The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Free Speech

First Amendment Claim of Professor Fired Over Article Claiming Race-Based Genetic IQ Differences …

can go forward, rules a federal judge, denying Cleveland State University's motion to dismiss.

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From Judge Dan Aaron Polster's decision Friday in Pesta v. Cleveland State Univ. (N.D. Ohio):

This case concerns the Plaintiff's First Amendment rights to academic freedom, freedom of speech, and freedom of association as a professor at Cleveland State University ("CSU"). The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights when they investigated and fired him for advancing a "genetic hypothesis of the cause of the racial IQ gap" between black and white Americans in a published academic article….

The Plaintiff, Bryan Pesta …, was a Professor in the Department of Management at CSU. Professor Pesta received tenure at CSU in 2010 and promotion to full professor in 2016. In March 2022, CSU fired Professor Pesta….

In August 2019, the Plaintiff co-authored and published in the peer reviewed journal, Psych, an article entitled "Global Ancestry and Cognitive Ability." The article essentially concluded that an IQ gap between white and black Americans was, at least in part, hereditary and the result of genetics. This conclusion is called a "hereditarian hypothesis." … In conducting research for the article, the Plaintiff used National Institute of Health ("NIH") data that consisted of over 9,000 individuals' actual DNA samples. The Plaintiff's article concluded that this data supported the belief that "genetics played a role in the mean differences in general intelligence between White and Black Americans."

The Plaintiff acknowledges that the article "proved controversial." In the aftermath, CSU students and faculty, along with non-affiliated individuals and groups, publicly criticized the article and petitioned CSU to discipline Professor Pesta. One notable critic was Dr. Kent Taylor …. In April 2021, Dr. Taylor—a UCLA Professor of Pediatric Medicine—wrote President Sands and alleged that the article's "[u]se of NIH data for studies of racial differences in this way [was] both a violation of data use agreement and unethical."

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Free Speech

No Pseudonymity for #TheyLied Plaintiff Suing for Libel and Invasion of Privacy Over Rape Accusations

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From Judge Nina Wang yesterday in Doe v. Roe (D. Colo.); note that I filed an objection to plaintiff's motion for pseudonymity:

According to the allegations in the Complaint …, Plaintiff and Defendant dated for nearly a year while enrolled at Tulane University …. After their relationship ended in October 2021, Defendant complained about Plaintiff's behavior to Tulane, which issued mutual no-contact orders the next month. Defendant also sought a protective order in Louisiana state court, claiming that Plaintiff stalked, harassed, shoved, and threatened her.

In both proceedings, Defendant did not claim that Plaintiff sexually assaulted her. Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to a state court order, pursuant to which Tulane's no-contact order became permanent, and Plaintiff agreed to withdraw from Tulane and cease all contact with Defendant. Plaintiff alleges that he never sexually assaulted Defendant, and that he left Tulane voluntarily.

In August 2022, following a "period of reflection," Plaintiff enrolled in Front Range Community College in Boulder, Colorado, although he planned to transfer to the University of Colorado ("CU Boulder") after his first year there. At CU Boulder, Plaintiff rushed and sought to pledge an unspecified fraternity, and paid its dues.

Shortly after the fraternity received his bid in September 2022, Defendant sent text messages to the fraternity's social chairs claiming, among other things, that Plaintiff transferred schools "not through his own choice, but because he was kicked out of Tulane for rape and stalking"; "sexually assaulted and raped [Defendant] countless times"; "forced [Defendant] into very uncomfortable sexual situations, forcing [her] to do painful things which [she] objected to"; "was abusive in every way"; "ha[d] been physically violent with [Defendant]"; "threatened [Defendant's] friends and family and attempted to cut [her] off from every person in [her] life"; and was "a threat to every woman's safety on [CU Boulder's] campus."

The fraternity "terminated" Plaintiff immediately, based on Defendant's allegedly defamatory claims, and refused to refund a deposit he paid. Plaintiff's college friends "cancelled him." Additionally, fraternity members "spread [Defendant's] malicious lies to numerous other students on campus, who proceeded to bully and ostracize [Plaintiff]." Plaintiff was ultimately "forced to withdraw" from CU Boulder "and return home to California." Meanwhile, Defendant has returned to Tulane, where she continues to "publish[] her false and malicious lies to numerous students there." Seeking damages, Plaintiff has brought three claims arising out of these allegations: defamation, intrusion on seclusion, and unreasonable disclosure of private facts.

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Supreme Court

Debating the Legacy of Justice John Marshall Harlan

A critical column by Jamelle Bouie prompts an extensive reply from Peter Canellos.

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After the Supreme Court invalidated the use of race in college admissions in SFFA v. Harvard, NYT columnist Jamelle Bouie wrote a column questioning the legacy of Justice John Marshall Harlan. The Supreme Court majority's reliance upon language from Harlan's opinion, Bouie suggested, might not be as anomalous as some of the Court's critics would like to think. Though credited with the claim that "the Constitution is colorblind," Harlan was no anti-racist.

The language of colorblindness that Roberts and Thomas use to make their argument comes directly from Justice John Marshall Harlan's lonely dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, the decision that upheld Jim Crow segregation. "There is no caste here. Our Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens," wrote Harlan, who would have struck down a Louisiana law establishing "equal but separate" accommodations on passenger railways.

But there's more to Harlan's dissent than his most frequently cited words would lead you to believe. When read in its entirety, the dissent gives a picture of Harlan not as a defender of equality, but as someone who thinks the Constitution can secure hierarchy and inequality without the assistance of state law. It's not that segregation was wrong but that, in Harlan's view, it was unnecessary. . . .

Harlan's brief for the colorblind Constitution rested, within the text, on a belief in the inherent superiority of white Americans and the basic inferiority of their Black counterparts. "Blacks and whites could be 'equals before the law,'" notes Hutchison, "but that did not mean they were equals in any other respect — in the social realm, racial inequality would rule 'for all time' if the nation remained blind to race 'in view of the Constitution.' "

This column prompted an extensive reply from Peter Canellos, author of The Great Dissenter: The Story of John Marshall Harlan, America's Judicial Hero in Politico. His reply begins:

There is no high court for historical injustices, no tribunal to which a historical figure can appeal when their reputation is maligned. Yet simple fairness and the need for a balanced view of the past require some attempt at reputational justice. Even in death, people should reap what they sow. It's a question that would have interested the Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan, who served from 1877 to 1911. With his religious values, unusual sense of how judicial opinions shape American destiny and his many dissents that appealed to future generations, Harlan believed in the long judgment of time.

But he might have shuddered at the thought of his own reputation in the dock.

Harlan's fame rests as the sole dissenter in case after case that took away the rights that Black people were granted in the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution. Those dissents not only inspired African American leaders in his time but provided an early roadmap for the victories that Black lawyers won in the 20th century. The fact that even one — though only one — white judge had seen the law in terms of its effect on Black people kept hope alive in the Black community. From church pulpits, he was hailed as a prophet in his time.

Canellos rejects Bouie's interpretation of Harlan, suggesting it results from wrenching Harlan's views out of context and transposing them into contemporary debates.

Bouie suggests that the notion of a purely color-blind Constitution can be used to cement white privileges in the law. Fair enough. He also goes on to suggest that this was what Harlan intended to do.

A closer look at Harlan's Plessy dissent, and the wider arc of his career, does not support that contention. . . .

Harlan was, indeed, far-sighted, but it's not credible to suggest his main concern was preserving racism at home while shielding it from critics abroad. His concern for the plight of Black people was straightforward and sincere, a feeling that Black people had been denied their legal rights as Americans. They had gotten a rotten deal. And concerns over white America's treatment of Black people were reflected in almost every aspect of his life during his years on the bench.

After a fairly thorough survey of Harlan's record (covering far more column inches than Bouie had at his disposal in the NYT) Canellos concludes:

It is commonly said that all such figures were "of their times." Certainly, their words and actions should be judged in the context of their times, including the prejudices that attached to that period. But that doesn't mean that every person is fated to share those biases, or that anyone whose work responds to the peculiar challenges of their era must be held in suspicion.

In Harlan's case, his willingness to acknowledge the wrongs done to Black people helped sustain faith in the legal system at one of its worst hours. His actions convinced Marshall, Motley and others that it was possible to persuade white judges to enforce the rights of Black people; imagine the disgrace to the system if every white judge had refused to uphold the Civil Rights Act of 1875, or if every white judge had rallied around the separate-but-equal doctrine.

It seems to me that the injury to public discourse in failing to recognize those who broke the mold or stood apart — or in seeming too eager to discredit them — is precisely that it forecloses the possibility of exemplary behavior. If John Marshall Harlan was a prisoner of his times, so are we prisoners of ours. And that serves to extinguish hope for a better world.

Supreme Court

Will SCOTUS Be the Mountain Valley Pipeline's MVP?

The Mountain Valley Pipeline's developers seek Supreme Court intervention to prevent the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit from delaying its completion.

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After years of legal and political wrangling, it appeared the Mountain Valley Pipeline was nearing completion. fewer than four miles of the 300-plus-mile project remain to be completed and Congress endorsed the pipeline's completion. Section 324 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 expressly called for the approval of all remaining permits, ratified all prior federal agency permits, and constrained further judicial review of such permit approvals.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit appears not to have gotten the message. Despite the fact that Congress had stripped the Fourth Circuit of any jurisdiction over cases challenging the pipeline's permits, last week the court issued two orders staying additional construction and approvals from the U.S. Forest Service and Fish & Wildlife Service.

On Friday, Mountain Valley Pipeline filed an emergency application with Chief Justice Roberts asking the Supreme Court to vacate the stays. The brief, filed by former Solicitor General Donald Verelli, explains why the Fourth Circuit's actions lacked any legal basis.

The argument that apparently convinced the Fourth Circuit to enter its stays is that Congress lacks the constitutional authority to intervene and effectively end the legal challenges to the pipeline's construction. As this academic amicus brief puts it, Congress may not "direct the result in pending litigation without amending substantive law." The problem is that Congress has substantively amended the law -- declaring these permits valid, rather than telling the Fourth Circuit to so conclude -- and deprived the Fourth Circuit of jurisdiction to consider the question (vesting such jurisdiction in the D.C. Circuit instead).

It is worth remembering that the only reason environmentalist groups have been able to challenge the Mountain Valley Pipeline in the first place is because Congress decided to impose permitting and other requirements for projects like this and further provided for judicial review of the relevant agency determinations to ensure that Congress's standards had been met. What Congress giveth, Congress may also take away. Congress was not required to allow environmentalists or anyone else to challenge whether a Forest Service or Fish & Wildlife Service decision was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law. Indeed, Congress did not even need to require that projects like the Mountain Valley Pipeline obtain federal permits at all. Thus Congress is certainly free to declare that the standards Congress set forth for projects like this have been met in this particular case -- and that is what it did.

Not only is the Fourth Circuit wrong to think there is a basis for continuing to hold up the Mountain Valley Pipeline, it lacks the jurisdiction to consider the question. It is well established that Congress retains the power to shift or strip federal jurisdiction, even from pending cases, and even if that disadvantages one party to the litigation. (See, e.g., Ex parte McArdle in which the Supreme Court upheld legislation stripping the federal courts of hearing particular habeas claims, even though that doomed McArdle's habeas petition.) Such a move may seem like dirty pool, but it is well within Congress's power to do.

The legal merits of this dispute seem rather clear. The only question is whether the Supreme Court will consider the Fourth Circuit's actions to be sufficiently egregious to justify a "shadow docket" order vacating the stays or providing other extraordinary relief.

Free Speech

No Pseudonymity for Non-Citizen Challenging Law Limiting Non-Citizens' Participation in Voter Registration

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From Chief Judge Mark Walker's opinion yesterday in Hispanic Federation v. Byrd (N.D. Fla.); the pseudonymous plaintiff is apparently a lawful permanent resident:

{This case involves a constitutional challenge to a newly-enacted law regulating third-party voter registration organizations. Plaintiff Doe seeks to proceed anonymously to avoid retaliation or harassment considering their immigration status and due to the "elevated political climate" concerning immigration more broadly.}

Ordinarily, parties referred to in a complaint must be identified by their real names. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provide that "[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties." Similarly, courts have long recognized that "[l]awsuits are public events" and that the public has a "legitimate interest in knowing all of the facts involved [in a case], including the identities of the parties." …

The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that pseudonyms may only be used in "exceptional" cases, and that there is "a strong presumption in favor of parties' proceeding in their own names." That presumption can only be overcome where the party seeking to proceed pseudonymously shows that they have "a substantial privacy right which outweighs the 'customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.'" In determining whether Plaintiff Doe has such a right, this Court considers the following three factors: (1) whether they are "seeking anonymity challenging government activity," (2) whether they will be "required to disclose information of the utmost intimacy", and (3) whether they will be "compelled to admit their intention to engage in illegal conduct and thus risk criminal prosecution."

As to the first factor, [that] Plaintiff Doe is challenging government activity … only has a neutral effect. Cf. Frank , 951 F.2d at 324 ("[T]he fact that Doe is suing the Postal Service does not weigh in favor of granting Doe's request for anonymity."); cf. also Roe v. Aware Women Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, at 686 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[N]o published opinion that we are aware of has ever permitted a plaintiff to proceed anonymously merely because the complaint challenged government activity.").

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Politics

"Strangers on the Internet" Podcast Episode 36: Therapy Speak as Relationship Abuse

Why the Sarah Brady and Jonah Hill controversy carries broader meaning

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The 36th episode (Apple Podcasts link here and Spotify link here) of Strangers on the Internet with co-host and psychologist Michelle Lange explores how therapy language has at times been weaponized in romantic relationships.

The Internet is abuzz with discussion about allegations by Sarah Brady, a University of Hawai'i law student, that her ex-boyfriend and celebrity Jonah Hill emotionally abused her and dressed up the abuse in therapy language. According to screenshots of text messages she posted publicly, he designated it "boundaries" that she should not post swimsuit pictures of herself on social media, model, surf with men, or interact with female friends of whom he didn't approve, among other things.

We discuss the difference between boundaries and coercive control, the ways in which boundary speak doesn't absolve the speaker of problematic values injected into requests (or demands), and the general current trends in distorting psychological language to serve one's purposes. We also delve into what happens when a partner's mental health or other life circumstances make it difficult for them to give what the other person might actually deserve under optimal conditions. Tune in and join the discourse!

Progressives Should Be Grateful For President Trump's Not-So-Conservative SCOTUS Picks

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Recently, Ron DeSantis, the Governor of Florida and GOP presidential candidate, offered a mild criticism of President Trump's three Supreme Court nominees. "I respect the three [Trump] appointees," DeSantis said, "but none of those three are at the same level of Justice Thomas and Justice Alito." DeSantis is not wrong. Consistently, Justices Brett Kavanaugh, Amy Coney Barrett, and to a lesser extent Neil Gorsuch, have voted to the left of Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito. Today, critics assail this Supreme Court as the most conservative bench in modern history. True enough. But it could have been far, far worse for progressives if President Trump had actually nominated Justices in the mold of Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. 

Look past the string of headline-grabbing conservative victories concerning abortion, affirmative action, the religion clauses, the Second Amendment, and so on. Rather, count up the 5-4 cases on the merits docket that swing left, the rejection of applications on the emergency docket brought by conservative litigants, and the denials of certiorari petitions that could have moved the law to the right. These three-dozen cases are all progressive victories snatched from the jaws of conservative defeat. On balance, progressives should be grateful for President Trump's not-so-conservative SCOTUS picks.

The Merits Docket

 

Let's start with the Supreme Court's merits docket. Justice Gorsuch has cast the deciding vote in five 5-4 cases that swung to the ideological left. First, Sessions v. Dimaya held that a federal immigration law was unconstitutionally vague. Second, Washington Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den exempted members of an Indian tribe from a tax on fuel importers. In both of these two cases, Justice Kennedy voted with the Court's conservatives in dissent. The third case, Herrera v. Wyoming, protected the right of an Indian Tribe to hunt on "unoccupied"  property. Fourth, United States v. Davis held that a criminal penalty for using a firearm during a "crime of violence" was unconstitutionally vague. The fifth case was the most significant. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which held that large portions of Oklahoma, including the city of Tulsa, remain "Indian country." As a result, the state of Oklahoma could not prosecute crimes committed by members of the Creek nation. In each of these five cases, President Trump's nominee to replace Justice Scalia voted opposite the Court's four conservatives.

After Justice Kavanaugh replaced Justice Kennedy, it should have become harder for the Court's four progressives to cobble together a majority for 5-4 cases--in theory at least. In May 2019, Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion in Apple v. Pepper, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan. The case held that iPhone owners could sue Apple for alleged antitrust violations. 

In September 2020, Justice Ginsburg passed away. By the end of October, Justice Barrett was confirmed to fill the vacancy. Now, with only three progressives on the Court (Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) two conservative Justices would have to swing left to form a five-member majority. Yet, the progressives would prevail in five more 5-4 decisions. In each case, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanugh joined the three progressives. First, Biden v. Texas approved the Biden administration's immigration policy. Second, Biden v. Missouri held that the federal government could mandate vaccines for health care workers. Third, Nance v. Ward ruled in favor of a death row inmate. Fourth, Torres v. Madrid allowed a plaintiff to sue police officers who shot her. Fifth, Torres v. Department of Public Safety ruled that Texas could be sued for damages.

In June 2022, Justice Breyer retired, and was replaced by Justice Ketaji Brown Jackson. This past term, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh continued to join the Court's three progressives in two prominent 5-4 cases. Allen v. Milligan held that Alabama violated the Voting Rights Act by not creating a second "majority-minority" district. And Cruz v. Arizona permitted a prisoner to challenge his conviction in federal court.

Finally, even when Justice Kavanaugh votes with the Court's conservatives, he still pivots left. Justice Kavanaugh wrote influential concurring opinions in the landmark abortion and Second Amendment cases. These concurrences narrowed the majority opinion by resolving difficult questions that were not yet in front of the Court.

By my count, since Justice Gorsuch's appointment, a Trump appointee has cast the decisive fifth vote in a 5-4 case that swung to the left a dozen times. To date, Justice Barrett has not cast the deciding vote in a 5-4 liberal case. But this tally only considers the Supreme Court's merits docket. The Supreme Court's emergency docket provides an even larger set of data points.

 

Emergency Docket

 

On the so-called "shadow" docket, five votes are needed to grant relief. Generally, these applications for emergency relief are decided by unsigned per curiam opinions. On occasion, one or more Justices will dissent from the denial or grant of relief. Since November 2020, Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch have consistently ruled together on emergency applications. Had Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett joined the conservative troika in each case, (3+2=5) full relief would have been granted.  

In January 2021, the Harvest Rock Church and South Bay United Pentecostal Church challenged California's restrictions on in-person gatherings and singing during worship. The Court, by a 6-3 vote, ruled that the prohibition on indoor worship violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch went further, and declared unconstitutional the singing ban. Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh, however, left the singing ban in place. (This concurrence was Justice Barrett's first writing on the bench.) This 3-2 split on the emergency docket would repeat itself again and again.

In four cases, Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett declined to cast the deciding votes that would have blocked the enforcement of vaccine mandates: Dunn v. Austin, We The Patriots USA v. Hochul, Does 1-3 v. Mills, and Dr. A. v. Hochul. Eventually, Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett also likely declined to grant certiorari in Dr. A v. Hochul. (I say likely here, and elsewhere, because the Justices did not expressly state their positions, but we can reasonably infer how they voted.) Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsch would have heard the case. Meanwhile, in Austin v. U.S. Navy Seals 1-26, Justice Kavanaugh and likely Justice Barrett allowed the Navy to deny religious exemptions for the vaccine mandate. 

This 3-2 split would fracture other cases on the emergency docket. The plaintiffs in Coalition for TJ v. Fairfax County School Board asked the Supreme Court to block an affirmative action policy at an elite public high school. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch would have granted the application. Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett were silent. In Moore v. Harper, the republican North Carolina legislature asked the Supreme Court to block the state supreme court's finding of a partisan gerrymander. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch would have granted the stay. Justice Kavanaugh and likely Justice Barrett declined to grant relief. (In June 2023, Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett would cast the fifth and sixth vote against the North Carolina legislature on the merits docket). In Alabama Association of Realtors v. HHS, the Court declined to block the federal eviction moratorium. Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett would have granted the application. Justice Kavanaugh concurred to explain why he would leave the policy in place, at least temporarily. (After the Biden administration called Kavanaugh's bluff, and continued the policy, the Court halted the moratorium by a 6-3 vote.) In NetChoice v. Paxton, Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett voted to block the enforcement of a Texas law that restricted social media sites. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch would have allowed the regulations to go into effect.

Since Justice Barrett's confirmation, I count thirteen cases in which she and Justice Kavanaugh could have joined Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch on the emergency docket. But the duo chose not to. By contrast, Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh likely joined the Court's progressives in Lombardo v. St. Louis. That unsigned opinion gave another appeal to the family of a prisoner who died in police custody. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch would have allowed the case to end. Ultimately, the lower court ruled against Lombardo's family again, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari over Justices Sotomayor and Jackson's dissent. 

Prior to Justice Barrett's confirmation in October 2020, Justice Kavanuagh was often the odd man out on the emergency docket. I count at least five cases from before the presidential election, which challenged COVID-related voting procedures: Berger v. North Carolina State Board of Elections, Wise v. Circosta, Moore v. Circosta, Andino v. Middleton, and Republican National Committee v. Common Cause Rhode Island. In each case, Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch would have granted full relief. Justice Kavanaugh did not.

Cert Denials

 

On the Supreme Court, four votes are required to grant certiorari. In rare cases, one or more Justices will dissent from the denial of certiorari. When there are three such dissents, we can reasonably infer that one more Justice was unwilling to give a "courtesy" fourth vote. Like with the emergency docket, there have been a string of high-profile cases where Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch dissented from the denial of certiorari. One more vote from a Trump appointee would have granted the petition. By my count, Justices Kavanaugh or Barrett could have been the fourth vote for certiorari in five important cases, but they chose not to.

In 2018, the Supreme Court denied appeals from Kansas and Louisiana, which excluded Planned Parenthood from Medicaid funding. Justice Kavanaugh, who could have provided the pivotal fourth vote, was silent in these cases. Arlene's Flowers v. Washington involved a florist who declined to make floral arrangements for a same-sex wedding. After nearly seven years of litigation, the Supreme Court denied review. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch would have granted the petition. Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett were silent. Boardman v. Inslee involved a challenge to a Washington law that granted employee information to unions. The Court denied review, but Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch would have granted certiorari. Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett allowed the case to conclude. Shoop v. Cunningham presented a challenge to a two-decade old murder conviction. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch would have granted review, and summarily reversed the lower court judgment that ruled for the prisoner. Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett said nothing. 

In Dignity Health v. Minton, California required a Catholic hospital to perform a hysterectomy on a transgender patient. The Court denied review, over the dissents of Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch. Alas, without the votes of Justices Kavanaugh or Barret, the Catholic hospital would be forced to perform the procedure. In a related case, Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany v. Emami, New York mandated that religious employers must fund abortions through their employee health plans. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch would have granted certiorari immediately. But Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett kicked the can down the road, and let the New York courts consider the case in light of a recent Free Exercise Clause decision, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. 

The following year, the New York appellate division ruled that Fulton did not change the relevant standard, so the Diocese lost again. And why did Fulton not change the relevant standard? Because in Fulton, Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh declined to overrule Employment Division v. Smith, a decision that required courts to deferentially review laws that burden religion. Even when Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh joined a conservative majority opinion, they tempered its reach. 

Meanwhile, Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch would have overruled Smith in Fulton. The relationship between Fulton and Catholic Diocese of Albany illustrates with clarity the gap between Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett on the one hand, and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch on the other.

 

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Critics of the Court should be at least somewhat grateful. Had President Trump nominated three Justices in the mold of Justices Alito and Thomas, none of the nearly three-dozen cases I mentioned above would have gone to the left, none of the moderating concurrences would have been written, and many of the emergency applications would have been granted. I'm not saying that the progressive glass is half-full--but they're lucky it's not empty. On the other hand, conservatives should be thrilled, but their cup does not exactly runneth over. 

Murder

New Statistical Evidence Supports the "Minneapolis Effect" as an Explanation for Increases in Homicides

A recently published statistical analysis of homicide rates in New York City finds strong support for the hypothesis that de-policing resulting from the George Floyd protests caused the 2020 homicide spikes.

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It is well known that there were significant spikes in homicides in 2020, particularly in major urban areas. In an article I published in 2021, I attributed these spikes to what I dubbed the "Minneapolis Effect"--specifically reductions in proactive policing as police pulled back in the wake of the George Floyd protests. I blogged about my article here.

A few days ago, an important new statistical study found corroboration for my hypothesis in New York City. Professor Dae-Young Kim's article "Did De-Policing Contribute to the 2020 Homicide Spikes?" answers the question posed in the title in the affirmative.

Professor Kim's article examines NYC homicide data from 2017 through 2020. It divides homicides into six different categories: gun, non-gun, domestic, non-domestic, gang, and non-gang. It assesses the connection between homicide rates in those categories and a significant reduction  in NYPD police stops of pedestrians. In NYC, stops fell from 13,453 in 2019 to 8,375 in 2020--a 30% decrease in proactive policing.

Professor Kim's article found that the reduction in stops led to an increase in three homicide categories:

… the interaction term of police stops and the pandemic presents the extent to which the 2020 homicide surges were attributable to reduced proactive law enforcement. Specifically, gun, non-domestic, and gang homicides significantly increased as police stops decreased in the pandemic and post-Floyd era. In addition, the supplementary correlation analyses present a significant correlation of police stops to gun (r=−.406, p =.008), non-domestic (r=-.321, p=.041), and gang (r=−.364, p=.019) homicides, respectively, in the pandemic and post-Floyd era. In contrast, the significant correlations disappear in the pre-intervention era.

While the full article is behind a paywell, one can gain a quick sense of the strength of Professor Kim's analysis by looking at graphs depicting NYC police stops, total homicides, and the six homicide categories described above:

In the first of the eight charts above, the reader can see the dramatic reduction in police stops by NYPD following the George Floyd protests. In the remaining charts, the simultaneous significant increase in homicides in the gun, non-domestic, and gang categories (but non in non-gun, domestic, and non-gang categories) is visually evident.

The explanation Professor Kim gives for this pattern tracks the one that I gave in my paper on the "Minneapolis Effect"--specifically, that police stops are targetted at gun crimes and related gang activity, and thus a reduction in stops will produce the greatest increase in homicides in these specific categories. As Professor Kim puts it:

Pedestrian stops are used to stop and frisk anyone, but mostly known gang members, on the street they suspect might engage in criminal activity or carry concealed weapons. Given the goal of pedestrian stops, the effects of de-policing should be more pronounced on gun, non-domestic, and gang homicides that usually occur in public settings. The current findings echo Piza and Connealy's (2022) study in that the lack of policing caused crime increases, ultimately compromising public safety and endangering communities.

In an earlier paper on the 2016 Chicago homicide spikes, Professor Fowles and I saw a similar pattern in the Chicago data.

Professor Kim's findings support the conclusions that I reached in my paper on the "Minneapolis Effect" about the compelling need to increase proactive policing. Here is the conclusion from my earlier article:

The quantitative data and qualitative evidence strongly suggest that a "Minneapolis Effect" has struck—that is, in the wake of antipolice protests following George Floyd's death in Minneapolis, police officers are being redeployed from antigun efforts and are retreating from proactive law enforcement tactics. This reduction in law enforcement efforts targeted at firearm crimes has led, perhaps predictably, to an increase in firearm crimes.

This article attempts to quantify the size of the Minneapolis Effect, estimating that about 710 more homicides and 2,800 more shootings occurred because of reduced policing in June and July alone. And the victims of these crimes are disproportionately Black and Brown, often living in disadvantaged and low-income neighborhoods.

While these estimates are stated in the cold precision of an economic calculation, it must be remembered that behind these grim numbers lies a tremendous toll in human suffering—lives lost, futures destroyed, and families left grieving. Understanding the nation's recent—and ongoing—homicide spikes requires urgent attention. And even more urgently, the nation needs to consider all possible responses to this tragedy, including responses that involve increased and proactive law enforcement efforts directed at combating gun violence.

 

Supreme Court

Notes on "The Restrained Roberts Court"

Contrary to popular perception, the current Supreme Court overturns precedent and declares laws to be unconstitutional less often than its predecessors did.

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In the July 31 issue of National Review, in an article titled "The Restrained Roberts Court," I explain why some common criticisms of the current Supreme Court are simply untrue. In particular, I explain that the Roberts Court overturns precedent and holds legislative enactments unconstitutional significantly less often than did the Warren, Burger, or Rehnquist Courts. In other words, the Roberts Court is meaningfully less "activist" than its post-WWII predecessors, at least as measured by conventional metrics.

From the article:

Commentators and reporters generally accept that the current Court is more likely to overturn precedent and invalidate laws than we have come to expect. Yet this widely shared perception is wrong. Based on available metrics, the current Court is less likely than its predecessors to overturn precedents or invalidate legislative enactments. If such actions are the hallmark of judicial imperialism, the Roberts Court is not particularly imperialist. . . .

the Roberts Court is the least likely of any court since World War II to overturn precedent. The Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts all overturned Supreme Court precedents at a higher rate than the Roberts Court, and it is not particularly close. Compared with its predecessors, the Court under Chief Justice Roberts has largely maintained the status quo.

This is not anything new. Folks have been charging that the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Roberts has been abandoning precedent for years. As I have shown in prior posts going back years, the data did not support such charges then, and it does not support such charges now.

Terms Cases Overruled Overruled/Term Overruling Cases Overruling/Term Alteration/Term (SCD)
Warren Court 15 64 4.27 45 3.00 3.06
Burger Court 17 70 4.12 52 3.06 3.41
Rehnquist Court 19 50 2.63 41 2.16 2.42
Roberts Court 17 25 1.47 19 1.12 1.65

 

While it may well be the case that the current Court, over time, may begin overturning precedents at a higher rate than its post-WWII predecessors, we have not seen that yet (and that is true whether one treats the Roberts Court as a single court, or if we divide it into a "First" and "Second" Roberts Court with the change occurring either when Justice Kavanaugh replaced Justice Kennedy or Justice Barrett replaced Justice Ginsburg.)

As in my prior analyses, I based my claims looking at three data sets, two compiled by the Library of Congress (precedents overturned per term and decisions overturning precedent per term) and one from the Supreme Court database (precedents altered per term). All three data sets produce similar results.

The number of precedents overturned per term may be lower in the Roberts Court, but are the precedents overturned more longstanding or significant? It does not appear they are any older or more longstanding. The average age of precedents overturned by the Roberts Court (38 years old) is older than that of the Warren Court (22 years old), but comparable to that of the Burger (35) and Rehnquist (39) Courts.

What about significance? From the article:

It is fair to note that not all cases — nor all precedents — are created equal, and some observers have considered the precedents that the Roberts Court has overturned to be especially important. But there is no neutral measure of a precedent's importance. Most people likely think the Dobbs decision to overturn Roe v. Wade was more important than the overturning of Nevada v. Hall's holding on state sovereign immunity in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt. But was Dobbs more significant than the Court's 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia to overrule Penry v. Lynaugh and declare the execution of an intellectually disabled person to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment? And if so, by how much? And what about decisions that overturned precedents concerning the rights of criminal defendants to confront their accusers, or the authority of states to tax out-of-state businesses, or the application of the 14th Amendment's liberty and equality guarantees to homosexual conduct and gay marriage?

The article shows how there is a similar story to be told when it comes to Court decisions declaring legislative enactments to be unconstitutional. The Roberts Court is doing that less than its post-WWII predecessors as well.

Note that these trends coincide with the Court hearing fewer cases, and this is largely due to the justices' collective decision to hear fewer cases. Hearing fewer cases means there are fewer opportunities to overturn precedent, declare statutes unconstitutional, or otherwise shift the law. The cases which produce such outcomes may be a larger share of the Court's overall decisions, and such cases may have a more consistent ideological valence than before, but as a quantitative matter, the Court is still doing less.

One claim about the Roberts Court that I think has greater merit is that it has is more skeptical of the executive branch than its predecessors have been. I think this is a fair claim, and is the result of a longer term trend. Across the board the Court has become less deferential to the executive branch over time. This is true in the context of administrative law (going from, say, SEC v. Chenery II to West Virginia v. EPA) but in areas like national security as well (going from Ex parte Quirin to Boumediene v. Bush).

What is most different about the Roberts Court is not that it is more likely to overturn precedent or declare statutes to be unconstitutional. What is different is that it is a more consistently conservative court than its predecessors. The Burger Court had a supermajority of justices appointed by Republican presidents, but was not particularly conservative. While the Rehnquist Court was thought by some to be fairly conservative, it issued plenty of decisions overturning precedents or declaring statutes to be unconstitutional that most would consider to be "liberal" decisions. Lawrence v. Texas and Roper v. Simmons are good examples.

During the first twelve years of the Roberts Court, the Court tended to be conservative, but not consistently, and certainly not consistently in cases in which precedents were reconsidered or statutes held unlawful. Justice Kennedy was the median justice during this period and the Court's decisions to overturn precedents and reject statutes largely tracked his particular jurisprudential vision, and this often meant decisions overturning precedents or rejecting statutes while moving the law in a "liberal" direction. Obergefell v. Hodges and Kennedy v. Louisiana are good examples.

When Justice Kennedy was on the Court, he was the median justice on a Court that was otherwise 4-4. This meant that his preferences often controlled. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh may be the median justices on the current court, but both of them are more consistently conservative in their rulings than was Justice Kennedy. Further, for the Court to overturn precedent or reject a statute on "liberal" grounds, the concurrence of more than one conservative justice is required. So we may get an occasional decision in which, say, Justice Gorsuch and Justice Barrett join the three progressive justices to overturn a conservative precedent, but such cases are likely to be rare.

This change in the court affects what cases the Court agrees to hear as well. It takes four justice to grant certiorari, so the three progressive justices lack the ability to force the Court to hear a case that concerns them (and they may not want to force the consideration of such cases either, as they may not like the outcome). This only reinforces the likelihood that when the Court decides to reconsider a prior precedent, it is more likely to reconsider a precedent about which the conservative justices are skeptical, and any resulting decision will likely move the law in what most would consider to be a conservative direction.

My National Review article concludes:

The reality is that some precedents should be overturned and some federal or state laws should be declared unconstitutional. It is also the case that the nation is divided over when such steps are warranted. I approve some of the Roberts Court's decisions in each of those categories and disapprove of others — but, in each case, my evaluation is based on my sense of the merits of the case and the Court's arguments. Accusations that the Court is vaporizing precedent and trampling democratic enactments — suggesting that it is not merely making bad decisions but doing so in an illegitimate way — are part of a broader effort to delegitimize it.

For many decades and with some regularity, the Court has overturned precedents and struck down legislative enactments. But so long as most such decisions moved the law in a progressive direction, legal elites mostly bit their tongues. What is different about the Roberts Court is not that it is keener to change the law but that, when it does so, it is more likely to shift doctrine in a conservative direction. If that makes the Court "not normal," as President Biden recently charged, and if that is supposed to be a problem, then the Court's critics should make their case openly and honestly.

Politics

Today in Supreme Court History: July 17, 1862

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7/17/1862:  Congress enacts the Confiscation Act, which empowers the government to seize the property of the rebels. The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of that law in The Confiscation Cases (1873).

The Chase Court (1873)

Academic Freedom

My New Article on Legislative Restrictions on Classroom Speech

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I am pleased to see that my latest article on the efforts of state legislatures to restrict what ideas professors can endorse in the classroom has now been published. "Professorial Speech, the First Amendment, and Legislative Restrictions on Classroom Discussions" appears in the latest issue of the Wake Forest Law Review.

From the abstract:

Academic freedom enjoys an uncertain status in American constitutional law under the First Amendment. It is particularly unclear how the First Amendment applies when it comes to professorial speech in the classroom. This lack of clarity has grave implications in the current political environment. There is now an unprecedented wave of legislative proposals aimed at curtailing teaching and discussing controversial topics relating to race and gender in state university classrooms, and the constitutionality of such measures will soon need to be resolved.

This Article sets out a new argument for protecting from legislative interference how faculty at state universities teach their courses. Building on existing First Amendment jurisprudence regarding academic freedom and government employee speech, the article lays out the constitutional infirmities with anti-Critical Race Theory proposals and clarifies the scope of an individual constitutional liberty in the context of professorial speech.

From the conclusion:

The Supreme Court has invited confusion by noting but not fleshing out an academic-freedom exception to ordinary government-employee speech doctrine.  It is possible to flesh out that exception in a way that coheres with the Court's various doctrinal commitments, but it will require reaffirming that professorial speech is "a special concern of the First Amendment."  When state government officials attempt to restrict what ideas can be taught in the classrooms of public universities, they do real damage not only to the intellectual life of those universities but also to the public discourse of the country.  The First Amendment is grounded in the fundamental commitment to the view that ideas should be freely discussed and that they cannot be rejected or embraced as a result of government diktat.  In the mid-twentieth century, the government sought to prevent the spread on college campuses of what it regarded as dangerous ideas by dismissing any professor who might adhere to them, discuss them, or teach them.  The Court rejected the stifling hand of censorship then.  The tools of censorship being wielded by the government today are different, but the ultimate goal is the same.  Government officials do not want professors at state universities to discuss ideas with which those government officials, and perhaps even popular democratic majorities, disagree.  The First Amendment bars them from having their way.

The argument developed in the article has relevance for legislation like Florida's Stop WOKE Act, the constitutionality of which is now before the 11th Circuit.

You can find the article here.

Free Speech

Poems of Emigration: "Simply People Who Couldn't Think as Instructed"

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Russian history has produced a subgenre of poems and songs about emigration (something American history has fortunately been largely spared). I blogged in March about Yevgeniy Kliachkin's "Farewell to the Motherland," and I also like the great Bulat Okudzhava's poem that begins,

How good it is that Zworykin left
And invented television there
If he had not left the country,
He, like all the rest, would have gone to Golgotha….

How good it is that Nabokov left
Not sharing with anyone the secrets of parting
How lucky that was! And on how many prophets
Their native land showed no mercy! …

Not a happy sentiment, but, hey, Russia's is not a happy history. In any event, a few weeks ago I came across Robert Rozhdestvenskiy's "The Talented Were Leaving My Country," written about the emigration of the 1970s. Here are the opening stanzas, which I found to be the most affecting; as usual, apologies for the flawed translation:

The talented were leaving my country,
Taking with them their dignity.
Some having sampled the Gulag gruel
And some a week before it.

Those who left weren't some sort of heroes—
How to tell who's a hero and who's not?
Simply people who couldn't think as instructed
Even if those were the very best of instructions ….

Free Speech

No Pseudonymity or Sealing in College Student's Race Discrimination Lawsuit

A federal court rejects plaintiff's arguments "that sealing ... is required because she is being 'slandered and libeled' and '[m]aking [her] information public would magnify the effects of [defendants'] wrongdoing' rather than right those wrongs."

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From Judge Rachel Kovner (E.D.N.Y.) in Anonymous v. Doe, decided last week:

Between June 14 and June 20, 2023, plaintiff, proceeding pro se and under the name "Anonymous," filed four actions … alleging that defendants the City of New York, LaGuardia Community College, and various individual employees of the College violated her constitutional rights. Along with the complaints, plaintiff filed requests that each action be placed under seal and that she be allowed to proceed anonymously ….

Plaintiff's four complaints all contain allegations that she was discriminated against in violation of federal and state law during her time as a student at LaGuardia Community College…. Plaintiff's first complaint alleges that, in June 2022, a College employee identified only as Jane Doe, in an attempt to discriminate against plaintiff on the basis of her race, falsely accused plaintiff of making a threat against a professor, eventually leading to plaintiff being barred from campus…. Plaintiff's second complaint centers around an incident in June 2022 when, in the aftermath of Jane Doe's accusation against plaintiff, plaintiff was allegedly accosted by multiple College security officers, threatened with arrest, and falsely imprisoned…. Plaintiff's third complaint alleges that a College professor subjected her to differential treatment based on her race and created a hostile learning environment, then falsely accused plaintiff of threatening her, ultimately leading to plaintiff being denied a diploma…. Plaintiff's fourth complaint alleges that the College discriminated against her and defrauded her in various ways, including by misrepresenting its services, fraudulently decreasing her GPA, depriving her of an opportunity to attend or speak at her commencement ceremony, and improperly placing financial and disciplinary holds on her student record….

[A.] Plaintiff's Sealing Requests Are Denied

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