The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Free Speech

Federal Prosecutors Dropping HIPAA Charges Against Dr. Ethan Haim, Stemming from Youth Gender Medicine Disclosures

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From the Justice Department's press release about the charges in June:

A Houston doctor has been indicted for obtaining protected individual health information for patients that were not under his care and without authorization, announced Alamdar S. Hamdani….

The four-count indictment alleges Haim obtained personal information including patient names, treatment codes and the attending physician from Texas Children's Hospital's (TCH) electronic system without authorization. He allegedly obtained this information under false pretenses and with intent to cause malicious harm to TCH.

According to the indictment, Haim was a resident at Baylor College of Medicine and had previous rotations at TCH as part of his residency.

In April 2023, Haim allegedly requested to re-activate his login access at TCH to access pediatric patients not under his care. The indictment alleges he obtained unauthorized access to personal information of pediatric patients under false pretenses and later disclosed it to a media contact.

From the Free Press (Tom Bartlett):

Haim decided to tell the media what was happening at his hospital. He knew taking a public stance on such a divisive issue could undermine his medical career before it really started, so he was determined to remain anonymous. He told me he didn't present his findings to hospital administrators because it was obvious to him that what was happening had the approval of higher-ups.

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AI in Court

AI Hallucinations in a Self-Represented Litigant's Brief in the Colorado Court of Appeals

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Even lawyers have at times filed briefs containing AI-hallucinated citations; but the danger is likely especially great for the many self-represented litigants. Here, for instance, is a passage from the Dec. 26 decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals in Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone, LLC, written by Colorado Court of Appeals Judges Lino Lipinsky, joined by Judges Jerry Jones and Grant Sullivan; the underlying case was a landlord-tenant dispute, but I'm focusing here on the discussion of the AI hallucinations:

Al-Hamim's opening brief in this appeal contained hallucinations, as well as bona fide legal citations. This case provides the first opportunity for a Colorado appellate court to address the appropriate sanction when a self-represented litigant files a brief peppered with GAI-produced hallucinations…. We affirm the court's judgment against Al-Hamim and put him, the bar, and self-represented litigants on notice that we may impose sanctions if a future filing in this court cites "non-existent judicial opinions with fake quotes and citations." …

Al-Hamim's opening brief contains citations to [eight] fake cases …. After we attempted, without success, to locate these cases, we ordered Al-Hamim to provide complete and unedited copies of the cases, or if the citations were GAI hallucinations, to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for citing fake cases. In his response to our show cause order, Al-Hamim admitted that he relied on AI "to assist his preparation" of his opening brief, confirmed that the citations were hallucinations, and that he "failed to inspect the brief." He did not address why he should not be sanctioned….

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Members of the International Criminal Court Need To Relearn The Lesson of Marbury v. Madison

Jefferson likely would have ignored any command from Chief Justice Marshall, and Marbury did not issue such a command.

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Another semester, another section of constitutional law. This week I taught Marbury v. Madison for the umpteenth time. Beyond teaching the mechanics of the Original Jurisdiction clause and the Judiciary Act of 1789, I always try to convey to my students why Marshall wrote the opinion backwards: Why decide the merits question about the commission before the jurisdictional question? The answer, as all know, was that Marshall was trying to establish the principle of judicial review for federal legislation. (And no, he did not create judicial review; read Hamilton in Federalist No. 78.)

Yet, lurking in the background was a fear. If Marshall had in fact ordered Secretary of State James Madison, an appointee of President Thomas Jefferson, to deliver Marbury's commission, it is likely the order would have been disregarded. It is not a certainty, but there was definitely that risk. If so, Marshall recognized what would happen if his court issued an order that was ignored: the court, as an institution, would be diminished.

At this point in class, I always ask students why do people follow court orders. The usual answer is that if you ignore the court, you will go to jail. That's fine, but it is the executive branch that will actually arrest a person and incarcerate them. Judges do not get off their benches and place handcuffs on a person. As Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 78, courts have neither force nor will, only judgment. Courts depend on the executive branch to enforce their judgments.

I then ask why does the executive branch enforce a court's judgments. The usual answer is that without that sort of enforcement, there would be anarchy and chaos in society. Maybe that's right. But at bottom, the answer is that the executive branch enforces the court's judgments because the executive branch thinks the court plays a valid role in society, even if any particular decision might be right or wrong.

I then ask whether the President should enforce a blatantly unconstitutional ruling (you can think of what that would be). At that point, students get a bit queasy. Some judicial supremacists (even if they do not know the term yet) say that court judgments should be enforced no matter what. Other departmentalists (even if they do not know the term yet) say that the President can decide for himself whether the order is constitutional, and enforce accordingly. Most students are in the middle, and don't quite know what to think, at least during the first week of class.

This class helped me bring into context the International Criminal Court (ICC). This judicial body sits in the Hague. (I wrote about its jurisdiction here.) The ICC has asserted the power to issue arrest warrants for war criminals, including heads of state. The ICC has no actual power to command people to the Hague. Rather, signatories to the Rome Convention have a legal obligation to arrest anyone in their jurisdiction that is subject to an ICC warrant. So are member states actually enforcing these arrest warrants? No. Consider three examples.

Example #1. Russian President Vladimir Putin is subject to an arrest warrant. Yet he was welcomed with a state visit to Mongolia, a signatory to the Rome Convention. The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber (whatever that is) found that Mongolia failed to cooperate with the arrest warrant. But so what? Will there be any actual consequences? Putin has also visited China, and President Trump has announced that he will visit with Putin. The ICC's ruling are less than parchment barriers.

Example #2. The ICC issued an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu was invited to Poland for the 80th anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp. Poland is a signatory to the Rome Convention, but signaled that it would not arrest Netanyahu. Can you imagine the Poles putting handcuffs on the Israeli prime minister at the site of an actual genocide? Maybe they could have loaded him on a railcar--there are still tracks at the camp--through Germany onto the Netherlands? And what will the consequences of Poland's refusal to enforce the warrant be? Absolutely nothing. Other European nations like France and Italy said Netanyahu could visit, citing the fact that he is a current head of state and has diplomatic immunity. Legalistic distinctions without a difference. What is going on here? These nations have determined that their own diplomatic interests with Israel dwarf whatever manufactured claims of genocide have been brought forward.

Example #3. The ICC issued an arrest warrant for Osama Elmasry Njeem, a Libyan charged with war crimes. The Italian police actually arrested Njeem, but the government did not transport him to the Hague. Rather, two days later Italy escorted Njeem back to Libya. The Prime Minister of Italy cited "procedural" reasons for returning him. But there may be another reason. Italy needs Libya's cooperation to handle the migrant situation. Returning Njeem likely helped Italy's diplomatic relations with Libya. By contrast, sending Njeem to the Hague would have harmed those relations. Which did Italy choose? Which option would any sane country choose? The arrest warrant was disregarded.

The ICC is John Marshall's worst nightmare: a court that issues orders that are routinely flouted. This is not really a court. It is a body of progressive human rights lawyers who wear powdered wigs and robes. They are cosplaying as judges, but have no actual sovereign authority of their own. It's as if the Harvard Law Review editorial board ordered that certain scholars should be arrested for writing the wrong type of scholarship. (Maybe these are the sorts of "consequences" Seth Barrett Tillman worried about.)

The ICC is emblematic of my general view about international law. International law is designed to allow smaller, weaker countries to exert power over larger, stronger countries. In the normal course of things, larger, stronger counters can use their diplomatic or military clout to achieve their ends. Smaller, weaker countries do not have either diplomatic or military clout, so they have to dress up their demands in the fancy garb of "international human rights law" and other such abstract legalisms. But at bottom, any "court" decision must be backed up by political will. And absent that political will, ICC opinions are little more than window dressing for human rights lawyers without any actual mandate.

Every action has an equal and opposite reaction. In 2002, Congress enacted the American Service-Members' Protection Act, known informally as The Hague Invasion Act. The law gives the president the power to use "all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of any U.S. or allied personnel being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the International Criminal Court." This is effectively a declaration of war against the Hague if any American servicemember is detained.

In 2020, the ICC began an investigation of American troops in Afghanistan, and Congress imposed sanctions on the Chief Prosecutor and her aide. This month, the House voted to impose sanctions on the entire ICC, and the Senate likely will agree. The ICC is already preparing for the crushing financial consequences. Microsoft, for example, would likely have to stop working with the ICC.

The members of this court need to relearn the lesson from Marbury. If you issue orders that will be ignored, you will no longer be a court.

Three Notes on National Injunctions

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Three notes on national injunctions. First, today the Court issued a stay of another universal injunction, this time in McHenry v. Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc. The Solicitor General had suggested that the Court could construe the stay request as a petition for certiorari before judgment, allowing the Court to directly address the universal injunction question. One reason that matters is that it would be good for the Court to tackle the universal-relief question directly, without the additional complexities that come from the context of the Administrative Procedure Act.

The Court did not grant certoriari before judgment, and Justice Gorsuch wrote a brief concurrence in the stay:

I agree with the Court that the government is entitled to a stay of the district court's universal injunction. I would, however, go a step further and, as the government suggests, take this case now to resolve definitively the question whether a district court may issue universal injunctive relief. See Labrador v. Poe, 601 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2024) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in grant of stay) (slip op., at 4–5, 11–13); Department of Homeland Security v. New York, 589 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in grant of stay) (slip op., at 1–5).

Second, I recently ran across a Supreme Court decision that has not featured in the debate over the national injunction, but it has language that is directly on point. The case is United States v. National Treasury Employees Union:

For three reasons, we agree with the Government's first suggestion—that the relief should be limited to the parties before the Court. First, although the occasional case requires us to entertain a facial challenge in order to vindicate a party's right not to be bound by an unconstitutional statute, see, e.g., Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 965–967, and n. 13, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2851–2852, and n. 13, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984), we neither want nor need to provide relief to nonparties when a narrower remedy will fully protect the litigants. See Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484–485, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 3037–3038, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989). In this case, granting full relief to respondents—who include all Executive Branch employees below grade GS–16—does not require passing on the applicability of § 501(b) to Executive Branch employees above grade GS–15, including those high-level employees who received a 25% salary increase that offsets the honoraria ban's disincentive to speak and write.

United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477–78 (1995).

Third, The Purpose of the Preliminary Injunction addresses trends in preliminary injunctions, especially the collapse of the four-factor test into the merits. It is not just about national injunctions. But it sheds light on a broader set of intersecting trends—the dominance of the merits, the rise of universal relief, and heightened judicial polarization and forum-shopping.

Free Speech

Google, as Non-Party, Not Subject to Injunction That Expressly Ordered It to Take Down YouTube Posts

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In Future Motion, Inc. v. Lai, decided Jan. 7 by Judge Michael Simon (D. Or.) (appeal filed Wednesday), plaintiff sued defendant for patent infringement, and Judge Simon issued an injunction that purported to bind not just defendant but others:

[I]n accordance with the Court's inherent equitable power to issue provisional remedies ancillary to its authority to provide final equitable relief, any internet service provider including but not limited to any web hosting company, domain name registry, domain name registrar, e-commerce service provider, and/or video platform provider having notice of the Court's Order must (1) take any and all action necessary to remove the infringing content from websites having content controlled by Defendant, or alternatively to disable access to the website; and (2) provide notice of compliance to Future Motion's counsel within five (5) business days of receipt of notice of this Order. This includes but is not limited to the following specific examples: …

[6.] Any video platform provider, including but not limited to Google LLC doing business as YouTube, must promptly upon receipt of a copy of this Order either disable public access to (i) the entire Floatwheel YouTube channel at https://www.youtube.com/floatwheel or (ii) to all individual videos teaching viewers how to make and/or use a product that infringes Future Motion's patents, including but not limited to … 48 videos [listed below with titles and URLs] currently hosted at the YouTube channel https://www.youtube.com/floatwheel….

[8.] Pursuant to this Court's inherent powers, any person or entity failing to comply promptly with this Order, including but not limited to any domain name Registrar, e-commerce service provider, video platform service provider (including Google LLC doing business as YouTube), freight forwarding service provider, or logistics company (including but not limited to those enumerated above) shall be subject to sanctions for civil and/or criminal contempt

(As is not uncommon, the text of the injunction was submitted as a proposed order by the plaintiff, which the judge accepted.) Later, Judge Simon issued a follow-up injunction (again based on a proposed order) stating, in part,

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Politics

Choice of Law in Takings Cases After Tyler v. Hennepin County (V)

A reader mailbag.

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This week, I've blogged on a forthcoming article about the Supreme Court case Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota. As I showed on Monday, in Tyler the U.S. Supreme Court held that surplus equity constitutes "private property" sufficient to support claims under the Takings Clause. As I showed on Tuesday and Wednesday, the Court reached that conclusion (primarily) by figuring out what the general law in England and the American states held at the Founding on surplus equity but (secondarily) also by checking how Minnesota (the defendant in Tyler) treated surplus equity when it wasn't foreclosing. Yesterday, I argued that this strategy makes practical sense in context. For originalists, the Tyler strategy provides a way to work out what "private property" means and covers when the historical record doesn't make explicitly clear whether a particular legal entitlement was understood to be property. For non-originalists, the Tyler approach provides a way for federal courts to steer between two dangers. The approach avoids overaggressiveness, in second-guessing state property law, and passivity, when states use their powers to define property to expropriate it.

Today, I'll devote this post to a "reader mailbag" day. Here's one reaction I've gotten: How far might federal courts go in relying on general law? To make the question more pointed, consider a hypothetical. Assume that English and American practice pre-1790 ruled out the possibility that surplus equity was property, but that American state courts and legislatures gradually came to regard it as property later. The hypothetical differs from what happened in Tyler. In Tyler the Court focused on general law sources before or only shortly after the ratification of the Fifth Amendment, and there was no tension between post-ratification general law and English and pre-ratification practice. But the hypothetical raises some important questions, about how much one can rely on general law.

I have two different answers depending on what you think is the right approach to constitutional interpretation. If you are not an originalist, in situations like my hypothetical, courts could and probably should follow general law. The general law provides a baseline. The baseline stands separate from judges' own views about whether a particular entitlement should or shouldn't be property (or, whether a state has good grounds to regulate it). And, the baseline allows for comparison of a state's law against the practices in other states.

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Birthright Citizenship

Debating Birthright Citizenship (Again) [UPDATED]

The arguments are not new. The willingness of an Administration to act on them are.

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During the first Trump Administration, some of the President's supporters urged him to embrace the view that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require recognition of birthright citizenship to those born in the United States to parents who were not legal residents.

As I noted at the time, some of the most thorough and comprehensive arguments to the contrary could be found in the work of Judge James Ho, who wrote several op-eds and a short law review article on the question before becoming a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . ." This provision unquestionably provides that those born on U.S. soil to American citizens and lawful permanent residents are American citizens at birth. The relevant legal question with regard to the Trump Administration Executive Order is what it means for someone to not be "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States at birth. The conventional account is that it excludes the children of foreign diplomats and invading armies. The revisionist account maintains that it also excludes the children of those unlawfully present in the country, and perhaps the children of non-citizen parents lacking lawful permanent residence as well.

There may well be a range of non-originalist arguments for the revisionist position, but as a matter of original public meaning, these arguments do not work.   Judge Ho explained why in a 2007 op-ed:

When a person is "subject to the jurisdiction" of a court of law, that person is required to obey the orders of that court. The meaning of the phrase is simple: One is "subject to the jurisdiction" of another whenever one is obliged to obey the laws of another. The test is obedience, not allegiance.

The "jurisdiction" requirement excludes only those who are not required to obey U.S. law. This concept, like much of early U.S. law, derives from English common law. Under common law, foreign diplomats and enemy soldiers are not legally obliged to obey our law, and thus their offspring are not entitled to citizenship at birth. The 14th Amendment merely codified this common law doctrine.

Members of the 39th Congress debated the wisdom of guaranteeing birthright citizenship — but no one disputed the amendment's meaning. Opponents conceded — indeed, warned — that it would grant citizenship to the children of those who "owe [the U.S.] no allegiance." Amendment supporters agreed that only members of Indian tribes, ambassadors, foreign ministers and others not "subject to our laws" would fall outside the amendment's reach.

The strongest counter-argument I have come across is that made by Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith (based on their 1985 book), but their argument does not vindicate the Trump Administration's position. Rather, their position is that Congress has "the power to regulate access to birthright citizenship for groups to whose presence or membership it did not consent" by defining what constitutes being "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." And if one takes an expensive view of Congress's Section 5 power to implement and enforce the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, this argument may have some force. But even if one accepts this argument (and I am unpersuaded), this would at most allow for Congress to enact legislation excluding some groups, such as those unlawfully present in the country, from conveying birthright citizenship. It would not provide adequate justification for unilateral action by the executive branch.

The above assumes that the question of birthright citizenship should be resolved by reference to the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. If one rejects this view, and believes either that courts should be particularly deferential to the political  branches or should embrace evolving constitutional meanings in response to political and other developments (such as an election in which a prevailing candidate advocated a contrasting constitutional interpretation), one might well reach a different conclusion.

UPDATE: For those interested in more on this subject, I recommend this essay by Paul Gowder from The UnPopulist, this John Yoo essay from Civitas Outlook, and this Michael Ramsey post from the Originalism Blog focused on the Trump EO (which links to this longer article).

Note that the Trump Administration position seeks to get around the Supreme Court's Wong Kim Ark decision by arguing that it implicitly accepted the requirement of domicile for one to be "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." Andrew Hyman makes a version of that argument here. I remain unpersuaded and would note that, even were this argument correct, it would do more to support potential legislation defining the contours of U.S. jurisdiction over non-citizens (and thus the eligibility of their children for birthright citizenship) than it would unilateral executive action.

One additional reason legislative action is necessary is that the traditional understanding of what it means for a non-citizen to not be subject to U.S. jurisdiction is reflected in how the U.S. treats foreign diplomats: They are not subject to U.S. law and thus can be expelled, but not prosecuted for crimes. Asserting that individuals not lawfully present in the country are subject to U.S. jurisdiction for some purposes but not others is not something that can simply be decreed.

Birthright Citizenship

Federal Court Issues Temporary Restraining Order Blocking "Blatantly Unconstitutional" Trump Birthright Citizenship Order

The TRO blocks the order for 14 days and is a sign that courts are highly skeptical of Trump's position.

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Earlier today, a US federal district judge issued a temporary restraining order blocking implementation of Donald Trump's executive order denying birthright citizenship to children of undocumented immigrants and immigrants in the US on temporary visas:

A federal judge on Thursday temporarily blocked President Donald Trump's executive order redefining birthright citizenship, calling it "blatantly unconstitutional" during the first hearing in a multi-state effort challenging the order.

U.S. District Judge John Coughenour repeatedly interrupted a Justice Department lawyer to ask how he could consider the order constitutional…..

Coughenour, a Ronald Reagan appointee, grilled the DOJ attorneys, saying the order "boggles the mind."

"This is a blatantly unconstitutional order," Coughenour told Shumate. The judge said he's been on the bench for more than four decades, and he couldn't remember seeing another case where the action challenged so clearly violated the constitution.

This is just the start of what is likely to be a lengthy legal battle, in just one of several cases challenging the order. It also isn't a final ruling on the merits, even in this one case.

Nonetheless, Judge Coughenour's negative reaction to the administration's position is  sign the order is likely to face great skepticism in the judiciary, and is likely to ultimately be struck down. It is also significant that this judge is a Reagan appointee. That's an early indication that this issue may not split judges along left-right lines.

I previously outlined why the Trump position on birthright citizenship is badly wrong here and here.

Has Any Reporter Asked Justice Jackson To Comment On Her Talisman Worn To The Inauguration?

How many reporters asked Martha Ann Alito about her flags?

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The inauguration was Monday. Today is Thursday. I have seen zero coverage in the mainstream media about Justice Jackson's attire. Has any reporter asked Justice Jackson if she realized she wore a symbol that has been widely recognized as a talisman to ward off evil?

ABA Journal provides links to some of the coverage:

As a fashion statement, there was some disagreement. Josh Blackman, a professor at the South Texas College of Law in Houston, initially called the cowrie shells a "fashion faux pas," while fashion historian Shelby Ivey Christie said the piece had undeniable visual impact.

The shell collar "brilliantly reinterprets the traditional judicial jabot through an African American cultural lens," Christie told HuffPost. The shell pattern suggests "ceremony and significance" along with "importance and intentionality," she said.

But there may have been a deeper meaning, according to HuffPost, Vogue, Ebony, the Root, Parade, Above the Law and a Volokh Conspiracy post by Blackman.

But silence from the large newspapers and media outlets.

This silence would be unremarkable, but for the persistent scrutiny attacks on Justices Thomas and Alito. ProPublica spent a year scrubbing through social media accounts to trace where in the world is Clarence Thomas. But no one has asked KBJ what she was wearing to the Capitol. Reporters have accosted the Alitos in their driveway, and interviewed their neighbors about flags. But has anyone sent a note to the Public Information Office?

I will continue to wait.

Update: An article on Huffington Post about Justice Jackson's talisman originally included this line:

After all, Jackson is the first Black Supreme Court justice to sit on the court. "Even folks unfamiliar with its cultural significance can recognize it as a meaningful choice."

I know that liberals do not believe that Clarence Thomas is actually black. For once, they wrote it! And what about Justice Thurgood Marshall?

The page was later fixed to say:

After all, Jackson is the first Black female justice to sit on the court. "Even folks unfamiliar with its cultural significance can recognize it as a meaningful choice."

I'm not sure what the addition of the word "female" does here. Clarence Thomas is also descended from African slaves.

Free Speech

Can People Suing Sean Combs / P. Diddy for Sexual Assault Proceed as John / Jane Does? Depends on Which Manhattan Federal Judge They Draw

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From Doe v. Combs, decided yesterday by Judge Lewis Kaplan (S.D.N.Y.):

Plaintiff "John Doe" claims that Sean Combs, a well-known rapper and record producer, sexually assaulted him, and that several businesses owned or controlled by Combs enabled him to do so. The question before the Court is whether the plaintiff should be permitted to litigate this case without revealing his identity. For the following reasons, the plaintiff's motion to proceed anonymously is denied….

"Federal court proceedings and records presumptively are public absent a showing of exceptional circumstances." Accordingly, "[t]he title of [a] complaint must name all the parties." This rule "serves the vital purpose of facilitating public scrutiny of judicial proceedings and therefore cannot be set aside lightly." … An exception is appropriate "only where the litigant seeking to proceed anonymously has a substantial privacy interest that outweighs any prejudice to the opposing party and 'the customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.'"

The plaintiff alleges that Combs violently raped him in the presence of multiple strangers. Undoubtedly, this is a highly sensitive and personal claim, and the plaintiff's privacy interest is compelling. The first factor thus favors the plaintiff's use of a pseudonym. However, "allegations of sexual assault, by themselves, are not sufficient to entitle a plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym." …

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Why United Does Not Allow You To Use In-Flight Screen As Extended Display

The limitation is not technology, but confidentiality.

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For more than a decade, I have traveled with an extra monitor. It is a life-saver for productivity on the go. Plus, if you keep an HDMI cable, you can use the in-hotel TV as a third display (assuming the inputs are easily accessible). When I am upgraded to business class on an international flight, I have enough room to use both my laptop and external monitor.

Then again, on a flight to Japan, a divine wind caused severe turbulence, and my monitor fell off the top of the seat, and cracked. I didn't do that again.Yet, I've always wanted more screens. I called United many years ago and asked if I could connect my computer to the inflight entertainment screen. There are inputs, and with the right adapters, I could make it work. After some hold, I was told the answer was no, without much explanation. And I thought it would be a bad idea to connect without permission, so I haven't done so.

In recent years, United has installed 4K screens with bluetooth functionality. It should not be difficult to set up wireless screencasting from a device directly to the screen. But that is still not an option. Why?

Finally, I've found out the reason, via The Points Guy:

As more travelers bring their own tablets and laptops on board, I've always wondered why airlines don't offer a screencasting feature on the entertainment screens. After all, it's a lot easier to get work done with some additional screen real estate.

Turns out, United can already technically enable screencasting today, Green said, but a major issue will likely mean that flyers will never see this functionality.

"We've had a lot of pushback from our corporate partners that say they don't necessarily want their staff using publicly available screens," Green said.

It's not that United would have access to any data; it's that they don't want nosy passengers snooping in on their neighbors.

Fascinating. Companies are worried that employees on travel will inadvertently disclose their confidential information on a display, which others can see.

This concern is valid. In the past, I have routinely seen people work on confidential information. I've seen judges write opinions. I've also seen lawyers review documents marked "confidential." And so on. Now, my vision is not as good as it was, so it is difficult for me to read text from more than a row away. But when a person is sitting next to me, I can easily see their screen. Some people have screen protectors on their laptops, but if they were to screencast, that benefit would vanish.

Do I worry about people seeing my screen? Not really. Almost everything I write is intended for public consumption. Maybe my neighbor might see a draft line that I intend to remove, but that risk is low. As for my emails and messages, I generally assume everything I write will one day be blasted on the front page of the New York Times, so I choose my words carefully. (There is not much difference between the messages I write and the blog posts I publish.)

I hope United does reconsider this option at some point. Having one more screen in economy would make my productive increase even more.

Update: A reader writes in with an obvious comment that did not occur to me:

The obvious reason not to let people put things on the screens you own in public is that invariably people will put porn on them, and then you'll have other people complaining that the united screen system is showing porn.

They don't say this because no corporate PR hack is going to talk about porn when it's not necessary. But it's definitely the real reason, and it's one they will not and should not budge on.

AI in Court

Federal Public Defender Submits Brief with Nonexistent Citation, Apparently Refuses to Admit This to the Judge at a Hearing

It's not the hallucination, it's the coverup.

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A short excerpt from the nearly 10,000-word opinion in U.S. v. Hayes, decided last week by Magistrate Judge Chi Soo Kim (E.D. Cal.):

The Court finds that Mr. Francisco submitted a fictitious or non-existent case and quotation in his written motion to unseal filed on November 21, 2024; knowingly made inaccurate and misleading statements in his written reply filed on December 5, 2024 to the government's opposition that expressly raised the fictitious case and quotation; and knowingly made inaccurate and misleading statements at the December 9, 2024 hearing.

The Court further finds that Mr. Francisco's inaccurate and misleading statements were not inadvertent as claimed, but knowing and made in bad faith. Despite being provided multiple opportunities to candidly acknowledge and correct his errors as required under his duty of candor to the court, Mr. Francisco unfortunately failed to do so….

In his motion to unseal, Mr. Francisco cited eight cases, six of which were cited in near string citation form. The primary case upon which Mr. Francisco relied—analyzing, quoting, describing the district court's analysis, and addressing in two different places in the motion—was "United States v. Harris, 761 F. Supp. 409, 414 (D.D.C. 1991)."

Unfortunately, "United States v. Harris, 761 F. Supp. 409, 414 (D.D.C. 1991)" is not a real case. The citation has all the markings of a hallucinated case created by generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools such as ChatGPT and Google Bard that have been widely discussed by courts grappling with fictitious legal citations and reported by national news outlets. Similar to other fictitious case citations created by generative AI tools, the fictitious "United States v. Harris" case looks like a real case with a case name; a citation to the Federal Supplement, which is the reporter that publishes opinions from federal district courts; identification of a district court; and the year for the decision….

Unlike other cases where counsel and litigants have admitted, sometimes reluctantly, that the fictitious citations and quotations were created by generative AI, Mr. Francisco states that he "did not use and ha[s] never used AI (artificial intelligence) to draft any of my motions." Instead, Mr. Francisco states that he "hastily" drafted the portion of his motion discussing the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d), which includes the fictitious case and quotation. Regarding his citation to the fictitious United States v. Harris case, he states: "I am baffled to say where it came from, first in a case name which does not exist, second from a district and year which does not match the citation volume and page, and third, which never even addresses the Motion's issues. It was an inadvertent drafting error I cannot begin to explain."

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New Essay at Civitas: "Trump Must Pick Judges Who Have Publicly Demonstrated Their Courage"

"The most important predictor of behavior on the bench is judicial courage."

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Today, the Civitas Institute published my new essay, titled "Trump Must Pick Judges Who Have Publicly Demonstrated Their Courage."

Here is the introduction:

One of the defining legacies of President Trump's first term is the judiciary. He appointed three Supreme Court justices, fifty-four judges to the courts of appeals, and 174 judges to the federal district courts. It is unlikely that Trump will top those numbers in his second term. There are fewer pending vacancies, and fewer judges will be eligible to step down. For these reasons and more, Trump must make every lifetime appointment count. Trump's first batch of picks checked all conventional boxes: they were smart, well-credentialed, and impactful. Trump's three appointees to the Supreme Court have already joined landmark decisions concerning abortion, the Second Amendment, and religious liberty. Moreover, a recent study demonstrates that the Trump lower court nominees have dwarfed the influence of Obama judges, and I suspect there will be an even more significant disparity for Biden judges.

Yet, not all Trump judges are made from the same stuff. While they may share similar judicial philosophy–it is easy enough to profess fidelity to originalism at a confirmation hearing–they do not all put it to the same use. In generations past, scholars and critics charged that some judges were "judicial activists" while others engaged in "judicial restraint." These terms are largely meaningless and fail to account for how judges rule in many cases. Instead, a different metric is a far greater predictor of behavior on the bench: judicial courage. Will a judge's decisions be affected, in any way, by how legal elites will respond? Stated differently, does the judge have a fear of being booed? Any judicial nominee would deny having such a fragile disposition. But there is only one way to prove it: a record of publicly demonstrating courage in the face of criticism by legal elites. If they haven't done it before becoming a judge, they will not do it after becoming a judge. Courage is like a muscle: it must be exercised. Every future Trump nominee should be able to show such steadfastness by word and deed.

And this paragraph will be relevant for FedSoc members:

Third, we should judge a judge by the company he keeps, or in Latin, noscitur a sociis. A recent book demonstrates that judges are likely "to follow the lead of the elite social networks that they are a part of" and "take cues primarily from the people who are closest to them and whose approval they care most about." The people a candidate seeks praise from before the appointment will be those the judge seeks praise from after the appointment. Social circles usually freeze upon confirmation. It is not enough to simply list an affiliation with the Federalist Society on a resume. (Then again, John Roberts denied being a member, while Professor Barrett let her membership lapse for much of her career and never attended the national convention.) The better question is what the candidate has accomplished with that platform. Ask not what FedSoc has done for you; ask what you have done for Fedsoc. Moreover, there should be serious doubts about any candidate who volunteers his time to groups like the American Bar Association, which has been overtly hostile to conservatives.

 

Free Speech

Trump Executive Order on "Ending Federal Censorship": Free Speech, Private Power, and Government Power Following Murthy v. Missouri

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Monday, President Trump issued an Executive Order, "Restoring Freedom of Speech and Ending Federal Censorship"; it reads, in relevant part:

Section 1. Purpose. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, an amendment essential to the success of our Republic, enshrines the right of the American people to speak freely in the public square without Government interference. Over the last 4 years, the previous administration trampled free speech rights by censoring Americans' speech on online platforms, often by exerting substantial coercive pressure on third parties, such as social media companies, to moderate, deplatform, or otherwise suppress speech that the Federal Government did not approve. Under the guise of combatting "misinformation," "disinformation," and "malinformation," the Federal Government infringed on the constitutionally protected speech rights of American citizens across the United States in a manner that advanced the Government's preferred narrative about significant matters of public debate. Government censorship of speech is intolerable in a free society.

Sec. 2. Policy. It is the policy of the United States to: (a) secure the right of the American people to engage in constitutionally protected speech;

(b) ensure that no Federal Government officer, employee, or agent engages in or facilitates any conduct that would unconstitutionally abridge the free speech of any American citizen;

(c) ensure that no taxpayer resources are used to engage in or facilitate any conduct that would unconstitutionally abridge the free speech of any American citizen; and

(d) identify and take appropriate action to correct past misconduct by the Federal Government related to censorship of protected speech.

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Property

Choice of Law in Takings Cases After Tyler v. Hennepin County (IV)

Two modest defenses of Tyler’s choice of law strategy.

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Yesterday, I finished covering the law and doctrine from my forthcoming article about the Supreme Court case Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota. As I showed on Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court held that surplus equity constitutes "private property" sufficient to support claims under the Takings Clause. As I showed on Tuesday, in the course of reaching that holding, Chief Justice Roberts made a little clearer and more orderly the principles the Court relies on when it makes choice of law decisions in takings litigation. Roberts announced that the Court was following a strategy for takings similar to the strategy it applies for other federal constitutional rights. That general strategy is associated with Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand-start by measuring the right under state law, but measure it with independent sources if the most relevant state laws seem likely to convert the Takings Clause into a dead letter. As I showed yesterday, however, Tyler and earlier takings choice of law cases depart slightly from the Brand strategy. In Tyler, not only did the Court take a second look at the law of Minnesota (consistent with Brand), it also consulted early English and American general law on the question whether surplus equity has been treated as a property right.

To this point, I've tried to explain how Tyler follows and how it departs from different lines of doctrine. And also to this point, I've reserved judgment on whether the Tyler strategy is convincing normatively. I think the Tyler strategy makes a considerable amount of sense, at least when applied in the contexts in which the Court has applied it. Today, I'll explain why-and, why I don't find any of the other strategies likely to be better in the same contexts.

I'm going to make two separate arguments on behalf of the Tyler strategy. One argument relies on originalism. Assume that there are convincing arguments to interpret the Constitution in light of its original meaning. (I know, I know, arguments for originalism are bound to be controversial and contestable. But every justification for any constitutional-interpretation theory is fraught, and I'm persuaded by some of the cases for originalism.)

It is not easy to work out what "private property" meant originally at the Founding. (The problems get even worse if one thinks, as Justice Thomas and I do, that what I've been calling "Takings Clause law" in this series is actually grounded in the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.) The sources that early American lawyers knew best and followed most took for granted that property exists, without spelling out exactly what it is. At the same time, competent lawyers do pretty well at sorting different legal entitlements into rights of "property," "contract" and so on without precise working definitions. So the Tyler strategy seems promising. Ordinarily, federal courts can and will just follow state property law. But when state law seems unreliable-or, threatening to some legal entitlement that might constitute constitutional "private property"-courts can cross-check it against early general law.

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Law & Government

Prof. Robert Leider on the arguments in Barnes v. Felix

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Professor Robert Leider, who writes in both constitutional law and criminal law, passed along these comments on the Supreme Court's recent oral argument in an excessive force case and I thought readers might be interested in them:

For scholars of both criminal law and federal courts, the Supreme Court's oral argument yesterday in Barnes v. Felix will be noteworthy.  The Supreme Court appears dangerously close to sleepwalking into a major revision of police self-defense law.  For federal courts scholars, meanwhile, yesterday's oral argument stood as a painful reminder of how the Court has corrupted certiorari review by detaching itself from deciding actual cases.

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