The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Free Speech

Arrest of Commenter at City Council Meeting for Accusing Police of Being "Fascist" and "Pro Domestic Abuse" Violated First Amendment

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An excerpt from yesterday's long decision by Chief Judge Stephanie Rose (S.D. Iowa) in Petersen v. City of Newton:

The constitutional violations alleged in this case stem from the enforcement of Newton's Derogatory Comments Rule …, which prohibited speakers from making "derogatory statements or comments about any individual" during the public comment portion of city council meetings….

[In August 2022,] Newton Police Officer Nathan Winters arrested Tayvin Galanakis during a traffic stop—an incident that drew Petersen's attention to the police department. Petersen investigated and discovered that Officer Winters was subject to a civil no-contact order related to domestic abuse allegations. When Petersen submitted public records requests seeking information about how the department had handled the matter, the City denied them….

Petersen attended the October 3, 2022 city council meeting to speak during the public comment period. He began reading prepared remarks characterizing the police department as "violent" and "pro domestic abuse." Mayor Hansen interrupted, declared Petersen in violation of the Rule, and directed Chief Burdess to remove him from the meeting. When Petersen insisted on finishing his remarks, Chief Burdess arrested him for disorderly conduct. This arrest was unprecedented—no one had ever been arrested at a Newton city council meeting before. Yet, at this same meeting, other speakers made critical comments about city officials that Mayor Hansen permitted under the Rule.

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Free Speech

UC's National Center for Free Speech and Civic Engagement $15K Non-Residential Fellowships (Applications Due March 21)

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From the webpage:

Applications are due by Monday, March 30th at midnight. If you have questions, please feel free to contact freespeechcenter@uci.edu or register for an info session. [Information Session: February 24, 2026, at 12pm PT | 3pm ET.]

About the Center

The UC National Center for Free Speech and Civic Engagement explores the intersection of expression, engagement and democratic learning and considers what can be done to restore trust in the value of free speech on college campuses and within society at large….

About the Fellowship

Each year, the Center selects fellows from a broad range of disciplines and backgrounds such as law, journalism, higher education, social science, technology and government. The Center welcomes candidates from all backgrounds to apply, and invites a wide range of innovative projects. As part of the University of California, the Center is committed to promoting diversity and equal opportunity in its education, services and administration, as well as research and creative activity.

Over the course of the fellowship, each fellow completes a project. Work products can take many forms such as (but not limited to) qualitative/quantitative research, curricular modules, toolkits or training programs/pilots. We are focused on projects that address current issues affecting students, staff, administrators and faculty and will have a direct impact on individuals and communities across campuses. For more information about the work of previous fellows, click here….

This 18 month non-residential fellowship will run from July 1, 2026 through December 31, 2027. Selected fellowships will be awarded $15,000 to support their work.

This year we are particularly interested in projects that address the following issues:

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Tariffs

My New Dispatch Article on the Tariff Decision, its Implications - and a Key Issue the Court Did Not Resolve

The Court stopped a massive presidential power grab, but did not resolve a crucial issue about judicial review of executive use of emergency powers.

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Today, The Dispatch published my new article (gift link) on the Supreme Court's tariff decision, entitled "The Supreme Court Spurns a Presidential Power Grab." Here's an excerpt:

On Friday, the Supreme Court ruled on three cases challenging President Donald Trump's massive system of tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA). In a 6-3 decision, the court rightly held that IEEPA does not give the president the power to impose tariffs. Among the cases decided was VOS Selections Inc. v. Trump, which the Liberty Justice Center and I filed on behalf of five small American businesses harmed by the tariffs (we were later joined by prominent litigators Neal Katyal and Michael McConnell). The decision is important for its impact on tariffs, and as a rejection of a sweeping executive power grab. But it also raises a crucial broader—and as yet unresolved—issue: how much deference to give presidential invocations of sweeping emergency powers. That issue is central to various cases working their way through the courts, and may soon arise again in the tariff context….

The main basis for the court's ruling is that IEEPA does not even mention the word "tariff," and has never been used to impose them by any previous president during the statute's nearly 50-year history. The power to "regulate" importation, which IEEPA does grant in some situations, does not include a power to impose taxes.

But an additional crucial factor was the sheer scope of the authority claimed by Trump. As Chief Justice John Roberts noted in his opinion for the court, the president claimed virtually unlimited power to "impose tariffs on imports from any country, of any product, at any rate, for any amount of time…"

Under Trump's interpretation of the law, the president would have virtually unlimited tariff authority, similar to that of an absolute monarch of the kind King Charles I aspired to be. The court decisively rejected this aspiration to unconstrained presidential power. Roberts' majority opinion, a concurring opinion by Justice Neil Gorsuch, and one by Justice Elena Kagan (writing for all three liberal justices) all, in different ways, emphasized this aspect of the case. As Gorsuch put it, "Our system of separated powers and checks-and-balances threatens to give way to the continual and permanent accretion of power in the hands of one man. That is no recipe for a republic…"

But the judiciary's future ability to constrain dangerous presidential power grabs depends in large part on an issue the court managed to avoid in the IEEPA case: whether and to what extent to defer to presidential assertions that an extraordinary situation exists justifying the invocation of sweeping emergency powers.

The article goes on to discuss how the issue of deference is likely to come up in potential litigation over Trump's efforts to use Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose a new set of sweeping tariffs:

The issue of how much deference to give to presidential invocation of emergencies is also likely to arise again in the context of tariffs. Within hours of the court's decision, Trump issued an executive order using Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose 10 percent global tariffs, before upping the rate to 15 percent the next day. But Section 122 only permits tariffs in response to "fundamental international payments problems" that cause "large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits" (which are not the same thing as trade deficits), "an imminent or significant depreciation of the dollar," or to cooperate with other countries in addressing an "international balance-of-payments disequilibrium." As prominent conservative legal commentator Andrew McCarthy explains in an insightful article for National Review, these preconditions for the use of Section 122 do not exist. There is no "fundamental international payments problem," and the United States does not have a balance-of-payments deficit. In addition, Section 122 tariffs can only remain in force for up to 150 days unless extended by Congress.

But when the Section 122 tariffs are challenged in court (as they likely will be), judges will have to decide whether to defer to Trump on the question of whether the statutory prerequisites are met. And when the 150-day period expires, they may also have to decide whether Trump can extend it simply by claiming a new balance-of-payments problem has arisen. If judges (mistakenly) give him broad deference, Section 122 could become a blank check for presidential tariff-setting that the Supreme Court just denied him in the IEEPA case.

How Should The Non-Delegation Doctrine and the Major Question Doctrine Apply to Foreign Affairs?

Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh raise important issues that Justice Gorsuch and Chief Justice Roberts do not fully address.

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In an earlier post, I observed that Learning Resources is not really a constitutional law case. The bulk of the Chief Justice's controlling opinion focuses on statutory interpretation, sprinkled with some major question analysis. But there is very little straight-up conlaw.

Justice Thomas, as usual, is in a league of his own. He wrote a through study of how the non-delegation doctrine ought to apply to different types of enumerated powers. In short, Congress cannot delegate "core" powers to the President because the exercise of those powers can deprive people of the private rights of life, liberty, and property. By contrast, Congress can delegate "non-core" powers to the President because the exercise of those powers would, at most, violate public rights, which are mere privileges, and would not deprive people of life, liberty, and property. I think you need to read the entire dissent to understand the full breadth of Thomas's vision, but these paragraphs offers a succinct summary:

The Constitution's separation of powers forbids Congress from delegating core legislative power to the President. This principle, known as the nondelegation doctrine, is rooted in the Constitution's Legislative Vesting Clause and Due Process Clause. Art. I, §1; Amdt. 5. Both Clauses forbid Congress from delegating core legislative power, which is the power to make substantive rules setting the conditions for deprivations of life, liberty, or property. Neither Clause prohibits Congress from delegating other kinds of power. Because the Constitution assigns Congress many powers that do not implicate the nondelegation doctrine, Congress may delegate the exercise of many powers to the President. Congress has done so repeatedly since the founding, with this Court's blessing.

The power to impose duties on imports can be delegated. At the founding, that power was regarded as one of many powers over foreign commerce that could be delegated to the President. Power over foreign commerce was not within the core legislative power, and engaging in foreign commerce was regarded as a privilege rather than a right. Early Congresses often delegated to the President power to regulate foreign commerce, including through duties on imports. As I suggested over a decade ago, the nondelegation doctrine does not apply to "a delegation of power to make rules governing private conduct in the area of foreign trade," including rules imposing duties on imports. Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads (2015) (opinion concurring in judgment). Therefore, to the extent that the Court relies on "'separation of powers principles'" to rule against the President at 8 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.), it is mistaken.

At first blush, there is something counterintuitive about Thomas's theory. The powers listed in Article I, Section 8 would have to be bifurcated based on a line that appears nowhere in the text: core, and non-core. The majority opinion says that the "power of the purse" is a "core congressional power." And as Justice Gorsuch notes in his concurrence, the text of Article I, Section 8, lists all of the powers in one block.

Section 1 of Article I vests "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted" in Congress and no one else. Section 8 proceeds to list those powers in detail and without differentiation. Neither provision speaks of some divide between true legislative powers touching on "life, liberty, or property" that are permanently vested in Congress alone and "other kinds of power[s]" that may be given away and possibly lost forever to the President.

That was my first blush. But after stewing on the matter for a few days, Thomas starts to make sense of something I have long intuited: not all of the powers in Article I, Section 8 are actually legislative; some are executive in nature. Here, Justice Thomas cites Michael McConnell's discussion of the King's "prerogative" power:

Congress also has many powers that are not subject to the nondelegation doctrine. "We now think of the powers listed in Article I, Section 8 as quintessentially legislative powers, but many of them were actual, former, or asserted powers of the Crown, which the drafters decided to allocate to the legislative branch." M. McConnell, The President Who Would Not Be King (2020) (McConnell); accord, Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). These include the powers to raise and support armies, to fix the standards of weights and measures, to grant copyrights, to dispose of federal property, and, as discussed below, to regulate foreign commerce. Art. I, §8; Art. IV, §3. None of these powers involves setting the rules for the deprivation of core private rights. Blackstone called them "prerogative" powers, and sometimes "executive." By one count, 13 of the 29 powers given to Congress in Article I were powers that "Blackstone described as 'executive' powers."

Thomas shows that the early Congresses delegates to the President the power to exercise these non-core powers without limitation.

For most of American history, the nondelegation doctrine was understood not to apply to these powers. Contra (Gorsuch, J., concurring). "The early congresses felt free to delegate certain powers to President Washington in broad terms." McConnell 333. Thus, the Constitution gives Congress the power to support armies, Art. I, §8, cl. 12, but Congress in 1789 delegated to the President the power to establish regulations for benefits to veterans wounded in the Revolutionary War. The Constitution gives Congress the power to grant patents, Art. I, §8, cl. 8, but Congress in 1790 delegated to executive officials the power to grant patents in their discretion. The Constitution gives Congress the power to borrow money, Art. I, §8, cl. 2, but Congress in 1790 delegated to the President the power to borrow up to $12 million on behalf of the United States in his discretion. The Constitution gives Congress the power to raise armies, Art. I, §8, cl. 12, but Congress in 1791 delegated to the President the power to raise an army of 2,000 troops in his discretion. And, as I explain further below, the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce, Art. I, §8, cl. 3, but early Congresses often delegated to the President the power to regulate foreign commerce.

I've lost track of the literature studying how the early Congresses delegated power. But maybe one way to make sense of some of these statutes is that Congress could delegate what were executive "prerogative" powers without regard to non-delegation concerns. I need to give this topic more thought.

As for the major question doctrine, I think Justice Kavanaugh has the better argument. It should have no applicability on the foreign affairs context.

Second, in any event, the Court has never before applied the major questions doctrine in the foreign affairs context, including foreign trade. Rather, as Justice Robert Jackson summarized and remains true, this Court has always recognized the "'unwisdom of requiring Congress in this field of governmental power to lay down narrowly definite standards by which the President is to be governed.' " Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) (concurring opinion) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936)). In foreign affairs cases, courts read the statute as written and do not employ the major questions doctrine as a thumb on the scale against the President.

Kavanaugh is certainly correct that Roberts is wrong to extend the MQD to foreign affairs for the first time without much consideration.

The Chief Justice's opinion's reliance on the major questions doctrine in this foreign affairs case is a first—a novel and unprecedented use of the major questions doctrine to invalidate Presidential action taken pursuant to congressional authorization in the foreign affairs area. I firmly disagree with that use of the major questions doctrine here. In the foreign affairs context, including tariffs, the longstanding rule is simple: Interpret the statute as written, not with a thumb on the scale against the President.

I think I'm done writing about Learning Resources for now. Let's see what tomorrow brings.

Climate Change

Climate Change Goes Back to the Supreme Court -- Colorado Edition

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Suncor Energy v. County Commissioners of Boulder County

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On today's order list there is only one grant of certiorari, but it is a big one: Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) v. County Commissioners of Boulder County. This is one of the climate change tort suits filed by state and local governments against fossil fuel companies under state law, and it will unquestionably be one of the biggest cases of the term (almost certainly next term given the Court's calendar).

In granting certiorari the Court expanded on the questions presented by the petition for certiorari. The QP offered by Suncor was as follows:

Whether federal law precludes state-law claims seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate.

In granting the petition, the Court added a second question:

In addition to the question presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the following question: Whether this Court has statutory and Article III jurisdiction to hear this case.

Where did this come from? When Suncor initially petitioned for certiorari, Boulder waived its right to file a brief in opposition. Some number of justices wanted to know what Boulder really thought, however, and the court requested that Boulder file a brief explaining why, in their view, the case was not cert worthy. In its filed response, Boulder offered four QPs, both to raise the jurisdiction question, as well as to note potential distinctions buried within Suncor's suggested QP:

  1. Whether this Court has statutory jurisdiction to review the interlocutory decision of the Colorado Supreme Court.
  2. Whether this Court has Article III jurisdiction to review the interlocutory decision of the Colorado Supreme Court.
  3. Whether the Clean Air Act impliedly preempts the state law tort claims advanced in this case.
  4. Whether the structure of the Constitution impliedly preempts the state law tort claims advanced in this case without regard to whether Congress intended to preempt those claims.

The first two of these suggested QPs were almost certainly the basis for the Court's added question, but the Court folded them into a single question, just as it accepted Suncor's QP formulation folding together statutory and constitutional arguments for preemption.

As longtime readers know, I believe the arguments for statutory preemption have no legal basis, while the structural arguments are a form of preemption through penumbra. That said, I believe there are serious questions about the scope of the defendants' conduct and potential relief that can be properly offered by a state court--questions that have been complicated by recent Supreme Court decisions in related areas such as National Pork Producers and Mallory. Greater clarity and consistency on this score would be welcome.

The timing of this grant is also interesting in that the arguments for federal preemption of state-law-based climate tory claims will be unquestionably weaker if, as the administration is arguing, the Clean Air Act provides no meaningful basis upon which to regulate greenhouse gases--let alone if Massachusetts v. EPA is overruled.

For those interested, here are my prior posts on this subject:

Supreme Court

The Roberts Court Rejects Trump's Tariffs

An initial take on Learning Resources v. Trump.

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Last Friday's opinion for the Court in Learning Resources v. Trump was mercifully short. The full stack of opinions, not so much.

The dueling opinions give us academic types lots of interesting material to chew on, including what to make of the fact that four separate opinions embrace the major questions doctrine, but do so in different ways, and how to assess Justice Thomas' suggestion that the nondelegation doctrine should be understood as much as a matter of due process as Article I vesting.

In the meantime, Learning Resources is an unquestionably important opinion. I wrote up some of my initial thoughts for Civitas Outlook. My column begins:

On Friday, the Supreme Court issued a sharp rebuke to the Trump Administration, rejecting the President's attempt to use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose tariffs on foreign nations. President Trump had asserted the "extraordinary power to unilaterally impose tariffs of unlimited amount, duration, and scope." Yet in Learning Resources v. Trump, Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for a six-justice majority, concluded that IEEPA "does not authorize the President to impose tariffs," period. In this conclusion, the Chief Justice was joined by the Court's three liberals — Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson — and two of Trump's three appointees to the Court —Justices Gorsuch and Barrett. Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito.

Learning Resources was the first case in which the Supreme Court reviewed one of the second Trump Administration's policy initiatives on the merits, and, as was so often the case during Trump's first term, the Administration came up short. However much authority the President may have to impose tariffs under other statutes, and however much deference the executive branch is due in other contexts, the Trump Administration's "Liberation Day" tariffs were a bridge too far.

Read the rest here.

Free Speech

Litigation Breeds Litigation + Follow-Up to Lawsuit Against Pro-Palestinian / Anti-Semitic Protesters Outside Synagogue

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From Friday's decision by Judge Shalina Kumar (E.D. Mich.) in Susselman v. Attorney Grievance Comm'n (for more on the Sixth Circuit's decision rejecting the underlying lawsuit against the protesters, see this post):

Plaintiffs Marc Susselman … sue[s] the Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission ("[AGC]"), its Board of Commissioners, and Michael Goetz, in his official capacity as the Administrator of the [AGC] (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging violations of [his] First and Fourteenth Amendment rights….

In 2019, Susselman learned that a group of protesters were in front of Beth Israel synagogue holding signs with messages that included "Jewish Power Corrupts", "Resist Jewish Power", and "No More Holocaust Movies." These protests had been occurring every Saturday morning since 2003, and Susselman felt compelled to file suit in federal court seeking an injunction "placing reasonable time, place and matter restrictions on [the protesters'] conduct, e.g., requiring that they be a certain distance from the synagogue property; that they be prohibited from protesting during the time period when the Sabbath service was being conducted; and that the number of protesters, and the number of signs they used, be limited to a reasonable number." …

Defendants in that case moved to dismiss the complaint asserting plaintiffs did not have standing to sue, and the protestors' conduct was protected by the First Amendment. Judge Roberts ultimately agreed with defendants that plaintiffs did not have standing to sue because their emotional distress did not constitute a concrete injury, and defendants' conduct was protected by the First Amendment "even if it disturbs, is offensive, and causes emotional distress." The case was dismissed.

Susselman appealed Judge Roberts' decision dismissing the case, challenging her ruling that plaintiffs' emotional distress did not constitute a concrete injury. The Sixth Circuit reversed Judge Roberts' ruling that plaintiffs did not have standing, but ruled that the protestors' signs were protected by the First Amendment….

Defendants moved for attorney fees on the basis that the lawsuit was frivolous, and Judge Roberts awarded fees in the amount of $158,721.75 to be paid jointly and severally by plaintiffs and Susselman. Susselman, convinced that Judge Roberts' rulings in the case were "motivated either by anti-Semitic sentiments, or by anti-Israel, pro-Palestinian sentiments, or by both…." appealed Judge Roberts' decision. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the attorney fee award, agreeing the lawsuit was frivolous and found that the record did not support Susselman's claims that Judge Roberts was biased against his clients. Susselman then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was denied.

On October 18, 2022, Susselman filed a formal complaint against Judge Roberts with the Sixth Circuit. In his complaint he asserted that "by virtue of the statements in her decisions which, taken together, had the distinct appearance of being anti-Semitic and/or anti-Israel, she had violated the Canons of the Code of Conduct of United States Judges.["] Chief Judge Sutton dismissed Susselman's complaint on September 7, 2023. Susselman filed a petition to have his complaint be reviewed by a judicial counsel of the Sixth Circuit, and on March 26, 2024, the court issued an order affirming Chief Judge Sutton's dismissal of the complaint against Judge Roberts.

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Torts

Amazon Could Be Liable for Selling Product Used to Commit Suicide, Coupled with Promotion of a "Suicide Instruction Book"

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From Thursday's Scott v. Amazon.com, Inc., decided by the Washington Supreme Court (opinion by Justice Helen Whitener); the lawsuit was brought by the families of four people who committed suicide, three adults (ages 18, 19, and 27) and one minor (age 17):

Amazon sells … "Loudwolf Sodium Nitrite" and "HiMedia GRM417-500G Sodium Nitrite." Each of the four decedents ingested the sodium nitrite they purchased from the Amazon website. According to Plaintiffs, sodium nitrite is used in laboratories for research and medical purposes, and it is also used in meat preservation. When used as a meat preservative, sodium nitrite is one of many ingredients. Curing salts typically call for sodium nitrite of 6.0 percent purity.

HiMedia Sodium Nitrite is 98.0 percent pure and Loudwolf Sodium Nitrite is 99.6 percent pure. Once ingested, sodium nitrite takes just minutes to produce enough methemoglobin to impair oxygen transport in the blood and cause hypoxia. Plaintiffs alleged that there is no legitimate household use for high purity sodium nitrite….

Plaintiffs alleged that Amazon promoted the sale of sodium nitrite on its website alongside other products that would assist in carrying out suicide. They contend that the Amazon website included recommended products, such as Tagamet to consumers who viewed sodium nitrite products. According to the Plaintiffs, Tagamet is an acid reduction medicine that suicide forums recommend purchasing to prevent life-saving vomiting that occurs when sodium nitrite is ingested.

Other products Plaintiffs identified being recommended on Amazon's website to customers who viewed sodium nitrite products include a small scale and a book titled The Peaceful Pill Handbook. Plaintiffs alleged that The Peaceful Pill Handbook is a suicide instruction book that devotes a chapter to lethal inorganic salts, which contains instructions on how to use sodium nitrite to die by suicide. The book states that sodium nitrite is readily available online and provides a hyperlink to the sodium nitrite products on the Amazon webpage.

Plaintiffs alleged that Amazon routinely sent reminder e-mails, with advertisements for these products, to customers who viewed sodium nitrite products on the webpage. In addition, Plaintiffs contend that one-star customer reviews from grieving family members about how the sodium nitrite product was being used for suicide were deleted by Amazon.

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Religion and the Law

2026 Church, State & Society Writing Competition for Law Students and Law Clerks

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Passing this along, for readers who fit the criteria (or who know those who do):

The Program on Church, State & Society at Notre Dame Law School is pleased to announce a writing competition on topics and questions within the Program's focus. This writing competition requests student-authored scholarly papers and will honor winners with cash awards. The purpose of this writing competition is to encourage scholarship related to the intersections of church, state & society and, in particular, how the law structures and governs that intersection.

Topic and Form: Papers should be focused, broadly, on topics related to church, state & society. For guidance on selecting a topic, students may wish to view our Program website and mission statement: https://churchstate.nd.edu/

Papers must be between 9,000-13,000 words, including footnotes and/or endnotes.

Eligibility: The competition is open to law students in good standing, enrolled in a traditional law degree (J.D. or LL.B.), a Master's degree (LL.M.), or a doctoral degree (S.J.D./J.S.D. or Ph.D.) program at an ABA-accredited law school within the United States. The competition is also open to recent graduates not yet practicing law (i.e., those completing clerkships or engaged in similar pursuits are eligible). Co-authored papers will not be accepted.

Submissions: Papers must be submitted by April 30, 2026.

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Civil Procedure

Diversity (the Civil Procedure Kind) and Self-Identification

"Courts cannot accept a model where an entity has a public-facing identity which it then renounces based on its behind-the-scenes activity."

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From Judge Gerald McHugh's opinion Friday in Sherman v. American Ass'n of Suicidology, Inc. (E.D. Pa.), an interesting illustration of how courts interpret rules to prevent improper manipulation by the parties and undue confusion for adversaries:

This is an action brought against an association incorporated in Washington D.C., which operates remotely, with no fixed physical location. For practical purposes it operates wherever its executive director is located.

When the action was filed in state court, there is no dispute that its executive director, Denise Hyater, was a resident of the District of Columbia, and discharged her duties there. This would have supported diversity jurisdiction if the case had been removed then, because the "nerve center" for remote entities is the state from which its activities are being directed. But the parties agree that diversity must continue to exist at the time of removal.

Removal here occurred on December 30, 2025. Plaintiff has moved to remand, because, as of that date, Defendant's website represented that the executive director of the association was Jenna Baker, who the parties agree was a resident of Pennsylvania, the same as Plaintiff. Defendant responded with an affidavit representing that the formal transition of authority did not occur until the following day, with the result that the association should be deemed a citizen of the District of Columbia on the date of removal. That response has in turn prompted Plaintiff to seek limited discovery on the issue of diversity.

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What About Nixon?

How many Presidents make a precedent?

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In Learning Resources, Chief Justice Roberts found that President Trump's tariffs lacked sufficient precedent. As a result, under the major questions doctrine, this novel exercise of power based on an old statute was unlawful. Yet, there was one President who did something similar, that the Chief Justice simply did not want to talk about. Of course, I speak of Richard Nixon.

Roberts acknowledged that President Nixon relied on the Trading with the Enemies Act (TWEA) to impose tariffs. And he further acknowledged that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (the predecessor of the Federal Circuit) upheld those tariffs. Yet, the Court found that Nixon's actions were not enough to establish a precedent.

Here, Nixon is relegated to a footnote:

It is also telling that in IEEPA's "half century of existence," no President has invoked the statute to impose any tariffs—let alone tariffs of this magnitude and scope. FN2

FN2: Indeed, even before IEEPA was enacted, only one President [Nixon] relied on its predecessor, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), to impose tariffs—and then only as a post hoc defense to a legal challenge.; United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc.(CCPA 1975). Those tariffs were also of limited amount, duration, and scope.

Roberts also tries to distinguish the Nixon tariffs from the Trump tariffs.

Finding no support in the statute the President invoked, the Government turns to one he did not: IEEPA's predecessor, TWEA. In 1975, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that the authority to "regulate … importation" in TWEA authorized President Nixon to impose limited tariffs. United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc.. When Congress enacted IEEPA two years later, the Government contends, it conveyed that same authority (except without the limits).

This argument cannot bear the weight the Government places on it. While this Court sometimes assumes that Congress incorporates judicial definitions into legislation, we do so "only when [the] term's meaning was 'well-settled'" before the adoption. A single, expressly limited opinion from a specialized intermediate appellate court does not clear that hurdle. The tariff authority asserted by President Nixon, moreover, was "far removed" from TWEA's "original purposes" of sanctioning foreign belligerents. We are therefore skeptical that Congress enacted IEEPA with an eye toward granting that novel power.

Justice Gorsuch likewise thinks that the Nixon practice does not count for much:

And, once more, it points to President Nixon's invocation of TWEA to support his 1971 tariffs during lower court proceedings . . .. Whatever one makes of this history, it hardly reveals the kind of contemporaneous and consistent executive interpretation that might advance the dissent's cause. To the contrary, the fact that no President until now has invoked IEEPA to impose a duty—even one percent on one product from one country—is telling.

By contrast, Justice Kavanaugh mention Nixon nearly thirty times. Kavanaugh suggests the Court was trying to "dodge" Nixon tariffs:

The Court tries to dodge the force of the Nixon tariffs by observing that one appeals court's interpretation of "regulate … importation" to uphold President Nixon's tariffs does not suffice to describe that interpretation as "well-settled" when IEEPA was enacted in 1977. Fair enough. But that is not the right question. The question is what Members of Congress and the public would have understood "regulate … importation" to mean when Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977. Given the significant and well-known Nixon tariffs, it is entirely implausible to think that Congress's 1977 re-enactment of the phrase "regulate … importation" in IEEPA was somehow meant or understood to exclude tariffs. 12

FN12: THE CHIEF JUSTICE's opinion also tries to dismiss President Nixon's tariffs as being of "limited amount, duration, and scope." That claim appears incorrect on all three points, as Judge Taranto carefully explained in his Federal Circuit opinion. President Nixon imposed 10 percent tariffs on virtually all imports from every country in the world for an unspecified duration.

What is the Court's aversion to President Nixon? Is it simply the fact that one President is not enough to establish a "longstanding" practice, as that term was used in Noel Canning? Or is it the fact that President Nixon was not a good President that the Court would rely upon?

I've written that Trump is refighting the war that Congress and the Burger Court waged against President Nixon. I think the Chief Justice's blithe dismissal of the Nixon precedent reflects those battle lines.

Justice Gorsuch's Campy Concurrence

Justice Gorsuch takes us on visit of Camp Barrett, Camp Kagan, Camp Kavanaugh, and Camp Thomas.

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Learning Resources had seven separate opinions. Everyone wrote something, except for Justices Alito and Sotomayor. For a regular merits decision, where time is not of the essence, publishing seven separate opinions may be overkill, but does little harm. But for a quasi-emergency-docket case, where an emergency stay is in place, the Court should proceed with all deliberate speed. Such promptness was especially appropriate because tariffs were being collected every day. Indeed, even as the Court managed to produce 170 pages in about five months, they failed to write a single sentence about the remedy, as the President pointed out in his press conference. Chief Justice Roberts insisted "We do not speculate on hypothetical cases not before us." Yet they also don't decide the actual remedial issue that is squarely before the Court.

What took so long? The Chief probably wrote his majority opinion before breakfast. Justice Kavanaugh articulated almost every point from his dissent at oral argument. That analysis was developed some ago, perhaps even when Judge Taranto wrote his Federal Circuit dissent. And Justice Thomas appears to have been thinking about this topic for some time. I think the reason for the delay has to be Justice Gorsuch. He decided to write a forty-six page concurrence, even though he joined the majority opinion in full. The concurrence was entirely a response to what everyone else wrote. And by writing this behemoth, Gorsuch forced Justices Barrett, Kagan, Thomas, and Kavanaugh to respond to him. And in turn, Gorsuch would have to reply to their responses. There are footnotes upon footnotes.

Yet, Justice Gorsuch's colleagues did not give him nearly as much attention as he gave them. Justice Barrett dispatched with Justice Gorsuch's "straw man" argument in a few pages.

To the extent that Justice Gorsuch attacks the view that "common sense" alone can explain all our major questions decisions, he takes down a straw man. I have never espoused that view.

Barrett also has a first with using the phrase "judicial flex" in an opinion:

I would not treat this evidence as precedent for a judicial flex. Justice Gorsuch proposes to do something new. The innovation is in significant tension with textualism, so I do not support the project.

Ouch.

And Justice Kagan insisted that she is not actually a convert to the major questions doctrine, and would not "relitigate" the issue further.

JUSTICE GORSUCH claims not to understand this statement, insisting that I now must be applying the major-questions doctrine, and his own version of it to boot. Given how strong his apparent desire for converts, I almost regret to inform him that I am not one. . . . I'll let JUSTICE GORSUCH relitigate on his own our old debates about other statutes, unrelated to the one before us.

Though I am critical of Justice Gorsuch's approach, I feel a certain kinship. I write what I believe, without regard to what others might think. Indeed, as I noted recently, I write what I write mostly for myself. It matters little to me whether people respond to me, either positive or negative. Justice Gorsuch cares about these issues profoundly. He has given them a lot of thought. He is, as we often are, entirely convinced he is correct. Gorsuch also thinks that some of his colleagues are being inconsistent. Gorsuch rightly calls Justice Kagan out for flip-flopping (see Jason Willick's essay), and suggests that Justice Kavanaugh has not made his case. But in the end, Justice Gorsuch does not seem to persuade anyone else. I can relate.

The styling of the concurrence is unusual. He refers to the four separate writings as camps: Camp Kagan, Camp Barrett, Camp Kavanaugh, and Camp Thomas.

Past critics of the major questions doctrine do not object to its application in this case, and they even join much of today's principal opinion. But, they insist, they can reach the same result by employing only routine tools of statutory interpretation. Post (Kagan, J., joined by Sotomayor and Jackson, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Meanwhile, one colleague who joins the principal opinion in full suggests the major questions doctrine is nothing more than routine statutory interpretation. Post (Barrett, J., concurring). Still others who have joined major questions decisions in the past dissent from today's application of the doctrine. Post (Kavanaugh, J., joined by Thomas and Alito, JJ., dissenting). Finally, seeking to sidestep the major questions doctrine altogether, one colleague submits that Congress may hand over to the President most of its powers, including the tariff power, without limit. Post (Thomas, J., dissenting). It is an interesting turn of events. Each camp warrants a visit.

And here, "interesting" does not mean of interest. It means inconsistent, or even hypocritical. See my post from 2016 on the meaning of "interesting." I recalled that Justice Kagan used a similar phrasing in Seila Law. She wrote, "For those in the majority's camp, that [Opinion] Clause presents a puzzle."

In a case with this many opinions, I suppose it is useful to label an opinion by the authoring Justice's name. But I don't quite get "camp." It comes off a bit, well, campy.

Learning Resources for Learning Resources

How to teach the tariffs case?

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Learning Resources v. Trump may seem like a very important decision today, but I'm not sure how much it will matter in the near future.

First, Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion. The Chief, per his usual style, said very little. He purported to simply apply longstanding doctrine, even where he broke new ground, especially on the application of the major questions doctrine for foreign affairs. Moreover, Roberts did not fully engage with most of the historical precedents advanced in Justice Kavanaugh's dissent. Roberts opinions are, as a general matter, not good teaching tools. Students invariably are left feeling unfulfilled.

Second, it isn't clear to me whether this case even belongs in a constitutional law casebook. I think classes on statutory interpretation could benefit from this decision. The major questions doctrine also makes sense for an administrative law class. But the majority opinion says very little about constitutional law. Sure, the Chief Justice gestures to Article I, which reserves the taxing power to Congress. And that principle does some work with the major questions doctrine. But the real work is not based on the text of the Constitution, but instead on how Congress over time delegated the power to impose taxes to the President. Again, this is not really about constitutional law. (I suspect the birthright citizenship will also be resolved on statutory grounds, removing another possible entry to a constitutional law casebook.)

Third, what should students make of the disagreement between Justice Gorsuch and Justice Barrett? I feel like not much new is added from Biden v. Nebraska. Indeed, Justice Barrett, as well as Justice Kagan, seem annoyed that Justice Gorsuch is still making them expend time on this dispute. Is any of this back-and-forth helpful to students in a class on statutory interpretation? I am doubtful. This opinion took nearly five months after oral argument to publish. Query how much of that delay was caused by Justice Gorsuch responding to the four "camps."

Fourth, what about the non-delegation doctrine? After oral argument, I suspected that Justice Gorsuch would at least discuss the non-delegation doctrine, but ultimately it made only a few brief appearances in his opinion. By contrast, Justice Thomas introduced an entirely new line of thought: the non-delegation doctrine only applies to core legislative powers that affect life, liberty, and property. But powers outside that core, that do not affect public rights, can be delegated without limitation. Is Justice Thomas right? I need to think about it some more. Justice Gorsuch raises some questions, but he doesn't really have a strong response. The Thomas dissent may be the only part of the entire case that belongs in a constitutional law casebook. I'll admit it is strange to only include a dissent, but students will benefit from Thomas's careful study.

Fifth, what about Justice Kavanaugh's dissent? It is nearly twice the length of the majority opinion. I found it more persuasive than I expected. Even though I have been following this issue for the past year, I never took the time to carefully walk through the statutory history. I don't think the issue is as "clear" as Kavanaugh said, but I am convinced this issue is close. There is no way that Justice Kagan could be right that the government loses based solely on the statute. I think the government loses only through an application of the major questions doctrine. And I need to think a bit more about Justice Kavanaugh's historical account of the tariff power controls. I almost wish that the Chief assigned the majority opinion to Justice Barrett, as she would have taken the time to fully engage the dissent. But Roberts kept this one for himself.

Ultimately, like much of Trump law, I don't think this decision will have much staying power. It is just another application of the major questions doctrine, even if the Justices still do not agree what that doctrine is.

Putting Trump's Backlash Against The Tariff Ruling In Context

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In Learning Resources v. Trump, the Supreme Court invalidated President Trump's global tariffs by a 6-3 vote. Almost immediately, Trump held an impromptu press conference, in which he lashed out at the Court, and in particular two of his appointees, Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett, who joined the majority. The presser was classic Trump: angry, winding, but direct. First, he conveyed a truth that Republican presidents have known for nearly a century, but have rarely said aloud: progressive justices never break ranks when it counts, but conservative justices will invariably find the principle to do so. Second, Trump uttered another unspoken truth: Presidents fear that criticizing the Supreme Court may result in the Justices ruling against them. The Justices are supposed to rule without fear or favor, but they are still human and will invariably react to what they see as an overbearing president. Third, Trump now sees clearly the problem with those who advised him on his first batch of Supreme Court nominees. Rather than focusing on nominees who favored a strong, robust executive, they supported nominees who actually wanted to transfer power from the executive to Congress and to the courts. Should Trump have another Supreme Court vacancy, these three important lessons will inform his future decision.

Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has had a majority of Republican-appointed Justices. Indeed, in 1991, eight of the nine Justices had been appointed by Republican presidents. Only Justice Byron White, a Kennedy appointee, was on the other side. Yet, the Court still leaned to the left. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1991), five Republican appointees voted to reaffirm Roe v. Wade. And even when the Court found a conservative majority, swing votes like Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy moderated the outcome to the left. But the opposite effect seldom, if ever, happened. Over the past two decades, I have struggled to think of a decision where a Democratically appointed Justice cast the decisive fifth vote for a conservative victory. Justice Stephen Breyer, to his credit, cast an important vote to save a Ten Commandments monument at the Texas Capitol, but that narrow ruling was overwhelmed by a companion case from Kentucky that broadly expanded the Court's power to scrutinize religious displays. Justice Breyer also cast a key vote in a pair of affirmative action cases from Michigan, but there, too, racial preferences were largely upheld. And in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012), Justices Breyer and Elena Kagan joined the Chief Justice in holding that states could opt out of the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid expansion. But it has been reported that they did so as part of a compromise to avoid invalidating the entire program. Since Justice Breyer's retirement, I think the odds of compromises from the left are slim. 

President Trump's press conference described this dynamic and used his own appointees as examples. Trump said, "The Democrats on the court are thrilled, but they will automatically vote no." Trump added that the Democratic appointees are "an automatic no, just like in Congress." How often do Democratic politicians break ranks and vote on principle? Republicans in Indiana voted against redistricting. Will any Democratic state legislatures actually vote against a Democratic gerrymander? Trump's analogy between Democratic politicians and Democratic-appointed judges has some merit. I struggle to think of any significant case where the Court's progressive justices cast a dispositive vote against the progressive side. 

Trump continued that the Democratic appointees are "an automatic no, no matter how good a case you have, it's a no." I think Trump is saying what every Supreme Court litigator would quietly admit: in an ideological case, only three or four votes are really ever up for grabs, and they are all on the right. But Trump drew a contrast: "You can't knock their loyalty, one thing you can do with some of our people." In other words, the progressive justices never break ranks when it counts, but "some of our people," that is, the conservative Justices, do.

Trump also shone a light on an unspoken element of Supreme Court advocacy: you cannot say or do anything that could offend the Justices. Trump explained he kept his mouth shut: "I wanted to be very well-behaved because . . . I didn't want to do anything that would affect the decision of the Court, because I understand the Court." He does understand the Court better than most people might think. Trump continued, "I understand how they are very easily swayed. I want to be a good boy."

Trump, likely on the advice of counsel, was told not to say anything negative about the Court while the case was pending, lest he sway the decision. The implication here was clear: if Trump criticizes the Court, he is more likely to lose. Trump even acknowledged this point in his roast at the Alfalfa Club earlier this month. He quipped, "I had the nastiest, most vicious joke about John Roberts," but "if you think I'm going to tell that joke you can forget it." Trump said the quiet part out loud: "I'm going to kiss his ass for a long time." Well, at least for a few weeks. Now Trump can tell the joke.

Do you see the problem? Judges are supposed to decide cases without fear or favor. Whatever a litigant says about the judge should have no bearing whatsoever on the outcome of the case. But of course, every first-year law student knows this isn't actually true. The clear import of some of the commentary about Trump's press conference is that he made it less likely that the Justices will rule in his favor in future cases. Judges are human. Indeed, judges are even more sensitive than mere mortals. One does not become a judge by ignoring how the public perceives them. And even if the justices tell themselves that Trump's comments have no effect on their ruling, the public perception is that there is such an effect. And where did this perception come from?

I'll let you in on a little secret. Much of the commentary you read about the Supreme Court involves obsequiousness in an attempt to curry favor. Law professors, in particular, want to be held in high regard by the justices. After all, they want to be cited and have their students hired as law clerks. (I, for one, never hold back, even if there are consequences for my candor.) You wonder why Trump's lawyer told him to put a muzzle on it?

Finally, I think Trump is having a rude awakening about the Supreme Court nominees from his first term. While Trump is angry at Justices Gorsuch and Barrett, I think his ire should be directed at the lawyers who advised Trump to pick them. A flashback is helpful. Immediately after Justice Scalia died, Trump realized he had an opening. If Trump could convince conservatives that he could be trusted to appoint a conservative to replace Scalia, he could win the primary. Trump innovated the process by releasing several lists of potential nominees. (It is noteworthy that Gorsuch and Kavanaugh were not on the initial list.) But let's be frank. Trump didn't know the people on the lists. He worked with the names given to him. And Trump, unlike prior presidents, didn't have a firm grounding in constitutional law or what the Supreme Court did.

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