The Volokh Conspiracy Archive

Here's the story, somewhat simplified, from a case now labeled Breskin v. Blattberg (D. Mass.) (I had filed an amicus brief opposing pseudonymity, as part of my general opposition to pseudonymity in defamation cases, see, e.g., Roe v. Smith):

Son v. mother federal lawsuit threatened: Blattberg accuses his mother, Breskin (a psychologist), of having sexually abused him 30 years ago, when he was 4 to 7 years old. The son claims he "did not remember the abuse until 2024." The son's lawyer sends a demand letter to the mother, threatening to sue, with a draft Complaint attached. They apparently agree that the son's lawsuit won't be filed until the end of February. (Again, remember that these are just the son's claims; nothing has been proved.)

Mother v. son state lawsuit filed first, pseudonymously, and under seal: In late February, the mother gets to the courthouse first, by suing the son in Massachusetts state court for defamation over his sexual assault allegations, which the mother says the son had made to third parties (including her mother and other relatives). She claims the son is trying to extort her, and has long "suffered from serious and severe mental illness." The case is filed as Doe v. Doe. The same day, the mother asks that the Complaint be sealed (impounded, in Massachusetts terminology), and the Massachusetts court agrees immediately:

After review, the court treats the current motion as an ex parte motion to impound under MA R Impound P Rule 3. The court finds that immediate and irreparable injury may result if the motion is not allowed. See MA R Impound P Rule 3(a). Nevertheless, under the Rule, an interested party must have an opportunity to be heard in opposition within ten days of this order. MA R Impound P Rule 3(a).

Son v. mother federal lawsuit filed, mother v. son removed to federal court: The next day after the mother sues, the son sues the mother in federal court (there's apparently diversity jurisdiction), using the caption Blattberg v. Breskin. The day after, he removes the mother's Doe v. Doe case to federal court, as he's entitled to do because he and his mother are citizens of different states.

Mother's motion to dismiss and seal son v. mother lawsuit, and to proceed pseudonymously on the strength of the pseudonymous mother v. son lawsuit: Four days after the son sues, the mother moves to dismiss the son's federal case, on the grounds that she "previously filed a prior pending action against the Plaintiff arising from the same alleged facts and causes of action." She also moves to seal the son's federal case, and seeks a protective order "against any additional disclosure of the parties' identities." Judge Richard Stearns (D. Mass.) shows at least temporary openness to this; he declines to dismiss the case, but consolidates the mother's and son's now-federal cases, and rules,

5/20/1996: Romer v. Evans is decided.

From yesterday's decision by Judge Hector Gonzalez (E.D.N.Y.) in Harr v. City of N.Y.:

In 2003, in connection with the invasion of Iraq, the United States Department of Defense developed a deck of playing cards, titled "Iraqi Most Wanted," to help familiarize troops with members of Saddam Hussein's government and inner circle. Approximately 20 years later and days after UnitedHealthcare CEO, Brian Thompson, was shot and killed, Plaintiffs James Harr and Comrade Workwear, LLC developed a deck of cards, modeled after the U.S. military's deck, titled "Most Wanted CEOs." … Plaintiffs' cards:

featured a well-known corporate executive, their affiliated company, and a QR code linking to educational content about the harm their company allegedly caused, with each suit representing an industry—pharmaceuticals and chemicals, essential goods and housing, finance and tech, and weapons and oil—all based on public information, with no contact details or other personal information included.

On December 15, 2024, Plaintiffs unveiled the final designs for the Most Wanted CEO cards and launched preorders. The product description for the cards read: "For educational and entertainment purposes only." Later that day, NYP [the New York Post] published an article on its website that claimed Plaintiffs "call[ed] online for the death of corporate executives" and linked "the release of the playing cards to the recent homicide of UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson" (the "Article"). The Article included a screenshot of one of Plaintiff's social media posts which contained the phrase: "The CEO must die." The screenshot in the Article omitted Plaintiffs' caption to the post, a "disclaimer" that read, in part: "When we say the CEO must die, we mean the structure of capitalism must be broken."

On December 16, 2024, NYP published the Article as its cover story. Overnight, the Article, and, consequently, Plaintiffs' playing cards were front-page news. That same morning, New York City Police Department ("NYPD") officers arrived at Harr's home and spoke with his fiancée. A little later, officers interviewed Harr at his workplace and "questioned him about the cards and whether he had violent intent or ties to any extremist groups." Plaintiffs allege Harr informed the officers that "he was an independent artist running a merchandise company, that the cards were a symbolic and educational project, and that he had [already] made public disclaimers rejecting violence."

The next day, [NYPD] Commissioner Tisch spoke at a press conference announcing that an individual had been arrested in connection with the investigation of Mr. Thompson's homicide (the "December Press Conference"). Plaintiffs allege that Commissioner Tisch "held up [the print edition of the Article] and falsely described [Plaintiffs'] playing cards as a 'hit list,' call[ed] him an 'extreme activist,' and part of a 'lawless, violent mob' calling for the 'targeted assassination' of CEOs." …

The Commissioner's statements, Plaintiffs claim, marked the inception of a campaign to punish Plaintiffs for the cards. In their view, the Article, NYPD interviews, and December Press Conference were part of "a coordinated effort to distort the nature of [Plaintiffs'] work and publicly reframe [them] as a threat in order to support a broader narrative around political violence and public disorder." Before and after the December Press Conference, Plaintiffs were "de-platformed" (i.e., permanently disabled from accessing) several social media and e-commerce platforms that were integral to their business.

Approximately two months after the December Press Conference, law enforcement officials from the NYPD "served a seizure warrant on the FedEx facility where Plaintiff[s'] inventory of playing cards was being stored, resulting in the confiscation of [their] entire preorder shipment." Plaintiffs assert that confiscation of their merchandise was carried out at the behest of Commissioner Tisch and part of Defendants' coordinated effort to "systematically strip[ ] [Plaintiffs] of access to the platforms and tools that allowed [them] to speak, sell, and operate," and inflict "reputational, financial, and constitutional harm." …

Plaintiffs sued Commissioner Tisch, arguing that she unconstitutionally retaliated against them based on their constitutionally protected speech. The court concluded that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that their speech didn't fall within the First Amendment exceptions for true threats and incitement:

I recently spoke at my daughter's Girl Scouts troop about America's 250th birthday. I brought a box of tea bags, and hid them in the students' backpacks. I then had the girls search through everyone's bags to illustrate the dangers of the writs of assistance. We then threw all the tea bags into a bucket of water to simulate the Boston Tea Party. (I wanted to simulate the Boston Massacre with nerf guns, but I was overruled.) My daughter often complains that no women signed the Declaration of Independence, so I brought a huge parchment copy of the Declaration, and had all the girls sign them with ballpoint quills. They really felt part of the movement.

At the end of the session, I showed them the classic Schoolhouse Rock video, "The Shot Heard Round The World." I wondered how these young kinds would react to such an old school video from 1975. The animation is crude but the narrative is timeless. The music is still entertaining and the lyrics are clear. The Scouts were enraptured and understood exactly what happened. Plus they connected my lesson earlier about the Revolutionary War with the video. They all booed at the Red Coats and King George.

There is a reason we still watch these videos five decades later. Great care, art, and attention was put into producing this video.

This brings me to the Federal Circuit's attempt at a "School House" rock video. I've since learned that Judge Newman was in the room when Chief Judge Moore played the video. The consensus was "WTF?" They literally erased a federal judge from the video. I understand there is a Senate Appropriations Committee hearing coming up with the Judiciary. The Administrative Office should be held to account for Moore's narcissistic taxpayer-funded fever-dream.

But beyond the substance, I have to criticize the art. It is obvious someone asked AI to generate a theme song about the Federal Circuit. And the output reflects that process. The tune was so bland and boring. The lyrics were completely unmemorable. Even now, I can't remember a single line from the song. The animations were clean enough, but the motions were so unnatural. And the imagery made no sense. Why was Ronald Reagan leading a Conga Line with Uncle Sam in the caboose? Why did the Judges wave glow sticks at Studio 54? Why did Chief Judge Moore fly off the bench to do a dance routine?

Anyone with artistic talent would have realized this video was terrible. But that is the dangerous allure of AI: it allows people without talent to pretend to be talented. Before AI, this video could have never been made. With AI, this video should never have been made. And, because everyone at the Judicial Conference was a captive audience, they have to dutifully applaud. No one will be watching this video in fifty years. I doubt anyone will be watching it in five days.

If I may draw a contrast, the award-winning Garland Walker Inn of Court in Houston puts on an annual musical review. This year, in honor of America 250, the Inn produced a show about those who signed the Declaration of Independence, and those who did not. It was funny, moving, and always entertaining. We are blessed in Houston to have such talented judges and lawyers (some of whom are my former students). Chief Judge Elrod and Judge Charles Eskridge were among the leads. One of the lead singers had performed on Broadway. The group did a reprise at the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference. It was a rousing success.

Even during the pandemic, members of the Houston bench were able to produce a hilarious video inspired by Hamilton.

Patent nerds should not pretend to be talented enough to boast about making a Schoolhouse Rock video. Also, they should stop erasing Pauline Newman.

I am not a fan of Bill Maher. I saw him perform when I was a Summer Associate in 2008 in Washington, D.C. I found him far more smug than funny. Whatever. Not my cup of tea. But I was moved by his recent segment titled "New Rule: No Jews, No News." He makes the obvious, and powerful point, that modern discourse about "colonialism" and "genocide" is simply anti-semitism dressed up in academic garb. It is also noteworthy that there were only scattered applauses in the crowd. The reliably liberal audience was unsure whether it was safe to laugh. Watch it all, or read the transcript after the jump.

From Brooks v. Lowes Home Centers LLC, decided yesterday by Judge Jerry Edwards, Jr. (W.D. La.):

In resolving a prior motion in this case, the Court discovered that the plaintiff's briefs contained misquoted or mischaracterized precedent…. Mr. Wilkins[, one of plaintiff's lawyers,] took full responsibility. Wilkins explained that he utilized an artificial intelligence ("AI") platform, Claude, to generate the brief. As part of his process, Mr. Wilkins had Claude's draft reviewed by a human law clerk, who discovered that Claude had hallucinated quotations. Mr. Wilkins then confronted Claude with the identified errors and entrusted Claude to correct them. Instead, Claude just made up more stuff. Mr. Wilkins filed that second output into the record without review.

To prevent this from happening again, Mr. Wilkins will have "a human with a law degree" perform a final check of every citation and quotation before filing briefs with the Court. Now for the Court's sanction.

We commend Mr. Wilkins for his candor, honesty, and the remedial measures he has undertaken since the filing of the offending brief. But these mitigating factors do not excuse Mr. Wilkins' conduct. "At the very least, the duties imposed by Rule 11 require that attorneys read, and thereby confirm the existence and validity of, the legal authorities on which they rely." Unchecked, unleashing AI on the Court creates a "burden." Ignorance of the risks of AI usage is no longer an excuse. And here, Mr. Wilkins affirmatively knew the risks. How he then could have blindly and solely trusted Claude to remedy the brief is difficult to fathom.

Wilkins was therefore sanctioned $1000.

In every state and in the federal criminal justice system, when a crime victim is killed, the law allows a family member or other representative to step into the victim's shoes and assert the victim's rights. That framework has become a routine and influential feature of modern criminal justice, embedded in statutes, constitutional provisions, and everyday courtroom practice. Yet despite its centrality, the justifications for this arrangement have received relatively little sustained scholarly attention. That gap has become more apparent following Professor Lee Kovarsky's recent article, "The Victims' Rights Mismatch," which offers a serious and thoughtful challenge to prevailing assumptions about deceased-victim representation and calls for sharply limiting victims' rights in such cases.

In a new article available on SSRN (and soon to be published in the U.C. Irvine Law Review), Professor Peter Reilly and I defend the conventional wisdom. Our article explains why a victim's death does not extinguish the justification for victim participation when that participation is exercised through a representative. Drawing on history, doctrine, and experience in actual criminal litigation, our article shows that representation of deceased victims is deeply rooted in Anglo-American law and consistent with related doctrines such as survival actions. It further demonstrates that the core justifications for victims' rights—expressive, participatory, and institutional—do not disappear when asserted through a representative. Nor does representative participation reduce sentencing to judgments of "social worth."

Finally, through a detailed examination of United States v. Boeing—the deadliest corporate crime in U.S. history, arising from two Boeing 737 MAX crashes (as I have blogged about previously here, here, and here)—our article illustrates how deceased-victim representation operates in practice as an important check on prosecutorial discretion and as a safeguard for transparency, accountability, and public confidence in the criminal justice system.

To give you a flavor our argument, here's our introduction: Read More

From Thursday's decision by Magistrate Judge JoAnna Gibson McFadden in Doe v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC:

Jane Doe has sued Amazon.com Services LLC for employment discrimination and seeks to proceed under a pseudonym in all public filings….

In short, Doe is concerned that naming herself publicly in this suit will somehow impair her ability to acquire documents necessary for her pending permanent residency application…. According to her motion, she is present in the United States on an employer-sponsored work authorization, and her lawful status "is dependent on maintaining continuous, non-disrupted employment." She "is engaged in an active employment-based permanent residency process," and her "permanent residency application is currently pending before the United States Department of Labor." This process "consists of multiple sequential stages that must be completed in a defined order and within specific timing constraints." Once the Department of Labor completes its review, Doe "must initiate the next phase within approximately three months" and must complete the phase in "December of this year."

Among the materials Doe must submit and verify is "detailed experience documentation, including letters from prior employers describing specialized skills." … She acquired "a substantial portion of the specialized skills that [she] must document" while she worked for the defendant. She "must therefore rely on documentation, verification, or references associated with Defendant, or individuals associated with Defendant, to satisfy immigration requirements." …

Doe contends that "[p]ublic identification of [her] in connection with this [employment discrimination] litigation creates a material risk of impairing [her] ability to obtain necessary cooperation, references, or documentation from the limited available sources during this critical period" of her immigration process. "Delays in obtaining required documentation within the relevant window may affect the sequencing and timing of subsequent stages." …

5/19/1921: Chief Justice Edward Douglass White dies.

On Monday afternoon, I received an email from a PR firm that I thought was a fake. It began:

Please see here for the fun Schoolhouse Rock-style cartoon theme song for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that Chief Judge Kimberly A. Moore played at their Judiciary Conference on Fri. in Washington. The crowd seemed to enjoy, and it does a good job of explaining the court.

For starters, I have spent several year ripping Moore for her stealth impeachment of Judge Pauline Newman. What brilliant PR flack put me on the distribution list? But then I clicked on the link and realized the video was in fact real. Moore actually retained a PR firm to publicize a cartoon theme song that she apparently commissioned.

I didn't think it was possible, but Moore has given Neal Katyal a run for most cringey YouTube video in recent memory. This video was clearly generated by AI. And I would wager AI also composed the lyrics and generated the vocal tracks. Everything about this video is fake. And it is awful.

Try to watch it without wincing. I've downloaded the video, in the likely event they take it down.

Given the standard applied to Judge Newman, this colossal error in judgment by Chief Judge Moore should warrant some sort of cognitive evaluation. How could she possibly think this was a good idea--so good to hire a PR firm to publicize it? Chief Justice Roberts, if you're reading, take away her cases, immediately. Hell, this video is so bad, Judge Moore may have failed to serve during "good behaviour."

After the jump, I'll break down this ridiculous feature, line-by-line.

The state trial court handed down its ruling in People v. Mangione, on whether to suppress part of all of the contents of the backpack Luigi Mangione was carrying at the time of his arrest in the state prosecution against him. In the federal case against Mangione, the federal court back in January denied the motion to suppress the contents of the backpack. But today the state court suppresses some of the contents for the state court prosecution (in particular, the magazine, cellphone, passport, wallet and computer chip) and allows the government to use other contents (in particular, the red notebook).

I found the new opinion a little odd. There's a part I was expecting that wasn't addressed. I thought I would explain what it is. [UPDATE: See below for what appears to be the explanation, rooted in New York state constitutional law.]

First, the opinion. The court begins by concluding that the relevant law is the federal Fourth Amendment and the New York Constitution, even though the actions were those of Pennsylvania police in Pennsylvania. So the heightened restrictions of New York law apply to the Pennsylvania officers, even though they presumably didn't know (and maybe couldn't know) they would be governed by New York state search and seizure law.

Second, the court concludes that New York search and seizure law settles what I have called the "moving property problem": If someone has a backpack, and it is moved away from a person, New York law says it can't be searched incident to arrest because the exigency is gone and the backpack is no longer in the area of the suspect's control.

Third, the court turns to the search at the police station, where the items in the backpack were searched. This search was fine, the court says: although the search at the McDonalds can't be allowed as an incident-to-arrest search, the search at the police station was valid as an inventory search. In particular, this allows admission of the notebook found in the backpack that wasn't searched at the McDonalds.

Fourth, the court says that the warrant the government obtained later that today to search the backpack does not make the contents admissible under the independent source doctrine, as this wasn't an independent source.

Beyond the part about New York law applying—a matter of the scope of New York law that I don't have a view of myself—I'm puzzled as to why there's no inevitable discovery argument based on the inventory search. That's the main argument that the federal court rested on in denying the motion to suppress, based on the same facts: the police were going to inventory everything anyway and find everything anyway, so everything they found in the backpack was going to be discovered anyway in the inventory, regardless of whether they initially searched it lawfully or not.

As far as I can tell, the state court does not address this argument, although I would think it's the key argument to address. Did the state not raise it? Or is there something about New York state law that makes that an improper argument? I don't know, as I haven't followed the case closely enough to say.

UPDATE: A New York lawyer writes in that it's an issue of New York law, where the inevitable discovery exception is a lot narrower than it is under federal law. See People v. Stith, 69 NY2d 313, 318–19 (1987): Read More

Today the Supreme Court GVR'd two cases in light of Callais. State Board of Election Commissioners v. Mississippi NAACP and Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. North Dakota presented the same issue: whether there is a private cause of action under Section 2. And, in both cases, Justice Jackson dissented. She wrote:

This case presents only the question of Section 2's private enforceability, which our decision in Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U. S. ___ (2026), did not address. Thus I see no basis for vacating the lower court's judgment.

Last week, the Court GVR'd a case from Alabama, Allen v. Caster, in light of Callais. Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. They contended that in addition to a Section 2 claim, the District Court also found a vote dilution claim, so there was no reason to GVR.

Today, the Court vacates a District Court order enjoining Alabama's 2023 Redistricting Plan and remands for reconsideration in light of the Court's new interpretation of §2 of the Voting Rights Act in Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U. S. ___ (2026). There is no reason to do so. In addition to holdingthat Alabama's 2023 Redistricting Plan violates §2, the District Court held, in one of the three cases before this Court, that Alabama violated the Fourteenth Amendment by intentionally diluting the votes of Black voters in Alabama. That constitutional finding of intentional discrimination is independent of, and unaffected by, any of the legal issues discussed in Callais. Vacatur is thus inappropriate and will cause only confusion as Alabamians begin to vote in the elections scheduled for next week. I respectfully dissent.

What is going on here?

I think much of the criticism of the "shadow" docket is overblown. When the Court grants or denies a stay, you can usually figure out why they did so. But the GVRs are often more cryptic. Often the Court is telling the parties to look at one issue, but in reality know another issue will resolve it.

For example, the cases from Mississippi and North Dakota are Section 2 cases. The question of whether there is an enforceable private cause of action only matters if in fact there is a Section 2 violation. You usually think of the existence of a cause of action as a non-merits threshold issue, but in reality, if there is no discrimination, the Supreme Court won't have to decide the threshold issue.

In light of Callais, I think it very, very unlikely that the Plaintiffs can prove an intentional racial gerrymander. And they may not want to. Remember, the Court vacated the entire judgment of the lower court. The parties have to start from square one. They would have to hold a new trial based on new evidence. And, as all know, Mississippi will likely redistrict in the near future, so the case would be mooted out. The NAACP may simply decide this particular case is not worth fighting. Why litigate over old maps that will not affect anyone? Thus the case goes away I am less familiar with the facts in North Dakota, but I suspect similar dynamic are at play. The Justices may never have to actually decide the private cause of action case under Section 2 because Section 2 will have very little vitality post-Callais. (Derek Muller has a new paper on private rights of action for election litigation.)

The Alabama GVR is a bit trickier to figure out. It isn't clear to me that the vote dilution case is controlled by Callais. But perhaps the Justices are hoping the District Court extends the Callais rule to the Fourteenth Amendment context. Then, the Court can summarily affirm, or something to that extent.

The Court's general practice, it seems, is to issue a landmark ruling then hide for a while. They took this path with affirmative action, abortion, guns, and now will do it with voting rights.

From today's Second Circuit decision in Christian v. Keane, in an opinion by Judge Joseph Bianco, joined by Judge Eunice Lee and, as to the Private Proverty Provision, Judge Steven Menashi:

These two appeals involve Plaintiffs' Second Amendment challenge to New York's Concealed Carry Improvement Act ("CCIA") provisions prohibiting firearm possession in two types of locations: (1) private property "where [a] person knows or reasonably should know that the owner or lessee of such property has not permitted such possession by clear and conspicuous signage indicating that the carrying of [guns] on their property is permitted or by otherwise giving express consent; and (2) "sensitive locations. Plaintiffs challenge the Private Property Provision, as applied to private property open to the public. Plaintiffs asserted only a facial challenge to the Public Parks Provision in the district court, but now also seek to raise an as-applied challenge based upon its application to rural parks.

We conclude that the Private Property Provision, as applied to private property open to the public, is unconstitutional because the State did not carry its burden of demonstrating that the restriction falls within our Nation's historical tradition of gun regulations, as required under the framework set forth in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen (2022). On the other hand, we conclude that the Public Parks Provision survives Plaintiffs' facial challenge because the State has carried its burden of showing that regulation is consistent with our Nation's historical tradition of banning gun possession in urban public parks. Finally, we decline to address any as-applied challenge to the Public Parks Provision, to the extent it applies to rural parks, because Plaintiffs failed to raise that challenge in the district court.

Judge Menashi dissented in part as to the Public Parks Provision.

From Magistrate Judge Elsa Bullard (D. Minn.) Wednesday in U.S. v. Doyle:

On January 26, 2026, the Government filed a complaint alleging that Defendant Joshua Doyle "did forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, or interfere with … Victim 1, a United State[s] Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent" performing official duties, and made physical contact with the victim, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1)….

Mr. Doyle moves for a "gag order" based on two posts that he alleges former Attorney General Pam Bondi made "regarding Mr. Doyle" prior to his initial appearance. Mr. Doyle asks me to "prohibit[ ] the Government from making further statements about [him]" and to direct Bondi to remove the two posts.

On January 28, former Attorney General Pam Bondi allegedly made two posts on the social-media platform, X.

In the first post, made at 12:53 pm., she stated:

I am on the ground in Minneapolis today. Federal agents have arrested 16 Minnesota rioters for allegedly assaulting federal law enforcement—people who have been resisting and impeding our federal law enforcement agents. We expect more arrests to come. I've said it before and I'll say it again: NOTHING will stop President Trump and this Department of Justice from enforcing the law."

In the second post, made at 1:10 p.m., Mr. Doyle alleges that Bondi posted a "'booking' style photo" of him….

Mr. Doyle's briefing suggests three separate grounds for a gag order.

From E.B. v. Kimi Crush Ltd., decided Thursday by Judge Michelle Peterson (W.D. Wash.):

On March 3, 2026, Plaintiff E.B. filed a complaint on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, bringing Washington state law claims alleging that Defendants Kimi Crush Limited …, Ant Hive Creations, Inc. …, Prinsloo Global Group, Inc. …, JoyBox Studio Limited …, and Starfish Technology Limited … operated illegal online casino games. Plaintiff states that she is a criminal defense attorney who faces reputational and professional harm if her diagnosed gambling addiction becomes known….

Plaintiff requests to proceed under the pseudonym E.B. to "(i) maintain her privacy when disclosing personal and highly sensitive details, such as her diagnosed gambling addiction; and (ii) protect her from the significant risk of professional and reputational harm[.]" …

A party's use of a fictitious name or pseudonym runs counter to "the public's common law right of access to judicial proceedings and Rule 10(a)'s command that the title of every complaint 'include the names of all the parties[.]'" Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit "permit[s] parties to proceed anonymously when special circumstances justify secrecy." Proceeding under a pseudonym is permissible when "necessary … to protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment." …

The Court finds Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing of the "need for anonymity to at least warrant provisionally granting her leave to continue pseudonymously until Defendants have appeared." … Plaintiff contends she risks substantial social and professional stigma should her gambling addiction become public knowledge. She raises reasonable concerns that this would affect her ability to attract and retain clients.

So Special Judge Steven David (Ind. Super. Ct. St. Joseph County) ruled Friday. There had been a dispute about the reasonableness of the attorney fees, as there often is, but the court largely ruled that defendant's fee request was indeed reasonable (with only modest deductions). It also noted that the plaintiff didn't use the opportunity to present live evidence at the fee hearing, which might have offered more of a chance at successfully challenging the fees:

No questions were asked of [defendant's] Lead Counsel. No one asked him to be placed under oath to give additional testimony other than his previous declarations. He was not asked to justify the hours. He was not asked any questions at all that may have helped the trial court judge determine what was reasonable or unreasonable. Such an examination would seem to this trial judge as to have been very helpful to it in its determination of what is reasonable and what is not.

For more on the substance of the case, here's an excerpt from the opinion in Kay v. Irish Rover Inc., decided last year by Indiana Court of Appeals Judge Paul Mathias, joined by Judges Elaine Brown and Dana Kenworthy:

Dr. Tamara Kay appeals the St. Joseph Superior Court's order granting The Irish Rover, Inc.'s, motion to dismiss her defamation claim…. On the dates the alleged defamation occurred, Dr. Kay was a tenured professor in the Keough School of Global Affairs and the Sociology Department at the University of Notre Dame. Her "academic research and teaching is focused on trade, labor, social movements, globalization, organizations, and global health which includes reproductive health and rights." Many of Dr. Kay's extensive writings in journals, newspapers, and on Twitter focus on advocating for abortion legalization.

The Irish Rover is an independent, student newspaper at the University. {[O]ne of its missions is to articulate and defend the Catholic character of the University.} …

After the United States Supreme Court decided Dobbs v. Jackson Woman's Health Organization on June 24, 2022, Dr. Kay "became more outspoken on the issue of abortion access," including more frequent posts on Twitter. On September 15, 2022, the Indiana General Assembly's legislation limiting abortion in Indiana took effect, although it was enjoined shortly thereafter….

Kay sued over two articles published by the Irish Rover that concerned Dr. Kay's speech. To oversimplify matters somewhat, under Indiana libel law, a libel claim based on speech on matters of public concern can only prevail based on a showing of knowing or reckless falsehood—mere negligence isn't enough, even if plaintiff is a private figure. (In this respect, Indiana libel law is more speaker-protective than the constitutional minimum set forth by First Amendment law.) And here, the court concluded that the Rover's statements were either true or at least reasonable interpretations of the facts that the Rover had, and certainly weren't knowingly or recklessly false:

The Volokh Conspiracy

Use This One Weird Trick to Keep Your Name Out of an Upcoming Sexual Assault Lawsuit Against You

Today in Supreme Court History: May 20, 1996

Open Thread

Court Rejects First Amendment Claims Against NYPD Commissioner Brought by "Most Wanted CEOs" Card Makers

The Dangerous Allure When Untalented People Use AI

Bill Maher On The Blatant Double Standard For Antisemitism

"Instead, Claude Just Made Up More Stuff"

Plaintiff's Immigration Concerns Don't Justify Pseudonymity

Today in Supreme Court History: May 19, 1921

Open Thread

Chief Judge Moore Commissions Bizarre AI Cartoon About The Federal Circuit Without Judge Newman

The Missing Part of the State Court Mangione Suppression Ruling?

Why is the Court GVRing Cases In Light Of Callais That Did Not Turn On The Issues In Callais?

The Second Amendment, Guns on Private Property, Guns in Parks, and "The Fifth Element"

Court Refuses to Order Pam Bondi to Delete Tweeted Booking Photos in Prosecution for Interference with ICE in Minneapolis

Plaintiff Can Sue Pseudonymously Because She's a Criminal Defense Lawyer with a Gambling Addiction

Notre Dame Pro-Abortion-Rights Professor Ordered to Pay $200K in Fees in Failed Libel Lawsuit Against Student Newspaper

Recent Volokh Posts

Volokh Conspiracy Daily E-mail

I WANT FREE MINDS AND FREE MARKETS!

I WANT TO FUND FREE MINDS AND FREE MARKETS

SUPPORT HONEST JOURNALISM

PUSH BACK

HELP KEEP MEDIA FREE & FEARLESS

STAND FOR FREE MINDS

PUSH BACK AGAINST SOCIALIST IDEAS

FIGHT BAD IDEAS WITH FACTS

BAD ECONOMIC IDEAS ARE EVERYWHERE. LET’S FIGHT BACK.

JOIN THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM

BACK JOURNALISM THAT PUSHES BACK AGAINST SOCIALISM

FIGHT BACK AGAINST BAD ECONOMICS.