The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Free Speech

Conservative Activist Robby Starbuck Alleges Massive Defamation by Google AI

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From the Complaint in Starbuck v. Google (not to be confused with the now-settled Starbuck v. Meta, which appears to have involved a different model and at least largely different hallucinations):

For nearly two years, one of the largest companies in the world—Google—has spread radioactive lies about Robby Starbuck through its AI products. When users submit queries to Google's AI platforms about Mr. Starbuck, they receive a "biography" that is outrageously false, whereby Mr. Starbuck is portrayed as (among other things) a child rapist, a serial sexual abuser convicted of assault, one who engages in financial exploitation, one who engages in "black ops" tactics such as illegal campaign finance practices, and a shooter—in short, as a monster. These lies continue today. [This is followed by extensive examples. -EV] …

In sum: over a period of two years and continuing, Google's AI tools systematically manufactured and published extremely damaging false claims about Mr. Starbuck, as well as fake 'sources' for its lies, despite periodically acknowledging that they were doing so. While Google and its executives were put on repeated notice and were aware of these falsehoods, they did nothing to prevent the continued defamation from occurring….

Earlier this year, Mr. Starbuck was approached by a woman who asked Mr. Starbuck if she could pose an "embarrassing question," which was: "is it true you had all those women accuse you?" As context, this woman told Mr. Starbuck that her "mom's group" had been discussing whether to support Mr. Starbuck's business causes, and one member of the group had pulled up a "biography" of Mr. Starbuck generated by Google AI, which claimed there were assault allegations against Mr. Starbuck….

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"The Article III of the Deal" by Paul Clement

In Bost, Paul Clement engaged in negotiations with the Justices about the proper standing rule.

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On October 8, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Bost v. IL Bd. of Elections. The merits question in this case is juicy: does federal law prohibit states from accepting congressional ballots after election day? But in Bost, the Supreme Court only considered the threshold issue: does a congressional candidate have standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to a state law that allows the state to receive ballots for two weeks after election day?

A divided panel of the Seventh Circuit found that Representative Mike Bost, an Illinois Republican, did not have standing. The panel's ruling turned in large part on the fact that Bost was an incumbent, and had won many elections by a sizable margin. The court reasoned that any late-arriving ballots might have affected his margin of victory, but would not have affected the ultimate outcome. Moreover, Bost argued that he suffered a "pocketbook" injury because he had to maintain his campaign staff for two additional weeks. The Seventh Circuit panel ruled that this injury was self-inflicted, because the law did not require him to maintain his staff, even as late-arriving ballots are counted.

Going into the argument, I was fairly confident the Supreme Court would reverse this ruling. At a minimum, the Seventh Circuit's opinion forces these sorts of challenges into the post-election context, and we all know how well that worked out after the 2020 election. What I wasn't sure about was which rule the Court would adopt.

As things turned out, Paul Clement, counsel for Bost, would present an entire menu of options for the Justices. These arguments were unlike anything I had seen before. There was an ongoing dialogue between Clement and the Justices about what test to adopt. Indeed, it seemed more like a mediation than an oral argument. A Justice would ask "What about this test?" and Clement would respond with "I could accept that, but I'd like something better."

Call it "The Article III of the Deal." By the time Clement sat down, the case was basically over. I'll talk more about some of the arguments by Illinois in another post.

Here, I will flag some of the negotiation tactics. (Note to self: if I ever have to buy a used car, bring Paul Clement.)

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Privacy

"The Language of [the California Invasion of Privacy Act] Is a Total Mess," Which Gets "Bigger as the World Continues to Change"

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From Judge Vince Chhabria's opinion Friday in Doe v. Eating Recovery Center LLC (N.D. Cal.):

The California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA) was enacted in 1967 to criminalize wiretapping and eavesdropping on confidential communications. Although it is a criminal statute, CIPA also authorizes victims to bring civil actions against those who violate the statute, allowing recovery of civil penalties of $5,000 per violation or three times the amount of actual damages—whichever is greater. See Cal. Penal Code § 637.2(a).

The language of CIPA is a total mess. It was a mess from the get-go, but the mess gets bigger and bigger as the world continues to change and as courts are called upon to apply CIPA's already-obtuse language to new technologies. Indeed, we have reached the point where it's often borderline impossible to determine whether a defendant's online conduct fits within the language of the statute.

This is such a case. The plaintiff seeks to impose CIPA liability on a website operator for using a third party to perform data analytics and targeted advertising. In particular, liability here turns on whether the third party "read" or "attempt[ed] to read" or attempted "to learn" the contents of an internet communication between the plaintiff and the website operator while that communication was "in transit." If so, the website operator could be liable to the plaintiff under CIPA for enabling the third party to engage in that conduct.

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Free Speech

Lawyer Suspended for Over-Aggressive Demand Letter in Libel Case

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From an N.H. S. Ct. decision earlier this year in Appeal of Hoppock; I thought the letter involved was likely too aggressive, but I'm surprised that the court found it to be a violation of the professional rules:

Hoppock represented a party with whom the complainant was involved in a dispute over the registration of a trade name. In June 2019, the complainant filed a grievance with the Attorney Discipline Office (ADO) regarding a letter, dated May 20, 2019, that she received from Hoppock…. The letter stated that the complainant had defamed Hoppock's client on social media and warned, "As you will soon find out, legal consequences shall befall you because of your reckless defamatory conduct." The letter continued, in pertinent part, to state:

[L]et me be very clear. I will not get into it with you and your ill, immature feelings toward [Hoppock's client] … which have now landed you in a difficult legal position.

What I will do is sue you for negligently or intentionally (or very recklessly) publishing falsely defamatory statements concerning [the client] to third parties ….

These are actionable statements for which [the client] demands Two Hundred Fifty Thousand ($250,000.00) Dollars in order to settle this problem, which I remind you is totally of your own making….

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Second Amendment Roundup: 3d Circuit Oral Argument on N.J. Rifle Ban

The en banc court exhibited a deep understanding of the issues.

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On October 15, the Third Circuit en banc heard arguments on New Jersey's prohibition on numerous semiautomatic firearms (pejoratively named "assault firearms") and magazines holding over ten rounds.  Three cases were consolidated under the title Association of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. (ANJRPC) v. Attorney General New Jersey.  The district court in ANJRPC held the rifle ban to violate the Second Amendment but upheld the magazine ban.  Earlier, a Third Circuit panel upheld the magazine ban, but the Supreme Court ordered it to reconsider in light of Bruen.  In August, the Third Circuit sua sponte ordered that the appeal of the district court decision be held en banc.

Predictably, the "common use" test set forth in Heller and Bruen was at the heart of the controversy.  The challengers argued that the banned firearms are bearable "arms" in the meaning of the text, and that the Supreme Court in Heller decided that arms in common use may not be banned under the history and tradition test.  Counsel agreed with a judge that the banned firearms are in common use both numerically and as determined by the numbers of gun owners.  The Supreme Court in Staples, and most recently in S&W v. Mexico, acknowledged that AR-15 rifles are commonly possessed by Americans.

New Jersey rejected what it called a "popularity test" for common use and argued that the banned firearms and magazines are not in common use, meaning that on average a gun is fired only 2.2 times in self-defense.  But "common use" refers to "keeping and bearing" and not "shooting/going bang bang" at a bad guy.  To use arms as in to keep and bear means, as Heller stated, "to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation."

Judge Hardiman noted that Heller referred to defense against tyranny three times, and that self-defense being the "central component" of the Second Amendment implied other lawful purposes.  New Jersey changed the subject to machineguns, suggesting that the high number of registered machineguns – 176,000 – proved the numerosity test to be unworkable.  Judge Hardiman countered that they are bound by Heller's statement that machineguns are not protected.  Moreover, the challengers noted, registered machineguns are largely held today as collector's items, not for self-defense, and many are not even functional.  This is a phantom question that the court need not resolve.

Moreover, the challengers pointed out that, unlike semiautomatics with magazines that have been chosen by Americans for over a century, machineguns were never widely accepted into the market as useful for self-defense, not to mention hunting and target shooting.  While a semiautomatic can pinpoint aggressors and avoid bystanders in a self-defense situation, indiscriminately firing in full automatic cannot distinguish the guilty from the innocent.

That got into the issue of arms that are "dangerous and unusual."  Judge Matey asked whether the element of creating "terror to the people" implied that the people at large are a factor in what is common use.  The challengers responded that doing so was a common-law offense but that carrying arms peaceably is not subject to a heckler's veto.  Arms that are commonly carried are not dangerous and unusual.

While most historical references use the term "dangerous and unusual," New Jersey contended that some also use the formulation "dangerous or unusual," citing Blackstone.  But Blackstone referred not to mere possession, but to "riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, … terrifying the good people of the land."  Heller used the term "dangerous and unusual," and Justice Alito, concurring in Caetano, wrote that "this is a conjunctive test: A weapon may not be banned unless it is both dangerous and unusual."  And Bruen found aspects of English history "ambiguous at best," seeing "little reason to think that the Framers would have thought it applicable in the New World."

New Jersey then claimed that "dangerous or unusual" actually boils down to the test of "unusually dangerous," a term never used by the Supreme Court.  In any event, it ultimately doesn't matter, because common arms cannot be unusually dangerous.

In response to a question of whether the people decide subjectively what they deem appropriate for self-defense, New Jersey argued that "the people" through their representatives decide what is unusually dangerous based on their perception of "objective characteristics."  As one judge suggested, since all firearms are dangerous under the alleged dangerous-or-unusual test, no limit would exist on what the legislature may choose to ban, despite what the people choose.

New Jersey responded that AR-15s have been used in mass shootings, to which another judge noted that handguns are used in the majority of murders, yet Heller held them to be protected.  Indeed, the Virginia Tech shooting in 2007 involved the criminal using modern semiautomatic handguns with so-called "large-capacity magazines," yet a year later, the Supreme Court decided Heller.  Not to mention that there were other similar pre-Heller murders, showing that mass shootings were not considered "unprecedented" in the minds of the Justices even back in 2008.

New Jersey counsel was fixated on the "Bowie knife craze" of the nineteenth century that prompted laws that are supposedly the most substantial analogues for New Jersey's rifle and magazine ban.  But most of those laws restricted only concealed carry, not possession. What is more, the outcome of cases challenging Bowie knife laws turned on common use. For example, the Texas Supreme Court held in Cockrum v. State (1859) that citizens had a right to carry Bowie knives for lawful self-defense, even though the Bowie knife was the "most deadly of all weapons in common use."

Since the focus was on the AR-15 semiautomatic rifle, the question arose whether the court should remand the case to the district court for fact finding on the other rifles as well as the shotguns and handguns on the ban list.  The challengers answered in the negative, as all (except one shotgun) were semiautomatics and shared many of the same features. Staples drew the line at full automatics versus semiautomatics.  Moreover, the burden was on New Jersey to demonstrate that each and every weapon it sought to ban was not in common use.  It had ample opportunity to fulfill that burden but failed to introduce such evidence.  See Mark W. Smith, "What Part of 'In Common Use' Don't You Understand?" JLPP (2023) (the common-use issue is encompassed in the history-tradition test of Bruen and, thus, the burden rests with the government to prove a banned arm NOT in common use).

New Jersey argued that in contrast to handguns, AR-15s have muzzle velocity that can shoot through walls and can fire out to 500 yards, features not appropriate for self-defense.  A judge stated that a rifle may be better for self-defense in a rural area, asking whether the Second Amendment recognizes a rural-urban distinction.  New Jersey responded that a Bowie knife or a machinegun could also be useful for self-defense, but are still not protected.  Once again, that side steps the fact that AR-15s meet the common-use test.  Also recall that the majority in Bruen rejected Justice Breyer's dissenting argument that violence with firearms is "more common in urban areas than rural ones."

Since the record established that AR-15 rifles typically come with magazines holding no more than thirty rounds, which in turn are in common use, the question arose of whether a facial challenge is proper since the record reflected nothing about magazines holding over thirty rounds.  The challengers responded that the ban is facially unconstitutional because it essentially bans all magazines that hold over ten rounds, making it invalid in all applications.  It is not an element of the criminal offense that a magazine hold over thirty rounds.  Similarly, Heller facially invalidated a handgun ban in toto, even though it suggested that full automatics could be banned.  And Bruen facially invalidated New York's "may-issue" carry regime even though the Court reaffirmed that felons could be banned from public carry and that "sensitive places" may exist that warrant a carry ban in certain locations.

New Jersey sought to depict the facial challenge as improper because plaintiffs didn't challenge the law's subsection defining firearms equipped with bumpstocks as "assault firearms."  Since these items are not at issue, the challengers responded that the court could view the case as challenging the other subsections of the assault weapons definition. Whether that is characterized as facial with respect to those subsections or as-applied is a matter of semantics.

Early in the argument, one of the judges warned that they must not "stray into intermediate scrutiny," which Bruen soundly rejected.  New Jersey counsel did just that with the argument that the state, not the people, decide what is so "unusually dangerous" that it can be banned.  That wholly flips the purpose of a guarantee in the Bill of Rights, which confirms "the right of the people" themselves to pick the arms they desire to keep and bear.

With the new Administration, circumstances are changing in the Second Amendment space.  The United States filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the challengers.  Moreover, the composition of the Third Circuit recently changed.  Judge Emil Bove took the bench in July, and Judge Jennifer Mascott was sworn in shortly before the oral argument.  If the court holds that New Jersey's firearm and magazine bans violate the Second Amendment, as it should, it will – to use Justice Kavanaugh's words in Snope – "assist [the Supreme] Court's ultimate decisionmaking on the AR–15 issue."

I litigated the New Jersey rifle and magazine bans decades ago in Coalition of New Jersey Sportsmen v. Whitman (D. N.J. 1999), aff'd (3d Cir. 2001).  That was pre-Heller, so we focused on vagueness and equal protection.  The state argued that the ban list consisted of semiautomatics, but many have machinegun names, most obviously the Avtomat Kalashnikov (Russian for Kalashnikov's automatic rifle).  At oral argument in the Third Circuit, one of the judges disagreed with our vagueness argument, unbelievably stating that "everyone knows what an assault weapon is, it's a submachinegun with a silencer."  Predictably, we got an adverse ruling.  We've come a long way since then.

Ninth Circuit Panel (by 2-1 Vote): President Trump Likely Lawfully Ordered National Guard to Portland

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From the majority opinion in Oregon v. Trump, by Judges Bridget Bade and Ryan Nelson:

After considering the record at this preliminary stage, we conclude that it is likely that the President lawfully exercised his statutory authority under 10 U.S.C. § 12406(3), which authorizes the federalization of the National Guard when "the President is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States." The evidence the President relied on reflects a "colorable assessment of the facts and law within a 'range of honest judgment.'"

As a result, the panel stays the district court's temporary restraining order that blocked the deployment. Judge Nelson has a separate concurrence, further defending this result. Judge Susan Graber has a dissent.

https://law.yale.edu/animals/people

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For a delightful moment, I thought Yale Law School decided to set up its naming hierarchy with animals on top, and underneath it with separate directories for people, cats, dogs (whether pets or bulldog mascots), and so on. Regrettably not: Turns out https://law.yale.edu/animals is the site of the Law, Environment & Animals Program, and the /people subdirectory is for the staff. Rats!

Religion and the Law

Sikh and Non-Sikh Divorce, Disagree on Whether Children Should Get Haircuts

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N.S. v. H.C., decided Friday by the California Court of Appeal (Justice Terry O'Rourke, joined by Justices Judith McConnell and Jose Castillo), involved a Sikh ex-husband, a "nonpracticing Christian" ex-wife, and a daughter and son who, "at the time of trial, … were seven and five years old respectively." The chief dispute had to do with whether the children should comply with various Sikh practices, including (1) not cutting their hair, (2) wearing religious bracelets, and (3) for the son, wearing a head covering (a patka). Here's an excerpt of the analysis as to the cutting of the hair:

The [trial] court concluded, "… The court finds that it is in the best interest of the children to feel comfortable with their hair and the length of the hair. However, the court finds that there have been times when mother has engaged in cutting [son's] hair, in particular, to intentionally upset … father. The court orders that if the children express a desire to have their hair cut, they may have their hair cut; however, at no time shall [son] receive a buzz cut and at no time shall [daughter's] hair be cut shorter than shoulder length. This assures that her father will still be able to braid her hair, notwithstanding that it is in two braids, rather than one braid." …

[The trial] court erred by failing to determine … whether mother had made a clear affirmative showing that if the children adhered to father's Sikh faith as regards the haircuts … it would be harmful to them. "[H]arm to the child from conflicting religious instructions or practices … should not be simply assumed or surmised; it must be demonstrated in detail."

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Supreme Court

Still the Stare Decisis Court (At Least For Now)

Even with a six-justice conservative majority, the Roberts Court has not (yet) increased the rate at which it overturns precedents.

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The Roberts Court has attracted headlines overturning longstanding and high-profile precedents, including Roe v. Wade and Chevron v. NRDC. This term, the Court appears poised to topple another, Humphrey's Executor, if (as expected) it upholds President Trump's removal of Rebecca Slaughter from the Federal Trade Commission.

In the past, I have noted that the Roberts Court has overturned precedent less often than did the Warren, Burger, or Rehnquist Courts. Indeed, as I've blogged repeatedly and written in National Review, it is not particularly close, as shown in data compiled by the Library of Congress and in the Supreme Court database (which includes precedent alteration in its tabulations).

Given the rash of recent decisions overturning prominent precedents, it is reasonable to ask whether this claims are still true. The answer? Thus far it is. Even though the Court now has a six-justice conservative majority, which should make it easier to overturn precedents at odds with conservative jurisprudential principles, the rate at which the Court is overturning prior precedents has not (yet) increased. To the contrary, it appears to have slowed.

If one divides the Roberts Court into the first Roberts Court (2005-2020) and the second Roberts Court (2020-present), the rate at which the Court has overturned precedents is actually lower in the second Roberts Court (although for one of the three measures, the difference is minimal).

Jonathan Adler

As illustrated in the accompanying chart*, whether one looks at cases overturning precedents per term, precedents overturned per term, or decisions altering precedent per term, we have not yet seen an increase in the rate at which the Roberts Court is overturning prior precedents. The confirmation of Justice Barrett to replace Justice Ginsburg unquestionably made the Court more conservative--and likely led to the overturning of Roe in Dobbs--it did not produce an immediate increase in the rate at which the Court has been moving the law in a conservative direction by overturning prior precedents.

These results may be surprising. There are multiple reasons why the shift from a 5-4 Court to a 6-3 Court would be expected to increase the number of precedents in jeopardy and the rate at which those precedents are overturned. It just has not happened yet.

One reason the Roberts Court has not overturned more precedent is that it hears fewer cases. It is stingy about granting certiorari, so it has fewer opportunities to overturn precedents.

At the same time, the Court appears somewhat deliberate about what cases it takes, and that includes what precedents it wants to revisit. The Court is overturning fewer precedents, but the precedents it is overturning may be higher profile. This may reflect a preference for stability in the law, accept when it comes to particularly significant decisions that push against the majority's jurisprudential vision.

I suspect it has been easier for the justices to coalesce about the need to overturn precedents that have long been targeted by conservative jurists, and for which the arguments for overturning the precedent are well developed and there is a fairly clear idea for what might replace the precedent. Roe, Chevron, Abood, and Bakke would all fit these criteria. But the number of such cases may not be as long as some think. And if the justices are hearing fewer cases, they are less likely to find themselves confronted with a case that requires reconsidering a precedent they had not already targeted.

It is also noting in this regard that since Justice Barrett has joined the Court, every case overturning a precedent that can be so characterized, moved the law in a more conservative direction. This stands in stark contrast to when Justice Kennedy was on the Court, and the Court would overturn precedents to move the law in both liberal and conservative directions, depending on Justice Kennedy's particular preferences.

It is also important to stress that it is still early, and what we have seen in the past few years--a Court wiling to overturn a few, high-profile precedents--may change. If the justices are interested in revisiting more areas of law, and reconsidering more precedents, cause attorneys and lower courts will likely give them the opportunity to do so.

[*Note: I initially uploaded the wrong version of the chart. This does not affect the bottom-line analysis, but did give an inaccurate picture of the magnitude change. I regret the error.]

The First Citation of the Heritage Guide in a SCOTUS Brief

A very timely citation on the "Calling forth the Militia" Clause

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One of the virtues of a project like the Heritage Guide to the Constitution is its utility. The constitutional history in that book will be used in future controversies that were not known when the book was written.

Case in point: the first citation to the guide comes in an amicus brief filed in Donald Trump v. Illinois. The brief cites the essay by Judge Greg Maggs and Professor Rob Leider on the Calling Forth the Militia Clause.

That determination is nonjusticiable because, as this Court held in Martin v. Mott, once Congress has authorized the President to call forth the militia when certain exigencies are present, "the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the President, and that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons." 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827). Plaintiffs creatively packaged their request for an injunction against the President's determination in nine different boxes, see ECF No. 1, but all invited the district court (and this Court on appeal) to violate Mott by purporting to review and invalidate a decision that Supreme Court precedent has held is assigned to the political branches.

As scholars have recognized, Mott "held that Congress gave the President sole and unreviewable authority to determine when an emergency exists that is sufficient to justify deploying the militia." Judge Gregory E. Maggs & Robert Leider, The Calling Forth the Militia Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 218, 221 (Josh Blackman & John G. Malcolm eds., 3d ed. 2025). . . .

Under the Constitution, the states fully ceded to Congress their power to "provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union." U.S. Const art. I, § 8, cl. 15. "The Constitution assigns the power to 'call forth the Militia' to Congress, and Congress has delegated portions of that power to the President." Newsom, 141 F.4th at 1055. It is "the clearest expression of federal power to conscript citizens." Maggs & Leider, supra, at 219 (emphasis added). Anti-Federalists had attempted during the ratification debates to "interject state governments into the process of calling forth the militia by requiring some form of state-level consent," but those efforts failed. Id. at 220.

I hope this is the first of many future citations.

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