He alleges these planned protest activities were peaceful in nature, but university officials claimed that protests held by aligned groups at "Columbia, Rutgers, and Yale" were "creating campus encampments" (apparently referencing the Students for Justice in Palestine ("SJP") student group, a separate entity with groups on those campuses) and have disrupted university operations to such a degree that they foresaw this, too, would disrupt university activities. UT issued a directive to students ordering them not to hold the event, or to face discipline under the university rules. Qaddumi alleges the PSC responded to UT's directive and explained that the planned protest was peaceful and educational in nature, and that they had no plans for setting up an overnight "encampment."
Separately, in March 2024, the Governor of Texas issued an executive order defining PSC as a "radical" organization and defining as "antisemitic" phrases that PSC uses at protests, such as "from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free," and stating views many of its members hold, such as saying that Israel's current policies compare to those of Germany during World War II, are also antisemitic. The executive order instructed UT to "ensure that [its] policies are being enforced and that groups such as the [PSC] and [SJP] are disciplined for violating [UT] policies."
Qaddumi, along with other students, proceeded with the April 2024 protest despite the directive to cancel it. Members of the UT Police Department arrived at the protest and called for students to disperse their protest, and Qaddumi alleges he relayed their instructions to the crowd. On accusations of criminal trespass, UT police officers subsequently arrested Qaddumi among other students. After his arrest, Qaddumi alleges he and his fellow protesters were released and charged with no crimes.
At the protest, Qaddumi alleges that counter-protesters were present holding Israeli flags and signs criticizing Palestine, who were not arrested. Qaddumi also alleges that students have held similar protests in the past who were not arrested or subject to a police response, such as an August 2020 demonstration in response to the murder of George Floyd; an April 2023 demonstration about compensation for graduate student work; and an April 2024 protest about the university firing staff members focused on advancing diversity and inclusion.
Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.
Victory! Yesterday, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of an innocent Atlanta family, represented by IJ, whose home was mistakenly raided by an FBI SWAT team. The Court undismissed all five of the family's claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act and rejected a novel and atextual rule that the Eleventh Circuit had invented to ding worthy cases. Click here to learn more.
Sesquipedalian federal judge Bruce Selya may be gone, but his influence lives on in First Circuit citations like this one: See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 16 F.4th 935, 944 (1st Cir. 2021) (concluding that an argument was preserved where "we have no reason to doubt that the district court grasped the gist of the [party's] argument" even though it was not made "with lapidary precision"). In other news, the First Circuit grants a new trial to a Puerto Rican man convicted of possessing a machine gun, whose objection to the conditions under which the jurors examined the weapon was just lapidarian enough to get the job done.
In the latest as-applied attempt by a nonviolent convicted felon to get back his right to keep and bear arms, we have a New York man who in 2015 was convicted for defrauding a bank of tens of millions of dollars and cheating on over $1 mil in taxes. Second Circuit: We used to hang felons like you. That's why there "are no twins of the modern felon-in-possession laws" from the Founding. At least you've got your health. Read More
On May 21, 2025, the Court docketed an Opinion and Order resolving motions to exclude expert testimony and for summary judgment. [It's available here. -EV] On May 27, Defendant Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis moved to seal the Opinion and Order. The Bank "seeks to keep confidential three narrow categories of information: (1) details regarding law enforcement shifts and staffing at the Bank, (2) references to staffing of security posts at the Bank, and (3) discussion of modifications to the Bank's security protocols during the COVID-19 pandemic."
In the Bank's view, "there are compelling national security and safety reasons" that justify preventing public "disclosure of information that could provide insights and impressions about the Bank's security, regardless of whether the information is about currently-in-force protocols." If its motion is granted, the Bank proposes to "submit a confidential copy of the Order with the confidential portions marked for the Court's review." If the Court approves of the proposed redactions, then the Bank proposes that the Opinion and Order be republished with the redactions….
"[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents." "This right of access bolsters public confidence in the judicial system by allowing citizens to evaluate the reasonableness and fairness of judicial proceedings, and to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies." "It also provides a measure of accountability to the public at large, which pays for the courts." … When it attaches, a court must decide "whether there [are] sufficient grounds to override the common-law right of access" that justify sealing the judicial record ….
The Bank's motion will be denied. (1) The information subject to the Bank's motion was material and important to the decision denying the parties' competing summary-judgment motions. It figured centrally in deciding whether the Bank could accommodate Mr. Maki's religious objections to the Bank's COVID-19 vaccination policy without incurring undue hardship. Put another way, the rationale underlying the accommodation and undue-hardship analysis cannot realistically be understood without accessing this information.
An interesting illustration of how big-dollar defamation verdicts can stem not from mass media publications or influencer social media posts, but from employment disputes.
From Brown v. Grundy, decided June 3 by Virginia Court of Appeals Judge Clifford Athey, joined by Judges Randolph Beales and Dominique Callins:
Dr. Brown and Dr. Grundy met while attending dental school together in the 1990s. In 2013, Dr. Brown hired Dr. Grundy to work for Charles H. Brown, III, D.D.S., P.C. as a licensed dentist. Over the course of Dr. Grundy's employment with the dental practice, the professional relationship between the dentists became strained due to, inter alia, disputes over access to "patient personal financial and account data." Eventually, in the fall of 2018, Dr. Brown and Dr. Grundy filed formal complaints against each other with the Virginia Department of Health Professions. On December 6, 2018, Dr. Brown subsequently terminated Dr. Grundy's employment with Charles H. Brown, III, D.D.S., P.C. When Dr. Grundy was terminated, the dental practice employed "7-9 full time associates," and Dr. Grundy estimated that he was the primary dentist for approximately 750 patients.
Dr. Brown drafted and published a December 4, 2018 letter, which was mailed to the patients of the dental practice, outlining his alleged reasons for terminating Dr. Grundy. In addition, the December 4th letter apologized "for the situation," committed to providing "additional information," and offered to review any past treatment provided by Dr. Grundy.
Grundy sued, and the court concluded that his claim could go forward based on these statements:
The order is stayed until noon tomorrow (June 13), and I expect the federal government will ask the Ninth Circuit and, if necessary, the Supreme Court for a further emergency stay.
FURTHER UPDATE 6/13/2025 10:32 am: The Ninth Circuit has temporarily stayed the order (Judges Mark Bennett, Eric Miller, and Jennifer Sung):
The court has received the government's emergency motion for stay pending appeal. Dkt. No. 5. The request for an administrative stay is GRANTED. The district court's June 12, 2025 temporary restraining order is temporarily stayed pending further order. See Doe #1 v. Trump, 944 F.3d 1222, 1223 (9th Cir. 2019). The response to the emergency motion is due June 15, 2025 at 9:00 AM PDT. The optional reply in support of the emergency motion is due June 16, 2025 at 9:00 AM PDT. The panel will hold a remote hearing by Zoom on June 17, 2025 at 12:00 PM PDT.
[Originally posted on 6/12/2025 at 8:58 pm, bumped up to note stay materials and later to note the stay itself.]
From Judge Charles Breyer (N.D. Cal.) just now in Newsom v. Trump:
On June 6, 2025, the federal government initiated immigration raids across the City of Los Angeles. Protests swiftly followed, and some individuals involved in those protests were unruly and even violent. State and local law enforcement responded. The following day, President Trump ordered that members of the California National Guard be federalized, and thereupon assumed control of those forces.
At this early stage of the proceedings, the Court must determine whether the President followed the congressionally mandated procedure for his actions. He did not. His actions were illegal—both exceeding the scope of his statutory authority and violating the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He must therefore return control of the California National Guard to the Governor of the State of California forthwith.
The judge's order:
Defendants are temporarily ENJOINED from deploying members of the California National Guard in Los Angeles.
Defendants are DIRECTED to return control of the California National Guard to Governor Newsom.
The Court further STAYS this order until noon on June 13, 2025.
UPDATE 6/12/2025 9:08 pm: A notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit has already been filed, though I also expect an emergency stay motion to come as well.
UPDATE 6/12/2025 10:04 pm: The emergency motion for a stay has been filed in the Ninth Circuit; the Introduction:
A very interesting new site, PoliceShootingsData.com, put up to provide the data discussed by political science professors Tom S. Clark (Chicago, formerly Emory), Adam N. Glynn (Emory), and Michael Leo Owens (Emory) in their Deadly Force: Police Shootings in Urban America. There's lots of raw data there, searchable in many ways, though you might start by looking at the key findings. Looks very useful; here's the quick summary:
Sometimes police officers use their guns during encounters with the public. When police shoot, they may strike or miss. Police shootings may wound or kill. They may be justified or unjustified.
But knowing exactly how often, when, where, and whom police shoot in the U.S.A. is unreasonably hard. It's true for cities, suburbs, and rural areas.
PoliceShootingsData.com lets you explore, download, share and use police shootings data for mid-to-large cities. These data are from open records requests of 300 police departments for records from every time a police officer discharged a firearm in all cities with 100,000 or more residents as of 2010.
Our site is intended to inform perspectives on police shootings in U.S. cities. It also provides access to replication materials to reproduce and evaluate the analyses for and findings from the new book Deadly Force: Police Shootings in Urban America. Plus, it exhibits original sequential art to help make police shootings, especially data about them, more public.
