I won't pretend to understand the intricate bankruptcy issues at play in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. What I can tell you is that Justice Kavanaugh is very, very upset. Apart from the nuances of the legal issue, Justice Kavanaugh repeatedly expresses sympathy and concern for those affected by the opioid crisis. Here are a few highlights:

Today's decision is wrong on the law and devastating formore than 100,000 opioid victims and their families.

To be sure, many Americans have deep hostility toward the Sacklers.

The opioid victims and their families are deprived of their hard-won relief. And the communities devastated by the opioid crisis are deprived of the funding needed to help prevent and treat opioid addiction. As a result of the Court's decision, each victim and creditor receives the essential equivalent of a lottery ticket for a possible future recovery for (at most) a few of them. And as the Bankruptcy Court explained, without the non-debtor releases, there is no good reason to believe that any of the victims or state or local governments will ever recover anything. I respectfully but emphatically dissent.

Opioid victims and other future victims of mass torts will suffer greatly in the wake of today's unfortunate and destabilizing decision. Only Congress can fix the chaos that will now ensue. The Court's decision will lead to too much harm for too many people for Congress to sit by idly without at least carefully studying the issue. I respectfully dissent.

I'm reminded of a common W. Bushism, which Justice Kavanaugh often repeats–we should be on the sunrise side of the mountain, not the sunset side.

For good measure, Kavanaugh includes several citations to an amicus brief from the Boy Scouts and the Conference of Catholic Bishops, who had their own bankruptcy issues. And he stresses how much bipartisan support is behind the arrangement:

Since then, even more victims and creditors have gotten on board. Now, all 50 States have signed on to the plan. The lineup before this Court is telling. On one side of the case: the tens of thousands of opioid victims and their families; more than 4,000 state, city, county, tribal, and local government entities; and more than 40,000 hospitals and healthcare organizations. They all urge the Court to uphold the plan.

Justice Kavanaugh also included a table of contents for his dissent, which was about twice as long as the majority opinion:

To map out this dissent for the reader: Part I (pages 5 to 18) discusses why non-debtor releases are often appropriate and essential, particularly in mass-tort bankruptcies. Part II (pages 18 to 31) explains why non-debtor releases were appropriate and essential in the Purdue bankruptcy. Part III (pages 31 to 52) engages the Court's contrary arguments and why I respectfully disagree with those arguments. Part IV (pages 52 to 54) sums up.

Not sure that I've seen anything like this before.

In an alternate universe, during the debate last night, a candidate would have referred to this decision as having an impact on the opioid crisis.

On Thursday, the Supreme Court decided two cases that concerned when an emergency stay should be granted: Moyle v. United States and Ohio v. EPA. Reading these two cases gave me whiplash. In Moyle, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh voted to dissolve a stay. And in Ohio, Chief Justice Roberts voted to grant a stay. In both cases, Justice Barrett would have denied emergency relief altogether. At least one member of the Court is consistent.

I've talked enough about the prematurely released Moyle opinion (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). As best as I can tell, there were no meaningful changes made in the final version. That suggests this case was done in May, but was being held till the end of the term for unstated reasons. It was released on Thursday, perhaps, because the document was out and the Court wanted to limit damage. Ultimately, no harm, no foul.

In Ohio v. EPA, states and industry groups sought an emergency stay of the Good Neighbor Plan, which limits emissions. The Court split 5-4. Justice Gorsuch voted to grant the stay. Justice Barrett dissented, and was joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. I saw some comments that this case split along gender lines, but I think that description doesn't do any work. Ohio v. EPA was a clear, and consistent manifestation of Justice Barrett's aversion to grant any sort of emergency relief. And the Court's progressives will gladly sign onto those criticisms of the shadow docket.

Justice Gorsuch's majority opinion needed five votes. And he twice favorably cited Justice Kavanaugh's Labrador concurrence–an opinion that Justice Barrett ignored in Moyle. This diplomatic gesture, if one was needed, likely helped bring Kavanaugh along. Gorsuch, citing Kavanaugh, explains that there are weighty harms on both sides of the ledger.

Like any other federal court faced with a stay request, we must provide the applicants with an answer—"grant or deny." Labrador v. Poe, 601 U. S. ___, ___ (2024) (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in grant of stay) (slip op., at 2). . . .

When States and other parties seek to stay the enforcement of a federal regulation against them, often "the harms and equities [will be] very weighty on both sides." Labrador, 601 U. S., at ___ (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 3). That is certainly the case here, for both sides have strong arguments with respect to the latter three Nken factors.

Next, Gorsuch, citing Chief Justice Roberts in Maryland v. King, explains that the state is always injured when its sovereign interests are impaired.

On one side of the ledger, the federal government points to the air-quality benefits its FIP offers downwind States. EPA Response 48–50. On the other side, the States observe that a FIP issued unlawfully (as they contend this one was) necessarily impairs their sovereign interests in regulating their own industries and citizens—interests the Act expressly recognizes. See Part I–A, supra; States' Application 24–26; Maryland v. King, 567 U. S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (ROBERTS, C. J., in chambers).

There is some tension here. In Moyle, Justice Barrett was willing to tolerate a partial impairment of the state's interest–the "injunction will not stop Idaho from enforcing its law in the vast majority of circumstances." Roberts and Kavanaugh joined that opinion. By contrast, in dissent, Justice Alito cited Roberts's Maryland opinion as support for state standing. Again, Barrett is being consistent between Moyle and Ohio. Roberts and Kavanaugh are at odds with themselves.

Justice Gorsuch concludes with what I think is the most important aspect of Kavanaugh's Labrador opinion: in an emergency posture, an application for a stay will ultimately turn on the likelihood of success. The Justices can decide early on who is likely to prevail on the merits, and that determination will usually be sufficient:

Because each side has strong arguments about the harms they face and equities involved, our resolution of these stay requests ultimately turns on the merits and the question who is likely to prevail at the end of this litigation. See Nken, 556 U. S., at 434; Labrador, 601 U. S., at ___ (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 4).

Kavanaugh's analysis is now the opinion of the Court. Moyle had only three votes. Kudos to Kavanaugh.

Justice Barrett's dissent was peak Barrett. Her introduction lays out the risks of granting "emergency relief" in a "fact-intensive" case requires meeting "stringent conditions."

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Today, it took the Court about 45 minutes to hand down three opinions: Loper/Bright, Fischer, and Grant Pass. I only predicted one of those assignments correctly. The Chief had Loper/Bright, and he went all in to overrule Chevron. The Chief also kept Fischer for himself (not Gorsuch), and Gorsuch wrote Grant Pass (not Jackson). Given my dismal track record, you would think I would stop making predictions. No such luck.

There are three remaining cases that will be handed down on Monday, the final day of the term.

I still think the Chief Justice holds Trump v. United States for himself. It will be the last case of the term.

In the February sitting, the NetChoice cases and Corner Post were argued. Justices Alito and Barrett are the only justices who have not written from that sitting. One of them has NetChoice and the other has Corner Post. I previously predicted Alito for that duo of cases, though a few people suggested Barrett may be the more likely pick. She was in the middle of the oral argument, and was the key vote to grant the stay on the emergency docket appeal. Then again, this case may be so fractured that there is not a clear majority. Alito may have a plurality or something to that effect. For the term, Alito has four majority opinions and Barrett has five. I'll stick with Alito for NetChoice, and Barrett for the nerdy procedure case, but my votes here are not confident.

Stay tuned for Monday, Monday, Monday!

I wasn't planning on watching the presidential debate. Contrary to what readers may believe, I do not like politics. I much prefer the law. I'd rather read a transcript of oral argument than sit through a meaningless political debate. My agenda for last night was to finish a long post on Murthy and finish reading Jarkesy. I only managed the former task. I turned the debate on when a friend messaged me that the 25th Amendment should be invoked. It was hyperbole, to be sure, but not too far from the truth.

Here are a few reactions. First, we often talk about judges in a state of mental decline: Judge Posner, is an extreme example. To a lesser extent, we've discussed Justices Ginsburg and Stevens. But even at their worst, these jurists were orders of magnitude more coherent and confident than anything we saw last night. Perhaps the presidency takes a bigger toll on a person than a judgeship.

Second, I think back to Ron Hur's report:

"We have also considered that, at trial, Mr. Biden would likely present himself to a jury, as he did during our interview of him, as a sympathetic, well-meaning, elderly man with a poor memory. It would be difficult to convince a jury that they should convict him—by then a former president well into his eighties—of a serious felony that requires a mental state of willfulness."

Based on everything I saw, Hur's assessment seems accurate. He was being kind. My reaction last night was one of pity and sadness, not anger. And this was Biden after a lot of prep! Can you imagine how he appeared after hours of free-wheeling interviews. For good reason the Administration does not want to release the recording. If you were to just read the transcript of the debate, you would not get the full image. But the audio is very instructive.

Third, my grandfather suffered from senility. It was a slow, gradual process. In his 80s, there were good days and bad days. But over time there were more bad days than good days. And eventually, by the age of 92, there were only bad days. He died not because of poor health, but because he simply no longer knew how to feed himself, and later he no longer remembered how to swallow. His wishes were to not receive artificial sustenance, and we honored those wishes. I saw my grandfather on that stage last night–not grandpa who died, but grandpa several years earlier. He could still "fake it," and make you think he was following along by reciting things he remembered before. But he wasn't there. One of the hardest conversations we ever had concerned taking away grandpa's keys. He got into a car accident where he drove through an intersection and t-boned another car. We took his keys away. It was tough. But it had to be done. Those who love President Biden should have a similar conversation.

Fourth, does this affect anything at the Court? Perhaps the only thing that could knock down Trump today would be ruling against him on the immunity case. That waits till Monday. Last night I joked that Chief Justice Roberts may switch his vote to retain Chevron, given that there will almost certainly be a Republican presidency. But what about retirements? If Justice Sotomayor was even thinking about stepping down, seeing Biden's feebleness may give her some new consideration. She can still announce her retirement after the last session on Monday. Justice Kennedy did much the same. I think the Democrats could easily confirm a nominee before October. Maybe Justices Kagan and Sotomayor both offer to step down in exchange for Biden stepping down. Let's make a deal!

T-minus 27 minutes to opinons.

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In Murthy v. Missouri, Justice Barrett wrote, "We begin—and end—with standing." And she meant it! Her majority opinion stretches nearly 30 pages, and it focuses entirely on standing. I don't think I've ever read anything quite like it. Not a single plaintiff has standing against a single defendant. Justice Barrett takes a sledgehammer to every single conceivable standing argument, and explains why it won't work. It reminded me of the scene from the Matrix Reloaded where Neo single-handedly destroys every single Agent Smith. Just when you think there are more arguments from the 26,000 page record, Barrett demolishes them. And at the end, she just flies away without touching the merits. Justice Barrett was on a mission! Though, I think the analogy fails, because the dissenters took the red pill.

Here is the test Barrett puts forward:

Putting these requirements together, the plaintiffs must show a substantial risk that, in the near future, at least one platform will restrict the speech of at least one plaintiff in response to the actions of at least one Government defendant. On this record, that is a tall order.

It is a tall order! The standards she erects are so byzantine, it is unlikely that anyone could ever satisfy them. And maybe that's the point. Justice Barrett, more than anyone else on the Court, is serving as the gatekeeper. She is extremely stingy on cert grants. She turns away all emergency petitions on the shadow docket (unless they're from the Fifth Circuit). She no longer believes in cert before judgment. And she forces lawyers to establish standing to a degree of certitude I've never seen before. Critics often charge that the Roberts Court is slamming shut the courthouse doors. Justice Barrett is the embodiment of that theme.

Perhaps Barrett would defend herself by saying she is simply applying longstanding precedent concerning jurisdiction. If she were right, then my criticisms above would falter. How can you blame a Justice for faithfully adhering to settled doctrine? But Justice Barrett routinely heightens the rules for standing by imposing new exceedingly exacting rules to satisfy Article III–or at least that is how I see things.

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Chief Justice Robert wrote an excellent, thorough, and overwhelmingly persuasive majority opinion in S.E.C. v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. __ (2024), holding that the Securities and Exchange Commission could not try civil fraud suits before its own Administrative Law Judges. It must instead try them in federal District Court where the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial must be available in all cases which were "[suits] at common law," as opposed to suits in equity and in admiralty.

The Supreme Court did today for the Seventh Amendment roughly what it did for the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). It held, in a narrow opinion, that Congress and the President cannot completely ignore the Seventh Amendment, just as they used to completely ignore the Second Amendment before Heller was decided. This is the case at least in civil fraud cases brought by the S.E.C.

The Chief Justice's opinion was joined by five other justices: Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Chief Justice Roberts' opinion examined originalist, textualist, and doctrinal sources of law. In much of the opinion, Chief Justice Roberts makes an overwhelmingly powerful argument that S.E.C. fraud cases are in the words of the Seventh Amendment "[s]uits at common law" which can only be tried by a jury and not suits in equity or admiralty where the right to jury trial has not historically been available.

The Chief's opinion is amply supported by prior Supreme Court precedent. The case does not overrule any precedent, although it distinguishes Atlas Roofing, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), a much critiqued precedent; Atlas Roofing's author (Justice White) claimed that it was overruled by a Supreme Court case in the 1980's, an issue which the Chief Justice's opinion pointedly did not address.

Justice Gorsuch wrote a very powerful and persuasive concurrence, which was joined by Justice Thomas, and which emphasized that the Jarkesy case implicated Article III's promise of a life tenured judge to hear suits in common law, as well as implicating the Seventh Amendment. Justice Gorsuch also observed that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause was implicated as well, because the S.E.C. was arguing that it could violate the separation of powers by combining legislative, executive, and judicial power—all in one administrative agency.

Justice Sotomayor wrote a heated dissent, which was joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. She complained that precedent was actually on her side, contrary to the Chief Justice's opinion. She relied very heavily on Atlas Roofing. Justice Sotomayor's view was that the Jarkesy case "involves the Government acting in its sovereign capacity to enforce a statutory violation. That makes the right at issue a 'public right' that Congress can take outside the purview of Article III, even when the new cause of action is analogous to a common-law claim." She also argued that "There are good reasons for Congress to set up a scheme like the SEC's. It may yield important benefits over jury trials in federal court, such as greater efficiency and expertise, transparency and reasoned decision-making, as well as uniformity, predictability, and greater political accountability."

Overall, S.E.C. v. Jarkesy is a correct and persuasive six justice majority opinion, which holds that in civil fraud suits, at least, the S.E.C. must bring its cases before an Article III judge and afford the defendant, who it is prosecuting, the right to a civil jury trial. It cannot prosecute such a suit before one of its own internal administrative law judges. Jarkesy is thus an important victory for both the rule of law and for common sense.

I know that everyone's following SCOTUS in this final week of the term, but I'd like to offer some quick thoughts about an important church-and-state decision a couple of days ago in Oklahoma. In Drummond v. Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled 6-2 that the state had violated state and federal law by contracting with a Catholic school to operate a charter school. Although I favor educational pluralism and am open to persuasion, under current SCOTUS religion clause jurisprudence, the Oklahoma court probably got this one right.

Charter schools are a hybrid: publicly chartered (hence the name) and funded but independently managed. Unlike private schools, but like regular public schools, they're free. The state picks up the tab. But unlike regular public schools, and like private schools, charter schools rely on parental choice. Only students whose parents have selected a charter school attend it, though a charter school must accept all who apply. And although charter schools have more flexibility than regular public schools—that's the whole point, to allow competition in the interests of the students—charter schools are more heavily regulated than private schools in terms of curriculum, teacher qualification, and other things.

In Drummond, the Oklahoma Charter School Board contracted with St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School to run a charter school. St. Isidore forthrightly asserts that it will incorporate Catholic teachings into every aspect of its curriculum. Although most contracts the school board makes with charter schools prohibit religious affiliation, the school board made an exception in this case.

This week, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ordered the school board to rescind its contract with St. Isidore. The contract, the court said, violated the Oklahoma Charter Schools Act, which requires charter schools to be non-sectarian (as I say, the board made an exception for St. Isidore), the Oklahoma Constitution, which prohibits public money from being used, directly or indirectly, to benefit a religious institution, and the US Constitution, which prohibits the establishment of religion. The court also rejected St. Isidore's argument that rescinding its contract with the school board would violate the school's free exercise rights under the U.S. Constitution.

It's not quite as clear as the Oklahoma court makes it seem, but the decision is probably correct, at least respecting the federal constitutional claims. Legally speaking, St. Isidore is caught in a dilemma—a dilemma that its hybrid nature as a charter school creates. If St. Isidore qualifies as a public school, there's an obvious Establishment Clause problem. St. Isidore argued that it shouldn't be seen as a public school, but as an independent contractor. But the Oklahoma statute specifically provides that charter schools are "public." And that's not just a matter of form, but also substance. As a charter school, St. Isidore is funded entirely by the state, must take all students who apply, and must comply with curricular and other requirements that don't apply to private schools.

On the other hand, if St. Isidore is a private actor, the US Supreme Court's recent free exercise cases may not help it too much. In Carson and Espinoza, the Court ruled that the state cannot exclude private religious schools from tuition assistance programs simply because they are religious—that would violate the schools' right to practice their religion. That seems correct to me. But in those cases, the Court stressed that public funds went to private schools through the filter of parental choice. Parents who received tuition assistance designated which schools would receive the money.

St. Isidore would be entirely free, by contrast, and Oklahoma would be funding the school directly. True, the amount of money St. Isidore would receive would depend, presumably, on the number of students it enrolled—and that would depend on parental choice. But the state is more in the foreground (and the parents more in the background) in this case than in either Carson or Espinoza, and it feels different, somehow.

So, either way, whether St. Isidore is a public school or a private school, it seems to me it should lose this case. That's a pity, because I'm sure the educational offerings at St. Isidore would exceed those in many other schools. Perhaps the school should reorganize as a purely private school and participate in Oklahoma's voucher program. Anyway, St. Isidore will surely seek cert, so we'll see what SCOTUS has to say. But not this week!

Alfonso Lopez and Zakey Rahimi share much in common. They both lived in Texas. They both possessed a firearm in violation of federal law. They both moved to dismiss their indictment on the ground that the federal law was unconstitutional. The Fifth Circuit agreed to dismiss both indictments. Both of their cases were appealed to the Supreme Court. And Justice Thomas agreed with both of their claims. That's where the similarities stop.

In United States v. Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist "struck down" the Gun-Free School Zones Act, without considering whether it may be constitutional as applied to Mr. Lopez. But for Mr. Rahimi, the Supreme Court treated his motion to dismiss as a facial challenge, and only considered whether Section 922(g)(8) could be validly applied to him. How to explain this disparate treatment?

Let's start with the facts of Lopez. All know that the Court declared the federal statute unconstitutional because the mere possession of a gun in a school was not "economic activity," and thus lacked a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce. But what most people do not know is that someone paid Lopez $40 to give the gun to someone at the school. By any definition, that payment is an economic transaction that would clearly satisfy the Lopez test. (Indeed, Gonzales v. Raich was a good vehicle because money did not change hands.) Here is how the Solicitor General described the facts in the Lopez merits brief:

2. On March 10, 1992, respondent, then a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school in possession of a concealed .38 caliber handgun, together with five bullets. In response to an anonymous tip, school officials confronted respondent, who admitted that he was carrying the weapon. He explained that an individual he identified as "Gilbert" had given him the gun to deliver to another individual after school for use in what respondent described as a "gang war." Respondent stated that he was to receive $40 for delivering the weapon. See Pet. App. 2a. [U.S. v. Lopez, 1994 WL 242541, at *6–7 (U.S.Pet.Brief,1994).]

Congress could have criminalized Lopez's actions, even under the new Lopez test. But the Court still accepted Lopez's motion to dismiss the indictment as a facial challenge, and declared the statute unconstitutional in all regards. Perhaps the Court found that because the statute lacked a jurisdictional hook, it didn't matter whether Lopez's individual conduct fell within the scope of the interstate commerce power. Judge Ho hinted at this possibility in Footnote 10 of his Kersee concurrence (which I wrote about here). I am uncertain because neither the SG's brief, nor Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, mentioned Salerno. The issue was simply not addressed.

Fast forward to Rahimi. The Solicitor General's opening brief did not even mention Salerno or any arguments concerning facial challenges. Rahimi's merits brief only mentions the facial challenge in passing. The SG's reply brief devotes a single paragraph to the facial challenge:

Moreover, Rahimi brought, and the Fifth Circuit sustained, a facial challenge to Section 922(g)(8). See Pet. App. 2a. On such a challenge, "the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Objections to applying Section 922(g)(8) to other factual scenarios, see Resp. Br. 46-47, cannot justify invalidating the statute on its face or as applied to Rahimi. Facial invalidation would be particularly inappropriate given that Section 922(g)(8) is subject to a severability clause, which states that the invalidation of one of the statute's applications does not affect "the application of such provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other circumstances." 18 U.S.C. 928.

During the oral argument, Justice Gorsuch asked SG Prelogar several questions about the facial challenge. And he posed the same question to Matthew Wright, counsel for Rahimi. This issue was on Gorsuch's mind. Wright directly compared his case to Lopez.

Neil Gorsuch: And the same thing when it comes to temporary dispossession. I understand your concern about permanent dispossession, but, again, that isn't what's necessarily before us in a facial challenge, where we have to ask is it unconstitutional in all of its applications, right?

J. Matthew Wright: Your Honor, that—that test for faciality, I—I think, is primarily remedial. It typically comes up in the civil context where someone is suing to enjoin the enforcement of a statute and—and so the Salerno test it's called, you know, comes into play as to, typically, that assumes there is a valid application or a space of valid application of the statute, and then the complaint is either there's too much outside or my case is outside or something like that. Ours is a facial challenge in the way that Lopez was a facial challenge, where the facts of Lopez were clearly within Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.

This Court found the facts of that case were Person A was going to pay Lopez $40 to give that gun to Person C after school. That's within the commerce power, but the statute itself was not within Congress's power to enact.

And so that statute failed as it then existed, the pre-amendment version of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, on its face.

That argument obviously did not persuade Justice Gorsuch, whose solo concurrence relied almost entirely on Salerno.

Later during the argument, Chief Justice Roberts returned to the theme:

John G. Roberts, Jr.: Well, but it—it's a facial challenge.

J. Matthew Wright: Right.

John G. Roberts, Jr.: And I understand your answer to say that there will be circumstances where someone could be shown to be sufficiently dangerous that the firearm can be taken from him.

J. Matthew Wright: Yes.

John G. Roberts, Jr.:
And why isn't that the end of the case?

J. Matthew Wright: Because —

John G. Roberts, Jr.
All you need to do is show that there are circumstances in which the statute can be constitutionally applied.

And that was the end of Rahimi's case.

The Lopez Court entertained a wide-range of hypotheticals why the Gun-Free School Zone Act, and indeed non-existent legislation, would be unconstitutional–even as Lopez himself was paid to deliver the gun! But in Rahimi, the Court narrowly construed the motion to dismiss the indictment as a "facial challenge," and refused to even consider any other applications in which the statute might be unconstitutional–even the very circumstances that the criminal defendant faced. Rahimi had the burden to show that the statute was unconstitutional in every circumstance, but Lopez did not have that burden. I often find myself writing that different litigants seem to have different burdens at the Supreme Court.

I am not an expert in this area, and I've been unable to find any clear guidance. Those who specialize in federal criminal defense may have some insights here. Please drop me a line. But at the very least, I see a tension between how the Court treated Lopez's challenge and how the Court treated Rahimi's challenge.

There are six cases remaining. The Court will be in session tomorrow. Friday, June 28. The Chief Justice did not announce that Friday will be the final day, so we will come back next week. The Court has announced that Monday, July 1 will be an opinion day. Here are my predictions for the final six cases.

From the January sitting, only Loper-Bright/Relentless remains. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh have not written from that sitting. Kavanaugh already has six opinions, so I think he is done for the term. Chevron is for the Chief.

From the February sitting, Corner Post and the NetChoice cases remain. Alito and Barrett have not written from that sitting. I predict Barrett will write a tight opinion in Corner Post, a nerdy procedure case. And Justice Alito will write for a very fractured Court in the social media cases.

From the April sitting, with the Moyle DIG, there were nine cases argued, six of which have already been decided. I predict that Chief Justice Roberts has the Trump immunity case. There is no way he gives that case up. I predict Justice Gorsuch has Fischer. He loves to hate on federal criminal law. And Justice Jackson has Grant's Pass. I think this case can be one of the surprise decisions of the term. Walking in, I thought there was no way the homeless people would prevail, but the oral argument suggests this opinion may be hard to write.

And, if I had to guess, Roberts will hold Chevron and Trump for Monday. Dump it during the Fourth of July weekend.

These predictions are worth what you paid.