The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

The New York Times Uncovered The Worst-Kept Secret In Academia

Summer study-abroad programs are cushy vacations for students and boondoggles to attract elite faculty.

|

As a general matter, law professors do not have to teach during the summer. Indeed, we barely teach during the academic year, as compared to virtually all other academic disciplines. The standard load is two lectures classes, plus a small seminar. The only way universities can attract elite faculty to teach in the summer is to situate the classes in exotic locations. Professors, and their families, have most-expenses-paid vacations to foreign cities. Sure, there are a few hours of teaching in the morning. But the rest of the time is free. And those same classes could easily be taught at the home institution. But again, professors would never sacrifice their summer breaks to teach domestically. What about students? Most law schools offer summer classes on this side of the pond. (I took CrimPro and a privacy law seminar during my 1L summer.) But who wants to toil in the heat? It's far more fun to study some esoteric topic in Europe.

Everyone knows these facts. It is not a secret. Indeed, over my career, I've challenged law professors who teach abroad. They insist that these programs are rigorous. So are classes in the United States. They insist that students can build camaraderie. They can do that here as well. They insist that students can be exposed to faculty who do not teach at our institution. Well, now Zoom can do that quite well. Plus, it pains me that students take on more debt to pay for cushy vacations, rather than trying to earn an actual salary over the summer. If I am reviewing a resume, and I see a summer-abroad program, I immediately think the person made a poor decision of how to spend the 2L summer.

I'm sure I'm an outlier. Plenty of professors who benefit from these programs love them. Same for administrators who tag along on the trips! Plus all students love vacations with academic credit. Rant over.

This background brings me to the latest breathless reporting in the New York Times. Now, the newspaper of record has focused on my alma mater, the Scalia Law School. The article is long. Really long. But the upshot is that George Mason has placed a priority on recruiting Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh to teach at summer study programs. Shocker! A DC law school works hard to connect its students with the leaders of the profession. My own law school has organized similar programs in the past with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg. (My students described it as a once-in-a-lifetime experience.) So have countless other law schools. The only reason this story exists is because GMU is subject to FOIA. I'd love to look through the efforts at Harvard, Yale, and other elite private schools to recruit the Justices. There is also an issue lurking under the surface. Elite institutions can no longer invite conservative Justices. So Mason, as well as Notre Dame have filled that gap.

Moreover, I am scratching my head at the apparent conspiracy between GMU study-abroad program and GMU clinics that file amicus briefs. Does anyone really think that Justice Gorsuch is more likely to read an amicus brief from a GMU clinic because he taught several GMU students in a clinic? The reason why conservative justices read amicus briefs by conservative scholars is because they find those ideas persuasive. And Mason punches far above its weight class with regard to prominent conservative scholars. Does anyone think elite Supreme Court clinics at Harvard or Stanford are tainted because of the close connections those institutions have with the Justices? Indeed, those clinics actually argue cases, and do not just file amicus briefs destined for the circular file.

D.C. is--for lack of better words--an incestuous swamp. Everyone "knows" everyone else. And there is a nonstop effort by people with less power to try to gain access to people with more power. When you meet someone in D.C., the first question you are asked is "What do you do?" They are not curious about what you do. They want to know if you can provide them with more influence. The Times fails to place any of these allegations in context. Everything is about the one law school that proudly extolls its conservative connections. This sort of journalistic paint-by-numbers fails to ever substantiate their claims. It's only enough to raise some concerns, and hope uninformed readers fill in the gaps on their own.

Nothing to see here. Wait till the next empty shoe drops.

Supreme Court

Where Are the SCOTUS Opinions?

This Supreme Court term is setting a record for not releasing opinions in argued cases.

|

October Term 2022 continues to be a term of longer arguments and fewer opinions. The Supreme Court has issued fewer opinions at this point in its term than during any term in the past century, even though it hears far fewer cases.

Lawrence Hurley of NBC News has the details:

Back in 1923, the Supreme Court had issued 157 rulings by May 1 in a term that started the previous fall.

On the same date a century later, the current justices, facing a firestorm of scrutiny on multiple fronts, have disposed of just 15 cases, fueling speculation about why they are falling behind.

In fact, the court has decided fewer cases at this point of the term — which begins each October and ends in June — than at any time in the last 100 years, according to numbers compiled by Supreme Court stats guru Adam Feldman.

There is one big caveat: The court hears oral arguments in substantially fewer cases now than it did in previous decades. In the 1922-23 term, the court heard 205 cases, noted Lee Epstein, a political scientist at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law. This term it was a mere 59.

The story notes several potential causes of the Court's slower performance: the leak investigation, the need to deal with filings on the "emergency docket" (aka the "shadow docket"), and the dispropportionate share of cases that address complex questions likely to splinter the justices.

It also appears that justices have been writing more. As the number of majority opinions has dropped, the number of concurrences and dissents appears to have held steady. In October Term 2005, for instance, there were 95 concurrences and dissents for 82 majority opinions. Last term there were also 95 concurrences and dissents, but only 57 majority opinions.

So far this term the Court has heard argument in 60 cases, deciding 13 and dismissing one more. That leaves 46 cases to be decided (or otherwise resolved). The Court has not announced its next opinion day.

Parental Rights

N.J. Appellate Court Affirms Family Court Judge's Refusal to Order COVID Vaccination

Such family court decisions are generally reviewed with great deference; the court isn't saying the judge's decision is necessarily the correct one, just that it's not clearly incorrect.

|

From Scott v. Scott, decided Friday by the New Jersey intermediate appellate court (Judges Whipple, Mawla and Walcott-Henderson):

Plaintiff Jenna Scott appeals from an August 29, 2022 Family Part order denying her application to administer the COVID-19 vaccine to minor children she shares with defendant, Geoffrey Scott, over his objection. The trial court conducted an extensive plenary hearing and addressed the best interests of the children. We affirm the order, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

The parties are parents of three minor children and, following their separation, they entered into a written custody and parenting agreement. Under this agreement, the parties share joint legal and physical custody of their children and all major decisions involving the children are to be made jointly. Plaintiff is designated the parent of primary residence (PPR) of the children. Within weeks of signing this custody agreement, plaintiff filed an order to show cause, seeking temporary sole legal custody so that the two elder children could be vaccinated over defendant's objection. The court denied the order to show cause and scheduled the matter for a plenary hearing.

The court held a four-day plenary hearing with both parties testifying along with two medical experts called by plaintiff: the children's pediatrician and a pediatric hospitalist, who had never examined the children. Both experts testified to the efficacy of the vaccine and recommended that it be administered to the children. Plaintiff testified that medical appointments were generally within her purview and that the children have received all other recommended vaccines and have not had any major side effects. Defendant testified that while he generally supports vaccination against most diseases, he wished to avoid this one because of the novel nature of mRNA vaccines and the potential for unknown long-term side effects.

Read More

Guns

"Petitioner's Second Amendment Rights Are Not Dependent on Her Spouse's Acquisition …

of an unrestricted concealed carry pistol permit," says N.Y. appellate court.

|

The case arose before Bruen, when New York required a showing of special need to get a license to carry a gun for self-defense. The petitioner had argued that she needed a gun because she and her husband would often carry substantial sums of cash for business, but the New York licensing authorities responded that she "failed to explain why her stated self-defense needs were not already adequately and independently addressed by her husband's recent acquisition of an unrestricted concealed carry license."

The New York intermediate appellate court rejected that logic (Matter of DiPerna-Gillen v. Ryba, decided Thursday in an opinion by Justice Stan Prizker, joined by Presiding Justice Elizabeth Garry and Justices Michael Lynch, Molly Reynolds Fitzgerald and Eddie McShan). The court's main point was that, given the decision in Bruen, which came down while the appeal was pending, petitioner had a constitutionally protected right to carry, even without a showing of special need. But the court added:

To the extent that the Attorney General attempts, inexplicably, to justify the determination based upon petitioner's "fail[ure] to explain why her stated self-defense needs were not already adequately and independently addressed by her husband's recent acquisition of an unrestricted concealed carry license," we note that this was not a basis for the denial of this application and "judicial review of an administrative determination is limited to the grounds invoked by" respondent.

More to the point, the statutory framework contains no such required showing and, suffice it to say that petitioner's Second Amendment rights are not dependent on her spouse's acquisition of an unrestricted concealed carry pistol permit.

Here's more of the state's argument, from its brief:

Read More

Senator Schumer's Letter to Chief Judge Godbey (NDTX)

If you don't do what I want, "Congress will consider more prescriptive requirements."

|

On Thursday, Senator Charles Schumer, the Majority Leader, sent a letter to the presiding officer of a federal court. No, it was not Chief Justice Roberts. Senator Durbin has that task locked down. Rather, Schumer sent the letter to Chief Judge Godbey of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

The theme, if you couldn't guess, concerns case assignment in single-judge divisions in Amarillo, Wichita Falls, and Lubbock. (I've written about this topic at some length here and here.)

Schumer charged:

Even though the Northern District has twelve active judges and another four senior judges who still hear cases, your orders provide that civil cases filed in many divisions are always assigned to a single judge, or to one of just a few. Cases filed in the Amarillo Division are always assigned to Judge Kacsmaryk; cases filed in the Wichita Falls Division are always assigned to Judge O'Connor; and cases filed in the Abeline, Lubbock, and San Angelo Divisions are split between just two judges. As a result of your recent assignment orders, plaintiffs in your district can now effectively choose the judge who will hear their cases.

Schumer issued an ultimatum: the court should "randomly" assign cases filed in "rural divisions," or else.

The Northern District of Texas could, and should, adopt a similar rule for all civil cases. Currently, a federal statute allows each district court to decide for itself how to assign cases. This gives courts the flexibility to address individual circumstances in their districts and among their judges. But if that flexibility continues to allow litigants to hand-pick their preferred judges and effectively guarantee their preferred outcomes, Congress will consider more prescriptive requirements.

It has come to this. The Senate Majority leader, who has no chance of actually passing court reform legislation, is issuing empty ultimatums to a federal judge. Anyone who can count to sixty knows such "prescriptive requirements" are dead on arrival. And certainly Schumer knows that as well. But Schumer's intent, like that of Durbin, is not to actually engage in good-faith discussions with the judiciary. Rather the goal, as always, is to undermine the authority of judges he disagrees with.

To quote Justice Alito:

It "undermines confidence in the government," Justice Alito says. "It's one thing to say the court is wrong; it's another thing to say it's an illegitimate institution. You could say the same thing about Congress and the president. . . . When you say that they're illegitimate, any of the three branches of government, you're really striking at something that's essential to self-government."

There have been no actual allegations that judges assigned to the Amarillo or Wichita Falls divisions have engaged in any judicial misconduct. (And no, authorship of a law review article that a judge did not actually write does not actually matter.) These judges have not been mandamused or reassigned by the court of appeals. None of the progressive judges on the Fifth Circuit have, in dissent, charged these judges with malfeasance. And no bar complaints have been filed against the Texas Attorney General or other plaintiffs who have filed in these forums. DOJ has filed motions to transfer cases in these divisions. And, those motions have been denied. In doing so, these courts have rejected the premise of Schumer's letter: that single-judge divisions undermine public confidence in the judiciary. Senator Schumer is, in effect, seeking reconsideration of what Judges Tipton, Kacsmaryk, and others have already ruled. The chief judge of a federal district cannot sit in judgment of another district judge in his district. That job belongs to the court of appeals alone.

I am well aware that in 2016, Judge Godbey's predecessor reassigned 15% of cases from the Wichita Falls division to herself. That was a controversial decision at the time, and one that was never fully justified. And Judge Godbey reversed that decision in 2022. I think it quite problematic for a single judge to take it upon herself to address what are, in effect, substantive grievances with a district court's rulings. From a pragmatic perspective, I am truly skeptical that all of the judges in Dallas would be willing to pick up a random share of cases in Amarillo or Lubbock. And no, as Senator Schumer suggests, remote hearings would not be an adequate substitute for actual parties in those communities.

The bigger problem, of course, is that Schumer has now boxed in Judge Godbey. If the Judge takes the sort of action that Schumer demanded, then he will be seen as caving to legislative pressure. If he ignores Schumer, he will be seen as enabling "judge shopping." And law professors on Twitter will beat their drums.

My recommendation? Do nothing now. DOJ filed motions to transfer, which were denied. Those motions will be appealed to the Fifth Circuit. If the Fifth Circuit affirms those motions, then Judge Godbey will have definitive ground to maintain the status quo. Acting now would be premature, and frankly, would weaken the separation of powers and judicial independence.

Zoning

A YIMBY Victory in Montana

Montana's sweeping new zoning reform is both good in itself and a potential model for cross-ideological cooperation on this issue elsewhere.

|

Exclusionary zoning causes massive housing shortages that prevent millions of people from "moving to opportunity" and becoming more productive. The state of Montana is about to enact important new zoning reforms that will make it easier to build new housing in the state. The new legislation is the product of an unusual cross-ideological coalition that might serve as a model for "YIMBY" reforms elsewhere. CityLab housing expert Kriston Capps has a helpful analysis of these developments:

Lawmakers in Montana's state legislature advanced bills in April that would shake up zoning, land use and building codes, making it much easier for property owners to build new housing — and much harder for local authorities to stop them.

A flurry of five separate "Yes In My Backyard" bills — all five sponsored by Republican legislators — are winding their way through various committees. One would require cities to permit backyard flats and other accessory dwelling units by right. Another law would allow duplex homes to be built in places zoned for single-family housing. If Montana Governor Greg Gianforte, also a Republican, signs even a couple of these bills into law, Montana will have leapfrogged several East and West Coast states that have struggled to respond to housing shortages at home….

In one fell swoop, the Montana legislature could issue a range of deregulatory actions that have only moved forward in California after years of agitation. On April 20, the legislature passed SB 323, which requires any city with more than 5,000 residents to permit duplex housing in areas zoned for single-family homes. Gianforte is expected to sign this bill as well as SB 406, which prohibits local governments from passing building codes that are stricter than the state code, any time now.

Of the bills in view, the most consequential is SB 382, the Montana Land Use Planning Act, a YIMBY omnibus package the likes of which few blue states would dare to consider.

SB 382 would transform the development process, limiting public hearings on housing projects by front-loading them to the general planning stages, when municipalities adopt their overall land-use plans. After that, approvals in Montana cities would proceed by right — effectively shutting out NIMBY homeowners who often thwart growth.

As Capps explains, the new legislation is the product of an unusual left-right political coalition:

The wave of legislation is the work of a diverse group of advocates from both the political left and right. The coalition behind this push is clear about its goal: Montana needs to head off a housing crisis at the pass.

On this point advocates can agree, even if on almost every other subject, they're worlds apart. And by joining forces, this left-right coalition cleared a political impasse that has blocked so-called housing-abundant policies, which strive to remove barriers to new construction.

We were able to go to mostly Republicans and talk about free markets the importance of property rights. They were able to go to folks on the left and talk about climate and social impacts," says Kendall Cotton, president and CEO of the Frontier Institute, a right-leaning free-market think tank. "It doesn't break down on normal partisan lines. Advocates shouldn't silo themselves on the normal partisan lines."

The YIMBY movement taking shape in Helena is unusual in the US: Few states with a Republican governor, much less with a GOP supermajority in the legislature, have advanced such sweeping efforts to promote new housing construction in cities. Some red states have seen the opposite happen: When Gainesville became the first city in Florida to end single-family-only zoning locally, state leaders threatened legal action, and local Democrats repealed the ordinance before it could take effect.

Zoning reform cuts across standard ideological lines. Economists and housing experts across the political spectrum agree on the need to curb exclusionary zoning. But there is also is long history of both left and right-wing NIMBYism, motivated by a combination of public ignorance, suspicion of market forces and developers, and (particularly, though far from exclusively, on the right) fear of disruption of existing communities by in-migration, especially that by the poor and racial minorities.

NIMBY opposition will be easier to overcome if reform advocates can work together across traditional political lines, as they have in Montana. As Copps notes, such coalitions may not be needed in overwhelmingly "blue" jurisdictions, where conservatives and libertarians have too little political influence to make much difference. But they can be useful in light-red, light-blue, and "purple" states like Virginia, where GOP Governor Glenn Youngkin has recently advocated reform, but will likely need help from Democrats to push legislation through. A broad coalition has turned out to be valuable even in strongly red Montana, where the support of liberals helped push reform over the top.

Whether Montana's success can be replicated elsewhere remains to be seen.  Capps suggests "[i]t's possible that the special sauce in Montana is ultimately Montana itself." But, while Montana-specific factors surely played a role here, the problems caused by exclusionary zoning are from unique to that state. Reformers should at least try to learn from the Montana experience and see if they can develop similar coalitions in other states.

Justice Alito Defends The Supreme Court In Ways Chief Justice Roberts Cannot

If Justice Thomas is the intellectual leader of the Supreme Court, Justice Alito is its heart.

|

I've grown completely numb to the daily reporting on alleged ethical problems at the Supreme Court. All of these pieces follow a similar pattern. (1) Reporter spends an inordinate amount of time poring over mountains of publicly-available documents. (2) Reporter finds something that was not disclosed, or not fully-disclosed. (3) Reporter raises allegation that the failure to fully disclose that item is a problem, without actually identifying what that problem is. (4) Reporter interviews left-wing ethics groups who insist that full disclosure is necessary. (5) Reporter interviews the same cadre of law professors, who maintain that even though no actual rule was violated, the Justice should abide by some unwritten, higher standard. (6) Reporter publishes piece, which is widely shared on social media, but not actually read. (7) Sober analysis later reveals that the Justice either complied with the rules or made a good-faith mistake that will promptly be corrected. I'll have much more to say about this journalistic paint-by-numbers in a future ABA Journal column. Sunlight is a good disinfectant; too much heat will burn everything down.

But you know what the press has largely forgotten about? An actual judicial crisis: how the draft Dobbs opinion leaked to the press. The media should devote as much attention to the leak, as it fixates on who Amy Coney Barrett hosted a baby shower for 20 years ago.

And amidst these attacks, the Supreme Court remains rudderless. We know that the Chef Justice is unable, or unwilling to defend his Court beyond self-serving bromides about the Court as an "institution." If he thought his shoddy letter to the Senate would quell controversy, he was very wrong. The statement the Chief organized raised more questions than it answered. Fortunately, at least one member of the Court is willing to defend the Court against the never-ending barrage of attacks: Justice Samuel Alito. If Justice Thomas is the intellectual leader of the Court, Justice Alito is its heart.

We see this heart in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, given in mid-April. He defends the Supreme Court in ways the Chief Justice cannot, or will not.

Read More

Zoning

More Evidence that Cutting Zoning Restrictions Reduces the Price of Housing

A new Pew Charitable Trusts study examining jurisdictions with that reformed zoning finds far lower rent increases there than elsewhere.

|

Illustration: Lex Villena; Lev Kropotov

Zoning rules that severely restrict the construction of new housing are a major violation of property rights, and also cause housing shortages that prevent millions of people from "moving to opportunity" and becoming more productive. There is already extensive research by economists and housing policy experts demonstrating these points. A new study by Alex Horowitz and Ryan Canavan, housing specialists at Pew Charitable Trusts, provides additional evidence:

A national housing shortage has driven up rents, leaving a record share of Americans spending more than 30% of their income on rent and making them what is known as rent-burdened. But in four jurisdictions—Minneapolis; New Rochelle, New York; Portland, Oregon; and Tysons, Virginia—new zoning rules to allow more housing have helped curtail rent growth, saving tenants thousands of dollars annually….

Research shows that rents rise when more people need housing relative to how many homes are available. Restrictive zoning policies make it harder and more expensive to build new housing for everyone who wants it, and most researchers have found that this drives up home prices and rents…..

But what happens to rents after new homes are built? Studies show that adding new housing supply slows rent growth—both nearby and regionally—by reducing competition among tenants for each available home and thereby lowering displacement pressures. This finding from the four jurisdictions examined supports the argument that updating zoning to allow more housing can improve affordability.

In all four places studied, the vast majority of new housing has been market rate, meaning rents are based on factors such as demand and prevailing construction and operating costs. Most rental homes do not receive government subsidies,… Policymakers have debated whether allowing more market-rate—meaning unsubsidized—housing improves overall affordability in a market. The evidence indicates that adding more housing of any kind helps slow rent growth. And the Pew analysis of these four places is consistent with that finding….

Each of these places kept rent growth minimal relative to the U.S. overall, even while demand for housing continued to grow. Between 2017 and 2021, the four jurisdictions saw their total number of households grow between 7% and 22%, while the total households nationally increased by 6%. More households require more homes, and a housing shortage relative to demand drives up rents….

During the period studied, rents nationwide increased by a whopping 31%, while, in the four reform jurisdictions, they only went up by 1% to 7%. That, despite the fact that all four experienced greater population growth than the national average. The success of Tysons, Virginia is particularly notable, because the northern Virginia area as a whole has experienced a major boom in housing prices over the last decade, driven by increased demand. Tysons' experience bodes well for the impact of "missing middle" zoning reform recently enacted in  nearby Arlington County, where I live.

The Pew analysis emphasize the benefits of lower rent, which is of obvious value to lower-income households. But at least equally important is the increased ability of people to "move to opportunity" in these jurisdictions, thereby improving both their own prospects and the productivity of the broader economy. Libertarians and other property rights advocates should also welcome the great expansion in property owners' ability to decide what to build on their land.

Throughout much of the country, zoning is the single biggest constraint on property rights. Zoning is the biggest property rights issue of our time. I say that despite the fact that it isn't in my interest to do so, given that I have devoted much more of my property scholarship to eminent domain.

"NIMBY" defenders of exclusionary zoning argue that they are necessary to protect the interests of current homeowners in places like Arlington - people like my wife and myself. But, in many ways, we too have much to gain from breaking down zoning restrictions - especially if we have children and we want them to be able to find affordable housing.

In recent years, valuable reforms have been enacted in a number of states and localities, and others are under consideration. But much remains to be done. The progress made in these four jurisdictions is an indication of what can potentially be achieved through broader reform.

Free Speech

Horn-Honking and the First Amendment

|

California law provides,

(a) The driver of a motor vehicle when reasonably necessary to insure safe operation shall give audible warning with his horn.

(b) The horn shall not otherwise be used, except as a theft alarm system.

The Ninth Circuit upheld this law earlier this month, against a challenge brought by a driver who wanted to honk her horn as an expression of support for political process. The court, in Porter v. Martinez (opinion by Judge Michelle Friedland, joined by District Judge Edward Korman, with a dissent by Judge Marsha Berzon), generally reasoned that the law was a content-neutral restriction on expression, and is narrowly tailored to the substantial government interest in traffic safety:

There is nothing novel about Section 27001's traffic-safety justification—in fact, it seems the California legislature had traffic safety in mind when it first enacted a version of Section 27001 in 1913. That early version of the law prohibited honking "for any purpose except as a warning of danger." . The traffic-safety justification for restricting the use of the horn can also be seen in the vehicle codes of at least forty other states, indicating a near-nationwide consensus on the need for such laws. This long history and consensus, coupled with the common-sense inference that the horn's usefulness as a warning tool will decrease the more drivers use it for any other function, support the State's asserted interest in traffic safety.

There's now a petition for en banc rehearing, filed by Porter's lawyer, David Loy of the First Amendment Coalition (a group that I've often represented in Amicus Brief Clinic cases); here's the Introduction:

Read More

Politics

Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions

Loss and woe.

|

Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

The U.S. Supreme Court has said that (most of the time) you need Congress's permission to sue federal officers when they violate your federal constitutional rights. But some state courts have rejected that reasoning when it comes to suing state officers for state constitutional violations. Which is right? In Arc Digital, IJ's Anthony Sanders argues it's the latter. He explains "law" doesn't just come from legislatures. Sometimes "the people" make it via a constitution and sometimes courts do. But the belief in "parliamentary supremacy" makes us think courts can't do what they've done for centuries: provide remedies for wrongs.

Read More

Free Speech

No First Amendment Problem with Temporarily Sealing Divorce Complaints Until Proof of Service Is Filed

|

From Bristow v. Forlini, decided yesterday by Judge Mark Goldsmith (E.D. Mich.):

Mich. Comp. L. § 552.6a provides [in relevant part]:

… Beginning October 1, 2022, a complaint for divorce filed with the court shall not be made available to the public until the proof of service has been filed with the court….

According to the response filed by the State, the statute is intended to provide victims of domestic violence and abuse a temporary period to find "safe harbor" after filing for divorce. Notably, the statute permits defendants and their attorneys of record to obtain a copy of the complaint before the filing of a proof of service.

As a result of this law, Bristow asserts that he can no longer obtain newly filed divorce complaints from the State's Sixteenth Judicial Circuit Court for Macomb County unless proof of service has been filed with the Macomb County Clerk or he has entered his appearance as a party's attorney of record. Bristow maintains that the statute inhibits his practice because it prevents him from expeditiously answering divorce complaints on behalf of his clients. Bristow identifies at least two occasions where he was unable to obtain a complaint filed with the Macomb County Clerk in a pending divorce case.

Bristow challenged the law as violating the First Amendment right of access to court records; the court concluded that he had standing to do so, but concluded that he was unlikely to succeed on the merits:

Read More

A Judge Who Understands Firearms

Judge Stephen McGlynn of the Southern District of Illinois asks probing questions about the state’s new rifle ban.

|

The recently-passed Illinois ban on "assault weapons" and magazines has been subjected to several federal and state court challenges. I previously posted about an adverse decision from the Northern District of Illinois, in which the court appeared to have been seriously misled by the state's "experts" about the nature of the banned firearms.  Today I'd like to focus on the oral argument on motions for a preliminary injunction that recently took place before a judge whose electrifying questions and comments exhibited superior knowledge about firearms.

Oral argument on four challenges was held in Harrel v. Raoul on April 12, 2023, before Judge Stephen McGlynn of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois.  Erin Murphy, counsel in Barnett v. Raoul, conducted the argument for the plaintiffs.  A preliminary injunction was sought not only by the plaintiffs, but also by the defendant local state's attorney and the sheriff.  Christopher Wells argued for the attorney general, the governor, and director of the Illinois State Police, in opposing injunctive relief.

Following the Supreme Court's decision last summer in the Bruen case, Ms. Murphy explained that "arms" include anything that constitutes bearable arms and all instruments that facilitate armed self-defense.  Thus, "a rifle, a pistol, a shotgun doesn't become any less of a bearable arm because it has a pistol grip or a thumbhole stock."  And under Heller and Bruen, the only "arms" that can be banned are those that are dangerous and unusual and therefore not in common use by law-abiding citizens.

Judge McGlynn agreed that "there's no question that AR platform rifles are commonly held, typically held" for self-defense.  But are there limits on how large magazine capacity may be such that it could be regulated?  There's no specific cutoff, Murphy responded, but magazines that are commonly possessed may not be banned.  Hundred-round drums are legal in many states, but are not commonly owned for self-defense.

Read More

Free Speech

"State Regulation of Online Behavior: The Dormant Commerce Clause and Geolocation"

|

Jack Goldsmith's and my article with this title is now out in the Texas Law Review, as is David Post's response (many thanks for writing that, David!). Many of our readers are already familiar with it from when I serialized it here several months ago; but here's the Introduction:

Many state laws apply to internet communications. Indeed, we take many such laws for granted. If you publish an online magazine or a blog that comments on people from all fifty states, you might be subjected to the libel laws of each state. If you sell online images of famous people (or, to be au courant, non-fungible tokens), you might be subjected to each state's right-of-publicity law. Likewise as to the torts of disclosure of private facts, false light, and more. To be sure, the First Amendment uniformly protects much of this speech. But if you go beyond the First Amendment's protections, you could in principle be subject to many different state laws.

When, if ever, must courts reject such laws as unduly burdening interstate commerce in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause? Courts in the 1990s and early 2000s often used the Clause to invalidate some internet-related state statutes—especially ones that restricted "harmful to minors" material. But more recently, and increasingly, courts have upheld state laws regulating various internet transactions.

The issue has been most notably implicated by recent state statutes that limit platforms' ability to block user posts based on the posts' viewpoint. The Florida and Texas social media platform viewpoint-neutrality statutes were indeed challenged under the Dormant Commerce Clause—and though the courts didn't reach the challenges because they struck down the statutes on other grounds, the question will doubtless recur as states increasingly seek to regulate social media platforms. The Supreme Court's decision returning abortion regulation to the states may also lead to statutes limiting abortion advertising that is targeted at states where abortion is illegal, and to Dormant Commerce Clause (as well as First Amendment) challenges to those statutes.

Read More

More