The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002
Trump's Complaint Against the New York Times: A Long Press Release that Mangles "Actual Malice"
It’s mainly praise for Trump: “President Trump secured the greatest personal and political achievement in American history.”
The complaint for Donald Trump against the New York Times reads like a long press release. It says little to show the falsity of the factual statements it identifies, and mainly praises Trump. Among the many examples: in its second paragraph it states that in the 2024 election "President Trump secured the greatest personal and political achievement in American history." Or from paragraph 12:
Thanks solely to President Trump's sui generis charisma and unique business acumen, "The Apprentice" generated hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue, and remained on television for over thirteen years, with nearly 200 episodes. "The Apprentice" represented the cultural magnitude of President Trump's singular brilliance, which captured the zeitgeist of our time.
Beyond that, what jumped out at me is the complaint's repeated references to the subjective "malice" that the complaint says the defendants have toward Trump. As every law student who has taken a First Amendment class knows, "actual malice" in New York Times v. Sullivan is a term of art – the Court has repeatedly made clear that it is an objective standard that focuses on whether the defendant was reckless about the possible falsity of a factual claim, and not on the defendant's hatred, ill will, or enmity. But the complaint's references to actual malice focus on subjective hostility to Trump. For example, paragraph 117 begins:
Defendants' actual malice manifested in numerous ways. Defendants launched investigations into President Trump, his family, and his businesses for the express purpose of harming all three.
In the claims for relief, the complaint says that the defendants were aware of falsity but emphasize subjective dislike of Trump. Paragraphs 139 and 153 both say:
The statements were published by Defendants with actual malice, as part of a long term pattern, with oppression and fraud in that they were aware at the time of the falsity of the publication and thus, made said publications in bad faith, out of hatred and ill-will directed towards President Trump without any regard for the truth.
I assume that the lawyers know that judges who care about the law will focus on the objective standard as laid out by the Supreme Court. So why the focus on hatred and ill will? It's possible they think this will help persuade the public, but it's hard to imagine that many members of the public (other than Volokh Conspiracy readers!) will learn anything about this complaint, much less care. Maybe they believe that the judge who will hear this case is likely to be a political hack who will like the invocations of ill will, but even then an ordinary complaint seems like the smarter move, as it would give a political hack more cover to be political. Maybe they think this will persuade journalists, but journalists who are not ardent Trump supporters will likely call lawyers or law professors and be told that actual malice is an objective standard.
My guess is that the answer is tied to the lavish praise of Trump I noted at the beginning of this post: I think the complaint centrally has an audience of one (Trump), and more broadly his hardest core supporters. It's not written to persuade, but instead to affirm – that Trump is the greatest and that his opponents are deranged (from paragraph 107: "Defendants baselessly hate President Trump in a deranged way"). So maybe it reads like a press release because it is a press release – to the most devoted devoted sliver of his base.
[Edit: I initially used the term "brief" to avoid having readers think I was talking about a complaint in the ordinary sense rather than the legal sense, but a user comment led me to conclude otherwise, so I changed it "complaint."]
String-Instruments-Only City Rule for Restaurant's Outdoor Music Is Unconstitutional Content-Based Restriction
From Red, White & Booze, LLC v. City of St. Pete Beach, decided yesterday by Judge Kathryn Kimball Mizelle (M.D. Fla.):
A city-issued permit allows a restaurant to play outdoor music using only string instruments and allows amplified music for only a few hours each weekend…. Because I conclude that the permit's prohibition of certain kinds of instruments is a content-based restriction on First Amendment-protected expression and the city fails to show that the conditions survive strict scrutiny, I preliminarily enjoin the city from enforcing parts of the permit….
Some excerpts from the court's long analysis:
[1.] The First Amendment protects music, including instrumental music…. [I]nstrumental music can be communicative in at least two ways apart from lyrics ….
First, instrumental music can communicate by association. Certain tunes or musical arrangements, even those without words, can become associated with a concept or message such that the music itself carries that message independent of any verbal accompaniment. For example, John Phillips Sousa's "Stars and Stripes Forever," usually performed without its little-known lyrics, conveys a sense of American national pride through long association with patriotic occasions, even in listeners who may not know the song's patriotic name….
Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, instrumental music is expressive in its own right. It can lift up or cast down the spirit, raise the mind to heaven or distract with terrestrial matters, and stir the human soul to heroic or base deeds, all of which prove instrumental music's power to communicate. Music can evoke these responses in a hearer "completely disassociated from titles, linguistic signals, and other forms of art."
The inherent power of instrumental music to communicate has been recognized for millennia and by many. See, e.g., Plato, The Republic l. 401d (Allan Bloom trans.) ("[R]hythm and harmony most of all insinuate themselves into the inmost part of the soul."); St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Pt. II-II, Q. 91, Art. 2 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans.) ("[It] is evident that the human soul is moved in various ways according to various melodies of sound.")….
[2.] Music is "[t]he art or science of combining vocal or instrumental sounds to produce beauty of form, harmony, melody, rhythm, [and] expressive content." Music's content, then, is the way in which different sounds are combined to create a particular expressive musical work. Thus, a regulation that prohibits certain musical combinations of sounds is content based, while a regulation that may be justified without reference to how sounds are combined to create instrumental music is not….
Masada Speeches
Two memorable speeches in defense of freedom.
At Masada in the year 74, over 900 rebels chose death before surrender, an extreme stand for freedom. Masada is a famous episode in Jewish history. It was long an icon of Israeli nationalism, although recently some Israelis have turned away from it and what its suicides symbolize.
The Romans attacked Masada four years after they destroyed Jerusalem and the Temple in 70, thereby wiping out the center of the Great Revolt of Jews against Rome (66-70). It was the last of several mopping-up operations. The historian Josephus attributes two speeches to the leader of the rebels at Masada, Eleazar son of Yair.
I discuss those speeches in this excerpt from my new book, Jews vs. Rome: Two Centuries of Rebellion Against the World's Mightiest Empire (Simon & Schuster, 2025):
Masada is a steep-sided plateau, crowned by two palaces and a set of fortifications, that rises dramatically in the wilderness. Masada lies in the desolate and forbidding landscape of the Judean Desert. To the west rise scarred and craggy hills. To the east, the Dead Sea. Beyond the Dead Sea rise the rugged mountains of Moab. The Dead Sea is the lowest place on the surface of the earth….
Masada was a station on an ancient version of an Underground Railroad. It was a place where Sicarii ["dagger men," among the most determined of Rome's Jewish opponents]and other freedom seekers might stop before continuing to Egypt, Libya, Arabia, the Parthian [Iranian] Empire, or Galilee….
For all his harsh criticism of Eleazar and the Sicarii, Josephus attributes two speeches to Eleazar that are moving encomiums of freedom. Indeed, they are among the classic statements on freedom written in ancient Greek. (Josephus wrote in Greek, but Eleazar would no doubt have spoken in Aramaic or possibly Hebrew.)
New on NRO: "This Constitution Day, Celebrate the Triumph of Originalism"
"As we celebrate the Constitution’s 238th birthday, originalism is now the dominant approach — on the left and the right — to interpret the Constitution."
In honor of Constitution Day, and the launch of the Heritage Guide to the Constitution, John Malcolm and I authored an essay on National Review Online, titled: "This Constitution Day, Celebrate the Triumph of Originalism."
Five decades ago, originalism wasn't even an -ism. In the academy, at the bar, and on the courts, the Constitution was interpreted as a living, breathing document. Contemporary values mattered more than text, history, and tradition. Yet today, as we celebrate the Constitution's 238th birthday, originalism is now the dominant approach — on the left and the right — to interpret the Constitution.
Even Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson said during her confirmation hearing, "I believe that the Constitution is fixed in its meaning" and that looking to "original public meaning" is "a limitation on my authority to import my own policy." Still, critics charge that lawyers and judges, lacking Ph.D.s, are not qualified to perform historical research and that originalism is partisan and lacking in any sort of neutrality. These claims do not hold up.
For nearly five years, a coalition of 30 judges, 60 academics, and 60 practitioners united to assemble a definitive, comprehensive, and neutral statement about the entire Constitution's original meaning. This ground-breaking research will be published in the fully revised third edition of the Heritage Guide to the Constitution. Justice Samuel A. Alito wrote in his preface that "the new edition of The Heritage Guide is a great place to start" for all Americans who "want to understand what our Constitution means."
These judges, scholars, and advocates who contributed to this book teach us how to determine the Constitution's original meaning in the right chronological order: the history before 1787; the records of the Constitutional Convention; the ratification debates; early practice in the legislative and executive branches; and finally, judicial precedent. More than 200 essays break down every clause of the Constitution through these five steps.
Here are the five steps:
First, what were the origins of the text in the Constitution? . . . .
The second part of the originalist inquiry focuses on what the 55 delegates accomplished in Philadelphia to frame the Constitution. . . .
The third, and perhaps most important phase, was the ratification debates. . . .
The Constitution was formally ratified in 1788, and the new government assembled in 1789. At that point, the fourth phase began. How did the early actors in our government understand the Constitution? . . .
The fifth inquiry, finally, turns to the courts: What have judges, especially on the Supreme Court, said about a particular clause of the Constitution?
We conclude:
This five-step approach reflects originalist best practices that students, lawyers, and the judiciary should follow. The Supreme Court has often referred to the Constitution's text, history, and tradition to understand the document's original meaning. It is important to approach these inquiries in the right order.
Today in Supreme Court History: September 17, 1787
9/17/1787: The Constitution is signed.
Happy Constitution Day!
Introducing the Third Edition of "The Heritage Guide to the Constitution"
Attend the live virtual launch on Constitution Day at 9:30 a.m.
Since 2021, I have served as the Senior Editor of The Heritage Guide to the Constitution. After nearly four years, the work is complete. Today, on Constitution Day, we will launch the fully revised third edition.
You can register to virtually attend our event at this link. Here is the program:
Panel I | Originalism in Theory and Practice: Insights from the Legal Academy
- Charles J. Cooper, JD, Founding Member and Chairman, Cooper & Kirk, PLLC
- Kurt Lash, JD, E. Claiborne Robins Distinguished Chair in Law, University of Richmond School of Law
- Randy E. Barnett, JD, Patrick Hotung Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center and Faculty Director, Georgetown Center for the Constitution
- Josh Blackman, JD, Senior Editor, The Heritage Guide to the Constitution and Centennial Chair of Constitutional Law, South Texas College of Law Houston (moderator)
Panel II | The Originalist Turn: A Judicial Perspective
- The Honorable William H. Pryor Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- The Honorable David R. Stras, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
- The Honorable Elizabeth L. Branch, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- John G. Malcolm, Executive Editor, The Heritage Guide to the Constitution and Vice President, Institute for Constitutional Government, The Heritage Foundation (moderator)
Description
Over the past two decades, the federal judiciary has increasingly grounded its cases in the Constitution's original meaning. Students, scholars, lawyers, and judges are now expected to understand and apply the text, history, and tradition of the Constitution. The Third Edition of The Heritage Guide to the Constitution will provide a comprehensive starting point to research issues from before, during, and after the Constitution's adoption. It equips all Americans with an authoritative and accessible introduction to our foundational charter.
Each of these 216 essays, written by over 150 distinguished jurists, scholars, and practitioners, was carefully reviewed to ensure they are of the highest quality and accuracy. This once-a-decade publication strives to be the definitive compendium of each of the provisions of the Constitution.
Join us for this two-panel launch event that includes authors from the both the judiciary and legal academia.
"The time is now right for a third edition of The Heritage Guide to the Constitution. The project continues under the leadership of Josh Blackman and John Malcolm. They are building on the proud legacy of the prior editions. I am confident that this volume will serve a new generation of lawyers, professors, students, and ordinary citizens who are deeply committed to the jurisprudence of originalism I spoke about four decades ago."
— The Honorable Edwin Meese III, Seventy-Fifth Attorney General of the United States
"'We the people' adopted the Constitution, and it is important that all Americans understand what our founding document means. Since the publication of the first edition twenty years ago, The Heritage Guide to the Constitution has been an invaluable resource for judges, lawyers, and the public at large. It marries scholarly depth and sophistication with prose that is readily accessible. The new third edition of the Guide retains the virtues of its predecessors while deepening the discussion of how constitutional provisions were understood when they were adopted. . . . Today, no savvy attorney would disregard original meaning in briefing or arguing an unsettled constitutional question in federal court. For attorneys involved in such cases—and for all other Americans who want to understand what our Constitution means—the new edition of The Heritage Guide is a great place to start."
— Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court
I will have much more to say about this important work very soon.
AG Pam Bondi Says "We Can Prosecute You" for Refusing to Print Posters for Charlie Kirk Vigil
But there doesn't seem to be any federal law actually authorizing such prosecutions (or civil lawsuits).
The Hill (Ashleigh Fields) reports:
Attorney General Pam Bondi on Monday said the Justice Department was investigating an incident involving a Michigan Office Depot employee who refused to print flyers advertising a vigil for conservative activist Charlie Kirk…. Office Depot said last week they removed the employee responsible for denying the order placed by the Kalamazoo County Republican Party.
Here's the Bondi quote, from Hannity on Fox, starting about 4:42:
Businesses cannot discriminate. If you wanna go in and print posters with Charlie's pictures on them for a vigil, you have to let them do that. We can prosecute you for that. But I have Harmeet Dhillon right now in our Civil Rights unit looking at that immediately, that Office Depot had done that. We're looking at that.
But no federal law, to my knowledge, purports to ban stores from discriminating based on the political expression of the material they're asked to print.
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bans discrimination by certain places of public accommodation—such as restaurants, hotels, theaters, and places of public amusement—based on race, religion, and national origin. But it doesn't ban discrimination based on political views, and it doesn't apply to retailers, so it wouldn't apply here. It also bans discrimination based on disability, but that's not applicable here either. Businesses can discriminate, just not on bases that the law forbids; and here, federal law doesn't appear to forbid this sort of discrimination.
"Why Everything Pam Bondi Said About 'Hate Speech' Is Wrong"
The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (Aaron Terr & Angel Eduardo) have a good rundown. An excerpt:
While discussing the assassination of Charlie Kirk and campus antisemitism on The Katie Miller Podcast, Bondi said the Justice Department would investigate and prosecute incidents of "hate speech." While she's trying to go into damage control mode and walk back some of her mistakes, it's important to correct our nation's chief law enforcement officer on what is and isn't protected expression….
The idea that "hate speech" is a separate and unprotected category of expression is one that we, unfortunately, have had to debunk time and time again. The fact is there is no "hate speech" exception to the First Amendment, and there can't be. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion on multiple occasions, and the reasons for this should be obvious to someone in Bondi's position….
Early this morning, Bondi published a post on X, attempting to clarify her comments after a wave of negative response. Unfortunately, she only introduced more confusion:
Hate Crimes Targeting People Based on Political Speech (as in the Charlie Kirk Murder)
The charges in the Charlie Kirk case include:
VICTIM TARGETING ENHANCEMENT: In violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.14(2), Tyler James Robinson intentionally selected Charlie Kirk because of Tyler James Robinson's belief or perception regarding Charlie Kirk's political expression.
The Utah hate crimes sentencing enhancement statute indeed includes "political expression" alongside race, religion, and the like as covered "personal attributes," and provides,
A defendant is subject to enhanced penalties under Subsection (3) if the defendant intentionally selects … the victim of the criminal offense because of the defendant's belief or perception regarding the victim's personal attribute or a personal attribute of another individual or group of individuals with whom the victim has a relationship….
Some other jurisdictions do the same, though I can't say how many; my quick search pointed to D.C., Iowa, and West Virginia. Some states also impose civil liability for violence targeting people based on, among other things, their political affiliation; consider, for instance California's Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976:
Hotel's Defamation Lawsuit Against Rabbi Shmuley Boteach Over Anti-Semitism Allegations Can Go Forward
An excerpt from Fontainebleau Florida Hotel, LLC v. Botach, decided today by Judge K. Michael Moore (S.D. Fla.):
This case arises from an incident that occurred at the Fontainebleau Florida Hotel …. Plaintiff alleges that the following events occurred:
After more than an hour of loitering, Defendant Boteach engaged in an uneventful conversation with a registered guest of the Hotel and the two parted ways. More than an hour later (after midnight on Sunday, December 2, 2024), Defendant Boteach engaged in a verbal altercation with the same registered guest wherein the guest and Defendant Boteach exchanged hateful words at each other.
The guest used language that was heinous and accused Defendant Boteach of being a "baby killer" and other words that are easily interpreted as antisemitic. Defendant Boteach, in turn, hurled anti-Islamic words at the registered guest and repeatedly shouted, "Allahu Akbar? Are you going to blow yourself up or something? … he uses the expressions of, like, suicide bombers." Within hours, Defendant Boteach posted an edited video of the exchange on Instagram and began his campaign of threats against the Hotel, its ownership, its outside lawyer, and its employees—who had nothing to do with the altercation except that Hotel security de-escalated and ended it.
Plaintiff alleges that following the altercation, the Defendant, who the FAC [First Amendment Complaint] describes as a "social media influencer and rabbi" with "hundreds of thousands of social media followers[,]" went on a "multi-week assault on the [Hotel], its personnel, and representatives—creating AI videos purporting to show them celebrating antisemitism, comparing them to Nazi collaborators, falsely accusing them of banning Jews from the property, and fabricating statements that they embraced a policy of Judenrein, i.e., the extermination of six million Jews." The FAC alleges that Defendant falsely stated that he was denied entry to the Hotel because he is "too Jewish," that the Hotel refused to cooperate with law enforcement's investigation of the incident, and that he "was trespassed from the Hotel for being 'too Jewish[.]'"
Why Charlie Kirk's Murderer Is "Death Eligible" Under Utah's Death Penalty Statute
Utah prosecutors have a strong argument that the assassination created a great risk of death to another individual besides Kirk, allowing capital punishment under Utah law.
Today state prosecutors in Utah County, Utah, charged Tyler Robinson with "aggravated murder" under Utah law, making him eligible for the death penalty if convicted. The prosecutors also announced that they will seek the death penalty. Under Utah law, a murder becomes aggravated, and thus, death eligible, if prosecutors can prove a specific aggravating circumstance connected with the murder. Here, acting under Utah's capital murder statute (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202) prosecutors have alleged the aggravating circumstance that Kirk's murderer "knowingly created a great risk of death to another individual other than Charlie Kirk and the defendant." In my view the prosecutors have strong case that Kirk's murder fits within that aggravating circumstance, and thus that Robinson (if proven guilty) is eligible for the death penalty.
My purpose in writing this post is to set out the specific Utah law relevant to Robinson's prosecution for a capital crime. As a criminal law professor at Utah's public law school, I teach these subjects regularly. This post addresses only Utah state law, not federal charges that may be applicable. Similarly, this post attempts to describe existing Utah law, not the desirability of seeking the death penalty in the Kirk case nor, more broadly, the desirability of the death penalty in general.
The factual circumstances surrounding Kirk's assassination are generally well known. I won't recount them all here. But it is important to dispel some misconceptions about Utah's death penalty statute.
For a murder to be death-eligible in Utah, prosecutors must prove a specific aggravating circumstance—beyond the fact of intentional murder. The facts alleged (if proven) make clear that Robinson acted with premeditation and, indeed, was lying in wait to get the opportunity to shoot Kirk. Under some homicide statutes, that premeditation alone might well be sufficient to seek the death penalty. For example, in California, a murder committed with malice aforethought (i.e., without provocation) becomes death eligible where "[t]he defendant intentionally killed the victim by means of lying in wait."
Under Utah's murder statute, however, there is no general aggravation for lying in wait or clear premeditation. With some exceptions, Utah's criminal law statutes generally follow the Model Penal Code (MPC), which was drafted by the American Law Institute in the late 1950s and early 1960s to rationalize criminal statutes. The MPC abandoned the distinction between premeditated and "merely intentional" murder, providing for only a single degree of murder. When Utah revised its criminal code in around 1973, it followed the MPC's approach to categorizing homicides. See generally Paul N. Cox, Utah's New Penal Code, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 718.
Turning to Utah's death penalty provisions in particular, some history is helpful. In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down state death penalty statutes all over the country. In Furman v. Georgia, the Court held that the statutes in effect at the time generally led to unpredictable infliction of the death penalty. In the immediate wake of Furman, many states (including Utah) responded by re-enacting death penalty statutes that addressed Furman's concerns by guiding jury discretion on death penalty verdicts. In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these modern death penalty statutes.
In drafting more specific death penalty statutes, many states looked to the MPC death penalty provisions. These provisions made certain murders death-eligible if a specific aggravated circumstance was proven. Among other aggravating circumstances, the MPC made a murder death-eligible when "[t]he defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons." See Gregg, 429 U.S. at 194 n.44.
Utah looked to the MPC as a source for its aggravating circumstances in its death penalty statute. But, in its current form, Utah's death penalty statute modifies the MPC aggravator involving risk to "many persons." Instead, Utah's statute requires proof of "great risk of death to another individual" (other than the deceased individual or the murderer). This broader language is significant, because it means prosecutors need only show a great risk to one other person—besides Kirk—to make his murder death-eligible.
What does Utah's language mean when it describes "great risk of death to another individual"? To be clear, this issue of how to interpret the aggravating circumstance is (within broad constitutional limits) solely a question of Utah state law. It appears that Utah caselaw contains only a handful of decisions interpreting the "great risk of death" provision. The gist of these decisions is that the defendant's murder is aggravated if the defendant place another person within the "zone of danger" of death.
In Utah's most recent decision on the aggravator, State v. Sosa-Hurtado, 2019 UT 65, the Utah Supreme Court considered a case where the defendant shot at one person in the course of a robbery and then shot and killed another. Here are the facts: Read More
Washington Court of Appeals Concurrence's >2500-Word Sharp Criticism of President Trump
From the concurrence in Judge George Fearing's concurrence in today's Wilkinson v. Wash. Med. Comm'n. Judge Fearing wrote the majority opinion, which upheld discipline imposed on a doctor for his COVID-related treatment, but rejected such discipline for the doctor's public speech "downplaying the severity of the COVID pandemic, promoting the use of ivermectin over a vaccine, and criticizing the government's response to the pandemic." On balance, Judge Fearing's majority is quite a First-Amendment-protective opinion, and his separate concurrence also argued that the doctor's speech should be especially protected as political speech, and not just speech about medicine.
Then, several pages into his concurring opinion, Judge Fearing turned from the issues in the case to the First Amendment more broadly, and then to the political situation in the U.S. more broadly. A short excerpt from his long criticism (which offers specific details as well as general condemnation):
Not for more than two hundred years has any President sought to destroy the First Amendment as our current national leader has…. This President operates under an authoritarian and retributive agenda that trashes the First Amendment rights of those who criticize him or who support causes with which he disagrees. This President loathes the nonpartisan nature of the First Amendment…. Our current President refuses to answer legitimate questions posed by reporters and attacks inquiring journalists as unfair and stupid….
Doctor Can't Be Disciplined by Washington Medical Commission for Blog Posts About COVID
The posts were "downplaying the severity of the COVID pandemic, promoting the use of ivermectin over a vaccine, and criticizing the government's response to the pandemic."
A short excerpt from the very long Wilkinson v. Wash. Med. Comm'n, decided today by Washington Court of Appeals Judge George Fearing, joined by Chief Judge Robert Lawrence-Berrey and Judge Tracy Staab; it strikes me as generally correct:
Dr. Richard Wilkinson challenges discipline imposed on him by the Washington Medical Commission … related to his treatment of seven patients with COVID-19 and related to his clinic website's blogs downplaying the severity of the COVID pandemic, promoting the use of ivermectin over a vaccine, and criticizing the government's response to the pandemic…. We affirm the patient care discipline and reverse the blog sanctions. WMC's discipline of Dr. Wilkinson for his website blogs breached his First Amendment free speech rights….
The First Amendment confirms that the government lacks power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. As a result, we presume content-based restrictions on speech invalid….. Critical to this appeal is the extension of First Amendment protection to false statements. U.S. v. Alvarez (2012). This protection is essential because some false statements are inevitable with an open and vigorous expression of views in public and private conversation, expressions the First Amendment seeks to guarantee. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964)….
WMC suggests that speech by doctors must be consensus driven. It cites no authority for this position. The law, to the contrary, defeats this position. The First Amendment robustly protects a doctor who publicly advocates a treatment that the medical establishment considers outside the mainstream or even dangerous.
WMC's contention that it may monitor the scientific accuracy of physician's speech means that the State of Washington holds power to monitor speech and assess the trustworthiness of that speech. A government's power to protect truthful discourse would cast a chill on the exercise of free speech and thought. Alvarez.
According to Dr. Richard Wilkinson, WMC's finding that his statements were false supports Wilkinson's position. It shows punishment based on viewpoint discrimination. We agree. The First Amendment reserves to the people the right to assess truth. The state has no right to protect the public against false doctrine.
What Does the Rabbi Who Conducted Your Wedding Say About Your Religious and Political Views?
Very little.
I agree with everything Josh says about the inappropriateness of anyone attacking judicial nominee Rebecca Taibleson on the basis of religion, and specifically because the Reform rabbi who married Rebecca and her husband supports LGBT causes.
And while this is sort of religious attack is very inappropriate in general, I also want to point out that it's not just inappropriate but absurd in this particular context.
First, Reform Judaism openly supports allowing Jews to define Judaism in their own terms. So there is zero reason to think that because a Reform rabbi marries you, you agree with either that Rabbi or the official Reform position on any given issue, much less every issue.
For that matter, the fact that you got married by someone is a particularly poor indication of your political and religious values.
Why do people choose a particular rabbi to marry them?
"We just moved to the area, and this is the only rabbi we know."
"We have friends who referred us to this rabbi as doing beautiful ceremonies."
"It's the rabbi from my childhood who saw me grow up, and it would be particularly meaningful to have this rabbi do my marriage."
"The bride's parents live in X, where we are holding the wedding, and Rabbi Y is the only rabbi in town."
"The groom's family belongs to Temple Beth X, and as part of their membership dues the rabbi conducts weddings of congregants for free."
"This is the only rabbi in town willing to do intermarriages."
And so on. You know what I've never, ever heard any Jewish couple say?: "We chose this rabbi because we checked the rabbi's theological and political views, and they align 100% with ours."
Conflict of Interest Watch: Rebecca Taibleson's father is Michael Krauss, a retired law professor who was my colleague at Scalia Law for many years. I don't think I ever met Rebecca, though.
Random Trivia Watch: The vast majority of conservative Jewish judges since the Reagan era have been men. If Taibleson is confirmed, she will join Neomi Rao as one of two Trump-appointed Jewish women.
An Unfair and Uninformed Attack On Rebecca Taibleson's Jewish Faith
The Jewish Federation is a widely regarded Jewish charity that supports all Jews, and it is beyond the pale to attack a person based on their Rabbi.
Last month, I wrote about President Trump's nomination of Rebecca Taibleson to the Seventh Circuit. In recent weeks, I've heard rumors of opposition to Taibleson's nomination on the right. All candidates should be subject to public scrutiny, but one set of attacks, I think, crossed the line.
Taibleson has been attacked for donating a small sum of money to the Milwaukee Jewish Federation. In most cities with a Jewish population, the Federation exists as an umbrella organization that supports all Jewish causes. The Federation supports Jewish education, summer camps, services for seniors, helps Jewish people in times of crisis, and more. To be sure, there are Jewish people on the far left of the aisle. (Trust me, I know.) And they support all sorts of DEI activities. But the Federation also supports conservative and orthodox groups as well. And in our current moment, the Federation has been steadfast on support for Israel. Am Yisrael Chai. The people of Israel live.
My kids go to a JCC camp, which is funded by the Jewish Federation of Houston. Do I approve of everything the Federation does? Of course not. But I support much of their work, and have financially supported the Federation of the years.
I agree with Mike Fragoso's analogy to Catholic Charities:
But, you see, Taibleson donated a paltry sum to the Milwaukee Jewish Federation and they support LGBT rights. The Milwaukee Jewish Federation is the blanket Jewish social-services organization in Milwaukee, sort of like a Jewish version of Catholic Charities. Should we think that Brett Kavanaugh supports open borders because he volunteered for Catholic Charities? That will be news to the illegal aliens getting caught up in Los Angeles's renewed ICE sweeps. The fact is that you can infer malice in most any charitable act if only you choose to approach it in bad faith.
Another attack is far more scurrilous: that the Rabbi who married Rebecca and her husband supports LGBT causes. I think going after a person's spiritual leader, and house of worship, is beyond the pale. Full stop. The Religious Test Cause, whatever it means, should ensure that we do not scrutinize how a person worships the almighty. Moreover, most Reform synagogues have inclusive policies for gays and lesbians. But that doesn't mean everyone who attends the synagogue agrees on those issues. As I've said many times before, there is no single standard of Judaism. There is no Jewish equivalent of a pope. In a given synagogue, worshippers are not required to agree with their rabbi on everything or anything. Indeed, it is an old pastime for people to complain about everything their rabbi says and does.
Do we really want to start scrutinizing the particular religious beliefs of a judicial candidate? I think the answer has to be no.
Tomorrow is Rebecca's hearing, on Constitution Day fittingly enough. I hope these attacks concerning religion stay out of the proceedings.
The New Wave of Faculty Terminations
My two recent pieces in Chronicle of Higher Education
The Fall semester is not going well so far when it comes to campus speech. Obviously the most horrible event in this regard was the murder of Charlie Kirk while he was engaged in a public speaking event on a university campus. A few years ago there were numerous instances of mobs of students and agitators disrupting conservative speakers and rioting when conservative speakers came to a college campus. The pace of such mob activity seemed to have slowed, but the Kirk shooting is a terrible escalation.
Unfortunately, the Kirk shooting is not the only news on the campus speech front. In just the past few days, I have written two pieces for the Chronicle of Higher Education on moves to fire professors for speech that has drawn the ire of politicians.
The first responded on events at Texas A&M University, where an English lecturer was quickly fired after a viral video promulgated by a Republican state legislator. The video shows a confrontation in a class on children's literature in which a student objected to the professor presenting materials on gender identity. The university president initially defended the instructor and her academic freedom, until the Texas governor started demanding that she be fired.
From the piece:
Events in Texas have been fast moving, and a great deal of factual information about the case remains unknown. What is clear is that state-government officials are extremely willing to intervene to punish professors at state universities for saying things in the classroom that those politicians do not like, and that university presidents there are under immense pressure to comply with such demands. Academic freedom is a tenuous thing in such an environment.
Read the whole thing here (you will need a free account to sign in).
The second is at the top of the website this morning. This longer piece walks through the First Amendment rights of government employees and particularly professors and other employees of state universities. Since the murder of Charlie Kirk, there has been an orchestrated campaign to identify individuals who posted on social media celebrations of his death (or worse) and to pressure their employers to fire them for those posts. University employees have been just one target of that campaign, but several universities have been extremely quick to bow to that pressure and suspend or fire professors for their speech relating to Charlie Kirk. In the process, some universities have issued public statements egregiously mischaracterizing First Amendment doctrine. The piece points out the circumstances when such terminations are constitutionally permissible -- and when they are not.
From the conclusion of the piece:
The American Association of University Professors once emphasized that, when speaking in public, professors should remember that the public will "judge their profession and their institution by their utterances," so they should conduct themselves with discretion when speaking in public. That remains good advice. Higher education is now under extraordinary political pressure, and public confidence in colleges and the academic profession is in free fall. Professors who behave immaturely (or worse) in public exacerbate those problems. Perhaps more immediately, constitutional doctrine that treats professors as different and special compared to other government employees depends on a judgment that professors make positive contributions to our public discourse, even when those contributions are controversial. If professors are seen as polluting the public environment and contributing to political polarization and intolerance, the calculation of how to balance the competing constitutional interests is likely to change. Perhaps judges should continue to insist that professors are different even when they are chanting on the campus quad or posting on social media, but they are likely to do so only if they think professors are acting responsibly.
Even if a sense of public virtue is not sufficient to encourage professors to exercise more care when speaking in public, self-interest should.
For a more extensive discussion of constitutional doctrine and academic freedom principles related to professors speaking in public about matters of public concern, see my law review article here.
Debating the UCLA Anti-Israel Encampment
Even if the encampment organizers' behavior was reasonable, the university's behavior was still illegal.
UCLA law professor Joey Fishkin, an advocate for the 2024 "antizionist" encampment at his university, has a lengthy blog post defending the university from Title VI and constitutional religious discrimination allegations that were the subject of a Becket Fund lawsuit (since settled), and now a federal civil rights action. The heart of the claims is that UCLA violated the religious freedom of, and discriminated against, Jewish students, by allowing the encampment to exclude Jewish students from the encampment, which in turn at times blocked access to campus building. Fishkin responded:
I can say unequivocally based on direct observation that the language quoted above—the central allegation in the Becket Fund complaint—was false. There was no Jew Exclusion Zone. The claim that the encampment was "segregating Jewish students and preventing them from accessing the heart of campus, including classroom buildings [which must mean Royce] and the main undergraduate library [Powell]," as the Becket Fund complaint put it, is false.
I see Fishkin's post as a defense of conduct by the people who ran the encampment. But taken in its best light, it doesn't do much to exonerate UCLA.
Fishkin's argument is that those running the encampment were genuinely and reasonably concerned about avoiding disruption and, more important, the protestor's safety and security; did not intend to exclude Jews as such or otherwise have antisemitic intentions; did not intend to block access to buildings; did not believe they were doing so; and did not at least when he was there, make antisemitic statements, or put up violent or obviously offensive signs.
However, it's not the students who were sued, nor is it the students who are the subject of federal civil rights action. It's UCLA.
My bottom line: Even if the encampers reasonably feared disruption and for their safety, it was illegal of UCLA to allow them to block other students from public property based on suspicion that the students might be violent or disruptive.
Even if from the encampers' perspective it was reasonable from a safety/disruption perspective to be suspicious of Jewish students wearing kippahs or stars of David, or students who refused to pledge their adherence to anti-Zionism, and exclude them from a section of the quad, it was illegal for UCLA to allow them to do so.
Even if those who ran the encampment believed that they weren't blocking access to buildings, it was (a) illegal for UCLA to put up a barrier that even partially blocked access to buildings (including, as I understand it, blocking handicapped access!) unless students could gain access to the encampment--which Fishkin acknowledges UCLA did on April 30, and (b) to the extent that the library and other buildings were fully inaccessible unless you went through the encampment, it was even more egregiously illegal behavior by UCLA to allow access to the encampment area to be blocked.
