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Court Rejects Promissory Estoppel Claim by Lawyer Whose Job Offer Was Revoked for Speech About Israeli Retaliation Against Gaza
"Plaintiff offers no evidence to support a finding that Defendant's promise of support was an unambiguous promise to not penalize Plaintiff for any actions she took as long as she believed they were in support of her Arab Muslim heritage."
From Chehade v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, decided today by Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman (N.D. Ill.):
The following facts are accepted as true for the purpose of resolving Defendant's partial motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff is an Arab Muslim woman who graduated from Georgetown University Law Center in 2023. While in law school, Plaintiff worked at Defendant's Chicago law office as a summer associate during Summer 2022. On July 29, 2022, Defendant offered Plaintiff a position as a full-time associate attorney, starting in Fall 2023, after Plaintiff's law school graduation.
When applying for summer associate positions, Plaintiff alleges that a law firm's commitment to diversity and retaining diverse associates was important to her as an Arab Muslim woman. Because Plaintiff saw no references to either "Muslim" or "Arab" in Defendant's recruiting materials and learned that Defendant had no specific affinity group for Muslim or Arab attorneys, Plaintiff decided to discuss her concerns with Alexis Robertson, Defendant's Director of Diversity and Inclusion. In July 2022, Plaintiff spoke with Robertson to ensure that Defendant would support her "authentic self." Plaintiff alleges that Robertson promised her that Defendant "valued and supported [her] Arab Muslim heritage and perspective and embraced her history and values." Plaintiff alleges that Robertson's assurances were critical to her decision to accept the full-time employment offer and not pursue other job opportunities.
Plaintiff was scheduled to start her job on October 23, 2023. In the weeks leading up to the scheduled start date, Plaintiff, a long-time supporter of Palestinian human rights, spoke out about Israel's bombing of the civilians of Gaza following the Hamas attack against Israel on her personal social media accounts and at an October 11, 2023 meeting at the City of Chicago's City Hall.
Plaintiff alleges that, prior to her scheduled start date, Defendant began investigating her background and found her social media posts speaking out in support of Gaza. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's management personnel, including Robertson, then created a plan to rescind Plaintiff's employment offer. On October 21, 2023, Lisa Noller, a partner and chair of Defendant's litigation group, asked Plaintiff to attend a meeting the following day at Defendant's Chicago office to discuss Plaintiff's social media presence. Plaintiff reached out to Robertson for guidance and support, but Robertson never responded.
On October 22, 2023, Plaintiff attended the meeting with Noller and Frank Pasquesi, the managing partner of Defendant's Chicago office. During the meeting, Plaintiff alleges that she was interrogated in a hostile manner about her student activism, community associations, remarks at the October 11, 2023 City Hall meeting, and social media posts about Hamas's attack and Israel's response. Plaintiff alleges that she was also interrogated about her previous leadership role in Law Students for Justice in Palestine ("SJP"), a Georgetown University Law Center student organization, and SJP's recent posts about the conflict, despite Plaintiff's contention that she was no longer involved in SJP after graduation. Following the meeting, and later that same day, Defendant revoked Plaintiff's employment offer.
Plaintiff sued, alleging, among other things, promissory estoppel, which is cousin to breach of contract. But the court dismissed that claim:
The salient question here is whether Robertson's statements that Defendant valued and supported Plaintiff's Arab Muslim heritage and perspective and embraced her history and values constituted an unambiguous promise that Plaintiff's employment offer would not be rescinded for her activism and advocacy efforts that she viewed as supportive of her Arab Muslim heritage. The Court holds that it does not.
Plaintiff offers no evidence to support a finding that Defendant's promise of support was an unambiguous promise to not penalize Plaintiff for any actions she took as long as she believed they were in support of her Arab Muslim heritage. To conclude otherwise would mean that Plaintiff would have a "get out of jail free card" for any action that she took, even if it violated Defendant's values and policies, due to her status as an Arab Muslim woman.
Plaintiff further alleges that Robertson knew Plaintiff was active in the Arab Muslim community, and thus Robertson's statements meant that Defendant would support Plaintiff's activism. To support her argument, Plaintiff attaches her resume and an essay she authored as exhibits to her response brief to show that Defendant was aware of her involvement with SJP and her experience as an Arab Muslim woman. But neither Plaintiff's alleged facts nor the exhibits reasonably impute knowledge of Plaintiff's activism to Robertson, much less Defendant. Nor does Plaintiff allege that she had conversations with Robertson about such activism.
The case Plaintiff cites is also unpersuasive. In Dugas-Filippi v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A. (N.D. Ill. 2014), the court found that an employer's oral promise that plaintiff would not be fired if she took six-month paid discretionary leave was sufficiently clear and definite to support a promissory estoppel claim where plaintiff was fired for taking the six-month discretionary leave despite the employer's at-will policy.
Here, Robertson's statements made no promise that Plaintiff's employment would not be rescinded. Instead, the statements only concerned support for Plaintiff as an Arab Muslim woman. here was no implicit promise that Plaintiff had total job protection no matter what she did or said so long as she believed those actions were related to her ethnicity, religion, or association.
Plaintiff essentially asks the Court to conclude that the parties understood that the promise of support implied a promise of job security regardless of Plaintiff's actions. However, the facts do not support the existence of a common understanding among the parties that would transform Robertson's statements of support into a promise to not rescind Plaintiff's employment offer. The Court finds that there was no unambiguous promise and no common understanding among the parties to support a promissory estoppel claim.
Plaintiff also sued for discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, and association; those claims weren't the subject of a motion to dismiss, and still remain. Note that Illinois law restricts private threats aimed at speech related to candidates or ballot measures:
Any person who, by force, intimidation, threat, deception or forgery, knowingly prevents any other person from (a) registering to vote, or (b) lawfully voting, supporting or opposing the nomination or election of any person for public office or any public question voted upon at any election, shall be guilty of a … felony [and shall be subject to civil liability].
This prohibition on "threat[s]" may cover not just threats of crime but also threats of economic retaliation: Thus, for instance, federal law bans "intimidat[ing], threaten[ing], coerc[ing], or attempt[ing] to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such other person … to vote as he may choose" has been interpreted as prohibiting threats of economic retaliation. Likewise, the Fair Housing Act makes it illegal "to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person … or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment [of housing nondiscrimination rights]," and courts have interpreted this as barring the firing of employees who rented to black and Mexican-American applicants, and barring the denial of agency funds to an organization that complained about a discriminatory permit denial.
But, unlike the statutes in some other states (and ordinances in some cities and counties, including in Urbana), the Illinois statute doesn't extend to job discrimination based on advocacy of ideological views that aren't directly tied to elections.
Gerald L. Pauling and Tracy M. Billows (Seyfarth Shaw LLP) represent defendant.
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I take the company's promise to mean no more than "we will not illegally discriminate against you based on your religion or national origin."
I agree with you, regarding this case (or, regarding this particular cause of action). But I think the law firm actually did go a bit further. "Not only will we not illegally discriminate against you, but this firm pledges to take at least some inchoate steps to make sure you will live your authentic self (whatever the fuck *that* means) as an attorney at this firm.
Again, this "we're gonna support you as a Muslim woman-slash-lawyer in this firm" message does not mean that the firm could not rescind its offer, as the court correct (IMO) concluded. But I do think that in a completely different set of facts, a court could have found that she had reasonably relied on certain accommodations. (E.g., that she could take breaks for prayer, especially if those did not conflict with must-be-there-on-time events like court hearings.)
One wonders what the firm found in her social media posts. If like some SJPers, she had expressed ecstatic approval of the barbaric horrors inflicted by Hamas, other jihadis, and Palestinian accomplices against innocents on 10/7/23., would that such facts have further bolstered F&L's case or would they have been immaterial for purposes of the P's claim?
Do firms, or should they, routinely check social media and other personal history before making job offers? Should they have had a conversation with P about exactly what assurances she was looking for from them? In particular, wouldn't it have neen prudent for Robinson to explore with P her "activism"?
What did she say?
That was exactly my question. What did she actually say to warrant that?
To revoke an offer at the 11th hour, for a law firm, was not a small thing. A lot of people had to sign off on that, and it seems that happened very quickly.
Suppose she was a GU Law college campus hamas terror supporter, filmed at GU hamas terror support rallies on campus. In this country, that is our political right; we may protest. And all she did was attend, and scream mindless slogans about rivers and seas. No violence, no tearing down posters. Just advocacy.
Does that behavior (attendance, verbal participation only) justify rescinding a job offer?
I am biased, and I know that. You're the law professor. Legal? Ethical?
In my book: sure. Who the hell wants to work with a "Hamas terror supporter"?!
I have no idea whether the law says: no, the firm can't rescind the job offer. I hope that's not the case. A private firm should be free to hire / not hire whoever it wants (for any reason whatsoever).
Ummm, excuse me Ms. DEI, I see your employment packet doesn't say your company has a specific affinity for Persians practicing Zoroastrianism. Will you allow my authentic self and support my beliefs? Beyond non-discrimination policies in which you just leave me alone regarding such matters, will you take positive steps to support me based on my ethnicity and religion?
Hey, your bed with your fleas, it is time to get cozy.
Foley Lardner is a large national firm with offices through out the United states.
There will likely be numerous clients that do not want her to work on their cases due to advocacy. There will be a lot of senior attorneys at the firm that are not going to want her working on their cases for the same reason. But the loss of client confidence and or client restrictions will be a difficult hurdle for her advancement.
Oh yeah, I get that. I was just trying to be funny implying the red flag should have been her asking about specific support for her ethnicity and religion. Thirty years ago she would have been told "no, we treat everybody the same and there is no special support for your religion or ethnicity beyond reasonable accommodation."
I understand my limitations in the subject. Having no training in the mystical arts of DEI, I would not be able to discern what special qualities she has, or where she might might need extra support based on her melanin levels and superstitions.
fwiw - I work in the accounting industry and have observed numerous times over the years where clients have requested not to have specific individuals not work on those client's projects for a variety of reasons. I suspect it happens in the legal field as well.
I've seen the same thing, for a variety of named reasons.
Hell, I even got declared 'persona non grata' once at a client. A dumb SOB who worked for the client had a few too many, started hitting on a much younger female employee of my company who was a) not interested, and b) had politely said no.
I drew the short straw and had to intervene; it was a mess.
Yet another case example of "don't post shit on social media"
In a nutshell; that would be my advice.