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Institute for Justice Petitions Supreme Court to Take Case Seeking to Overrule Kelo v. City of New London
Kelo is the 2005 ruling in which the Supreme Court held that the government can take property for private "economic development.""
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Today, the Institute for Justice filed a cert petition urging the Supreme Court to hear Bowers v. Oneida County Industrial Development Agency, a case in which IJ seeks to overrule Kelo v. City of New London (2005). Kelo is the controversial case in which the Supreme Court held that the government could use eminent domain to take property in order to promote private "economic development." Although the Fifth Amendment states the the government may only take private property for "public use," a narrow 5-4 Supreme Court majority built on earlier precedents to rule that virtually any potential public benefit qualifies as such. The Court also ruled the government need not prove that the supposed public benefit will actually materialize. In the Kelo case itself, it never did, and the condemned property ended up being used mainly by feral cats.
The Institute for Justice is, of course, the public interest firm that represented the property owners in the Kelo case. I wrote about the case, its development, and why the Court got it wrong, in my book The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent Domain.
Here is an excerpt from IJ's description of the Bowers case:
Bryan Bowers and his business partner Mike Licata build things. And they pride themselves on building things the people in their upstate New York community actually want and need. That is what led them to buy a plot of land across from a new hospital in Utica, New York: They had heard from doctors in the area that they would happily rent space from a Bowers building if one went up.
Unfortunately, they weren't the only ones with plans for a medical office building near the hospital—or with plans for their newly acquired land. A different group of doctors had formed a private company they called Central Utica, LLC, that had plans for a building next door. After Bryan and Mike signed a contract to buy their new land, Central Utica announced that it wanted Bryan and Mike's land, too—to use as a private parking lot for its building.
Two different people wanting the same thing is nothing new, whether it's toddlers with toys or private businesses with land. The difference is that this dispute happened in New York, where local and state officials sometimes behave like spoiled children.
Central Utica wrote a letter to a local government agency, the Oneida County Industrial Development Agency, asking it to take Bowers' land using eminent domain. Shockingly, the county agreed. In the county's telling, the new private office building would create jobs and economic growth, and that was reason enough to invoke the power of eminent domain. (Bryan, of course, proposed to build an office building that would also have created jobs, and the location was already surrounded by literally thousands of parking spots, including a brand-new multi-level garage, but the county didn't seem troubled by that.)
That may seem like a flimsy basis for taking away someone's private property, but in New York, it's standard procedure. New York is the nation's leading abuser of eminent domain, and it is a stark example of the excesses of one of the Supreme Court's most reviled decisions: Kelo v. City of New London….
Against this backdrop, the condemnation of Bryan's property is just more of the same. Sure, a private business went to the government and asked to be given someone else's private property—but that's not unusual in New York. While most states would have a problem with that, in New York, it took the court all of a paragraph to conclude that the taking was constitutional. If it weren't enough that the new private office building would create jobs, the court identified another secondary benefit that would justify the condemnation: The public, it said, could use the new parking lot at night, when its new private owner didn't need it.
Of course, that isn't true. Once the new owners took over the land, they immediately put up signs making clear that the general public wasn't allowed….
But in New York, that doesn't matter. It doesn't matter whether the public can actually use the land that's being taken, and it doesn't matter that in reality the land is a private parking lot in a sea of public parking spaces—just like it didn't matter in Kelo whether the government would actually build anything at all. All that matters is whether the government can imagine a good reason for the taking.
A rule that says the government can take your property whenever it can imagine a benefit to doing so is just a rule that says the government can take your property whenever it wants to. It will be up to the Supreme Court to decide whether the Constitution demands more than that.
Four current Supreme Court justices have previously expressed interest in overruling or at at least revisiting Kelo. Unlike the recent "passive park" case, this case seems like a good vehicle for doing so. It features a dubious condemnation for private development, and one that also raises a number of issues that could help clarify Kelo's extremely vague standards for what qualifies as a forbidden "pretextual" taking. If the Court doesn't want to overrule Kelo outright, they should at least clarify and strengthen the pretextual taking rules.
As IJ notes, many states have passed eminent domain reform legislation since Kelo or repudiated it as a standard for the public use clauses of their state constitutions. But, as described in my book, many of the reform laws are weak, and still permit a wide range of abusive takings.
I will likely have more to say about this case in future posts.
NOTE: I have worked with the Institute for Justice on various other property rights issues over the years, but have no involvement in this case. However, I may file an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to hear it.
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Kelo was a bad decision and overturning it can only be a good thing.
Will they rebuild the little pink house?
Kelo was correctly decided based on precedent, yet completely contrary to the plain meaning of 5A. That is one of the problems with stare decisis - it allows the slow morphing away from the plain meaning of the constitution.
Tell me about it! Look where we are on the Second Amendment after a chain of misguided precedents, ignoring half of it entirely and misreading the other half to somehow have self-defense and hunting emanating from its penumbra?!? Egregiously Wrong, I say.
Randal -
there is considerable historical writing supporting the individual right to keep and bear arms, That is really not in dispute. Holbrook has documented much of the historical writing ( may have mispelled halbrook/ holbrook).
Secondly, a proposal was made in the senate to limit the right to keep and bear arms in 2a to the "common defense" during the senate debate on the all the bill of rights. That proposed change was voted down in the senate. Continuing the argument that 2a only provides for the right to keep and bears arms in connection with the militia is both inane and dishonest when the historical writing and other history is viewed properly.
Why does voting down "common defense" mean that we should ignore what was voted up? That's so obviously retarded, I'm going to do you the courtesy of pretending you didn't say it.
there is considerable historical writing supporting the individual right to keep and bear arms
I'm all for the individual right to keep and bear arms, I think rights have to be understood as attaching to individuals. That doesn't imply a constitutional right to go hunting, though, for instance.
There has, of course, been a ton of historical analysis from various directions on the meaning of the Second Amendment.
My personal opinion is that the 2A was ratified for a limited purpose. Over time, the understanding expanded. Still, the text references a limited (if important) purpose regarding state control of militia. This has been cited by many relevant experts.
Separately, there is a right -- secured by the Constitution -- to keep and use weapons for other purposes, included personal defense.
All usages would be subject to reasonable regulation.
Separately, there is a right -- secured by the Constitution -- to keep and use weapons for other purposes
Secured by the Second Amendment? The Second Amendment is clear about its purpose. Seems like extending it to other purposes is just making things up.
Over time, the understanding expanded.
Exactly. And that's why I agree with Texas Joe that we should reset the understanding back to the plain meaning of the text.
I think the other uses are "separately" protected. For instance, a right to privacy includes a right to defend oneself from attack.
As to the expanding 2A, for instance, fwiw, there is original understanding that the framers of the 14A understood a wider meaning to the 2A than the original framers. Substantive due process also probably expanded over time in the 19th Century.
I think such constitutional development is appropriate in general and not "making things up." I'm not an originalist so don't mind in principle if the textual meanings develop.
For instance, a right to privacy includes a right to defend oneself from attack.
But not in any possible way. If you kill someone with fentanyl in self-defense somehow, that doesn't retroactively legalize your possession of fentanyl or make fentanyl into a constitutional right.
In other words, even if there is a constitutional right to self-defense lurking somewhere, it isn't for armed self-defense any more than it's for self-defense with illicit substances.
In other words, even if there is a constitutional right to self-defense lurking somewhere, it isn't for armed self-defense any more than it's for self-defense with illicit substances.
I think, factoring everything, that the right to self-defense does include the ability to have arms to carry it out.
The right to arms was one of the widely accepted common law rights that provide a reasonable pool to help determine what rights people retained. State constitutions reflect this as does current understanding and congressional statements. Use of fentanyl to defend oneself not so much.
Again, reasonable limits have always been present, including limits on the types of arms.
Hey, if you think there some sort of right to bear arms in self-defense that comes from common law independent of the Second Amendment, great! Let's not twist the Second Amendment around it though. The Second Amendment isn't about that.
Then the question becomes, was it really a right, or more of a privilege? And why not let the states figure that out, rather than the federal constitution, which is silent on the matter?
As an aside, this was one of Scalia'a rhetorical tricks. He talked about this a lot in Heller, but never really tied it back in to the Constitution. So then why does it matter? Well, why would he have spent so much of the opinion talking about it if it didn’t? Seems to be the thought process.
"And that's why I agree with Texas Joe that we should reset the understanding back to the plain meaning of the text."
Would you be willing to do that with the whole Constitution?
Yes.
Was the argument to vote down "common defense only" because people were running around the floor saying it was redundant? If so, you may have a point. If not...?
Jumping onto the short bus with Texas Joe, Krayt? I suppose it's where you belong.
The Senate returned to this amendment for a final time on September 9. A proposal to insert the words "for the common defence" next to the words "bear arms" was defeated.
https://web.archive.org/web/20150904025505/http://rs6.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsj&fileName=001%2Fllsj001.db&recNum=74&itemLink=r%3Fammem%2Fhlaw%3A%40field%28DOCID+%40lit%28sj001133%29%29%230010075&linkText=1
"Kelo was correctly decided based on precedent"
Agreed!
"yet completely contrary to the plain meaning of 5A."
I don't buy this though. The Constitution isn't a document with a lot of obvious plain meaning: "A Constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves."
It's not obvious that "use" excludes "benefit."
It's pretty clear that "public use" was, however, meant to exclude, "Just taking it from one person in order to give it to another".
Let everyone know where the constitution would authorize the government to take private property for the purpose of giving it to another private individual
That's a weird way to phrase it. It's not obvious that "use" includes "benefit."
There is NO SUCH THING as "correctly decided based on president". The belief president should even be considered outside of the plain meaning of the Constitution is the BIGGEST problem with the courts.
It's too bad the Lost Liberty Hotel thing didn't work out.
Kelo v. City of London was correctly decided. Multiple state courts accepted the same principle.
The property was taken for "public use." As a matter of policy, the use might have been bad. Separate matter. Her house could have also been taken for other stupid governmental usages without controversy. She received compensation.
The opinion spells out how long-term precedent was followed. I think the taking of a home might have additional Fourth Amendment concerns but it would be a novel approach.
The case here doesn't even have that going for it.
It was not, and the city did not even pretend that it was. It was indisputably taken for private use, by Pfizer. The city, instead, claimed that it was taken for public benefit, and that this was close enough to use.
If the government can justify "public benefit" on the basis of hypothetical tax revenues or ordinary utility to the public, it's hard to imagine what sort of taking wouldn't qualify. Transfer the property from George to Bob? Just hypothesize that Bob will pay more taxes on it due to making improvements, and you're good to go. Transfer it to a non-profit? It advances the non-profit's mission in serving the people.
It's just a sophistry to pull the clause's teeth, like 'affects' and 'in aggregate' were for the interstate commerce clause.
The property was taken for "public use" as that term is used in the Fifth Amendment. Not "close enough" to the Fifth Amendment. A subcategory of the Takings Clause usage.
It might not be a literal "public use" (though the word "use" is flexible enough going by the dictionary definition IMHO that it is) but the majority opinion held it fit the constitutional terminology.
The majority held:
The disposition of this case therefore turns on the question whether the City’s development plan serves a “public purpose.”
Which it argues precedent held as part of "public use" in the constitutional sense. I used quotations advisedly.
You're begging the question. There was no thought that the public would have use of the taken property. As you yourself quote, the court said "public purpose," not public use. And the only "public purpose" that was offered was generating additional tax revenues for the government. (Which has no limiting principle; the government can simply transfer any bit of private property from owner A to owner B, for the purely private benefit of owner B, if it deems that owner B is wealthier than owner A.)
The opinion shows how it satisfied the constitutional meaning of public use. The public purpose cited was:
The City has carefully formulated an economic development plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including — but by no means limited to — new jobs and increased tax revenue.
The public would use the property for this purpose. For instance, Pfizer can use the land for a complex that offers additional jobs. The public uses it to have more work.
This is not a "purely private benefit" but one that benefits the public at large. If the property was solely taken in the hope of obtaining higher tax revenue, it would have been a closer question.
It would seem rather open-ended though even there higher tax revenue is a public benefit, not purely a private one.
NOT EVEN REMOTELY TRUE. Public use, as understood by the authors of the 5th amendment absolutely meant LITERAL public use. The very concept of a "subcategory" would be foreign to them.
I don't think original understanding -- not that we have much here -- is all that is appropriate to apply the amendment.
JoeBronx comment - "The opinion spells out how long-term precedent was followed"
That is exactly my point - precedent allowed the taking of private property for private use, yet nothing in the constitution supports it. Neither 5a nor 4a
I didn't just say that, of course, and don't agree with the rest.
Economic development had a public purpose that was carried out to benefit the public. The government didn't just hand it over to private parties. It was done for public use.
The opinion spelled out how it followed precedent and was constitutionally appropriate. I'm open to 4A arguments and maybe the 5A argument is a good policy that should be carried out in state constitutions or something. But, the current 5A doesn't require it.
I mean, tautologically that's true. But if Kelo had come out the other way — as large numbers of people think it should have — then the 5A would require it.
It would require it as a matter of reality but Trump v. U.S. saying something doesn't to me necessarily make it rightly so.
Public purpose IS NOT permitted Constitutionally. Public USE is required. What the OPINION claimed is Constitutionally IRRELEVANT in all cases.
I think the court could pretty straightforwardly find for the appelants without having to do anything more to Kelo than very slightly narrow (or “clarify”) it.
It's actually pretty rare for the Court to own up to overturning a prior decision. Usually they 'clarify' that it actually meant something completely different.
Well for example the Court could put a little bit of teeth into the concept of “pretextual taking,” mentioned in Kelo. It seems to me that a case where a developer wants to build exactly the same kind of building that his land was taken to build on behalf of another developer with more inside political pull could be a reasonable example of a “pretextual taking.” The Court could easily say this, clarify that “pretextual taking” isn’t an empty concept, and resolve this case while staying within the Kelo framework if it wants.
Ilya, can you see how this case is the prototype for Tuition Forgiveness? A contract broken by the 2 sides that are not part of the original contract. My property and you (the govt) come in and ---like with climate change --- take it in the name of anonymous future beneficiaries. KELO was wrong from day one
"Today’s decision is simply the latest in a string of our cases construing the Public Use Clause to be a virtual nullity, without the slightest nod to its original meaning. In my view, the Public Use Clause, originally understood, is a meaningful limit on the government’s eminent domain power. Our cases have strayed from the Clause’s original meaning"
I’m sorry, but the federal givernment guaranteed the student loans involved. A party that guarantees a loan is obviously a party to the contract. And guarantors can offer to pay the loan back and erase the debtor’s debt, and sometimes do. When private parties are involved, since it’s usually a case when the original debtor is in some measure of trouble and has difficulty repaying, the bank takes the money and says thank you very much. But even if it’s done out of the blue, banks don’t typically consider voluntarily honoring a guarantee clause as an “interference” with their contract.
Moreover, tuition loan guarantees are based on the Spending Clause, with the funds deriving either taxation or borrowing. Neither source of revenue is considered a “taking” and neither is subject to the Taking Clause. The two cases have nothing whatsover to do with each other. The recent student loan forgiveness case involved whether Congress had authorized the loan forgiveness program. There was no constitutional issue, and certainly no takings issue, involved.
Your post simply makes no sense.
Indeed, I would have taken the position that when a loan contract contains both a guarantee clause and a prepayment clause, as the student loans did, then the loan processor hasn’t lost anything by the guarantor paying the loans early because the processor, like the originator, agreed to the terms. So I don’t think they can sue for lost revenue by the prepayment and guarantee clauses being exercised. They had no contractual right to the revenue. So when the guarantor is a corporation or government entity, I don’t think they have standing to pierce the corporate or government veil and claim that the guarantee honor was unauthorized under the corporate or governmental rules. I think if a corporation rather than the Biden administration had been involved, and a bank had tried to claim that the guarantee honor did not follow proper corporate formalities with lost future processing revenue as the basis for standing, the case would have been tossed out of court quickly on grounds the guarantee and prepayment clauses meant the bank had no contractual right to future revenue and hence no standing to complain about clauses it agreed to being exercised.
Look, the problem with what Biden was doing, wasn't that Congress couldn't have done it by enacting a law. It was that Biden couldn't do it without that law, but was doing it anyway.
The federal budget and assets aren't the President's personal property, that he can just give away to people he likes as a gift.
False on 3 counts.
I was not a party and I will pay. You know that, so that is dishonest.
The guarantee is in the name of the people, government is not separate in the way you would like, THis is not Lords of England., In effect, we the government back this tuition to the point that if we forgive it we will stiff our electorate with the bill. That only makes snese to you.
Finally, why did Nancy Pelosi say it literally could not be done, was not in his power.
IT IS OBVIOUSLY TAKINGS. None of my negihbors take your view, just hack lawyer defense of something that clearly should not be done.
In a diverse society, government often does things that don’t make sense to at least some portion of the citizenry. If Congress had authorized the loan forgiveness program, the courts would have had no problem with it, whether you (or I) think it makes sense or not. And it would be no more a taking than the money Congress currently authorizes for various long-established student grant and loan forgiveness programs.
Suggest you read up a bit on civics and how our government works.
First months of law school NEVER ARGUE YOUR CASE STARTING FROM A CONTRAFACTUAL. Congress did not authorize a loan forgiveness program ...NEEEEEXT !!!!! 🙂
The Democrats were in full-throated support of it. Of government taking from the little guy, huh?
And giving it to coporations, huh?
Because they pay more taxes. Oh, I understand why the echo chamber put out the orders.
Ohhhh.
Ohhhhhhhhhhhhhbbhbbhbbhhhhh.
"Dharmok and Jalad at Tanagra. His eyes open. His sails unfurl."
Corporations do not pay more taxes, so that's dumb.
I wouldn't say that Kelo had "full-throated" support from Democrats. It had some support, for reasons implied by the OP. Kelo followed from precedent. So, for Kelo to go the other way, some amount of precedent would've had to have been repudiated. That's a door Democrats are troubled about opening. We're generally in favor of public works and infrastructure projects, and a weaker eminent domain regime could severely hamstring those efforts.
I don't think Democrats would be sad to see Kelo go as long as it didn't jeapordize bona fide public projects. For example, could eminent domain still be used to acquire land for a privately owned and operated public transportation project, say, an airport? There's a tension underlying Kelo where going too far in the other direction is very anti-privatization.
I mentioned clmiate change Many poor suffered horribly NOW in the summer's heat yet we are throwing god-awful mega-billions (Janet Yellen says we need at least THREE TRILLION A YEAR) at climate change and rising heat. So though real people now suffer from the heat we let them and put TRILLIONS out for anonymous future possible sufferers. PURE NONSENSE
AND THAT IS A TAKINGS case
Overturn Berman v. Parker while you're at it.
"I will likely have more to say about this case in future posts."
Am I the only one that found this hilarious?
But seriously, it is good to see Somin writing on eminent domain. It seems to be one of the only subjects he can expound upon without unbridled fanaticism.
Just wondering what bridled fanaticism could possibly mean
Looking it up, the lower court argued that:
"Here, the acquisition of the property will serve the public use of mitigating parking and traffic congestion, notwithstanding the fact that the need for the parking facility is, at least in part, due to the construction of a private medical facility."
https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter//3dseries/2024/2024_00523.htm
The public is getting use out of the taking. They don't have to be able to specifically use the property directly to do so. But, if there was some assumption that the public should share the property for parking or whatever, that could be a narrow as applied thing to address. Still, it was not merely "imagined" that it had that purpose.
I support having the local government make the decisions on determining such things given due process is followed. The state can also, if it deems best, put some limits on takings of this type. The particulars do not seem SCOTUS cert worthy.