The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

AI in Court

$2900 in Sanctions for AI Hallucinations in Filings by Self-Represented Litigant

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From Monday's decision in Lothamer Tax Resolution, Inc. v. Kimmel, by Chief Judge Hala Jarbou (W.D. Mich.):

This order comes in response to pro se Defendant Paul Kimmel's pattern of submitting misleading filings to the Court. In an opinion issued August 29, 2025, the Court observed that one of Kimmel's filings contained the error-filled citations that are a hallmark of content generated by artificial intelligence (AI), and warned Kimmel that he must verify the accuracy of his citations in the future. In a subsequent order issued November 19, 2025, the Court noted that Kimmel's recent filings still cited dozens of misrepresented or fake cases, and ordered Kimmel to explain why he should not be sanctioned for this conduct. Kimmel responded on November 24, 2025, claiming that the inaccurate citations resulted from editing errors and stylistic mistakes rather than from AI. For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that Kimmel violated Rule 11 and will impose monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,900….

Kimmel acknowledges that "[s]everal citations or quotations in [his] Objection were inaccurate." He does not admit to using AI, though; he avers "that some of those mistakes arose from relying on secondary summaries or search-engine case pages rather than the official opinion." Ultimately, he characterizes his errors as "occasional technical mistakes [that] are unavoidable, but … never intentional." He states that he will take steps in the future to verify his citations and avoid misrepresenting cases. However, as explained below, the Court finds Kimmel's response lacking.

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Free Speech

Defamation Lawsuit Over Peacock TV Docuseries "Paul T. Goldman" (Based on Book "Duplicity: A True Story of Crime and Deceit") Can Go Forward

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From Doe v. Finkelman, decided yesterday by the Florida Court of Appeal by Judge Spencer Levine, joined by Judges Cory Ciklin and Alan Forst:

Appellant filed an amended complaint against the defendants/appellees for defamation per se and conspiracy to defame. According to the amended complaint, defendant Paul Finkelman wrote a book entitled Duplicity: A True Story of Crime and Deceit in which he accused appellant—his ex-wife—of various criminal acts, including prostitution and being the "madam" of a prostitution ring. Based on the book, the defendants created, produced, and published a "docuseries," entitled Paul T. Goldman, which was streamed and distributed on Peacock TV….

The series featured Finkelman as himself, using the alias "Paul T. Goldman." Finkelman revealed his true identity throughout the series. Appellant's amended complaint alleged that the series referred to appellant by a fictitious name, "Audrey Munson." Appellant alleged that she was "easily identifiable as the subject of the false and defamatory statements published by Defendants."

According to the amended complaint, the format of the show was a documentary that operated on "multiple levels." One level was the "real life" story of Finkelman as told by the actual persons involved in the events and by actors portraying the actual persons. The second level was a "making of" documentary where the audience was taken "behind the scenes" during filming and was "privy to parts of the actual creative process."

{The trial court found that the "docuseries" at issue was a single publication rather than multiple publications, and further that the series was not "of and concerning" appellant, and that the statements in the series were not capable of defamatory meaning. We disagree.}

Here's a quick summary of the long opinion:

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Politics

Libel Lawsuit over Critical Race Theory Book That Accused Doctor of "Mass Hysterectomies"

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Last year, Dr. Mahendra Amin prevailed in part in his lawsuit against NBC over certain accusations; from the June 26, 2024 decision in that case:

NBC published multiple reports about allegations that Plaintiff, Dr. Mahendra Amin, performed mass hysterectomies on female detainees at an Immigration and Customs Enforcement … facility …. NBC reported allegations that Dr. Amin performed hysterectomies that were unnecessary, unauthorized, or even botched. {Viewed in their entirety, the September 15, 2020 episodes of Deadline: White HouseAll In With Chris Hayes, and The Rachel Maddow Show accuse Plaintiff of performing mass hysterectomies on detainee women.} …

Multiple statements [made in the NBC coverage] are verifiably false. The undisputed evidence has established that: (1) there were no mass hysterectomies or high numbers of hysterectomies at the facility; (2) Dr. Amin performed only two hysterectomies on female detainees from the ICDC ….

Amin is also suing others who had made similar statements, and Tuesday he sued Sage Publications, an academic publisher. From the Complaint:

This Complaint arises from Defendant's December 4, 2024, publication of a book titled Slippery Eugenics: An Introduction to the Critical Studies of Race, Gender and Coloniality [by R. Sanchez-Rivera], and which includes a section containing multiple false and defamatory statements of and concerning a private figure, Dr. Mahendra Amin, M.D., which accuse him of performing fifty-seven (57) hysterectomies that were not medically necessary and were conducted without consent on immigrant women [detainees] ….

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Free Speech

Anti-Stalking Injunction Requires More Than Just a Showing of "Being Weirded Out or Uncomfortable"

"[Appellants'] homemade signs talked about May being mental health awareness month, one referenced the movie One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest and included a photograph of actor Jack Nicholson, one mentioned perimenopause and empty nest syndrome, one said '[h]ere comes da judge' around the time that Appellee had a divorce hearing .... Another sign included the language '[h]ere's looking at you kid' and contained a photo of Humphrey Bogart."

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In Heule v. Humphrey, decided yesterday by Florida Court of Appeal (First District) Chief Judge Timothy Osterhaus and Judges Joseph Lewis and Adam Tanenbaum, the trial court issued an injunction against Appellants:

Appellee alleged that Appellants, since October 2019, had placed numerous homemade signs in their windows and had hung a skeleton, which they would dress in outfits that corresponded to events in the lives of Appellee and her teenage daughter, on their front door. This began after Appellee's vehicle accidently rolled into Appellants' dining room, which resulted in physical damage to Appellants' home and emotional distress. Appellants kept a daily tally on one of their signs with the number of days that had elapsed since the accident.

Other homemade signs talked about May being mental health awareness month, one referenced the movie One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest and included a photograph of actor Jack Nicholson, one mentioned perimenopause and empty nest syndrome, one said "[h]ere comes da judge" around the time that Appellee had a divorce hearing, and one read, "Just because you are paranoid doesn't mean they are watching (or listening) sometimes a steak out is just a barbeque right?" Another sign included the language "[h]ere's looking at you kid" and contained a photo of Humphrey Bogart. Appellants dressed the skeleton in things like a straitjacket and a black dress.

After the trial court denied both petitions, Appellee filed a supplemental affidavit in which she claimed that Appellants' behavior had caused her substantial emotional distress. During the subsequent hearing, Appellee explained that she had moved from her property for a period of approximately three years after the accident but returned in July 2023. She testified about the signs and the skeletons as well as Appellants' installation of some sort of solar device. She stated, "Whether it's listening I'm not really sure." She also testified about how difficult it had been for her to see Appellants' signs and knowing that her daughter, who claimed to have had nightmares about Appellants, was affected by them. She described one verbal altercation she had with Appellant Frank Heule over the fence that separated their properties.

Appellee's daughter testified that she had never spoken to either of Appellants, and she could give no example of a time when something she had said to either her mother or a friend became the subject of one of Appellants' "displays." Appellant Frank Heule testified that he and his wife posted the signs and skeletons in response to things they heard about in the news. He claimed to have pointed a camera down his driveway, not at Appellee's home. Appellant Judy Heule testified about the distress that the accident with Appellee's vehicle had caused her and her husband, about how the couple chooses to "put [their] thoughts out there," and about how she had looked up Appellee's name in court records.

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Free Speech

No Pseudonymity in Crypto Scam Case, Despite Alleged Death Threat Against Plaintiff

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From today's order by Magistrate Judge Kathryn Starnella in Y.S. v. Doe (D. Colo.):

This case involves a cryptocurrency transaction wherein Plaintiff transferred approximately $100,000.00 in digital currency to various unknown individuals, who allegedly later blocked Plaintiff's requested withdrawals and absconded with the remaining funds….

"Lawsuits are public events." "Courts are public institutions which exist for the public to serve the public interest" and "secret court proceedings are anathema to a free society." Therefore, "[o]rdinarily, those using the courts must be prepared to accept the public scrutiny that is an inherent part of public trials." The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate the naming of the parties. Rule 10(a) requires that a complaint "name all the parties," and Rule 17(a) requires the prosecution of an action "in the name of the real party in interest." …

Plaintiff asks the Court to proceed pseudonymously in this litigation because he received a death threat from an unidentified individual who is, at least in part, allegedly responsible for the underlying cryptocurrency scam. The text message exchange indicates this individual told Plaintiff, "I'm going to send a hitman after you!" and that "[he] just contacted the hitman, [the hitman] checked [Plaintiff's] address" and the hitman would "find [Plaintiff] before 12 o'clock tomorrow[.]" The individual further stated the hitman would kill Plaintiff, and informed Plaintiff he knew his home address. This exchange occurred after Plaintiff confronted the individual about the alleged fraudulent crypto scheme that gives rise to this suit…

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Free Speech

Fourth Circuit (2-1) Upholds Ban on Teaching Any Person How to Make or Use Explosives While "Knowing" Such Person's Bad Intentions

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From today's Fourth Circuit opinion in U.S. v. Arthur by Fourth Circuit Judge Steven Agee, joined by District Judge Roderick Young (E.D. Va.), the facts (though defendant's main challenge relates to the facial coverage of the statute):

Arthur [through his company, Tackleberry Solutions, offered] … "training," with the goal of "help[ing] the average person to be able to defend themselves" against "a tyrannical government of our own or an invading tyrannical government." He published videos and sold manuals online with titles including "Fatal Funnels, Wartime Tactics, Repelling the Assault," and "Quick Reaction Force, Modern Day Minutemen, Improvised Explosives." …

The FBI began investigating Arthur following a fatal incident in June 2020 involving one of his customers, Joshua Blessed. While searching Blessed's home in Richmond, Virginia, the FBI found fourteen live pipe bombs that were identical to those described in Arthur's manuals, as well as six manuals that he wrote.

Shortly thereafter, the FBI had a confidential informant—"Buckshot"—contact Arthur for training…. Eventually, Arthur invited Buckshot to join him for in-person training, for which Buckshot would be charged a fee. Buckshot accepted his invitation and, upon his arrival, explained to Arthur that "[the] ATF's been to my house…. [T]hey're probably coming back…. [W]hen they do, I want to be ready." … Arthur spent the next three hours teaching him how to fortify his residence against the returning federal agents.

[Among other things, Arthur] suggested mounting cans of Tannerite {a commercially available explosive, commonly used to make exploding targets for marksmanship purposes} around the property that could be detonated with a rifle shot. In addition to this "perimeter defense," Arthur suggested that it "wouldn't be a bad idea" for Buckshot to "put[ ] some [improvised explosive devices (IEDs)] right up around the doors [of the house]." He noted that he kept such an IED on his front porch.

Arthur also suggested "a setup called the Spiderweb," which he described as "a freaking death box." The "Spiderweb" involved blocking most entrances to Buckshot's house and then placing remotely operated explosives near the remaining entrances, along with a "sentry gun" that could be remotely fired. Arthur even went so far as to offer to "help [Buckshot] design [and] build it," and later showed Buckshot how to use a lightbulb to make a detonator ….Buckshot paid Arthur for the training, and the two agreed to stay in contact.

The majority concluded that the speech banned by the statute "fall[s] largely within one of the 'well-defined and narrowly limited classes of [unprotected] speech': speech integral to criminal conduct," because it was tantamount to aiding and abetting crime (rather than being protected "abstract advocacy" of crime "contemplated in [cases such as] Brandenburg v. Ohio):

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Judicial Nominations

Demand Justice Targets Democrats Over Judicial Nominees

The progressive advocacy group thinks voting for any Trump judicial nominees is inexcusable.

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The New York Times reports that Demand Justice, a progressive activist group that has previously called for Democrats to expand the size of the Supreme Court, will be running ads against Democratic Senators who have voted in favor of some Trump judicial nominees.

The ads, part of an initial $1 million campaign which will begin to air on television and appear online on Wednesday, make the case that none of Mr. Trump's judicial appointments deserve bipartisan support because they are putting loyalty to the president above the Constitution.

The evidence that Demand Justice cites for that claim is that none of Mr. Trump's appointments to lifetime court seats have said in written answers to the Senate that Mr. Trump lost the 2020 election or that the attack on the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, amounted to an insurrection.

The three senators being targeted with the initial ad campaign are John Fetterman of Pennsylvania, Maggie Hassan of New Hampshire and Angus King of Maine, who is an independent but caucuses with Democrats. Notably, none of three are up for re-election in 2026. All are moderates and among the group who voted to end the government shutdown last month. . . .

Mr. Fetterman has voted to confirm one judge, Ms. Hassan has voted for three and Mr. King has voted for four, the group said.

According to the story, another progressive advocacy group (MoveOn) will also begin pressing Senate Democrats to vote against all of President Trump's judicial nominees.

The apparent aim of these campaigns is not to prevent the confirmation of any judges (as judicial nominees can be--and largely have been--confirmed on party-line votes), nor is it to punish Democratic Senators facing re-election. It is apparently designed merely to ensure that Democrats adopt party-line opposition to Trump's nominees.

AI in Court

If You Can Afford ChatGPT, You Can Afford Sanctions for Filing Motions with ChatGPT Hallucinations

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From Jarrus v. Governor, decided yesterday by Judge F. Kay Behm (E.D. Mich.):

The court is cognizant that imposing a monetary sanction on plaintiffs who qualify for IFP status [based on inability to pay filing fees -EV] may be ineffective. However, the court also ordered Plaintiffs to explain how much, per month, they spend on "AI" subscriptions per month. Plaintiff Michael Jarrus explained that he pays approximately $20 per month in a subscription to "ChatGPT Plus." Over the course of 12 months, the evidence suggests that Plaintiff Michael Jarrus is at least able to afford a Chat GPT subscription of about $240. Absent proof that a monetary sanction will prove impossible to pay, the court will enter sanctions sufficient to deter similar conduct in the future….

Consistent with Magistrate Judge Patti's warning that each AI citation might incur a cost of $200 per citation, the court adopts that amount and imposes a fine of $300 per Plaintiff (a total of $600) for three misrepresented, AI-generated citations. Each Plaintiff [Michael Jarrus and his mother] shall, individually, be responsible for paying $300. These fines are due to the Clerk of Court and shall be paid in full by February 2, 2026. Failure to pay these amounts may result in dismissal of this action in its entirety or, if one Plaintiff pays their fine but not the other, of the nonpaying Plaintiff's claims for failure to comply….

If Plaintiffs file any future briefing in this case with even a single misrepresented, misquoted, or fictitious case that is caused by the use of generative "AI", this court will strongly consider any recommendation to dismiss this case for bad faith failure to comply with court orders, or revocation of Plaintiffs' IFP status, or in the alternative, it would not be clearly erroneous for the Magistrate Judge to strike or otherwise refuse to consider the merits of an entire briefing for the inclusion of a misrepresented, misquoted, or fictitious case.

More on the circumstances that led the court to be especially exercised here:

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David Lat Interviews Pa. S. Ct. Justice David Wecht

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A very interesting interview, on David Lat's Original Jurisdiction substack (for those who like text) and podcast (for those who prefer audio). An excerpt:

I recently noticed that although I've interviewed more than a dozen current and former judges, only two have sat on state courts (and by the time I interviewed them, those judges—Rolando Acosta and Debra Wong Yang—had left the bench). Put another way, I have not, until today, hosted a sitting state-court judge—a considerable omission, considering the significance of state courts. As noted by the National Center for State Courts, "State courts play a critical role in our democracy, handling about 96 percent of all legal cases in the United States."

I set out to remedy this gap—and was delighted when Justice David Wecht, a longtime friend, agreed to join me. He's a timely guest: last month, he and two of his colleagues were reelected to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for which I named them Judges of the Week. Why? Their court is one of the most important state courts in the country—for reasons I discussed with Justice Wecht on the episode.

In our conversation, we also covered the justice's interesting path to the Pennsylvania high court; why he believes young (and not-so-young) lawyers should get involved with their communities; certain unique features of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as well as its relationship to the U.S. Constitution; and, of course, his recent reelection to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court….

Free Speech

Free Speech Unmuted: Defamation Law in the Age of AI with Lyrissa Lidsky

My cohost Jane Bambauer and I are joined by Prof. Lyrissa Lidsky (Florida), who is also a co-reporter for the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Torts: Defamation and Privacy.

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What happens when 1970s defamation law collides with the Internet, social media, and AI? Lyrissa, my cohost Jane Bambauer, and I discuss explains how the law of libel and slander is being rewritten for the digital age; why the old line between libel and slander no longer makes sense; how Section 230 upended defamation doctrine; the future of New York Times v. Sullivan and related First Amendment doctrines; Large Libel Models (when Large Language Models meet libel law); and more.

Our past episodes:

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Free Speech

Journal of Free Speech Law: "Free Speech and Incorporation: A Reassessment," by Ilan Wurman

From the "Gitlow v. New York at 100" symposium, held this year at the Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law; other papers from that symposium will be published shortly.

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The article is here; the Introduction:

In a previous book, the author sought to establish that the likely original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause was that it guaranteed equality in fundamental rights under state law. The central provisions of the first section of the Amendment—due process of law, protection of the laws, and the privileges and immunities of citizenship—had long-established antebellum legal meanings. Due process of law primarily meant there had to be established law before one could be deprived of life, liberty, or property, and any violation of that established law had to be adjudicated according to known and established procedures. The protection of the laws was the other side of the coin: It was the legal protection the government had to extend against private invasions of private rights, principally judicial remedies and physical protection from violence. The protection of the laws was the heart of the social compact: Men exit the state of nature and give up some of their executive power and agree to obey the sovereign—they agree to give allegiance—in exchange for the sovereign's protection against private violence and private invasions of rights.

The antebellum legal background is crucially important for understanding the original meaning of the Amendment's privileges or immunities provision because it is that provision that therefore must accommodate the central goal of the Amendment's drafters of constitutionalizing the Civil Rights Act of 1866. That act guaranteed equality in civil rights under state law. Although many Republicans believed the act was justified under the Thirteenth Amendment's enforcement clause, many, including John Bingham, the principal author of the Fourteenth Amendment's first section, believed the Act to be unconstitutional. Moreover, it was necessary to enshrine the civil rights principle in the Constitution itself, lest the Democrats take over and repeal that legislation; Congress needed, in the words of Representative and future President James Garfield, "to lift that great and good law above the reach of political strife, beyond the reach of the plots and machinations of any party, and fix it in the serene sky, in the eternal firmament of the Constitution."

Yet, if the due process and protection of the laws clauses in the Amendment had their historical legal meanings, they would not accomplish that central objective. Due process does not guarantee equal rights, only that whatever rights one has will not be taken away without established law and known procedures. Nor does equal protection of the law guarantee equal rights, but rather guarantees only that whatever rights one possesses will be equally protected against, say, Ku Klux Klan violence. That leaves only the privileges or immunities provision, whose language does the necessary work. The Reconstruction generation understood that civil rights defined and regulated under state law, including contract and property rights, were fundamental rights that all free governments had to secure. They were, in other words, the "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States," shared by all citizens, though states may have regulated the rights differently. A state would "abridge" those rights by giving a lesser set of rights to a disfavored class.

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Second Amendment Roundup: The U.S. Defends NFA Restrictions Lacking a Tax Nexus

The DOJ claims basis in the tax power and the commerce clause, and no Second Amendment problem.

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As I previously explained in "The Zero Tax on NFA Firearms," serious constitutional issues arise about the constitutional validity of the registration and other requirements of the National Firearms Act as to the firearms that now have a $0 tax.  They include short barreled shotguns (SBSs), short-barreled rifles (SBRs), silencers, and "any other weapons" (AOWs).  Machineguns and destructive devices remain subject to the $200 making and transfer tax.

Three challenges are pending, Chris Brown v. ATF in the Eastern District of Missouri (see docket here), Silencer Shop Foundation v. ATF in the Northern District of Texas (see docket here), and Jensen v. ATF also in the Northern District of Texas (see docket here).

In Silencer Shop, in response to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the United States has filed its opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment.  The United States contends that the NFA regulations as applied to the zero-taxed firearms remain justified under Congress's tax power, as they support the collection of the special occupational taxes on firms engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling NFA firearms.  They are also justified under the Commerce Clause, as the related activities in intrastate commerce substantially affect interstate commerce.  Finally, DOJ argues that the Second Amendment does not protect NFA firearms, including suppressors, because they are "dangerous and unusual."

Article I Tax Power

As to the tax power, Sonzinsky (1937) upheld the NFA special occupational taxes (SOT) applicable to NFA businesses.  That part of the NFA remains intact.  The government argues that the zero-taxed making and transfer requirements of the NFA remain valid so the government may ensure that NFA businesses are paying their SOT.

But like any other regulated industry, the government knows whether applicable restrictions are followed by inspections, investigations, and other procedures.  Under Title I of the Gun Control Act, firearm businesses are required to have licenses, and they are subject to inspection for compliance with regulations.  Those engaged in the business of making or selling firearms without a license are prosecuted under the GCA.  However, firearms bought by non-licensees from FFLs are not subject to licensing and are not required to be registered and regulated for eternity so that the government can keep track of those requiring a license.  In fact, 18 U.S.C. § 926(a) of the Gun Control Act actually prohibits the registration of firearms that are sold to non-licensees.

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Preemption

A Second Round with William Barr on Litigation Over Interstate Pollution

Whatever the merits of climate tort suits (or lack thereof), the argument they are preempted does not hold up.

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After I responded with a letter to the editor to William Barr's Wall Street Journal op-ed arguing that state-law-based tort suits against fossil fuel companies seeking redress for climate-related harms are preempted, Barr responded with a letter of his own, to which I offered a sur-reply. Here is a quick review of the argument, with some additional commentary.

In his initial op-ed, Barr argued that "disputes involving pollution that crosses state or international borders are the exclusive domain of federal law." My letter (and accompanying blog post) pointed out that this was wrong, noting the Supreme Court's decision in International Paper v. Ouellette in which the Court held that such suits are not preempted, but that common law nuisance suits over interstate pollution must apply the law of the source state, not that of the polluted plaintiff.

In his reply, Barr sought to argue that I "misread" Ouellette, writing:

In response to my op-ed on climate-change tort suits, he invokes International Paper Co. v. Ouellette (1987) to suggest that states may regulate out-of-state emissions unless doing so is "incompatible" with federal law. But Ouellette reinforces my position.

The court held that the Clean Water Act pre-empts states from applying their own pollution law to an out-of-state source, since subjecting one source to multiple state laws would create a "chaotic confrontation" and undermine the federal regulatory structure.

What Barr's letter elides is that while Oullette prevents a state or its residents from applying their state's law to out-of-state polluters, it expressly held that nuisance suits over interstate pollution are not preempted, but may continue. As I noted in my sur-reply letter:

While he is correct that the court in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette (1987) "held that the Clean Water Act pre-empts states from applying their own pollution law to an out-of-state source," it further held that "nothing" in federal law precluded "aggrieved individuals from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the source State."

In other words, such suits may proceed and aren't pre-empted by federal law. This is precisely what happened in Ouellette. After the court's decision, the case proceeded to trial on remand, the plaintiffs presented their case and International Paper settled, agreeing to pay substantial compensation.

So there is no mistake, Ouellette rejected Barr's initial claim that "disputes involving pollution that crosses state or international borders are the exclusive domain of federal law." It did not preempt such suits, but rather set the terms under which such suits can proceed. The Ouellette case itself is a case in point, as the plaintiffs were allowed to pursue their claims against interstate air and water pollution on remand.

The point of Barr's initial op-ed was to encourage the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Suncor Energy v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, the most recent state-law-based climate tort suit brought before the Court.

Thus far, the justices have shown little interest in wading into climate tort litigation, despite repeated entreaties to do so. I suspect one reason for this is the fundamental weakness of the substantive argument, combined with the preliminary posture on which these cases have been brought. While there is an ostensible circuit split, insofar as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit swallowed the preemption arguments and several state courts have not, this has not yet been enough to convince four justices to support certiorari.

Even if the justices ultimately vote to grant cert, precluding state climate litigation altogether will remain a heavy lift under current law. Insofar as Congress has the constitutional authority to preempt litigation of this sort, it has not enacted any law that would do so, and I will be surprised if the Court ultimately says otherwise.

As my second letter concluded:

It is the job of the judiciary to say what the law is, not what it should be. If Mr. Barr believes state-law-based climate litigation should be pre-empted, he should encourage Congress to enact a law that does so.

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For more on the subject, here are my prior posts on climate-related tort litigation:

Higher Education

Federal Trade Commission Staff Endorses Proposal to End American Bar Association Monopoly on Law School Accreditation

FTC staff support the proposal by the Texas Supreme Court to allow for alternative means of accreditation.

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The American Bar Association's de facto monopoly on law school accreditation took another hit this week as the directors of the Federal Trade Commission's Office of Policy Planning and Bureau of Competition endorsed a proposal by the Texas Supreme Court to allow alternative means of accreditation.

This endorsement came in a nine-page letter to the Texas Supreme Court released with the approval of both currently serving FTC Commissioners.

The letter reads in part:

we endorse the Proposed Amendment and commend that it would eliminate the current rule's delegation of authority to the American Bar Association (ABA). The ABA should not serve as a gatekeeper to a critical aspect of admission to the legal profession. Such control by the ABA is inimical to the principles on which competition law rest. The ABA is dominated by practicing attorneys, who have strong interests in limiting competition for legal services. As such, the current rule raises serious competitive risks by so broadly delegating to the ABA the state's authority to set eligibility requirements for admission to the Texas bar. It effectively gives the ABA, an organization that has previously flouted the rule of law it purports to promote, the ability to exclude market participants who would compete with its members. We encourage the Court to reclaim its authority to expand opportunities for qualified individuals to provide legal services to the Texas public as envisioned by the Proposed Amendment.

It concludes:

The ABA should no longer have "the final say on whether a law school's graduates are eligible to sit for the Texas bar exam."49 The ABA's standards for accreditation appear to go far beyond what is reasonably necessary to assure adequate preparation for the practice of law in Texas, increasing the cost of a legal education. The current rule therefore likely causes Texas to forgo admitting many potentially qualified lawyers who could provide needed legal services to the Texas public.

The Proposed Amendment is an important step in weakening the ABA's enduring monopoly and resulting power to impose costly, overly burdensome law school accreditation requirements. It is no coincidence that in its 1995 lawsuit challenging the ABA's anticompetitive conduct, the DOJ stressed that the ABA's power over law schools comes, in part, from state mandates: "ABA approval is critical to the successful operation of a law school" because the "bar admission rules in over 40 States require graduation from an ABA-approved law school in order to satisfy the legal education requirement for taking the bar examination."50 Thirty years later, little has changed yet. The Proposed Amendment is a laudable first step. We commend the Texas Supreme Court for its initiative to disrupt the anticompetitive status quo and encourage other states to take similar steps.

FTC Chairman Andrew Ferguson also commented on the proposal in this Twitter thread.

I discussed the potential end of the ABA's accreditation monopoly here. Derek Muller analyzed the Texas proposal here. Civitas Outlook sponsored a symposium on the Texas Supreme Court's proposal here.

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