The Volokh Conspiracy

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The Volokh Conspiracy

Free Speech

Megan Thee Stallion's Defamation Lawsuit Against "Online Personality" "Milagro Gramz or Mobz World" Can Go Forward

Plus, does speech about a celebrity become "intentional infliction of emotional distress" when the celebrity is known to have been "trauma[tized]" by a violent crime?

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From today's decision by Chief Judge Cecilia Altonaga (M.D. Fla.) in Pete v. Cooper:

The allegations are connected to the fallout from the 2022 conviction of Daystar Peterson, popularly known as Tory Lanez, a Canadian rapper and singer who was found guilty of assaulting Plaintiff with a firearm following a widely publicized trial. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant … uses [his social media accounts] to harass and defame Plaintiff by disseminating false narratives and conspiracy theories. These include claims that Plaintiff lied under oath, suffers from alcoholism, is "mentally retarded," and needs a guardian.

The court concludes that plaintiff had adequately alleged that the statements were (1) factual assertions (rather than just insults, hyperbole, or opinion), (2) false, and (3) said with knowledge or recklessness as to their being false.

The court also allows plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to go forward:

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Three Books for Black History Month

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February is Black History Month, and this year's this is "African Americans and Labor." Here are three books I recommend:

1. Robert Higgs, Competition and Coercion: Blacks in the American Economy 1865-1914. Higgs argues that despite significant coercion, there were sufficient competitive forces in the American (and in particular southern, where most black Americans lived) economy to allow African Americans as a group to significantly improve their standard of living during the relevant time period. The book, written in the 1970s, received an undeservedly negative reception from the Marxist-dominated labor history world.

2. Paul Moreno, Black Americans and Organized Labor: A New History. In my review of this book, I wrote:

Moreno, unlike many historians, does not treat black workers and the black people more generally as passive bit players in a larger class conflict between "capital" and "labor." Nor, unlike many historians, does he pay disproportionate attention to the relatively few examples of racially egalitarian unions in the pre–New Deal period, which some historians use as purported exemplars of the true spirit of labor solidarity. Rather, he properly treats African Americans as striving as best they can to promote their individual and collective well-being in a hostile economic and social environment.

3. David E. Bernstein, Only One Place of Redress: African Americans, Labor Regulations and the Courts from Reconstruction to the New Deal. My book started from a simple premise that went almost entirely unrecognized in the relevant literature: given that black Americans lacked political power, one could expect that labor regulations at best would not take their interests into account, and at worse would intentionally be used to exclude them from the labor market. I back up that basic intuition with studies of laws restricting labor recruitment in the south, licensing laws, railroad labor laws, prevailing wage legislation, and New Deal labor laws. I also note that contrary to conventional wisdom, court decisions protecting free labor competition tended to help black workers in the relevant time period.

I'm not going to argue that these are necessarily the three *best* books one can read on African American labor. But I would say that if you are interested at all in the subject, you have probably already read books and articles from a more standard progressive or Marxist perspective, and these books are both well-researched and provide a more market-friendly and regulation-skeptical perspective.

The Fair Labor Standards Act Imposed A Ban On Child Labor That Was "Identical" To the Child Labor Provision Declared Unconstitutional In Hammer v. Dagenhart

Congress enacted a facially unconstitutional provision, and the Solicitor General could only ask the Supreme Court to overrule Hammer.

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This week, I taught cases on enumerated powers from the Progressive Era and during the New Deal. In Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918), the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a federal law that banned the transportation of good made by child labor. The Court found that this law was in fact an attempt to regulate local labor conditions, and the focus on shipping the goods was something of a pretext.

More than two decades later, the Supreme Court overruled Hammer in United States v. Darby (1941). This precedent upheld the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Darby was largely an extension of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel (1935). These two decisions replaced the "direct effects" test with the "substantial effects" test. Under this regime, Congress could regulate any local activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The Court would also review such regulations with something akin to rational basis scrutiny, and require only a reasonable fit between the means Congress has taken, and the ends Congress is seeking to accomplish.

While teaching Darby, I wondered how Solicitor General Francis Biddle distinguished Hammer. So I pulled the government's brief. To Biddle's credit, he acknowledged that the FLSA contained a child labor provision that was "identical" to the law declared unconstitutional in Hammer:

. . . we recognize that the statute declared unconstitutional in Hammer v. Dagenhart is identical with the child-labor provisions in the present Act. And the prohibition against transporting goods produced by adults working under substandard labor conditions which is involved in this case cannot be distinguished in theory from the ban upon shipping goods produced by children.

The SG argued that subsequent precedent was "inconsistent" with Hammer, including Mulford v. Smith (1939). But the FLSA was enacted in 1938, the year before Mulford.

Of course, Biddle asked the Court to overrule Hammer, which it ultimately did:

It is submitted that the Court has abandoned the principles which controlled the decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart, and that the case should be expressly overruled.

But Congress and the President cannot anticipate the overruling of a Supreme Court precedent. Or at least they are not supposed to.

There you have it. Hammer declared a federal statute unconstitutional. Two decades later, Congress re-enacted an "identical" statute, and the President signed it into law, with no contrary precedent on the books.

I find it very difficult to get worked up over the current events of the day. If the President determines that a Supreme Court precedent is wrong (Humphrey's Executor for example), he can choose to take actions inconsistent with it, and let the Courts decide whether to maintain that precedent. Presidents from Jefferson to Lincoln to Roosevelt understood departmentalism. The ABA had a conniption when President George W. Bush issued a signing statement. Trump is making departmentalism great again.

Politics

Guest Post from Professor Kurt Lash: (Former) President J.D. Vance

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I am happy to pass along this fascinating guest post from Professor Kurt Lash:

Vice Presidents are generally considered a kind of president in waiting. In fact, a great many vice presidents have ascended to the presidency, including John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Calvin Coolidge, Lyndon Johnson, Joe Biden

. . . and J.D. Vance.

You may have missed it, but, in fact, J.D. Vance was, by law, our 47th President.

If only briefly. If you watched the Inauguration Ceremonies, you might have noticed an odd moment of rush and confusion between J.D. Vance saying his oath of office and Donald Trump then saying his presidential oath. During those brief moments, J.D. Vance was commander in chief of the armed forces and chief executive of the United States.

Let me explain. J.D. Vance took his oath of office just as the clock was striking 12:00pm. (you can see this on the C-Span feed)According to the Twentieth Amendment, "The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January." This occurred because the ceremony had gone overtime, likely due to a certain politicians deciding to give an elongated comments (for what reason, heaven only knows).

So, instead of Vance taking his oath before 12:00 and Trump taking his oath at twelve, Vance officially became Vice President at the stroke of 12:00pm-- the precise moment former President Joe Biden's term expired. There being no other person qualified to be president at that moment, J.D. Vance automatically became the President.

Again, according to the twentieth amendment:

"If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President-elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified."

Although Donald Trump had been elected by a majority of the people, prior to his taking the oath of office, he was not qualified to be president. According to the Constitution: "Before he enter on the execution of his office, [the person chosen or elected president] shall take the following oath or affirmation—"I do solemnly swear . . ."

As of 12:01, Vance's family was still receiving congratulatory applause and handshakes, while slowly moving away from the podium. The master of ceremonies announced that Chief Justice Roberts who would administer the Presidential oath, and Roberts approached the podium. President-elect Trump also approached and did his family, including Melania Trump who carried the two bibles upon which Trump would place his hand which taking the oath.

Trump was about to qualify as President, but he had not yet taken his oath. Vice President Vance had taken the oath and was qualified to be Vice President and, in the absence of a qualified president, Vance became, however briefly, the most powerful person in the world.

Watch the video of the inauguration oaths again. Vance finishes his oath with his family around him and Vance's hand on a bible. Once the V.P. oath was completed, president-elect Trump advanced to the podium, as did his family and soon-to-be-first lady Melania Trump who held the bibles upon which Trump would place his hand.

Yet, for some reason, Chief Justice John Roberts did not wait for the family to gather or bibles to be put in place. Instead, the Chief Justice immediately began to administer the oath to Donald Trump, bibles be damned. Not under his watch would erstwhile President Vance be allowed to suddenly end the ceremony and declare martial law until the end of the Ohio State-Notre Dame football game.

Chief Justice Roberts knew the constitutional rules and knew the importance of the constitutional clock. So long as the Chief Justice had any say, the term of new 47th President would be brief. Donald Trump good naturedly allowed the Justice to rush the affair, and took the required oath of office. At that point, at the strike of 12:02pm, the presidency moved from Vice President to (now) qualified President Trump.

Don't let anyone tell you otherwise. Despite President Trump's claim to contrary, we have already had our 47th President.

If only for a moment.

The Hughes Court Repudiated FDR In Humphrey's Executor, and the Roberts Court Will Repudiate Trump by Maintaining Humphrey's Executor

The separation of politics, not the separation of powers, will decide Wilcox v. Trump.

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Students always have difficulty reconciling Myers v. United States (1926) with Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935). In Myers, Chief Justice Taft forcefully held that the President has an absolute removal power of a postmaster. But Humphrey's Executor held that the President could not remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission without showing cause. Superficially, at least, there are ways to line up the precedents. The postmaster only exercised executive power, while the FTC member exercised "quasi-judicial" and "quasi-legislative" powers, whatever those are. But there is another explanation I usually tell students.

Humphrey's Executor was argued on May 1, 1935, and decided on May 27, 1935. Schechter Poultry v. United States was argued on May 2 and 3, 1935, and decided on May 27, 1935. Coincidence? I think not. Both of these cases were repudiations of President Roosevelt's powers. Humphrey's Executor unanimously upheld the so-called independent regulatory agencies, and Schechter Poultry unanimously halted the National Industrial Recovery Act. This was not a good day for President Roosevelt. Both cases were largely seen as repudiations of FDR's overreaching powers.

Of course, if Roosevelt lost the battle on May 27, 1935, he would win the war in 1937. Even though there was no actual "Switch in Time that Saved Nine," West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937) signaled that the Supreme Court would no longer stand in Roosevelt's way. And, over time, Roosevelt would make nine appointments to the Supreme Court. The rest is history. In a fairly short period, Roosevelt radically altered the Constitution, the Supreme Court, and our republic.

Over the decades, Humphrey's Executor became a conservative bête noire.  But when the opportunity arose in Morrison v. Olson to scale back Humphrey's Executor, Chief Justice Rehnquist more-or-less reaffirmed the precedent. Only Justice Scalia, in dissent, was willing to highlight the problems with Humphrey's Executor. Over the ensuing decades, Scalia's Morrison dissent became gospel, and Rehnquist's Morrison majority aged quite poorly.

Fast forward to the Roberts Court. In a series of cases, stretching from Free Enterprise Fund (2010) to Seila Law v. CFPB (2020), the Court chipped away at Humphrey's Executor, but did not overrule the precedent. In the wake of Seila Law, the Court has not ventured further, finding various ways to avoid the issue. But that avoidance is no longer possible.

President Trump fired a member of the National Labor Relations Board without showing cause. Trump argued that the removal protections in the National Labor Relations Act are "inconsistent with the vesting of the executive Power in the President." The fired member, Gwynne Wilcox, has challenged her removal. This case allows Trump to directly challenge Humphrey's Executor. The District Court (Judge Howell) and the inevitable D.C. Circuit panel will be bound by that precedent, so there will be no surprises below.

What happens at First Street? The Supreme Court could simply deny review, given that there is a binding, on-point precedent. I am reasonably confident that Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch will vote to grant cert. For reasons I'll explain below, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Barrett will want nothing to do with this case. Who will be the fourth vote for cert? Justice Kavanaugh.

This vote would be the most consequential cert vote Justice Kavanaugh will ever cast. Way back in 2008, then-Judge Kavanaugh wrote in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB (2008) that the D.C. Circuit should "hold the line and not allow encroachments on the President's removal power beyond what Humphrey's Executor and Morrison already permit." He repeated that same line in PHH Corporation v. CFPB (2018).

I have to imagine that overruling Humphrey's Executor is something Justice Kavanaugh has thought about for some time. In 2018, the WSJ wrote, "Judge Brett Kavanaugh, now President Trump's nominee to the Supreme Court, has signaled he would like to overturn the precedent set in the case, Humphrey's Executor v. U.S." By contrast, Chris Walker thought Kavanaugh would not overrule the precedent. Then again, Walker suggested that Kavanaugh would be solicitous to Chevron, and we all know how that turned out in Loper Bright. Kavanaugh's chance to overrule Humphrey's Executor will come soon enough.

But Justice Kavanaugh only gets us to four votes. What about Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Barrett? Let's start with the Chief.

Roberts, like Kavanaugh, came of age after Morrison v. Olson. Humphrey's Executor, much like Roe v. Wade, was the sort of precedent that Reagan wunderkinds dreamed about overruling. Roberts did not need to overrule Humphrey's Executor in Seila Law, so he didn't. But what happened with Dobbs? Roberts blinked. He made up this bizarre fifteen-week test that made a hash out of precedent. It was such a weak opinion that we won't even bother including it in the next edition of the casebook. Roberts thought he was avoiding controversy, but in the process put out a totally forgettable concurrence. Certainly not a ruling for the ages.

I suspect Roberts would do much the same in Wilcox v. Trump. When presented with the opportunity to catch his white whale, he won't. If there was any other Republican president, Roberts would not hesitate to overrule Humphrey's Executor. While overruling Roe created something of a backlash, most Americans don't know the NLRB from the YMCA. Gutting the for-cause protections would make no appreciable difference in people's lives. It would be a freebie! But not with Trump. Roberts will not be seen as surrendering to Donald Trump's hostile takeover of the federal government. The Chief Justice will not save DOGE as a tax. My prediction is that Roberts will vote to reaffirm Humphrey's Executor, and in the process say some meaningless things about the separation of powers.

What about Justice Barrett? I think she will see the stare decisis value of Humphrey's Executor as too strong. She will say that as a matter of first impression, she might decide the case differently (with a cf. footnote citing all of the anti-removal scholarship), but given nine decades of precedent, the reliance interests are too weighty. And by a 5-4 vote, the Roberts Court will save independent agencies.

The Hughes Court repudiated FDR in Humphrey's Executor, and the Roberts Court will repudiate Trump by maintaining Humphrey's Executor. This case will not be based on the separation of powers, but an attempt to separate the Court from politics.

FDR did not have a good day in 1935, but he prevailed in 1937. Every action has a equal and opposite reaction. Let's see what happens in 2027.

Free Speech

"These Events Took Place in 2023—Not 1943": Title VI Anti-Semitic Harassment Claim Against Cooper Union May Proceed

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Judge John Cronan's opinion today in Gartenberg v. Cooper Union (S.D.N.Y.) considers Jewish students' claim that Cooper Union, a N.Y. private college, was deliberately indifferent to protesters' creating a hostile environment for Jewish students following the Oct. 7 attack. As I noted earlier, Judge Cronan concluded (generally correctly, I think), that the First Amendment bars Title VI liability based on "speech on matters of public concern." But the court allowed plaintiffs' case to go forward based on their allegations of other, constitutionally unprotected, conduct; an excerpt from the long opinion:

While Cooper Union is correct that the First Amendment imposes significant limits on the ways in which the Court can rely on many of the alleged acts of harassment detailed in Gartenberg's Complaint, Gartenberg nevertheless alleges sufficient facts to establish an actionably hostile educational environment based on instances of harassment that are not constitutionally protected in this context….

Although the October 25 demonstration began as a peaceful, public protest concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Gartenberg alleges that after a couple hours a mob of protestors forced their way past campus security guards and into the Foundation Building. Once inside, the protestors obstructed the hallway and disrupted classes while apparently attempting to locate President Sparks. Unable to find her, the protesters then "descended on the hallway surrounding the library" while continuing to chant their slogans.

It is plausible that this incident was physically threatening or humiliating to the Jewish students huddled inside the library. The demonstrators "attempted to enter the library, banging on and rattling the locked library doors and shouting 'let us in!'" They then spread out along the floor-to-ceiling windows separating the library from the hallway and banged loudly on the glass while waiving a Palestinian flag, holding up signs critical of Israel, and continuing their chants, this time plausibly directed at the visibly Jewish students inside the library.

This ordeal, which lasted approximately twenty minutes, was sufficiently threatening that a Cooper Union administrator locked the library doors as the mob approached, and the Jewish students left inside, some of whom were crying, contacted their loved ones and attempted to call the NYPD for help. Indeed, two school employees suggested that those Jewish students, and those students alone, should "hid[e] in the windowless upstairs portion of the library out of the demonstrators' sight" or attempt to "escap[e] the library through the back exit." And as noted, President Sparks herself was sufficiently frightened that she locked her office door to keep the demonstrators out before escaping the building through a back exit, and then "had a security guard stationed in front of her office for the remainder of the fall semester." Finally, when the Jewish students were at last able to leave, some of them were escorted out by campus security. These facts provide compelling support for Gartenberg's allegation that this incident was threatening or humiliating.

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Free Speech

"Title VI Must Be Applied Consistent with First Amendment Principles"

A federal district court discusses how the First Amendment limits liability for "hostile environment harassment" based on "speech on matters of public concern" in universities (public or private). And the reasoning may extend to Title VII liability on workplaces as well.

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An excerpt from Judge John Cronan's long decision today in Gartenberg v. Cooper Union (S.D.N.Y.) (I expect to blog more later about other facets of the case [UPDATE: see this post]); note that the court's logic applies to Title VII liability in workplaces as well, especially since it cites precedents and articles that focus on Title VII:

Title VI makes it unlawful for institutions that receive federal funding to discriminate against participants in their programs on account of race, color, or national origin. In the educational context, actionable discrimination includes an institution's "deliberate indifference" to known instances of student-on-student harassment that are "'severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive' and discriminatory in effect." …

Title VI Must Be Applied Consistent with First Amendment Principles, Even When the Defendant is a Private Institution.

At the outset, Cooper Union maintains that Gartenberg's hostile environment claims are based largely on protected political speech by pro-Palestinian members of its community, and are therefore foreclosed by the First Amendment. Indeed, Gartenberg's Complaint—which alleges liability predicated, in part, on a demonstration on a public sidewalk concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the distribution of fliers supporting the Palestinian cause, a controversial "art display" advocating violent resistance to "colonialism," and a speech given by Dr. Bartov about the Holocaust—is "rife … with [F]irst [A]mendment overtones." DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n (5th Cir. 1995).

Gartenberg responds that the First Amendment has no relevance to her hostile environment claims. Gartenberg contends that Cooper Union is a private institution and that "[i]n contrast to students at public or state institutions, students at private colleges do not enjoy First Amendment protections." Going on, Gartenberg argues that regardless of whether Cooper Union is itself bound by the First Amendment, it would "still have the authority under the U.S. Constitution, and a responsibility under Title VI, to punish students who harass their Jewish peers on campus and thereby interfere with the victims' ability to participate in school activities."

Gartenberg's argument is unpersuasive.

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Guns

Second Amendment Protects Marijuana Users Unless There's Concrete Showing They're Dangerous

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From U.S. v. Cooper, decided today by Eighth Circuit Judge David Stras, joined by Judges Steven Grasz and Jonathan Kobes:

In United States v. Veasley (8th Cir. 2024), we concluded that keeping firearms out of the hands of drug users does not "always violate[] the Second Amendment." Now the question is whether it sometimes can. The answer is yes, so we remand for the district court to determine whether it does for LaVance Cooper….

Cooper consented to a bench trial on stipulated facts. One was that he smoked marijuana three to four times a week. Another was that he had done it two days before officers found a Glock 20 pistol in his car during a traffic stop. Based on those facts and a few others, the district court found Cooper guilty of being a drug user in possession of a firearm, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), and sentenced him to 37 months in prison….

In every Second Amendment case, the overarching question is whether a limitation on the right to keep and bear arms is "consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation." N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen (2022). Key to answering that question is identifying "analogue[s]": Founding-era regulations that "impose[d] a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense" with a "comparabl[e] justifi[cation]." See also United States v. Rahimi (2024) (explaining that the modern regulation "need not be a 'dead ringer' or a 'historical twin'"). If no comparable analogues exist because "disarmament is a [purely] modern solution to a centuries-old problem," or strays too far from the "how and why" of "historical regulations," then the Second Amendment kicks in….

In Veasley, we identified two Founding-era analogues that "make [the drug-user-in-possession statute] constitutional in [certain] applications": "confinement of the mentally ill" and the "criminal prohibition on taking up arms to terrify the people."

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FBI Agents File Class Action Challenging "Retaliatory Firing"

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While FBI agents may be at-will employees who can, generally speaking, be fired for "any reason or no reason," they can't be fired for an unconstitutional reason, or as punishment for the exercise of their constitutional rights (e.g. he can't fire all the African-American agents, or all the agents registered as Democrats).

The Complaint, filed in DC District Court, is posted here. Plaintiffs are "employees of the FBI who worked on Jan. 6 and/or Mar-a-Lago cases, and who have been informed that they are likely to be terminated in the very near future for such activity." They "intend to represent a class of at least 6,000 current and former FBI agents and employees who participated in some manner in the investigation and prosecution of crimes and abuses of power by Donald Trump, or by those acting at his behest."

Three Counts of unlawful activity are alleged: (1) Violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution: Retaliation Based on Perceived Political Affiliation; (2) Violation of Plaintiffs' Substantive and Procedural Due Process Rights under the 5th Amendment; and (3) Violation of the Plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment Right to Privacy.

I think they've got a decent case - don't you?

Donald Trump

Trump's Tariff Power Grab May not be Over

Yesterday's deals with Canada and Mexico stopped the trade war for now. But Trump may yet return to asserting sweeping authority to impose whatever tariffs he wants.

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Yesterday, Trump postponed his plan to impose massive 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico, as a result of deals in which the two countries largely promised to do things they were already doing, actions that are highly unlikely to curb the fentanyl crisis that Trump used as a pretext for his actions.

But this doesn't necessarily mean that the crisis is over. After all, Trump only postponed the tariffs by 30 days. He hasn't cancelled the plan to impose them entirely. What he does after the thirty day deadline expires remains to be seen. In addition, Trump's tariff ambitions may not be limited to Canada and Mexico. He also threatens to impose them on the European Union and others. Moreover, even just threatening tariffs only to pull back after extorting concessions on other issues, causes real harm, by disrupting the continuity and legal certainty on which trade relationships depend. A key purpose of free trade agreements - like the USMCA deal that Trump himself signed with Canada and Mexico in 2018, only to violate it now - is to establish certainty and forestall opportunistic imposition of trade restrictions.

Thus, we cannot rest easy about this issue. Importers and others should still plan to bring legal action against the imposition of these kinds of tariffs. And they would do well to use the major questions and nondelegation arguments I outlined here. As also noted in my earlier post, opponents should also do everything they can to oppose the tariffs politically, by highlighting the ways in which they will increase prices for Americans.

Court Upholds 15-Year Sentence for Multiple Politically Motivated Arsons of Walmarts

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From U.S. v. Olson, decided yesterday by Eleventh Circuit Judge Ed Carnes, joined by Judges Andre Brasher and Charles Wilson:

During a two-week period …, Olson conspired with seven others to set fires in four different Walmart stores. They set the fires during business hours while customers, children, and employees were still inside the stores. The fires caused confusion, chaos, and fear….

In early 2021, Alexander Olson moved to Lillian, Alabama, with his brother, Quinton Olson, and his friend, Michael Bottorff, who became two of his co-conspirators, to live in a house already occupied by his other soon-to-be co-conspirators, Jeffrey Sikes, Erica Sikes, Sean Bottorff, Jenna Bottorff, and Mikayla Scheele. After moving in, Olson became involved in meetings (that sometimes lasted all day) in which the eight co-conspirators planned the Walmart fires.

Jeffrey Sikes was unquestionably the leader of the pack. On the night before the first fire, he instructed co-conspirators Olson, Sean Bottorff, and Mikayla Scheele to pack bags with tactical gear and clothes in preparation for the next day's operation. When that day arrived, Olson, Scheele, and Sikes entered the first Walmart during normal business hours, while Bottorff stayed in the getaway car. Sikes told Olson and Scheele that once the three of them were inside the store, they should disperse, douse store merchandise with lighter fluid, and then set the merchandise on fire. Each one of them, including Olson, lit a fire inside the store. As those three fires broke out and spread, there was "mass chaos" as customers, including young children, and employees scrambled to get out of the store.

The next day, Olson and Scheele set fire to another Walmart in Mobile, Alabama. They followed a similar pattern to the one they had used the day before: they entered the store separately, found each other once inside, and then split up as Scheele set fires. As the two of them left the store, there were "a lot of people outside" as everyone tried to escape the burning store. The alarms were loud, the smoke was thick, people were scared and screaming.

On the way back home from that second fire, the group stopped at a different Walmart so that Olson could buy a cell phone. They planned to use that phone to anonymously send a document entitled "Declaration of War and Demands for the People" to various media outlets.

The "Declaration of War" characterized Walmart's policies and business practices as "a crime against humanity" that "validate[d]" the conspirators' "action of war against them." The document included seven demands that Walmart would have to meet for the fires at its stores to stop:

  • Pay its employees $18/hour, regardless of full-time status (Demand 1)
  • Pay 100% of each employee's health insurance premium (Demand 2)
  • Give new moms six months maternity leave and new dads two months paternity leave (Demand 3)
  • Pay its CEO no more than five times as much as its lowest-earning employee (Demand 4)
  • Implement a climate plan (Demand 5)
  • Supply 900 ready-to-eat meals (900 from each store) to people in need each day (Demand 6)
  • Produce half of its goods in the United States within five years (Demand 7)

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Free Speech

Harvard Title VI Settlement Chilling Anti-Israel, Anti-Zionist, and Anti-Anti-Zionist Speech

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FIRE (Robert Shibley) has a long and detailed analysis of the settlement (announced Jan. 21), which I highly recommend. A few thoughts of my own [UPDATE: I made some corrections below; see the UPDATE at the bottom for more details]:

[1.] The settlement adopts the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of anti-Semitism, which defines anti-Semitism to include, among other things,

Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.

Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.

Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation….

Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.

Much as I disagree with such statements, they are constitutionally protected speech, whether anti-Semitic or not; no serious university should ban them.

[2.] Harvard also adds an express prohibition on anti-Zionist statements, which could be violated by statements such as "using or disseminating tropes, stereotypes, and conspiracies about Zionists (e.g., 'Zionists control the media')." Whether or not such statements are anti-Semitic, they too are constitutionally protected. People must be free to criticize ideologies (whether political, religious, or a mix), even in intemperate and hyperbolic (and unfair) ways.

Note also that Harvard policy now says, "Zionists, anti-Zionists, and non-Zionists are all protected against discriminatory disparate treatment and harassment under the policy." This follows that "using or disseminating tropes, stereotypes, and conspiracies about" anti-Zionists would be forbidden as well.

[3.] Harvard, as a private university, could restrict speech this way on its own without violating the Constitution. But I think federal government pressure aimed at getting such intermediaries to restrict speech does violate the Constitution (see NRA v. Vullo (2024), and also this post by Evelyn Douek & Genevieve Lakier). And the rules adopted in the settlement would indeed violate the First Amendment, as was recognized by this federal court decision that preliminarily enjoined a University of Texas rule that adopted the definition.

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