The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Torts

Mississippi Court Rejects Tort Claim Over Wife's Leaving Husband "Without Any Notice or Warning"

The court also concludes that there is no separate "verbal assault" tort in Mississippi, and that falsely telling spouse "I love you" generally isn't actionable fraud.

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From Justice Lawrence's opinion in Herbert v. Herbert, decided in April 2023, but only recently posted on Westlaw:

In the complaint's first count, Mark asserted a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the complaint Mark stated, "On or about November 7, 2018, without any notice or warning whatsoever, the [d]efendant left the parties' marriage." Mark alleges that despite his efforts at "reconciliation," Nina has "refused all communication." The complaint continued that since November 7, 2018, the defendant engaged in "numerous intentional actions or communications" that caused "severe emotional distress to the [p]laintiff." …

{In Mark's affidavit attached to his response in opposition to summary judgment, he alleged the following testimony as further "examples of facts" that support his claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, verbal assault, fraudulent misrepresentation, and defamation and slander: "When I called to tell [Nina] that my mother, to whom she was close, had died unexpectedly, she offered no sympathy, but yelled repeatedly and loudly that I had been mean to her and refused to come to [my mother's] funeral because [Nina] was not my wife. We were still married at the time." Nina "intentionally email[ed] me a photograph of my being charged with a BUI," "scream[ed] out in front of gathered people that [I] was a 'motherf*****' and flipped [me] the middle finger," "l[ied] to me [concerning] where she was on November 9, 2018," and "[o]n November 14-18, 2018, remov[ed] property from the couple's joint storage unit and empt[ied] [the] marital home."} …

To prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove

[(1)] [t]he defendant acted willfully or wantonly towards the plaintiff by committing certain described actions; [(2)] the defendant's acts are ones "which evoke outrage or revulsion in civilized society"; [(3)] the acts were directed at, or intended to cause harm to, the plaintiff; [(4)] the plaintiff "suffered severe emotional distress as a direct result of the acts of the defendant"; and [(5)] "such resulting emotional distress was foreseeable from the intentional acts of the defendant."

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Free Speech

Encouraging Readers to Harass Person for Alleged Sexual Misconduct Creates Jurisdiction in Person's Home State

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From Lord v. Smith, decided last Friday by Judge Virginia Kendall (N.D. Ill.), reaffirming an earlier decision:

Both Lord and Smith are professional online gamers with millions of followers on streaming platforms and social media. They use the handles Ohmwrecker and H2O Delirious, respectively. Lord alleges that Smith began a defamatory online harassment campaign, accusing him of sexual misconduct with a minor and of releasing revenge porn against a different, adult partner. He also claims that Smith promoted harassment and stalking of Lord among Smith's 4.4 million Twitter followers. He says Smith encouraged his fans to threaten Lord with violence and "repeatedly assisted his fans getting access to [Lord's] home address."

Lord is an Illinois citizen, and Smith is a citizen of North Carolina. Lord brings claims against Smith for portraying him in a false light, defamation, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Smith moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. He submitted an affidavit affirming that he lives and conducts his business in North Carolina, has never set foot in Illinois, and has directed none of his videos, business, or online posts specifically to residents of Illinois. In response, Lord submitted an affidavit that Smith "directed his fans to my home address in Illinois and encouraged his fans to contact and harass me, even when his fans commented on these posts with threats of violence against me."

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Affirmative Action

Court Preliminarily Enjoins Minority Business Development Agency Race- and Ethnicity-Based Funding

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The case is Nuziard v. Minority Business Dev. Agency, decided Monday by Judge Mark Pittman (N.D. Tex.); here's the summary of the program:

To qualify as a "minority business enterprise" [under the MBDA], a "socially or economically disadvantaged individual" must manage the business's operations and own at least 51% of it. An individual is presumed to be a "socially or economically disadvantaged individual" if they are Black, African American, Hispanic, Latino, American Indian, Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander, Puerto-Rican, Eskimo, Hasidic Jew, Asian Indian, or a Spanish-speaking American. But any other race or ethnicity is not considered "socially or economically disadvantaged" and thus ineligible for the center's services….

And here's the court's opening paragraph:

The Constitution demands equal treatment under the law. Any racial classification subjecting a person to unequal treatment is subject to strict scrutiny. To withstand such scrutiny, the government must show that the racial classification is narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. In this case, the Minority Business Development Agency's business center program provides services to certain races and ethnicities but not to others. Because the Government has not shown that doing so is narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest, it is preliminary enjoined from providing unequal treatment to Plaintiffs….

Note that the challenge was just to race- and ethnicity-based funding, so it might be that the preference for Hasidic Jews isn't covered. The term "Jews" can refer both to an ethnic group and a religious group, depending on the context; but "Hasidic Jews" seems to me to refer just to a religious group (albeit one whose self-identification tends to turn  on ancestry as well as religious practice). Nonetheless, the court's analysis suggests that this preference is as unconstitutional as the others.

Congratulations to Richard M. Esenberg, Daniel P. Lennington & Cara M. Tolliver of the Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, and to Jason C. Nash, all of whom represent plaintiffs.

The Great Success of Artificial Intelligence

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Many people have long doubted that AI can really simulate humans. But recent news made me a believer. Making up plausible-seeming but utterly false statements, and asserting them as true with no shame but with total assurance? That's about as human as you can get.

AI in Court

Lawyer Explains How He Used ChatGPT to Produce Filing "Replete with Citations to Non-Existent Cases"

"Can you show me the courts opinion in Varghese v China Southern Airlines"? "Certainly! ... I hope that helps!"

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A month ago, I wrote about Judge Kevin Castel (S.D.N.Y.)'s May 4 order in Mata v. Avianca, Inc.:

The Court is presented with an unprecedented circumstance. A submission filed by plaintiff's counsel in opposition to a motion to dismiss is replete with citations to non-existent cases. When the circumstance was called to the Court's attention by opposing counsel, the Court issued Orders requiring plaintiff's counsel to provide an affidavit annexing copies of certain judicial opinions of courts of record cited in his submission, and he has complied. Six of the submitted cases appear to be bogus judicial decisions with bogus quotes and bogus internal citations. Set forth below is an Order to show cause why plaintiff's counsel ought not be sanctioned.

The Court begins with a more complete description of what is meant by a nonexistent or bogus opinion. In support of his position that there was tolling of the statute of limitation under the Montreal Convention by reason of a bankruptcy stay, the plaintiff's submission leads off with a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Varghese v China South Airlines Ltd, 925 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff's counsel, in response to the Court's Order, filed a copy of the decision, or at least an excerpt therefrom.

The Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in response to this Court's inquiry, has confirmed that there has been no such case before the Eleventh Circuit with a party named Vargese or Varghese at any time since 2010, i.e., the commencement of that Court's present ECF system. He further states that the docket number appearing on the "opinion" furnished by plaintiff's counsel, Docket No. 18-13694, is for a case captioned George Cornea v. U.S. Attorney General, et al. Neither Westlaw nor Lexis has the case, and the case found at 925 F.3d 1339 is A.D. v Azar, 925 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir 2019). The bogus "Varghese" decision contains internal citations and quotes, which, in turn, are non-existent: …

The following five decisions submitted by plaintiff's counsel contain similar deficiencies and appear to be fake as well ….

The court therefore ordered plaintiff's counsel to show cause why he shouldn't be sanctioned, and plaintiff's counsel responded that he was relying on the work of another lawyer at his firm, and this second lawyer (who had 30 years of practice experience) he was relying on ChatGPT. The court ordered a further round of explanations, and here's the heart of the filing yesterday from the second lawyer (paragraph numbering removed):

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Surveillance

On Bears With Video Cameras and Fourth Amendment Law

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Ilya recently flagged the civil suit recently filed in federal court in which the complaint alleged that Connecticut officials violated a couple's Fourth Amendment rights by releasing camera-carrying bears in the area that came within 200 yards of their home.

Commentators are having lots of fun with the case, and that's great.  And to the extent some readers have strong views of putting video cameras on wild bears as a matter of policy, I am glad this case gives them an opportunity to voice those concerns.  But if some are wondering if the suit has legal merit, I don't think it does. Among the problems:

  1. The bears did not enter a space that the Fourth Amendment protects.  The Fourth Amendment is not a roving protector of all property interests.  It's pretty specific about the kinds of property it protects: "persons, houses, papers, and effects."  A bear 200 yards from a home has not searched a person, house, paper, or effect, so it hasn't triggered the Fourth Amendment.  It's true that the Supreme Court has adopted a rule that some space immediately outside of a physical home can count as a "house" — the so-called "curtilage" doctrine, which extends the home to area around the home that is used like parts of the home, such as a front porch — but I am not aware of caselaw that says the curtilage can extent 200 yards from a home. The cases just don't extend the house concept that broadly to cover so much land in the area around the home, whether under the so-called "reasonable expectation of privacy" theory or the so-called "property" theory of searches. (Some commentators suggest that the curtilage doctrine wrongly takes away Fourth Amendment rights by artificially limiting the Fourth Amendment to the space around the home, but I think that is textually backwards; it's the text of the Fourth Amendment that limits protection, and the curtilage doctrine that extends the home beyond the four walls of the building.)
  2. There's reason to doubt the bears are covered by the Fourth Amendment.  Does putting a camera around a bear's neck make the bear a state actor, like a person?  This isn't necessarily a new question.  There's lots of lower-court caselaw on drug-detection dogs that are brought to a car and then jump into the car and sniff for drugs, alerting to drugs inside. Most (but not all) of that caselaw holds that, if the dog jumped into the car unprompted by a human officer, then it's not action attributable to the government. If that caselaw applies here, then it seems dubious that the bears are covered by the Fourth Amendment at all.
  3. The plaintiffs are seeking a remedy that is not available to them, at least based on the complaint.  The plaintiffs are seeking an injunction ordering the state officials to turn off all cameras on bears within 10 miles of their property, for all video taken from the cameras to be destroyed, and to stop bears from having cameras (or at least from coming on to their property). But under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons (1983), injunctive relief is not available in federal court against state officials unless the plaintiff can show "a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way." Here, I take it that would require some showing that the state's tagged bears are going to come up to their home with the video cameras on again (assuming the cameras were on before). If there is specific reason to think that, it is not in the complaint.

There are other arguments the state could make, such as that the bear-tagging program, if it's a search, is part of a reasonable non-law-enforcement program under the "special needs" exception. Certainly plausible, but it would help to have more facts about the program to say more.

Anyway, I realize that discussing current law draws the ire of some readers, who prefer we discuss what the law of camera-carrying wild bears should become, not merely what the rulings of small-minded courts would suggest it now is. But I figured I would at least offer the latter.

Second Amendment Roundup: Looking for Historical Analogues in All the Wrong Places

California is appealing the injunction against its “Not Unsafe” Handgun Act.

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California's Unsafe Handgun Act effectively bans the sale of almost all semiautomatic pistols that were designed beginning in 2007, and all such pistols introduced in 2013 and thereafter.  As explained in a previous post, in March, U.S. District Judge Cormac J. Carney of the Central District of California issued a preliminary injunction in Boland v. Bonta against enforcement the law.  The Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction pending appeal.

Along with co-counsel Dan Peterson, I filed an amici curiae brief in support of the plaintiffs on behalf of law enforcement and firearms rights groups.  I'd like to share our major points.  First, some background.

California bans pistols with  designs introduced in 2007 and thereafter based on two features that the state requires but that consumers don't want or need.  One is a magazine disconnect mechanism that prevents the pistol from being fired without a magazine; that's bad for emergency use in self-defense.  The other is a chamber load indicator, a hole, protrusion, or visual indicator allowing one to tell if a round or cartridge is in the chamber; that's a substitute for the basic safety rule always to assume that a firearm is loaded.  Almost no manufacturer makes pistols with both features.

California is not appealing the injunction against enforcement of a third required feature, microstamping capability, in which the firing pin leaves a distinctive mark on the primer of a cartridge when fired. It's supposed to help solve crimes, but won't. Required since 2013, the technology just isn't feasible, and no pistols are manufactured with that feature.

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Free Speech

First (?) Libel-by-AI (ChatGPT) Lawsuit Filed

"Every statement of fact in the summary [provided by ChatGPT] pertaining to [plaintiff] Walters is false."

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It's Walters v. OpenAI L.L.C., No. 23-A-04860-2, filed in Gwinnett County (Georgia) yesterday. An excerpt from the Complaint (and please note both that the Complaint is just an allegation, and that the statements quoted in it about Walters are allegedly entirely made up, not by some human accuser but by a hallucinating AI program):

8. Fred Riehl is a third party who works for a media outlet [Ammoland.com] as a journalist and who is a subscriber of ChatGPT.

9. On May 4, 2023, Riehl interacted with ChatGPT about a lawsuit (the "Lawsuit") that Riehl was reporting on.

10. The Lawsuit is in federal court in the Western District of Washington, case No. 2-23-cv-00647, with short caption of The Second Amendment Foundation v. Robert Ferguson….

14. In the interaction with ChatGPT, Riehl provided a (correct) URL of a link to the complaint on the Second Amendment Foundation's web site, https://www.saf.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Dkt-1-Complaint.pdf. [I assume that he was using a ChatGPT plugin that allows users to feed PDFs into ChatGPT. -EV]

15. Riehl asked ChatGPT to provide a summary of the accusations in the complaint.

16. ChatGPT responded that the document "[I]s a legal complaint filed by Alan Gottlieb, the founder and executive vice president of the Second Amendment Foundation (SAF), against Mark Walters, who is accused of defrauding and embezzling funds from the SAF. The complaint alleges that Walters, who served as the organization's treasurer and chief financial officer, misappropriated funds for
personal expenses without authorization or reimbursement, manipulated financial records and bank statements to conceal his activities, and failed to provide accurate and timely financial reports and disclosures to the SAF's leadership. The plaintiff seeks various forms of relief, including the recovery of misappropriated funds, damages for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, and removal of Walters from his position as a member of the SAF's board of directors."

17. Every statement of fact in the summary pertaining to Walters is false.

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Religion and the Law

Women-Only Naked Spa Lacks Constitutional Right to Exclude Transgender Patrons with Penises

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From Judge Barbara Jacobs Rothstein's opinion yesterday in Olympus Spa v. Armstrong (W.D. Wash.):

The Olympus Spa is a Korean spa "specifically designed for women," and the services offered there "are closely tied to the Korean tradition," meaning patrons are "require[d] … to be naked" during certain services. The facilities include "a bath area containing multiple whirl-pools, a traditional Korean body-scrub service area, standing showers, sit-down showers, a steam room, and a dry sauna." As noted, patrons are "typically fully naked" while utilizing these areas and thus "have visual access" to other nude patrons. Nor is nudity optional. It is allegedly "required for certain procedures called 'Seshin'" pursuant to Korean tradition. According to Plaintiffs, female patrons receiving a Korean body scrub "must do so unclothed," and all employees who provide those scrubs ("ddemiri") are women.

Olympus Spa maintains a "female-only policy" under which it restricts admission to women—or, more specifically, individuals who "physically present[ ] in the nude as … female." It apparently advertised this entry policy on its website with the following language: "Biological women are welcome[.] It is the policy of Olympus Spa not to discriminate on the basis of race, color, national original, sex, age, or disability in its programs or activities, as required by applicable laws and regulations." Olympus Spa thus admits transgender women only if they have "gone through post-operative sex confirmation surgery." Plaintiffs attribute the policy to their "traditional, theologically conservative" Christian values. They believe in "modesty as between the sexes" and "hold the conviction that a male and female should not ordinarily be in each other's presence while in the nude unless married to each other." See also Dkt. No. 1-2 at 4 ("Women are in a vulnerable position when they are unclothed and/or having treatment while unclothed and we seek to ensure that they feel their privacy and rights are respected. This is a biblical principle from 1 Peter 3:7, 1 Timothy 3:1-7, 1 Timothy 5:2, Phillipians 4:3, Genesis 1:27, Proverbs 31:17, Phillipians 2:3 and more."). The Jane Doe Employees accordingly refuse to perform massages or body scrubs on naked men. And Jane Doe Patron, a Christian "who frequently receives treatments at Olympus Spa," likewise "believes that men and women should not be viewing each other's naked bodies unless married to each other." …

The Washington State Human Rights Commission concluded that the spa's policy violated Washington's ban on gender identity discrimination in public accommodations, and the court held that this didn't violate the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause, or the right of intimate association:

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Guns

Third Circuit Holds That at Least Some Felons Retain Second Amendment Rights

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Today's en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General so concludes, in a majority opinion by Judge Hardiman, which got the votes of nine of the fifteen judges. The challenger in this case pleaded guilty in 1995 to making a false statement to obtain food stamps; because this was in theory punishable by up to five years in prison under Pennsylvania law, that made him a felon for federal gun law purposes (even though his actual sentence was just three years' probation plus "$2,458 in restitution, $288.29 in costs, and a $100 fine"). But the logic of the majority opinion suggests that this might apply to many felons, perhaps even including people convicted of violent felonies, at least as I read the court's rationale.

Judge Ambro, joined by Judges Greenaway and Montgomery-Reeves concurred, but would have excluded felons whose crimes suggest that they "would, if armed, pose a threat to the orderly functioning of society," such as "murderers, thieves, sex offenders, domestic abusers, and the like." Judge Greenaway also joined the majority, but the other two did not. (Judge Porter also wrote a separate concurrence focusing on federal power.)

Judges Shwartz, Restrepo, Krause, and Roth dissented, generally arguing that felon disarmament laws are categorically constitutional. Judge Krause's separate dissent is particularly detailed. I don't have the time to excerpt the opinions, which are 107 pages long, and contain much detailed historical argument; you can read them here.

It seems to me nearly certain that the Supreme Court will agree to hear the case, perhaps in conjunction with the Fifth Circuit domestic civil restraining order automatic disarmament case, U.S. v. Rahimi. As a practical matter, this is a much more important case than Rahimi (which itself is quite important); the federal government is nearly certain to seek review by the Supreme Court; the decision invalidates a federal statute; there is a circuit split; the broad reasoning of the decision is in tension with the Court's statements that felon disarmament laws are presumptively constitutional. All of these are factors cutting in favor of Supreme Court review, and put together they make such review extremely likely.

Merck Sues HHS, Claims Drug Price Negotiation Program Violates First and Fifth Amendment

Pharma has a "choice": Negotiate with HHS or pay $10 million "tax" per day.

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Today, Merck challenged the constitutionality of the Drug Price Negotiation Program for Medicare, under the Inflation Reduction Act. Generally, the word "negotiation" suggests a voluntary transaction between two parties. But negotiating with the government is seldom voluntary. You can't just walk away. The New York Times describes the process this way:

Experts noted that the negotiation process gives drug makers leeway to reject Medicare's final offer and walk away without a deal if they are not happy, subject to a tax. [Update: The Times updated the story to include the following sentence] But Merck's lawsuit said that for one of the company's drugs, the tax for refusing an offer could amount to tens of millions of dollars on the first day and rise to hundreds of millions daily after a few months.

And how much is that "tax"? The amount starts at 186% of the drug's daily revenue, and increases to 1900% of the drug's daily revenue. Merck claims that it would have to pay tens of millions of dollars on the first day after it refuses to negotiate, and that amount could escalate to hundreds of millions per day after a few months. Is this a tax? Or a penalty? For those keeping track at home, Congress projected that the exaction, whatever it is, would raise no revenue, since non-compliance would bankrupt any company.

Sounds familiar? This framework reminds me of the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid Expansion. The Obama Administration gave the states a choice: expand Medicaid or risk losing their entire Medicaid budget. Ultimately, the Court found this spending program was unconstitutionally coercive. Chief Justice Roberts recognized that the states did not actually have a meaningful choice of whether to expand Medicaid. Roberts explained in his controlling opinion:

More importantly, the size of the new financial burden imposed on a State is irrelevant in analyzing whether the State has been coerced into accepting that burden. "Your money or your life" is a coercive proposition, whether you have a single dollar in your pocket or $500.

Of course, Merck is not a state, and the Inflation Reduction Act does not violate the Tenth Amendment. But there are other constitutional provisions at play.

First, Merck raises a claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Here, the pharmaceutical products are "private property" under Horne v. USDA (2015). Moreover, the drugs are patented, which creates another species of property rights. Here is the crux of the argument:

Under the IRA, the Government will take Merck's patented products by forcing Merck to provide third parties with "access" to those products at steeply discounted prices. That compelled transfer of title effects a classic, per se taking. See, e.g., Horne, 576 U.S. at 362; Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2072 (2021) (taking occurs whether the Government takes property "for itself or someone else"). This Program deprives Merck of the "rights 'to possess, use and dispose of'" its property. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). Just as the statute in Horne effected a classic per se taking by requiring raisin farmers to turn over a portion of their crop to the Federal Government, see 576 U.S. at 361, the IRA's forced-sale regime does the same by compelling drug manufacturers to surrender their patented drugs to third parties for the Government's benefit.

Horne and Cedar Point provided robust protection of property rights. Indeed, Cedar Point--in my view, at least--quietly rewrote decades of Takings Clause precedent. The IRA program is somewhat different from Horne, in that the government is not physically taking the pills from Merck's factory--like the trucks that showed up to collect the Horne's raisins. Rather, the federal government is effectively forcing Merck to "negotiate" with Medicare, and then to sell the drugs at that "negotiated" rate. And all of this is done without providing any just compensation. Again, I put scare quotes around "negotiate" because the tax/penalty is so ruinous that there is no actual ground for arms-length bargaining. Your money, or your company's life.

Congress could, assuming there is a "public use," simply seize Merck and the drugs it produces pursuant to the Takings Clause, by paying just compensation. Remember, Congress could have seized the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company, and required it to manufacture steel for the war efforts; the President could not act unilaterally. But taking over Merck, a la Venezuela, would have been politically unpalatable. Congress could have also dictated the prices at which the drugs were sold. But again, such a move would have been a political non-starter. Instead, the program was sold under the cheerful banner of "negotiation." Sort of like when the exaction that enforced the ACA was labelled a "penalty" rather than a "tax." Who wants to pay new taxes? But the Inflation Reduction Act's shortcut runs directly into the Takings Clause.

Merck also argues that they are required to "agree" that HHS's prices are "fair." Merck asserts that they are compelled to communicate "state propaganda," and thereby deceive the public.

In short, when the Government seeks to influence the public, it must do so as a genuine participant in the marketplace of ideas. It cannot seize additional megaphones by commandeering the voices of others. The IRA's dystopian parody of "negotiation" violates those principles. First, by forcing manufacturers to "agree" with HHS on a "maximum fair price"—as opposed to just forcing manufacturers to sell at that price—the Program compels those businesses to parrot an ideological message inimical to their own views.

In many regards, this case reminds me of the original challenge to the Affordable Care At in 2010. The case is brought by Yaakov Roth of Jones Day, who was one of the lawyers involved with NFIB v. Sebelius. Indeed, we once again have something of a synergy between big business and conservative constitutional jurisprudence (the Takings Clause and compelled speech doctrine). More and more of late, there is a greater disconnect between these pillars, but at least here, all the stars seems to line up.

Stay tuned.

Free Speech

George Santos's Bail Guarantors Must Be Disclosed -- but the Order so Holding Is Sealed Pending Appeal

(The appeal is an appeal to the District Court, so it will likely be resolved fairly quickly.) [UPDATE 6/20/23: The District Court affirmed the disclosure order; the guarantors' names will be released 6/22, at least unless they "seek to withdraw from" being guarantors.]

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From Magistrate Judge Anne Shields (E.D.N.Y.) today, in U.S. v. Santos:

For the reasons contained in the attached Order, the motions to unseal the identities of the Suretors who signed the Bond for Defendant's pretrial release, filed herein at Docket Entries 13 and 14, are granted. To allow Defendant to appeal this ruling to the District Court, the Clerk of the Court is directed to maintain the attached decision and all previously sealed documents, including the Bond, under seal. Any appeal of this Order must be filed by noon on Friday, June 9, 2023.

Here's more on the backstory, from a post of mine on the subject when the motion to unseal was filed:

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Trans

Court Blocks Florida Law Limiting "Puberty Blockers" and Cross-Sex Hormones for Minors

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From Doe v. Ladapo, decided today by Judge Robert Hinkle (N.D. Fla.):

This action presents a constitutional challenge to a Florida statute and rules that (1) prohibit transgender minors from receiving specific kinds of widely accepted medical care and (2) prohibit doctors from providing it. The treatments at issue are GnRH agonists, colloquially known as "puberty blockers," and cross-sex hormones. This order grants a preliminary injunction….

[II.] Gender identity is real

With extraordinarily rare exceptions not at issue here, every person is born with external sex characteristics, male or female, and chromosomes that match. As the person goes through life, the person also has a gender identity—a deeply felt internal sense of being male or female. For more than 99% of people, the external sex characteristics and chromosomes—the determinants of what this order calls the person's natal sex—match the person's gender identity.For less than 1%, the natal sex and gender identity are opposites: a natal male's gender identity is female, or vice versa. This order refers to such a person who identifies as female as a transgender female and to such a person who identifies as male as a transgender male. This order refers to individuals whose gender identity matches their natal sex as cisgender.

The elephant in the room should be noted at the outset. Gender identity is real. The record makes this clear. The medical defendants, speaking through their attorneys, have admitted it. At least one defense expert also has admitted it. That expert is Dr. Stephen B. Levine, the only defense expert who has actually treated a significant number of transgender patients. He addressed the issues conscientiously, on the merits, rather than as a biased advocate.

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crime victims

What is the Significance of an Attorney General's Confession of Error in a State Capital Case?

In my Supreme Court amicus brief for the victim's family in Oklahoma v. Richard Glossip, I argue that the Oklahoma Attorney General's unfounded confession of "error" should not dictate the case's outcome.

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Currently pending before the Supreme Court is a certiorari petition filed by Richard Glossip, who was convicted eighteen years ago of commissioning the murder of Barry Van Treese in 1997. Glossip was sentenced to death for his crime. Glossip's petition seeks review of an issue related to his purported discovery of "new" evidence, which he alleges was "concealed" by the prosecution.

The newly-elected Oklahoma Attorney General supports Glossip's petition, as indicated by his support of Glossip's earlier-filed motion for a stay of execution.

Yesterday, along with Kent Scheidegger of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, I filed an amicus brief for the Van Treese family and the Oklahoma District Attorneys Association. The brief urges the Court to deny further review. Here is the introduction from the brief:

This case involves Glossip's effort to overturn an aggravated murder conviction that is nearly two decades old. The Oklahoma state courts have carefully reviewed that conviction and resulting death sentence. They have concluded that Glossip is guilty and his sentence is proper.

But in the last few months, a new Oklahoma Attorney General has arrived on the scene. For reasons that are unclear, he personally believes that a new trial is warranted—an opinion unanimously rejected by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) below as "not based in law or fact."

The Attorney General's opinion does not provide a basis for reviewing the decision below, which is fully supported by multiple independent and adequate state grounds. Any further delay would inflict enormous suffering on the Van Treese family. The Court should deny certiorari.

Our amicus brief goes on to argue:

The "new" evidence issue Glossip asks this Court to review was carefully considered by Oklahoma's highest court for criminal cases. The OCCA reached the fact-bound conclusion that there was no "new" evidence—and thus no reason to doubt the integrity of Glossip's convictions and sentence. No federal legal issue exists warranting further review. Such review is barred by adequate and independent state grounds for the OCCA's decision.

In addition, the OCCA's factual conclusions below were entirely correct. The purported concealment of evidence never occurred. And the dispute pertains to evidence that was not material to Glossip's aggravated murder conviction.

At bottom, Glossip asks this Court to adopt the novel theory that, when a state Attorney General personally disagrees with a decision below, that unhappiness trumps all other procedural requirements. But "the proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of parties." Young v. United States, 315 U. S. 257, 259 (1942). This Court has no authority to give decisive weight to the Attorney General's views over the OCCA's—and there is no reason to do so given the trauma that any further delay would inflict on the victim's family.

Two other amicus briefs were filed yesterday, both supporting Glossip's petition. A brief filed by law professors Nora Freeman Engstrom et al. argues that the Court should review the issue of a prosecutor's obligations in connection with correcting false testimony at trial. A brief filed by the Innocence Project argues that the OCCA failed to properly defer to the opinion of the Oklahoma Attorney General about this case.

Next month, response briefs will be filed by the Oklahoma Attorney General on July 5 and shortly thereafter by Glossip. The Court will decide whether to review the case in the fall.

My pro bono clients, the Van Treese family, released the following statement as we filed the brief yesterday:

While the Office of Attorney General is the highest law enforcement position in the state, this isn't the wild west, and the Attorney General does not have the power of judge, jury, and executioner. My family hopes and prays that the U.S. Supreme Court will deny the petition and bring this case to a conclusion after 26 long years.

Free Speech

Journal of Free Speech Law: "The New Gatekeepers?: Social Media and the 'Search for Truth,'" by Prof. Ashutosh Bhagwat

Just published as part of the symposium on Media and Society After Technological Disruption, edited by Profs. Justin "Gus" Hurwitz & Kyle Langvardt.

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The article is here; here are the Introduction and the start of Part I:

What is the role of "Trusted Communicators" in disseminating knowledge to the public? The trigger for this question, which is the topic of this set of chapters, is the widely shared belief that one of the most notable, and noted, consequences of the spread of the internet and social media is the collapse of sources of information that are broadly trusted across society, because the internet has eliminated the power of the traditional gatekeepers who identified and created trusted communicators for the public. Many commentators argue this is a troubling development because trusted communicators are needed for our society to create and maintain a common base of facts, accepted by the broader public, that is essential to a system of democratic self-governance. Absent such a common base or factual consensus, democratic politics will tend to collapse into polarized camps that cannot accept the possibility of electoral defeat (as they arguably have in recent years in the United States). I aim here to examine recent proposals to resurrect a set of trusted communicators and the gatekeeper function, and to critique them from both practical and theoretical perspectives. But before we can discuss possible "solutions" to the lack of gatekeepers and trusted communicators in the modern era, it is important to understand how those functions arose in the pre-internet era.

[I.] The Old Gatekeepers

Underlying the concept of trusted communicators is the question of "Who to trust?" But underlying that question is yet another, more foundational one: "Who decides who to trust?" Ultimately, of course, each person must decide for themselves who to trust. But for a societal consensus on this question to emerge, some common source of authority must exist. If there is one lesson that can be drawn from the modern era of social media, it is that robust, public discourse alone cannot be expected to generate an automatic consensus on who can be trusted (or on trustworthy facts). The quest for trusted communicators, then, is in truth a quest for authoritative sources of trust—which is to say, a quest for authority. In the internet era, centralized control over information flows has fragmented and, consequently, so too has the authority to identify trusted communicators. Before seeking to recreate such authority, however, it is important to understand how and why such authoritative sources of information emerged in the pre-internet era, when modern expectations about trust and a factual consensus developed—which is to say, during the first six or seven decades of the twentieth century.

Who were the creators and designators of trust during this period? In short, it was the institutional media. Moreover, through most of the twentieth century, institutional media acted as the gatekeepers of knowledge and news as well. Just who constituted the institutional media gatekeepers, however, changed over time. During the first part of the century, perhaps the crucial period in the development of gatekeepers and trusted communicators, it was major daily newspapers, especially those associated with William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer, as well as Adolph Ochs's New York Times. As we shall discuss in more detail, in many ways it was cultural clashes between Hearst and Pulitzer on one side and Ochs on the other that generated the dominant gatekeeper/trusted-communicator model.

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Politics

Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) Offering $200K in Research Grants

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From FIRE's call for proposals:

Summary: The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE), a nonpartisan 501(c)(3) organization, seeks research proposals related to freedom of expression and academic freedom.

Grant information: A total pool of $200,000 will be available in 2023, with a maximum amount of $65,000 per grant and no minimum amount.

Applicant eligibility: Applicants must currently be one of the following:

  • Faculty — tenured, tenure-track, adjunct or otherwise — at an accredited institution of higher education.
  • A Ph.D. student at an accredited institution of higher education.
  • A postdoctoral researcher at an accredited institution of higher education.
  • A researcher or fellow at a governmental or independent scholarly institution such as a laboratory or think tank….

International eligibility: We accept grant applications from outside of the United States. …

Eligible fields: We currently have the capacity to evaluate grant applications related to freedom of expression and academic freedom in the following fields: economics, education, history, law, philosophy, political science, psychology, and sociology.

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