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Would Banning Social Media Implicate The Free Speech Clause? Or Would It Be an Age-Based Classification?
These questions relate to Skrmetti.
During oral argument in Skrmetti, Justice Thomas disputed that the Tennessee law imposed a sex-based classification. Instead, he said, this was merely an age-based classification. Adults are able to receive certain treatment, but minors cannot. And generally, age-based classifications are reviewed for minimum rationality. For example, why do different states grant drivers licenses at 15, 16, 17, and 18 years old? Courts would never even ask such a question.
JUSTICE THOMAS: Much of your -- the latter part of your opening statement suggests that the -- well, seemed to suggest that there's an outright ban on this treatment. But that's not the case. It's really for minors. So why isn't this simply a case of age classification when it comes to these treatments as opposed to a ban, as you suggested in your opening statement?
Solicitor General Prelogar pushed back on this suggestion. She explained that when the government imposes two types of classifications (suspect and non-suspect), the courts have considered it under the suspect (or quasi-suspect) classification.
GENERAL PRELOGAR: It's certainly true, Justice Thomas, that the statute classifies based on age, but it packages that age classification with a sex restriction and says that for all adolescents, you cannot take these medications if they're inconsistent with your sex.
So I acknowledge that the State so far has not banned this care for adults, although I think that the arguments it's making that this isn't a sex-based line in the first place would equally apply in that context. But the Court has likewise made clear that when you classify on the basis of multiple characteristics, you can't avoid heightened scrutiny just because you have a non-protected characteristic that accompanies the protected one.
This exchange may have implications for another type of law. Australia banned social media for minors. Sweden is considering similar rules. I'm sure states in our country will follow suit.
How should the courts consider a categorical ban on social media for minors? Is the ban merely an age-based classification? Or does the ban violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment? To rephrase the SG's answer to Justice Thomas, what happens when an age classification is packaged with a fundamental right?
I can't recall if anyone argued that the law in Brown v. EMA was merely an age-based classification. But Ginsberg v. New York seemed to expressly countenance different speech restrictions for minor.
I'm not sure what the answer is to this question. I'll give it some thought.
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"what happens when an age classification is packaged with a fundamental right?"
Ask any second amendment scholar.
So Ltbf, you agree with Biden's Solicitor General? Good that you can do that, painful as it must have been.
I find it difficult to conceive of a social media restriction as a constraint on free speech. There are many, many platforms that are regulated by the government that I (as an adult) have no access to whatsoever (such as the bandwidths regulated and licensed by the FCC to major television and radio networks.) And of course I have no right to express myself on private platforms such as the pages of the New York Times. And, importantly, this is not a content-based restriction; it applies to all content equally. And it does not restrict minors (or anyone) from point-to-point communications, or one-to-many communications (books, plays, movies, tv, radio, newspapers, flyers, billboards, videos, etc.)
I have no idea how it would be enforced, however.
Can you define "social media" in a way that is content-neutral?
I won't claim to any definitive conclusions on the question, but I think it will be tricky to distinguish services like Twitter and Facebook from services like YouTube and TikTok (if that is the sort of distinction we'd want to draw) without referring somehow to the manner in which the services engage with their users and the kinds of activities that users participate in. More to the point, what kinds of harms do we think these services are exposing our kids to? Is a restriction that draws the line between Twitter and TikTok really serving that purpose?
There is also, at least, a non-trivial argument that we have First Amendment rights to what might be described as "instrumentalities of speech," which comes up when we're talking about the right to record police activities in public. I'm not sure we can easily walk past the argument that teens have a right to engage with others via services that enable communication not otherwise feasible.
It's a challenging and frustrating situation. I think there's a growing sentiment that our online addictions (including leaving comments on Reason!) are not contributing to our mental health, possibly infecting our politics, and making us generally unhappy. The kids coming up now seem different and unable to engage with the real world constructively the same way that older, pre-social media generations can. I, personally, miss slow media and being disconnected. But I'm not sure what we can do about that but hope for voluntary change by individuals.
"Can you define "social media" in a way that is content-neutral?"
It's been done, no need to reinvent the wheel. Go look up what other countries and industry groups have used as definitions and choose.
"I think it will be tricky to distinguish services . . . without referring somehow to the manner in which the services engage with their users and the kinds of activities that users participate in."
This is a limitation that appears only in your mind. Legislators are in fact free to refer somehow to the manner in which services engage with their users, the kinds of activities that users participate in, both, or neither.
"But I'm not sure what we can do about that but hope for voluntary change by individuals."
We could use the sovereign powers of the United States to create laws and regulations. That's a thing we can do. Whether we should is another question, but flailing around whining that it's impossible isn't helpful or accurate.
It's been done, ...
I won't ask for a link, but it would be helpful to understand what specific regulatory regime you have in mind, so that I can respond appropriately.
For instance - I can review one apparently relevant regime (left unnamed, to annoy you) which does, indeed, define the relevant term in a content-neutral way - but also rather capaciously.
Which is fine! But the point I was making was specifically about what we conventionally refer to as social media. The term this regulation uses encompasses any hosting service that disseminates information upon request. I don't know how you distinguish "social media" from other services that do that, without referring to what people are saying on them.
If the answer is: we shouldn't try! Sure, fine, we could regulate all the services. But this regulatory regime gets into compelled and censored speech, so that would be another issue if implemented here.
Whether that's the one you're thinking of, who knows.
I think a number of cases - Tinker comes to mind, but also Ginsberg v. New York - establish that minors have First Amendment rights, but not as many as adults.
Indeed seems to me that are enough First Amendment as applied to minors cases that it already forms its own distinctive body of law with its own distinctive standards, and there is no need to graft standards from however Skrmetti gets decided onto them.
Tinker sets a lower First Amendment standard for minors IN SCHOOL than for adults. Tinker is very specifically and explicitly about the school context. It leaves the First Amendment rights of minors outside of school at the same level as adults.
Ginsberg is kindof weird, but the whole area of sex/porn is kindof weird, and I'd be surprised to see it generalized to non-sexual content.
So I think the analysis of a hypothesized ban on all social media use by minors really doesn't hinge on the "by minors" part at all. Would a ban on all social media use by adults satisfy First Amendment scrutiny? Of course not. Does limiting the ban to minors affect the First Amendment analysis? I would argue that under existing doctrine the answer is no, and I doubt the courts will change that now.
As is often the case, when there is a series of cases on an issue, one side thinks there is an underlying principle that can be extended to other contexts, while the other side thinks each case is its own sui generis exception that doesn’t have to be considered when formulating a general rule.
This has happened many times in judicial history. The history of the religion cases, the privacy cases, and others all reflect this tension.
If seems to me that Bostock does not necessarily extend to Skrmetti. As Alito noted, it’s a statutory interpretation rule, not a constitutional one.
More fundamentally, it seems there are plausible scientific or ideological arguments that people do virtually everything they do because of their sex. People rape, they may choose their vocation, they may do a great many things based on motivations that are in some underlying biological way sexual in nature. If people choose a vocation that they think will better help them find a mate or a date, are they choosing their vocation because of their sex? I don’t see why, under Bostock, they couldn’t be said to be doing so.
I generally disfavor arguments that statutes are vague. Nothing human is perfect, no language is completely unambiguous, and boundaries can be drawn. But when society is in strong disagreement about what sex means and a court extends sex from physical biology to behavior by saying it is obvious from the text that this or that behavior is inherently based on sex, it seems to me one has to examine whether it’s really so obvious. Indeed, if sex is a social construct, then what a judge thinks is obvious counts no more than what anybody else thinks is obvious.
Perhaps Justice Gorsuch, like Justice Potter Stuart, knows it when he sees it. But who gave either the authority to dictate what sex must mean to others based solely on the strength of their own personal convictions?
Having a chromosomal disorder (anything other than XX or XY) is a genetic condition that should be afforded tremendous latitude in terms of whatever treatment is required to help that person live a normal life.
Gender dysphoria is not a medical condition, but rather a psychological one. It occurs in individuals possessing perfectly healthy male and female bodies. As such, persons who suffer from this condition should receive whatever psychological treatment they require. But, as with other mental health conditions, it does not follow that the individual's conceptions of their state require an outside observer to join in their perceptions. A male body is still a male body, no matter what is done to it. A female body the same. The CT scans done recently on Egyptian mummies can tell us, with absolute certainty, the sex of those inside the wrapping. Skeletons do not lie. But we can have no idea how those persons perceived themselves.
The law speaks to sex, not gender.
"Gender dysphoria is not a medical condition, but rather a psychological one."
I'm not so sure there's actually a sharp dividing line between medical and psychological conditions. The brain IS an organ, after all, and a lot of psychological conditions are actually due to 'hardware' malfunctions, not 'software'.
In fact, it's hard to see why gender dysphoria would be so intransigent if it didn't have a biological basis in brain anatomy.
There could be hope for you, Brett. Perhaps gender identity is a trait, every bit as real as sex, even when the two disagree?
Sure, of course it is. Just like thinking you only have one leg, and that thing coming off your other hip is an alien growth, is a trait.
Paranoia is a trait, too. Do we tell paranoids that we're really out to get them?
My own Asperger's is a trait, and is perfectly real. I'd likely have been a much happier person if it hadn't taken me a half century to understand human relationships well enough to enjoy something like a normal life.
Sometimes traits are disease states. That's not a slam against people who are saddled with those traits.
There aren't enough people who think they have only one leg to make it a trait (so no, to the one-leg analogy). Paranoia is believed to be environmental, not genetic. Additionally, effective treatment does not include accepting the parnoia as real. I'll give you that Asperger's is a trait. But, the treatment isn't to affirm the trait.
Gender identity stands alone as a trait whose associated disease (gender dysphoria) is most often treated by affirming one's mis-matched gender identity.
Right. And we might add that it is alone among dysphorias in being 'treated' that way. We certainly don't assure anorexics that they're fat, and offer them bariatric surgery!
The question is, SHOULD it be treated differently in that way? Or is the reasoning that leads to all other dysphorias being treated differently valid, and the current treatment of gender dysphoria a political/ideologically motivated malpractice?
The question is, SHOULD it be treated differently in that way?
You don't think treating as a delusion has been tried? We treat it the way that works.
According to the studies I've seen, treating it as a delusion actually had as good a psychological outcome as humoring it, (Not great, just 'as good'.) and a better clinical outcome in as much as it didn't involve surgical mutilation.
That's why the first countries to try out the humoring approach have largely given up on it: Given a choice between a treatment that doesn't work, and is largely harmless, and a treatment that doesn't work and has severe side effects, ethical doctors prefer the former.
Citations? And note, my claim wasn't about minors.
Queuing up epistemic closure....
Correction of a Key Study: No Evidence of “Gender-Affirming” Surgeries Improving Mental Health
"Original Study by Bränström & Pachankis (2019)
...
While the authors found no evidence of benefits of hormonal treatments (adjusted odds ratio=1.01, 95% CI=0.98 - 1.03), they noted a statistically significant relationship between time since surgery and mental health status (adjusted odds ratio=0.92, 95% CI=0.87 - 0.98). Specifically, the researchers observed that as of 2015, patients who had surgeries further in the past had better mental health than patients whose surgeries were more recent. This “longitudinal association between gender-affirming surgery and reduced likelihood of mental health treatment” was interpreted by the authors as the evidence of a positive, time-release-like effect of “gender-affirming” surgery. The authors opined that this finding should “lend support to the decision to provider gender-affirming surgeries to transgender individuals who seek them.” The conclusions of the study were widely publicized by mass media outlets. The study also made a rapid and significant impact on clinical and public health education."
"Vigorous Debate Leads to Correction of Key Finding
After the study was published, many researchers and scientists (including some SEGM advisors) alerted the AJP to multiple serious methodological problems that challenged the study’s conclusion. In response, the AJP editor requested an independent statistical review of the data, which led to a reanalysis of the data and an official correction (2,3). When gender dysphoric patients who received surgeries were compared to those who did not have surgeries, there was no statistically significant difference in their mental health utilization (Figure 1).
Nine months after the study’s original publication, the AJP stated, “the results [of the reanalysis] demonstrated no advantage of surgery in relation to subsequent mood or anxiety disorder-related health care visits or prescriptions or hospitalizations following suicide attempts”"
A Teen Gender-Care Debate Is Spreading Across Europe
"As Republicans across the U.S. intensify their efforts to legislate against transgender rights, they are finding aid and comfort in an unlikely place: Western Europe, where governments and medical authorities in at least five countries that once led the way on gender-affirming treatments for children and adolescents are now reversing course, arguing that the science undergirding these treatments is unproven, and their benefits unclear.
The about-face by these countries concerns the so-called Dutch protocol, which has for at least a decade been viewed by many clinicians as the gold-standard approach to care for children and teenagers with gender dysphoria. Kids on the protocol are given medical and mental-health assessments; some go on to take medicines that block their natural puberty and, when they’re older, receive cross-sex hormones and eventually surgery. But in Finland, Sweden, France, Norway, and the U.K., scientists and public-health officials are warning that, for some young people, these interventions may do more harm than good."
Your second link concerns minors. Your first link is a single study.
This link highlights scores of studies (the above one is not among them), most of which support the efficacy of gender-affirming care in adults.
Just to chime in along with Josh. There's really no question that gender affirming care is effective in adults. There are tons of studies over decades and decades. This isn't a a new treatment.
That's why the first countries to try out the humoring approach have largely given up on it...
No they haven't! You're confusing adults with minors.
Gender affirming treatments should be reserved for cases that are likely to benefit from them. It does seem like such cases were overdiagnosed over the past 10 years or so as a backlash against right-wingers' persecution attempts, especially among minors. That'll make the treatments seem statistically less effective. But the pendulum seems to be swinging back in the right direction.
The best outcome will happen when trans issues drop out of the news again, so treatment decisions aren't as clouded by culture war concerns. But that will require conservatives to shut up about it. I don't see that happening, it's been such a good wedge issue for them.
"No they haven't! You're confusing adults with minors."
Adults are entitled to do all sorts of things that have no medical basis, and rightfully so. The only question with adults is who pays, really.
95% of the argument has been about minors all along.
Exactly right. There is no element of *blame* here with respect to gender dysphoria. But if one takes the "if it's in the brain, it must be a medical condition" argument to its logical conclusion, it becomes a hyper-materialist argument that rules out love on the one hand, and moral turpitude on the other.
No, I think at the level of the brain we can make a "hardware" vs "software" distinction, even if thinking is entirely a biological process.
if one takes the "if it's in the brain, it must be a medical condition" argument to its logical conclusion
You're not taking it to its logical conclusion. You're shearing it of all nuance. The solution is, don't do that. The brain is nuanced.
The plaintiffs are not claiming to have a disability, and their argument is in no way a medical one. It is based on the Bostock standard that applies to behavior that need have nothing to do with anything medical.
Bostock applies to biological men who decide to wear womens’ clothing or do anything else traditionally associated with femaleness for larks the same way it applies to those who decide to do so for any other reason. Noyhing to do with any medical argument. And the arguments the plaintiffs are using do the same.
I sometimes wonder what the point of defeating the ERA was. Who knew at the time that the courts weren't going to let it matter?
You could check the arguments of the folks pushing to ratify it still:
https://www.eracoalition.org/uploads/2023/05/Common-Legal-Questions-January-2023.pdf
If seems to me that Bostock does not necessarily extend to Skrmetti. As Alito noted, it’s a statutory interpretation rule, not a constitutional one.
They call this a "distinction without a difference." Or, as I'm sure we'll learn over the next couple of decades, "judicial conservatives' favorite method for introducing doctrinal incoherence to a body of established law in order to serve narrow political objectives."
The statutory/constitutional distinction is meaningless. The question is why the logic behind determining whether discrimination against trans people constitutes discrimination "on the basis of sex," in the context of Bostock, wouldn't similarly apply when determining the extent to which the Equal Protection Clause places restrictions on the state's ability to craft laws around sex-based distinctions. Alito says, "just because." That's not really a reason.
Consider:
A state requires employers to provide paid maternity/paternity leave to their employees, but specifically requires more leave to be provided to mothers, based on the expectation that they typically have greater medical issues post-birth. Would that be constitutionally defensible? (I assume yes, though I wouldn't be surprised if the question has been asked and answered by the courts somewhere.)
Now consider: citing some putative concern about how HRT might negatively impact the pregnancies of trans men, the state specifically provides that pregnant trans men are not entitled to expanded "maternity" leave, and goes further to withhold state support (via Medicaid and other public health programs) for trans men seeking to become pregnant.
Constitutionally speaking, how should we evaluate that distinction? Longer maternity leave for bio-women (a term I'm using because I know "AFAB" will be triggering) might be constitutionally defensible because it serves an important governmental interest (in the health and recovery of pregnant bio-mothers) in a way that is substantially related to that interest (by giving them more paid leave to recover). Trans men under this regime would be entitled to less expansive paternity leave. The only reason they're not entitled to longer "maternity" leave is based on some putative concern about whether their otherwise being on HRT could negatively impact a pregnancy - which, if anything, would counsel in favor of providing more leave and recovery time. This is a distinction based solely on the bio-sex and current gender identity of the trans men.
Should a distinction drawn on those lines be subject to no more than rational basis scrutiny?
It's not the fact that one is based on a statute and one is based on the constitution that's relevant; it's that the wording of the statute and the wording of the constitution are different, and therefore a decision relying on the former does not necessarily apply to the latter.
I didn’t assert that Bostock applied. I am asking why the reasoning behind concluding that discriminating “on the basis of sex” encompasses discriminating on the basis of gender identity and sexuality shouldn’t similarly apply when determining what constitutes a sex-based classification sufficient to trigger intermediate scrutiny under the EPC.
Was that not clear?
Is it not clear that the Constitution doesn't say anything at all about "on the basis of sex," and that "shall not deny anyone the equal protection of the laws" is not obviously coterminous with "shall not discriminate on the basis of sex"?
Hasn't precedent established that discrimination on the basis of sex is subject to intermediate scrutiny?
It HAS been established that the judiciary decided to render not ratifying the ERA futile, anyway.
If your complaint is that sex-based distinctions shouldn’t be subject to intermediate scrutiny under the EPC because nothing in the constitutional text says so, fine.
But I am asking questions about the law as it is. I have been clear throughout my comments that I’ve been talking about reasoning applied to a body of case law interpreting the EPC, not how one would interpret the text as a matter of construction.
You've been asking questions about how the jurisprudence is.
No, Goober, the law as it is.
Whatever asinine point you think you’re making by talking about “jurisprudence” as opposed to “law,” it’s wrong.
Let’s suppose they are the same. The statute expressly permits single-sex schools but not single-race schools, and has a standard for workplace sex discrimination lower than for race discrimination which contains exceptions that some businesses (Hooters is notable) have passed, with discrimination permitted by the courts.
Is it your view that the constitution draws these same detailed distinctions, standards, and boundaries as the statute? In cases where the constitutional standard for government organizations is higher than the statutory one, and there are a few, are you saying it should be lowered?
The statute at issue in Bostock was Title VII of the Civil Rights Act which addresses employment, not schools. I'm not sure a court has ever held that Hooters doesn't violate Title VII. But if they did, it would be on the basis that female-only servers are a BFOQ (bona fide occupational qualification).
That being said, the relief plantiffs are asking for in this case is not to invalidate the law. It is instead to remand the case with instructions to use intermediate scrutiny to decide whether the law survives. So, there is no argument about whether the standard for the statute (BFOQ) is the same as the constitution (intermediate scrutiny). It's only that there is sex discrimination in both cases that require further anaylsis.
You’ve ignored my entire comment and are asking an irrelevant question.
The only point I am making here is that a statutory distinction made on the basis of one’s gender identity is a sex-based classification for constitutional purposes, for the same reasons that “on the basis of sex” in the statutes is interpreted to include aspects of a person that are treated differently depending on the underlying biological sex of the person (specifically, gender expression or identity, and sexual orientation).
Is having more bathrooms for women than men, as many building codes these days require, constutionally defensible?
Remind me: Are 'transmen' the women pretending to be men, or the men pretending to be women? I'd guess the latter, since you're contrasting them with "bio-women", which is to say, "women", but your later discussion about them getting pregnant and negative effects on pregnancy from hormone therapy suggest the latter.
Of course, this terminology is intended to be confusing, that's the point of it, but just so we can actually discuss this, would you clear up this point? Do "trans men" have Y chromosomes?
Yes, I understood that some of you would be too triggered to think straight.
I'm not particularly "triggered", that would imply some sort of emotional reaction. I'm just confused, and want some clarity, and the terminology seems designed to destroy, not provide, clarity.
Intentionally, I suspect, an exercise in Orwellian newspeak.
You understood what I was saying, in context. Your “confusion” results from your steadfast resistance to employing language that trans people use to refer to themselves, and you are spinning out this digression for no reason other than to exercise it more.
You’re not a serious person, Goober.
Yeah, my steadfast refusal to say that I see five fingers.
So brave, Goobs.
It will be brave when you have a cage with a rat strapped to my face, or electrodes taped to my genitals. As it is, no bravery required, just a lack of interest in lying for your cause.
Whatever you say, Goobs.
It is notable, Brett, that you're passionate about a whole bunch of things, to the point of a lot of moral myopia. Plenty of antipathy for lots of people and groups.
But performative assholery only comes up with trans people.
" Plenty of antipathy for lots of people and groups."
Says the guy calling people assholes.
Count me amongst the antipathetic towards assholes!
Another self-hating asshole!
Normally, "trans men" mean XX people who want to be recognized as men. But SimonP can't use language any better than he can use logic.
You’re responding to the dope feigning utter confusion over the term you easily understood.
Transwomen are biological men (and vice versa).
He didn't actually need reminding. Gullible.
"Transwomen are biological men..."
That's a matter of dispute.
More accurately, trans women's genotype and phenotype are male (almost all of the time), but their cerebrotype is female and cerebrotype likely has some significant biological basis.
This assumes that there is such thing as "cerebrotype." (I mean, it's an existing word in biology, but it doesn't mean what you're using it to mean.)
Of course my argument rests on that belief. But as I have argued many times, the evidence for that belief is 1) hundreds of thousands of Americans being trans and 2) for those who have gender dysphoria, the most effective treatment is most often to affirm their gender idenity (i.e, to affirm the existence of cerebrotype).
"Longer maternity leave for bio-women (a term I'm using because I know "AFAB" will be triggering)"
Huh? Do you think it would be constitutional to deny maternity leave to women who conceived and bore a child, but were assigned male at birth?
Not the scenario I'd been considering, but we could specify that, under the hypothetical regime, trans men would be denied extended "maternity" leave for the reasons I'd stated, while trans women would also be denied extended leave (i.e., they'd only be entitled to ordinary "paternity" leave), since they don't need to recover from the physical ordeal of pregnancy and childbirth.
I'm also not focused on whether the distinctions would be constitutional. The question is whether they ought to be evaluated as sex-based classifications, for constitutional purposes.
It strikes me that if the law only extended maternity leave to biological women, and limited biological men to paternity leave, this would be perfectly reasonable, since only biological women can get pregnant. (Without exotic and life threatening medical interventions, anyway.)
Nobody is going to specifically deny "trans men", (Biological women who pretend to be men.) pregnancy leave. Just not happening.
Trans advocates won't, because they'll insist that 'trans men' are just men, and don't need a specific policy. And if they do advocate for a specific policy, it would be to have it both ways, and give them the pregnancy leave.
Trans opponents wont, because they'll insist on framing the policy in terms of biological reality, and not claims of 'trans' status; They won't CARE that the women are claiming to be men.
I’m not engaging with you on this, Goober.
You’re fighting the hypothetical and answering the wrong question anyway.
I'm rejecting the hypothetical as contrary to what we know of the participants.
What the fuck are you talking about, Goobs? It was my hypothetical. There isn’t anyone to talk about besides the people I described.
Go stick your dick in a pickle jar. It’ll be more productive than what you’re doing here.
Leave based on pregnancy is disability-based.
Beyond that, parental leave has no need to distinguish between men and women.
Really, the only question here is whether we'll get ideologically based contra-biological definitions of "pregnancy" to go along with the ideologically based contra-biological definitions of "gender". The days when you could say "man" or "woman" in a law, and count on the judiciary or bureaucrats not treating "man" as including some women, or "women" as including some men, are past.
A similar development with regards to 'pregnancy' can't be ruled out.
Well, since Simon brought up sex assigned at birth, I'm wonder if he thinks, to the extent that "sex assigned at birth" is distinct from "sex", that members of the female sex can be denied maternity leave if they were assigned male at birth.
Simon says he avoided using "AFAB" because it might be triggering, but a better reason to avoid using it might be that it's less applicable to the situation then "female" (or "bio-women").
And for those who feel strongly about addressing people with preferred terminology, many women object to being referred to as non-transgender women, or cisgender women, and prefer to just be referred to as women.
At the same time, many trans "women" identify as biologically female.
ISTM that whatever term we choose to refer to real, legit women, men with gender dysphoria will try to include themselves in that term. And people who want to distinguish between women and men with gender dysphoria will have to figure out a new category to make the distinction, which the dysphoric men will want to be included in.
"At the same time, many trans "women" identify as biologically female."
So. Freaking. What.
They can identify as Emperor of the United States for all I care.
ISTM you are begging the question on what "women" means.
If you refuse to follow the lunatics down the rabbit hole, obviously you're going to have little tolerance for Humpty Dumpty, down at the bottom of it, paying words to mean crazy stuff.
"ISTM you are begging the question on what "women" means."
No I'm not. My argument doesn't depend on what we call women.
However, the begging the question fallacy comes up often in this topic with the use of the term "misgendering". And if one of your main concepts is based on a fallacy, it's time to start questioning the rest of your framework.
I didn't say it did. What I said was your concept of the what the word "women" refers to, those who are "real, legit," begs the question. That is, you have already concluded (regardless of what terms we use) that trans women aren't "real, legit women."
"I didn't say it did."
Then maybe you don't get what begging the question is.
"That is, you have already concluded (regardless of what terms we use) that trans women aren't "real, legit women.""
Sure. That's my characterization, but not my argument. You are free to disagree.
Your argument was "men with gender dysphoria" (your terminology) will always want to be referred to in the same way that "legit women" (again, your terminology) are referred to (*). And, that's a bad thing in your view. ISTM, your conclusion (it's a bad thing) is based on your assumption that trans women aren't legit women. Thus, you have begged the question.
(*) I don't think your claim is even correct. We already have "cis women" and "trans women" that distinguishes the two cases. Many cis women don't like it, but I think trans women do.
No, I think “AFAB” and “AMAB” are terms designed to describe gender identity assigned at birth, and operate as an indirect way to refer to “biological sex,” which is a term that trans folk find uncomfortable in the same way that fags like me find “homosexual” off-putting and women sometimes resent being referred to as “females.”
I don’t take any particular view on whether it would be constitutional to deny trans people extended maternity leave, while permitting them ordinary paternity leave. My point in this thread has only been to say that any such denial would constitute a sex-based distinction subject to intermediate scrutiny, which is a point Alito seems to dispute.
Even talking about "gender identity assigned at birth" is to use the nonsensical trans framing.
1. Newborns don't HAVE "gender identities", they're about as close to neuter in terms of their identities as humans get. They have biological sexes.
2. Doctors don't assign biological sex at birth, 'assignment' is a discretionary activity. They record the anatomical correlates of biological sex, which in nearly all cases is an accurate guide to that biological sex.
The term 'assign' is used by trans advocates to pretend that what doctors record at birth is somehow arbitrary.
Not engaging with you on this, Goobs.
"No, I think “AFAB” and “AMAB” are terms designed to describe gender identity assigned at birth, and operate as an indirect way to refer to “biological sex,”"
Gender identity assigned at birth? No one is claiming that there is any attempt to assign to the baby its sense of identity with respect to societal gender roles. What they are doing is observing the baby's sex.
I agree that sex assigned at birth is an indirect way to refer to sex, but why not refer to sex directly? Why place an observation at a particular time ahead of the observed quality itself? Especially since, when there is a discrepancy between the two, it's likely that the latter will be dispositive.
I refer to “gender identity” at birth because I’m inclined to agree that biological “sex” doesn’t change, so it doesn’t make sense to distinguish between one’s “sex” at birth and one’s “sex” later on. You’re male or female, or you have some chromosomal condition that makes your sex indeterminate.
I don’t much care for this nit-picking over the word “assign.” Nothing is directly perceived without the mediation of thought and judgment. Even if all you’re doing is assigning sex or gender identity based on a simple observation of external reproductive organs, you have to understand what you’re looking at and what you call it.
Why bother with talk of assigning at all? As you say, in order to assign something, you have to understand what you're looking for.
So what's the distinction between someone's sex, and someone's sex assigned at a particular time, be it birth, prior to birth, or throughout the person's life?
And to the extent that there is a distinction, what's so special about sex assigned at birth?
Are you being deliberately obtuse? This isn't that hard to understand.
"AFAB" and "AMAB" are terms that have proven useful as people in the trans/NB community (and their allies) otherwise lack terminology that grasps what we're trying to describe. A person who is biologically male but later comes out as NB or trans has features or experiences that we might want to refer to generically, but it is difficult to do so succinctly. "AMAB" serves that purpose, and is (for now) typically accepted by the trans/NB communities as inoffensive. So, its conventional use is spreading.
All the "but what about" responses I'm getting are beside any point I came here to make and tedious anyways. "Assign" vs. "record" is a semantic distinction that is irrelevant anyway. "What does it mean to refer to one's sex at birth" is disputing a metaphysical question when we are essentially in agreement on what sex is.
Biological sex is fixed. You're born with the chromosomes that make you the way that you are, and your body doesn't its apparent sex without surgical alteration. I don't care to entertain or defend extremists who assert otherwise for transparently ideological reasons.
Gender identity is socially contingent and learned over time. Calling a baby a "boy" or "girl" at birth typically begins that process - it determines what we name the child, what types of clothing we start putting on it, the colors we use in their environment, the toys we buy them, the way we present them to others. Some kids and adults later come to find the gender identity they've been raised with no longer feels "right," somehow, and they cast about for alternative approaches.
That's all it is. It's really not hard at all to understand. The only people who pretend to be challenged by it are people like Goober over there, who insist on their own ideologically-motivated terminology.
Really, the only question here is whether we'll get ideologically based contra-biological definitions of "pregnancy" to go along with the ideologically based contra-biological definitions of "gender".
Wait ok what? That's the only question? What sort of contra-biological definitions of "pregnancy" are you fever dreaming about? Something like, a biological male with blueballs counts as pregnant for purposes of maternity leave?
Why do you suppose they're in a hospital bed, then?
For the record, Brett's article doesn't even mention the word "pregnant." Not only that but it has nothing to do with trans people. Just Brett's anti-gay instincts kicking in, basically.
I can only presume that Goober was not physically present at any of his children's births, so as far as he knows the pregnant mother goes away one day and comes back some time later with baby in tow. Otherwise he'd be more familiar with the medical facilities in which babies are often delivered.
Read the thread.
Culture war issues get ad hoc treatment. I would not try to extrapolate from Skrmetti to a normal case.
The Court reasoned in Ginsburg that the material was obscene as applied to minors even though it was not to adults. And since obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment, the law was uphled. That is, the age-based restriction must be based on an existing exception to freedom of speech, not merely because it is age-based.
What would the existing exception be for a categorical ban on minors using social media?
I don't think this is a particularly difficult constitutional question. Age-based classifications are typically only subject to rational-basis scrutiny, UNLESS they implicate a fundamental right, in which case they are subject to strict scrutiny. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (Mandatory retirement age for judges only subject to rational-basis scrutiny because no fundamental right to be a judge.)
Freedom of speech is about as fundamental as a right gets (as opposed to, e.g., access to hormone treatments). So, I think any court would review an age-based restriction on social media under strict scrutiny, which is not to say the government could not necessarily justify such a restriction, but it would have to meet that higher standard.
Yes, I agree with that analysis. Strict scrutiny would apply, but I believe the government could meet that hurdle. And others who have posted here have answered my previous question about the *how* of enforcement. So, the only remaining question is: would it be wise policy?
Where I teach you can be disciplined (and eventually thrown out) if you violate the ban on social media as stated in the Student Manual. But the point I want to make is: This actually asnwers the real problem social media cause : to others who are distracted by someone else's use. Education is becoming more and more geared to the least educable. Yes, ban social media and let prospective students know it. Then if you don't like it, go elsewhere.
Must freedom mean that we do shit for the hell of it.
But Ginsberg v. New York seemed to expressly countenance different speech restrictions for minors.
Brown v. EMA stated that the opinion applied obscenity in an age-appropriate way. Minors still had freedom of speech but sometimes it has to be applied in an age-sensitive way.
So, e.g., minors have a right to reproductive autonomy but parental involvement could be required in certain respects. That rule survives Dobbs. For instance, birth control rights remain.
[The right to minors to obtain abortions held before Planned Parenthood v. Casey; that is, when strict scrutiny was the rule.]
A categorial ban would be a major step here. Multiple cases protected free speech for minors, including their right to wear armbands. Compare marriage rights, which is a fundamental right, but can be denied to those under a certain age.
Not a lawyer.
Question: if minors have limited rights, where/how is the line drawn as to what rights they enjoy fully, and which they don’t?
Is accessing social media and getting hormone treatments more akin to getting a driver’s license or more like restrictions placed on owning a gun (a right)?
The Supreme Court in PACKINGHAM v. NORTH CAROLINA considered access to social media an aspect of free expression.
"Social media allows users to gain access to information and communicate with one another about it on any subject that might come to mind."
The Supreme Court has not decided a case turning on the breadth of gun rights of minors. Marriage is a fundamental right, but it can be denied to minors. It might be argued that the nature of a right to own a firearm is age sensitive. For instance, traditionally, there was a minimum age for militia service.
This leaves out why it is considered a dual age/sex classification. It's because an underage cisgender boy could use medications for gender-affirming treatment because his gender is aligned with his biological sex.
But an underage transgender boy could not receive the exact treatment to achieve the exact same results only because his gender is not aligned with his biological sex.
So it is not about age. The law treats even children of the same age differently based only on their biological sex. And the fact that the transgender youth could receive gender-affirming care when they are older doesn't change the fact that the exact same gender-affirming care would be allowed at a younger age but for their sex.
"It's because an underage cisgender boy could use medications for gender-affirming treatment because his gender is aligned with his biological sex.
But an underage transgender boy could not receive the exact treatment to achieve the exact same results only because his gender is not aligned with his biological sex."
I'll ask you the same question I did SimonP above: By "transgender boy", do you mean a boy who thinks he's a girl? Or a girl who thinks she's a boy? Let's set aside the deliberate confusion for a moment, and have some clarity: Are we taking XX or XY?
Because the 'cisgender' boy, which is to say a boy who isn't delusional about their sex, could use certain medications to delay puberty to a normal time frame if they were suffering from precocious puberty, but this wouldn't in any sense be 'gender affirming', it would be an established medical treatment which is known to be quite safe.
Likewise, either a girl deluded into thinking she's a boy, or a boy deluded into thinking he's a girl, if suffering from precocious puberty, could both use the same medications to the same effect: Making sure puberty occurred on a normal schedule. And it would not be 'gender affirming' in their case, either.
But a delusional boy or girl who used those drugs to a different effect, to delay puberty from happening on time, and prevent it from happening normally at all, would be engaged in a different course of treatment, intended to prevent normal development, not facilitate it, and which has severe side effects.
It's like a "cis-diabetic" could take insulin to maintain a normal blood sugar, but a 'trans-diabetic" would be taking it to artificially induce improper blood sugar regulation with tragic consequences.
A trans boy's sex is female and gender identity is male.
The Tennessee statute only prohibits the use of hormones and puberty blockers for affirming a gender identity that does not match the child's sex. That's a facial classification on the basis fo sex.
Perhaps there is justification for that classification that survives intermediate scrutiny (e.g., a medical necessity for treating precocious pubert but not gender dysphoria), but the plaintiff is only asking fro remand to analyse the law under intermediate scrutiny.
The District Court in issuing a preliminary injunction has already analyzed the law under intermediate scrutiny. L. W. v. Skrmetti, 679 F.Supp.3d 668 (M.D. Tenn. 2023). The United States as Intervenor (not as Plaintiff) is asking for the judgment of the Court of Appeals to be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. Those proceedings would presumably include a full trial on the merits in the District Court with the burden of justification on the State of Tennessee Defendants. (Although it is possible that the Court of Appeals would first analyze the statute based on intermediate scrutiny, again with the burden on the State.)
The original Plaintiffs have also petitioned for certiorari, which the Court has so far neither granted nor denied. If SCOTUS were to rule in favor of the United States, it would likely GVR that petition.
Couldn't it just as easily be a facial classification on the basis of gender, rather than sex? Clever as that is, does it really address the fundamental issue of personal rights and State powers?
It's both a facial classification on the basis of sex and gender identity. SCOTUS only certified the question of whether the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause. Whether the statute violates the Due Process clause because it infringes on personal or parental rights would be the subject of separate cert request.
The problem for you, Brett, is that the law doesn't ban these treatments insofar as they may have severe side effects. For example, a minor can still delay puberty beyond its natural timeframe as long as they intend to "live as" one gender but not the other, with the same risk of side effects either way. Why should that matter?
Justice Thomas is off base here. The Tennessee statute challenged in Skrmetti does not prohibit minors qua minors from receiving the medications and treatments at issue. Instead, it prohibits medical treatments intended to allow “a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex” or to treat “purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor’s sex and asserted identity.” Minors can receive such medications and treatments for other purposes.
How, I wonder, does one possibly justify age-related abridgement of the right to Free Speech as anything other than unconstitutional abridgement. "No law" means no law; if the authors had intended exceptions they wouldn't have stated it in absolute terms.
I sujppose it's only a question if you are a lawyer and/or don't have any children.(Kagan and Sotomayor have no children) I feel zero remorse and much pride of job in banning my kids from that sht. Is this hard to understand?
There is a vast difference between parents choosing what material to expose their children to, and government imposing restrictions (either prohibiting or requiring) on those children without the approval of either them or their parents.
But the bill in question does not, in fact, prohibit anything without the approval of parents.
"This bill requires the social media company to verify the express parental consent for the minor to become or continue as an account holder if the individual is a minor. A social media company must prohibit a minor from becoming an account holder, or continuing as an account holder, unless the social media company has the express consent of the minor's parent to allow the minor to become or continue as an account holder."
By so doing it renders the parents' choice binding, rather than overriding it.
No, it prohibits everything without the approval of parents.
Which is exactly the scheme rejected in Entertainment Merchants Association.
Which is basically the only way that the parents can actually have a binding choice.
It's both. It's an age-based classification subject to rational basis combined with a viewpoint neutral speech restriction, subject to intermediate scrutiny.
Pretend you are a Libertarian !! With school choice it is neither. It is part of the contract, no different from school uniforms.
Unless my 14 year old is paying his school bills the contract is with me and is enforced in loco parentis.
YOu are so addicted to making an issue out of things you don't recur to first principles or think in terms of human-to-human agreements.