The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Affirmative Action

How America's Growing Diversity Weakens the Case for Racial Preferences in Education

Affirmative action becomes harder to defend when it entails discrimination against a variety of racial and ethnic minority groups.

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The Supreme Court will soon issue its decisions in cases challenging the legality of racial preferences in admission at Harvard and the University of North Carolina. Most likely, the justices will rule that such policies are either categorically illegal or at least subject to much tighter judicial scrutiny than imposed by previous precedents. But, even aside from legal considerations, there is a different factor that has weakened the case for affirmative action preferences over the last several decades. Ironically, that factor is America's growing racial and ethnic diversity.

There is a simple standard rationale for affirmative action, dating back to its origins in the 1960s: America has a long history of horrific discrimination against some of its minority groups, especially blacks and Native Americans. If not for that history, those groups would be better off than they are now. Whites, by contrast, have often benefited from that discrimination (call it "white privilege," if you will). Thus, justice requires some form of compensation to the groups that have been wronged, at the expense of those that have unjustly benefited. Various types of carefully targeted racial preferences can help provide that compensation, and enable us to achieve a more just society.

This rationale is far from air-tight. Among other weaknesses, it is wrong to assume that most whites are beneficiaries of slavery, Jim Crow, and other historical wrongs. Many were actually harmed by it (albeit, less so than blacks, of course). Some of the white victims of affirmative action policies are even members of groups that themselves faced extensive discrimination at various times. Jews are an obvious example, given the once- widespread discrimination against Jewish students at many elite educational institutions.

Still, the traditional rationale for affirmative action is compelling in some ways. Most notably, it is undeniably true that slavery, segregation, and other forms of state-sponsored discrimination inflicted terrible harm on black Americans, and some other groups. Absent that history, we would likely have fewer racial conflicts and less racial inequality today.

But, as conservative political commentator Christopher Caldwell explains in a recent New York Times article, the traditional rationale has been weakened by America's increasing racial and ethnic diversity, most notably the growing role of Asian-Americans in higher education:

Affirmative action is on a shaky footing not just because the composition of the [Supreme] court has changed but also because the composition of the country has changed. Demography has caused the moral ground to fall out from under the policy….

Affirmative action dates from executive orders issued by Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s. The policy was meant to help Black people at a time when the country was effectively biracial, with white people outnumbering Black people by a ratio of about seven to one…..

[B]ecause white people constituted an overwhelming majority, the number of white applicants disadvantaged by affirmative action was relatively low… And advantages were being redistributed from descendants of the former oppressor race (white people) to descendants of the former oppressed race (Black people)….

That has changed. The arrival of large numbers of immigrants over the past half-century has upset the logic of affirmative action in several ways. For one thing, white Americans no longer dominate the educational system. (They make up only 22 percent of the Stanford class of 2026, for instance.) Early on, affirmative action was also extended to Latinos, whose numbers continue to grow. In addition, African and Caribbean immigrants and their children now account for more than 40 percent of the Black enrollment in the Ivy League, which risks crowding out the people that affirmative action was originally intended to help….

More than any other development, though, the enormous rise in Asian immigration since the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 has complicated the administration of affirmative action. The complication, simply put, is that Asian students, on average, have been considerably more qualified for college than students of other groups….

Students for Fair Admissions presents evidence (which Harvard disputes) that Asian enrollment stalled because Harvard tweaked its admissions system to keep Asian students out. Citing internal Harvard documents, Students for Fair Admissions argues that if Harvard pursued a neutral admissions policy focused on academics alone, its incoming classes might have been more than half Asian.

Harvard did a number of things with Asian applicants differently from other applicants…

When majorities discriminate against their own kind, as largely white universities did in the early days of affirmative action, it may not feel like a bad kind of discrimination….  But the biracial historical context that used to tug at consciences, pushing admissions officers (and the parents of rejected students) to a more indulgent understanding of affirmative action, is gone….

[T]he United States has become a multiracial country, and affirmative action has turned into a different kind of program. Building diverse student bodies now requires treating Asian overrepresentation as a problem to be solved. This means discriminating by race in a way that is radically more direct and intrusive.

As Asians have become increasingly prominent among the victims of affirmative action, it becomes more difficult to argue that the policy is just redistributing ill-gotten gains from a group that has benefited from oppression to those harmed by it. Asians themselves, of course, have a history of being victims of discrimination in the US, from racist immigration policy to Japanese internment, among many other examples.

The beneficiary class has also been expanded to include groups far removed from the horrific history of slavery, Jim Crow, and persecution of Native Americans. Many are post-1965 Hispanic, African, and Caribbean immigrants, or children thereof. These groups have surely suffered some prejudice and discrimination. But not on anything like the enormous scale of victims of slavery, Jim Crow, and the forcible displacement of Native Americans.

To the extent that the rationale for racial preferences has shifted from alleviating historical injustice to promoting "diversity," current policies have other flaws. I summarized some of them in a Boston Globe article about the Harvard-UNC cases:

The racial categories used by Harvard, UNC, and many other universities are remarkably crude. The "Hispanic" or "Latino" category lumps together such varied groups as Argentinians, Cubans, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans. "Asian" encompasses more than half the world's population, including Chinese, Indians, and Japanese. Arabs, native-born white Protestants, and Swedish immigrants are all classified as "white." "African American" includes both native-born Black Americans and immigrants from Africa and the Caribbean. Such sweeping and arbitrary classifications amount to little more than crude racial stereotyping of a kind courts would reject in almost any other context. They certainly don't reflect any carefully nuanced assessment of different groups' distinct characteristics or potential contributions to educationally useful diversity.

Perhaps Harvard, UNC and other institutions could fix these problems by applying the "diversity" rationale in a more nuanced way. But I am skeptical that real-world government and educational bureaucracies are capable of doing so fairly and accurately. Moreover, it is dangerous to provide an open-ended rationale for a vast range of racial and ethnic preferences.

Alternatively, we can try to reinvigorate the compensatory justice rationale for affirmative action by confining it to American descendants of slaves (ADOS) and perhaps also some Native Americans, such as those living on reservations. This latter option might even potentially avoid the use of racial preferences, as such. But it has a variety of potential pitfalls of its own.

The problems Caldwell highlights are not as completely new as he suggests. The truth is that the US has never been a purely "biracial" country. Even before recent waves of Asian and Latino immigration, there were substantial populations of those groups - descendants of 19th and early-twentieth century immigrants and Hispanics living in territories the US acquired after the Mexican War. Native Americans have, of course, been present in large numbers since before the Founding. And, obviously, white Americans have long been divided into a wide range of ethnic and religious groups that make it hard to lump all of them into a single "privileged" class. But even if not completely new, the growing diversity of the last several decades has weakened the case for affirmative action programs and made it even harder than before to structure them in a way that is plausibly just.

I think the best way to address these problems is simply to bar racial and ethnic preferences in government and government-funded educational institutions. I advocate a similar hard line against forms of racial and ethnic discrimination supported by many on the political right (e.g. - racial profiling in law enforcement, and discrimination in immigration policy).

But those more supportive of affirmative action than I am should at least give careful consideration to the challenges created by an increasingly diverse society. When a policy originally intended to compensate blacks for a long history of oppression has gradually morphed into efforts to cap the number of Asian students at selective universities, something has gone badly wrong.

Originalism in the Lower Courts: Fifth Circuit Panel Invites Amicus Briefs on Second Amendment

"Of particular interest are historical gun regulations applicable to intoxicated or impaired individuals."

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On June 5, a Fifth Circuit panel (Smith, Higginson, and Willett) heard oral argument in United States v. Daniels. In this case, the defendant argues that a prohibition on possession of firearms for users of intoxicants and marijuana violates the Second Amendment, as construed by Bruen. No amicus briefs were filed in this case. The only submissions were made by the Federal Public Defender and the Department of Justice. Two days after oral argument, the panel issued a directive:

The court invites briefs from amici curiae who wish to supply relevant information regarding the history and tradition of restrictions on the use and possession of firearms as pertinent to the issues presented in this case. Of particular interest are historical gun regulations applicable to intoxicated or impaired individuals. Such briefs must be filed by July 6, 2023 (regardless of any time limitations set by rule).

I wholeheartedly endorse this directive. In my article, Originalism and Stare Decisis in the Lower Courts, I explain that lower courts can remedy the lack of originalist briefing by inviting amici to submit briefs. Specifically, with such a request, the panel is indicating there is interest. Moreover, there is no need to seek leave from the parties.

I encourage scholars on the Second Amendment to submit briefs in this case. Hunter Biden's lawyers may also be interested!

Going forward, the Fifth Circuit, and other courts, should create some sort of repository of such requests, and provide public notification. At it stands, only the handful of lawyers who made appearances in these cases would have seen the directive. Thankfully, a few people pointed it out to me.

Immigration

Why Legal Immigration is Almost Impossible for the Vast Majority of those Who Want it

Cato Institute immigration policy expert David Bier outlines how the US immigration system bars the vast majority of potential migrants, much like Prohibition banned almost all uses of alcohol.

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Many people say that illegal migrants should instead "get in line" and "wait their turn" to enter legally. In a new Cato Institute study, immigration policy expert David Bier explains why, for the vast majority, that simply isn't possible. For most there simply is no "line" that they can join. Even for many of those who are potentially eligible, the "line" is so long that it might take decades for them to get permission to enter - if it ever happens at all. In most cases, demanding that would-be immigrants wait in line is much like demanding that people who wanted to get a drink during Prohibition do so legally:

America traditionally had few immigration restrictions, but since the 1920s, the law has banned most aspiring immigrants. Today, fewer than 1 percent of people who want to move permanently to the United States can do so legally. Immigrants cannot simply get an exception to immigrate any more than restaurateurs in the 1920s could simply get an exception to sell alcohol. Instead, just as Prohibition granted only a few exemptions for religious, industrial, or medical uses of alcohol, people seeking an exception to immigration prohibition must also fit into preexisting carve‐​outs for a select few.

Many Americans have the false impression that these carve‐​outs are realistic options for potential immigrants to join American society, but the government's restrictive criteria render the legal paths available only in the most extreme cases. Even when someone qualifies, annual immigration caps greatly delay and, more frequently, eliminate the immigrant's chance to come to the United States. Legal immigration is less like waiting in line and more like winning the lottery: it happens, but it is so rare that it is irrational to expect it in any individual case.

This study provides a uniquely comprehensive, jargon‐​free explanation of U.S. rules for legal permanent immigration. Some steps are simple and reasonable, but most steps serve only as unjustified obstacles to immigrating legally. For some immigrants, this restrictive system sends them into the black market of illegal immigration. For others, it sends them to other countries, where they contribute to the quality of life in their new homes. And for still others, it requires them to remain in their homeland, often underemployed and sometimes in danger. Whatever the outcome, the system punishes both the prospective immigrants and Americans who would associate, contract, and trade with them.

Bier methodically goes through every currently existing option for legal immigration and explains their scope and limitations. For example, as he points out, the refugee admissions system is constrained by a narrow legal definition of who qualifies as a refugee,  a tight annual cap (currently 125,000) that the US nonetheless fails to reach because of bureaucratic obstacles, and other constraints. Along the way, Bier also dismantles some other common myths about immigration policy, such as that the US takes the majority of the world's migrants (it in fact only takes about 7.5%), and that it is more open to immigration than any other country (far from it).

Bier proposes a variety of useful reforms, such as abolishing discriminatory country-based caps for employment visas, eliminating long waits for visas of many kinds, and much else.

Much of what Bier covers is well-known to immigration policy experts. But the paper is a valuable overview for both specialists and interested laypeople.

Over the last two years, the combination of the end of the Covid pandemic and policy changes by the Biden administration has enabled the US to regain pre-pandemic and Pre-Trump levels of legal migration. But while Biden's changes have  had a significant liberalizing impact, Bier's paper shows they still exclude the vast majority of would-be migrants.

Bier's paper cannot and does not resolve all debates over immigration policy. A committed restrictionist could potentially read it, agree with all or most of its points, and conclude that the status quo is much better than he previously thought!

But it does have a number of policy implications, nonetheless. Bier catalogues many ways in which the current system is self-contradictory, undermining its own stated objectives, such as preventing family separation and attracting workers to industries with labor shortages.

The extraordinary difficulty of legal migration also undercuts arguments that migrants have a moral duty to "get in line" rather than try to enter illegally. The near-impossibility of legal entry for most strengthens the case that they are morally entitled to disobey immigration laws, especially in situations where the alternative they face is a lifetime of poverty, violence or oppression.

The paper also has implications for the ongoing public debate over disorder at the border. Most of that disorder is in fact caused by restrictions on legal migration, which incentivize people fleeing horrific conditions to try illegal routes instead (the only ones available to them). Just as Prohibition predictably led millions of people to purchase alcoholic beverages from organized crime, so severe immigration restrictions predictably lead migrants to cross illegally or seek out the services of smugglers.

The best way to reduce illegal alcohol sales and the involvement of organized crime in that industry was to end Prohibition. Similarly, the best way to reduce illegal border crossings and associated problems is to make legal migration easier, as the Biden Administration has begun to do with its CNVH parole program, a policy that has significantly reduced illegal border crossings by migrants from the four nations it covers.

I do have a few quibbles with Bier's analysis. Most notably, I think the estimate that 158 million people (based on surveys) would migrate to the US if legal barriers were dropped is probably an overstatement. It doesn't take account of various moving costs associated with migration, which respondents may not consider when answering survey questions (e.g. - the cost of learning a new language, finding a job, etc.). It also does not consider constraints imposed by employment and housing markets. In a section of Chapter 6 of my book Free to Move, I discuss the limitations of such estimates in more detail.

It may be that the current system bars "only," say, 80 or 90 percent of would-be migrants to the US, as opposed to Bier's estimate of 99%. But even the lower figure is enough to show the severely restrictive nature of the status quo - and the ways in which it consigns many millions of people to lives of poverty and oppression largely because of morally arbitrary circumstances of ancestry and place of birth. As Bier notes, the system also severely constrains the liberty and economic opportunities of native-born Americans.

Religion and the Law

"Minnesota Appeals Court Decides 4 Cases on Religious Exemptions from Vaccine Mandates"

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A post by Prof. Howard Friedman (Religion Clause), which he kindly allowed me to pass along:

Yesterday, the Minnesota Court of Appeals decided four separate appeals from decisions of Unemployment Law Judges who denied unemployment benefits because an applicant refused on religious grounds to comply with an employer's Covid vaccine mandate. Goede v. Astra Zeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP, (MN App., June 12, 2023), was the only one of the four cases published as a precedential decision. The court affirmed the ULJ's denial of benefits even though the state Department of Employment and Economic Development urged its reversal.  The court said in part:

The ULJ found that "Goede does not have a sincerely held religious belief that prevents her from receiving a COVID-19 vaccine." The ULJ explained: "Goede's testimony, when viewed as a whole, shows by a preponderance of the evidence that Goede's concern is about some vaccines, and that she is declining to take them because she does not trust them, not because of a religious belief." The ULJ further stated that "[w]hen looking at the totality of the circumstances, Goede's belief that COVID-19 vaccines are not okay to put in her body is a personal belief not rooted in religion."

In Daniel v. Honeywell International, Inc., (MN App., June 12, 2023), the appellate court again upheld a denial of benefits, this time to a former employee who refused both the Covid vaccine and refused to comply with the employer's religious accommodation.  The court said in part:

Relator asserts that Honeywell's COVID-19 policy requiring that he get weekly COVID-19 tests and submit the results "required [him] to defy [his] religious faith." He asserts that he was upholding his religious faith "by practicing [his] God given right of 'control over [his] medical' by not subjecting Jesus Christ's temple to forcefully coerced medical treatments such as weekly PCR and/or rapid antigen test requirements."…

The ULJ found that relator lacked credibility because he provided inconsistent testimony and he struggled to explain his religious beliefs.

The court reversed the ULJ's denial of benefits in two other cases. In Benish v. Berkley Risk Administrators Company, LLC, (MN App., June 12, 2023) the court said in part:

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Free Speech

Dr. Luke Is a Public Figure for Purposes of His Libel Lawsuit Against Ke$ha

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From Judge Garcia's majority opinion in Gottwald v. Sebert, decided today by New York's high court, though all the judges agreed on this point:

By 2014, when Gottwald initiated this defamation action, he was, by his own account, a celebrity—an acclaimed music producer who had achieved enormous success in a high-profile career. As self-described in the complaint, he "has written the most Number One songs of any songwriter ever" and "was named by Billboard as one of the top ten producers of the decade in 2009." Gottwald's engagement with the media was "obviously designed to project his name and personality" before a wide audience to establish his reputation in this field. He purposefully sought media attention for himself, his businesses, and for the artists he represented, including Sebert, to advance those business interests. He had been featured in various publications, as well as on radio and television, highlighting the nature of his relationships with those artists and his development of their talent and careers.

Sebert alleged that, shortly after establishing a professional relationship as her producer, Gottwald sexually assaulted her. Therefore, Gottwald is appropriately considered a limited-purpose public figure, and as a result he must prove that Sebert's allegedly defamatory statements were made with actual malice.

To quote Judge Rivera's dissent, which agrees with the majority on this point,

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Free Speech

If Employee Is Fired for Off-the-Job Political Speech, Can He Be Denied Unemployment Compensation

on the grounds that the firing was for "misconduct" (such as violation of a social media policy)?

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From Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc. v. Moritz, decided Mar. 31 by the Nebraska Supreme Court (in an opinion by Justice John Freudenberg, joined by Chief Justice Michael Heavican and Justices Stephanie Stacy and Jonathan Papik):

At issue in this appeal is whether social media posts directed toward local public figures from a public account of an officer of a local bank constituted misconduct in connection with work disqualifying the employee from unemployment benefits. The reason for the employee's termination was that the posts violated the employer's social media policy. The posts were not sent from work, during work hours, or using the employer's equipment. The posts did not contain information obtained in the capacity as an employee, mention the employee's position at the bank, or refer to coworkers or customers….

Moritz was fired from his internal audit supervisor job at Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc. because of complaints that Pinnacle got about Moritz's social media posts:

The Twitter posts tagged the incumbent mayor, whose husband had recently died from suicide. In one post, it was suggested the mayor "take your husband's lead … he had a good idea." Another post stated that "your husband couldn't stand you why should we?" and that "everyone will blow their brains out if you're still the mayor." …

Pinnacle's investigation revealed other posts on Moritz' Twitter account beginning in 2020 in which disparaging remarks were made about public figures. The posts included calling the chief executive officer of a local hospital "fat" and calling a politician a "cunt" who had "tried to [expletive]" a former political commentator's "corpse to attempt to extract sperm and create the antichrist."

Pinnacle's Social Media Policy provided the following though also added that "[o]fficers of the bank" (a category that included Moritz) "and their significant others have additional responsibilities as the viewpoints they express on social media may be interpreted by customers and the community as the Bank's viewpoints":

The same principles and guidelines found in the Bank's policies apply to your activities online. Ultimately, you are solely responsible for what you post online. Before creating online content, consider some of the risks and rewards that are involved. Keep in mind that any of your conduct that adversely affects your job performance, the performance of fellow employees or otherwise adversely affects employees, customers, suppliers, people who work on behalf of the Bank or the Bank's legitimate business interests may result in disciplinary action up to and including termination.

Carefully read these guidelines and the Bank's other policies and ensure your postings are consistent with these policies. Always comply with our Code of Conduct and Ethics and never reveal information about a customer or other confidential information. Inappropriate postings that may include discriminatory remarks, harassment, and threats of violence or similar inappropriate or unlawful conduct will not be tolerated and may subject you to disciplinary action up to and including termination.

Always be fair and courteous to fellow employees, suppliers and people who work on behalf of the Bank. Also, keep in mind that you are more likely to resolve work-related complaints by speaking directly with your co-workers or by utilizing our open door policy than by posting complaints to a social media outlet. Nevertheless, if you decide to post complaints or criticism, avoid using statements, photographs, video or audio that reasonably could be viewed as malicious, obscene, threatening or intimidating, that disparage employees or suppliers, or that might constitute harassment or bullying. Examples of such conduct might include offensive posts meant to intentionally harm someone's reputation or posts that could contribute to a hostile work environment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, disability, military status, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, or any other status protected by law or Bank policy.

Moritz claimed unemployment benefits, but was largely disqualified on the grounds that he had been fired for misconduct. The court concluded otherwise, applying Nebraska's unemployment compensation law, under which "to determine whether an employee is partially or totally ineligible for benefits, one must consider (1) whether there was an act of proven misconduct and (2) whether the misconduct was connected with the employee's work":

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Free Speech

Journal of Free Speech Law: "Brokered Abuse," by Prof. Thomas Kadri

Just published as part of the symposium on Media and Society After Technological Disruption, edited by Profs. Justin "Gus" Hurwitz & Kyle Langvardt.

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The article is here; here are the Introduction and Part I:

"It's accually obsene what you can find out about a person on the internet."

To some, this typo-ridden remark might sound banal. We know that our data drifts around online, with digital flotsam and jetsam washing up sporadically on different websites across the internet. Surveillance has been so normalized that, these days, many people aren't distressed when their information appears in a Google search, even if they sometimes fret about their privacy in other settings.

But this remark isn't a throwaway line by a disgruntled netizen. No. It's a boast by a stalker, Liam Youens, who went online to find his victim, Amy Boyer. Youens traced Boyer after buying her work address from a data broker—a company that traffics information about people for profit. Youens documented his search for Boyer's whereabouts on his personal website: "I found an internet site to do that, and to my surprize everything else under the Sun. Most importantly: her current employment." After he asked the broker for more information, he just had to bide his time. "I'm waiting for the results," he wrote ominously, not long before shooting Boyer dead at work.

Data brokers fuel abuse by sharing people's information and thwarting their obscurity. The value of obscurity, though sometimes overlooked in privacy discourse, rests on the idea that "information is safe—at least to some degree—when it is hard to obtain or understand." Brokers hinder obscurity by making it easier and likelier to find or fathom information about people. This act of foiling obscurity, in turn, facilitates interpersonal abuse. The physical violence suffered by Amy Boyer is but one kind of abuse; people also face stalking, harassment, doxing, defamation, fraud, sextortion, and nonconsensual sharing of their intimate images.

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Cryptopocalypse

Episode 462 of the Cyberlaw Podcast

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It was a disastrous week for cryptocurrency in the United States, as the SEC filed suit against the two biggest exchanges, Binance and Coinbase, on a theory that makes it nearly impossible to run a cryptocurrency exchange in the US that is competitive with overseas exchanges. Nick Weaver lays out the difference between securities "process crimes" and "crime crimes," and how it helps to distinguish the two lawsuits. The SEC action marks the end of an uneasy truce between regulators and the cryptocurrency industry, but not the end of the debate. Both exchanges have the funds for a hundred-million-dollar criminal defense and lobbying campaign. So you can expect to hear more about this issue for years (and years) to come.

I bring up two AI regulation stories. First is Mark Andreessen's post trying to head off AI regulation, which is pretty persuasive until the end, where he says that the risk of bad people using AI for bad things can be addressed by using AI to stop them.  Sorry, Mark, it doesn't work that way. We aren't, for example, stopping the crimes that modern encryption makes possible by throwing more crypto at the culprits.

My nominee for the AI Regulation Hall of Fame, though, goes to Japan, which has decided to address the phony issue of AI copyright infringement by declaring that it's a phony issue and there'll be no copyright liability for their AI industry if it trains its models on copyrighted content.  That's the right answer, in my view, but it's also a brilliant way of borrowing and subverting the EU's GDPR model, in which aggressively regulating global data transfers turns out to be a pretty good trade barrier. Now Japan proposes to write the global copyright rules for AI, at least as a practical matter. Why? Because Japan's policy effectively gives immunity from copyright claims to any AI company that builds a dataset or trains its models in Japan. The rest of the world can follow suit or watch their industries flock to Japan to train their models in relative regulatory certainty. This has to be the smartest piece of international AI regulation any jurisdiction has come up with so far. (It helps, of course, that copyright claims against AI are mostly rent-seeking by Big Content.)

Kurt Sanger, just back from a NATO cyber conference in Estonia, explains why military cyber defenders are stressing their need for access to the private networks they'll be defending. Whether they'll get it, we agree, is another kettle of fish entirely.

David Kris turns to public-private cooperation issues in another context. The Cyberspace Solarium Commission has another report out. It calls on the government to refresh and rethink the aging orders that regulate how the government deals with the private sector on cyber matters.

Kurt and I consider whether Russia is committing war crimes by DDOSing emergency services in Ukraine at the same time as it's bombing Ukrainian cities. We agree that the evidence isn't there yet.

Nick and I dig into two recent exploits that stand out from the crowd. Barracuda's security appliance has been so badly compromised that the only remedial measure involves a woodchipper. Nick is confident that the tradecraft here suggests a nation-state attacker. I wonder if the remedy is also a way to move Barracuda's customers to the cloud.

The other compromise is an attack on MOVEit Transfer. Flaws in the secure file transfer system have allowed ransomware gang Clop to download so much proprietary data that they have resorted to telling their victims to self-identify and pay the ransom rather than wait for Clop to figure out who they've pwned.

Kurt, David, and I talk about the White House effort to sell section 702 of FISA for its cybersecurity value -- and my effort, with Michael Ellis, to sell 702 (packaged with intelligence reform) to a conservative caucus that is newly skeptical of the intelligence community. David finds himself uncomfortably close to endorsing our efforts.

Finally, in quick updates:

Download 462nd Episode (mp3)

You can subscribe to The Cyberlaw Podcast using iTunes, Google Play, Spotify, Pocket Casts, or our RSS feed. As always, The Cyberlaw Podcast is open to feedback. Be sure to engage with @stewartbaker on Twitter. Send your questions, comments, and suggestions for topics or interviewees to CyberlawPodcast@gmail.com. Remember: If your suggested guest appears on the show, we will send you a highly coveted Cyberlaw Podcast mug! The views expressed in this podcast are those of the speakers and do not reflect the opinions of their institutions, clients, friends, families, or pets.

 

 

 

Chief Justice Roberts Is Not A "Weather Vain." He's Just So Vain.

He probably thinks the Court is about him.

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Chief Justice Roberts has evolved over the years. There was a time when he could be viewed as an "institutionalist." In 2017, I analogized Roberts to a bank--depositing and withdrawing capital to advance the conservative "long game."

The institutional theory views the Court as something like a checkbook: the Court can take a big withdrawal once in a while, so long it makes regular deposits. Indeed, Roberts has adopted such a fiduciary approach to judging. Back in 2007, he viewed the Court's three-decade-long pattern of divisive 5-4 decisions as "eroding, to some extent, the capital that [Chief Justice] Marshall built up." Thus, decisions can fall on either side of the ledger: deposits or withdrawals. By depositing "capital" in the narrow decisions—such as WRTL v. FEC, NAMUDNO v. Holder, NFIB v. Sebelius, and King v. Burwell —the Court can withdraw that "capital" in the broad decisions like Citizens United v. FEC, Shelby County v. Holder, and cases yet to come.

But after Trump, Roberts's "long game" was turned upside down, and post-Dobbs, the long game is long gone.

If he is no longer an "institutionalist," what is he?  In the Washington Post, Jennifer Rubin offers this description of Chief Justice Roberts.

If political opinion "tester" explains Roberts's past compromises and the shift from Shelby to Milligan, he should be viewed not so much as an institutionalist (who would protect the jurisprudential integrity of the court and insist on abiding by the highest ethical standards) but as an unprincipled politician, trying to prevent his radical colleagues from sinking the court and the Republican Party when he suspects blowback to decisions from the court's right-wing majority.

In that sense, Roberts has become the worst sort of results-oriented judge. Rather than legal consistency, respect for precedent or even a judicial philosophy, he's become the quintessential weather vane. How much can the public tolerate? How far must he let his conservative colleagues drift before the court falls into political oblivion?

I don't quite agree. Chief Justice Roberts sees himself as the Court's savior--the only force that can protect the legacy of John Marshall. John Roberts, and no one else, knows what is best for the Republic. John Roberts, singlehandedly, can ward off incursions from the radical left Court "reformers" and the radical right (including his colleagues). Of course, this is all a figment of Roberts's imagination. Delusions of grandeur, really. He can barely keep his own Court in line. Joan Biskupic's reporting suggests that even his colleagues are annoyed at how much Roberts seems himself as in control.

I don't think Roberts is a weather vane. I think he's just, so, vain. He probably thinks the Court is about him.

Free Speech

Only Reasonably Proper Posts from Me Today

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I'm at a conference at a public university, and I'm using the WiFi system; I checked the terms of use, and saw that "By clicking 'Accept'" (as I did) I "agree that … [my] use and activity [related to the network, presumably] will conform to reasonable expectations of propriety." OK then!

I think that WiFi access provided by government bodies, such as public universities, government-owned airports, and the like, is a "limited public forum" in which speech restrictions are constitutional only if they are viewpoint-neutral and reasonable; and a "conform to reasonable expectations of propriety" proviso is too vague to be reasonable (see Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky (2018)). One day I might challenge one such policy, but probably not today ….

Free Speech

No First Amendment Academic Freedom Right to Give Quizzes in Public University Class

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From Fass v. Benson, decided Wednesday by the Texas Court of Appeals (Dallas), in an opinion by Justice Erin Nowell, joined by Justices Robbie Partida-Kipness and Nancy Kennedy:

Professor Fass is a tenured professor of public policy and affairs at UTD [University of Texas Dallas]. For the past thirty years, he has taught a wide range of graduate and undergraduate courses. Since 1988, he has regularly taught statistics courses for the School of Economics, Political, and Policy Sciences (EPPS)….

In late March 2019, Dean Jennifer Holmes, who served as Head of UTD's School of EPPS, informed Professor Fass he would receive a classroom "peer evaluation" outside of his usual scheduled evaluations. A non-tenured instructor who had not taught undergraduate statistics since 2004 observed Professor Fass's evening class. The next day, Dean Holmes told Professor Fass the evaluator was "very critical" of his teaching. She also told him several of his students from his morning section complained about his class. This was the first time Professor Fass heard about any student complaints. Dean Holmes also discussed with him her concerns about the rate of withdrawals, failures, and drops (WFDs) in his class. UTD administrators had never stated WFDs were relevant to a professor's teaching method and never included them as a metric in performance evaluations.

After the evaluation, Dean Holmes told Professor Fass to alter his approach to student grading by eliminating any further quizzes and relying solely on homework assignments….

Fass refused, and was later removed from teaching; he sued on various grounds, and the court ruled, among other things:

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Law & Government

Codifiers' Errors and 42 U.S.C. 1983

with relevance to both a 1980 precedent and a recent article by Alex Reinert

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Last week's Supreme Court decision in Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski is an interesting case about causes of action to enforce legislation adopted under Congress's spending power, and prompted an especially interesting dissent from Justice Thomas about the basis and nature of the spending power that I commend to students of structural constitutional law. But one other interesting thing about it is that it reaffirmed the validity of a 1980 case called Maine v. Thiboutot.

What is Thiboutot and why is it interesting?

The federal statute for enforcing constitutional rights, 42 U.S.C. 1983, which was passed as Section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, reads:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . .  subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .

While people had long used the statute to enforce federal constitutional rights, the fact that the statute says "rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws," combined with the Court's increasingly stingy approach to implied causes of action to enforce federal statutes, prompted the question: can Section 1983 also be used to enforce federal statutory rights? In Thiboutot, in an opinion by Justice Brennan the Court said: sure, that's what it says! 

What makes this interesting is that while this is indeed what the text says, the text probably reflects a mistake that was not originally intended by Congress. When Congress first passed the statute in 1871, it referred only to constitutional rights. A few years later, Congress added the "and laws" basically by accident.

How did this happen?

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Free Speech

Allegations That Particular Conduct Stemmed from a Racist Motivation Generally Aren't Defamatory

(though false allegations  about the details of the conduct may be).

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From Cooper v. Franklin Templetion Investments, decided Thursday by the Second Circuit (Judges Rosemary S. Pooler, Barrington D. Parker and Alison J. Nathan):

On May 25, 2020, Plaintiff, a white woman, encountered Christian Cooper (no relation), a black man in Central Park, while she was walking her dog and he was birdwatching. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Cooper confronted her, and his "intentionally aggressive actions" caused her to "fear for her safety and the safety of her dog." She alleges this fear caused her to warn Mr. Cooper that she would tell the police there was "an African-American man threatening [her] life," and then to place a 911 call to that effect. The confrontation, which was recorded on a video that went viral, "became international news as a racial flashpoint." Plaintiff alleges that she was "characterized as a privileged white female 'Karen' caught on video verbally abusing an African American male with no possible reason other than the color of his skin."

Later that same day, Franklin Templeton published the following statement on Twitter regarding the incident: "We take these matters very seriously, and we do not condone racism of any kind. While we are in the process of investigating the situation, the employee involved has been put on administrative leave." Plaintiff alleges that while Franklin Templeton did contact her that day, it did not seek to interview Mr. Cooper about the incident, did not obtain a recording of Plaintiff's 911 call from the police, and did not take various other potential investigative steps. The following afternoon, Franklin Templeton put out another statement on Twitter (the May 26 Statement): "Following our internal review of the incident in Central Park yesterday, we have made the decision to terminate the employee involved, effective immediately. We do not tolerate racism of any kind at Franklin Templeton." As relevant here, Johnson, Franklin Templeton's president and CEO, made two further public statements about the incident. In a June 2, 2020 interview with Bloomberg, in response to questions about Plaintiff's termination, Johnson stated:

I just have to commend [ ] our crisis management team, it was a holiday. Everybody got together. We needed to spend time getting the facts. Sometimes videos can get manipulated and so you have to make sure that you've reviewed all the facts. I think the facts were undisputed in this case, and we were able to make a quick decision.

And in a July 6, 2020 interview with Fortune, Johnson stated: "[Defendants] espouse zero tolerance for racism."

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Politics

A Brief Post About Congratulations to Prevailing Lawyers

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For several months, I've generally congratulated prevailing lawyers in cases I write about, as a mark of acknowledgment of their professional success on behalf of their clients. I've done so without regard to whether I agree with the lawyers' positions as a legal or moral matter; they apparently did a good job as lawyers, and my hat is off to them for that. (To be sure, it's possible that they just had a strong case that few lawyers would lose, or perhaps they did a shoddy job and won despite that, but I was willing to generally infer professional quality from the victory.)

Indeed, I was hoping to model for law student readers the principle that lawyers succeed by serving their clients, entirely apart from broader political questions. When I didn't congratulate the prevailing lawyers, that was generally because (a) I thought the decision as a whole (and not just the part I wrote about) was split enough to not be a victory, (b) the lawyers' names weren't easily obtainable, (c) there were so many lawyers on the winning side that listing them all would have been a chore, or (d) I forgot.

But though I had explained this practice in this post, it seems from comments that quite a few readers interpret congratulating a lawyer as a mark of endorsement of the lawyer's position—which, especially, to nonlawyers, is indeed a plausible interpretation. I've thus tentatively decided that I'd take something of a middle road (especially since this is certainly not a great matter of principle for me one way or another): I would note the names of the prevailing lawyers and indicate that they represent the prevailing party, a public acknowledgment that I hope will be seen as a gesture of professional respect, without saying "congratulations." And I thought I'd mention this expressly, so that readers don't assume that my noting some people when I had congratulated others before says something about my views on the merits. I hope this makes sense, to readers and to the lawyers involved.

Roberts Waves the White Flag of Textualism in Allen v. Milligan

Justice Scalia would be rolling over in his grave.

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On Saturday, I offered some faint praise for Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion in Allen v. Milligan--truly, faint praise, as I commended the Chief for (probably) writing a sincere decision he actually agrees with. Roberts barely cleared a fairly-low bar--not much to write home about. Now, having finished reading all 112 pages, here comes the criticism. To start, I'll focus on textualism.

In Bostock, Justice Alito coined one of the most-memorable lines since Justice Scalia's passing: he charged Justice Gorsuch with piloting a "pirate ship" under a "textualist flag." Allen, alas, couldn't even be called a pirate ship for textualism. The Chief hoisted a white flag of textualism--it was a complete and total surrender to Gingles v. Thornburg (1986), the worst excesses of William Brennan's anti-textualism. Justice Alito explained in his dissent:

Gingles was decided at a time when the Court's statutory interpretation decisions sometimes paid less attention to the actual text of the statute than to its legislative history, and Gingles falls into that category. The Court quoted §2 but then moved briskly to the Senate Report. Today, our statutory interpretation decisions focus squarely on the statutory text.

Part I.A of Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion, which Justice Kavanaugh joined in full, disregards nearly everything we have learned about textualism over the past four decades. Roberts doesn't just cite legislative history. He cites pre-legislative history. He quotes, at some length, editorials in the Washington Post and New York Times as evidence of the statute's meaning! Indeed, the Chief quotes the Times, which editorialized that City of Mobile v. Bolden (1980) was "the biggest step backwards in civil rights to come from the Nixon Court." The Nixon Court? Not the Burger Court. The Nixon Court?! I'm old enough to remember when the Roberts implored us that there are not Obama or Trump judges, and that is a mistake to identify a judge by the appointing president. But, apparently, there was a Nixon Court, and Nixon judges. Why on Earth would Roberts have included that line, of all lines? The analysis would have been just the same if that sentence was omitted. And for those counting at home, the moderates Justices Stewart (Eisenhower) and Stevens (Ford) were in the majority. To balance things out, the Chief cites an op-ed by Senator Orrin Hatch, who opposed "mandating racial proportionality" and the Wall Street Journal editorial page.

Next, Roberts moves from pre-legislative-history to actual legislative-history.  Roberts traces debates between Senator Hatch, who chaired the Senate Subcommittee and Representative Peter Rodino, who chaired the House Judiciary Committee. Roberts also cites the views of Attorney General William French Smith, though, curiously, does not mention him by name--only "Attorney General." Smith is the only politician who isn't named! Thankfully, this impasse was "resolved" by Senator Bob Dole. And, Roberts relays, the Senate passed Dole's compromise "by an overwhelming margin, 85-8." And, for good measure, we learn that President Reagan signed the Act into law. (I noticed Justice Jackson name-dropped Reagan as well in Talevski).

Why is any of this information relevant to the meaning of the statute? It is not relevant for a textualist decision to focus on the legislative players who drafted a bill. It is not relevant for a textualist decision to indicate the vote-count of a statute, let alone to note the support was "bipartisan." And, Justice Kavanaugh's practice notwithstanding, it is irrelevant which President signed the bill into law. At most, this name-dropping is designed to inject armchair political punditry into the U.S. Reports, and suggest that this benighted bipartisan compromise by long-ago politicians should inform the meaning of the statute. Can we apply this framework to the politicians that enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964? What did they think about transgender rights? How can Roberts, who joined Bostock, and Kavanaugh, who lambasted Bostock, engage in such anti-textualist reasoning?

The rest of the majority opinion follows his approach. On p. 17, Roberts writes, "We have understood the language of §2 against the background of the hard-fought compromise that Congress struck." On p. 28, Roberts writes, "And neither the text of §2 nor the fraught debate that produced it suggests that 'equal access' to the fundamental right of voting turns on computer simulations." And so on. The careful parsing of the text never actually appears. It all comes back to Bob Dole. Or at least a caricature of Bob Dole.

We're all textualists now, except when the Chief has 5 votes. Justice Scalia would be rolling over in his grave.

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