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The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002
Firings, and Tariffs, and Trump, Oh My!
Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh are still chewing over Justice Gorsuch's questions from the tariffs case.
I attended the oral argument in the tariff case. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent sat a few rows behind me, right next to Secretary of the Commerce Howard Lutnick. Every now and then, I turned around to look at Bessent and the other politicos. He was paying very close attention, and didn't doze off.
Now, Bessent seems to have some information we do not. Bessent told Fox Business that the ruling would likely come in January. If Bessent is right, the opinions in that case must be nearing completion. Yet, based on the oral argument in Slaughter, the tariff case is very much on the Justices' minds. These two cases may be landmark rulings for the separation of powers. In Slaughter, both Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett brought up the tariff case by name, and Justice Gorsuch called back to his questions from that sitting. Plus Solicitor General Sauer tried as hard as he could to avoid any discussion of the non-delegation doctrine and the major questions doctrine. If Bessent is right, then the Justices are just thinking out loud. But something tells me that the tariff case is not quite settled yet. As I wrote after that argument, counting to five may be tricky.
First, Justice Barrett recalled Justice Gorsuch's question concerning legislative vetoes:
And, actually, this is a question I truly don't know the answer to and I just thought of it during the argument as we were talking about bargains.
So both Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kagan were asking you about the bargain that Congress has made in creating these independent agencies. And I was struck by, you know, I remember Justice Gorsuch brought up in the tariffs argument the fact that the tariff statute had a legislative veto originally. I don't know whether the original 1935 FTC Act from Humphrey's did or did not.
But I guess the question that I have, is that part of the bargain? Because legislative vetoes were pretty ubiquitous throughout the Twentieth Century. . . .
But I guess what I'm saying is, having lost that check, maybe these independent agencies have become something that Congress didn't intend or anticipate even at the point that it set it up, which is the point that Justice Gorsuch made in the tariff argument with respect to IEEPA.
I wrote about the legislative veto issue here. Barrett's intuition was right. Congress added a legislative veto over FTC rules in 1980, but that "bargain" was upset by Chadha.
Second, Justice Kavanaugh called back to Justice Gorsuch's questions concerning veto overrides:
Well, once the power is taken away from the President, it's very hard to get it back in the legislative process. Kind of the flip side of what we were talking about in the tariffs case because the Congress, the real world of this is the independent agencies shift power from the presidency to the Congress. Everyone recognizes that.
I think Congress has more control over the independent agencies than they do over the executive agencies. Congress doesn't want to give that up. It's hard for the President to get new legislation passed that would, for example, convert an independent agency to an executive agency.
Do you have an answer to that real -I mean, I think just leave it to Congress ignores the reality of the legislative process and Congress's desire to keep that power that they have had that most people have recognized over the independent agencies.
That's a theory out there. I just want to get your response to that.
I wrote about the veto overrides in the tariff case here.
In the tariffs case, Justice Gorsuch described delegation as a one-way ratchet that, as a practical matter, cannot be retrieved.
Wisconsin Judge Hannah Dugan Found Guilty of "Obstructing Federal Agents Seeking to Make an Immigration Arrest Outside Her Courtroom"
So reports the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (John Diedrich, Mary Spicuzza & Hope Karnopp):
On April 18, Dugan was presiding over a misdemeanor court on the sixth floor of the Milwaukee County Courthouse….
Federal agents were there to arrest Eduardo Flores-Ruiz, 31, charged with battery and appearing before Dugan. Flores-Ruiz illegally re-entered the U.S. in 2013.
Dugan learned of the planned arrest from her clerk. She went to the main corridor with another judge, questioned the agents, and directed them to the chief judge's office, who was working on a plan on how such arrests were to be treated.
Dugan returned to her courtroom, moved Flores-Ruiz's case up first and then directed Flores-Ruiz and his attorney through a non-public door and into a hallway used by judges and staff, witnesses testified.
Flores-Ruiz and his attorney emerged into the public corridor. Federal agents followed them. He was arrested outside the courthouse after a brief foot chase.
"You Are Not the Selection Committee. You Are the Welcoming Committee."
A nice line for prospective parents-in-law, from Abigail Shrier (crediting a friend of hers) in her Free Press advice column.
One more item from the same column—the person seeking advice, about what to do about her 22-year-old daughter's prospective impending marriage, included this in her question:
[G]iven that these two are facing certain separation for a couple years, I feel like her fiancé proposed in order to tie her down. To take her off the market.
Shrier's response:
The only reason any good man ever proposes to a woman is because he wants to "tie her down" and "take her off the market." There is nothing sinister in this—and in fact, much to celebrate.
George Mason University Scalia Law School Dean Search
Your chance to apply to be a law school dean!
Do you want to be the next dean of Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, and (sort of!) my boss? Well, now's your chance to apply! You can lead the law school with more Volokh Conspiracy bloggers than any other. See this link for information about the position, and how to apply.
The search committee asked me to put up this post, which I am happy to do. But I am not a member of the committee, myself. So interested applicants should send their queries and applications to the committee, at the link above, not to me.
Brennan Center Symposium on "2025's Most Significant State Constitutional Cases"
Contributors include Eugene Volokh and myself, among many others.
Today, the Brennan Center State Court Report published its symposium on "2025's Most Significant State Constitutional Cases." Contributors include Erwin Chemerinsky, Miriam Sefter, former Ohio Supreme Court Chief Justice Maureen O'Connor, former Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice Nathan Hecht, Anthony Sanders (Institute for Justice), the Volokh Conspiracy's own Eugene Volokh, and myself, among others. Here is an excerpt from my contribution:
In Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. State Corporation Commission, the Virginia Supreme Court held that a law authorizing broadband service providers to take property to install fiber optic cables across railroad-owned land violated the state constitutional requirement that eminent domain can only be used for a "public use" and that a taking for a private entity does not qualify unless it is "for the authorized provision of utility, common carrier, or railroad services…."
The case is significant because it addresses one of the constitutional amendments enacted in multiple states in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's controversial 2005 ruling in Kelo v. City of New London, which held that private "economic development" is enough to satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment. These post-Kelo reforms — or state court interpretations of preexisting constitutional provisions — have frequently provided stronger protections against abusive takings than the U.S. Supreme Court was willing to enforce under Kelo. The post-Kelo experience provides a potential model for other state constitutional litigation and reform efforts on property rights issues, most notably exclusionary zoning. But such state-level initiatives are not a fully adequate substitute for strong enforcement of federal constitutional protections in these areas.
Eugene's piece addresses North Carolina Bar and Tavern Association v. Stein, an important economic liberties case.
18-Month Sentence for Anti-Asian/Anti-Gay Threats Sent by Montana State Univ. Chinese Culture Club President
(Not the Chinese Boy George.)
From the government's Offer of Proof in U.S. v. Wu (D. Mont.), in which an 18-month sentence was just announced yesterday; Wu indeed appears to himself be Asian:
If this case were tried in United States District Court, the United States would prove the following:
On February 16, 2023, a detective with Montana State University (MSU) Police Department contacted the FBI to report that a potentially threatening communication had been sent to the Queer Straight Alliance (QSA), an LGBTQ+ student group on the MSU campus. The email, sent from ProtonMail account "tpusaatmontanastate@protonmail.com," contained the subject line "Killing all the groomers and faggots." The email read:
"Sinners of the QSA you must repent and turn to god, not the god that supports isis terrorists and sharia law but the white god of Christianity. If you do not call off your grooming party of young children tonight, we will send someone to the Rialto and send everyone present to an early death in hell."
On February 23, 2023, QSA received a second email, this time from ProtonMail account "tpusainc@proton.me." The subject line read "Repent the grooming children" and the email stated:
"Sinners, you may have been able to coerce some of us into silence but a majority of Montanan's along with our founder Charlie Kirk will always be against your satanic ways. True Montanan's will not stop until we expel all the groomers and colored people from our campus and great state!["]
On March 10, 2023, Student-1, a female MSU student of Asian descent who was affiliated with the QSA, received an email from ProtonMail account "DARIA_DD78@proton.me." The email subject line was "killing the chink," and the email read: "Hi Chink I have people watching your house day and night. One of these days you will get what's coming to you. This isn't Missoula in real Montana we kill gooks like you."
The following week, Student-1 planned an "Anti-Hate Teach-In" at MSU. Rex Wu assisted Student-1 with planning the event.
>$230K #TheyLied Judgment Affirmed in Defamation Case Based on Sexual Assault/Harassment Allegations
Couteller v. Mamakos, decided yesterday by the N.Y. intermediate appellate court, affirmed a default judgment in favor of a defamation plaintiff (for more on the case, see this post about the initial trial decision):
The court providently exercised its discretion by striking defendant's answer based on her "failure to comply with court orders, in the absence of adequate excuses," which permits an inference of willful and contumacious behavior. The record reflects that defendant failed to attend a status conference, did not meet discovery deadlines, and neglected to communicate with counsel, culminating in counsel's application to be relieved. Defendant failed to take any action in this case for over a year, despite the court's instruction to either retain new counsel or notify the court of her intention to proceed pro se. Defendant failed to appear at a scheduled conference notwithstanding the court's warning that a failure to appear would result in sanctions…. Defendant's willingness to permit this case to "linger for years without resolution," caused prejudice to plaintiff and impaired "the efficient functioning of the courts." …
The sole excuse defendant offered was that she did not timely receive the order which directed her to appear because it was sent to the wrong address. However, the record reflects that, about a month before the conference, defendant's former attorney sent the order via certified mail to the same address defendant provided on her motion to vacate. "A demonstrably false excuse will not justify the vacatur of a default."
Kai the Hatchet-Wielding Hitchhiker Loses Yet Another Defamation Lawsuit
From McGillvary v. Grande, decided Tuesday by Judge Jennifer Hall (D. Del.):
In February 2013, pro se Plaintiff Caleb L. McGillvary rose to internet fame as the "Kai the Hatchet-Wielding Hitchhiker," after he stopped an attacker who had crashed a car into pedestrians. Later that year, Plaintiff was convicted of first-degree murder in an unrelated incident, and he is currently serving a 57-year sentence in New Jersey state prison. In 2021, Defendant Todd Grande published a video on his YouTube channel in which he discussed Plaintiff's personal history and purported to analyze his personality.
Plaintiff sued for libel, but the court dismissed the claim:
For one thing, most of the statements in the video are opinions and characterizations, not assertions of fact, and are therefore incapable of defamatory meaning under Delaware law. Second, even if some statements were capable of being defamatory, the facts alleged in the amended complaint do not plausibly suggest that they could have lowered Plaintiff in the estimation of the community or deterred third persons from associating or dealing with Plaintiff. See McGillvary v. Netflix, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2024) (holding that allegation that McGillvary engaged in public urination did not have a tendency to injure his reputation because "McGillvary already has a reputation for public urination given two other public urination incidents"). Finally, given Plaintiff's status as a limited-purpose public figure—having given interviews to a news program and a late-night talk show—the complaint fails to state a defamation claim because it fails to plausibly plead facts suggesting actual malice.
The court also dismissed the disclosure of private facts (invasion of privacy) claim:
Today in Supreme Court History: December 18, 1944
12/18/1944: Korematsu v. U.S. decided.
Open Thread
What’s on your mind?
Sinking And Floating Liquidation
Continuing the debate over liquidation from Bruen to Slaughter.
Much of the debate about the removal power focuses on practice after the Constitution was adopted. Of course, there is the so-called Decision of 1789. There is also the Decision of 1790, which created the Sinking Fund Commission. However, in the immediate years after the framing, the Decision of 1789 seemed to take hold. Fast-forward one hundred years, and there was the Decision of 1887, which created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). As the Progressive Era unfolded, Congress began to create more multi-member commissions with removal protections. Myers v. United States found that the President had the absolute power to remove a single executive branch officer, but Humphrey's Executor upheld tenure protections for FTC commissioners.
How should a court make sense of these competing traditions? For the first century, after ratification the Decision of 1789 seemed to suggest the President's removal power could not be restricted. For the second century after ratification, the Decision of 1887 seemed to suggest that the President's removal power could be restricted. But in the past two decades, the 1887 settlement has been eroded, and we are moving closer to the Decision of 1789.
During oral argument in Slaughter v. Trump, Justice Barrett offered a careful consideration of this chronology.
Barrett acknowledged that recent historical work "shows that independent agencies has a longer pedigree than maybe some thought originally." But she maintained that the Sinking Fund Commission did not really establish a precedent for statutory removal restrictions. It was true that the Vice President and Chief Justice were appointed to the Commission by statute, and the President could not remove them. But the President could remove the other three members of the commission: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney General. Thus, the President could control a majority of the Commission. And in reality, Washington likely expected Alexander Hamilton to make all of the important decisions. Indeed that is exactly what would happen, so Washington had no need to fire anyone. Moreover, the Sinking Fund Commission, as well as the Revolutionary War Debt Commission, had "very, very limited authority."
Justice Barrett asked Amit Argawal, counsel for Slaughter, to "assume, that I disagree with you about the history." When Justice Barrett asks counsel to "assume" something, you know what she believes. Rather, Barrett said, the first "statutory removal restriction, like the inefficiency, neglect, malfeasance [standard] appeared in the 1887 with the ICC."
Justice Barrett then turned to the topic of liquidation:
But let's say that I think the liquidation argument throughout the 19th century shows that, by the time of the end of the 19th century, up until you get to the ICC, and the emergence of what starts to look like the more modern independent agency, that the government has the better of the argument.
But let's say that in 1887 after the ICC and then after the FTC and then after Humphrey's when there was more the explosion of independent agencies, that --let's just assume, again for this purpose, that at that point, yes, you do have precedents like Humphrey's. Humphrey's clearly is --is, you know, a good case for you. Do you still lose? If I say as of 1887, it was liquidated, it was settled, but then we did have cases and congressional practices that veered from that unbroken law. . . .
But, counsel, if it had the first --I mean, in --in the --the assumptions that I've asked you to make, it was liquidated as of 1887. So you think liquidation can kind of get a new restart, like kick-start in 1887?
In short can a liquidated practice become unliquidated? Or to use the imagery of the day, can liquidation sink and later float?
Here, I think a useful precedent to consider is Bruen. Leading up to the Reconstruction Era, the notion of an individual right to keep and bear arms had crystalized. And even if there was not a strong enough case based on original meaning, that right had been liquidated through practice. However, after Reconstruction, that settlement was altered. Jim Crow regimes enacted discriminatory gun control laws. Territories in the Wild West enacted gun free zones. And by the start of the twentieth century, governments enacted handgun carry bans. Indeed, the Sullivan Law from New York was on the books for more than a century by the time Bruen was decided.
In Bruen, Justice Thomas dismissed the relevance of the Jim Crow laws, as well as the laws from the Wild West. But there is some resemblance between the chronology of the Second Amendment and the chronology that Justice Barrett described in Slaughter. The line can be drawn roughly before and after the Progressive Era---when so much of the Constitution was damaged. Was the Second Amendment a case of liquidation followed by unliquidation? Did a liquidated right to bear arms float before the Civil War and sink after the Civil War? And how should courts consider these competing streams of authority?
In Bruen, Justice Barrett expressed concerns about liquidation in her concurrence:
Happy Saturnalia
Another year of the the Volokh Conspiracy tradition of marking the occasion of this ancient Roman holiday.
Today is Saturnalia, an ancient Roman holiday with a long tradition here at the Volokh Conspiracy. Admittedly, it's tradition only in so far as I have put up a post about it almost every December 17 since 2006. But, by internet standards, that's a truly ancient tradition, indeed!
The Encyclopedia Romana has a helpful description of Saturnalia:
During the holiday, restrictions were relaxed and the social order inverted. Gambling was allowed in public. Slaves were permitted to use dice and did not have to work. . . Within the family, a Lord of Misrule was chosen. Slaves were treated as equals, allowed to wear their masters' clothing, and be waited on at meal time in remembrance of an earlier golden age thought to have been ushered in by the god. In the Saturnalia, Lucian relates that "During My week the serious is barred; no business allowed. Drinking, noise and games and dice, appointing of kings and feasting of slaves, singing naked, clapping of frenzied hands, an occasional ducking of corked faces in icy water—such are the functions over which I preside."
As in most years, we have no shortage of strong candidates for the position of Lord of Misrule. But the current occupant of the White House has a particularly compelling claim to the title.
Happy Saturnalia to all the friends, Romans, and Volokh Conspiracy readers out there!
NOTE: Most of this post is adopted from previous Saturnalia posts.
Trump's Attempt to Deport Chinese Dissident Guan Heng is Part of an Awful Pattern
The administration has sought to deport numerous dissenters back to their oppressors.
The Trump Administration's effort to deport Chinese dissident Guan Heng has rightly drawn widespread outrage and condemnation. Guan is a hero for his exposure of the Chinese government's oppression and persecution of the Uyghur minority, and he faces near-certain imprisonment or death if he is deported to China, or to Uganda (a Chinese-aligned state to which the Trump administration may be trying to send him). Legally, he has an rock-solid case for asylum.
Sadly, the effort to deport Guan is part of a broader pattern of Trump administration efforts to deport dissidents and victims of persecution back to the regimes that oppress them. These policies now include deporting Russian dissidents back to Vladimir Putin's brutal dictatorship, refugees who fled oppression in Cuba and Venezuela, Iranian Christians who fled persecution by that country's radical Islamist regime, and Afghans who fled the Taliban (including many who aided the US during the war). Such policies are obviously cruel and unjust. They are also strategically counterproductive.
A policy that essentially aids anti-American regimes in their persecution of dissidents undermines our position in the international war of ideas between these governments' ideologies and ours, and deters future would-be dissidents and allies from working against those governments or aiding us. This isn't making America Great Again. It's making us simultaneously evil and stupid.
Jewish Plaintiffs in Establishment Clause Cases
I was doing some research on Establishment Clause cases, and noticed the plaintiffs in several leading cases were Jewish. I'm sure I'm missing others.
In Braunfeld v. Brown (1961), Abraham Braunfeld and the other plaintiffs were "member[s] of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which requires the closing of their places of business and a total abstention from all manner of work from nightfall each Friday until nightfall each Saturday."
In Engel v. Vitale (1962), Steven Engel was described as a "devout Reform Jew."
In Flast v. Cohen (1968), the lead plaintiff was Florence Flast. Several sources indicated he was Jewish, but nothing definitive. The other plaintiffs were Albert Shanker, Helen D. Henkin, Frank Abrams, C. Irving Dwork, Florine Levin. I would surmise that at least some of these plaintiffs were Jewish as well. Cohen, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, was Jewish.
In Lee v. Weisman (1992), student Deborah Weisman was Jewish, and objected to a graduation message delivered by Rabbi Leslie Gutterman, of Temple Beth El in Providence.
In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (2004), Michael Newdow's mother was "Jewish but secular."
In Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014), Susan Galloway was Jewish.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), Alton Lemon, the lead plaintiff was not Jewish, but the respondent, David Kurtzman, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, was Jewish.
Update: I found a detailed article that provides a somewhat critical analysis of Jews and the Establishment Clause. Here is a snippet:
Pfeffer and the leading Jewish organizations were gratified by the decisions in McCollum, Torcaso, Engel, and Schempp. These decisions did much more than change the law. They theoretically redefined, in educational institutions throughout America, the place of Christian values and traditions in American culture. Gregg Ivers describes the Engel and Schempp decisions "as the moral equivalent of a dagger through the heart of the traditional Christian values so long embodied in the American civic and religious cultural milieu."268 The alienation and discomfort that Jews had felt on American soil since 1654 were now officially redeemed. The time had come for the nation to journey on a new, secular expressway.
Not all Jews greeted these Court decisions with a spirit of triumph. One Jewish resident of Los Angeles sent Pfeffer the following message: "I feel that because of you and your ilk, in all the civilized nations of the world the most despised, spat upon, hated and shunned person is the Jew."269 Another warned him: "You are getting we [sic] the Jews in a terrible mess, keep it up and we shall all again be persecuted."270 A Christian responded in a similar fashion: "Your motives seem small, petty and personal."271
L. Scott Smith, The Secularization of America's Public Culture: Jews and the Establishment Clause, 32 U. La Verne L. Rev. 257, 293 (2011)
Free Speech Unmuted: Does the First Amendment Protect Supposedly "Addictive" Algorithms?, with Matthew Lawrence
Can the government regulate social media features because they are "addictive"? Jane Bambauer and I talk with Emory Law professor Matthew Lawrence about whether features like infinite scroll, personalized feeds, "near-miss" reward patterns, and dopamine-driven engagement tactics are comparable to gambling or even drug addiction—and whether that means the government can step in. The conversation digs into current lawsuits, whether there's a constitutionally significant difference between content and design, how addiction is defined in law and neuroscience, and what First Amendment limits exist when regulating digital platforms. A smart, fast-moving discussion for anyone curious about the future of free speech, tech regulation, and the psychology behind our screens.
Our past episodes:
Suspicion That Man Fiddling with Phone Might Be "Filming School Children" Doesn't Justify Detention by Police
"To hold otherwise would allow police officers to demand identification from anyone near a school while using a smartphone—parents taking first-day-of-school videos, a grandparent trying to pull up directions while in the school drop-off line, or dog walkers holding their phone near their chest."
From Judge Daniel Crabtree's opinion yesterday in Alea v. Ptacek (D. Kan.):
Plaintiff Galicano Alea was walking his dog on a sidewalk adjacent to a public middle school. He was fiddling with his phone to adjust his music selection. But to defendant Julian Garcia, a police officer, it appeared that plaintiff was filming school children. So, he detained plaintiff and demanded identification. Plaintiff refused. Officer Garcia eventually released plaintiff, who continued his walk. Still on school property, plaintiff then encountered a second officer, defendant Scott Ptacek. Officer Ptacek detained plaintiff and demanded identification. When plaintiff refused, Officer Ptacek arrested him for interference with a law enforcement officer. Six months later, prosecuting authorities dismissed all charges against plaintiff. Plaintiff now has sued the officers for violating his Fourth Amendment rights….
Though plaintiff's conduct arguably appeared creepy, Officer Garcia, lacking reasonable suspicion, lacked a lawful basis for the detention. And Officer Ptacek lacked a lawful basis to arrest plaintiff for refusing identification. To hold otherwise would allow police officers to demand identification from anyone near a school while using a smartphone—parents taking first-day-of-school videos, a grandparent trying to pull up directions while in the school drop-off line, or dog walkers holding their phone near their chest….
[D]efendants offer just one crime to support their reasonable-suspicion position: reckless stalking as defined by Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5427(a)(1) …:
Recklessly engaging in a course of conduct targeted at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person in the circumstances of the targeted person to fear for such person's safety, or the safety of a member of such person's immediate family and the targeted person is actually placed in such fear[.]
Defendants identify three factors they contend supported reasonable suspicion: the weekend reports about someone photographing children at pools and parks; plaintiff walking near the school during drop-off hours; and plaintiff ostensibly filming children. The court considers each fact, in turn, below, then considers all three of them together….
Self-Represented Litigants Can't Be Denied Right to Object to Witness Testimony
From Beslow v. Jason, decided yesterday by the Virginia Court of Appeals by Judge Daniel Ortiz, joined by Judges Randolph Beales and Vernida Chaney; the underlying dispute was whether to let a stepmother adopt her husband's child, over the other mother's objection:
At trial, both parties testified to their fitness as parents and the interests of the child. On direct examination, the Beslows [the stepmother] asked Jason [the mother] about her relationship with the child. The Beslows objected when Jason testified that the child said the Beslows would not let her talk to Jason anymore.
The trial court overruled the objection because Jason was answering the Beslows' question, then prohibited the Beslows from making objections as non-attorneys. Jason then explained that she was opposed to the petition for adoption, alleging Shamila was abusive. The Beslows again objected to Jason's testimony as hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection, and reminded the Beslows, "I told you a little while ago that because you're not counsel you're not able to object to evidence." Jason later introduced into evidence pictures of herself and the child, a call log showing calls she made to Vernon's cell phone for her weekly telephone visitation, whether the calls were answered or missed, and text messages the child sent her.
The guardian ad litem noted that the child had been successful at school and enjoyed living with the Beslows. The Beslows enrolled the child in multiple activities and tried to help the child regulate her emotions, which were complicated by ADHD and the presentation of autism. Shamila volunteered at the child's school, helped with a field trip, and ensured that the child attended appointments, practices, and school.
The trial court found that Jason had not abandoned the seven-year-old child and consistently sought custody, and there was no evidence that she could not care for the child financially or otherwise. It further found that the Beslows attempted to limit Jason's visitation with the child, but that they provided a suitable home for the child, and the adoption would not affect physical custody. Based on those findings, the trial court ruled that Jason's withholding of her consent to the adoption was not contrary to the best interests of the child, and denied the petition for adoption….
