The primary issue before the Court is whether Defendants violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by enforcing a footwear policy at its 7-Eleven store, despite Mr. Niederquell's protestation that he has an impairment preventing him from wearing shoes.
The Court concludes Defendants have not violated the ADA. Defendants' footwear policy is a legitimate health and safety measure that may be imposed despite Mr. Niederquell's alleged disability. Furthermore, Defendants have offered Mr. Niederquell remote purchasing options that adequately accommodate Mr. Niederquell's circumstances and afford him full and equal access to Defendants' goods….
The Declaration of Independence. (National Archives.)
Today is the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence.
Over the years, I have written various posts and articles on the American Revolution and the ideals of the Declaration of Independence and the American Founding. Some have obvious continuing relevance to such issues as identity politics, nationalism, immigration, the role of slavery in American history, and more. Particularly relevant, given recent political developments, are the various pieces on the liberal universalist ideals of the Founding and their opposition to ethno-nationalism.
I hope the links are useful, and stir reflection on the principles of the Declaration. Unless otherwise noted, all of these pieces were published as posts on the Volokh Conspiracy blog. I put them in chronological order:
"Frederick Douglass on Immigration," April 10, 2014. A discussion of Frederick Douglass's great 1869 speech on how American ideals require openness to immigration.
"The Case Against Nationalism," National Affairs, Winter 2024 (with Alex Nowrasteh). This article is a more general critique of nationalism. But it includes a section explaining why nationalism is inimical to the ideals of the Declaration and the Founding.
"Trump vs. the Declaration of Independence," July 4, 2025. Several items on the Declaration of Independence list of grievances against George III also apply to Trump today, most notably on immigration, trade, and deportation without due process. Like King George, he is "unfit to be the ruler of a free people."
"My House Judiciary Subcommittee Testimony Against the "Preserving a Sharia-Free America Act," Feb. 9, 2026. Summary of my testimony before the US House of Representatives Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution and Limited Government, explaining why discrimination against immigrants based on their speech and religion is unconstitutional and contrary to the ideals of the Founding. The testimony itself is available here.
From Thursday's Seventh Circuit decision in U.S. v. Rose, written by Judge Frank Easterbook and joined by Judges Thomas Kirsch and Doris Pryor:
In September 2009 Jonathan Rose was involuntarily committed to a mental hospital in Indiana, suffering from a "psychiatric disorder." The record does not name the disorder or contain a detailed evaluation by a mental-health professional. He was released in January 2010 and has not been recommitted.
In 2022 Rose purchased several guns. He tried and failed to purchase others but was turned down because of his civil commitment. (A mismatch of birthdates in public databases seems to be responsible for his success on some occasions and failure on others.) In 2023 Rose was indicted for acquiring guns in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), which prohibits anyone "who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution" from possessing firearms. He also was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) for lying to the gun dealers. Rose told each dealer that he had never been committed to a mental institution. United States v. Holden (7th Cir. 2023), concludes that § 922(a)(6) is compatible with the Second Amendment.
But the district court concluded that § 922(g)(4) is not, as applied to someone who is no longer mentally ill. It dismissed those counts of the indictment, leading to this appeal by the United States.
Other courts of appeals have reached divergent conclusions about the validity of § 922(g)(4). See Tyler v. Hillsdale Sheriff's Department (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (invalid except as applied to a currently dangerous person); Beers v. Attorney General (3d Cir. 2019) (valid), remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 590 U.S. 940 (2020); Mai v. U.S. (9th Cir. 2020) (valid). All of these decisions predate [the Supreme Court's decisions in Bruen, Rahimi, Hemani, and Wolford]. Between Rahimi and Hemani the Fourth Circuit rejected a facial challenge to § 922(g)(4) while reserving the possibility of an as-applied challenge. U.S. v. Gould (4th Cir. 2026). The issue is open in this circuit….
Heller [and later cases] flatly stated that "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill" are presumptively valid…. But … the Justices' remarks concern people who are mentally ill, not people who used to be mentally ill. Yet § 922(g)(4) applies to anyone who ever was committed to a mental institution. Some people are committed but released after they recover; others are committed in error and released once the mistake is discovered. Neither set of persons is mentally ill today, but § 922(g)(4) applies to both categories.
From Judge Matthew McFarland (S.D. Ohio) Thursday in Rice v. Schell; the analysis seems basically correct to me:
[T]he Advance Ohio Higher Education Act ("S.B. 1") … touches upon, among other things, the discontinuation of offices and orientation programs related to diversity, equity, and inclusion ("DEI") at public universities. Miami University is one such state university that has closed certain committees, entities, and programs related to DEI — both before and after S.B. 1 became effective.
A tenured professor now seeks judicial relief to reinstate these entities and programs on constitutional and statutory grounds. This request raises several questions, including the fundamental question of who decides which committees, entities, and programs a public university should maintain. As for the limited question presented here, the record does not demonstrate that Plaintiff—an individual professor unimpeded in his classroom teaching, scholarship, research, or publications—can proceed with his claims in federal court….
The Court starts by outlining what is at issue in this case and—perhaps just as importantly—what is not at issue. This is not a case involving allegations that the government is compelling particular speech. This is not a case in which a university itself brings suit to enjoin a law on institutional autonomy grounds or otherwise. This is not a case in which students allege constitutional violations. This is not a case in which a plaintiff has been threatened with disciplinary action for certain speech. This is not a case involving abridgment of a professor's speech in the classroom or on the campus green. Rather, this dispute centers around a professor who brings suit to enjoin a university to reestablish certain committees, programming, and events.
From U.S. v. Virginia, decided yesterday by Judge Robert Payne (E.D. Va.); these conclusions played a role in the court's "irreparable harm" analysis, one of the factors that the court had to consider in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction:
The record in this case shows that, with increased enforcement activity and the resistance thereto, there came to be "increasingly common threats of targeted harassment of and retaliation against federal immigration officers for simply doing their jobs." In particular, it is shown by the affidavit of Eric S. Weiss, the Deputy Field Office Director for the United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal Operations ("ERO") division, that:
Individuals, including immigration activists and other members of the public, routinely photograph, film, and publish online ICE ERO enforcement actions to include the personal identities of ICE officers and other federal task force personnel. The photographs and films are posted online for the sole purpose of intimidating and harassing government employees and are directly used by members of local organized crime and transnational criminal organizations in serious and potentially deadly ways.
That activity is commonly referred to as "doxxing." According to Weiss, "ICE personnel regularly observe and overhear individuals shouting phrases such as 'doxx these people,' 'find out who they are and where they live,' and 'we will find out who you are and who your family members are.'" Weiss also avers that there is credible intelligence showing that Mexican criminals coordinating with domestic extremist groups:
have placed targeted bounties for the murders of ICE and CBP personnel in a tiered bounty system. Cartels have disseminated a structed bounty program to incentivize violence against federal personnel, with payouts escalating based on rank and action taken.
The bounty system includes $2,000 "for gathering intelligence or doxxing ICE officers," $5,000 to $10,000 "for kidnapping or non-lethal assaults on standard ICE/CBP" officers and agents, and up to $50,000 "for the assassination of high-ranking officials."
According to the record, "[d]oxxing of ICE officers/agents has also been encouraged across the web." For example, "ICESpy.org, ICEList.is, and ICEList.info" are sites that "perpetrat[e] the doxxing of ICE staff and contractors."
Also, some who oppose the current modes of enforcing the immigration laws take pictures of ICE officers' faces and run those pictures through facial recognition applications so that the pictures can be searched through social media. Experience has shown that, when an identification of the officer is thereby made, the search continues to identify the ICE officers' family members and to locate the homes of the agents. Those findings are then posted on the anti-ICE websites which urge harassment of the ICE officers and interference with them in the conduct of their jobs in enforcing immigration laws.
From U.S. v. Virginia, decided yesterday by Judge Robert Payne (E.D. Va.):
On May 20, 2026, citing concerns that federal law enforcement officers were "undercut[ting] basic expectations of accountability, sow[ing] fear and confusion, and erod[ing] the public trust," Governor Abigail Spanberger signed the Mask/Identity Law. The Mask/Identity Law makes it a misdemeanor [with some exceptions] for a "law-enforcement officer" to "wear a facial covering that conceals, obscures, or otherwise covers his face while such law-enforcement officer is engaged in the performance of his official duties." A "law-enforcement officer" includes both state and federal law enforcement officers….
The court concluded that the law likely couldn't be applied to federal officers; that result seems correct to me, given the precedent limiting state attempts to control federal officers' performance of their jobs:
The United States argues that the Mask/Identity Law directly regulates ICE's enforcement of the federal immigration laws. The United States relies heavily on the decision in U.S. v. California (9th Cir. 2026). The Ninth Circuit's analysis focused on California's mandate of "visible display of identification" for law enforcement. As the Ninth Circuit correctly explained, there is a direct regulation of the government where a state law, "lays hold of federal officers in their specific attempt to obey orders and requires qualifications in addition to those that the [federal] Government has pronounced sufficient." {The district court found that the mask component of California's law discriminated against the Federal Government. That finding was not appealed.}
In Johnson v. Maryland (1920), the Supreme Court held that a federal postal service employee could not be convicted of violating a state law that required drivers in the state to have a state driver's license because doing so would "lay[ ] hold of" employees and require additional qualifications the Federal Government did not have for its own employees. When so doing, the Supreme Court distinguished state laws like driver's license requirements from a "general rule[ ]" that "incidentally" might affect "the mode of carrying out the employment" (citing "the mode of turning at the corners of streets" as an example of a permissible law). Applying, Johnson, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the California identification requirement "requires qualifications in addition to those that the [federal] Government has pronounced sufficient." In other words, California added requirements for federal officers to follow while conducting law enforcement activities, and thereby regulated the federal activity.
In U.S. v. Virginia (4th Cir. 1998), the Fourth Circuit found invalid a similar kind of state law that sought to regulate the FBI's use of private contractors by imposing hiring requirements beyond those that had been set by the FBI. Such additional requirements do "not merely touch the Government servants remotely by a general rule of conduct; [they] lay[ ] hold of them in their specific attempt to obey orders and require[ ] qualifications in addition to those that the [federal] Government has pronounced sufficient."
From the June 23 decision in Huckabee v. Meta Platforms, Inc., by Third Circuit Judge Peter Phipps, joined by Judges Arianna Freeman and Emil Bove:
Mike Huckabee … is a Baptist minister, the former Governor of Arkansas, a two-time presidential candidate, a New York Times best-selling author, a nationally syndicated radio and television host, and the current United States Ambassador to Israel.
Between April and June 2024, his name, image, and likeness were used in three different advertisements to endorse cannabinoid, or 'CBD,' products on the Facebook social media platform …. One of the advertisements reported that Huckabee was leaving his then-job as a television show host on Trinity Broadcasting Network, a Christian-based television network, to "[p]ursue [a] [g]reater [p]urpose," which was the promotion of CBD products. In another advertisement, Huckabee appeared to "open[ ] up about his health problems and the miracle that helped him turn his life around," which was the use of CBD products.
Another advertisement contained a link, which if clicked, opened what appeared to be, but was not, the Fox News website. That linked webpage had an article with Huckabee's name, image, and likeness reporting that he was leaving his television show due to health issues from an autoimmune disease, and that "[a]s a God-fearing Christian," he recommended "CBD [as] the future of medicine in America," since it was "more effective than similar offerings from … 'Big Pharma' Companies." Each of the advertisements was made by a third party without Huckabee's permission, and Facebook was paid to feature those messages to its users.
The advertisements were a commercial success: after viewing them, "numerous fans" of Huckabee purchased the CBD products. Huckabee learned of the advertisements in or around May 2024, and Facebook removed them from its platform in June 2024. This was not Facebook's first experience with CBD advertisements that had misused the names, images, or likenesses of other public figures. It had previously hosted similarly unauthorized CBD advertisements depicting media personalities Laura Ingraham, Jeanine Pirro, and Sean Hannity, and news outlets reported on those instances.
Huckabee sued under Arkansas's Frank Broyles Publicity Rights Protection Act of 2016, which exempts social media platforms from liability so long as they lack "actual or constructive knowledge of the unauthorized commercial use of a person's name, image, or likeness." He pointed to these items as sufficient to allege a plausible claim of such knowledge:
Ilya Somin has already covered much of the Trump v. Barbara territory in his posting here on the VC a few days ago [available here], and I agree with everything he writes, including his terse summary: "The 6-3 decision was right, and a contrary ruling would have had horrific results."
I'll assume the basic framework of the case is familiar to you all. If not: The Citizenship Clause of the 14th Amendment says that anyone "born . . . in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" is a US citizen. The case turns on the meaning of those five italicized words: "subject to the jurisdiction thereof". Trump's Executive Order (#14160 [available here]) says that individuals born here whose mothers are present in the US "unlawfully" are not US citizens. He asserts that this does not violate the Citizenship Clause because those individuals are not"subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" within the meaning of that phrase – at least, within the meaning of that phrase in 1868, when the Citizenship Clause was added to the Constitution.
Plaintiffs, needless to say, disagree, as does a majority of the Court.
Having now read through the six different opinions,*
*Roberts for the Court, Jackson concurring, Thomas dissenting, Alito dissenting, Gorsuch dissenting, Kavanaugh concurring in the result and partially dissenting. The entire set is available here.
a couple of points struck me as highly unusual and noteworthy.
In particular, Justice Kavanaugh's separate opinion – concurring (in Part I) in the Court's judgment (Executive Order 14160 is invalid), dissenting (Part II) on the underlying rationale for that invalidity – is an extremely interesting piece of judicial work, well worth a careful reading.
Justice Kavanaugh votes to invalidate Trump's Executive Order because, as he says, it "contravene(s) a federal statute." What statute, you ask? The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1401(a), which "mirrors the text of the Fourteenth Amendment," providing that "All persons born . . . in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States." Read More
The American bald eagle--our nation's national bird and symbol--is doing well. Populations have been expanding for years, and are now approaching the levels estimated for the founding era.
Many policymakers, pundits and professional environmentalists want to credit the Endangered Species Act for the success of eagle recovery efforts. But try as they might, it is hard to find much evidence that the ESA (as opposed to other conservation laws and recovery efforts) did much good, for reasons I explain in the latest issue of PERC Reports, published by the Property & Environment Research Center in Bozeman, MT.
The biggest factor in the eagle's recovery was almost certainly the banning of DDT for most uses. But this was done prior to the enactment of the ESA, under a different law (and by the EPA, not the Fish & Wildlife Service, the latter of which administers the ESA). The eagle also received more targeted protection from other laws. The bald eagle was officially removed from the endangered species list in 2007, and since then populations have continued to soar without the ESA's protection.
There's more, but those are reasons to read the article. It concludes:
Americans should be pleased that bald eagle populations continue to expand. The growing number of bald eagles is a conservation success story. But given the act's longstanding and widespread record of failing to promote species recovery, we should be careful before attributing that success to the Endangered Species Act.
Jonathan H. Adler
[ And, yes, for those curious, I took the picture that accompanies this post.]
The material to which plaintiffs are objecting, from the court filings.
An excerpt from Openden v. Kennedy, decided Tuesday by Judge Adam Abelson (D. Md.):
In June 2024, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) distributed a video internally to its employees as part of a "Coffee With" series. The June 2024 episode was an interview with Ronza Othman, the director of the EEO Compliance Group within CMS's Office of Equal Opportunity and Civil Rights. In the video, Ms. Othman, who is an attorney who happens to be blind and was holding a white cane, describes her hobbies, the challenges and opportunities of serving in a role like hers, and other aspects of her approach to her job.
Plaintiffs in this case worked for CMS at the time and are Jewish. They have sued the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in his official capacity ("Defendant" or "HHS"), contending that the video constituted "severe, pervasive, and unwelcome harassment" on the basis of national origin and religion. They do not take issue with the content of the interview but rather with a scarf that Ms. Othman was wearing during the interview that both Plaintiffs and Ms. Othman have described a keffiyeh. Plaintiffs do not take issue with Ms. Othman wearing a keffiyeh as such, but rather focus on an image on it that includes a Palestinian flag, a map, and a hand with two fingers raised. Plaintiffs contend that they perceive the image as "advocating for the murder and slaughter of persons of Jewish heritage and faith, as well as the destruction of Israel."
HHS vigorously disputes that characterization, or the reasonableness of that perception. But for current purposes the Court need not wade into those disputes because for Plaintiffs' hostile work environment claim to proceed, they must allege either (1) that Ms. Othman was Plaintiffs' "supervisor" or (2) that after being put on notice of the allegedly harassing behavior HHS took "'no prompt and adequate remedial action to correct it.'" Plaintiffs' allegations do not allege facts that would satisfy either standard.
"[Students] reported that the course content did not align with its description in the course catalog; that the course was poorly organized and 'essentially was a stream of consciousness conversation' about Dr. Chavis's personal issues; and that Dr. Chavis humiliated certain students because of, for example, their race and fraternity affiliation."
From Chavis v. UNC, decided Tuesday by Chief Judge Catherine Eagles (M.D.N.C.):
Dr. Larry Chavis was a non-tenured professor at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill Kenan-Flagler Business School. In 2024, UNC declined to renew his teaching contract. He alleges that decision was based on his race, made in retaliation for his reports of discrimination and outspoken criticism of UNC on diversity issues, and violated his First Amendment rights….
The facts as recited are either undisputed or viewed in the light most favorable to Dr. Chavis, as required at this stage of the proceedings.
Dr. Chavis began working at UNC in 2006 …. During the summer of 2022, Dr. Chavis taught a graduate microeconomics course at UNC. One student in that class left course feedback stating in part:
Even though as a social liberal I agree with 90%+ of [Dr. Chavis's] personal observations about our society today – I think you would be better served to not share everything that you do during class. If I had wanted a degree in some sort of Native American studies or African American studies I would not have pursued an MBA. While I was not the least bit offended by your observations, I suspect there were some of the class that were.
When Dr. Chavis learned about the comment, he posted an excerpt of it on LinkedIn and stated that it was "just mean and walks right up to and probably crosses a line into being offensive." There is no evidence to indicate UNC took any action based on the evaluation or Dr. Chavis's post, and at the end of the 2022-2023 school year, UNC renewed Dr. Chavis's contract for another year….
As part of meeting with faculty and conducting focus groups, [Business School] Dean Frank met with Dr. Chavis in February 2024 to discuss his thoughts about the business school and his position. In an email sent shortly after that conversation, Dr. Chavis expressed frustration with his lack of career advancement at UNC and explained that he limited his time and interactions at the business school because of his perception that other faculty members "hate [him] for being too truthful and too supportive of equity."
