The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Politics

Conservatives Should Not Be Surprised By Justice Kavanaugh's Voting Pattern With Chief Justice Roberts

Revisiting Seven-Sky v. Holder.

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For a generation, legal conservatives chanted, "No more Souters." This mantra arose in the wake of the nomination of Justice David Souter, who turned out to be a consistent liberal vote. After NFIB v. Sebelius, the Obamacare case, conservatives adopted a new mantra: "No more Robertses." Never again would conservatives select a Justice who would rewrite a law in the name of judicial restraint. Yet, to replace Justice Kennedy, President Trump managed to select a Justice who has voted with Chief Justice Roberts nearly 95% of the time! Roberts and Kavanaugh are cut from the same cloth. And Kavanaugh consistently votes with Roberts, and the Court's three progressives, to form a majority. But this voting pattern should not come as a surprise. Like with Justice Gorsuch, Judge Kavanaugh's jurisprudence-under-pressure was on full display.

Flash back to 2011, as the constitutional challenges to the Affordable Care Act were trickling up to the Supreme Court. One of the cases, Seven-Sky v. Holder landed before Judge Kavanaugh on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The other two judges on the panel (Silberman and Edwards) upheld the ACA's individual mandate. This provision, the panel found, could require people to purchase health insurance based on Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. But Judge Kavanaugh took a very different path based on Congress's taxing power. The analysis here is very complex. Indeed, I devoted an entire chapter of my 2013 book on the Obamacare litigation to Kavanaugh's approach. (You can read an excerpt here.) To over-simplify things, there are four things to know about Kavanaugh's opinion. 

First, Kavanaugh found that the court lacked jurisdiction because the "tax" that enforced the ACA would not be collected until 2014. Critical to that jurisdictional analysis, however, was a finding that the Affordable Care Act in fact imposed a tax, rather than a penalty. Kavanaugh repeatedly referred to a "tax penalty." Having found that the court lacked jurisdiction, Judge Kavanaugh should have simply ended his opinion. But he didn't. He never does. He always keeps writing.

Second, Kavanaugh made a comment in dicta about how the ACA could be put on a surer footing. Specifically, Congress could make "just a minor tweak" to the law, and "eliminate the legal mandate language." Rather than penalizing people who failed to comply with the individual mandate, people without insurance could simply pay a tax to the IRS. The law would shift from a mandate enforced by a penalty, to a choice that resulted in a tax. This change would not be merely one of semantics. This alternative law would be grounded in Congress's broad taxing power, and would avoid the thorny question of whether the federal government could require people to engage in a commercial transaction. 

Third, the federal government expressly invoked Judge Kavanaugh's opinion before the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General argued that no "minor tweak" was needed because the ACA was "materially indistinguishable from Judge Kavanaugh's proposed revision." The argument tracked many of Kavanaugh's observations about how the ACA operates. In the reply brief, the Solicitor General then built on Judge Kavanaugh's observation, and wrote the Court should not construe the ACA to "create[] an independent legal obligation." Rather, the government contended, the ACA as drafted gave people a choice: purchase insurance or don't purchase insurance. And if they chose the latter option, they would have to pay a tax.

Fourth, Judge Kavanaugh's decisions planted the seeds for Chief Justice Roberts's saving construction. Shortly after the case was argued, Harvard Law School Professor Laurence Tribe observed that it was "considerably more plausible to see the law being upheld under the taxing power, as Judge Kavanaugh suggested it would be [as] if the law were interpreted this way." Tribe was right. To save the law, Roberts read the Affordable Care Act in the same fashion as Kavanaugh's tweaked version. Under the so-called "saving construction," the law did not actually impose a mandate to  purchase insurance, but instead merely taxed the uninsured. 

For my book, I interviewed a senior DOJ official who relayed that "Judge Kavanaugh's opinion convinced the Solicitor General's office that the 'tax argument might be a more conservative and judicially restrained basis to act to uphold as a tax.'" DOJ credited Judge Kavanaugh with the "assist" for the argument that would save Obamacare.

Judge Kavanaugh's opinion in Seven-Sky was like a carbon copy of his nascent Supreme Court jurisprudence. First, his lodestar is avoiding controversy, especially in polarized cases. During oral argument, Kavanaugh analogized the Obamacare litigation to the New Deal clash between the Supreme Court and President Roosevelt. He asked, "[W]hy should a court get in the middle of that and risk being another 1935 situation"? Now, Justice Kavanaugh's consistent voting pattern with the Chief Justice reflects a similar mode of avoiding controversy. Public perception pervades all aspects of his judging. Indeed, in his recent remarks to the Eighth Circuit judicial conference, Kavanaugh cited his decisions in Allen v. Milligan and Moore v. Harper as evidence that the Court is not "partisan." In both cases, Kavanaugh voted with the Court's progressive wing. To paraphrase Chief Justice Roberts, the Court as an "institution" functions better when there are fewer 5-4 cases, where all the conservatives vote together. And that is apparently how Kavanaugh defines the Court's legitimacy.

Second, Kavanaugh can never fully remove himself from the political process. He consistently offers compromises as a way to signal moderation. In Seven-Sky, he felt compelled to offer Congress advice on how to modify a statute, even after finding that the court lacked jurisdiction. But why? His efforts to reach out to resolve issues that are not properly before the Court are flatly inconsistent with any professed fidelity to judicial restraint. Yet, to this day, Justice Kavanaugh routinely writes concurrences that purport to settle issues that are not properly before the Court, especially in high profile cases involving abortion and guns.

Third, Kavanaugh employed Roberts-esque dexterity to avoid difficult legal questions. After Justice Kennedy announced his retirement, SCOTUSBlog observed that Kavanaugh in Seven-Sky was "willing to look for artful ways to avoid deciding questions he does not want to decide." Artful? More like inventive. None of the parties raised the specific taxing power argument he relied on. Indeed, during oral argument in Seven-Sky, Judge Edwards asked Beth Brinkmann, who headed DOJ Civil Appellate, whether she had read the obscure provision of the tax code that Judge Kavanaugh was asking about. She replied, "No." Rather, Kavanaugh developed a convoluted argument based on the tax code all by himself--an argument that allowed him to duck the most consequential constitutional question in a generation. SCOTUSBlog concluded that Kavanaugh "recognized that the litigation over the ACA was politically fraught for both the judiciary as a whole and for individual judges who might have aspirations to higher courts, and so he decided to find a way out." Kavanaugh surely knew that his future Supreme Court nomination would hinge largely on that decision, and like Chief Justice Roberts, Kavanaugh found a way to avoid striking down the statute. Indeed Kavanaugh apparently had such aspirations for some time. I wrote the chapters of my book with some precision in order to provide a complete record, should Kavanaugh ever be nominated to the Supreme Court. And so it came to be. 

Justice Kavanaugh is performing just as Judge Kavanaugh's record would have predicted. His record was in plain sight for all to see. Recently, Senator Mitch McConnell observed, "Those who have paid attention to his earlier career are familiar with [Kavanaugh's] restrained, case-by-case jurisprudence." (Kavanaugh was not McConnell's preferred pick after Justice Kennedy announced his retirement.) Indeed, at least with regard to Obamacare, Judge Kavanaugh was to the left of his former boss, Justice Anthony Kennedy. The Court's longtime swing vote would have invalidated the entire Affordable Care Act. Those who were responsible for selecting Justice Kavanaugh were no doubt aware of Seven-Sky, but recommended him nonetheless. But we have at least some evidence that Kavanaugh initially met some resistance.

In May 2016, then-candidate Donald Trump released a list of eleven possible candidates to fill the seat caused by Justice Antonin Scalia's passing. Indeed, two names were glaringly absent from that initial list: Judges Brett Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and Judge Neil Gorsuch of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Both were well-known appointees of President George W. Bush. I can only conclude that Kavanaugh's omission was deliberate--perhaps due to Seven-Sky v. Holder. At the time, the Wall Street Journal Editorial Board wrote that Trump should add Kavanaugh to the list, who "could replace some of the conservative intellectual heft that the Court has lost in Justice Scalia." The Journal did not mention Gorsuch. 

In September 2016, Trump would release the second iteration of the list, now with 21 names. This time, Gorsuch made the cut. But Kavanaugh was still missing. Again, I can only conclude this omission was deliberate. In November 2016, after the election, the Wall Street Journal editorialized once again that Kavanaugh should be added to the list. In January 2017, shortly after the inauguration, President Trump nominated Gorsuch to fill the Scalia vacancy. Ultimately, no one on the initial list would be nominated to the Supreme Court. 

Ten months later, in November 2017, President Trump released the third iteration of his list, which ballooned to twenty-five names. Two conspicuous names made the cut. At long last, Judge Kavanaugh was included. I don't think Kavanaugh had done anything over the prior year to warrant his inclusion. Rather, whatever resistance there was to Kavanaugh on prior lists was overcome. At the time, I thought Kavanaugh was at last added so he could be nominated to the Court. And so he was. When liberals came out in full force to oppose Kavanaugh's confirmation, I chuckled. The worst thing that could have happened to the left would have been for Kavanaugh to have withdrawn. Just about anyone else on the Trump list would have been to Kavanaugh's right, but without the baggage. Nevertheless, he persisted.

Another name was added to the November 2017 list: Amy Coney Barrett, who was confirmed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals only seventeen days earlier. I will discuss Justice Barrett in the next post.

Self-Defense

"Busting the Durable Myth that US Self-Defense Law Uniquely Fails to Protect Human Life"

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T. Markus Funk, who has written extensively on self-defense law, has an article with this title here (in The Champion, the magazine of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers); here's the abstract:

The cases of Jordan Neely, Ahmaud Arbery, Kyle Rittenhouse, and George Alan Kelly brought the long-simmering national debate about self-defense to a full boil. Member of the legal commentariat quickly offered their takes on all aspects of these flashpoint cases, further sparking spirited discussion.

The disrupting note in the constant drumbeat of lawyers, legislators, academics, reporters, and other legal observers, however, is the claim that US self-defense law is exceptionally severe by international standards and comparatively underappreciative of the value of human life and the need to prevent violence.

The problem with this narrative is that it fails to recognize that US self-defense law is, in fact, very much within the international mainstream and, in many respects, is significantly more protective of attackers and more carefully calibrated to reduce overall societal violence than the self-defense laws of many other nations. As this article argues, in terms of impact, such erroneous claims seriously distract from the much-needed debate over US self-defense law's deeper public policy and moral grounding.

Much worth reading.

Free Speech

Court Unseals and Depseudonymizes Student's Settled First Amendment Lawsuit Against University

An illustration that courts are often willing to reconsider stipulated sealing and pseudonymization decisions when members of the public or media object.

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From Doe v. Amar, decided yesterday by Judge Sue Myerscough (C.D. Ill.), in response to my motion to unseal and depseudonymize; this is the case I blogged about in April:

[T]his case arises out of Mr. Doe's tenure as a student at the University of Illinois College of Law. On November 18, 2022, Mr. Doe filed this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. The Complaint alleged that Defendants—all officials, employees, and trustees of the University of Illinois—violated Mr. Doe's First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. According to Mr. Doe, Defendants did so by compelling him to meet with the University's Behavioral Intervention Team (BIT), retaliating against him for exercising his right of free speech, and subjecting him to an unconstitutionally vague code of conduct….

On December 5, this Court denied Mr. Doe's motion for a preliminary injunction in a written order. Noting that "the possibility of a sanction is not the same as its guarantee," the Court found that Mr. Doe's allegations of irreparable harm were too speculative to justify preliminary injunctive relief. Mr. Doe then moved for reconsideration of several of the Court's orders, including the Court's decision to deny Mr. Doe the ability to litigate under a pseudonym. The Court denied that motion, too. The Court found that "none of the reasons for sealing the record or proceeding pseudonymously were present in this case," and that in any event Mr. Doe "had waived the request to keep [his identity] sealed because he … referred to himself" in his pleadings and exhibits.

On December 7, Mr. Doe filed a notice of interlocutory appeal as to the Court's order on his motion for injunctive relief. While that appeal was pending, the Illinois Supreme Court imposed a one-year suspension on Mr. Doe's attorney, Justin K. Schwartz, for neglecting client matters and keeping unearned fees. Mr. Doe then retained new counsel. In March 2023, the parties "engaged in mediation … [and] reached a settlement agreement and mutual release of claims."

On April 19, the parties jointly moved to "seal the Court record for this matter in its entirety and replace Plaintiff's name with 'John Doe.'" In the alternative, the parties asked that the Court "reconsider its denial of Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym, permitting pseudonym treatment for 'John Doe,' and allowing Plaintiff to file redacted exhibits." The Court granted the former request in a text order dated April 28, 2023. As a result, the docket is now wholly sealed, and the caption renders Plaintiff's name as "John Doe."

On May 2, the parties made a similar request of the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit denied their motion the next day.

That court's two-sentence order read as follows: "Retroactive anonymity is an oxymoron and it is never appropriate to seal entire appeals. The Supreme Court held in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (1994), that settlement does not justify vacatur."

The court concluded that I had standing to intervene, to vindicate my "right of access as a member of both 'the press and the general public.'" And it reconsidered its earlier grant of pseudonymity and decision to seal, though it allowed redactions from several exhibits:

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Supreme Court

Are Petitions for Certiorari Declining?

October Term 2022 saw a significant drop in the number of paid petitions for certiorari. Is it a trend?

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There were only 1,252 paid petitions for certiorari filed with the Supreme Court in October Term 2022. This is well below the average number submitted during the prior five-year and ten-year periods (1,645.8 and 1593.8 respectively), as Michael Migiel-Schwartz notes in an interesting SCOTUSBlog post. Is this a trend?

Migiel-Schwartz writes:

This year's decline is substantial: a 21.2 percent decrease from the previous 15-year average, and a 23.9 percent decrease from the previous five-year average. Even compared with the 2019-20 term's 1,478 petitions, it marks a more than 15 percent decrease. . . .

It is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions based on these numbers alone, and it is possible that the 2022-23 term is a one-year blip. The downturn does not seem to be the result of declining merits decisions in the federal courts of appeals. Although they too have decreased in recent years, that decrease has been slow and fairly steady from 2012 through 2023 — not the sudden drop seen this year in the Supreme Court's paid docket.

Whatever the cause of this term's decline, the average of 1,589 is consistent with a longer-term trend downward noted in 2007 by David Stras. "Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the number of paid petitions filed with the Court ranged from 1,986 petitions in 1990 to 2,417 petitions in 1981," Stras wrote. "However, beginning in 1994, or at about the time of greatest decline in the Court's plenary docket, the number of paid petitions began to plummet, with only 1,693 paid petitions filed during October Term 2004, a nearly 22% decrease since 1994."

It will be interesting to see whether the precipitous drop in petitions filed last term is a temporary blip, to which Covid-19 may have contributed, or is part of a larger trend. Among other things, the change in the Supreme Court's composition could be altering the calculus for potential filers, but it is not clear why this would produce an overall decline in cert petitions, as opposed to a shift in what sorts of petitions are filed. (That is, if there are fewer opportunities for progressive interests it would seem these could be offset by increased opportunities for conservative interests.)

The longer term drop in paid petitions for certiorari is significant, but is far less than the decline in the size of the Court's merits docket. So while the decline in petitions could contribute to the shrunken merits docket, it does not appear to be the driver. The Court is hearing fewer cases than it used to because it is choosing to hear fewer cases. So unless the justices decide to start hearing more cases, or Congress intervenes, we are likely stuck with a smaller Supreme Court docket, whether or not paid petitions for certiorari decline.

Politics

Venice, Trieste, Slovenia, and Croatia

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My wife and I just came back from visiting our older son, who has been on a college work-study this Summer in Venice and Trieste, and then taking a trip to Slovenia (Ljubljana, Bled, Postojna Cave) and Croatia (Pula, Rovinj, Plitvice Lakes, Split, Dubrovnik). It was a delightful trip, even beyond just seeing our son. A few thoughts:

  1. Most impressive man-made sight: Venice. Yes, it's full of tourists, but there's a reason for that. A City of Islands, a citypelago, unlike most other places on earth.
  2. We spent three days in Venice, but no-one offered us any Dogecoin.
  3. Most impressive natural sight: Postojna Cave in Slovenia. Glorious.
  4. Leibniz cookies, continental Europe's answer to the Fig Newton.
  5. Best meals, from cheapest to most expensive: Geco Pub in Trieste; Ćiri Biri Bela in Split; Arsenal in Dubrovnik; Bled Castle Restaurant in Slovenia.
  6. In Trieste, we stayed on Viale 20 Settembre. (a) What's the significance of September 20? (b) That street name, unsurprisingly, is seen in many Italian cities; why is it somewhat ironic in Trieste?
  7. It was very easy to get around in English (admittedly, in the relatively touristy places we visited), and the people were generally very friendly.
  8. Dubrovnik in Croatia was once the Republic of Ragusa, with the motto "Non bene pro toto libertas venditur auro," meaning "Liberty isn't worth selling for all the gold in the world." Good sentiment! Also, winter is coming.

The FTC Doubles Down, Down, Down

Episode 468 of the Cyberlaw Podcast

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This episode of the Cyberlaw Podcast kicks off with coverage of a stinging defeat for the FTC, which could not persuade the courts to suspend the Microsoft-Activision Blizzard acquisition. Mark MacCarthy says that the FTC's loss paves the way for a complete Microsoft victory, as other jurisdictions begin to trim their sails. We credit Brad Smith, Microsoft's President, whose policy smarts likely helped to construct this win.

Meanwhile, the FTC is still doubling down (and down) in its pursuit of aggressive legal theories. Maury Shenk explains the agency's investigation of OpenAI, which raises issues not usually associated with consumer protection. Mark and Maury argue that this is just a variation of the tactic that made the FTC the de facto privacy regulator in the U.S. I ask how policing ChatGPT's hallucinatory libel problem, which the FTC seems disposed to do, constitutes consumer protection, and they answer, plausibly, that libel is a kind of deception, which the FTC does have authority to regulate.

Mark then helps us drill down on the Associated Press deal licensing its archives to OpenAI, an arrangement that may turn out to be good for both companies.

Nick Weaver and I try to make sense of the district court ruling that Ripple's XRP is a regulated investment contract when provided to sophisticated buyers but not when sold to retail customers in the market. It is hard to say that it makes policy sense, since the securities laws are meant to protect retail customers more than sophisticated buyers. But it does seem to be at least temporary good news for the cryptocurrency exchanges, who now have a basis for offering a token that the SEC has been calling an unregistered security. And it's clearly bad news for the SEC, signaling how hard it will be for the agency to litigate its way to the Cryptopocalypse it has been pursuing.

Andy Greenberg makes a guest appearance to discuss his WIRED story about the still mysterious attack that gave Chinese cyberspies the ability to forge Microsoft authentication tokens.

Maury tells us why Meta's Twitter-killer, Threads, won't be available soon in Europe. That leads me to reflect on just how disastrously Brussels has managed the EU's economy. Fifteen years ago, the U.S. and EU had roughly similar GDPs, about $15 trillion each. Today, EU GDP has scarcely grown, while U.S. GDP is close to $25 trillion. It's hard to believe that EU tech policy, which I've dubbed EUthanasia, hasn't contributed to continental impoverishment, which, Maury points out, is so bad it's even making Brexit look good.

Maury also explains the French police drive to get explicit authority to conduct surveillance through cell phones. Nick offers his take on FISA section 702 reform. And Maury evaluates Amazon's challenge to new EU content rules, a challenge that he thinks has more policy than legal appeal.

Not content with his takedown of the Ripple decision, Nick reviews the week's criminal prosecutions of cryptocurrency enthusiasts. These include the Chinese bust of Multichain, the sentencing of Variety Jones for his role in the Silk Road crime market, and the arrest of Alex Mashinsky, CEO of the cryptocurrency exchange Celsius.

Finally, in quick hits,

Download 468th Episode (mp3)

You can subscribe to The Cyberlaw Podcast using iTunes, Google Play, Spotify, Pocket Casts, or our RSS feed. As always, The Cyberlaw Podcast is open to feedback. Be sure to engage with @stewartbaker on Twitter. Send your questions, comments, and suggestions for topics or interviewees to CyberlawPodcast@gmail.com. Remember: If your suggested guest appears on the show, we will send you a highly coveted Cyberlaw Podcast mug! The views expressed in this podcast are those of the speakers and do not reflect the opinions of their institutions, clients, friends, families, or pets.

More on Standing in the 303 Creative Case

A response to my critique of the Court's new standing jurisprudence.

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"This Court has never recognized an unqualified right to pre-enforcement review of constitutional claims in federal court. … As our cases explain, the 'chilling effect' associated with a potentially unconstitutional law being 'on the books' is insufficient to 'justify federal intervention' in a pre-enforcement suit. Instead, this Court has always required proof of a more concrete injury and compliance with traditional rules of equitable practice. The Court has consistently applied these requirements whether the challenged law in question is said to chill the free exercise of religion, the freedom of speech, the right to bear arms, or any other right."

Whole Women's Health v. Jackson (2021) (majority opinion)

No one contends that pre-enforcement review should be available whenever a state law chills the exercise of a constitutional right. Rather, as this Court explained in Young, pre-enforcement review is necessary "when the penalties for disobedience are . . . so enormous" as to have the same effect "as if the law in terms prohibited the [litigant] from seeking judicial construction of laws which deeply affect its rights." 209 U. S., at 147.

Whole Women's Health v. Jackson (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joined by Justices Kagan and Breyer)

A couple of weeks ago I posted an article (here) criticizing the Court's decision in the website designer's case (303 Creative v. Elenis) granting Lorie Smith standing to pursue her claim in federal court. My argument, in essence, was that Lorie Smith suffered no "concrete injury" whatsoever, that the case was entirely hypothetical make-believe ("If she does this, and the State of Colorado does that, then her constitutional rights will have been violated"), and that the penalties for disobeying the statute were not "so enormous" as to justify pre-enforcement review of her hypothetical claim.

Incidentally, those of you who disagree with my contention that the Court is in the process of completely dismantling the standing requirement in federal courts should take a look at the colloquy between Justices Roberts and Kagan in the student loan case, Biden v. Nebraska, another late-Term case in which the Court allows a plaintiff (the State of Missouri) to proceed with its challenge despite having suffered no injury whatsoever.

The following is a response authored by John Ohlendorf and David Thompson of Cooper, Kirk in Washington DC, authors of an amicus brief in the 303 Creative case on behalf of Young Americas Foundation in support of Lorie Smith, taking issue with my post (and several others which had been similarly critical of the Court's standing analysis in the case).  I've reprinted it below in full (saving my response to their comments for a subsequent post).


After the Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in favor of free expression in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis at the end of the last Term, a curious thing happened: several commentators, including Professor Post, published sharply worded criticisms of the decision not based on its interpretation of the First Amendment as barring the application of Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) to the Petitioners' speech, but over an issue that was not even contested before the Supreme Court at the merits stage—whether the Petitioners, 303 Creative and its owner Lorie Smith, had standing to sue. We confess to being puzzled by these criticisms—not only because we thought the Petitioners' standing was a slam-dunk (for reasons we laid out in an amicus brief we filed before the Court on behalf of the Young America Foundation), and not only because the other side apparently thought so too, given the Respondents' decision not to dispute standing before the Court (and the failure of Justice Sotomayor's to mention the issue in her dissent). The most puzzling part of these criticisms is their failure to meaningfully engage with what we thought was the most straightforward reason Ms. Smith and her company had standing to challenge Colorado's Act: the direct, imminent, and undisputed injury that the Act's "Communication Clause" inflicted on Ms. Smith's speech. In this post, after briefly discussing the background of the case, we explain why this injury unquestionably gave Ms. Smith standing to challenge the Act. We also argue the posts by Professor Post and others also fail even on their own terms to cast any doubt on the Petitioners' standing.

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Politics

Conservatives Should Not Be Surprised By Justice Gorsuch's Opinion in Bostock

Revisting Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College District.

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By virtually any measure, today's Supreme Court is the most conservative bench in modern history. Replacing Justice Antonin Scalia with Justice Neil Gorsuch, rather than Merrick Garland, or someone to his left, preserved the balance of the Court. Getting Justice Anthony Kennedy to retire, and replacing him with Justice Brett Kavanaugh, in many regards, moved the Court to the right. And replacing Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg with Justice Amy Coney Barrett right before the tumultuous 2020 presidential election proved to be the coup de grâce. On paper at least, there is a 6-3 conservative majority for the first time in nearly a century. 

Still, as I have documented elsewhere, Justices Kavanaugh, Barrett, and to a lesser extent Gorsuch, have voted to the left of Justices Thomas and Alito. The three Trump appointees are simply not as conservative as they could have been. But conservatives should not be surprised by President Trump's Supreme Court picks. Their track record--both what they did and did not do--have predicted their views on the high court. This post will discuss Justice Gorsuch. Future posts will focus on Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett.

In June 2020, many conservatives were stunned by Justice Gorsuch's majority decision in Bostock v. Clayton County. He found that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination against employees because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. This case was 6-3, with Chief Justice John Roberts, and the progressives in the majority. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh dissented. This decision came as something of a shock to the right. Indeed, Senator Josh Hawley of Missouri warned that Bostock may "represent[] the end of the conservative legal movement." (The rumors of the movement's death were greatly exaggerated.)

Bostock was not a one-off for Justice Gorsuch with regard to federal protections for LGBT people. In several other lesser-profile cases, he parted company with Justices Thomas and Alito. First, in Idaho Department of Correction v. Edmo, the Ninth Circuit held that denying transition treatment for a transgender inmate was unconstitutional. Idaho asked the Supreme Court for an emergency stay of the lower court ruling. Only Justices Thomas and Alito would have granted that relief. Later, Edmo was provided the transition treatment and the case ostensibly became moot. Justices Thomas and Alito would have vacated the lower court's decision. Justice Gorsuch was once again silent, letting this precedent of the Ninth Circuit stand. (Justice Kavanaugh was confirmed one week before certiorari was denied, so he likely did not participate in that case.)

Second, Gloucester County School Board v. Grimm involved a transgender student and bathrooms at a public school. The Fourth Circuit held that both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited denying transgender students access to the restrooms assigned to the opposite biological sex. By the time the cert petition reached the Supreme Court, the Biden administration had adopted the Fourth Circuit's reading of Title IX, in light of Bostock. However, rather than resolving whether the Department of Education was correct, the Supreme Court simply denied certiorari. Justices Thomas and Alito would have granted the petition. Justice Gorsuch was silent, as were Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett, letting this precedent of the Fourth Circuit stand

Third, in Kincaid v. Williams, the Fourth Circuit held that the Americans with Disabilities Act required a prison to accommodate an inmate's gender dysphoria. On appeal, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Justices Alito and Thomas would have granted the petition right away, finding there was "no good reason for delay." Justice Gorsuch, as well as the other two Trump appointees, let the precedent of the Fourth Circuit stand. 

Should Bostock, Edmo, Grimm, and Kincaid have been surprises? Not really. In 2008, then-Judge Gorsuch sat by designation on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. He heard Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College District on a panel with appointees by Presidents Carter and Clinton. The case concerned Rebecca Kastl who "presented full-time as female." After "complaints that a man was using the women's restroom," Kastl was banned "from using the women's restroom until she could prove completion of sex reassignment surgery." The Ninth Circuit had previously held that California law prohibited discrimination against "transgender individuals" based on the "victim's real or perceived non-conformance to socially-constructed gender norms." That opinion was authored by the liberal lion of the Ninth Circuit, Judge Stephen Reinhardt. The Kastl panel then extended that state law doctrine to Title VII. Gorsuch agreed with the Carter and Clinton appointees to extend that Reinhardt precedent to Title VII. Under Gorsuch's view, federal law had all along barred "impermissible gender stereotypes" of a transgender individuals. One such impermissible stereotype was the notion that bathrooms can be assigned based on a person's biological sex. Kastl was an unpublished, non-precedential three-page order. But it was cited by many district court opinions, as well as a case from the Eleventh Circuit. Here Judge Gorsuch decided an important question of federal law in a drive-by fashion.

Throughout his entire career, Justice Gorsuch has read the protections of federal law broadly--including the Equal Protection Clause, Title VII, Title IX, and the ADA--to broadly protect LGBT rights. Bostock, Edmo, Grimm, and Kincaid should not have been a surprise for anyone who read Kastl. And those who were responsible for nominating Gorsuch were no doubt aware of Kastl, and recommended him nonetheless.

Free Speech

Attempt to Block Comment About Critical Race Theory at State Bd. of Ed. Meeting Yields $89K Attorney Fee Award

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From Regenold v. Ohio State Bd. of Ed., decided Friday by Judge James Graham (S.D. Ohio.):

Plaintiff Daniel P. Regenold brought this lawsuit over a modest but important matter. He had requested to speak for no more than five minutes at a public meeting of the Ohio State Board of Education., but the Board denied his request. The Board said that it had already closed the book on the topic he wished to address – critical race theory in Ohio education. Board President Laura Kohler notified Regenold that the Board had addressed the topic at prior meetings and passed a final resolution on the matter at least nine months earlier.

Regenold filed suit …, seeking a preliminary injunction and asserting that the Board violated his rights under the First Amendment …. He alleged that the Board's decision to deny his request to speak was an overbroad, content-based restriction. Pointing to the language of the Board's applicable policy on conducting public meetings, Regenold argued that critical race theory remained an "issue of general interest" for which the Board's policy promised that the public would always have the right to speak.

Regenold's request for injunctive relief became moot about six months later when the Board allowed him and others to speak on critical race theory at public meetings. Later, defendants made an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which Regenold accepted. The Court entered Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $1,000….

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Free Speech

First Amendment Claim of Professor Fired Over Article Claiming Race-Based Genetic IQ Differences …

can go forward, rules a federal judge, denying Cleveland State University's motion to dismiss.

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From Judge Dan Aaron Polster's decision Friday in Pesta v. Cleveland State Univ. (N.D. Ohio):

This case concerns the Plaintiff's First Amendment rights to academic freedom, freedom of speech, and freedom of association as a professor at Cleveland State University ("CSU"). The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights when they investigated and fired him for advancing a "genetic hypothesis of the cause of the racial IQ gap" between black and white Americans in a published academic article….

The Plaintiff, Bryan Pesta …, was a Professor in the Department of Management at CSU. Professor Pesta received tenure at CSU in 2010 and promotion to full professor in 2016. In March 2022, CSU fired Professor Pesta….

In August 2019, the Plaintiff co-authored and published in the peer reviewed journal, Psych, an article entitled "Global Ancestry and Cognitive Ability." The article essentially concluded that an IQ gap between white and black Americans was, at least in part, hereditary and the result of genetics. This conclusion is called a "hereditarian hypothesis." … In conducting research for the article, the Plaintiff used National Institute of Health ("NIH") data that consisted of over 9,000 individuals' actual DNA samples. The Plaintiff's article concluded that this data supported the belief that "genetics played a role in the mean differences in general intelligence between White and Black Americans."

The Plaintiff acknowledges that the article "proved controversial." In the aftermath, CSU students and faculty, along with non-affiliated individuals and groups, publicly criticized the article and petitioned CSU to discipline Professor Pesta. One notable critic was Dr. Kent Taylor …. In April 2021, Dr. Taylor—a UCLA Professor of Pediatric Medicine—wrote President Sands and alleged that the article's "[u]se of NIH data for studies of racial differences in this way [was] both a violation of data use agreement and unethical."

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Free Speech

No Pseudonymity for #TheyLied Plaintiff Suing for Libel and Invasion of Privacy Over Rape Accusations

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From Judge Nina Wang yesterday in Doe v. Roe (D. Colo.); note that I filed an objection to plaintiff's motion for pseudonymity:

According to the allegations in the Complaint …, Plaintiff and Defendant dated for nearly a year while enrolled at Tulane University …. After their relationship ended in October 2021, Defendant complained about Plaintiff's behavior to Tulane, which issued mutual no-contact orders the next month. Defendant also sought a protective order in Louisiana state court, claiming that Plaintiff stalked, harassed, shoved, and threatened her.

In both proceedings, Defendant did not claim that Plaintiff sexually assaulted her. Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to a state court order, pursuant to which Tulane's no-contact order became permanent, and Plaintiff agreed to withdraw from Tulane and cease all contact with Defendant. Plaintiff alleges that he never sexually assaulted Defendant, and that he left Tulane voluntarily.

In August 2022, following a "period of reflection," Plaintiff enrolled in Front Range Community College in Boulder, Colorado, although he planned to transfer to the University of Colorado ("CU Boulder") after his first year there. At CU Boulder, Plaintiff rushed and sought to pledge an unspecified fraternity, and paid its dues.

Shortly after the fraternity received his bid in September 2022, Defendant sent text messages to the fraternity's social chairs claiming, among other things, that Plaintiff transferred schools "not through his own choice, but because he was kicked out of Tulane for rape and stalking"; "sexually assaulted and raped [Defendant] countless times"; "forced [Defendant] into very uncomfortable sexual situations, forcing [her] to do painful things which [she] objected to"; "was abusive in every way"; "ha[d] been physically violent with [Defendant]"; "threatened [Defendant's] friends and family and attempted to cut [her] off from every person in [her] life"; and was "a threat to every woman's safety on [CU Boulder's] campus."

The fraternity "terminated" Plaintiff immediately, based on Defendant's allegedly defamatory claims, and refused to refund a deposit he paid. Plaintiff's college friends "cancelled him." Additionally, fraternity members "spread [Defendant's] malicious lies to numerous other students on campus, who proceeded to bully and ostracize [Plaintiff]." Plaintiff was ultimately "forced to withdraw" from CU Boulder "and return home to California." Meanwhile, Defendant has returned to Tulane, where she continues to "publish[] her false and malicious lies to numerous students there." Seeking damages, Plaintiff has brought three claims arising out of these allegations: defamation, intrusion on seclusion, and unreasonable disclosure of private facts.

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Supreme Court

Debating the Legacy of Justice John Marshall Harlan

A critical column by Jamelle Bouie prompts an extensive reply from Peter Canellos.

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After the Supreme Court invalidated the use of race in college admissions in SFFA v. Harvard, NYT columnist Jamelle Bouie wrote a column questioning the legacy of Justice John Marshall Harlan. The Supreme Court majority's reliance upon language from Harlan's opinion, Bouie suggested, might not be as anomalous as some of the Court's critics would like to think. Though credited with the claim that "the Constitution is colorblind," Harlan was no anti-racist.

The language of colorblindness that Roberts and Thomas use to make their argument comes directly from Justice John Marshall Harlan's lonely dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, the decision that upheld Jim Crow segregation. "There is no caste here. Our Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens," wrote Harlan, who would have struck down a Louisiana law establishing "equal but separate" accommodations on passenger railways.

But there's more to Harlan's dissent than his most frequently cited words would lead you to believe. When read in its entirety, the dissent gives a picture of Harlan not as a defender of equality, but as someone who thinks the Constitution can secure hierarchy and inequality without the assistance of state law. It's not that segregation was wrong but that, in Harlan's view, it was unnecessary. . . .

Harlan's brief for the colorblind Constitution rested, within the text, on a belief in the inherent superiority of white Americans and the basic inferiority of their Black counterparts. "Blacks and whites could be 'equals before the law,'" notes Hutchison, "but that did not mean they were equals in any other respect — in the social realm, racial inequality would rule 'for all time' if the nation remained blind to race 'in view of the Constitution.' "

This column prompted an extensive reply from Peter Canellos, author of The Great Dissenter: The Story of John Marshall Harlan, America's Judicial Hero in Politico. His reply begins:

There is no high court for historical injustices, no tribunal to which a historical figure can appeal when their reputation is maligned. Yet simple fairness and the need for a balanced view of the past require some attempt at reputational justice. Even in death, people should reap what they sow. It's a question that would have interested the Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan, who served from 1877 to 1911. With his religious values, unusual sense of how judicial opinions shape American destiny and his many dissents that appealed to future generations, Harlan believed in the long judgment of time.

But he might have shuddered at the thought of his own reputation in the dock.

Harlan's fame rests as the sole dissenter in case after case that took away the rights that Black people were granted in the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution. Those dissents not only inspired African American leaders in his time but provided an early roadmap for the victories that Black lawyers won in the 20th century. The fact that even one — though only one — white judge had seen the law in terms of its effect on Black people kept hope alive in the Black community. From church pulpits, he was hailed as a prophet in his time.

Canellos rejects Bouie's interpretation of Harlan, suggesting it results from wrenching Harlan's views out of context and transposing them into contemporary debates.

Bouie suggests that the notion of a purely color-blind Constitution can be used to cement white privileges in the law. Fair enough. He also goes on to suggest that this was what Harlan intended to do.

A closer look at Harlan's Plessy dissent, and the wider arc of his career, does not support that contention. . . .

Harlan was, indeed, far-sighted, but it's not credible to suggest his main concern was preserving racism at home while shielding it from critics abroad. His concern for the plight of Black people was straightforward and sincere, a feeling that Black people had been denied their legal rights as Americans. They had gotten a rotten deal. And concerns over white America's treatment of Black people were reflected in almost every aspect of his life during his years on the bench.

After a fairly thorough survey of Harlan's record (covering far more column inches than Bouie had at his disposal in the NYT) Canellos concludes:

It is commonly said that all such figures were "of their times." Certainly, their words and actions should be judged in the context of their times, including the prejudices that attached to that period. But that doesn't mean that every person is fated to share those biases, or that anyone whose work responds to the peculiar challenges of their era must be held in suspicion.

In Harlan's case, his willingness to acknowledge the wrongs done to Black people helped sustain faith in the legal system at one of its worst hours. His actions convinced Marshall, Motley and others that it was possible to persuade white judges to enforce the rights of Black people; imagine the disgrace to the system if every white judge had refused to uphold the Civil Rights Act of 1875, or if every white judge had rallied around the separate-but-equal doctrine.

It seems to me that the injury to public discourse in failing to recognize those who broke the mold or stood apart — or in seeming too eager to discredit them — is precisely that it forecloses the possibility of exemplary behavior. If John Marshall Harlan was a prisoner of his times, so are we prisoners of ours. And that serves to extinguish hope for a better world.

Supreme Court

Will SCOTUS Be the Mountain Valley Pipeline's MVP?

The Mountain Valley Pipeline's developers seek Supreme Court intervention to prevent the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit from delaying its completion.

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After years of legal and political wrangling, it appeared the Mountain Valley Pipeline was nearing completion. fewer than four miles of the 300-plus-mile project remain to be completed and Congress endorsed the pipeline's completion. Section 324 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 expressly called for the approval of all remaining permits, ratified all prior federal agency permits, and constrained further judicial review of such permit approvals.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit appears not to have gotten the message. Despite the fact that Congress had stripped the Fourth Circuit of any jurisdiction over cases challenging the pipeline's permits, last week the court issued two orders staying additional construction and approvals from the U.S. Forest Service and Fish & Wildlife Service.

On Friday, Mountain Valley Pipeline filed an emergency application with Chief Justice Roberts asking the Supreme Court to vacate the stays. The brief, filed by former Solicitor General Donald Verelli, explains why the Fourth Circuit's actions lacked any legal basis.

The argument that apparently convinced the Fourth Circuit to enter its stays is that Congress lacks the constitutional authority to intervene and effectively end the legal challenges to the pipeline's construction. As this academic amicus brief puts it, Congress may not "direct the result in pending litigation without amending substantive law." The problem is that Congress has substantively amended the law -- declaring these permits valid, rather than telling the Fourth Circuit to so conclude -- and deprived the Fourth Circuit of jurisdiction to consider the question (vesting such jurisdiction in the D.C. Circuit instead).

It is worth remembering that the only reason environmentalist groups have been able to challenge the Mountain Valley Pipeline in the first place is because Congress decided to impose permitting and other requirements for projects like this and further provided for judicial review of the relevant agency determinations to ensure that Congress's standards had been met. What Congress giveth, Congress may also take away. Congress was not required to allow environmentalists or anyone else to challenge whether a Forest Service or Fish & Wildlife Service decision was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law. Indeed, Congress did not even need to require that projects like the Mountain Valley Pipeline obtain federal permits at all. Thus Congress is certainly free to declare that the standards Congress set forth for projects like this have been met in this particular case -- and that is what it did.

Not only is the Fourth Circuit wrong to think there is a basis for continuing to hold up the Mountain Valley Pipeline, it lacks the jurisdiction to consider the question. It is well established that Congress retains the power to shift or strip federal jurisdiction, even from pending cases, and even if that disadvantages one party to the litigation. (See, e.g., Ex parte McArdle in which the Supreme Court upheld legislation stripping the federal courts of hearing particular habeas claims, even though that doomed McArdle's habeas petition.) Such a move may seem like dirty pool, but it is well within Congress's power to do.

The legal merits of this dispute seem rather clear. The only question is whether the Supreme Court will consider the Fourth Circuit's actions to be sufficiently egregious to justify a "shadow docket" order vacating the stays or providing other extraordinary relief.

Free Speech

No Pseudonymity for Non-Citizen Challenging Law Limiting Non-Citizens' Participation in Voter Registration

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From Chief Judge Mark Walker's opinion yesterday in Hispanic Federation v. Byrd (N.D. Fla.); the pseudonymous plaintiff is apparently a lawful permanent resident:

{This case involves a constitutional challenge to a newly-enacted law regulating third-party voter registration organizations. Plaintiff Doe seeks to proceed anonymously to avoid retaliation or harassment considering their immigration status and due to the "elevated political climate" concerning immigration more broadly.}

Ordinarily, parties referred to in a complaint must be identified by their real names. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provide that "[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties." Similarly, courts have long recognized that "[l]awsuits are public events" and that the public has a "legitimate interest in knowing all of the facts involved [in a case], including the identities of the parties." …

The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that pseudonyms may only be used in "exceptional" cases, and that there is "a strong presumption in favor of parties' proceeding in their own names." That presumption can only be overcome where the party seeking to proceed pseudonymously shows that they have "a substantial privacy right which outweighs the 'customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.'" In determining whether Plaintiff Doe has such a right, this Court considers the following three factors: (1) whether they are "seeking anonymity challenging government activity," (2) whether they will be "required to disclose information of the utmost intimacy", and (3) whether they will be "compelled to admit their intention to engage in illegal conduct and thus risk criminal prosecution."

As to the first factor, [that] Plaintiff Doe is challenging government activity … only has a neutral effect. Cf. Frank , 951 F.2d at 324 ("[T]he fact that Doe is suing the Postal Service does not weigh in favor of granting Doe's request for anonymity."); cf. also Roe v. Aware Women Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, at 686 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[N]o published opinion that we are aware of has ever permitted a plaintiff to proceed anonymously merely because the complaint challenged government activity.").

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Politics

"Strangers on the Internet" Podcast Episode 36: Therapy Speak as Relationship Abuse

Why the Sarah Brady and Jonah Hill controversy carries broader meaning

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The 36th episode (Apple Podcasts link here and Spotify link here) of Strangers on the Internet with co-host and psychologist Michelle Lange explores how therapy language has at times been weaponized in romantic relationships.

The Internet is abuzz with discussion about allegations by Sarah Brady, a University of Hawai'i law student, that her ex-boyfriend and celebrity Jonah Hill emotionally abused her and dressed up the abuse in therapy language. According to screenshots of text messages she posted publicly, he designated it "boundaries" that she should not post swimsuit pictures of herself on social media, model, surf with men, or interact with female friends of whom he didn't approve, among other things.

We discuss the difference between boundaries and coercive control, the ways in which boundary speak doesn't absolve the speaker of problematic values injected into requests (or demands), and the general current trends in distorting psychological language to serve one's purposes. We also delve into what happens when a partner's mental health or other life circumstances make it difficult for them to give what the other person might actually deserve under optimal conditions. Tune in and join the discourse!

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