The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Esquire Allegation that President Bush Sr. Pardoned His Son Neil Bush

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[UPDATE 12/4/2024 10:55 am: Esquire revised the post [UPDATE: see here for the revised version]; I hope to blog a bit more about that later today, but for now I just wanted to flag that.] [UPDATE 12/4/2024 5:32 pm: Esquire has now deleted the post altogether, so I don't anticipate blogging about the revised version.]

Esquire posted an item Dec. 3 titled "A President Shouldn't Pardon His Son? Hello, Anybody Remember Neil Bush?" and subtitled "Nobody defines Poppy Bush's presidency by the fact that he pardoned his progeny. The moral: Shut the fck up about Hunter Biden, please." It relates some of Neil Bush's exploits, and states:

[T]his lucky American businessman['s] … father exercised his unlimited constitutional power of clemency to pardon the Lucky American Businessman for all that S&L business way back when. The president's name was George H.W. Bush. The Lucky American Businessman was his son, Neil ….

However, as others have noted (and see also some of the comments to the article), the Justice Department pardon and clemency site doesn't appear to have any record of any pardon to Neil Bush: I've checked the name search function, the Bush Sr. pardon list, and the Bush Sr. commutations list. A 2003 Washington Post article that describes Neil Bush as "the latest manifestation of a long tradition in American life—the president's embarrassing relative" doesn't mention any pardon or clemency, or even any conviction. It says,

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Free Speech

Court Rejects Promissory Estoppel Claim by Lawyer Whose Job Offer Was Revoked for Speech About Israeli Retaliation Against Gaza

"Plaintiff offers no evidence to support a finding that Defendant's promise of support was an unambiguous promise to not penalize Plaintiff for any actions she took as long as she believed they were in support of her Arab Muslim heritage."

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From Chehade v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, decided today by Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman (N.D. Ill.):

The following facts are accepted as true for the purpose of resolving Defendant's partial motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff is an Arab Muslim woman who graduated from Georgetown University Law Center in 2023. While in law school, Plaintiff worked at Defendant's Chicago law office as a summer associate during Summer 2022. On July 29, 2022, Defendant offered Plaintiff a position as a full-time associate attorney, starting in Fall 2023, after Plaintiff's law school graduation.

When applying for summer associate positions, Plaintiff alleges that a law firm's commitment to diversity and retaining diverse associates was important to her as an Arab Muslim woman. Because Plaintiff saw no references to either "Muslim" or "Arab" in Defendant's recruiting materials and learned that Defendant had no specific affinity group for Muslim or Arab attorneys, Plaintiff decided to discuss her concerns with Alexis Robertson, Defendant's Director of Diversity and Inclusion. In July 2022, Plaintiff spoke with Robertson to ensure that Defendant would support her "authentic self." Plaintiff alleges that Robertson promised her that Defendant "valued and supported [her] Arab Muslim heritage and perspective and embraced her history and values." Plaintiff alleges that Robertson's assurances were critical to her decision to accept the full-time employment offer and not pursue other job opportunities.

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More Leaks in the NY Times About The "Supreme Court Ethics Debate"

Jodi Kantor reports on a confidential ten-page memo from Justices Gorsuch, and comments from Justices Thomas and Alito.

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Another day, another leak story in the New York Times. This time, Jodi Kantor turns her attention to the Supreme Court's "ethics debate." This piece is far less earth-shattering than Kantor's prior reports. The biggest reveal is that Justice Gorsuch wrote a ten-page memo opposing any efforts to make the ethics code "enforceable." Everything else reported either reflects what the Justices have said in public, or can be reasonably inferred from what the Justices said in public. The bigger story, of course, is that leaks are still coming from the Court--and these leaks are designed to impugn and attack those on the "wrong" side of legal issues.

Let's go through it.

First, we learn that Judge Robert Dow, the Chief's Counselor, prepared the first draft:

 In May 2023, the chief justice made a public concession, saying the court could take further steps to "adhere to the highest standards" of conduct. Three months later, he gave his colleagues the first draft of the code, prepared by Judge Robert M. Dow Jr., a staff member who advises the chief justice. It was modeled on the one for federal judges, according to several people familiar with the process.

Relatedly, there is an office at the Court that provides ethics advice, though some justices do not seek it "consistently." I'm not sure this fact has been reported before:

While a legal office at the court dispenses ethics advice to justices upon request, the counsel is not binding, and not all the justices have consistently sought it out, according to several people familiar with the office.

Second, the Court's progressives supported a code that can be enforced. Justices Kagan and Jackson (but not Sotomayor) have said as much in their public remarks. Sotomayor also has gotten in trouble for her book events.

All three liberals — Justices Sotomayor, Kagan and Jackson — supported enforcement.

In an apparent attempt to make a higher level of scrutiny palatable to their colleagues, Justice Kagan proposed an initial step, involving a small group of veteran federal judges, according to people familiar with the discussions. She sketched out what she called a "safe harbor" system that would give the justices incentive to consult the judges about ethics issues. Later, if the justices were criticized — say, for accepting a gift — they could respond that they had obtained clearance beforehand.

"There are plenty of judges around this country who could do a task like that in a very fair-minded and serious way," Justice Kagan said at a public appearance this year.

Third, the Court's conservatives were not interested in negotiating on this point. Here, Kantor repeats her claim about the Trump immunity decision--there was no attempt to play ball with the liberals.

That modest proposal went nowhere.

…

The three liberal justices insisted that the rules needed to be more than lofty promises. But their argument never had a chance.

Fourth, the liberals signed the code, even though it lacked any enforcement mechanism. This was the best they can do. Yet, Kagan has continued to criticize it publicly.

In the fall of 2023, Chief Justice Roberts, seemingly determined to emerge with something to show the nation, circulated a revised version of the new code and urged his colleagues to sign it, according to people from the court. It had no means of enforcement. The liberal justices decided this was the best they could get, at least for the moment. All nine members of the court signed.

Fifth, the villain of the story is Justice Gorsuch. Kantor reveals that Gorsuch wrote a ten-page memorandum opposing it.

Justice Gorsuch was especially vocal in opposing any enforcement mechanism beyond voluntary compliance, arguing that additional measures could undermine the court. The justices' strength was their independence, he said, and he vowed to have no part in diminishing it.

The justices began discussing the proposal inside their private conference room and through memos. One from Justice Gorsuch, raising questions and cautions, stretched to more than 10 pages.

This is a reveal not only of the memo, but that it was discussed in conference, and subsequent writings. For the second time in a few months, Kantor has now revealed a private correspondence from Gorsuch. In September, she wrote about Gorsuch's note to Roberts about the Trump immunity decision.

Sixth, Kantor also links Gorsuch's opposition to the code with his general opposition to administrative regulations:

Justice Gorsuch, Mr. Trump's first appointee to the court, is known for his no-one-tells-me-what-to-do streak, with warnings of government overreach and a record of libertarian, sometimes-unpredictable rulings. As a teenager, he watched his mother, then the head of the Environmental Protection Agency, face a bruising congressional investigation into the mismanagement of a toxic waste program and eventually resign.

At the time the justices were debating the ethics questions, Justice Gorsuch was working on a book asserting that Americans were afflicted with too many laws. He warned colleagues that enforcement could undermine the independence of the court by putting other figures in a position to judge the justices, according to several people familiar with the discussions. Justice Alito echoed some of those concerns.

This sort of reporting is not just inferential. She seems to be relaying how Gorsuch tied together his new book and the ethics code--or at least how those on the Court perceived Gorsuch's comments. I suspect some of Gorsuch's colleagues were none too pleased with his book talk during the conference.

Seventh, Kantor writes that Alito and Thomas said those who support the code were being political. Alito said as much to the Wall Street Journal, so nothing surprising here.

In the private exchanges, Justice Clarence Thomas, whose decision not to disclose decades of gifts and luxury vacations from wealthy benefactors had sparked the ethics controversy, and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. wrote off the court's critics as politically motivated and unappeasable.

Eighth, Kantor explains the deliberations about the ethics code were super-super secret:

The discussions were treated with extra secrecy because they were so sensitive, according to people from the court. Instead of the usual legal issues, the justices were contending with controversy about finances and gifts from friends, and some of the ground rules of their own institution.

But no so secret that she didn't get the goods.

Ninth, Kantor offers these comments on sourcing

To piece together the previously undisclosed debate, The Times interviewed people from inside and outside the court, including liberals and conservatives, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the proceedings and the justices' thinking. This article also draws upon public statements by the justices, who declined to comment.

It is significant that Kantor indicate she spoke to both "liberals and conservatives." Past reporting did not have this note. It is also true that the Justices "declined to comment" on the article, but that doesn't mean the Justices did not speak to Kantor.

So who leaked? Well, here is what I wrote about Kantor's article on the Dobbs leak:

Second, and I alluded to this point in my earlier post, Justice Kagan is absent from this reporting. There is absolutely nothing about what she thought or did during these deliberations. There are insights into all of the other eight Justices, but nothing on Kagan. This isn't new. Back in the day when Biskupic got the scoops, Kagan was also largely absent. I think it likely that Kagan, or at least Kagan surrogates, are behind these leaks. If Kagan is willing to publicly undermine her colleagues in a speech at the Ninth Circuit, why would she do any less off-the-record? Moreover, this entire story is consistent with Kagan's MO, and describing the Court as bending over backwards for Trump.

This passage accurately describes Kantor's most recent article, if you substitute the emphasized text with "and criticizing the code for not being enforceable."

Also noticeably absent are Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh. They appear nowhere in the story. Even as Gorsuch is thrown under the bus, and Alito and Thomas are criticized.

Anyway, Merrick Garland still has not resigned. Nor has Chief Justice Roberts.

Join Me in Donating to Reason

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I just gave to Reason, to support their excellent coverage and analysis. We are editorially independent of Reason, and contributions to them don't support us. (We split our modest advertising revenue with them, and they provide technical and other services.) My donation just reflects my respect for the work they do; I don't always agree with it, but I think it's on balance a huge contribution to public debate.

You can donate yourselves here, if you are so inclined. To quote their pitch this year,

To help us keep an eye on the state while also keeping our chill, Reason relies on the generosity of its readers, listeners, and viewers, not (heaven forbid) the government. The Webathon is critical to funding our work, from hard-hitting investigations to thoughtful commentary, while also fostering a community of freedom-loving individuals. We count on contributions both from grizzled veterans of the liberty movement and from bright-eyed and bushy-tailed folks discovering these ideas for the first time in our pages, pods, and videos. For 2024, we're shooting for $400,000….

In a shouty, partisan world, Reason offers calm, principled journalism—and a little bit of fun. With your generous support, we can produce fearless reporting and incisive analysis. But we know you're probably here for the swag, so we've got you covered:

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Since Reason Foundation is a 501(c)(3), you also get a little tax break when you donate, which is extremely on-brand….

Free Speech

Eighth Circuit Grants Rehearing En Banc as to Whether "Equity Training" Requirement for Public Employees Violates First Amendment, …

including when employees were required to "correctly" answer multiple choice questions based on the training content.

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The court just agreed to this last Wednesday; here's the earlier panel decision (Henderson v. Springfield R-12 School Dist.)—which will now be reconsidered—written by Eighth Circuit Chief Judge Steven Colloton and joined by Judges James Loken and Jane Kelly:

During the 2020-21 school year, the school district required employees to attend a presentation entitled, "Fall District-Wide Equity Training." Attendees were paid for their time and received professional-development credit.

The school district provided in-person and virtual training. At the in-person training, school officials instructed the attendees on how to become "Anti-Racist educators, leaders and staff members." The district defined "anti-racism" as "the work of actively opposing racism by advocating for changes in political, economic, and social life." The presenters cautioned that actions like practicing color-blindness and remaining silent about racism perpetuated white supremacy.

The presenters stated, "We want to stress that we are not calling you as an individual a white supremacist. That being said, certain actions or statements … can support that structural system of white supremacy." The presenters also displayed an "Oppression Matrix" that categorized various social groups as a privileged, oppressed, or border group. For example, within the category of race, the matrix identified white people as a privileged social group, biracial people as a border group, and Asian, Latina/o, black, and native people as oppressed social groups. At the virtual training, the school district provided similar instruction.

Some employees were also required to complete online modules in which they watched videos, read articles, and answered multiple-choice questions relating to equity and diversity. For example, one question asked: "When you witness racism and xenophobia in the classroom, how should you respond?" Employees could select one of two options: (1) "Address the situation in private after it has passed"; or (2) "Address the situation the moment you realize it is happening." The module deemed the second option the correct answer. If the employee selected the first option, then a message appeared explaining why the choice was "incorrect." To complete the module, employees had to select the "correct" answer.

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Free Speech

Speech to Idaho Minors Urging Them to Get Legal Out-of-State Abortions Protected by First Amendment, Even When …

it's intended "to conceal the abortion from the minor's parents or guardian," holds a Ninth Circuit panel. But the panel rejects a challenge to restrictions on "harboring" or "transporting" the minor under such circumstances.

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From yesterday's decision in Matsumoto v. Labrador, written by Ninth Circuit Judge Margaret McKeown and joined by Judge John Owens:

This case concerns a unique legislative undertaking: an "abortion trafficking" statute. Idaho Code § 18-623. Idaho defines the crime of "abortion trafficking" as "procur[ing] an abortion" or "obtain[ing] an abortion-inducing drug" for an unemancipated minor by "recruiting, harboring, or transporting [a] pregnant minor" with the intent to conceal the abortion from the minor's parents or guardian. This provision appears to be the first post-Dobbs statute to criminalize the act of helping another person obtain an abortion, even if that abortion is legal in the state where it occurs….

[We conclude that] the statute's provision on "recruiting" violates the First Amendment by prohibiting "a substantial amount of protected speech relative to its plainly legitimate sweep." … [But we conclude that] the prohibition of "harboring and transporting" … do not violate Challengers' First Amendment rights. We also conclude that the statute is neither void for vagueness nor facially in violation of the First Amendment rights of association….

Before launching into an analysis of the statutory text, we note that this statute is unusual among trafficking statutes, despite its "abortion trafficking" title. There are two fundamental dissimilarities between Section 18-623 and traditional trafficking statutes. To begin, traditional human trafficking statutes typically apply to coercive conduct and/or the facilitation of universally illegal purposes. In contrast, Section 18-623 criminalizes non-coercive as well as coercive conduct for the procurement of legal abortions—for instance, performed in Oregon or Washington—as well as illegal ones. The term "trafficking," whether of humans or otherwise, is also usually defined with respect to an illegal trade with economic motive. In contrast, Section 18-623 does not contemplate any type of trade or economic motive….

[A.] Void-for-Vagueness Challenge

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Free Speech

Court Rejects Lawsuit Against Nancy Grace Over True-Crime Podcast Related to Prosecution for Rape of Madison Brooks

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From Carver v. Grace, decided today by Judge Carl Barber (E.D. La.):

This defamation case derives from the alleged rape and tragic death of an LSU student, Madison Brooks, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. After a heavy night of drinking, Madison Brooks left a Baton Rouge bar with Plaintiffs Casen Carver and Everett Lee and their two male companions, Kaivon Washington and Desmond Carter.

Less than an hour later, Madison Brooks was dropped off at Pelican Lakes Neighborhood, the entrance of which is off Burbank Drive. Madison Brooks was later hit and killed by a motor vehicle on Burbank Drive. Kaivon Washington and Desmond Carter were indicted for raping Madison Brooks in the backseat of the car. Plaintiff Casen Carver, the driver, was indicted for first-degree rape, third-degree rape, and video voyeurism Plaintiff Everett Lee rode in the passenger seat and remains under investigation….

Plaintiffs allege Nancy Grace and iHeartMedia made defamatory statements by … on (1) [Nancy Grace's] YouTube program titled "Nancy Grace Analyzes Defense Reaction to Damning Video of Attack on LSU Coed" ("Crime Online Show") and (2) on an episode of Nancy Grace's podcast, distributed by iHeartMedia, Crime Stories with Nancy Grace, titled "Haunting Video of LSU Beauty Madi Brooks Who Dies After 3 Men Allegedly Sex Assault" (Crime Stories Podcast")….

Considering the statements as whole in the context in which they were made, the Court finds Nancy Grace and iHeartMedia's statements are not actionable. The statements are not defamatory because they are either not "of and concerning" the Plaintiffs; substantially true; Nancy Grace's opinion; and/or based on statements of law enforcement officials….

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Free Speech

"Beautiful," "Exceptional" "Design" Test for Sunset Strip Billboard Approval Violates First Amendment

This is in West Hollywood, right near where I lived for a while; many of the Sunset Strip billboards are indeed visually striking, but that doesn't mean the permitting scheme can rely on city officials' aesthetic judgments.

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From Judge Fernando Aenlle-Rocha (C.D. Cal.) in KBS Holdco, LLC v. City of West Hollywood, decided July 8 but just recently posted on Westlaw:

The amendments to the Sunset Specific Plan (the "Amended Billboard Plan") include "new standards and guidelines to regulate the distribution, size, location, and operation of new and modified billboards and tall walls," and design principles intended to "ensure high-quality signage projects that are creative, contextual for Sunset Boulevard, and sensitive to adjacent land uses." Under the Amended Billboard Plan, applications for new off-site signs must be "screened for design excellence in accordance with a process and procedures established by the City Manager, or designee" and granted concept awards, before applicants may apply for development agreements with the City. According to Plaintiff, the City Manager or his or her designees created the Sunset Arts and Advertising Program to conduct the screening process and delegated all discretion and decision-making authority to the Design Excellence Screening Committee (the "Screening Committee")….

Round 2 applications were reviewed and scored by the Screening Committee on ten "evaluative criteria" stated in the Submission Guide. Applications were required to receive an average weighted score of 225 out of 250 points to secure a concept award. These criteria and their associated point values were:

1) "Is the design exceptional (see Section 2.1 'Design Quality' of the 2019 Billboard Policy)" – 50 points;

2) "Does the project create a unique opportunity for the display and experience of public art?" – 30 points;

3) "Does the project showcase a commitment and sensitivity to the importance of diversity in the architectural design and/or advertising industry?" – 30 points;

4) "Does the project create and sustain a positive land use outcome? (New development project, rehab of building, preserve an important building or use)" – 30 points;

5) "Does the project add value to the public realm, the experience of place, and the pedestrian experience along Sunset?" – 25 points;

6) "Does the project create valuable signage that reinforces Sunset as the premier destination for creative advertising?" – 25 points;

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Special Counsel Weiss Files Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Indictment in California Hunter Biden Case

"The defendant’s motion should be denied since there is no binding authority on this Court which requires dismissal."

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In my post last night, I noted that President Biden's issuance of the pardon to his son does not exactly end his pending criminal cases. During the first Trump administration, even after Trump pardoned Joe Arpaio, Michael Flynn, and Steve Bannon, those cases continued.

Yesterday, Hunter's attorney filed a motion to dismiss the indictment.

Defendant Robert Hunter Biden respectfully provides notice of a Full and Unconditional Pardon that requires dismissal of the Indictment against him (D.E. 1) with prejudice and adjournment of all future proceedings in this matter. . . . The President's pardon moots Mr. Biden's pending and yet to occur sentencing and entry of judgment in this case and requires an automatic dismissal of the Indictment with prejudice.

Today, Special Counsel David Weiss has filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. Something tells me that these briefs were drafted some time ago, in anticipation of a potential Biden pardon. Here is the introduction of Weiss's motion:

On December 1, 2024, media outlets reported that the President had issued a pardon for the defendant. Shortly thereafter, defense counsel filed "Defendant's Notice of Pardon." The defendant did not attach the pardon to its filing and the government has not received a copy of it. In that filing, defense counsel asserted, without any legal support that, "a Full and Unconditional Pardon [] requires dismissal of the Indictment against him," and further that the pardon "requires an automatic dismissal of the Indictment with prejudice." Notice at 1. Defense counsel misrepresents the law. Nothing requires the dismissal of the indictment in this case.

The issues here are very murky, and have been debated for some time. Some scholars view a pardon as effectively wiping out the conviction, as if it never occurred. Other scholars view the pardon as simply denying any consequences that flow from the conviction, yet the conviction remains intact. The ruling in the Arpaio case leans towards the latter position. Hunter favors the former view.

A pardon is surely binding on the executive branch, but is it binding on the courts? Is a pardon the Supreme Court of the Land, in the same sense that a statute or ratified treaty is? Even if the conviction is vacated, could a state charge Hunter with a crime like "felon in possession," or use the federal conviction as the predicate offense for a state RICO charge? There are lots of questions I have been mulling over all day.

It is just about 5:00 pm, and Merrick Garland still has not stepped down. Does Biden now move to have David Weiss removed to protect his son? I hope Garland has that resignation letter ready.

Fifth Amendment

Can the Just-Pardoned Hunter Biden Claim Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, if Questioned About His Crimes?

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A couple of people asked me this; the short answer:

[1.] Because the privilege applies only when a witness reasonably fears prosecution, and the pardon precludes prosecution for any "offenses against the United States which he has committed or may have committed or taken part in during the period from January 1, 2014 through December 1, 2024," a pardon may indeed eliminate the privilege, and allow a court or congressional committee to order Hunter Biden to testify. "[I]f the witness has already received a pardon, he cannot longer set up his privilege." Brown v. Walker (1896). "[A] witness may be compelled to testify concerning his involvement in a crime when he is protected from later prosecution … by the applicable statute of limitations … or by a pardon." Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing Brown).

[2.] But the privilege disappears only when there's no realistic prospect of prosecution by any American government, federal or state. So if a witness is asked about something, and the answer might lead to state prosecution for which the state statute of limitations hasn't run, the witness can refuse to testify because of that risk of state prosecution, even if a federal prosecution is taken off the table by the federal pardon. (Recall that a Presidential pardon only pardons for federal crimes.) This is relevant because some conduct can violate both state and federal law.

How this would play out as to any particular investigation of Hunter Biden's behavior, I leave to others.

Pardons

How To Ban Lame-Duck Pardons

A draft amendment to make pardons accountable to voters.

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President Biden has pardoned his son Hunter for all federal crimes committed from 2014 through yesterday. That's not just for the crimes for which Hunter has already been charged, but for anything he did (or may have done) during the last ten years. Granting this pardon was something the President had pledged not to do in June, while he was still a candidate for reelection ("I abide by the jury decision. I will do that and I will not pardon him."). But, as NBC reports, "it was decided at the time that he would publicly say he would not pardon his son even though doing so remained on the table." And now that the election is over, Biden could issue the pardon without worrying that voters would punish him or Vice President Harris, who had replaced him on the ticket.

Presidents have the constitutional "Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." There's nothing Congress can do about that. Giving someone a pardon power is hard to do without, because the chain of review for prosecutorial decisions has to stop somewhere. If the buck doesn't stop with the President, it'll stop with less-accountable prosecutors or courts.

But the President is only accountable to the electorate so long as he or his party are up for election. Once the election is over, there's no one for voters to punish. That's why Biden waited until after the election to pardon Hunter; why Trump did the same for Steve Bannon and Roger Stone; why Obama did the same when commuting the sentences of Chelsea Manning and the terrorist Oscar López Rivera. And, most notoriously, that's why Bill Clinton waited until his last full day in office to pardon the fugitive Marc Rich, who had fled to Switzerland to avoid prosecution and whose ex-wife donated $450,000 to the Clinton Library.

Some people argue that Presidents would be too stingy with pardons if the voters got to see them first. But that's what happens in a democracy: the people get to decide. If we don't think the pardon power should be reviewed by the public, then why lodge it with the President, rather than with judges or other unelected officials? A truly unreviewable pardon system would raise real dangers for a democracy, because it could be used to insulate attacks on the system from any punishment. But much the same thing happens when the President can simply wait the voters out.

Maybe the lame-duck period should be shorter; we've already amended the Constitution once to move up Inauguration Day. But it's hard to imagine that we'd provide no time at all for a transition, especially when California is still counting the votes. And it doesn't take very long to sign a piece of paper.

So the better solution is to ban, not lame-duck periods, but lame-duck pardons. Here's draft language that might do the trick:

The power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States may not be exercised without a public proclamation of the same; nor may it be exercised from one month prior to the time of choosing the electors until the next presidential term begins, except to grant temporary reprieves extending no longer than the tenth day of such term.

Three important things about this draft. First, it bans secret pardons: the voters can't judge pardons that they don't know about. Second, it creates a "blackout period" in which the President can't issue pardons or commutations, starting one month before election day and lasting until the start of the next term. Whether the President is on the ballot or not, voters would have time to decide what they think of a pardon and whether to withhold their votes for the President's party. And third, it creates an exception for temporary reprieves, letting the current President postpone punishments (especially capital ones) and letting the newly elected President, or the same one if reelected, decide whether to make those reprieves permanent.

Mike Rappaport, who's discussed this issue before, notes that right now might be the right time for members of Congress to act. The issue is in the news now. President Biden isn't on the ballot anymore, and neither is Vice President Harris, so Democrats could endorse the amendment without facing any electoral penalty. And because the focus right now is on Biden, Republicans could endorse it as a criticism of the incumbent rather than of their own president-to-be.

If not now, when?

Politics

Liberty and Parental Rights

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[I'm putting together a post on a specific parental rights question, and it reminded me of this post of mine from 2011, which I thought I'd rerun.]

Some comments on recent posts have suggested that libertarians should support a broad notion of parental rights. I haven't written at any length on parental rights (except as to the special case of parental free speech rights), and my thinking on this is far from definite; and of course I surely can't speak for libertarians generally. But as somehow who is in many (though by no means all) matters a presumptive libertarian, I thought I'd say a bit about this. Note that I'm speaking in this post about what I think the right rules ought to be, not about what we should understand our Constitution to say with regard to this question.

1. To begin with, though parental rights are seen by the law as part of parent's "liberty," it's an unusual sort of liberty. The strongest case for liberty arises when people seek the right to do what they please with their own bodies, labor, and property, and the bodies, labor, and property of consenting adult partners (whether sexual, familial, business, or otherwise).

But parental rights are the rights to control someone else's actions. My child is not me. He is not my property. That I have the right to, say, alter my own body (or hire someone to do it for me) or to choose spiritual healing over traditional medical treatment doesn't tell us much about whether I should have the right to alter another person's property, or deny another person medical treatment—even if the other person is my minor child.

2. Moreover, parental rights don't just involve the government refraining from action (e.g., by not arresting me for false imprisonment when I physically restrain my child, the way it would if I tried to do that for an adult). Rather, they sometimes involve the government taking affirmative coercive steps to support parents' rights.

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Free Speech

No Sealing of Dupont Documents in Toxic Tort Case

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From Wednesday's decision by Judge Robert Numbers (E.D.N.C.) in Dew v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co.:

Plaintiffs, current and former residents of southeastern North Carolina, claim that Defendants contaminated the Cape Fear River with toxic chemicals. After conducting discovery, Defendants asked the court to grant summary judgment in their favor. A part of summary judgment briefing, the parties filed a wealth of documents and information, some of which Defendants claim contained sensitive business information.

Defendants … sought to keep 36 documents under seal. Defendants said, in conclusory fashion, that each document should be kept under seal because they contained some combination of confidential, sensitive, and non-public business information. They also noted that each of the documents had been designated as Confidential or Highly Confidential under the protective order entered by the court. But beyond that, Defendants provided neither substantive argument, nor evidence in support of their motion….

As with all aspects of the federal government, the federal courts belong to the People of the United States. As a result, the public has "a general right to inspect and copy … judicial records and documents." Allowing public access to judicial records advances the public's "interest in ensuring basic fairness and deterring official misconduct not only in the outcome of certain proceedings, but also in the very proceedings themselves."

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Politics

A Proposal To Create A New Article III Court of Immigration Review

"Creation of the COIR would also ensure a 'uniform rule' of immigration law as commanded by Article I of the U.S. Constitution."

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I pass along this proposal from an attorney who recently clerked on the Ninth Circuit. I think this proposal has some merit, and could potentially garner sixty votes in the Senate:

The American people have spoken: migration must be controlled. President Trump won not only the electoral and popular vote, but also Congressional majorities. Surveys show that most Americans approve of "mass deportations." Concern about the border is also bipartisan, with the Biden Administration having moved to restrict asylum claims over the last year.

But while President Trump's Administration may try crack down on immigration, he likely will not be able to achieve the goals of the American people unless Congress is also willing to change how the federal judiciary reviews deportation orders and challenges to immigration policy. To solve this problem, Congress should create a new Article III court with exclusive jurisdiction over all immigration cases—call it the Court of Immigration Review (COIR).

The basic contours of America's mass-migration problem are well understood. Economic migrants travel from distant places—sometimes flying from Asia and Africa—to South America, walk or ride to the U.S. border, and file a claim for asylum (along with other, arguably redundant claims). Most of these claims are meritless. But simply by articulating a fear of persecution, most migrants will be issued a notice to appear and released to await a hearing before an immigration judge (IJ). This process is so backlogged that even scheduling the hearing can take years, leading to what DHS agents call "catch and release."

Even after an IJ rules, the process does not end: roughly 1.4 million migrants are subject to a deportation order but remain in the country. When the an IJ rejects an asylum claim and orders a migrant deported, that migrant can appeal to an executive agency called the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). If the BIA affirms the IJ's order, the migrant may appeal (again) to a federal circuit court. The appropriate circuit court to hear the appeal is determined by geography. In Texas, appeals go to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In the American West, they land in front of the Ninth Circuit.

I cannot speak for the Fifth Circuit, but during my time as a Ninth Circuit clerk, immigration appeals made up as many as 30% of cases heard in each sitting. Some languished for years before the court ruled. Most ended with a memorandum disposition summarily affirming the BIA. But reversals happen: for instance, the court recently ruled that a migrant could not be deported because a corrupt police officer in Mexico threatened him after an altercation in 1992. Even when deportation orders are affirmed, the years of delay are a de facto win for migrants. Immigration appeals also contribute to the backlog in the rest of the civil justice system, which is now so severe that the judiciary itself is lobbying for the creation of new Article III judgeships.

The Ninth Circuit is also a favored venue for partisan challenges to federal immigration policy. During Trump's first term, progressive groups repeatedly obtained preliminary injunctions from friendly California district courts subject to review by the Ninth Circuit. During the Biden Administration, conservative states responded by filing challenges to the administration's immigration policy in Texas district courts overseen by the Fifth Circuit. Whatever immigration policy one prefers, the effect of this gamesmanship is to undermine any uniform federal immigration policy.

Enter my proposed Court of Immigration Review. In most respects, the COIR would function like any other court of appeals. It would have eleven Article III judges, it would hear cases in three-judge panels, and its decisions would be subject to review by the Supreme Court. But unlike other courts of appeal, the COIR would have exclusive and original jurisdiction over all appeals from the BIA and all challenges to immigration regulations and statutes. Other federal courts – including district courts – would be stripped of jurisdiction to hear these cases. An exception would be prosecutions for criminal violations of immigration law, which should remain with federal district courts that have experience with criminal trials and procedure.

Beyond clearing the dockets of other federal courts and allowing for a quick resolution to the massive backlog of non-meritorious immigration appeals, creation of the COIR would also ensure a "uniform rule" of naturalization and as commanded by Article I of the U.S. Constitution. Of course, if the COIR's interpretation of immigration law was erroneous, the Supreme Court could step in. But the nation would no longer be dependent on the Supreme Court's intervention to ensure the existence of a uniform immigration policy. Nor would the Court need to repeatedly stay erroneous injunctions issued by single-judge district courts.

While pro-migration partisans may oppose this idea, that is because the current legal chaos contributes to a de facto system of open borders. Democrats may also complain (rather richly, in light of recent proposals to pack the Supreme Court) that Trump should not get to appoint eleven new Article III judges. But COIR judges would be specialists with jurisdiction over immigration matters and have no say over other hot-button judicial issues like abortion. If allegations of court packing are of serious concern, COIR judges could be appointed on a staggered basis, with Chief Justice Roberts temporarily appointing judges from other courts to serve on COIR in the interim.

Finally, the COIR's creation would not break any "norms." The Federal Circuit already has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces hears appeals involving military justice issues. Congress created Emergency Courts of Appeal to hear challenges to critical national economic policies in the 1940s and the 1970s. And Congress often uses jurisdiction stripping to ensure national priorities are not bogged down in court. During the Biden Administration, Congress stripped the Fourth Circuit of jurisdiction over appeals involving a critical pipeline, and gave the D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over any challenge to the recently enacted TikTok ban. Fixing the immigration system is no less important.

Free Speech

Court Upholds N.J. Law That Lets "Certain Public Officials" Demand That Private Entities Stop Disclosing Their Home Addresses

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From Tuesday's decision by Judge Harvey Bartle (E.D. Pa.) in Atlas Data Privacy Corp. v. We Inform, LLC (D.N.J.):

Daniel's Law [a New Jersey civil and criminal statute] provides that judges, prosecutors and other law enforcement officers as well as their immediate family members ("covered persons") may request in writing that any person, business, or association not disclose or make available their home addresses and unpublished telephone numbers….

In July 2020, a disgruntled lawyer who had litigated before United States District Judge Esther Salas sought to assassinate her at her home in New Jersey. After finding her home address on the Internet, the lawyer showed up on a Sunday evening armed and dressed as a delivery driver. Daniel Anderl, Judge Salas's twenty-year-old son, answered the door and was fatally shot by the lawyer. Her husband and Daniel's father was severely wounded. The lawyer then fled. In response to these crimes, the New Jersey Legislature passed Daniel's Law in November 2020 and has amended it thereafter.

Daniel's Law, as declared by the New Jersey Legislature, was enacted to serve the following goals:

This act shall be liberally construed in order to accomplish its purpose and the public policy of this State, which is to enhance the safety and security of certain public officials in the justice system, including judicial officers, law enforcement officers, child protective investigators[,] … and prosecutors, who serve or have served the people of New Jersey, and the immediate family members of these individuals, to foster the ability of these public servants who perform critical roles in the justice system to carry out their official duties without fear of personal reprisal from affected individuals related to the performance of their public functions.

The law prohibits any entity when requested from thereafter disclosing the home address and unpublished telephone number of a covered person …. A "covered person" is defined as "an active, formerly active, or retired judicial officer, law enforcement officer, or child protective investigator …, or prosecutor and any immediate family member residing in the same household as such [individual]." … The entity must comply with the request no later than 10 business days after receipt.

The court concludes that the law is a content-based speech restriction that extends beyond mere "commercial speech," but nonetheless upholds the law against a facial challenge (leaving possible room for occasional as-applied challenges when the home address is sufficiently "newsworthy"):

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