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Conservatives Should Not Be Surprised By Justice Gorsuch's Opinion in Bostock
Revisting Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College District.
By virtually any measure, today's Supreme Court is the most conservative bench in modern history. Replacing Justice Antonin Scalia with Justice Neil Gorsuch, rather than Merrick Garland, or someone to his left, preserved the balance of the Court. Getting Justice Anthony Kennedy to retire, and replacing him with Justice Brett Kavanaugh, in many regards, moved the Court to the right. And replacing Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg with Justice Amy Coney Barrett right before the tumultuous 2020 presidential election proved to be the coup de grâce. On paper at least, there is a 6-3 conservative majority for the first time in nearly a century.
Still, as I have documented elsewhere, Justices Kavanaugh, Barrett, and to a lesser extent Gorsuch, have voted to the left of Justices Thomas and Alito. The three Trump appointees are simply not as conservative as they could have been. But conservatives should not be surprised by President Trump's Supreme Court picks. Their track record--both what they did and did not do--have predicted their views on the high court. This post will discuss Justice Gorsuch. Future posts will focus on Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett.
In June 2020, many conservatives were stunned by Justice Gorsuch's majority decision in Bostock v. Clayton County. He found that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination against employees because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. This case was 6-3, with Chief Justice John Roberts, and the progressives in the majority. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh dissented. This decision came as something of a shock to the right. Indeed, Senator Josh Hawley of Missouri warned that Bostock may "represent[] the end of the conservative legal movement." (The rumors of the movement's death were greatly exaggerated.)
Bostock was not a one-off for Justice Gorsuch with regard to federal protections for LGBT people. In several other lesser-profile cases, he parted company with Justices Thomas and Alito. First, in Idaho Department of Correction v. Edmo, the Ninth Circuit held that denying transition treatment for a transgender inmate was unconstitutional. Idaho asked the Supreme Court for an emergency stay of the lower court ruling. Only Justices Thomas and Alito would have granted that relief. Later, Edmo was provided the transition treatment and the case ostensibly became moot. Justices Thomas and Alito would have vacated the lower court's decision. Justice Gorsuch was once again silent, letting this precedent of the Ninth Circuit stand. (Justice Kavanaugh was confirmed one week before certiorari was denied, so he likely did not participate in that case.)
Second, Gloucester County School Board v. Grimm involved a transgender student and bathrooms at a public school. The Fourth Circuit held that both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited denying transgender students access to the restrooms assigned to the opposite biological sex. By the time the cert petition reached the Supreme Court, the Biden administration had adopted the Fourth Circuit's reading of Title IX, in light of Bostock. However, rather than resolving whether the Department of Education was correct, the Supreme Court simply denied certiorari. Justices Thomas and Alito would have granted the petition. Justice Gorsuch was silent, as were Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett, letting this precedent of the Fourth Circuit stand
Third, in Kincaid v. Williams, the Fourth Circuit held that the Americans with Disabilities Act required a prison to accommodate an inmate's gender dysphoria. On appeal, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Justices Alito and Thomas would have granted the petition right away, finding there was "no good reason for delay." Justice Gorsuch, as well as the other two Trump appointees, let the precedent of the Fourth Circuit stand.
Should Bostock, Edmo, Grimm, and Kincaid have been surprises? Not really. In 2008, then-Judge Gorsuch sat by designation on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. He heard Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College District on a panel with appointees by Presidents Carter and Clinton. The case concerned Rebecca Kastl who "presented full-time as female." After "complaints that a man was using the women's restroom," Kastl was banned "from using the women's restroom until she could prove completion of sex reassignment surgery." The Ninth Circuit had previously held that California law prohibited discrimination against "transgender individuals" based on the "victim's real or perceived non-conformance to socially-constructed gender norms." That opinion was authored by the liberal lion of the Ninth Circuit, Judge Stephen Reinhardt. The Kastl panel then extended that state law doctrine to Title VII. Gorsuch agreed with the Carter and Clinton appointees to extend that Reinhardt precedent to Title VII. Under Gorsuch's view, federal law had all along barred "impermissible gender stereotypes" of a transgender individuals. One such impermissible stereotype was the notion that bathrooms can be assigned based on a person's biological sex. Kastl was an unpublished, non-precedential three-page order. But it was cited by many district court opinions, as well as a case from the Eleventh Circuit. Here Judge Gorsuch decided an important question of federal law in a drive-by fashion.
Throughout his entire career, Justice Gorsuch has read the protections of federal law broadly--including the Equal Protection Clause, Title VII, Title IX, and the ADA--to broadly protect LGBT rights. Bostock, Edmo, Grimm, and Kincaid should not have been a surprise for anyone who read Kastl. And those who were responsible for nominating Gorsuch were no doubt aware of Kastl, and recommended him nonetheless.
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Gorsuch is often good on fourth amendment issues. He and Sotomayor agree fairly often. I'm not sure if I'd call this a liberal position more than an understanding that the Fourth Amendment is there to protect against abuses of the legal system.
I realize it’s tempting, after years of liberals viewing the Court’s decisions through the prism of the resulting political impact, to do the same. Doing so from a conservative perspective is equally illegitimate. Which is why horserace posting like this from Blackman are exhausting. These are not supposed to be political decisions, though I recognize they are inevitably/inextricably bound up in politics. Maybe I'm unduly idealistic, but this shouldn't be about politics. That's what ends up corrupting the law (and it has). It's wrong to view the Court as a super-legislature that can right any wrong.
I agree. Well said.
Such a naive view. The court is a political body. 85 years of left wing decisions require a reaction.
Conservatism is not a suicide pact.
I see it differently:
85 years of (legally / constitutionally) wrong decisions (e.g., Roe v. Wade) require a reaction -- we need judges who will faithfully apply the Constitution, not twist it out of all recognition to fit their political agenda (the abortion agenda, the gay agenda, the trans agenda, the racial-preferences agenda, etc., etc.). Faithful (honest) application of the Constitution will give us conservative outcomes; we, unlike the Left, don't need to engage in blatant dishonesty.
Bob is right, this is a naive view. Judges are political, and language is malleable and subjective. But on the other hand, the rule of law depends on objective and static meaning, and this should probably be strived for even if not perfectly attainable.
So I'm conflicted on this, it's sort of a paradox. I also disagree that the principled approach is unfailingly conservative, it is somewhat, but there is a double edged sword always. For example, the most radical transformation of the US system of government between founding and now is the increase and centralization of power in the federal judiciary. True conservatism as reflected in the founding would be to devolve power to the states, which would enable both conservative and radically progressive results alike at the state levels in the near term. In the long term it will be better though.
"I see it differently"
Let’s unpack that.
Since 1954 the four Chief Justices (all appointed by Republican Presidents) have failed to “faithfully apply the Constitution”.
Since the end of WWII, the 34 Justices (21 appointed by Republicans, 13 appointed by Democrats) have failed to “faithfully apply the Constitution”.
Since 1962, the Supreme Court has always had a majority of Justices appointed by Republican Presidents. But apparently they failed to “faithfully apply the Constitution”.
But now the Court is suddenly doing it right? An institution dominated by Republican appointments since before I was born was bad, but now it’s good?
“Faithful (honest) application of the Constitution will give us conservative outcomes”
Obviously not, since the Court has been dominated by Republican appointees for my entire life (literally).
“we, unlike the Left, don’t need to engage in blatant dishonesty.”
303 Creative proves otherwise.
You said below that “conservative and individual liberty” are mutually exclusive. You’re just plain wrong.
303 Creative is proof of that. But I guess perhaps you’re attitude is demonstrating that I was too idealistic in what I wrote above, and that team scoring should be a thing.
Your implication borders on bad faith, that the past Republican appointments to the Court you catalog were made in furtherance of a Republican/conservative agenda. That only has become a thing in reaction to the riptide of jurisprudence to legislate the Living Constitution from the bench, AKA distort the law by finding any justification to find for the deserving party.
“You said below that “conservative and individual liberty” are mutually exclusive. You’re just plain wrong.
303 Creative is proof of that.”
303 Creative is proof that the right of an individual to be free of someone else’s religion isn’t considered as fundemental as a religious person’s right to ignore laws everyone else has to follow. It is a pure, anti-individual-liberty case. It also had a fake business (no such site existed), fake examples (the “gay” guy was straight, married, and never asked for her services), and fake rights (the “right” to run a business in violation of existing law).
“past Republican appointments to the Court you catalog were made in furtherance of a Republican/conservative agenda.”
Are you arguing that conservative Presidents appointing conservative Justices is somehow unusual? That seems to border on bad faith, don’t yiu think?
“That only has become a thing in reaction to the riptide of jurisprudence to legislate the Living Constitution”
Like I said, you claim that the Republican-dominated Supreme Court that has existed for my entire lifetime was somehow a radical leftist Court. It’s more likely that you see centrist decisions as radical.
“AKA distort the law by finding any justification to find for the deserving party.”
Yes, the conservative-dominated Court has been hell-bent on finding ways to deliver radical, illegitimate rulings to the left for over 70 years. That sounds totally reasonable. *eyeroll*
303 Creative is proof of that.
You're confused about the meaning of liberty, to call this an anti-liberty case. I'm not commending such behavior, but ignoring laws goes to the heart of liberty, being free of government coercion. That's what the Bill of Rights is all about, restrictions on government from passing laws that infringe upon individual liberty. The flag burner defied the law and was vindicated. It wasn't a neighbor that tried to punish him, it was the government.
You don't have any right to be free of your neighbor's religion, any more than you have a right to be free of his speech. That's because your neighbor has no power on his own to force his religion on you or coerce you to speak as he wishes.
You do have a right to be free of the government compelling you to conform to your neighbor's religion, or that same government coercing you to speak as it or your neighbor wishes.
You have a wrong understand of liberty and rights, and what liberty and rights the Constitution protects. Oh, and your Overton window is all screwed up. Of course you want to claim "the center". Yes, that Republican dominated Supreme Court twice upheld Roe, until the third time was the charm. Definitely your whole life there. Maybe you're 15, I don't know.
This case is not about public accommodation, it's about free speech.
"But now the Court is suddenly doing it right? "
Not really, its just better. It is far from perfect [Bostock, recent VRA case and others]. Mostly because the new justices are still stuck in the obsolete "impartial" mode.
If they were more like Alito and Thomas, it would be "doing it right".
If they were doing it like the two most radical conservative Justices since William Rehnquist died they would be doing it right? Gee, that doesn't seem like a fringe position at all.
If you wanted your preferences to prevail in modern America, Bob from Ohio, you should have persuaded a majority of Americans to become roundly bigoted, superstition-addled, half-educated, economically inadequate, backwaters-inhabiting, science-disdaining hayseeds.
Right-wing thinking is doomed in an America whose population has rejected conservatism for a half-century and becomes less White, less rural, less religious, less bigoted, and less backward each and every day.
Carry on, clingers. Your betters will let you know how far and how long, as has become the American way.
I don’t disagree with that sentiment, but I also find it rather obnoxious to score the justices according to one’s policy preferences/outcomes, like a race handicapper. It tries to affirm they are all their to be political creatures, irrespective of the law. Each in their own way, I think Roberts, Alito, and Thomas are all trying to be faithful to the law, undoing the decades of bad decisions as they come.
But that has to be based on the cases in front of them. The facts of which may not allow each, in good conscience, to vote as the Blackman handicappers of the world want. That’s what I find so distasteful: the demand to reach the politically desirable result, no matter the facts of particular cases.
That’s what the liberal justices have done. I know it’s what the critics of the conservatives justices think they are doing. I say that when a Gorsuch or Roberts go against the team, it’s because that’s where their principles take them. Not because they are cozying up to any particular cocktail circuit players. That’s the difference between them and the libs.
I’ll say it now: does anyone actually believe that a liberal justice would ever break ranks on a significant case? That’s my point. When it matters, they vote their preference, never against their interest. Alas, that’s why the law always ratchets one way.
We may not like that Roberts twisted himself into a pretzel finding the individual mandate was a tax. I don’t think it was because he liked Obamacare, or cared about his future acceptance among Washington power brokers. It was because he thought the structure of the Constitution allowed for it, given the general trend (precedent) of Congress’s economic powers, and that it would have been too traumatic to our system to decide otherwise in that moment. Like Scalia’s stamp: stupid but constitutional. Maybe some think that stupid, or evil. I just don’t think it’s untethered like much of the liberal jurisprudence we’re now swimming against.
"are all trying to be faithful to the law, undoing the decades of bad decisions as they come."
Yes, those decades of dishonest decisions made by those Republican-appointed, secretly-liberal justices who have been trying to destroy American jurisprudence.
Fortunately Thomas, Alito, and (sometimes) Roberts, those plucky heroes fighting to push back the darkness, have received reinforcements from Mitch McConnell. Now the Super Six can bring back Truth, Justice, and the American Way to a country on the edge of annihilation.
"I’ll say it now: does anyone actually believe that a liberal justice would ever break ranks on a significant case?"
Yes. I think that liberal Justices are as dedicated to the law as conservative Justices are. Kagan and Thomas agreed 64% of the time last term, and that wasn't because Thomas breaks ranks. Jackson was in the majority 84% of the time.
Your premise is that liberals aren't honest and conservatives are. Your premise is false. Honesty isn't the sole possession of conservatives.
No, it's that I don't think either are particularly honest. I do know that historically the liberals never break ranks on high profile cases (the one way ratchet), as Blackman's recent posting further document (to his chagrin, not another Souter/Roberts riff). Nobody says that about Sotomayor or Jackson. Maybe Blackman's correct that Kagan flirtation with finding common ground ended with Dobbs (and the student loan case) and she'll return to be lock step with her compatriots.
This is more about the disconnect between "Republican", "Conservative," and "Individual Liberty."
These aren't identical things.
These days, Conservative and Individual Liberty are mutually exclusive.
No need to blame Blackman’s partisan myopia on liberals, he can suck like this all by himself.
" he can suck like this all by himself."
In fairness, we probably shouldn't be passing along plausibly true stories from his high school days.
"Why spoil the beauty of the thing with legality?" Spoken by the character of President Teddy Roosevelt in the film THE WIND AND THE LION.
Beware of results-oriented decisions. They make for terrible precedents. My head hurts when I think of applying a dynamic interpretation of the statutory language of ERISA or the Internal Revenue Code.
So why shouldn't the current court reverse 85 years of "results-oriented decisions"?
It is possible to be both result oriented and right on the law; the two are not mutually exclusive. In answer to your question, partly because of the reliance interest those 85 years of decisions have created. Individuals, law enforcement, businesses and government have all relied on those decisions for what they can and cannot do. Suppose, for example, Obergefell were to be overruled. There are tens of thousands of couples who are now legally married, and have planned accordingly, who may no longer be. The disruption that such a decision would create would be enormous.
Laws change all the time. There is no right to rely on lack of change.
There may not be a right to rely on lack of change, but reliance interest is a valid policy reason for not changing.
"valid policy reason"
I thought they should be "right on the law", not engaging in policy determinations?
Krychek_2 2 hours ago
"It is possible to be both result oriented and right on the law; the two are not mutually exclusive."
Krychek - "Result oriented" and "right on the law are almost always mutually exclusive. You mention Obergefell which a prime example. I was in favor of creating martial statutes for same sex marriages for at least 10 years prior to obergefell, if for no other reason to protect both partners in a manner similar to what each states' family codes do for regular marriages. However, the legal / constitutional rationale for same sex marriage in Obergefell is flat out piss poor.
The current court is welcome to do as it wishes, but its majority and fans should have the character to refrain from whining and whimpering like an Alito when the culture war's winners dismantle most of the clinger court's handiwork.
Would Gorsuch have concurred in the judgment in Obergefell based on sex discrimination?
This is awfully thin gruel. Edmo, Grimm and Kincaid are denials of cert (Edmo also involved denial of an emergency stay). There's no obligation to publish one's vote on cert, so we don't even know whether Gorsuch voted to deny cert, only that he did not announce his willingness to grant it. Moreover, there are numerous reasons for denying cert, including the desire to find a better vehicle, to allow lower courts to flesh out the issues, etc. Particularly with issues as relatively novel as those involving public accommodations of gender transition, it is entirely possible that the "conservative" position is better served by waiting for the right case rather than jumping into a ready-fire-aim shadow docket food fight.
That leaves Kastl. The panel ruled against the transgender plaintiff, affirming the dismissal of the case on summary judgment. What evidently bothers Blackman is that Gorsuch did not object to the panel's reliance on an earlier 9th Circuit case, which had held that California law protected transgender employees from discrimination, for the proposition that Title VII does the same. However, in the earlier case, the 9th Circuit had already concluded that California law "parallels Title VII."
So what was Gorsuch supposed to do. A 9th Circuit panel can't overrule another panel. Moreover, he was sitting by designation. I don't believe I've ever seen an outside-the-circuit judge, sitting by designation, dissent on the grounds that the circuit's existing precedent should be overruled. That doesn't happen.
There is no evidence that Gorsuch has some secret track record of favoring LGBT causes or litigants. Like it or not, his Bostock opinion derived from a textualist reading of the statute.
A faulty textualist reading but yeah.
Do sex-specific restrooms predate the Constitution?
How did inns and government buildings handle such things?
Of Course the Native Amuricans had the first ones, Teepees with "Squaws" and "Braves" signs, pretty sure they still have those, at least they did at Harrah's Cherokee Casino last time I went.
Frank
Historically, society has segregated according to sex, not gender. Which is why I’m not really interested in much of the gender stuff.
However, I believe one of the issue in Bostock (combined cases, maybe not that one in particular) was an employer prohibiting a biological female funeral home employee from wearing a men’s-style suit. That’s how Gorsuch gets to his textual “sex discrimination”, because it’s trafficking in gender stereotypes about how the biological sexes are supposed to behave. Personally don’t care from a tolerance/legal perspective if a man wants to wear a dress…we shouldn’t be enforcing stereotypes that only women wear dresses. I do think it odd (putting it charitably) but hey, it’s a free country and everything. I guess we went through something 50/100 years ago with women wearing pants, or not wearing nylons.
Not forbidding a biological woman to wear a man’s suit is a much different controversy than allowing a biological man in a women’s dressing room, or competing athletically against women. I’d like to think Gorsuch and his compatriots can recognize this.
Who cares? Bostock was interpreting the Civil Rights Act, not the Constitution.
(A fact that apparently every person who doesn't like the decision is unaware of. Which makes it hard to take their takes seriously.)
I strongly disagree with the Bostock opinion because Gorsuch got the statutory language / textualism wrong based on the plain meaning of the words at the time of enactment. very few , if any, conservatives disagree with the opinion based on the constitution as you claim.
"Bostock" case always reminds me of the late Lyman Bostock Angels Outfielder murdered at the age of 27 by some nutbag who thought he was sleeping with his wife. Guy asked Bostock "Who said you could sleep with my wife?" Bostock said "Everybody!"
Of course in 1978 it wasn't a "Mass Shooting" just another Black on Black murder in Gary Indiana (some things never change) A-hole got found "Not Guilty by reason of Insanity" Guy did follow Senescent J's advice and "Used a Shotgun"
Frank
At first the star cluster is a blob of light. But as one approaches one begins to make out individual stars, and as one comes closer still, one sees the stars separate more and more and notes the distances between them.
The Bush court…hopefully it was worth it.
>By virtually any measure, today’s Supreme Court is the most conservative bench
Just look at past Justices like McReynolds, a vigorous advocate for mandatory transgender bathrooms and taxpayer funded sex change surgery for minors. He would faint if he saw how hindbound conservative troglodytes like Sotomayor stand in the way of progressivism today!
The mark of a good jurist is that they reach a result that their jurisprudence dictates, even when the result is not something that they personally would necessarily prefer.
The mark of a bad jurist is that their results are always in-line with their preferred policy preferences, and they simply find the reasoning to reach the result that they already want.
I should add that while I sometimes disagree strongly with Justice Gorsuch's results, and I will question his techniques, I do not doubt that he is a good jurist in that he consistently follows his jurisprudence.
And here Gorsuch's method is textualism, which gets him to the result he got to. The alternative method would be a legislative history-based approach: "nobody in 1964 thought the law was protecting gays/lesbians as a class [which is certainly true] therefore the law doesn't protect them."
But looking at the text of the law gets you to the opposite result. The law bars discrimination on the basis of sex. That means, among other things, it's generally discrimination to treat employees of one sex differently than employees of the other sex based on the same behavior. An employer could legally bar all employees from swearing at the workplace, but barring only women from swearing violates Title VII. An employer could have a rule that no employee could date somebody who was left-handed, but if that rule was only enforced against men, that would be sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. And for the same reason, an employer rule permitting men to be married to women but barring women from being married to women violates Title VII. That's textualism, and that's what Gorsuch was doing.
Now, others may think other interpretive methods should at least sometimes trump textualism. But there's nothing non-conservative about textualism. One of the biggest champions of textualism over legislative history was Scalia.
It is a textualist argument, yes. But I don't think it's a correct one. Basically, Bostock interprets the statutory language "on the basis of" as being equivalent to a "but for" causation standard. I think a better interpretation would be that "but for" causation is a necessary, but not sufficient determinant that something has been done "on the basis of" a characteristic. You should also have proximate cause.
I'll confess that I don't understand what you mean by "proximate cause" in this context, but my point wasn't to re-litigate Bostock. My point was there is a strong textualist argument that gets you to the result in Bostock, and I think that's a better explanation of how Gorsuch got to the result he got to than some "he's soft on the gays, not like a true conservative would be" implication of the OP. Now, you may have a different textualist argument, and of course that's fine. Having said that, "but for" is a pretty standard way of approaching anti-discrimination law in interpreting the statutory term "because of."
Right, "because of" . . . "on the basis of" appears in the statute elsewhere I think.
It's true that courts have used "but for" causation in approaching antidiscrimination law. But long before that, the concept developed in tort law and criminal law, and it is from these areas that the concept was borrowed. Over the centuries, the idea of "proximate cause" also developed because in some cases "but for" causation may exist, yet the connection between the supposed cause and effect is nonetheless remote and tenuous.
First Google result for "but for causation" yields a useful summary:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/but-for_test
Related to that last point is the idea of a "superseding cause."
Anyway . . . perhaps the textualist argument is a better explanation of Gorsuch's action here than some kind of soft spot for transgenders and gays. I don't know. Or as a third possibility, maybe he calculated that it would otherwise help conservatives politically and legally to take the issue off the table. He does seem like he prizes a supposed intellectual rigor and consistency relatively highly. In the end, speculating about motives and secret inmost thoughts and feelings is just that, speculation.
Thanks. I do understand what proximate cause means in tort law, I'm just trying to understand what that would mean in Title VII law. Is your point that an employer firing a gay employee after the employer discovers the employer is gay primarily motivated by anti-gay animus as opposed to animus on the basis of sex? If so, I understand that, but I don't think that gets around the fact that anti-gay animus is largely rooted in animus against gender non-conformity, and Title VII pretty clearly protects against discrimination based on perceived gender non-conformity. And, more to the point here, it's still literally discrimination under the text of the act to fire a woman for dating a woman but not a man for dating a woman.
But I sense we may agree more than we disagree. My main point was that rather than go down the Josh B. "he's not a REAL conservative" route, the better understanding is that Gorsuch was simply being a textualist. Now, maybe as you suggest, there were alternative textualist approaches that could have gotten him to a different result. But I'm still sticking with the idea that he got to the result he got to because of his textualism.
I don’t think Gorsuch’s result was required by textualism at all. Beyond that, I’ll refrain for the moment from loose political characterizations or speculating about hidden sentiments or partialities.
But if someone says “he’s not a REAL conservative,” it depends what they mean by that. It is often noted and worthy of comment that the liberal justices vote in lockstep on any issue that is seen as political or remotely partisan. For some conservatives, that is the mirror image of exactly what they want to see in conservative justices, and by that definition they would be right. By any standard, though, the right somehow always gets a decidedly mixed bag with its justices.
What I understand Blackman to be saying here is that Gorsuch’s view on this particular legal issue — however derived, whether based on his view of textualism or anything else — was or should have been a known quantity based on Kastl. That seems fair, as far as I can tell.
It’s best to assume integrity as much as reasonably possible. I’m OK with the idea that Gorsuch was, in his mind, applying his principles in a consistent way. I don’t think Blackman is necessarily contradicting that here.
On the Title VII issue, no, it’s not "literally discrimination under the text of the act" to fire a woman for dating a woman but not a man for dating a woman, necessarily. Say a Muslim barbershop doesn’t want to hire a gay barber. The gay barber might say, “oh it’s because I’m a man” or “it’s because I’m a woman,” but the barbershop says no, it’s because of your actions and lifestyle that I don’t agree with, we otherwise hire men and women. They are both right in different colloquial senses: the “but for” cause sense and the “proximate cause” sense. Same for an ice cream shop that doesn’t want to hire a man with makeup on and balloons stuffed in his blouse. To say that it’s because he’s a man is accurate in a sense -- just as in the example above, it’s accurate to say that the driver was robbed because the mayor shut down the street for construction. But the weight of centuries of legal doctrine development illustrates the insufficiency of mere but-for causation. Admittedly, there may be some difficulty in drawing lines.
So which of these meanings are adopted by the words “because of” in the statute? Well, what is the original public meaning? That is still textualism in my opinion, as it is just a matter of determining what words mean. This is before getting to any kind of intent-based analysis. But even there, it seems to me that textualism has to allow for instances where the text itself is ambiguous in which case there would be additional reliance on evidences of intent insofar as they are good or the best evidence of the (original public) meaning of text that is not ascertainable on its face.
I think we'll have to agree to disagree about the textualist result. Believing that certain behavior is immoral when done by a man but not when done by a woman is, literally, making a judgment "based on" sex. An employer might think it's morally problematic for women to curse a lot and not men to curse a lot. That employer might be willing to hire women who don't curse a lot. It's still clearly discrimination under Title VII to fire a woman for cursing a lot and not firing a man who curses in the same way. And that's true even if the employer continues to employ women who don't swear. Again, a whole lot of sex discrimination cases are based hostility to gender nonconformity. Which anti-gay prejudice is an example of.
As to Josh B., I get more of the sense that we're in a series of "Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and A. C-B are not REAL conservatives, because REAL conservatives would always vote for the substantive outcome conservatives would prefer." If you want to have a more charitable interpretation of Josh B., I won't try to talk you out of it, but again, we'll need to agree to disagree.
"That’s textualism, and that’s what Gorsuch was doing."
Nothing in the text says the sex of a non -employee third party matters.
The text of the statute says it's (generally) illegal to discriminate on the basis of sex. That text means it's (generally) illegal to treat men and women differently for the same/similar behavior. The text does not limit that behavior to "at work" behavior, and contains no rule excluding behavior with third parties.
So, as I noted above, while an employer could bar all its employees from dating left-handed people, it would be a clear Title VII sex discrimination violation for an employer to have a policy that bars, on pain of discharge, men from dating left-handed people but permits women to date left-handed people. Same result for a employer policy that bars men from dating men but permits women to date men.
I happen to agree with almost all of Gorsuch's opinions and dissents (Gamble dissent was spot on) Bostock is probably the only one that I think he got totally wrong. - plain / ordinary meaning of the words at the time the statute was enacted.
There have been quite a few dissents and opinions of his that I have disagreed with from a results point of view, but bostock is the only one I have disagreed with from a legal point of view.
Sex = blow job
For sure you're not talking about Sotomayor then. And probably Brown, even though it's a small sample size, but I'm relying on her myriad of dissents which paint a pretty good picture.
That she's an idiot?? please elaborate.
As a general rule, I tend to appreciate Kagan and Roberts the most, but that’s also because I tend to judicial restraint and well-reasoned opinions.
I think that Ketanji Brown Jackson has a consistent philosophy to date, albeit with a small sample size. It’s a bit early to tell, though, especially since she hasn’t been given majority opinions on issues that would really test it.
On the other end of the spectrum, I actually find that Alito and Sotomayor (IMO) are incredibly similar in that they have the most results-oriented jurisprudence. And not in a good way.
Ketanji is the Beyoncé of the Supreme Court!
This all strikes me as correct. It seems obvious to me that Alito just votes for whatever position matches the Republican orthodoxy of the day, but I can see how the same criticism applies Sotomayor with regards to Democratic policy preferences.
Someone else wrote roughly "if Roberts and Kagan agree, that's obviously the correct position" and I tend to think that's right. But I do think that KBJ, Gorsuch and Barrett also all have something resembling reasonable judicial philosophies even if I don't necessarily agree with them.
It was loki who developed the rule that when Roberts and Kagan agree, the decision is correct. He added if they split, the correct decision is the side opposite to Alito’s opinion.
I wonder what loki thinks of applying that rule to 303 Creative. Given the stipulations in the case, I was persuaded by Gorsuch’s opinion and found Sotomayor’s to be results oriented. I was disappointed Kagan signed on to it.
My understanding is that First Liberty did "catch" then-Judge Gorsuch sitting by designation on the 9TH, but did not say anything to avoid rocking the boat. It was a legal expert at Heritage Foundation of all places who argued in favor of adding Judge Gorsuch to Trump's short list.
I do wonder if Justice Gorsuch views himself as the arbiter between religious liberty and LGBT legal issues--a strong proponent of both.
So in Fulton, he argues for the Court to adopt strict scrutiny, while savaging Chief Justice Roberts for his improper connect-the-dots statutory interpretation, and then reading Title VII broadly to encompass sexual orientation and gender identity.
many solid Catholics and many Natural Law theorists criticize Gorsuch's teacher, John FInnis, and Bostock shows why.
THIS IS ILLOGICAL
“An individual’s homosexuality or transgender status is not relevant to employment decisions. That’s because it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex.”
That would mean women MUST be in the military, flaming gays must be your guard of your life in war. WHO that is normal would agree with that.
AND this is reason
“Title VII prohibits discrimination because of sex itself, not everything that is related to, based on, or defined with reference to, “sex.” Many things are related to sex.” (Alito, 13)
“[J]udges should ascribe to the words of a statue ‘what a reasonable person conversant with applicable social convention would have understood them to be adopting.’” (Alito, 24)
“A literalist approach to interpreting phrases disrespects ordinary meaning and deprives the citizenry of fair notice of what the law is.” (Kavanaugh, 11)
Finnis taught Gorsuch and destroyed Natural Law (and in fact, reason) by BOSTOCK
"Even as understood today, the concept of discrimination because of “sex” is different from discrimination because of
“sexual orientation” or “gender identity.” And in any event,
our duty is to interpret statutory terms to “mean what they
conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were written.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 16 (2012) (emphasis added). If every
single living American had been surveyed in 1964, it would
have been hard to find any who thought that discrimination
because of sex meant discrimination because of sexual orientation––not to mention gender identity, a concept that
was essentially unknown at the time. "
Is peer review the problem?No, it is actually the cause.
More than 70% of researchers have tried and failed to reproduce another scientist's experiments, and more than half have failed to reproduce their own experiments.