The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Politics

"A Lawsuit Is a Fruit Tree Planted in a Lawyer's Garden"

An Italian proverb, which I just learned yesterday.

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The earliest reference I could find in a case is State of Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. (1972), but I found a 1944 newspaper reference as well, so it was known even then. My colleague Paola Sapienza confirms that it is indeed an Italian proverb, "Una causa è un albero da frutto piantato nel giardino di un avvocato."

Paola also pointed to another proverb, "Causa che pende, causa che rende." That translates to "A pending case makes money [for the lawyer]," but somewhat less precisely (and changing the focus from the lawyer to the client), as

A pending case is a spending case.

Free Speech

Eleventh Circuit Rejects Federal Child Porn/Sex Trafficking Claims Against Video Chat Service Omegle

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From M.H. v. Omegle.com LLC, decided yesterday by the Eleventh Circuit (Judges Andrew Brasher and Ed Carnes, joined as to the sex trafficking claim by Judge Barbara Lagoa):

The facts of this appeal underscore that the internet in general and social media in particular pose grave risks to children. When C.H. was eleven years old, a stranger connected with her through Omegle.com, an online social media platform that places people in video chatrooms. The stranger then tricked and threatened C.H. into making child pornography. Unfortunately, this problem is not unique to Omegle.com. Our precedents reflect that child predators use many other online platforms to find and exploit their victims.

Through her parents, C.H. sued Omegle.com LLC. She alleged that Omegle.com violated 18 U.S.C. § 2255, known as "Masha's Law," by knowingly possessing child pornography. She also sued Omegle.com for violating the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, which forbids knowingly benefitting from participation in a sex trafficking venture. The district court dismissed her claims under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. That section provides that for purposes of civil liability, "[n]o provider … of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by" a user.

C.H.'s appeal presents two questions of statutory interpretation. First, we must decide whether she stated a claim under Masha's Law for the knowing possession of child pornography. We conclude that she has not. Second, we must decide whether C.H. can bring her sex trafficking claim because of an exception to section 230 under the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act ("FOSTA"). We believe she cannot. The FOSTA exception applies only to conduct that meets the standard for criminal liability for sex trafficking. Here, C.H. does not plausibly allege that Omegle.com had actual knowledge that it benefited from sex trafficking, which is the standard for criminal liability. Accordingly, we affirm the district court….

Here's the core of the court's analysis rejecting the child pornography claims:

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Supreme Court

Justice Jackson Authors First Decision of OT2024

The junior justice authors a unanimous immigration law decision for the first of the term.

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This morning the Supreme Court issued its first signed decision in an argued case for October Term 2024. (The Court previously DIGged another case.) This restores the tradition of deciding at least some cases in the fall. Last year, the Court's first decision in an argued case did not appear until January.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote for a unanimous Court in Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, which considered whether a petitioner may obtain judicial review when an approved visa petition is revoked due to a determination by the government that the petitioner  was in a sham marriage.

Here is how Justice Jackson summarizes the decision:

A common feature of our Nation's complex system of lawful immigration is mandatory statutory rules paired with discretionary exceptions. Executive Branch agencies implement both. Whether any given agency decision is mandatory or discretionary matters, because Congress has limited judicial review of many discretionary determinations. See 66 Stat. 208, as amended, 8 U. S. C. §1252(a)(2)(B). This case involves the Secretary of Homeland Security's decision to revoke initial approval of a visa petition that Amina Bouarfa, a U. S. citizen, filed on behalf of her noncitizen spouse

The Secretary points to 8 U. S. C. §1155 as the source of the agency's revocation authority; that provision states that the Secretary "may, at any time," revoke approval of a visa petition "for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause." The issue we address today is whether revocation under §1155 qualifies as a decision "in the discretion of " the Secretary such that it falls within the purview of a separate statute—§1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—that strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain discretionary actions. We hold that it does.

It is not surprising that the first opinion of the term is unanimous, as unanimity can produce a smoother and quicker opinion drafting process. It is also worth remembering that, as the junior-most justice, Justice Jackson is most likely to be assigned unanimous decisions in cases that the justices believe present straight-forward and relatively easily resolved questions.

There is no word yet on when the Court may issue additional opinions.

Academic Freedom

The Academic Freedom Podcast is Back!

The podcast relaunches with a conversation with Cary Nelson

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After a bit of a hiatus, The Academic Freedom Podcast is back and will hopefully release on a more regular schedule in coming months. It is still sponsored by the Academic Freedom Alliance and can be found on the same feed and at the same webpage. However, it is also now co-sponsored by the new Center for Academic Freedom and Free Speech at Yale Law School and the episodes can also be found there.

The description of the new episode:

The AFA's Keith Whittington interviews Cary Nelson, the Jubiliee Professor of Liberal Arts & Sciences Emeritus at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He served for many years in the leadership of the American Association of University Professors, including terms at its president from 2006 to 2012. He is currently chair of a new organization, the Alliance for Academic Freedom (not to be confused with the Academic Freedom Alliance). In addition to his work on American poetry, he is the author of several books on higher education, including Manifesto of a Tenured Radical from 1997 and No University is an Island from 2010. His latest book is the just published Hate Speech and Academic Freedom: The Antisemitic Assault on Basic Principles.

Subscribe to the The Academic Freedom Podcast through your favorite podcast platform so that you don't miss an episode.

Impeachment

Webinar Today on My New Book on the Impeachment Power

Hosted by the Society for the Rule of Law

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I will be doing a webinar today at noon (eastern) with Gregg Nunziata at the Society for the Rule of Law. You can register for the virtual event at here.

We will be discussing my latest book, The Impeachment Power: The Law, Politics, and Purpose of an Extraordinary Constitutional Tool, just published by Princeton University Press. From PUP's description of the book.

Drawing insights from American and British history, congressional practice, and the language of the Constitution itself, Whittington shows how impeachment is a tool for checking abuses of elective office and defending constitutional norms. While we have come to associate impeachment with the presidency, it can be used to remedy gross misconduct by an array of officers of the federal government. Whittington cautions against abusing this immense and consequential power to settle political scores, demonstrating how it undermines the independence of the branches and makes Congress the seat of political power.

From the blurbs:

"A truly exceptional contribution to the literature on impeachment. Whittington shows how impeachment is indeed about politics, but it must be a high constitutional politics that calls on elected officials to exercise the responsible judgment on which the health of democratic institutions ultimately depends. There is no doubt that this indispensable treatment of the subject will, as it should, find a wide audience in the nation's capital and beyond."—Bob Bauer, author of The Unraveling: Reflections on Politics without Ethics and Democracy in Crisis

"As presidential impeachments descend to the realm of normal politics, many Americans are asking what impeachments are really for and how they work. This is the perfect book to answer those questions: nonpartisan, historically informed, reliable, and readable. Keith Whittington has done the country a favor."—Michael W. McConnell, author of The President Who Would Not Be King: Executive Power under the Constitution

You can buy a copy for yourself -- including in audiobook form! -- right now. You can also find an earlier conversation about the book and the impeachment power with Harvard Law School's Jack Goldsmith at the Lawfare Podcast here.

Politics

Would Banning Social Media Implicate The Free Speech Clause? Or Would It Be an Age-Based Classification?

These questions relate to Skrmetti.

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During oral argument in Skrmetti, Justice Thomas disputed that the Tennessee law imposed a sex-based classification. Instead, he said, this was merely an age-based classification. Adults are able to receive certain treatment, but minors cannot. And generally, age-based classifications are reviewed for minimum rationality. For example, why do different states grant drivers licenses at 15, 16, 17, and 18 years old? Courts would never even ask such a question.

JUSTICE THOMAS: Much of your -- the latter part of your opening statement suggests that the -- well, seemed to suggest that there's an outright ban on this treatment. But that's not the case. It's really for minors. So why isn't this simply a case of age classification when it comes to these treatments as opposed to a ban, as you suggested in your opening statement?

Solicitor General Prelogar pushed back on this suggestion. She explained that when the government imposes two types of classifications (suspect and non-suspect), the courts have considered it under the suspect (or quasi-suspect) classification.

GENERAL PRELOGAR: It's certainly true, Justice Thomas, that the statute classifies based on age, but it packages that age classification with a sex restriction and says that for all adolescents, you cannot take these medications if they're inconsistent with your sex.

So I acknowledge that the State so far has not banned this care for adults, although I think that the arguments it's making that this isn't a sex-based line in the first place would equally apply in that context. But the Court has likewise made clear that when you classify on the basis of multiple characteristics, you can't avoid heightened scrutiny just because you have a non-protected characteristic that accompanies the protected one.

This exchange may have implications for another type of law. Australia banned social media for minors. Sweden is considering similar rules. I'm sure states in our country will follow suit.

How should the courts consider a categorical ban on social media for minors? Is the ban merely an age-based classification? Or does the ban violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment? To rephrase the SG's answer to Justice Thomas, what happens when an age classification is packaged with a fundamental right?

I can't recall if anyone argued that the law in Brown v. EMA was merely an age-based classification. But Ginsberg v. New York seemed to expressly countenance different speech restrictions for minor.

I'm not sure what the answer is to this question. I'll give it some thought.

Free Speech

Interesting Illustration of International Subpoenas Aimed at Identifying Alleged Online Defamers

The case indirectly involves a long and messy divorce dispute between a Korean billionaire tech CEO (chairman of the third-largest South Korean company) and the daughter of South Korea's first democratically elected President.

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From In re Ex Parte Application of Kim, decided Thursday by Judge Beth Labson Freeman (N.D. Cal.), a case involving an application filed "pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, seeking leave to take limited discovery from Google LLC" for a South Korean civil defamation case:

Ms. Kim claims that she has been the victim of cyberbullying arising from her relationship with Tae-Won Chey, with whom she lives in the Republic of Korea, where they are raising their child. For the past eight years, Mr. Chey has been involved in legal proceedings relating to his divorce from So-Yeong Roh. Mr. Chey is the Chairman of a large Korean tech conglomerate and Ms. Roh is the daughter of former South Korean president Tae-Woo Roh.

Their divorce proceedings have garnered significant publicity, and anonymous persons have published more than 100 videos on YouTube that portray Ms. Kim in a negative light. Among other things, the YouTube videos state that Ms. Kim fabricated her academic credentials and that Ms. Kim's mother was a bar hostess and the mistress of a married man.

The videos were posted anonymously on ten different YouTube channels. The persons who posted the videos appear to be native Korean speakers, and nothing in the videos suggests that they live outside of Korea. Ms. Kim has filed ten civil defamation actions in the Seoul Western District Court in Korea. Those actions have not been served, however, because Ms. Kim has not been able to discover the identities of the persons who posted the videos.

Ms. Kim asserts that the information necessary to identify the persons who posted the videos is held by YouTube's parent company, Google LLC, which maintains its principle office in Mountain View, California….

As construed by the Supreme Court, § 1782 "authorizes, but does not require" a district court to permit discovery for use in a foreign proceeding. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., (2004). "Section 1782's statutory language has been distilled to permit district courts to authorize discovery where three general requirements are satisfied: (1) the person from whom the discovery is sought 'resides or is found' in the district of the district court where the application is made; (2) the discovery is 'for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal'; and (3) the application is made by a foreign or international tribunal or 'any interested person.'"

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Free Speech

No Pseudonymity for Plaintiffs Challenging Employer's COVID-19 Protocols

"[C]ourts should not permit parties to proceed pseudonymously just to protect the parties' professional or economic life."

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In Berens v. Yale New Haven Health Servs. Corp., decided yesterday by Judge Janet Hall (D. Conn.)'s decision, Yale New Haven Health employees sued to challenge Yale New Haven's COVID-19 vaccine protocols. Those plaintiffs who sued pseudonymously apparently all received exemptions from the vaccine mandate, but "were required to submit negative COVID-19 test results each week" from mid-2021 to mid-2022. They are alleging that Yale New Haven, acting in concert with the government, violated their due process and equal protection rights.

The merits, though, aren't yet before the court; rather, the question was whether the plaintiffs could sue pseudonymously, hiding their identities from both the defendant and the public. No, the court said:

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a), "[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties[.]" This requirement "serves the vital purpose of facilitating public scrutiny of judicial proceedings and therefore cannot be set aside lightly." {"[I]dentifying the parties to [a] proceeding is an important dimension of publicness [because] [t]he people have a right to know who is using their courts."} … When determining whether pseudonyms are appropriately used, the court, in its discretion, must balance "the plaintiff's interest in anonymity … against both the public interest in disclosure and any prejudice to the defendant." …

This case involves a company policy requiring COVID-19 vaccination or testing, and, therefore, is not a highly sensitive matter. Indeed, "[t]he fact that a case involves a medical issue is not a sufficient reason for allowing the use of a fictitious name, even though many people are understandably secretive about their medical problems." …

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Free Speech

Order Unsealing Opinion Granting New Trial Based on Judge's Sexting Relationship With One of the Prosecutors

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From Judge Marco Hernandez's decision posted yesterday in U.S. v. Hernandez-Zamora (D. Alaska); for the order granting a new trial, see this other post:

On July 19, 2024, Defendant filed a motion for either dismissal of the indictment or a new trial based on misconduct by former U.S. District Court Judge Joshua Kindred and a senior Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA 1"). Prior to filing a response to Defendant's motion, the Government sought a protective order concerning confidential material it planned to disclose to defense counsel. The Court granted the motion for a protective order, and all materials that were subject to the protective order were filed under seal, including the response and reply briefs related to the motion for a new trial.

The Court ultimately granted Defendant's motion for a new trial, finding that the relationship between Judge Kindred and AUSA 1 created an appearance of impropriety in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 455. The Court's opinion, which referenced the sealed materials, was also filed under seal.

Now, Defendant … asks that the Court unseal and remove redactions from these court filings, arguing that they contain important information about judicial and prosecutorial misconduct in this case. The Government opposes Defendant's motion….

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Politics

New Trial in Case Where Judge Had Sexting Relationship With One of the Prosecutors

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From Judge Marco Hernandez's Opinion in U.S. v. Hernandez-Zamora (D. Alaska), filed Sept. 27 but just unsealed yesterday:

On May 19, 2021, Defendant Rolando Hernandez-Zamora was indicted on one count of cyberstalking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A(2)(A), (B), and 2261(b)(6).

On June 1, 2021, the matter was assigned to United States District Court Judge Joshua Kindred.

On November 19, 2021, Defendant was charged in a superseding indictment with one count of cyberstalking in violation of a protective order violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A(2)(A), (B), and 2261(b)(6).

In December 2021 Judge Kindred began texting frequently with a senior [Assistant U.S. Attorney] ("AUSA 1"), sending her "selfies," and telling her that he found her attractive. Judge Kindred also began asking AUSA 1 to send him nude photographs of herself. AUSA 1 agreed to share nude photographs of herself with Judge Kindred via the encrypted messaging app Signal, and "he agreed to delete everything." AUSA 1 then began sending Judge Kindred nude photographs. AUSA 1 also sent Judge Kindred text messages "describing how [she] would perform oral sex on him." Judge Kindred would "frequently" send AUSA 1 texts "detailing … his fantasies of performing oral sex and anilingus on [her]."

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Second Amendment Roundup: Firepower and the Fourth Circuit

The en banc court makes bizarre claims about the 5.56 mm cartridge.

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The case of Snope v. Brown has been distributed for the Supreme Court's conference for December 13.  Previously styled Bianchi v. Brown, the cert petition challenges Maryland's "assault weapon" prohibition which the Fourth Circuit upheld en banc earlier this year.

The Wall St. Journal's Editorial Board just took notice in "AR-15 Rifles and the Constitution" (Dec. 8), observing that the Fourth Circuit "second-guesses people who say they keep or bear an AR-15-style rifle for self-defense."  It concludes: "But the Second Amendment isn't an inkblot on the Constitution. It means something. Can that possibly not include a right to own the gun that claims to be America's bestselling rifle?"

Now for a deeper dive.  Essential to the majority's decision was a sadly-mistaken view of the quite ordinary ammunition that the banned rifle typically fires.

Back on March 20, the case was being argued before the Fourth Circuit en banc.  Judge Harvie Wilkinson noted that "Heller talks about M16s and the like, weapons of war," and another judge chimed in that "the AR15 is the M16."  That was the basis on which the court previously upheld the ban, which was now back in the court because the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Bruen.

Judge Wilkinson asked appellants' counsel Pete Patterson: "Have you ever fired an M-16?"  Counsel: "I have not your Honor."  Judge Wilkinson: "Well I have and we used them when I was in the Army Reserve.  That was way back, way way back."  (He served in 1968-69.)  Judge Wilkinson went on to state:

And when we took shots at the targets, wherever we hit, there was nothing left, the kick was so powerful that when the bullets hit the human beings, it splintered them into all sorts of little pieces, there was very little left of the human being, and that was a very earlier model of the M16, and since then it's been perfected, and perfected, and perfected into an even more lethal weapon than the ones that I used.

Actually, both back then and now, the M16 (like most AR-15s) fires the relatively-underpowered 5.56 mm cartridge.  It has very little kick.  And while obviously the 5.56 can be lethal, in no way does it even come close to "splintering" a human into "little pieces."  It won't even do that to a squirrel.

While the rhetoric was toned down when the en banc decision was issued on August 6, what it said would still make any person familiar with firearms wonder what planet the court is on.  But first let's conduct a reality check on the characteristics of different higher-powered and lower-powdered rifle cartridges.

For over a century, millions of American deer hunters have chosen the .30-06 round.  That is what our Armed Forces used in the M1903 bolt action rifle and the M-1 Garand semiautomatic rifle.  The .308 or 7.62 cartridge, which the military used in the M-14 rifle, perhaps became the most popular deer round for a time.  There are numerous other rounds on the market of equal or better take-down power, such as the 6.5 Creedmoor.

In 1950, the .222 Remington cartridge was developed for varmint hunting.  It evolved into the .223 Remington round, which in turn became the basis of the 5.56 mm cartridge adopted by the military for use in the M16 and favored by many target competitors.  Neither round is preferred by deer hunters, as most loads are too underpowered to harvest big game.

Maryland game regulations require that rifles used for deer hunting must use ammunition developing a muzzle energy of at least 1,200 foot pounds.  A typical 5.56 with a normal 55 grain bullet generates 1,223 ft.-lbs. of muzzle energy.  By contrast, a. 308 round with a 150-grain bullet fires with 2,648 ft.-lbs. of muzzle energy, over double that of the 5.56.

As is plain to see, the power of the .223/5.56 round isn't much to speak of compared to typical hunting rounds.  It is so underpowered that the Armed Forces are replacing its 5.56 M16 and M4 rifles with a new 6.8 x 51 mm round (the XM7) which has muzzle energy of 2,267 ft-lbs with a 135 grain bullet.

Now to the decision in Bianchi, authored by Judge Wilkinson.  On cartridge power, it includes a single long paragraph with citations to five district court opinions and a Washington Post article, but no expert sources.  It begins: "The firepower of the AR-15 and M16 is a key component of their 'phenomenal lethality.'" They are "[b]uilt to generate 'maximum wound effect' and to pierce helmets and body armor…."  You can't have it both ways.  Maximizing the wound size requires a bullet with a soft nose or hollow point that expands.  Piercing a helmet or armor requires a bullet with a steel core or other hard metal that will not expand.

Instead of comparing other rifle cartridges with the underpowered 5.56/.223, the court compares this rifle cartridge with handgun cartridges.  Supposedly "AR-15 bullets discharge at around 'three times the velocity of a typical handgun….'" What is a "typical" handgun?  What are your calculations?  Are you aware that rifles in the AR-15 configuration come in many calibers, including as small as .22 rimfire?

"These higher velocity rounds 'hit fast and penetrate deep into the body,' creating severe damage," continues the court.  Most bullets from most firearms have that potential.  The court adds that an AR-15 bullet "yaws" or "turns sideways" in tissue, rotating and creating a large, "temporary cavity" or "blast wave" that can be "up to 11-12.5 times larger than the bullet itself"; that is known as "cavitation."   That's from another district court opinion, not a scientific study.  And it is oblivious to the fact that more powerful rifle rounds would have much more devastating effect.  But that doesn't justify banning the rifles that fire them.

This is a complex subject, and the court just didn't do any real homework.  Dr. Martin Fackler, military trauma surgeon and former director of the Army's Wound Ballistics Laboratory, wrote in the Annals of Emergency Medicine: "The most common misconception about gunshot wound treatment is that the penetration of any 'high-velocity' bullet causes enigmatic 'shock waves' and cavitation that will doom tissues even far from the bullet path."

Regarding rounds fired from the M16, Dr. Fackler wrote in Wound Ballistic Review that "most often the bullet travels about five inches through flesh before beginning significant yaw. But about 15% of the time, it travels much farther than that before yawing – in which case it causes even milder wounds, if it misses bones, guts, lung, and major blood vessels."  In Vietnam, it was found that many bullets passed through torsos "traveling mostly point forward, and caused minimal damage."

The Bianchi court next inappropriately compares wounds from rifles to those from handguns.  It asserts that a "typical 9mm [bullet] wound to the liver" from a Glock 19 handgun "will produce a pathway of tissue destruction in the order of one inch to two inches," but an AR-15 wound "will literally pulverize the liver, perhaps best described as dropping a watermelon onto concrete."  Hyperbole aside, a .30-08 deer rifle round would cause much more injury.  Again, should deer rifles be banned?

While we're comparing rifles to handguns, consider the 7.62 x 39 full metal jacket round used in the AK-47 (which Maryland bans) and the SKS (not banned).  Dr. Fackler notes that it "does not deform in tissue and travels about 26 cm [10.2 inches] before beginning to yaw. This explains the clinical finding that most wounds caused by this bullet resemble those made by much lower velocity handgun bullets."

Bianchi tells us that the "catastrophic" damage of AR-15 rounds leaves "multiple organs shattered," bones "exploded," and "soft tissue absolutely destroyed," which "often cannot be repaired" by trauma surgeons.  That potential exists for wounds from shots fired from firearms of almost any kind.

A cartridge does not care what type of firearm fires it.  A .223 round fired from an AR-15 will cause exactly the same wound as one fired from a single-shot rifle that Maryland does not ban.  Yet the Bianchi court seeks to justify the ban on certain rifles based on the wounding potential of the cartridge they fire when countless other rifles fire exactly the same cartridge.  Presumably all rifles that fire this cartridge, not to mention all that fire more powerful cartridges, may be banned.  That would be most rifles other than the .22 rimfire.

Descriptions of wounds in the most gory manner possible to justify a gun ban loses sight of the fact that the Second Amendment protects "arms," which include "any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another."  (Heller, quoting Timothy Cunningham's 1771 legal dictionary.)  That criminals injure and kill innocents with arms is reason for innocents to have arms, not to ban them.

There is much more to the Bianchi's majority opinion, and Judge Richardson (joined by four other judges) does an able job in refuting the arguments.  As a side note, he knows about firearms, writing: "Speaking from experience, many hog hunters deploy the exact weapons that Maryland bans, including the AR-15."

David Kopel's post on this blog from last year – "How powerful are AR rifles?" – provides a detailed review of the issues herein.  At a more general level, my book America's Rifle: The Case for the AR-15 discusses the broader, historical context of the issue.

Free Speech

Challengers Have Standing to Challenge Connecticut "Harassment" Ban for Lawyers

The Second Circuit holds that the challengers sufficiently alleged that the ban is broad enough to cover their constitutionally protected speech (including speech that may offend some based on gender identity, race, religion, and more); the court didn't reach the question whether the ban actually violates the First Amendment, which the trial court will now have to take up.

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In Cerame v. Slack, decided today by the Second Circuit, Chief Judge Debra Ann Livingston, joined by Judges Walker and Sullivan, concluded that plaintiffs had standing to challenge Connecticut bar rule 8.4(7), which provides,

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to … (7) Engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, color, ancestry, sex, pregnancy, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, status as a veteran, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or marital status in conduct related to the practice of law. This paragraph does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation, or to provide advice, assistance or advocacy consistent with these Rules.

The court elaborated on the scope of the ban:

Commentary to Rule 8.4 defines discrimination to "include[ ] harmful verbal or physical conduct directed at an individual or individuals that manifests bias or prejudice on the basis of one or more of the protected categories." Harassment is defined to "include[ ] severe or pervasive derogatory or demeaning verbal or physical conduct."

In addition, while previous Commentary to Rule 8.4 specified that attorneys were subject to discipline for misconduct "in the course of representing a client," the current Commentary to Rule 8.4 broadly defines "conduct related to the practice of law," as used in Rule 8.4(7)'s text, as follows:

Conduct related to the practice of law includes representing clients; interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers and others while engaged in the practice of law; operating or managing a law firm or law practice; and participating in bar association, business or professional activities or events in connection with the practice of law.

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