The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Free Speech

"Professor Sues University of Texas for First Amendment Violations"

|

This is just a complaint at this stage (Lowery v. Mills (W.D. Tex.)), so these are only the plaintiff's allegations, but he's being represented by the people at the Institute for Free Speech, whose work I've generally found quite reliable. (I e-mailed UT on Thursday to ask if they had a statement, and have so far gotten no response.) From IFS's announcement:

A finance professor is suing officials at the University of Texas at Austin (UT) who threatened to punish him for his criticism of the university by threatening his job, reducing his pay, and removing his affiliation with UT's Salem Center.

In a complaint filed in the Austin federal court, Dr. Richard Lowery, an Associate Professor of Finance at the McCombs School of Business at UT-Austin, said the officials at the state's flagship university violated his constitutional right to criticize government officials. The lawsuit also claims the UT administration harmed his right to academic freedom.

Professor Lowery is well known for his vigorous commentary on university affairs. His articles have appeared widely, including in The Hill, the Texas Tribune, the Houston Chronicle, and The College Fix. He questioned the UT administration's approaches to critical-race theory, affirmative action, academic freedom, competence-based performance measures, and the future of capitalism.

One key target of Prof. Lowery's critiques was the UT administration's use of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) requirements to filter out competent academics who dissent from the DEI ideology.

Read More

Free Speech

Federalist Society Panel on "Discussion, Coercion, and the Pursuit of Truth" at Law Schools

The panel was moderated by Fifth Circuit Judge James Ho, and included former Solicitor General Paul Clement, Prof. Renee Lettow Lerner, legal journalist David Lat, lawyer Jay Edelson, and me.

|

Here's the description:

Recent events at a number of law schools have raised concerns about civility and respect for opposing views. Many law schools have expressed their commitment to "fostering an environment that values the free expression of ideas," and have promised "consequences" for disruptive behavior, including Yale Law School. But are existing policies and practices effectively enforced and up to the task? Are law schools creating an environment that encourages the free discussion of ideas?

Do law schools owe their students a grounding in civility, a practice endorsed by bar associations throughout the country? Does tolerance of disruptive behavior and bullying conflict with these schools' commitment to fostering an environment that supports free expression? If law schools fail to teach students to engage respectfully with each other, or to appreciate diverse perspectives on important questions, where will students learn it? Has tolerance for ideological coercion on campus turned law schools into an informal training ground for future bad behavior that bar associations and courts will have to police?

Read More

Free Speech

Federal Prosecution for Threats Against "Crisis Pregnancy Center"

|

[UPDATE 9/17/2024: Caleb Freestone has been sentenced to a year and a day in prison.]

The case is U.S. v. Freestone; here's the Justice Department's press release, from late January:

The indictment, returned by a federal grand jury in the Middle District of Florida, alleges that Caleb Freestone, 27, and Amber Smith-Stewart, 23, engaged in a conspiracy to prevent employees of reproductive health services facilities from providing those services. According to the indictment, as part of the conspiracy, the defendants targeted pregnancy resource facilities and vandalized those facilities with spray-painted threats. According to the indictment, Freestone and Smith-Stewart, and other co-conspirators, are alleged to have spray painted threats, including "If abortions aren't safe than niether [sic] are you," "YOUR TIME IS UP!!," "WE'RE COMING for U," and "We are everywhere," on a reproductive health services facility in Winter Haven, Florida. The indictment further alleges that facilities in Hollywood, Florida, and Hialeah, Florida, were also targeted.

The indictment also alleges that Freestone and Smith-Stewart violated the FACE Act by using threats of force to intimidate and interfere with the employees of a reproductive health services facility in Winter Haven because those employees were providing or seeking to provide reproductive health services. The indictment further alleges that Freestone and Smith-Stewart violated the FACE Act by intentionally damaging and destroying the facility's property because the facility provides reproductive health services.

The 1994 Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act is generally used for threats against abortion clinics, but it more broadly covers any "facility that provides reproductive health services," "includ[ing] medical, surgical, counselling or referral services relating to the human reproductive system, including services relating to pregnancy or the termination of a pregnancy." The clinics that the defendants targeted allegedly "provide[d] abortion alternatives including counselling, pregnancy testing, ultrasound examinations, and referral services." Here's the Justice Department's broader statement about the Act:

The FACE Act is not about abortions. The statute protects all patients, providers, and facilities that provide reproductive health services, including pro-life pregnancy counseling services and any other pregnancy support facility providing reproductive health care.

Sounds quite right to me. (For an argument opposing the prosecution, see this item by Natasha Lennard [The Intercept]; I'm not persuaded by it, given that the law was indeed deliberately written to protect not just abortion clinics, but all entities that provide "services relating to pregnancy.")

Free Speech

Illinois Appellate Court Reverses Conviction for Threatening a Judge

A defendant's telling his lawyer, "when I get out of here, I'm going to get that judge" and "I don't make threats[,] I make promises" isn't a true threat, the court holds.

|

From People v. Roach, decided Thursday by the Illinois Appellate Court (opinion by Justice Robert Steigmann, joined by Justices Peter Cavanagh and James Knecht):

In November 2020, during a meeting with defendant at the Winnebago County jail, defendant told [his lawyer,] Braun, "When I get out of here, I'm going to get that judge" [referring to Judge McGraw -EV]. Braun responded, "That sounds like a threat." Defendant said, "I don't make threats. I make promises." Braun testified defendant was a little agitated, and Braun took defendant's statements seriously "based upon all the information [Braun] had at that time."

Braun alerted the judge of the threat, which led the defendant being prosecuted for it and ultimately being convicted and sentenced to two years in prison. In the course of the investigation, a detective interviewed defendant on video:

During the first 25 minutes of the video, defendant denied threatening McGraw. At around the 25-minute mark of the video, the detectives left the interview room and defendant began speaking to the camera. Defendant expressed his anger with McGraw, trial counsel, and the police through a cacophony of expletive-filled, violent statements, punctuated by brief asides to say he was not threatening anybody. Defendant's comments toward the camera continued until Witt returned to the interview room, at which time defendant maintained to Witt that he did not threaten McGraw.

The appellate court reversed, concluding that the statements fell outside the "true threats" exception to the First Amendment, and thus weren't covered by the state threats statute:

Read More

Politics

Abortion and Religious Liberty - New Amicus Brief and Article

|

Recently, the Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty submitted an amicus brief in the Indiana Court of Appeals. This case presents a RFRA-based challenge to the state's abortion laws. I co-authored the brief with my colleague, Howard Slugh. We are grateful to Zechariah Yoder who served as our local counsel.

I have also posted to SSRN a draft article, titled Abortion and Religious Liberty. It will be forthcoming in the Texas Review of Law & Politics. I co-authored the article with Howard Slugh and Tal Fortgang.

"The Rise and Fall of Jews at Law Schools"

|

An interesting essay by New York Law School professor Rebecca Roiphe. A taste:

Many, if not most, students have bought into academic lessons peddled in the 1980s and '90s as an outgrowth of what's often called critical legal theory. Among them:

Law is not a neutral institution designed to ensure the peaceful resolution of disputes in a diverse society.
Neutrality is not an unachieved but noble goal.
Legal institutions are just a vicious guise that allows the powerful to exploit the weak.
The law is not a flawed but worthy process to improve, but an evil institution to weaponize or dismantle.
The lecture halls in our law schools are now filled with professors and students who believe these things. In their view, the profession is no longer an essential gatekeeper of the rule of law, a key component of the American founding. Instead, it's a part of the problem: a white, racist, oppressive clique that uses its claims of fairness to mask its oppression of the powerless.

This kind of thinking is a big problem for Jews.

As they say, read the whole thing. I think there is also much more to say on the topic about how Critical Legal Studies and its offshoots were and are rebellions not just against formerly dominant legal liberalism, but against a particular kind of mid-century legal liberalism among whose champions Jews were wildly disproportionately represented, and the triumph of which coincided with the rise of Jews in the legal profession and (especially) the legal academy.

It's not a coincidence and it surely did not go unnoticed that when students at Harvard and Yale back in the mid 80s started protesting the oppressive liberalism and "white" demographics of the Yale and Harvard faculties, the old WASP faculty was largely gone or going, and replaced by a plurality or majority of Jewish professors. The sort of radicals who found the liberals of Jewish descent like Owen Fiss, Harry Hillel Wellington (who had felt obliged to change his last name from Weinstein back in the day), and Nazi refugee Guido Calabresi as representing an institutionally (if not personally) racist old guard were hardly likely to be sympathetic to Jewish concerns as they gained power.

In 2023, Pierson v. Post Meets Keeble v. Hickeringill

Modern-day efforts to sabotage fox hunts.

|

Property classes usually begin with two foundational cases about animals. First, Pierson v. Post (New York, 1805) involved a dispute over a fox hunt. Second, Keeble v. Hickeringill (Queen's Bench, 1707) involved a dispute over a duck hunt. Both cases had a common thread. On the one side was a traditional hunter, who engaged in the hunt with all the  formalities. Post pursued the fox with hounds, while Keeble built an elaborate trap known a duck decoy. On the other side, Pierson intercepted the fox at the last minute, and Hickeringill shot-off a loud gun to scare away the ducks. In both cases, hunters were frustrated by--to put it loosely--jerks who did not abide by the informal hunting code of ethics. Who prevailed? In Pierson, the Court ruled for the jerk, because he was the first person to physically capture the fox. But in Keeble, the Court found that the jerk interfered with the hunter's lawful employment.

An ongoing saga in England reflects something of a hybrid between Pierson and Keeble.

The Warwickshire Hunt club, which was founded in 1791, still holds elaborate fox hunts. Or something like that. Britain outlawed hunting of foxes using dogs in 2004. But hunters can still lay down artificial scents, which the hounds can track. However, critics of the hunt claim that dogs often wind up killing a fox.

Enter the West Midlands Hunt Saboteurs group. This organization takes extreme steps to interfere with the hunts, which are held on private property. Like Pierson, the saboteurs prevent the hunters from getting the fox. And like Hickeringill, the saboteurs try to scare away the prey:

At least three times a week, rain or shine, the activists pursue the galloping riders by S.U.V. and on foot through forests and fields, both to film evidence of what the activists say are illegal activities and to do whatever they can to hinder the actual hunt.

Turning the hunters' tools against them, the activists blow their own hunting horns and crack whips in an attempt to confuse the hounds. They also wield canisters of citronella spray to mask the foxes' scent and employ small amplifiers that play the sound of crying hounds to unsettle the pursuing pack further. Every activist has a walkie-talkie. . . .

The activists have spent years harrying the hunters. To confuse the pursuit of the fox, they master use of the hunting horn and learn dozens of distinctive shouts, including the "tallyho" that is yelled when the animal is spotted.

When I teach Pierson, I often joke that if there was a disputed hunt today, there would be recordings to indicate who caught the animal first. And so it is:

For the activists and the huntsmen alike, this is a propaganda war, too — a battle for hearts and minds. Video cameras are everywhere, some wielded by the activists, some carried by the hunters.

As one of the hunters came galloping past, she shouted at Mr. Graham: "You're trespassing! Don't film my children!"

Unfazed, he zoomed in with a hand-held camcorder on a group of hunters standing nearby on the windswept hillside. Without uttering a word, they turned their phones on him, recording the recorder.

There is nothing new under the sun.

Politics

Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions

Chastising finger wags, derogatory reports, and steel threats.

|

Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

Friends, come join us in D.C. on Tuesday, March 7 for a symposium on Shielded: How the Police Became Untouchable, a timely new book by Joanna Schwartz. The event will feature panels on official accountability—including an appearance from one of the plaintiffs in Monroe v. Pape!—as well as a live recording of the Short Circuit podcast. Co-hosted by IJ and the Georgetown Center for the Constitution, the event will take place at the law school. Click here for details and to RSVP.

Read More

Adjunct Law Professors

|

A couple of adjunct law professors (i.e., practicing lawyers who teach part-time at a law school, generally for a very modest amount of money) and I are writing a short piece on adjunct teaching, and we'd love to hear any thoughts our readers have on this. Have you taught as an adjunct, or considered doing it? What have been the pluses and minuses? What ideas do you have for how the adjunct system can be improved?

Alternatively, if you took classes from adjuncts as a student, what have you found to be the pluses and minuses of that? As you might gather, we have lots of views of our own on this, but we'd like to get some thoughts from others, to make sure we aren't missing some important points. Please feel free to post comments below, or e-mail me at volokh at law.ucla.edu. Thanks!

Free Speech

"On The Need For Diverse Viewpoints In Biglaw," by David Lat

|

An excerpt from David Lat's Original Jurisdiction newsletter (and also earlier published by him in the Boston Globe), though the whole thing is much worth reading:

On the morning of June 23, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark opinion in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home. You might have expected the lawyers who won the case, celebrated Supreme Court litigators Paul Clement and Erin Murphy, to receive congratulations within their firm for such a major victory.

Instead, they received walking papers. That afternoon, Clement and Murphy announced in the Wall Street Journal that they were leaving Kirkland & Ellis, the nation's highest-grossing law firm. Why? Because Kirkland presented them with an ultimatum: withdraw from representing clients in Second Amendment cases, including existing clients in ongoing representations, or withdraw from the firm.

"We couldn't abandon our clients simply because their positions are unpopular in some circles," the lawyers wrote. So they left Kirkland to start their own litigation firm.

It's not just representing unpopular clients; even articulating an unpopular opinion might be a fireable offense today in the world of large law firms (aka "Big Law"). Take support for the Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, which overturned Roe v. Wade and sent abortion back to the states. At least two antiabortion women partners allege — one in the Wall Street Journal and one in Original Jurisdiction, my newsletter about the legal profession — that their support for Dobbs played a major role in their being forced out of their firms….

Of course, it's not a recent development that large law firms are overwhelmingly liberal (as reflected in, for example, their lopsided contributions to political campaigns). What's different today is not only the partisan intensity but the possibility that you might lose your job for holding the wrong views. Simply put, Big Law — the nation's largest, most prestigious, most profitable law firms, which in many ways set the norms for the rest of the legal profession — is currently seized by ideological intolerance and groupthink. (There are some exceptions — most notably Jones Day, which gained notoriety for its work on behalf of Trump.) …

Free Speech

Libel Lawsuit Against Case Law Repository for Its Not Noting That a Case Had Settled

|

Leagle.com publicly distributes a wide range of court opinions, precedential and nonprecedential, from all over the country. Unlike Westlaw, Lexis, and Google Scholar, it is Google-searchable, so when a party's name is Googled, any opinion mentioning the party is likely to come up.

[1.] John D. Thomas had been involved in Modarres v. Thomas, which went up to the California Court of Appeal and came out badly for him. From the Introduction to the opinion (which also appears on Leagle):

John David Thomas and 184 Diamond, LLC (defendants), appeal from a default judgment entered after the trial court imposed terminating sanctions against Thomas for misuse of the discovery process. Following a default prove-up hearing, the court awarded plaintiff Farah Modarres a total of $217,000 in compensatory damages against defendants and $1 million in punitive damages against Thomas only. Defendants argue the trial court abused its discretion by imposing terminating sanctions against Thomas because a lesser sanction would have been sufficient. They also challenge the punitive damages award against Thomas on the grounds Modarres presented insufficient evidence of Thomas's net worth at trial, the punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive in amount, and the award erroneously excluded 184 Diamond, LLC, which was otherwise jointly and severally liable with Thomas for compensatory damages.

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing terminating sanctions against Thomas for his misuse of the discovery process. We also conclude Modarres failed to present admissible evidence of Thomas's then current financial condition sufficient for us to make a well-informed decision whether the amount of punitive damages awarded was unconstitutionally excessive. We therefore modify the judgment to strike the award of punitive damages and remand for a new default prove-up hearing only on the issue of the amount of punitive damages. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The case was then remanded to the trial court:

Modarres is entitled to punitive damages. The judgment is modified to strike the award of punitive damages in the amount of $1 million. The matter is remanded for a new default prove-up hearing only on the issue of the amount of punitive damages. We direct the trial court to issue an order under Civil Code section 3295, subdivision (c), permitting Modarres to conduct discovery into Thomas's current financial condition. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. Modarres shall recover costs on appeal.

And on remand, the case settled (according to a later appellate decision, "Modarres and Thomas settled the lawsuit without involving the law firm [that had represented Modarres], allegedly depriving the law firm of its fees").

[2.] Now, the new lawsuit, filed Tuesday and labeled Thomas v. Leagle, Inc. (S.D. Cal.): Thomas is suing Leagle for libel and for placing him in a false light based on its having posted the earlier California Court of Appeal opinion (with no allegations that the opinion itself was inaccurately rendered). Here's the rationale:

Read More

Campus Free Speech

GWU Law Student Gov't Directs People to Stop Saying/Writing "Illegal," "Alien," and "Assimilation" re: Immigration

It's the "Immigration - Written and Oral Reform Declaration (I-WORD) Joint Resolution" from 2021.

|

As you might gather, I don't think serious law schools—including student government groups at such law schools—should be "direct[ing]" faculty, staff, and students not to use certain legal terms, especially when they are parts of statutes, statutory titles current (the Alien Tort Statute) and past (the Alien Act), court opinions, and more. But here I just wanted to present the text of the GW Law Student Bar Association resolution, so readers can decide on it for themselves.

Purpose: To call upon members of The George Washington University and The George Washington University Law School to abstain from using the terms "illegal," "alien," and "assimilation" in internal communications and external correspondence regarding immigration.

WHEREAS: Since 1948, the right to a nationality, the right to change one's nationality, and the right not to be deprived of one's nationality are all universally recognized under international law1;

WHEREAS: The term "alien" has historically been used throughout U.S. immigration law to refer to individuals who do not have U.S. citizenship and are not a US national2;

WHEREAS: Immigration advocates have long argued that the term "alien" dehumanizes migrants and commonly conjures up images of Martians or Mandalorians that readily lend itself to xenophobic rhetoric3;

WHEREAS: State and municipal governments such as California and New York City have taken steps to remove and replace the word "alien" in long standing legal codes4;

WHEREAS: The phrase "illegal alien" has historically been used in US immigration discourse to describe an individual, who is not a US citizen or a US national, and is present within the sovereign territory of the United States in a manner that is not in accordance with the law5;

Read More

More