The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Free Speech

No Sealing of Files in Eviction Proceedings

|

From Barfield v. Doe, decided today by the Florida Court of Appeal, in an opinion by Judge Jeffrey Kuntz, joined by Judges Martha Warner & Edward Artau:

The litigants in the eviction proceeding sought to shield an entire court file from public disclosure. They argued a landlord filed an eviction action after agreeing not to do so and that the landlord received the rental payments before the action was filed. So the litigants argued that public disclosure of the eviction action was potentially defamatory and would affect the tenants' creditworthiness. Citing Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration Rule 2.420(c)(9)(A)(vi) (2022), the county court accepted these reasons as a basis to seal portions of the court file….

Read More

Free Speech

Federal Court Rejects Ex-Anchor Ed Henry's Libel Claim Against Fox News

|

From an opinion by Judge Ronnie Abrams (S.D.N.Y.) yesterday in Henry v. Fox News Network LLC:

Plaintiff Edward Henry brings this lawsuit for defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference against his former employer Fox News Network LLC and Fox News' Chief Executive Officer Suzanne Scott.

Henry's claims arise from four statements issued by Fox and Scott that reported on the circumstances of Henry's termination. The statements indicated that, after receiving a complaint from a former employee against Henry regarding sexual misconduct, Fox retained an outside law firm to conduct an investigation and ultimately terminated Henry based on the findings of that investigation.

According to Henry, Defendants' statements were false because he was not in fact terminated based on the findings of the investigation, but instead to further a narrative that Fox was reforming its culture and in an effort for Scott to advance her career. Moreover, because Fox had permitted other consensual affairs between employees and because he claims that his sexual activity with former Fox Business producer Jennifer Eckhart—who has accused him of sexually assaulting and raping her—was in reality consensual, Henry asserts that Defendants' statements announcing his termination for "willful sexual misconduct" created the intentionally false impression that his conduct must have been "akin to rape."

No, said the court (what follows is just some excerpts from a considerably longer discussion):

Read More

Supreme Court

Did Nina Totenberg Have a Conflict of Interest in Covering Justice Ginsburg?

Based upon Totenberg's new book, a prominent legal ethicist thinks the conflict was a real one.

|

NPR Supreme Court reporter Nina Totenberg has a new book on her relationship with the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Dinners with Ruth: A Memoir on the Power of Friendships. I have heard nothing but positive reactions to the book, which chronicles Totenberg and Ginsburg's relationship, which long predated RBG's elevation to the Supreme Court.

The book is a "beautifully touching story of an enduring friendship between two exceptional women," writes Northwestern law professor emeritus Steven Lubet in The Hill. But that's not all. According to Lubet the "barely acknowledged subtext in the book is a conflict of interest between Totenberg's obligations as a reporter and devotion to her friend." In his article, Lubet (who is a noted expert on legal ethics), raises questions about how their relationship may have influenced Totenberg's reporting.

Writes Lubet:

To protect Ginsburg from surprises, Totenberg routinely alerted her in advance to the topics she intended to cover, which is generally prohibited by NPR's Ethics Handbook. The rule against "previewing" questions does not apply to side jobs, but even then the handbook cautions against "entanglements that conflict with our journalistic independence."

In raising questions about whether Totenberg's coverage was influenced by her relationship, Lubet focuses on the controversy surrounding Justice RBG's comments about then-candidate Donald Trump (which I covered extensively on this blog).

Following an uproar about her flagrant breach of judicial ethics, Ginsburg issued a tepid statement of regret, calling her remarks "ill-advised" and promising to "be more circumspect" in the future.

Totenberg was scheduled to interview Ginsburg a few days later. Following her "usual practice," she told the justice that "I was going to ask her about what she had said." "That's my job," she explained, "I'm going to ask you about it as I would anybody else," telling Ginsburg, "she could get mad at me" if she wanted to.

The interview was not much to get mad at. Totenberg asked Ginsburg why she decided to "say you were sorry," rather than why she'd made the remarks in the first place. Ginsberg gave her prepared answer: "Because it was incautious." Totenberg did not raise the ethics issue, suggesting instead that the justice had merely "goofed." Even that was too much for Ginsburg. "It's over and done with, and I don't want to discuss it anymore."

Totenberg accepted the stonewalling. The obvious next question – to anyone not tiptoeing around a friend's embarrassment – was whether Ginsburg would recuse herself from cases challenging the election. That would have put Ginsburg on the spot – and any answer would have been extremely meaningful in light of later events – but Totenberg let it drop.

As it happened, Justice Ginsburg did not recuse when a case involving the Trump campaign reached the Court.

Lubet concludes:

Conflicts of interest are insidious because those who are most affected are least likely to recognize the problem. NPR's management evidently decided that Totenberg's star quality justified the risk.

UPDATE: Lubet is not the only one to offer this criticism of Totenberg. The progressive blog, Balls & Strikes, has published a review by Cornell Law School clinical professor G.S. Hans with the title: "'Dinners With Ruth' and Without Any Semblance of Journalistic Standards, By Nina Totenberg." And, to get a flavor of the review, the subtitle reads: "The veteran Supreme Court journalist has long faced criticism related to her close friendship with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Now, she's written a whole book celebrating it."

Free Speech

"Central Park Karen" Defamation & Discrimination Lawsuit Rejected

|

From today's opinion by Judge Ronnie Abrams (S.D.N.Y.) in Cooper v. Franklin Templeton; this seems correct to me (for more on the defamation theory here, see this post):

Plaintiff Amy Cooper, a white woman, was formerly employed by Defendant Franklin Templeton in New York as a Portfolio Manager. On May 25, 2020, she was involved in a confrontation with birdwatcher Christian Cooper, a black man, while walking her dog in Central Park. Video footage of the encounter was posted to Facebook and Twitter later that day. The video quickly went viral—garnering millions of views—and earned Plaintiff the moniker "Central Park Karen" on social media. The next day, Franklin Templeton announced that it had conducted an internal review of the incident and terminated Plaintiff's employment….

The following facts are drawn from the complaint and are assumed to be true for the purposes of this motion….

On May 25, 2020, Plaintiff was involved in an altercation with Christian Cooper, a black man, while he was birdwatching and she was walking her dog in Central Park. The confrontation, which Plaintiff claims caused her to fear for her safety and that of her dog, culminated in Plaintiff placing a 911 call, during which she told the police that there was "an African-American man threatening [her] life." A video of the encounter was shared on social media that same day; it quickly went viral and "became international news as a racial flashpoint." Plaintiff was soon branded a "privileged white female 'Karen'" by the media and social media users….

On the night of the Central Park incident, Franklin Templeton—Plaintiff's then- employer—published the following statement on Twitter concerning the incident:

We take these matters very seriously, and we do not condone racism of any kind. While we are in the process of investigating the situation, the employee involved has been put on administrative leave.

Read More

Administrative Law

Does the D.C. Bar Ethics Complaint Against Jeff Clark Implicate the Major Questions Doctrine?

In the wake of West Virginia v. EPA, it seems that "major questions" can be found almost anywhere.

|

In West Virginia v. EPA, the Supreme Court whole-heartedly embraced the major questions doctrine, under which agencies asserting broad regulatory powers implicating matters of exceptional economic or political significance must be able to identify a clear statement from Congress authorizing the exercise of such powers.

As a consequence of the West Virginia decision, litigants challenging governmental actions have found major questions lurking in all manner of regulatory disputes. In some cases, invocation of the major questions doctrine makes sense (see, e.g., concerns about the SEC climate disclosure rule or the student-debt forgiveness plan). In other cases, not so much.

One place one might not have expected to see the major questions doctrine pop up is in the proceedings concerning the D.C. Bar's ethics complaint against former Trump Administration Justice Department official Jeffrey Clark. In Clark's answer filed with the D.C. Court of Appeals Board on Professional Responsibility, however, the doctrine is invoked. Here is the relevant portion of the Clark's redacted filing:

22. EIGHTEENTH DEFENSE—D.C. BAR JURISDICTION WOULD VIOLATE THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE The D.C. Bar lacks jurisdiction over the conduct of the Respondent referred to in the Charges because 28 U.S.C. § 530B does not clearly delegate to the Department of Justice the power to confer on the District of Columbia authority to regulate lawyers serving in the Department of Justice, especially not those interacting with the President to deliberate and decide on questions that reach the President for resolution. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022); Hickman v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976); OLC Opinion. West Virginia establishes a clear statement rule known as the "major questions doctrine." Whether considered (1) as a class of questions (i.e., whether state and local bars can ever regulate internal Executive Branch deliberations on legal matters) or (2) an as-applied question of whether Respondent's legal advice and opinions on extant facts as rendered to the President and to his Department of Justice superiors concerning irregularities in the 2020 presidential election, major questions are presented. As such, any statute authorizing state, local, or D.C. regulation of such questions requires a clear statement from Congress delegating that power. These are major questions of both a political nature and implicate core features of federalism and/or the separation of powers. Id. at 2607-08; id. 2617, 2621 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (doctrine protects both separation of powers and federalism).

[Edited] I have some major questions about this claim.

Free Speech

First Amendment Limits on State Laws Targeting Election Misinformation, Part III

A First Amendment framework for analyzing restrictions on election-related speech.

|

This is part III in a series of posts discussing First Amendment Limits on State Laws Targeting Election Misinformation, 20 First Amend. L. Rev. 291 (2022). What follows is an excerpt from the article (minus the footnotes, which you will find in the full PDF).

The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether election-related lies (or other forms of election misinformation) can be regulated by the government without violating the First Amendment. As a result, while the Court's First Amendment decisions provide a general framework for evaluating the constitutionality of state election-speech statutes, they leave a number of difficult issues unresolved, including whether election-related speech enjoys greater or lesser constitutional protection than speech in other contexts and whether the government has a sufficiently compelling—or even important— interest in curtailing or eliminating various unsavory election-speech practices. Our goal here is not to fully resolve these uncertainties, but merely to highlight the constitutional challenges current state statutes are likely to face and to potentially guide future legislative efforts in this area.

[A.] Determining the Appropriate Level of Judicial Scrutiny

As with so much of First Amendment law, the level of judicial scrutiny to be applied usually determines the outcome of the case, which is why so much of the criticism of the Supreme Court's election-speech jurisprudence is focused on the Court's conflicting signals regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to statutes that restrict speech in the context of political campaigns and elections.

Read More

Guns

Court Strikes Down Ban on Gun Acquisition by People Under Felony Indictment

An indictment for a crime, the court stresses, is very different from a conviction of the crime.

|

From yesterday's U.S. v. Quiroz, Judge David Counts (W.D. Tex.), discussing 18 U.S.C. § 922(n); part of the argument had to do with the lack of historical precedents for the law, but I thought readers would especially interested in this passage:

This Court is skeptical that the Government here, or in any other court, could defend § 922(n)'s constitutionality. Not only does the historical record lack the clear evidence needed to justify this regulation, § 922(n) evokes constitutional scrutiny in other ways….

The nature of grand jury proceedings [which are the ways that an indictment is obtained in the federal system -EV] is one such area that casts a shadow of constitutional doubt on § 922(n). Some feel that a grand jury could indict a [burrito] if asked to do so. [That appears to be a Texification of a New York Chief Judge's famous quote involving a "ham sandwich." -EV] The freewheeling nature of such proceedings stems from the Supreme Court holding that (1) the rules of evidence don't apply, (2) evidence barred by the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule may be heard, and (3) the grand jury may rely on evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Simply put, "[a] grand jury investigation is not an adversarial process." …

The Government argues here that it has always been able "to impose substantial liberty restrictions on indicted defendants." To support that claim, the Government lists detentions or conditions of pretrial release as examples. Why the Government believes those examples support its argument is unclear; detention hearings have substantial procedural safeguards. For one thing, at a detention hearing, the defendant may request the presence of counsel; testify and present witnesses; proffer evidence; and cross-examine other witnesses appearing at the hearing. Grand jury proceedings have none of these safeguards. Detention hearings also occur at a different stage in the proceeding—often after indictment. And even if restricting a defendant's right to possess a firearm as a condition of pretrial release is constitutional—an issue which this Court does not consider here—that doesn't also make § 922(n)'s restrictions in the indictment stage constitutional.

{Whether this Nation has a history of disarming felons is arguably unclear—it certainly isn't clearly "longstanding." And what's even more unclear—and still unproven—is a historical justification for disarming those indicted, but not yet convicted, of any crime.}

The court also discusses an interesting historical means of dealing with people who hadn't been convicted of a crime, but who were viewed as potentially dangerous:

Read More

Armenia, On Its Own?

The West's indifference so far results from hypocrisy, cynicism, and shortsightedness about its own interests

|

Last week, a dictatorship—Azerbaijan—invaded the territory of an aspiring democracy—Armenia. Hundreds of Armenians were killed in a matter of hours, and Azerbaijan infiltrated deep inside Armenian territory. Although the two countries fought two years ago over the disputed region of Nagorno Karabakh—Armenian in population but within the borders of Azerbaijan—this invasion was qualitatively different. Resolving the Karabakh conflict was not the aim. Azerbaijan seeks large swaths of territory inside Armenia to create a land bridge to Turkey, thus establishing a pan-Turkic union from Europe to Central Asia, long the goal of Azerbaijan's patron, Turkey. Armenians stand in the way of this project, as they did 100 years ago, at the time of the Armenian Genocide.

Given the Western reaction to the recent invasion of another aspiring democracy—Ukraine—by a different dictatorship—Russia—you might have expected the West to rush to Armenia's support. The West's initial reaction, though, was rather different: half-hearted expressions of concern, coupled with calls for both sides, the aggressor and the victim, to stop fighting. Why?

In Compact Magazine this week, I explain that the West's indifference to Armenia results from a combination of hypocrisy, cynicism, and shortsightedness. The West's concern for democracy is highly selective, operative only where the West sees its interests at stake. Here, the West apparently has concluded that its interest lies in appeasing Azerbaijan, which can help supply gas to Europe and check Russia and Iran in the South Caucasus.

Hypocrisy in the pursuit of national interest is one thing: not admirable, but not uncommon and at least comprehensible. Here, though, the West is acting hypocritically in a way that goes against its interests. Azerbaijan can offer little to the European Union in terms of gas exports. And abandoning Armenia to its fate will do little to contain Russia or Iran. In the end, it will only lessen Western influence in the region:

In reality, Azerbaijan lacks sufficient gas to meet EU expectations, and the "critical infrastructure" for extracting and transporting Azeri gas is owned by the Russian petroleum giant, Lukoil. The deal will thus do little to end Russian dominance over Europe's energy supplies, and may even line Russian pockets.

Or consider the canard that Armenia is "Russia's satellite and Iran's ally." By contrast, the argument goes, the West can rely on Azerbaijan to check those two nations and advance Western interests. This is false. Russia has a military base in Armenia, but Russia has very strong ties with Azerbaijan, as well. Two days before Russia invaded Ukraine, Aliyev traveled to Moscow to sign a cooperation agreement with Moscow—an agreement, the Azeri strongman boasted, "that brings our relations to the level of an alliance." For its part, Armenia has resisted supporting Russia's invasion of Ukraine, despite Kremlin pressure.

Russia has studiously maintained neutrality in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Indeed, in the current crisis, it has refused Armenia's request for military assistance, even though it has a treaty obligation to protect Armenia if invaded. While Azerbaijan was attacking Armenia this week, Putin, Aliyev, and Erdogan were photographed sharing a friendly moment at the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Samarkand.

Regarding Iran, the situation is similarly complicated. Armenia has historical ties to Iran that go back millennia, and the Islamic Republic insists it won't tolerate a change in Armenia's borders now. But so far, Tehran has not offered Armenia real assistance. On the contrary, Iranian authorities vocally supported Azerbaijan's 2020 action, cheering Aliyev's "liberation" of Karabakh. And this month, Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan signed a joint declaration on developing a trilateral north-south transport corridor to link the three countries economically—and, of course, to cut out the West in the important South Caucasus hub. Supporting Azerbaijan against Armenia won't isolate Iran.

Thankfully, it looks like the West, or at least the US, may be beginning to see the light. The US has stepped up its involvement, green lighting a visit by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Armenia this past weekend and hosting a quick meeting with the belligerents in New York. The US doesn't need to commit military resources. But it can stop supplying millions of dollars of military assistance to Azerbaijan, as it does every year, and can impose sanctions on the family of Azeri strongman Ilham Aliyev until Azerbaijan withdraws its troops from Armenian territory. For its part, the European Union can stop trying to make deals with a dictator whose conduct is scarcely different from Putin's. And both Washington and Brussels can increase financial support for Armenia.

You can read my whole essay in Compact here.

Politics

The Way To Stop Worrying About Judicial Legitimacy Is To Stop Worrying About Judicial Legitimacy

The answer to any question about the Supreme Court's legitimacy should be "next question."

|

Recently, several Justices have opined on the legitimacy of the Supreme Court.

The Chief urged people not to criticize the legitimacy of the Court, simply because they disagree with an opinion.

"You don't want the political branches telling you what the law is. And you don't want public opinion to be the guide of what the appropriate decision is," said Roberts, who added, to laughter, "Yes, all of our opinions are open to criticism. In fact, our members do a great job of criticizing some opinions from time to time. But simply because people disagree with an opinion is not a basis for criticizing the legitimacy of the court."

Justice Kagan observed that that judges undermine their legitimacy when they impose their own personal preferences on the people.

"Nobody elected me," Kagan said in a public conversation at the Temple Emanu-El Streicker Center in Manhattan. "And the only reason people should accept what judges do is because they're doing law, they're doing something that they were put there to do. And so I think judges … undermine their legitimacy when they don't act so much like courts and when they don't do things that are recognizably law, and when they instead stray into places where it looks like they're an extension of the political process, or where they're imposing their own personal preferences."

And, Kagan added that the Court is legitimate when it acts like a Court:

"I would say it's when a court is legitimate when it's acted like a court," Kagan said. "A court does not have any warrant, does not have any rightful authority, to do anything else than act like a court. It doesn't have the authority to make political decisions. It doesn't have the authority to make policy decisions. Its authority is bounded and the court should be constantly aware of that."

Justice Sotomayor also joined the fray:

She added: "When the court does upend precedent, in situations in which the public may view it as active in political arenas, there's going to be some question about the court's legitimacy."

In the wake of Dobbs, I adopted a new rule of thumb for reading discourse about the Supreme Court. Whenever anyone starts talking about "legitimacy"--yes, scare quotes--I stop reading. Immediately. There is nothing new that can be said about the Supreme Court and legitimacy. Really, nothing new. Casey made the case about as well as it could be made. For three decades, people kept repeating Justice Souter's "wisdom"--more scare quotes.

The Dobbs majority and dissent vigorously disagreed on Casey's conception of "legitimacy." Ultimately, the Dobbs majority concluded that the Court should not concern itself with outward-looking concepts like "legitimacy." The Chief, as well as the Dobbs dissenters, insisted the Court should take account of such concerns.

I explained this divide in a Newsweek column:

Casey's understanding of legitimacy, Alito suggested, "went beyond this Court's role in our constitutional system." Stare decisis should not be "subject to the vagaries of public opinion." The Court, Alito explained, "cannot allow [its] decisions to be affected by any extraneous influences such as concern about the public's reaction to [its] work." In the span of a few paragraphs, the majority wiped away a generation of received wisdom about legitimacy.

Indeed, Dobbs redefined legitimacy altogether. Alito quoted from Rehnquist's Casey dissent: the Supreme Court does not "derive[] its legitimacy…from following public opinion," but by faithfully deciding cases based on written law. Justice Alito and his colleagues explained that "[w]e do not pretend to know how our political system or society will respond to today's decision overruling Roe and Casey." Nor do they care.

And nor should they care when the press or others ask about legitimacy.

Of course, the irony is that the majority restored an issue to the political process, while the dissent would have let five robed lawyers continue to dictate abortion policy nationwide. Kagan's concerns about legitimacy are better suited for Obergefell, which wrested the issue of marriage from the political process based on penumbras. For progressives, legitimacy is defined as maintaining the precedents of the Warren and Burger Courts. When the Court created those precedents out of thin air, legitimacy was never in question. But when the Court exorcises those phantasmal precedents, legitimacy comes into doubt. Indeed, for progressives, stared decisis is defined as stand by the precedents of the Warren and Burger Courts. The script at this point is predictable.

My advice to the Supreme Court justices: whenever anyone asks about the Court's legitimacy, the answer should be "next question." Or, if they are feeling more loquacious, "Our job is to decide cases based on law, without fear or favor of public perception."

Maybe I can frame the issue in tautological terms that will resonate with the Chief: the way to stop worrying about judicial legitimacy is to stop worrying about judicial legitimacy.

Free Speech

First Amendment Limits on State Laws Targeting Election Misinformation, Part II

An overview of state efforts to combat election misinformation.

|

This is part II in a series of posts discussing First Amendment Limits on State Laws Targeting Election Misinformation, 20 First Amend. L. Rev. 291 (2022). What follows is an excerpt from the article (minus the footnotes, which you will find in the full PDF).

Despite public outcry over the rise of misinformation in political campaigns, there is little federal regulation of the content of election-related speech. Other than in the context of campaign finance, federal law is largely absent in this space. Federal laws governing political speech focus primarily on advertising, but even with regard to advertising existing federal law is minimal and directed largely at traditional mediums of communication such as broadcast and print. Although federal agencies like the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have "truth in advertising" laws that target false or misleading content in advertisements, those laws apply only to advertisements affecting "commerce," which the FTC has interpreted as precluding its ability to regulate the content of political advertisements.

The states, however, have not held back. Beginning in at least 1893, when Minnesota criminalized defamatory campaign speech, state legislatures have sought to enact statutes targeting false speech in elections. Today, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have statutes that potentially regulate election-related speech, including but not limited to the content of political advertising. These statutes basically take one of two forms: statutes that directly target the content of election-related speech and generally applicable statutes that indirectly implicate election-related speech by prohibiting intimidation or fraud associated with an election.

Before we examine the extent to which the First Amendment may limit state efforts to regulate election misinformation, it will be helpful to get an overview of the breadth and depth of current state laws that purport to address lies, misinformation, intimidation, and fraud in elections. To aid in this assessment, we developed a multi-level taxonomy of the types of speech targeted by the various state statutes. At the most general level, we can divide the statutes into eight categories based on the subject matter the statute regulates: speech about (1) candidates; (2) ballot measures; (3) voting requirements or procedures; (4) source, authorization or sponsorship of political advertisements; (5) endorsements; and (6) incumbency; as well speech that involves (7) intimidation; and (8) fraud or corruption. The top-level categories are not exclusive and many statutes fall within more than one category.

We also further divided each category based on the level of knowledge or intent, if any, the statute requires before liability attaches. For example, some statutes require that the false speech be made knowingly or with reckless disregard as to the truth of the statement. Other statutes impose liability if the speaker should have known the information was false, which is often referred to as "constructive knowledge." Still others impose liability regardless of knowledge, which is a form of "strict liability."

A. Laws that Target False Election-Related Speech

Read More

Judge Oldham Bails Out Texas

Episode 422 of the Cyberlaw Podcast

|

The big news of the week was a Fifth Circuit decision upholding Texas's law regulating social media speech suppression. The decision was poorly received by the usual supporters of social media censorship but I found it both remarkably well written and surprisingly persuasive. That does not mean it will survive the almost inevitable Supreme Court review but Judge Oldham wrote an opinion that could be a model for a Supreme Court decision upholding the Texas law.

The big hacking story of the week was a brutal takedown of Uber, probably by the dreaded Advanced Persistent Teenager. Dave Aitel explains what happened and why no other large corporation should feel smug or certain that the same cannot happen to them. Nick Weaver piles on.

Maury Shenk explains a recent European court decision upholding sanctions on Google for its restriction of Android phone implementations.

Dave points to some of the less well publicized aspects of the Twitter whistleblower's testimony before Congress. We agree on the bottom line – that Twitter is utterly incapable of protecting either U.S. national security or even the security of its users' messages. If there were any doubt about that, it would be laid to rest by Twitter's dependence on Chinese government advertising revenue.

Maury and Nick tutor me on The Merge, which moves Ethereum from "proof of work' to "proof of stake," massively reducing the climate footprint of the cryptocurrency. They are both surprisingly upbeat about it.

Maury also lays out a new European proposal for regulating the internet of things – and, I point out, for massively increasing the cost of all those things.

China is getting into the attribution game. It has issued a report blaming the National Security Agency for intruding on Chinese educational institution networks. Dave is not impressed.

The Department of Homeland security, in breaking news from 2003, has been storing the contents of phones it seizes on the border. Dave predicts that DHS will have to further pull back on its current practices. I'm less sure.

Now that China is regulating vulnerability disclosures, are Chinese companies reluctant to disclose vulnerabilities outside China? The Atlantic Council has a report on the subject, but Dave thinks the results are ambiguous at best.

In quick hits:

Download the 422nd Episode (mp3)

You can subscribe to The Cyberlaw Podcast using iTunes, Google Play, Spotify, Pocket Casts, or our RSS feed. As always, The Cyberlaw Podcast is open to feedback. Be sure to engage with @stewartbaker on Twitter. Send your questions, comments, and suggestions for topics or interviewees to CyberlawPodcast@steptoe.com. Remember: If your suggested guest appears on the show, we will send you a highly coveted Cyberlaw Podcast mug!

The views expressed in this podcast are those of the speakers and do not reflect the opinions of their institutions, clients, friends, families, or pets.

 

Free Speech

District Court Rejects Right of Publicity Claim on "Parody" Grounds

|

From Steele v. Goodman, decided Thursday by Judge John A. Gibney, Jr. (E.D. Va.):

The plaintiffs assert that [Jason] Goodman violated [the right of publicity statute] by publishing videos and selling merchandise on the website Red Bubble that depicted [David] Steele's face on the hind end of an animal and on a cartoon body. The Court finds that Goodman's creations, while repugnant, are parody images protected by the First Amendment.

Courts are sharply divided on when (especially outside the context of commercial advertising) the First Amendment preempts the "right of publicity," which is the right to control the commercial use of one's name, likeness, and other attributes of identity, whether in comic books, video games, greeting cards, or elsewhere. But there is general agreement that parodic uses are protected, and this fits that well.

Here's the backstory, which also led to a libel claim that the court declined to dismiss:

Goodman … "owns, maintains[,] and operates multiple Internet and social media properties, including YouTube channels and a Twitter account." "The name of Goodman's social media properties is 'Crowdsource The Truth' ('CSTT')." On June 13, 2017, Steele—EIN's founder—participated in an interview in Oakton, Virginia, with an "agent" of CSTT, George Webb. {The complaint provides a litany of Steele's purported accomplishments. The Court will not recite them here, save to note that prior to his death, Steele—through EIN—ran an "educational campaign" called #UNRIG, with the stated purpose of communicating "to all citizens the possibility of an ethical, legal, non-violent restoration of integrity to the United States Government."} During the interview, Steele discussed "his views on 9/11, pedophilia[,] and the purpose of #UNRIG."

Read More

Strangers on the Internet: Podcast Episode 7 out now

How to spot a narcissist (or get rid of one)

|

I posted the seventh episode of my podcast "Strangers on the Internet" (the direct link for Apple Podcasts is here). My co-host, psychologist Michelle Lange and I deal with one of the most important issues in the dating and relationship context: how to detect both narcissistic traits and full-blown narcissists. We teach listeners the signs of love bombing, gaslighting, and other signature moves of energy vampires.

In other online dating (as well as legal) news, the search for Irene Gakwa--who disappeared after moving in with a Wyoming man she met online--continues, in part thanks to a dedicated team of local women in Gillette, WY.

The Dormant Commerce Clause and Geolocation: Conclusion

|

[Jack Goldsmith and I will have an article out about the Dormant Commerce Clause, geolocation, and state regulations of Internet transactions in the Texas Law Review early next year, and I've been serializing it here; this post is the conclusion of the series. There is still plenty of time for editing, so we'd love to hear any recommendations you folks might have; in the meantime, you can read the entire PDF of the latest draft (though with some formatting glitches stemming from the editing process) here.]

Throughout American history, most everyday behavior of Americans—shopping, speaking, gathering—has been governed largely by state law. People were protected by (and liable under) state consumer protections laws; public accommodations laws; the tort law of libel, invasion of privacy, and right of publicity; and more.

The internet has shifted a great deal of commercial, personal, and political activity "into cyberspace"—but behind that metaphor are people communicating from one state into another state, sometimes about the residents of a third state. Our commitment to federalism, both as a means of preserving local political decision-making and of fostering experimentation, remains important despite changing technology. And geolocation technology makes it possible to preserve, at least to a large extent, this traditional territorial pluralist vision.

Congress may choose to homogenize the rules for internet activity, by preempting state law. And the courts of course must enforce a floor of federal First Amendment protection for such activity. But beyond that, absent a hard-to-make showing of undue burden on interstate commerce, courts should play only a limited role in striking down on "extraterritoriality" grounds state laws that apply to internet transactions. That is so whether the state laws are tort law rules, antidiscrimination laws, common carrier laws, or other means by which states engage in the age-old endeavor of defining and reconciling the legitimate interests of citizens and business enterprises.

Free Speech

First Amendment Limits on State Laws Targeting Election Misinformation, Part I

Although the federal government has largely stayed out of regulating the content of election-related speech, the states have been surprisingly active in passing laws that prohibit false statements associated with elections.

|

I want to thank Eugene for inviting me to write about an article Evan Ringel and I recently published titled First Amendment Limits on State Laws Targeting Election Misinformation, 20 First Amend. L. Rev. 291 (2022). The article expands on a whitepaper we wrote in 2021 that cataloged state efforts to regulate election-related speech (available on SSRN).

In today's post and over the remainder of this week, we plan to: (1) provide a summary of our project to study state efforts to regulate election-related speech; (2) present an overview of state laws that target election-related speech; (3) explore potential First Amendment frameworks for assessing the constitutionality of government restrictions on election speech; (4) assess whether existing state laws restricting election-related speech are likely to pass First Amendment scrutiny; and (3) discuss how these state approaches intersect with broader societal efforts to reduce the frequency and impact of election misinformation.

What follows is an excerpt from our article (minus the footnotes, which you will find in the full PDF). The article went to press before the Fourth Circuit in Grimmett v. Freeman enjoined the enforcement of a North Carolina statute that makes it a crime to publish or circulate derogatory reports about political candidates (see Eugene's posts on the case here and here). We'll discuss this case on day 4.

Introduction

The last two presidential election cycles have brought increased attention to the extent of misinformation—and outright lies—peddled by political candidates, their surrogates, and others who seek to influence election outcomes. Given the ubiquity of this speech, especially online, one might assume that there are no laws against lying in politics. It turns out that the opposite is true. Although the federal government has largely stayed out of regulating the content of election-related speech, the states have been surprisingly active in passing laws that prohibit false statements associated with elections.

Read More

More