The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Free Speech

"Myanmar's Junta Arrests Swiss Filmmaker, 13 Cast Members for Defaming Buddhism"

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Radio Free Asia reports:

[The defendants] are accused of insulting Buddhist cultural traditions and the morals of Buddhist monks, according to state media. Authorities haven't specified under which law they would be prosecuted….

The film, titled "Don't Expect Anything," portrays the message that it is meaningless to worship Buddha images or pagodas, and instead it's important to follow Buddha's teachings.

The 12-year-old main character uses harsh words in the film to describe how the monks enjoy the food donated by lay people every day. The film portrays her as a reincarnation of a hermit who practiced Buddhist teaching in a previous life.

The film, linked to in the Radio Free Asia article, is apparently this:

Thanks to the Media Law Resource Center (MLRC) MediaLawDaily for the pointer.

20 Years After You Can't Say That! Was Published, Feeling Vindicated by 303 Creative

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Twenty years ago, the Cato Institute published my book, You Can't Say That!: The Growing Threat to Civil Liberties from Antidiscrimination Laws. The basic theme of the book was that as the scope of antidiscrimination laws has expanded, these laws increasingly infringe on bedrock constitutional liberties, especially freedom of expression. To the extent that there is a conflict, the rights protected by the Constitution should win out over claims that the infringements are justified by an asserted compelling government interest in "eradicating" discrimination.

Cato tried very hard to place the book with a publisher, but constantly ran into ideological opposition. I couldn't help but think how ironic it was that book editors, of all people, thought a book was too favorable to freedom of expression. Indeed, one publisher even suggested that the book's relatively tame libertarian theme was "aggressively hostile … to standard social mores." (see excerpt below, from when the book had a different working title).

This past term, in the 303 Creative case, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that freedom of speech can be infringed by the government in the name of the government's asserting compelling interest in ensuring "equal access to publicly available goods and services." While I can't take personal credit for this holding, I'm pleased to say that the position I took twenty years ago, which struck book editors as so radical as to be "aggressively hostile … to standard social mores," is now the law of the land.

Free Speech

No Pseudonymity for Plaintiffs Seeking to Respond to School's "Black Lives Matter" Posters

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From yesterday's decision in Cajune v. Indep. School Dist. 194, by Judge Jerry Blackwell (D. Minn.) (for more on the First Amendment issue raised in the case, see this post):

Believing the posters carried political messages, some parents and students objected to [a Minnesota school board's] hanging "Black Lives Matter" posters without also displaying posters offering various other viewpoints.

Some plaintiffs sought to sue pseudonymously, "for fear of reprisal from political activists in the southern suburban Minneapolis metropolitan community," but the court said no:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires that the complaint "must name all the parties." It is fundamental that "the public has a right to know who is using [its] courts." Accordingly, "[t]here is a strong presumption against allowing parties to use a pseudonym." …

"The threat of hostile public reaction to a lawsuit, standing alone, will only with great rarity warrant public anonymity." The Unnamed Plaintiffs have not presented such a rare case.

The Unnamed Plaintiffs vaguely reference "cancel culture" and two incidents that occurred outside of the District as evidence that they reasonably fear "reprisal from political activists" for participating in this case: interference with a bakery's business in Eagan, and a Shakopee bank employee who lost their job after criticizing a school district superintendent online. But the two alleged incidents lack any connection to the phrase "Black Lives Matter" and bear no similarity to the Inclusive Poster Series at issue here. The Unnamed Plaintiffs also claim that Plaintiffs had been physically blocked from entering school board meetings, but the alleged misbehavior stopped after Plaintiffs complained. Finally, the named Plaintiffs in this case have litigated two federal lawsuits asserting their viewpoints for nearly two years without apparent incident. The motion to proceed pseudonymously is denied.

The precedents on this are a mix. For a contrary result on similar facts, see Menders v. Loudoun Cty. School Bd. (E.D. Va. 2021), which allowed a pseudonymous challenge to a school board's policies on teaching views associated with Critical Race Theory:

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Free Speech

Public School May Hang "Black Lives Matter" Posters Without Displaying Other Viewpoints

The government gets to pick and choose which speech it displays on its property, and doesn't have to give others a right to reply (except in public fora, which don't include school walls).

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From yesterday's decision in Cajune v. Indep. School Dist. 194, by Judge Jerry Blackwell (D. Minn.):

Following George Floyd's murder in May 2020, school administrators, staff, and teachers joined much of the country in finding ways to support their students, including Black students. For its part in those efforts, in April 2021, the school board for the Lakeville, Minnesota public school district vetted and authorized a multicultural poster series that included two posters with the phrase "Black Lives Matter."

Not everyone supported the decision. Believing the posters carried political messages, some parents and students objected to hanging "Black Lives Matter" posters without also displaying posters offering various other viewpoints. After the school board denied those requests, the objectors challenged the school board's action by filing this lawsuit, claiming First Amendment violations…. Because display of the posters constitutes government speech not subject to First Amendment challenge, the school board's motion is granted, and Plaintiffs' lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice.

I think that's correct: A school is entitled to decide what messages it wants to spread—whether about science, history, morality, or anything else—without having to spread contrary messages. (There's a narrow exception as to religious messages by a public school, because of the Establishment Clause, and some opinions have suggested that there might be an exception as to outright partisan election-related speech, e.g., "Vote Democrat," but these are indeed narrow exceptions to the general rule.)

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Free Speech

Court Reduces $1.4M Verdict to $71.5K in #TheyLied Renaissance Faire Libel Case

Defendant had accused plaintiffs, "the King and Queen of [the Pittsburgh] Renaissance Faire," of failing to properly deal with allegations of sexual harassment, and of retaliating against sexual harassment victims; the jury found that the defendant knew the statements were false, or at least recklessly disregarded the risk of falsehood.

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From Friday's decision in Amor v. Conover (E.D. Pa.) by Judge John Gallagher:

In this case, the Court must decide whether defamation damages sustained by Plaintiffs, the King and Queen of a Renaissance Faire, cut to the bone, or are merely "just a flesh wound." {See Jones, T., & Gilliam, T. (1975). Monty Python and the Holy Grail. Cinema 5 Distributing. [Wait, what's Camelot doing in the Renaissance? -EV].}

Here, Plaintiffs accused the Defendant of defamation, for publishing online accusations about Plaintiffs in their capacities as renaissance faire performance directors. After a jury found for Plaintiffs, Defendant now seeks to vacate the judgment and $1.4 million damages award assessed by the jury. Because a reasonable jury, making its own determinations as to credibility of witnesses, and applying the applicable legal standard, could have found for the Plaintiffs in this action, Defendant's motion will be denied insofar as it seeks to completely vacate the judgment or award of damages. However, because the jury's damages award was unreasonably excessive in light of the evidence presented at trial, the total damages award is remitted to $71,500.

For the reasons that follow, the Court remits the compensatory damages award to Plaintiff Dr. James Amor from $750,000 to $50,000, the punitive damages award to Plaintiff Dr. James Amor from $250,000 to $1,000, the compensatory damages award to Plaintiff Ms. Patricia Amor from $300,000 to $20,000, and the punitive damages award to Plaintiff Ms. Patricia Amor from $100,000 to $500….

Plaintiffs … initiated this defamation action by filing a complaint on December 30, 2021, alleging pro se Defendant … "deliberately, recklessly, and maliciously" published defamatory statements against Plaintiffs online…. Plaintiffs … both worked as assistant directors at the Pennsylvania Renaissance Faire, and performance directors at the West Virginia and Pittsburgh Renaissance Faires. As performance director, Dr. Amor testified his responsibilities are to supervise the Renaissance Faire cast/actors, as well as coordinate with independent or national acts that participate in the Faire as well. In addition to his Renaissance Festival involvement, Plaintiff Dr. Amor is a dentist with a business practice located in Pennsylvania.

Defendant, Ms. Conover, was a paying guest at the Pittsburgh Renaissance Festival who maintained an online blog where she wrote about, among other topics, Plaintiffs.

The blog statements in question claim the Plaintiffs refused to take seriously allegations that renaissance festival cast members/employees under their supervision committed sexual misconduct against other renaissance festival cast members/employees, some of whom were minors under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged abuse. According to Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant's statements further allege Plaintiffs "retaliated against said rape and/or sexual assault victims by, amongst other things, publicly humiliating them, calling them crazy, refusing to rehire them, and/or terminating them from employment."

The court concluded that plaintiffs were limited purpose public figures, which means that the jury, to find for plaintiffs, had to find that defendant knew her allegations were false or at least likely false. The jury did find for plaintiffs, "awarded Dr. Amor $750,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages …, and awarded Ms. Amor $300,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages." The court affirmed the verdict:

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Crime Victims Rights Act

Should the Philadelphia D.A.'s Office Have Been Sanctioned for Failing to Protect Crime Victims' Rights?

My amicus brief to the Third Circuit argues that the district court appropriately sanctioned the Philadelphia D.A.'s Office for making misleading representations about whether they had conferred with a crime victims' family.

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Yesterday, I filed an amicus brief in the Third Circuit, arguing for affirmance of a sanctions order against the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office for failing to protect crime victims' rights. The D.A.'s Office told a federal district court that it had been in communication with the victims' family before deciding to confess error in a capital case—a representation that the district court found was misleading. After the district court sanctioned the D.A.'s Office, the Office appealed to the Third Circuit. Yesterday's brief—filed on behalf of the family by attorneys from Gibson Dunn, the National Crime Victims' Law Institute, and me—argues that the Third Circuit should affirm the district court's sanctions order.

The brief recounts facts tracking back to January of 1984. In that month, Robert Wharton and his accomplice brutally murdered Bradley and Ferne Hart in their own home and left their seven-month-old baby daughter, Lisa, to die—the horrific climax of a months-long campaign of terror against the family.  After Wharton strangled and drowned Ferne in a bathtub, and his accomplice stomped and strangled Bradley in the basement, Wharton sadistically shut off the home's heat in the dead of winter, leaving baby Lisa to freeze and starve.  Miraculously, she survived—discovered three days later among the carnage when Bradley's father visited the home and heard her cries.

A jury found Wharton guilty of two counts of first-degree murder in 1985 and returned two death sentences.  After a reviewing court vacated his sentences on a technicality, a second jury again determined that he should be sentenced to death in 1992.

For nearly forty years, Lisa and her family have awaited justice.  Wharton, however, has dragged out the proceedings at every step, filing numerous baseless claims for post-conviction relief in state and federal court.  His sole remaining claim, which he brought on federal habeas, is that his lawyer at his 1992 penalty hearing was ineffective because he failed to present "mitigation" evidence of Wharton's supposedly positive adjustment to prison. (On that point, it is notable that Wharton had attempted to escape twice, and in one attempt provoked gunshots as officers sought apprehend him.)

The interminable delay in holding Wharton accountable for his crimes has been agonizing enough for Lisa and her family. But the recent actions of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office have only compounded their suffering. Despite zealously opposing Wharton's efforts to overturn his conviction and death sentence for over three decades, the D.A.'s Office, with no explanation, suddenly announced that it would no longer contest the only remaining penalty-phase claim. The D.A.'s office then led the district court to believe that the Hart family supported this about-face—representing to the court that the D.A.'s Office decided to concede Wharton's claim only "[f]ollowing . . . communication with the victims' family."

That statement was deeply misleading.  As the district court found, "the only communication was to inform a single family member that the D.A.'s office was considering conceding.  None of the family members supported the decision to concede, and several expressed shock and indignation that the District Attorney's Office had suggested otherwise."  Lisa—the sole survivor of Wharton's heinous crimes—was "confused," "hurt," "outraged," and "had no idea what was going on." Bradley's sister, Patrice Carr, found it "unbearably painful and shocking" to learn that the concession was "even a consideration." And Bradley's brother, Dr. Tony Hart, was "taken [a]back" when he learned the truth. Contrary to what the D.A.'s Office led the district court to believe, the family "is of one accord in asking . . . that the District Attorney do all he can to maintain the death penalty in this case."

In response to that shocking misrepresentation—which impeded the district's court ability to comply with its own statutory obligation to ensure crime victims are treated with dignity and respect—the court imposed the mildest of sanctions. It merely ordered the District Attorney to apologize to the family in writing, and the D.A.'s Office to present "a full, balanced explanation of facts" in future habeas proceedings. Yet the D.A.'s Office has appealed the court's order and contends that it discharged its legal and ethical obligations all along.  Read More

Free Speech

Explicit Sexual Proposition to 16-Year-Old Can Be a Crime, Even if Sex with the 16-Year-Old Isn't

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From yesterday's decision in Ohio v. Sebring, decided by the Ohio Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Jill Flagg Lanzinger, joined by Judge Jennifer Hensal (and with Judge Donna Carr concurring in the judgment):

Mr. Sebring was friends with the parents of C.S., a 16-year-old girl. C.S. had a sixteenth birthday party at her house. Several of C.S.'s friends, including Q.H. and E.B., attended the birthday party. Mr. Sebring, who was 34 years old at the time, also attended the birthday party.

According to E.B., the teenagers at the party (all of whom were in high school) swam, ate, and then went to the basement to watch a movie. The adults stayed upstairs, but Mr. Sebring went to the basement with the teenagers. E.B. testified that there were three couches in the basement, and that she was sitting on one of them while Mr. Sebring was sitting on another couch. Mr. Sebring asked E.B. to come sit next to him, but she declined. Mr. Sebring then "squeezed" himself between E.B. and another person on the same couch. Mr. Sebring rested his hand on E.B.'s knee and started playing with her hoodie. E.B. testified that Mr. Sebring gave her an alcoholic beverage, which E.B. explained contained Tito's and orange juice. E.B. testified that she was familiar with the taste of alcohol, and that she saw Mr. Sebring pour Tito's into the drink. When questioned by the trial court, E.B. clarified that Tito's is a brand of vodka.

E.B. testified that Mr. Sebring asked to drive her home at least twice, but she declined. Mr. Sebring then had E.B. add him to Snap Chat, a messaging app. E.B. left the party and Q.H. drove her home. Mr. Sebring then started messaging E.B. through Snap Chat. In one of the messages, Mr. Sebring asked E.B. to return to the party, indicating that he "misse[d] his drinking buddy." E.B. did not immediately respond to Mr. Sebring's messages. Mr. Sebring then messaged E.B.: "Tell your mom that you want to spend the night here and let me eat that Pussy * * *." E.B. took a picture of the message, which the State introduced as an exhibit at trial. E.B. testified that Mr. Sebring apologized to her the next day for sending inappropriate messages, and that she blocked him on Snap Chat. On cross-examination, E.B. testified that the content of that message was not the type of thing that she discussed with her adult friends.

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Free Speech

Appellate Court Vacates "Harassment Prevention Order" Aimed at Protecting Police Officer

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M.B. v. T.E., decided Aug. 11 by the Appeals Court of Massachusetts (Justices Vickie Henry, Kenneth Desmond & John Englander), reverses a harassment prevention order issued under Mass. General Laws ch. 258E; the factual backstory:

In apparent retaliation for T.E.'s cooperation with a Federal drug prosecution, a third party, S.B., established "whosarat.com," a website dedicated to identifying and posting personal information about government informants. This situation and harassment by S.B. has, quite understandably, caused T.E. considerable distress. {Any stress that T.E. has experienced, of course, would not justify his harassing someone else.} T.E. believes that because certain details known only to the police appeared on the website, a particular police department must be providing his information to the website.

M.B. is a police officer of that department, shares the same last name as S.B., and is his distant relative. T.E. theorized that M.B. and the police department are part of a conspiracy to harass him. He sent a series of emails to the department's Chief about the situation, some of which were intemperate and counterproductive, and some of which M.B. perceived as a threat.

M.B. sought and received a harassment prevention order against T.E., but the appellate court vacated the order. The statute authorizes such orders based on a finding of "[three] or more acts of willful and malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property and that does in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property," and the appellate court concluded that such acts were not sufficiently shown:

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Parental Rights

Eleventh Circuit Holds That Alabama Ban on Transgender Procedures on Minors Can Go in Effect

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From today's decision in Eknes-Tucker v. Marshall, by Judges Barbara Lagoa, joined by Judge Andrew Brasher and District Judge J.P. Boulee (N.D. Ga.):

[S]ection 4(a)(1)–(3) of Alabama's Vulnerable Child Compassion and Protection Act … states that "no person shall engage in or cause" the prescription or administration of puberty blocking medication or cross-sex hormone treatment to a minor "for the purpose of attempting to alter the appearance of or affirm the minor's perception of his or her gender or sex, if that appearance or perception is inconsistent with the minor's sex." Thus, section 4(a)(1)–(3) makes it a crime in the State of Alabama to take part in providing puberty blockers or cross-sex hormone treatment to a minor for purposes of treating a discordance between the minor's biological sex and sense of gender identity.

Shortly after the Act was signed into law, a group of transgender minors, their parents, and other concerned individuals challenged the Act's constitutionality, claiming that it violates the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment…. [W]e hold that the district court abused its discretion in issuing [a] preliminary injunction [against the Act] …. The plaintiffs have not presented any authority that supports the existence of a constitutional right to "treat [one's] children with transitioning medications subject to medically accepted standards." Nor have they shown that section 4(a)(1)–(3) classifies on the basis of sex or any other protected characteristic….

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Religion and the Law

Excluding Farmer's Market Vendor for Refusing to Host Same-Sex Weddings on Its Land Violates Free Exercise Clause

So holds a federal court.

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From Country Mill Farms, LLC. V. City of East Lansing, decided today by Judge Paul Maloney (W.D. Mich.):

The City of East Lansing requires vendors for its Farmer's Market to comply with the City's public policy against discrimination. Country Mill Farms offers to rent a portion of its property [which is not connected with the Farmer's Market] for weddings. Country Mill Farms, however, will not rent the property for same-sex weddings. Because of this general business practice, the City denied Country Mills Farm's vendor application for the 2017 East Lansing Farmers Market. Country Mill Farms and its owner, Stephen Tennes, sued….

The court noted that "Defendant's 2017 decision to deny Plaintiffs' application substantially burdened Plaintiffs' free exercise of religion":

Defendant relied in the revised 2017 vendor guidelines to deny CMF's application to participate in the ELFM. The stated reason for the denial was the Plaintiffs' decision not to rent the venue for same-sex weddings. Plaintiffs' decision was motivated by religious beliefs. Plaintiffs were forced to choose between their religious beliefs and a government benefit for which CMF was eligible….

The court acknowledged that "neutral and generally applicable" policies don't violate the Free Exercise Clause, but held that the City's policy wasn't neutral and generally applicable because it contained discretionary exemptions:

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Artificial Intelligence

Another Example of a Pro Se Litigant Trying to Use ChatGPT (Unsuccessfully)

Not ChatGPT's fault, but an illustration of how some pro se litigants are trying to use the technology.

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In Berman v. Matteucci, a pro se prisoner sought to file a belated habeas petition, claiming that he had just learned about a possible legal basis for his appeal using ChatGPT. No, said Judge Michael Mosman (in an opinion released in July, but not posted on Westlaw), because the statute of limitations isn't tolled through newly discovered legal theories:

On December 8, 2010, Petitioner was found guilty except for insanity of one count of Arson in the First Degree, one count of Burglary in the Second Degree, and 18 counts of Reckless Burning. When he did not take a direct appeal, his conviction became final on December 8, 2011 and he had one year from that date in which to timely file this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus case.

In his Petition, Petitioner claims that the statute of limitations should not run from the time that his judgment became final pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), but from April 2023 when he discovered the factual predicate of his claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Because his Petition fails to provide any specifics as to these newly discovered factual predicates, the Court advised Petitioner to elaborate on this allegation when responding to the show cause Order.

In his Response (#10) to the show cause Order, Petitioner states that in April 2023, an artificial intelligence chatbot provided him with insights that helped him discover his claims that the maximum sentencing policy for disabled individuals found guilty except for insanity violates several constitutional provisions. He asserts that prior to April 2023, artificial intelligence technology was not sufficiently advanced to impart this knowledge to him.

Petitioner's understanding of his legal claim is not a "factual predicate" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), and he need not understand the legal significance of known facts for the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations to commence. Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000). His lack of legal knowledge also does not warrant equitable tolling. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, Petitioner has not established that the AEDPA's statute of limitations began running any later than the date his state-court judgment became final on January 7, 2011. Because the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations expired long before Petitioner filed this case, his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is summarily dismissed, with prejudice, on the basis that it is untimely.

Artificial Intelligence

Another Note from a Judge About Generative AI Programs

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It's an aside in In re: Vital Pharmaceutical by Bankruptcy Judge Peter Russin (released June 16, but I just came across it):

In preparing the introduction for this Memorandum Opinion, the Court prompted ChatGPT to prepare an essay about the evolution of social media and its impact on creating personas and marketing products. Along with the essay it prepared, ChatGPT included the following disclosure: "As an AI language model, I do not have access to the sources used for this essay as it was generated based on the knowledge stored in my database." It went on to say, however, that it "could provide some general sources related to the topic of social media and its impact on creating personas and marketing products." It listed five sources in all. As it turns out, none of the five seem to exist. For some of the sources, the author is a real person; for other sources, the journal is real. But all five of the citations seem made up, which the Court would not have known without having conducted its own research. The Court discarded the information entirely and did its own research the old-fashioned way. Well, not quite old fashioned; it's not like the Court used actual books or anything. But this is an important cautionary tale. Reliance on AI in its present development is fraught with ethical dangers.

Should be a familiar cautionary tale by now, but I thought it was worth noting again. (I was just testing Claude 2 by asking it for cases on pseudonymity in libel litigation, and it hallucinated some up for me, much as other AI programs have been known to do.)

Politics

American Bar Association Committee Proposes New Protections for "Free Expression of Ideas"

"A law school shall adopt, publish, and adhere to written policies that encourage and support the free expression of ideas" that "[p]rotect the rights of faculty, students, and staff to communicate ideas that may be controversial or unpopular," and "[p]roscribe disruptive conduct that hinders free expression by preventing or substantially interfering with ... classes, meetings, interviews, ceremonies, and public events."

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An American Bar Association Strategic Review Committee Memorandum, released Thursday, suggests a proposed new Standard 208 in the ABA's Standards for law schools:

[a] A law school shall adopt, publish, and adhere to written policies that protect academic freedom. A law school's academic freedom policies shall:

[1] Apply to all full and part-time faculty, as well as to all others teaching law school courses;

[2] Apply to conducting research, publishing scholarship, engaging in law school governance, participating in law related public service activities, and exercising teaching responsibilities, including those related to client representation in clinical programs; and

[3] Afford due process, such as notice, hearing, and appeal rights, to assess any claim of a violation of the academic freedom policies.

[b] A law school shall adopt, publish, and adhere to written policies that encourage and support the free expression of ideas. A law school's free expression policies must:

[1] Protect the rights of faculty, students, and staff to communicate ideas that may be controversial or unpopular, including through robust debate, demonstrations, or protests; and

[2] Proscribe disruptive conduct that hinders free expression by preventing or substantially interfering with the carrying out of law school functions or approved activities, such as classes, meetings, interviews, ceremonies, and public events;

[c] Consistent with this Standard, a law school may:

[1] Restrict expression that violates the law, that falsely defames a specific individual, that constitutes a genuine threat or harassment, or that unjustifiably invades substantial privacy or confidentiality interests.

[2] Reasonably regulate the time, place, and manner of expression.

[3] Adopt policies on academic freedom and freedom of expression that reflect the law school's mission, including a religious mission, so long as such policies are not in violation of the law and are clearly disclosed in writing to all faculty, students, and staff prior to their affiliation with the law school.

Interpretation 208-1

Standard 208 applies to both public and private law schools.

Interpretation 208-2

A law school may, when appropriate, differentiate among students, faculty, and staff in its policies on freedom of expression.

Interpretation 208-3

Standard 208(a) does not preclude a law school from identifying the courses that will be taught, requiring courses to cover particular content, or requiring faculty, students, or staff to clarify in appropriate circumstances that their views are not statements by or on behalf of the law school.

Interpretation 208-4

This Standard does not prevent a law school from applying disciplinary action for conduct identified in Standard 208(b)(2).

Interpretation 208-5

Subsection (c) recognizes that law schools may restrict speech consistent with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Interpretation 208-6

Effective legal education and the development of the law require the free, robust, and uninhibited sharing of ideas reflecting a wide range of viewpoints. Becoming an effective advocate or counselor requires learning how to conduct candid and civil discourse in respectful disagreement with others while advancing reasoned and evidence-based arguments. Concerns about civility and mutual respect, however, do not justify barring discussion of ideas because they are controversial or even offensive or disagreeable to some.

Note that the existing ABA Standard 405 briefly discusses academic freedom ("A law school shall have an established and announced policy with respect to academic freedom and tenure of which Appendix 1 herein is an example but is not obligatory"), but this proposal would elaborate on that, and would also add the material on freedom of expression. Thanks to James Creigh for the pointer.

Copyright

No Copyright for Certain AI-Generated Works, but Maybe Yes for Others, if Prompts are Detailed Enough

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The AI-generated artwork.

 

From Thaler v. Perlmutter, decided Friday by Judge Beryl Howell (D.D.C.):

Plaintiff Stephen Thaler owns a computer system he calls the "Creativity Machine," which he claims generated a piece of visual art of its own accord. He sought to register the work for a copyright, listing the computer system as the author and explaining that the copyright should transfer to him as the owner of the machine. {In his application, he identified the author as the Creativity Machine, and explained the work had been "autonomously created by a computer algorithm running on a machine," but that plaintiff sought to claim the copyright of the "computer-generated work" himself "as a work-for-hire to the owner of the Creativity Machine."}The Copyright Office denied the application on the grounds that the work lacked human authorship, a prerequisite for a valid copyright to issue, in the view of the Register of Copyrights. Plaintiff challenged that denial …..

Thaler sought review of the Copyright Office denial, but the court held that Thaler indeed couldn't be protected given his claim that the work was "autonomously created" by the program. Authorship is for humans, the court held (though corporations, government entities, and the like can own copyrights because they were created by the groups' human employees).

Yet the court reserved the question whether the user of an AI program could own the copyright in the output because the user contributed enough to the output in the form of sufficiently detailed prompts and other items that would guide the output:

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Politics

Singular "They" in Court

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From D.C. v. Casa Ruby, Inc., decided May 1 by D.C. trial judge Danya A. Dayson, but just posted on Westlaw:

Therefore, specifically, as to each Third-Party board member Defendant, there must be factual allegations sufficient to support an inference or conclusion that the board member either intentionally, rather than negligently, inflicted harm on Casa Ruby, that they voted for or assented to a distribution made in violation of DC Code 29-406.33, that a board member intentionally violated a criminal law or that the board member received some amount of money to which they were not entitled.

{[Footnote accompanying the "they":] In this Order, the pronoun "they" is used as a singular pronoun to refer to a hypothetical person, consistent with prevailing practices in style guides. See, e.g., MLA Handbook § 3.5 (9th ed. 2021) ("[T]hey has gained acceptance as a generic, third-person singular pronoun used to refer to hypothetical or anonymous people."); APA Publication Manual § 4.18 (7th ed. 2020) (advising writers to "use 'they' as a generic third-person singular pronoun to refer to a person whose gender is unknown or irrelevant to the context of the usage."); The Associated Press Stylebook, they, them, their (55th ed. 2020) ("Arguments for using they/them as a singular sometimes arise with an indefinite pronoun (anyone, everyone, someone) or unspecified/unknown gender (a person, the victim, the winner)."); The Chicago Manual of Style ¶ 5.48 (17th ed. 2017) (noting that "because he is no longer universally accepted as a generic pronoun referring to a person of unspecified gender, people commonly (in speech and in formal writing) substitute the third-person-plural pronouns they, them, their, and themselves (or the nonstandard singular themself.))".}

This doesn't speak to the more modern pronoun dispute: the use of "they" to refer to named people, whose gender is known (whether or not they themselves prefer to be labeled "they"). It's also just one judge's opinion; I expect many other judges prefer to avoid this, and many others just use singular "they" without saying anything about it.

As for me, I still urge my students to avoid this, unless they have reason to think the judges who will be reading the brief are fine with it. Here's what I wrote about it two years ago:

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