From a decision last year in Ali v. Osman, from Judge Stephanie Hayden (N.D. Cass County Dist. Ct.); I just learned about it because it's on appeal to the N.D. Supreme Court:
Sara and Mojahid were married on February 5, 2001 in Sudan.
Under Islamic law, a husband has the right to initiate a divorce ("talaq") against his wife. All that is required to achieve talaq is for a husband to pronounce his intent to divorce his wife on three separate occasions, either verbally or in writing. The husband does not need to communicate his three pronouncements to his wife. She need not be present for them or even aware of them. A wife cannot object to a talaq.
Unbeknownst to Sara, Mojahid pronounced talaq three times prior to December 11, 2022. On or about December 11, 2022, Mojahid obtained a Certificate of Divorce from Sara in Sudan (the "Divorce Certificate") based on his pronouncement of talaq. When he obtained the Divorce Certificate, neither Mojahid nor Sara lived in Sudan. They lived in the United Arab Emirates ("UAE") at the time, which had been their residence since 2015. Additionally, Sara was not present when Mojahid obtained the Divorce Certificate. Mojahid emailed Sara the Divorce Certificate on December 19, 2022.
From a Complaint in Murray v. Alphabet, Inc., just removed yesterday to federal court, one of the sets of screenshots that the plaintiff says were hallucinated by Google's AI Overview:
As usual for such libel-by-AI lawsuits, the claim isn't "Garbage In, Garbage Out," in the sense that Google is creating a summary from inaccurate online allegations and is thus parroting the inaccuracies. Rather, plaintiff claims that the allegations appear only in the AI Overview, and that the AI algorithm composed the allegations itself.
From yesterday's decision by Judge Dana Sabraw (S.D. Cal.) in Button v. Lopresti:
The Court accepts the Amended Complaint's allegations as true for purposes of resolving the motion to dismiss. Dusty Button was a world-renowned and well-known ballet dancer. She accumulated nearly half a million followers and subscribers on Instagram until December 2021, when she deleted her social media account due to "severe cyber bullying and harassment." Mitchell Button was a part of "Button Built," a team and brand for automotive design, builds, and work in the automotive industry. Mitchell Button also had nearly half a million followers and subscribers on his Instagram account, @button_built. He too deleted this social media account in 2021 because of "severe cyber bullying and harassment." …
In July 2021, Plaintiffs were sued in the United States District Court of Nevada for $131,000,000 ("Nevada Lawsuit"). The Nevada Lawsuit was publicized in thousands of articles, televised on news and media outlets such as Good Morning America, and published on social media pages and channels. [The lawsuit involved allegations of sexual assault. -EV] The coverage of the Nevada Lawsuit states Plaintiffs were sued in a civil action. Plaintiffs were never arrested, charged with any crime, or jailed in connection with the allegations contained in the Nevada Lawsuit. On January 6, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment in the Nevada Lawsuit. Plaintiffs posted a redacted version of the motion for summary judgment to their Instagram page, @WeTheButtons, which is "dedicated to providing accurate information about the [Nevada Lawsuit]." Defendant followed this Instagram page….
A third-party Instagram page, @trail.huntr, posted to Instagram a photo of Mitchell Button's automotive work. On January 27, 2025, Defendant posted a comment on this post, stating the Buttons were "locked up for some f*cked up stuff" and it was a "shame they weren't good people." The post by @trail.huntr was "shared" at least three hundred and twenty two times, and Defendant's comments were published to hundreds of thousands of people.
The Harlan Institute has completed the Fourteenth Annual Virtual Supreme Court Competition. This year, in honor of America's 250th Anniversary, the competition presented the case of Patriots v. Loyalists. This competition offered teams of two high school students the opportunity to research American history, write persuasive appellate briefs, argue against other students through video chats, and try to persuade a panel of esteemed attorneys during oral argument that the Declaration should be signed.
On April 7, we held the Final Four round at the Georgetown Supreme Court Institute. Presiding were Judge Kyle Duncan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and Judge Gregory Maggs of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. In the first match, the Petitioners were represented by Team #24358 from Creekview High School in Texas (Lauren Hohltand Tzur Shalit). Their coach was Jonathan Cartray. The Respondents were represented by Team # 24627 from Regis High School in New York (Cullen Brennan and Nicholas Kim). Their coach was Eric DiMichele.
In the second match, the Petitioners were represented by Team #24346 from Greenwich High School in Connecticut (Kaitlyn Qin and Diana Davidson). Their coach was Aaron Hull. The Respondents were represented by Team #24266 from the Baldwin School in Pennsylvania (Eileen Wang and Sarah Tarka). Their coach was Athan Biss.
After two excellent, closely-matched rounds, Team #24358 from Texas and Team #24346 from Connecticut advanced.
After the Final Four round, we walked over the Supreme Court for lunch, a tour, and a lecture. It is always a treat to bring students to the Supreme Court for the first time.
In the evening, we held the Championship Round at the National Archives. On permanent display in the Rotunda are the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. It was so special for students to debate the foundational question of independence in the presence of the Declaration. This may have been the first time since 1776 where the pro-Loyalist argument was presented before the Declaration.
Presiding were Judge Duane Benton (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit), Judge Neomi Rao (U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit), Justice Evan Young (Supreme Court of Texas), and Judge Charles Eskridge (U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas). Both teams presented compelling arguments for and against independence. In the the end, the judges selected the Patriots, Lauren Hohltand Tzur Shalit, as the Champions. Diana Davidson was selected as best oralist.
This was a magical evening and a fitting tribute to 250 years of independence. My sincere thanks two Elizabeth Steeves (Yale) and Shemaiah DeJorge (Georgetown) for helping to coordinate this competition.
An excerpt from a long Washington Court of Appeals decision approved yesterday for publication, Asbach v. Couto (Judge Bradley Maxa, joined by Chief Judge Bernard Veljacic and Judge Erik Price):
Couto and Karina divorced in 2012. Since then, Couto has had multiple DVPOs [Domestic Violence Protection Orders] issued against him regarding Karina, [his now-adult son] Aiden, and [his minor daughter] NC. Testimony in these cases and previous DVPO proceedings show that Couto frequently screamed at his family, threw things, waved a knife around, and engaged in other coercive, aggressive, and emotionally manipulative behaviors. Aiden's DVPO expired when he became an adult in 2023.
In 2024, Couto published a YouTube video in which he attempted to reach out to Aiden now that he was an adult. In the video, he stated that Karina had a narcissistic personality disorder and lies. Couto characterized this video as an attempt at reconciliation with Aiden.
Karina filed petitions for another DVPO for herself and to renew the DVPO for NC. Aiden also filed a petition for a DVPO based on the YouTube video and an allegation that Couto had intentionally shown up to Aiden's workplace and at a grocery store where NC was.
The trial court granted the DVPOs for Karina and Aiden. The court also renewed the DVPO for NC for one year, to which Couto had stipulated. The court found that Couto's YouTube video was a form of coercive control. The court's DVPOs required Couto to remove any YouTube video regarding Karina, Aiden or NC [the removal order wasn't challenged -EV], and prohibited him from posting or sharing any videos or other media with references to them.
Attorney John Randolph, who is bipolar, had a mental health episode on August 3, 2021. During the incident Randolph approached a child at a public park and tried to persuade the child to go boating or parasailing with him. When police responded, Randolph made several nonsensical statements, including an inaccurate belief that he was the child's father. According to Randolph, this conduct is consistent with the occurrence of a manic episode associated with bipolar disorder.
The matter resolved with Randolph pleading guilty to disturbing the peace. About two years later, Explore with Us (EWU) Media posted a 14-minute video on YouTube and Facebook, consisting of segmented police body camera (bodycam) and security camera footage of the August 3 incident. Portions of the video include EWU Media's voice-over narration that added information beyond what was depicted in the footage, including that Randolph "does, in fact, have a bit of dirt on him, so to speak," "apparently" is "hiding a rather tumultuous past," and could "relapse" at any time.
The posting received millions of views and thousands of comments, including references to Randolph being a pedophile. Randolph received harassing emails and voicemails, including a death threat. He eventually closed his law practice because of the constant harassment from the public. Randolph sued EWU Media, asserting multiple claims based on his assertion that the narration over the video was false and defamatory because it includes statements leading viewers to believe Randolph is a pedophile who could relapse at any moment….
5/13/1912: Seventeenth Amendment is approved by the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it the prior month. The Seventeenth Amendment was ratified in 1913.
According to plaintiff, “[Prof.] Harner believed Plaintiff’s planned zine project [class assignment] was on ‘the issue of ‘trans’ people sexually assaulting others in prison,’ a topic Harner found ‘so many issues with.’”
For purposes of the present motion, and resolving the disputed material facts in Plaintiff's favor, the Court finds:
Plaintiff's interaction with Defendant Vern Harner on April 20, 2023 was "momentary." Plaintiff mentioned she was thinking about focusing her zine project on women's rights and showed Harner her computer screen with a Google search for an article available; she "did not have any article open." Harner did not say much but told Plaintiff to make sure the source Plaintiff planned to use was reputable. Harner did not tell Plaintiff that her project idea violated social work values and ethics.
Either later that day or the next day, Harner identified and reviewed an article that Harner believed Plaintiff had open on her computer. Harner believed Plaintiff's planned zine project was on "the issue of 'trans' people sexually assaulting others in prison," a topic Harner found "so many issues with." One issue was Plaintiff's alleged reliance on the article as a source, which among other things, Harner identified as being "full of TERF and far right dog whistles and talking points." {TERF appears to refer to trans-exclusionary radical feminism.} Harner sought advice from Defendant Claudia Sellmaier, explaining Harner's impressions of Plaintiff to Sellmaier.
On April 27, 2023, Plaintiff presented Harner with her draft zine project sometime after 11:30 a.m. Harner planned three-to-five minutes with each student that morning. Harner did not identify why Plaintiff's project targeted transgender people or what specific social work standards Harner believed Plaintiff violated. Plaintiff expressed she did not understand why her project was not considered a social justice issue.
Harner became visibly upset reviewing and discussing the draft zine, eventually throwing their hands in the air and telling Plaintiff, "[t]his is targeting transgender." Their interaction ended and at some point Plaintiff asked to meet later that day with Harner, but Harner stated they were unavailable that day.
From Rice v. Schell, decided two weeks ago by Judge Matthew McFarland (S.D. Ohio), but just posted on Westlaw a few days ago:
Plaintiff Darryl Rice serves as a tenured and endowed associate professor of management for the Farmer School of Business at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio. For over a decade, Plaintiff has taught courses such as Diversity and Cross-Cultural Management, participated in Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion ("DEI") programming, and contributed to entities like DEI-based committees at Miami University. In April 2025, Miami University began to wind down certain programs and entities related to DEI. Specifically, the following entities were eventually discontinued: (1) the Office of Transformational and Inclusive Excellence, (2) the Farmer School of Business DEI Service Committee, (3) the Center for Student Diversity and Inclusion, (4) Miami Regional's Center for DEI, (5) the Department of Management DEI Service Committee, (6) Miami University's Across-the-Divide Conference, (7) the Office of Transformational and Inclusive Excellence Newsletter, (8) the Inclusive Excellence Faculty Fellows Program, (9) the DEI Mastermind Program, (10) the Diversity and Inclusion Networking Event, (11) DEI Professional Development Day, as well as other activities that Plaintiff had used to fulfill his service obligations. For purposes of Miami University's Tenure Track Guidelines, "service" obligations include "activities which contribute to the University's and/or the campus's mission," serving on committees, and providing continuing education programs if they are not already incorporated within the "teaching" category.
Miami University explained to Plaintiff that these closures were mandated by the Advance Ohio Higher Education Act ("S.B. 1"). That being said, Miami University began the process of closures and reorganization before S.B. 1 officially took effect. The Court pauses here to highlight particularly relevant portions of S.B. 1. This legislation commands that "the board of trustees of each state institution of higher education shall adopt and the institution shall enforce a policy" prohibiting, among other things, the following:
(1) Any orientation or training course regarding diversity, equity, and inclusion [unless an exception applies];
(2) The continuation of existing diversity, equity, and inclusion offices or departments; and
(3) Establishing new diversity, equity, and inclusion offices or departments….
Moreover, the statute reads: "Nothing in this section prohibits faculty or students from classroom instruction, discussion, or debate, so long as faculty members allow students to express intellectual diversity." …
Plaintiff sued, claiming that the law violated, among other things, the First Amendment, but the court disagreed:
It … proves helpful to contextualize this matter by emphasizing what is at issue and—perhaps just as importantly—what is not at issue. This is not a case involving allegations that the Government is compelling particular speech. This is not a case in which a university itself brings suit to enjoin a law. This is not a case in which students allege constitutional violations. This is not a case in which a plaintiff has been threatened with disciplinary action for certain speech. This is not a case involving allegations of a professor's speech being stymied in the classroom or on the campus green. Rather, this dispute centers around a professor who brings suit to enjoin a university to reestablish certain committees, programming, and events….
A recent YouGov poll shows the Court is likely less unpopular than before. The tariff ruling may have given it a boost. The poll has several other notable findings, as well.
A recent YouGov poll, conducted in early May, finds that 38% of Americans approve of the job the Supreme Court is doing, while 45% disapprove. That -7 net disapproval may not seem very impressive. But it's way better than the other two branches of government. In recent surveys, an average of 58% disapprove of Donald Trump, compared to 38% who disapprove. Congress' approval rating is much lower, still.
The Court's current numbers are also a modest improvement from polls conducted in mid to late 2025. At that time, an Economist/YouGov poll found a net -16 disapproval (51-35), Gallup found a -10 (52-42), and Quinnipiac a -13 (53-40). In fairness, a June 2025 YouGov poll found almost identical results to their most recent one (45% disapprove, 40% approve). But that appears to have been an outlier at the time.
To the extent that the Court has become less unpopular, it may be in part because of the recent decision in the tariff case (which I helped litigate). The May YouGov poll found 58% approving of the result, while only 25% disapprove. An earlier YouGov poll, conducted right after the ruling, found 60% approve and 23% disapprove. Thus, I may have helped make the Supreme Court a little more popular (or, rather, less unpopular). I'm sure I will get invited to all the cool SCOTUS holiday parties this year (OK, almost certainly not….).
Before going further, I should emphasize that public opinion is a poor barometer of the quality of the Court's decisions. Survey data shows most Americans know very little about the Constitution and the Court's work, and a majority cannot even name one Supreme Court justice. Similarly, I do not claim that broad public support for the tariff decision proves that the justices go it right (though I do in fact believe they got it right, for other reasons). Ideally, the justices should not be guided by public opinion. Insulating them from it is one of the reasons why they have life tenure.
But, as I have noted in the past, public opinion about the Court does matter in some ways. A highly unpopular Court is more vulnerable to measures to curb or even destroy its authority, such as court-packing. And the Court can more easily strike down major policy initiatives of the president and other political leaders if it knows doing so will enjoy substantial public support. If the Court becomes sufficiently unpopular, politicians could potentially defy its rulings with little fear of political consequences. Thus, while it is unlikely the Court decided the tariff case as it did merely because the tariffs are unpopular, that unpopularity may have made it easier for the justices to strike down one of Donald Trump's signature policy initiatives.
For these and other reasons, the Court's degree of public approval can matter. That's true even though the public's assessment of the Court's work says little about whether the justices are actually doing a good job or not. Indeed, if the Court were to become immensely popular, I would worry they weren't doing enough to protect the rights of unpopular minorities.
In addition to the Court's overall approval rating and the question about tariffs, the YouGov survey has several other interesting results. They also did approval ratings for all the individual justices:
Interestingly, the three liberal justices seem to have the highest approval ratings. All three have net positive ratings, while all six conservatives are net negative. But I would not give too much credence to these numbers. As noted above, most Americans cannot even name a Supreme Court justice, and many of those giving opinions in the YouGov survey probably know little or nothing about the justices in question. Even as it stands, for each of the justices 33% or more said they had no opinion, except Clarence Thomas (about whom only 27% had no opinion).
In addition to the tariff case, YouGov also asked respondents whether the Court should overturn Obergefell v. Hodges (the 2015 ruling striking down state laws banning same-sex marriage); 51% of respondents said "no" and only 24% said "yes." They similarly asked about the birthright citizenship case currently before the Court, on which issue 53% said the Court could ruled that "[a]ll children born in the U.S. should automatically become citizens," while 39% wanted it to rule that "[o]nly those children born in the U.S. whose parents are citizens or lawful permanent residents should automatically become citizens."
As with the tariff case, I agree with majority public opinion on both of these issues. I have argued the Court should rule against Trump in the birthright citizenship case, and that Obergefell v. Hodges is a landmark civil rights decision, even though its reasoning should have been better. It all goes to show I am a true Man of the People! OK, maybe not… In reality, I hold all kinds of unpopular views. And I think majority public opinion is often highly ignorant and influenced by bias.
On a slightly more serious note, Obergefell's strong popularity is one of the reasons why I think it is unlikely to be overruled. And the unpopularity of Trump's position on birthright citizenship is one reason why the Court probably won't hesitate to rule against him on this issue if a majority of justices believe he's wrong (as seemed likely, though not certain, to be the case after oral argument).
There are several other interesting questions in the survey, which I may post about it in the future, if time allows. For example, the poll confirms that term limits for Supreme Court justices are popular, while court-packing is not; this despite the fact that the question on the latter was favorably worded for the pro-packing side, inasmuch as it asked about "expanding the size of the Supreme Court" without mentioning that the reason for doing so was to change the ideological composition of the Court to one more favorable to one side of the political spectrum.
In sum, the public's view of the Court is only modestly negative, and much less so than its view of the president and Congress. That's hardly a rousing endorsement. But it's a lot better than the other two branches of government, and that difference may provide some protection against political attacks on judicial independence.
This afternoon, Justice Alito extended the administrative stays pausing the order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit halting the prescription of the abortion medication mifepristone via telemedicine. The new deadline is Thursday (when the Court is also expected to issue one or more opinions in argued cases).
What explains the extension? The justices are presumably deciding what to do about the stay applications. One possibility is that they will either grant or deny the stay requests, with one or more justices filing opinions. Another possibility is they are considering whether to grant certiorari before judgement to consider the threshold standing question, as the Fifth Circuit's order created a split with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
One factor potentially complicating the Court's consideration of these stay requests is the failure of the Food and Drug Administration to file anything with the Court. This complicates things because in the usual course the federal government is among those asking the Court to intervene when a lower court blocks a federal action. The Court generally assumes that orders blocking federal action cause irreparable harm to the federal government, and such harm is generally a threshold consideration for the Court to consider providing extraordinary relief. But here the FDA (or, rather, the Solicitor General) is silent, suggesting that the federal government is not too concerned about the Fifth Circuit's order. It also means there is no thumb on the scale when the justices balance the remaining equities.
Insofar as the justices' sense of which party is likely to prevail on the merits will do the work, I would think a stay will ultimately be granted, unless the justices decide to grant cert. Louisiana's arguments for Article III standing, like those in the AHM litigation, sound superficially plausible, but wilt under examination. Even assuming Louisiana has alleged cognizable injuries, it remains fairly speculative that the alleged injuries are fairly traceable to the FDA's decision to allow mifepristone prescriptions via telemedicine and quite uncertain that blocking the 2023 regulatory change would provide any meaningful redress. It is fair to complain that this could mean no one has standing to challenge FDA drug approvals or regulatory relaxations, but so be it.
It is fair to complain that the Court has not been particularly vigilant enforcing limits on state standing claims in recent years (U.S. v. Texas notwithstanding), but that's more an argument for granting cert, and ending "special solicitude" for state standing claims, than for compounding the error. Indeed, curtailing state standing is a necessary (but not sufficient) step the justices should take if they wish to scale back the demand for emergency relief on the interim docket.
Meanwhile, those who are generally critical of the Court's handling of the "shadow docket" must feel a bit conflicted. On the one hand, they surely want an immediate order blocking the action of the Fifth Circuit. On the other hand, they generally insist that the justices explain themselves, and drafting opinions takes time. It is almost as if there are trade-offs involved.
From today's decision by Judge Jeannette Vargas (S.D.N.Y.) in Goldstein v. CUNY:
On January 9, 2026, Plaintiff Avraham Goldstein ("Plaintiff") filed his Third Amended Complaint in this action. Plaintiff alleges that he is employed as an assistant professor at City University of New York, Borough of Manhattan Community College. He is an Israeli citizen, an Orthodox Jew, and a Zionist. Plaintiff alleges that he was the subject of discrimination and retaliation after he complained about a program on campus called the "Palestinian Solidarity Series." Plaintiff asserts claims for religious and national origin discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"), and New York Civil Rights Law ("NYCRL"), as well as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his rights to due process and equal protection.
Defendant Nadia A. Saleh ("Defendant") brings this motion to strike Paragraphs 34 through 46 of the Third Amended Complaint. These paragraphs purport to outline the historical origins of the current state of Israel, beginning in Biblical times, then outlining events that took place during the Roman empire through the present day. For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion to Strike is GRANTED.
"It is my hope that Pennsylvanians, and Americans, of all viewpoints and backgrounds will oppose and resist the scourge of Jew-hatred before it undermines what our ancestors have built here."
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice David Wecht makes this statement in his personal capacity. This statement is not made on behalf of any other person, nor on behalf of the Supreme Court or any other institution.
The people of Pennsylvania elected me. They put their faith in me, and I reciprocate. I have faith in Pennsylvanians, and they deserve to know the following.
In 1998, my wife and I were married at Pittsburgh's Tree of Life Congregation, on whose Board of Trustees I served. Twenty years later, in the very same sanctuary where our wedding occurred, the worst massacre of Jews in American history was perpetrated. That terror came from the right. Jew-hatred has always festered on the fringe of that sector.
In the years that have followed, that same hatred has grown on the left. Increasingly, it has moved from the fringe to the mainstream. It is the duty of all good people to fight this virus, and to do so before it is too late .
My jurisprudence and adjudication have always been independent, and they always will be. Now, my voting registration reflects that independence as well.
From 1998 to 2001, years that preceded my judicial career, I served as Vice-Chair of the Pennsylvania Democratic Party. In the quarter century that has passed since then, the Democratic Party has changed. Nazi tattoos, jihadist chants, intimidation and attacks at synagogues, and other hateful anti-Jewish invective and actions are minimized, ignored, and even coddled. Acquiescence to Jew-hatred is now disturbingly common among activists, leaders and even many elected officials in the Democratic Party.
