The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Donald Trump and Section 3 of the 14th Amendment

Donald Trump is obviously not disqualified from seeking re-election under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment.

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The Colorado Supreme Court and Maine's Secretary of State have both declared that former President Donald Trump is disqualified from being on Republican primary ballots in 2024 because of his role in the events that led to the January 6, 2021 riot at the Capitol Building when the electoral votes from the 2020 presidential election were being counted. This is a hard question, which I have thought carefully about for months now and here is my final conclusion.

An early draft of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment provided in effect that: "No person shall be President or Vice President, Senator or Representative, or elector of President of President and Vice President or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, or as a Member of any State Legislature, or as any executive or judicial officer who, having previously taken an oath to support the Constitution of the United States shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.

The words "President or Vice President" were deliberately edited out of the final version of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This, together with the disqualification of presidential electors and vice-presidential elector who have engaged in "insurrection or rebellion" makes it clear that the Framers' of Section 3 did not intend for it to apply to presidents or vice presidents who engaged in insurrection.

This impression is augmented by the fact that Section 3 methodically applies in order from the highest office to the lowest office. Section 3 first disqualifies insurrectionist Senators and then Representatives. It then disqualifies all appointed civil or military officers; it then disqualifies insurrectionists from serving as a member of any State legislature, and it finally disqualifies insurrectionists from serving as State executive or judicial officers. This careful hierarchy suggests that the phrase "or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States" does not apply to the President or Vice President, but applies only to appointed federal officers.

This fact is further confirmed by the Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2, which says [The President shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States." The President does not appoint himself so obviously he is not an Officer of the United States under the Appointments Clause.

Moreover, the Commission clause of Article II, Section 3 says that "[T he President] shall" i.e. must, "Commission all the Officers of the United States." No President has EVER commissioned himself or his Vice President either before or after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. The President is obviously not an Officer of the United States for the purposes of the Commission clause.

Finally, Article II, Section 4 provides that: "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States" shall be liable for impeachment. Note here that the text does NOT say: "The President, Vice President, and all other civil Officers of the United States. Once again, Article II does not treat the President and Vice President as being merely civil officers. It instead treats them as stand-alone officers like the King of England or the Prince of Wales.

Just as Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains a hierarchy of officers, so too does Article II in the Appointments Clause, the Commission Clause, and the Impeachment Clause making it crystal clear that the President and Vice President are not civil officers of the United States.

They are sui generis like the King of England and the Prince of Wales.

Finally, consider that the oath taken, which must be broken to engage the Disqualifications Clause is an oath "to support the Constitution." This oath appears in Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution and applies to Senators, Representatives, and all executive and judicial officers both of the United States and of the several States. The President, in contrast, takes a special oath "to the best of my ability," to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." The difference in the words of the presidential oath of office from the other specified in Article VI, Section 3 is additional powerful evidence that the President and Vice President are not covered by Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The only evidence that the President is a civil officer of the United States is two-fold and is in both cases underwhelming to say the least. During the Senate floor debate on Section 3 a Senator objected that insurrectionist Presidents are not covered by the Disqualification Clause. Another Senator then said the President was covered because he was a civil officer of the United States. This is an embarrassingly thin reed for the proponents of presidential disqualification to grasp onto, since the Congress itself voted to strike the words president and vice president from Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. It has been decades since the Supreme Court, under the leadership of Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts started ignoring such floor colloquies, which are often staged for the benefit of the courts, in favor of the plain meaning of the legislative text.

The second and even weaker argument is that the presidency is described in Article II as being "an office" and therefore the President must be an officer. Many people hold offices under the Constitution and statutes of the United States. FBI agents for example hold an office and are officials, but they are not officers of the United States. If they were, Congress could put them in the line of succession to the presidency. It could also impeach them and the Senate could by a two-thirds vote remove them. By now we are getting to the land of the absurd! Officers of the United States and individuals who happen to hold an office are two very different kettle of fish.

I believe that I have conclusively proved that the President and Vice President are not covered by the Disqualification Clause. I turn next to whether the events of January 6, 2021 were an insurrection. No-one would contend they were a rebellion, which requires the use of armed paramilitary force to overturn the election.

Noah Webster's First Edition 1828 Dictionary of American English defines "insurrection" as follows:

INSURREC'TION, noun [Latin insurgo; in and surgo, to rise.]

  1. A rising against civil or political authority; the open and active opposition of a number of persons to the execution of a law in a city or state. It is equivalent to sedition, except that sedition expresses a less extensive rising of citizens. It differs from rebellion, for the latter expresses a revolt, or an attempt to overthrow the government, to establish a different one or to place the country under another jurisdiction. It differs from mutiny, as it respects the civil or political government; whereas a mutiny is an open opposition to law in the army or navy. insurrection is however used with such latitude as to comprehend either sedition or rebellion.

It is found that this city of old time hath made insurrection against kings, and that rebellion and sedition have been made therein. Ezra 4:19.

Webster's defines a riot as follows:

RI'OT, noun

  1. In a general sense, tumult; uproar; hence technically, in law, a riotous assembling of twelve persons or more, and not dispersing upon proclamation.

The definition of riot must depend on the laws. In Connecticut, the assembling of three persons or more, to do an unlawful act by violence against the person or property of another, and not dispersing upon proclamation, is declared to be a riot. In Massachusetts and New Hampshire, the number necessary to constitute a riot is twelve.

The events of January 6, 2021 occurred for three-and-one-half hours in one city only in the United States, Washington D.C., and not as an overall insurgency in multiple cities across the United States. The crowd was not carrying firearms and it dispersed when then President Trump asked for it to disperse. While the interruption of the counting of electoral votes is inexcusable as is the death that day of five persons and the injury of dozens of others, the fact of the matter is that the events of January 6, 2021 were more akin to a riot than they were to a systematic planned-out "insurrection or rebellion." Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment use the words "insurrection" or "rebellion as synonyms. The canon of construction of noscitur a sociis, a word derives its meaning from the company it keeps applies here. The kinds of "insurrections" described in Section 3 are akin to "rebellions" as the paradigm case of the onset of the Civil War makes clear. The events that occurred on or about January 6, 2021 were very, very bad, but they were not an insurrection or rebellion.

Moreover, President Trump understandingly himself believed that mail-in voting had led to widespread fraud and abuse, which had caused him to lose the 2020 presidential election notwithstanding the fact that he received more votes than Barack Obama had received in 2008. While this does not excuse what happened on or about January 6, 2021, it does mean that President Biden or his successor should pardon Trump for any crimes he may have committed during his tenure in office as was done with President Richard M. Nixon. President Trump has a committed base of followers, which amounts to 40% of the U.S. population. He is beating President Biden with 51% of the vote in some opinion polls. One cannot and should not jail a 77-year old former President of the United States under these circumstance. Accordingly, President Trump should be pardoned in the same broad way as was President Richard M. Nixon. I say this as a Nikki Haley supporter and not as a follower of former President Trump.

Disunion, Slavery, and the Causes of the Civil War

Abraham Lincoln pledged in his First Inaugural Address to keep the union together but to allow slavery in the States that had it already

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Nikki Haley recently downplayed the role of slavery in the actual starting of the Civil War.  Technically, she is absolutely right.  President Abraham Lincoln in his First Inaugural Address said that he would fight to keep the Union together, and that he would ban slavery in the western territories, but he pledged to forever protect slavery in the southern States that had it, and Lincoln even endorsed the infamous Corwin Amendment that would have forbade by constitutional amendment federal actions that would outlaw slavery altogether.  It is Chris Christie and Ron DeSantis who have gotten the history wrong in this particular campaign food fight.

Consider what Lincoln said when he took the oath of office on March 4, 1861:

"Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern States that by the accession of a Republican Administration their property and their peace and personal security are to be endangered. There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed and been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the published speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches when I declare that--

I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.

Those who nominated and elected me did so with full knowledge that I had made this and many similar declarations and had never recanted them; and more than this, they placed in the platform for my acceptance, and as a law to themselves and to me, the clear and emphatic resolution which I now read:

Resolved, That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and especially the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend; and we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any State or Territory, no matter what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes.

I now reiterate these sentiments, and in doing so I only press upon the public attention the most conclusive evidence of which the case is susceptible that the property, peace, and security of no section are to be in any wise endangered by the now incoming Administration. I add, too, that all the protection which, consistently with the Constitution and the laws, can be given will be cheerfully given to all the States when lawfully demanded, for whatever cause--as cheerfully to one section as to another."

For Lincoln, his first priority even ahead of abolishing slavery was avoiding disunion.  As a man from Illinois, he was acutely aware of the fact that all the Midwest's farm produce floated by barge down the Ohio, Missouri, and Mississippi River to New Orleans. If Louisiana seceded, the economy of the Union would be at her disposal. It was essential to prevent this result.

In pledging to outlaw slavery in the Western territories, Lincoln was girdling the tree of slavery in the southern states where it existed in 1861.  Such a strategy would end slavery in 100 years but not sooner.

In September 1862, the United Kingdom considered recognizing the independence of the Confederacy, exchanging ambassadors, and resuming trade and commerce with the South.  But, Lincoln knew that anti-slavery opinion was very strong in the U.K., so he announced in September 1862 that all three million slaves in areas still in rebellion against the Union as of January 1, 1863 would be emancipated by presidential executive order thus turning the Civil War from being a war about keeping the Union together into a war to free the enslaved people.  And, all four million enslaved people were freed when Lincoln helped steer the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery to passage in Congress and after Lincoln's assassination in April 1865.  The U.K. DID, as Lincoln predicted it would, stay out of the Civil War once it became a war to free the slaves, which is undoubtedly what Lincoln hoped would happen.

Slavery was the root cause of the Civil War, but Nikki Haley is right that from March 4, 1861 to January 1, 1863, the Civil War was about keeping the Union together. Only after Emancipation did the Civil War became a fight to end enslavement in the United States.  And, at that point the U.S. was on the North's side of the fight.

Free Speech

"Fake Sherlock," or Fake Allegations by New York Magazine?

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An interesting false light lawsuit filed today, Walter v. Herbert (M.D. Pa.), over New York magazine's "The Case of the Fake Sherlock" article (see pp. 11-19 of this PDF for a paywall-free version). The article had been introduced by the magazine with,

Richard Walter was hailed as a genius criminal profiler at murder trials, at forensic conferences, and on true-crime TV. In reality, he was a fraud. How did he get away with it for so long?

Walter attaches to his Complaint an American Association for Forensic Science Ethics Committee report that is introduced with this cover letter (of course, the "complaint" in that letter refers to the complaint against Walter submitted to the AAFS, not the Complaint in Walter's newly filed case):

This will be an unusual report because, in the case of dismissals, we usually offer only a brief description. The very public nature of this complaint, based on publication in a nationwide magazine, requires a detailed explanation.

When this complaint was first received, it was accompanied only by an article from New York magazine, written by David Herbert. (Attachment 1) When the Ethics Committee (hereafter "the Committee") members read the article, we all thought that we would be recommending some sort of sanction. By the time we finished our investigation, we all thought that the complaint should be dismissed. The article accuses the Respondent of fraud and also makes the Academy appear ineffective for not sanctioning him as a result of two previous complaints.

Because of the very public nature of the complaint, the Respondent, Mr. Richard D. Walter, Retired Fellow, General Section, has agreed that the Ethics Committee can waive the usual requirement of confidentiality when reporting this dismissal.

Much of the misconduct alleged in the New York article occurred many years ago and was therefore outside of the Committee's jurisdiction. Mr. Walter, however, gave a deposition in 2022, wherein several of the old allegations were discussed in detail. We concluded that any material misstatements in that deposition could be considered as within our jurisdiction. After reviewing the transcript, the Committee sent the respondent a pointed letter (Attachment 2) inviting him to respond to several apparent discrepancies. It was Mr. Walter's answer, accompanied by documentation that he provided (Attachment 3), and additional information the Committee obtained independently which ultimately persuaded the Committee that this complaint should be dismissed.

The following are issues that demonstrate that the New York article is highly biased and contains factual errors….

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Institute for Justice: Totally Worth Your Donations

As I've mentioned before, it's one of the public interest law firms that I admire most.

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I just gave some money to the Institute for Justice, a first-rate libertarian public interest law firm (and also the provider of the weekly Short Circuit posts on this blog, which are written by IJ's John Ross). I've long much admired IJ: I've litigated some First Amendment cases, but it's not that hard to win them, given how strong First Amendment protections generally are—IJ, on the other hand, has figured out ways of winning even economic liberties cases, where the degree of difficulty is much higher.

Here's IJ's little pitch, which I'm delighted to pass along, with my full endorsement:

Friends, please give us money. We will use it to sue the government, whether it is arresting a grandmother for criticizing the government; flooding a fourth-generation family farm without paying; secretly declaring that a perfectly pleasant neighborhood is a slum (so it can be seized via eminent domain); robbing innocent people's safe-deposit boxes (and then losing what they took); trespassing on rural property without a warrant, stealing a trail camera, and using it to spy on the owner's family; barring a nonprofit from providing free legal advice; and many, many other things. Help IJ protect the constitutional rights of all Americans with a secure online donation today at ij.org/donate.

By the way, if you do donate (or have donated in the past), please leave a comment below saying you did, so your fellow readers can see. (No obligation, of course, but I think it might be nice.)

Podcasts

History Podcasts for the New Year

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Want to start the new year by listening to a history podcast? Here are some suggestions.

Rather than providing links to Spotify or Apple, I'll just supply the information so that you can find the podcast anywhere you choose; not all of these podcasts are available on every player. My player of choice is Podcast Republic, which I found for free in the Google Play store.

Just as the Beatles weren't the first rock and roll band, but they did inspire the formation of many other bands, the modern founding father of history podcasts is Mike Duncan, with The History of Rome. The more than 180 episodes start with the founding of Rome and conclude with the fall of the Western Roman Empire.

Duncan then followed up Revolutions, examining in depth ten influential revolutions: the British Civil Wars of the mid-17th century in 16 episodes, the American Revolution in 15, the French Revolution in 54, the Haitian Revolution in 19, the Bolivarian revolutions of northern South America in 27, the mid-19th century European revolutions in 49 (divided into three separate units), Mexico in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in 27, and Russia's Bolshevik Revolution in 103. (Numbers are based on numbered episodes. Each of these podcasts has several supplemental episodes.)

While keeping up a prodigious output of weekly episodes, Duncan wrote two books. The first is The Storm Before the Storm: The Beginning of the End of the Roman Republic, covering 146-78 BC. As Duncan explains, the Roman Republic self-destructed because politicians and their supporters, of diverse ideological views, all started tearing down the unwritten traditions that had made republican self-government possible and had kept political battles within reasonable bounds. While Duncan doesn't make the point explicitly, the parallels to modern American politics are ominous. Duncan's other book is Hero of Two Worlds, a biography of the audacious Marquis de Lafayette.

David Crowther's The History of England is delightfully wry. Beginning with the primordial history after the collapse of Roman rule, the podcast is presently in the middle of the British Civil Wars in 1642. For any history podcast, I recommend starting at the beginning and working your way forward, just like when you discovered the existence of The Gilmore Girls in 2021.

History of the Germans, by Dirk Hoffmann-Becking, is well-named since "Germany" as a political unit long postdates the German people. Beginning in the late Dark Ages, the series has covered the rise of the Holy Roman Empire, the numerous Italian intrigues of HRE emperors trying to maintain their power there, and the rise and fall (ca. 1500) of the merchants' Hanseatic League, based in Germany's northern ports. Then, the podcast took a step back in time, to tell the story of Germany's eastern front—including the wars with the Slavs and the rise of Prussia. At the moment, in episode 131, we are in the mid-13th century.

The Russian Rulers History Podcast, by Mark Schauss, began with Rurik and continued all the way to Putin. That chronology being completed, Schauss now podcasts on special topics from all over Russian history and culture.

Eric Halsey's The Bulgarian History Podcast may seem obscure to American listeners. The podcast is an excellent starting point for learning Balkan history. Having begun with the long-age invasion of the Bulgar tribe from Central Asia, the series is now up to the Second Balkan War on the eve of World War I, in episode 198. Most listeners will be surprised to learn that there were two Bulgarian Empires, which controlled much of the Balkans, long before the emergence of the modern Bulgarian nation in the late 19th century.

Along the way, Bulgarian History necessarily looks in depth at the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires, particularly their policies and wars in the Balkans. You'll learn about Albania's greatest national hero, Skanderbeg (1405-68) who successfully led Albanian resistance to the Ottomans for 22 years, until he succumbed to malaria.

A podcast preceding the Mike Duncan era is 12 Byzantine Rulers, by Lars Brownsworth. The 17 episodes are a fine starting point for the basics of Byzantine history.

Brownsworth followed up with Norman Centuries. Educated American listeners will have at least a little familiarity with the Anglo-French Normans who conquered England in 1066. But as Brownsworth describes in 20 episodes, the Normans ranged far and wide, conquering Sicily and Southern Italy, and becoming a major power in the Mediterranean,

The History of Egypt, by Dominic Perry, begins in prehistory and takes the listener through the litany of pharaohs. With over 200 episodes, we're still not up to 1,000 BC. Perry also provides information about the lives of ordinary Egyptians, to the extent information is available. The podcast is steeped in archeology, and Perry provides many side episodes on interesting archeological sites, the history of Egyptian archeology, and interviews with modern scholars.

The Ancient World, by Scott C., aims to cover a vast array of material. The initial episodes were chronological, and bounced from one location to another. Since then, the podcast has focused on one particular topic, and followed it from start to finish. Currently, the podcast is nearing the end of Carchemish (C Episodes), about the Neo-Hittite kingdoms of Assyria (today, eastern Syria and western Iraq). Other series are Rediscovery (R Episodes), about archeologists and explorers who led the rediscovery of the ancient world; Bloodline (B Episodes), a ten-generation history of the  descendants of Mark Antony and Cleopatra; and Thea (T Episodes), about the Seleucid Empire, a successor state that ruled some of the territory conquered by Alexander the Great.

As the series titles indicate, the main focus of The Ancient World is the Near East, an area about which we have far more surviving written information from ancient times than we do about most other parts of the world.

A common feature of all the above excellent podcasts is that they are mainly apolitical and nondidactic. The podcasters let the events and individuals speak for themselves. This sets them apart from some other history podcasts whose underlying theme is convincing listeners to become leftists.

While the above podcasters sometimes express their own views, the expression is rarely intrusive or designed to make some point about modern politics.

Free Speech

Want Collateral to Ensure a Judgment Can Be Collected, Your Honor? No Problem—Use My NFT!

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Judge Jed Rakoff (S.D.N.Y.), in today's Hermes Int'l v. Rothschild, isn't having it. First, the backstory from an earlier (May 2022) decision in the case:

Around December 2021, defendant Mason Rothschild created digital images of faux-fur-covered versions of the luxury Birkin handbags of plaintiffs Hermes International and Hermès of Paris, Inc. …. Rothschild titled these images "MetaBirkins" and sold them using so-called "NFTs" (non-fungible tokens), explained further below….

NFTs, or "non-fungible tokens," are units of data stored on a blockchain that are created to transfer ownership of either physical things or digital media. When NFTs are created, or "minted," they are listed on an NFT marketplace where NFTs can be sold, traded, etc., in accordance with "smart contracts" that govern the transfers. Because NFTs can be easily sold and resold with a transaction history securely stored on the blockchain, NFTs can function as investments that can store value and increase value over time.

When an NFT is linked to digital media, the NFT and corresponding smart contract are stored on the blockchain and are linked to digital media files (e.g., JPEG images, .mp4 video files, or .mp3 music files) to create a uniquely identifiable digital media file. The NFTs and smart contracts are stored on the blockchain (so that they can be traced), but the digital media files to which the NFTs point are stored separately, usually on either a single central server or a decentralized network.

Fashion brands are beginning to create and offer digital replicas of their real-life products to put in digital fashion shows or otherwise use in the metaverse. NFTs can link to any kind of digital media, including virtual fashion items that can be worn in virtual worlds online. Brands sometimes partner with collaborators in offering co-branded virtual fashion products.

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Free Speech

Basketball Player's Outburst to Heckling Fan Isn't Actionable Infliction of Emotional Distress

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Another interesting twist from the Keisel v. Westbrook Utah Court of Appeals decision that I discuss in a separate post that deals with a libel lawsuit based on some follow-up statements:

In March 2019, the Utah Jazz were playing a game against the Oklahoma City Thunder. Midway through the second quarter, Russell Westbrook, the Thunder's point guard at the time, had a verbal altercation with Shane Keisel, a Jazz fan who was sitting next to his girlfriend Jennifer Huff just a few rows up from the court. In the initial moments of this altercation, Keisel said something to Westbrook that included the phrase "on your knees." … [In response], Westbrook shouted: "I swear to God, I'll fuck you up, you and your wife, I'll fuck you up, … I promise you on everything I love, on everything I love, I promise you." …

"Due to the highly subjective and volatile nature of emotional distress and the variability of its causations, the courts have historically been wary of dangers in opening the door to recovery therefor." On an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, our courts thus require a plaintiff to demonstrate:

(a) that a defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff considered outrageous and intolerable in that it offends the generally accepted standards of decency and morality; (b) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress or where any reasonable person would have known that such would result; and (c) that severe emotional distress resulted as a direct consequence of the defendant's conduct.

And to sustain such a claim, "a defendant's alleged conduct must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair, it must instead be so severe as to evoke outrage or revulsion."

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Free Speech

Court Rejects Fan's Libel Claims Against L.A. Clippers Player Russell Westbrook and the Utah Jazz

Westbrook and the Jazz characterized the fan's insults to Westbrook as racist; in context, the court concluded, these were constitutionally protected statements of opinion.

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From Keisel v. Westbrook, decided today by the Utah Court of Appeals (written by Judge Ryan D. Tenney and joined by Judges Michele M. Christiansen Forster and Ryan M. Harris); for some reason, I couldn't find the full opinion yet on the court's website, but I'll link to it when it's up:

In March 2019, the Utah Jazz were playing a game against the Oklahoma City Thunder. Midway through the second quarter, Russell Westbrook, the Thunder's point guard at the time, had a verbal altercation with Shane Keisel, a Jazz fan who was sitting next to his girlfriend Jennifer Huff just a few rows up from the court. In the initial moments of this altercation, Keisel said something to Westbrook that included the phrase "on your knees." Westbrook responded profanely and aggressively, and his response was caught on video and then circulated on social media before the game had concluded. When Westbrook was asked about the altercation in a post-game interview, Westbrook said that he thought Keisel's initial comment to him was "racial." Westbrook also said that Keisel's "wife" had made a similar comment.

The Jazz quickly investigated the altercation, determined that Keisel had violated a code of conduct that governs fan behavior, and banned Keisel from attending its home games for life. Before the next home game, then-owner Gail Miller addressed the crowd and said, among other things, "We are not a racist community." …

Keisel and Huff sued for libel and related torts, but the court rejected the claim:

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Free Speech

In Which States Is an Employee Protected from Firing for Making and Posting Porn Videos Off-Duty?

Colorado, North Dakota, probably Montana, and maybe New York.

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As I noted in yesterday's UW Chancellor post, the First Amendment generally doesn't prevent government employers from firing employees for making porn videos off-duty: Porn is generally viewed as speech that's not on "matters of public concern" for purposes of First Amendment employment law. (Much porn is protected against criminal prosecution or civil liability, but not against government employer retaliation.)

Likewise, the state statutes and local ordinances that protect speech by employees, including private employees, generally limit themselves to "political activity." Whether that's defined broadly or narrowly, it's unlikely to cover making of garden-variety porn. A New Hampshire law protects speech by government employees, but is limited to the "right to publicly discuss and give opinions as an individual on all matters concerning any government entity and its policies."

But four states, by my count, might protect employees who make porn off-duty from employer retaliation. Colorado law provides,

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Politics

Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions

Brady violations, dual enrollments, and a West Coast conviction.

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Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

  • Transgender woman is serving a 75-year prison term for murder, assault, and burglary. A prison guard repeatedly presses her into giving sexual favors in 2011. He is then convicted. In 2018—after the statute of limitations has lapsed—she files a civil rights suit. Prisoner: Equitable tolling due to the abuse and fear of retaliation. District court: Let's hold an evidentiary hearing! And denied. Second Circuit (over a dissent): The hearing did not violate the prisoner's Seventh Amendment rights. And equitable tolling doesn't apply.
  • Two men were convicted for their roles in a New Orleans armed robbery of an armored truck that left a guard dead. But the feds failed to disclose key info about a cooperating, testifying witness until after trial began—and even then didn't disclose everything. Fifth Circuit: That later info undermines confidence in the verdict of one of the men, who might be able to get another trial. (Doesn't help the other.)
  • Power company says it can't make a living these days under a federally mandated price cap. It petitions FERC for relief, which is granted. While the matter is on appeal, the new Chair requests a voluntary remand without asking for permission from the other commissioners. Meanwhile, the Commission's composition changes and it then nixes the price cap relief. Did the Chair have unilateral power to ask for a remand? Sixth Circuit: The statute says "business" requires a quorum of commissioners and a remand request is "business." Partial dissent: This aggression cannot stand. The milquetoast partial vacatur of the majority ain't enough.
  • Thanks to the work of enterprising chemists, methamphetamine has gotten more potent, which—this Michigan criminal defendant suggests—wrongly results in low-level dealers being treated like kingpins. Sixth Circuit: Too bad he waived that argument, or at least invited error by not pressing it more forcefully at sentencing. Concurrence: The government waived waiver (but this guy loses anyway).
  • The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act gives federal funds to school districts that provide a "free appropriate public education" to all children with disabilities. But the requirement does not extend to post-secondary education. What to do, then, with dual-credit, dual-enrollment courses at state universities or junior colleges? The Sixth Circuit, in dual rulings, holds they aren't covered.
  • Kansas City, Mo. police search a tow yard, where they seize business records, recover 16 stolen vehicles, and shoot the owner's dog. Two months later, an officer asks the tow yard owner to do him a solid and release a car owned by a relative; when the owner refuses, the officer says "it's game on." When a recording of the call is released to local media, prosecutors decide to drop the 31 counts of forgery stemming from the search. The owner sues, and the district court rejects all 17 state and federal claims. Eighth Circuit: No error here.
  • Midwesterners love to debate what is in the Midwest, including whether and which Plains states are Midwestern. While Midwest purists and maximalists may disagree about where Nebraska fits, they would all agree that the Cornhusker State is definitely not on the West Coast. So why is this former Nebraska congressman—convicted for lying to the FBI in Lincoln and D.C.—appealing in the Ninth Circuit? The judges are as flummoxed as we are. Conviction vacated for violating the Constitution's Venue and Vicinage Clauses.

New case! Last year, a SWAT team tore up Amy Hadley's home in South Bend, Ind., searching for a fugitive who was not there, never had been, and had no connection to her family. Officials have refused to pay for the damage. An uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment or Article 1, Section 21 of the Indiana Constitution? Or a violation of Article 1, Section 12, which provides that "every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law"? No doubt all three. Click here to learn more.

Natelson on the Offices and Officers of the Constitution in 1788 and 1868

"Mr. Tillman has been joined by another legal scholar, Josh Blackman. Together, they have tried to reconstruct the meanings of all these words and phrases."

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Rob Natelson is one of my favorite originalist scholars. When he writes something new, I will read it. And I think very, very carefully before I disagree with him. His careful writing and meticulous research is well-regarded. Natelson's scholarship has been cited by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.

I was very pleased to see that Natelson published an op-ed on the Section 3 debate in the Epoch Times. And Natelson provides some support for the Tillman/Blackman position that the President is not an "Officer of the United States" for purposes of Section 3.

The Constitution of 1788 uses two distinct phrases: "Officers of the United States" and "Office under the United States." Natelson concludes, "substantial evidence . . . suggests" that the phrase Office under the United States "doesn't include elected offices, such as senators, representatives, the vice president, or the president."

I am grateful that Natelson offered praise for the work of my dear colleague, Seth Barrett Tillman:

Over a decade ago, Seth Barrett Tillman, an American legal scholar working in Ireland, noticed that the use of these "office" phrases isn't haphazard. He found patterns. These patterns appear both in the drafting process and in the finished Constitution. Mr. Tillman also identified other historical facts consistent with the patterns.

Since that time, Mr. Tillman has been joined by another legal scholar, Josh Blackman. Together, they have tried to reconstruct the meanings of all these words and phrases.

In 2014, I gave a lecture on my ACA book at Stanford. Judge Michael McConnell was kind enough to host me at his home for a lovely dinner. Will Baude, who was then a fellow at Stanford, attended. Over dinner, we were discussing some of the most important, and under-appreciated originalist scholars. Our discussion immediately turned to Professor Tillman in Ireland. Indeed, in 2016 Baude wrote that "Professor Tillman's theory makes sense of patterns that most of us never saw." Natelson, Baude, and I all recognized Tillman's gift: he sees what us moderns cannot. And Tillman saw all of this long before Trump came on the scene. His position has remained consistent for some time. I am grateful to have worked so closely with Seth for the past seven years or so.

Natelson explains that our position about "Officers of the United States" and "Office under the United States" is "back[ed] . . . up with a fair amount of proof." Natelson highlights six items.

First, the phrase "Office under the United States," Natelson writes, "was the obvious successor to the extremely common British term 'office under the Crown.'" And this phrase has for centuries refered only to appointed positions. Natelson observes that "[a]s former subjects of the British Empire, members of the founding generation had heard and used that expression all their lives." It may be that people today are unfamiliar with this phrase. But, Natelson reminds us, "We must never assume the Constitution's ratifiers didn't understand a legal phrase in a legal document as important, as closely examined, and as widely discussed as the Constitution." (Tillman and I discuss the phrase "Office under the Crown" in Part IV of our ten-part series.)

Second, Natelson focused on the Commissions Clause, which provides that president "shall Commission all the Officers of the United States." He observes that "commissioning yourself" would be "awkward." Natelson writes that "no one has ever seriously suggested that the president must commission himself or other elected officials." Well, that's not exactly right. More than a decade ago, Professor Sai Prakash suggested that the President should commission himself and that such commissions may exist. Prakash wrote, "That no physical evidence of such a commission exists, however, certainly does not prove that the President never issued one." I do not know if Prakash still holds that position. Professors Calabresi and Attorney General Mukasey have also cited the Commissions Clause as proof that the President is not an "Officer of the United States." Natelson likewise observes that "the president must not be an 'Officer of the United States.'" (Tillman and I discuss the Commissions Clause in Part III of our ten-part series.)

Third, Natelson points to the Impeachment Clause, which authorizes impeachment of "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States." He writes that "If the president and vice president were officers of the United States, there would be no need to list them separately." Again, this position is not new. Justice Story articulated this same textualist argument in his Commentaries.

Fourth, Natelson observes that "[t]he Constitution treats the oaths of the president and members of Congress separately from the oaths of 'Officers of the United States.'" The Article VI Oaths Clause provides oaths for "Officers of the United States." The President does not fall in the aegis of this language. This fact is supported by the fact that he has a separate oath provision in Article II. (This argument stands apart from whether an oath to "support" the Constitution is distinct from an oath to "protect and defend" the Constitution.)

Fifth, Natelson turns to the Foreign Emoluments Clause, which applies to those who hold an "Office . . . under the United States." Natelson, relying on Tillman's scholarship, remarks that "President George Washington accepted such gifts without any public objection," as did Thomas Jefferson. Natelson concludes that this history "suggests that the members of the founding generation didn't think of the president as an 'Office under the United States.'"

Sixth, Natelson points to the Hamilton document from 1791. He observed that "Hamilton's list included all appointed positions. It excluded all elected ones, including the presidency." We have said enough about the Hamilton document. And to our knowledge, no one has responded to our analysis. Natelson acknowledges that "the Tillman–Blackman evidence from the 1790s does have the virtue of being uncontradicted."

Next, Natelson turns to the Fourteenth Amendment. He observes that Section 3 uses the same phrases that are used in the Constitution of 1788: "Officers of the United States" and "Office under the United States." And he offers a rule of legal interpretation: "when an amendment uses a word or phrase from the original Constitution, we should presume that the amenders used the phrase the same way the original Constitution does." This approach should not be controversial. In Heller, Justice Scalia interpreted the phrase "keep and bear arms" in the Second Amendment by looking to "historical background," including similar provisions in the English Bill of Rights and the early state constitution. Applying this rule, Natelson writes, "suggests that 'office under the United States' in the 14th Amendment means the same thing as in the original Constitution." He adds, to his "there's no strong evidence to the contrary." Natelson concludes, "the president isn't an "officer under the United States" in the original Constitution, then he's not one in the 14th Amendment, either." And, Tillman and I have explained, in the Constitution of 1788 and Section 3, the phrase "Officers of the United States" does not include elected officials.

***

Natelson responds to the charge from the Colorado Supreme Court, and Professors Baude and Paulsen, that the Blackman/Tillman position amounts to a "secret code." Rather, Natelson explains, the Framers of the Constitution "were highly skilled legal drafters who knew what they were doing." The Constitution has "no 'secret' meanings—even if modern writers ignorant of 18th-century conditions might think it did."

In recent months, former-Attorney General Mukasey and Professor Steve Calabresi have advanced our position: that the President is not an "Officer of the United States." Now, Rob Natelson has joined the fray. There is no "secret code."

Donald Trump

Maine and Michigan Issue Rulings on Trump and Section 3 Disqualification

Maine's Secretary of State ruled that Trump is ineligible for the presidency. The Michigan Supreme Court refused to reconsider a lower court ruling allowing Trump to remain on the GOP primary ballot, because state law doesn't limit primary ballot access to allow only candidates eligible for the office they seek.

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Seal of the state of Maine. (NA)

 

Over the last two days, the states of Maine and Michigan have issued rulings on challenges to Donald Trump's eligibility to run for the presidency, under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Maine Secretary of State Shenna Bellows (a Democrat) ruled that Trump is disqualified from being a candidate in the state's GOP presidential primary. Meanwhile, the Michigan Supreme Court refused to reconsider lower court rulings holding that Trump cannot be removed from the state's primary ballot because state law doesn't require primary candidates to be legally eligible for the office they seek election to.

The Maine decision is the more significant of the two, because it actually reaches the merits of the Section 3 issue. Secretary Bellows' ruling is similar to the recent Colorado Supreme Court  decision on the same subject. Like the Colorado court, Bellows concludes that the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol was an insurrection (an easy call, in my view), that Trump's activities amounted to "engaging" in that insurrection (I think this is the hardest issue at stake), that the president is an "officer of the United States" covered by Section 3 (another easy issue), that Trump's activities were not protected by the First Amendment, and that Section 3 is "self-executing" and thus states can enforce it without additional congressional legislation. Like the Colorado Supreme Court, Bellows also concludes that the laws of her state require candidates whose names appear on primary ballots to be eligible for the office they seek.

I won't review Bellows' reasoning in detail. But, as already noted, it is largely similar to that of the Colorado Supreme Court decision, which I analyzed at some length here. I think the Colorado ruling is correct, and therefore Bellows' decision is sound, as well. As Bellows notes, her ruling is subject to review by state courts and - ultimately - the US Supreme Court.

Bellows' ruling also addresses a number of evidentiary issues, which I will not try to assess, but which can potentially be reviewed by state courts. In addition, she rejects a clever but ultimately frivolous argument that Trump is disqualified from running for president under the Twenty-Second Amendment, which bars people who have already served two terms. The plaintiff  alleged Trump is ineligible under that Amendment because he claims he won the 2020 election; if so, Trump has already had a second term as president, and therefore can't run in 2024! Bellows rightly notes that "Application of the term limit turns on whether an individual has actually been elected President twice, not on beliefs or assertions about that fact…. That Mr. Trump has falsely asserted that he
won the 2020 election is no more disqualifying than it would be for him to proclaim that he is not a United States citizen."

Coming on the heels of the Colorado ruling, the Maine decision (especially if upheld by state courts), makes it more likely that additional states will disqualify Trump. That, in turn, makes it more likely the  Colorado decision will be reviewed by the US Supreme Court (the Colorado GOP has already asked the Court to take the case).  If the federal Supreme Court doesn't definitively resolve the issue, we are likely to end up with a situation where Trump is barred from the ballot in some states, but not others.

The Michigan Supreme Court ruling is a denial of a petition to review lower court decisions that held Trump cannot be excluded from the GOP primary ballot because - unlike in Colorado and Maine - candidates who appear on state primary ballots need not be constitutionally eligible for the office they seek. The lower court and the Supreme Court leave open the possibility that Trump can be barred from the general election ballot, should he win the Republican nomination.

Significantly, neither the lower courts nor the Supreme Court addressed the issues of whether Trump is disqualified from holding office under Section 3. The lower courts simply concluded they need not consider that question, because Trump cannot be barred from the primary ballot regardless of whether he is ineligible to become president, or not. The Supreme Court chose not to review those rulings.

There is a dissent to the denial of the right to appeal by Justice Elizabeth Welch. Some commentators have wrongly assumed this dissent represents the opinion of the Court. But it is actually just a statement of one justice's reasons explaining why she would have preferred for the state Supreme Court to review the case and issue a decision, as opposed to simply leaving lower court rulings in place by denying the plaintiffs the right to appeal.

We cannot assume the other justices necessarily agree with Justice Welch's reasoning. But, to the extent it matters, she writes that she would have affirmed the lower court ruling on the grounds that Michigan state law (which she carefully differentiates from the Colorado law relied on by that state's Supreme Court) doesn't bar constitutionally ineligible candidates from primary ballots. She also notes she "would affirm the Court of Appeals' ruling…, which still allows appellants to renew their legal efforts as to the Michigan general election later in 2024 should Trump become the Republican nominee for President of the United States or seek such office as an independent candidate."

I did a more detailed overview of the legal, moral, and political issues at stake in the Section 3 litigation in this article. In a more recent post, I explained why Section 3 disqualification doesn't require a prior criminal conviction for insurrection.

 

Free Speech

Requiring Web Sites to Post and Report Terms of Service Doesn't Violate First Amendment

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So holds Judge William Shubb (E.D. Cal.) in X Corp. v. Bonta:

AB 587 requires that social media companies post their terms of service "in a manner reasonably designed to inform all users of the social media platform of the existence and contents of the terms of service." The law also requires that such companies submit twice yearly "terms of service reports" to the Attorney General containing, inter alia, the current version of the terms of service for their platform, as well as a description of content moderation practices used by the social media company for that platform, including, but not limited to, how the company addresses (A) hate speech or racism; (B) extremism or radicalization; (C) disinformation or misinformation; (D) harassment; and (E) foreign political interference.

The "terms of service" as defined in AB 587 appear to bear all of the hallmarks of commercial speech. Under Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corporation (1983), there is "strong support" for finding that the speech is commercial where "(1) the speech is an advertisement, (2) the speech refers to a particular product, and (3) the speaker has an economic motivation."

Although the terms of service may not literally be advertisements in the sense of proposing a commercial transaction, they are directed to potential consumers and may presumably play a role in the decision of whether to use the platform. They refer to the company's product or service, i.e., the social media platform, and communicate important information concerning the platform and how users may utilize the product.

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Free Speech

UW-La Crosse Chancellor Fired for Posting Porn Videos of Himself with His Wife

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The N.Y. Times (Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs & Dan Simmons) reports:

The chancellor of a state university in Wisconsin was fired this week after posting pornographic videos with his wife online.

The University of Wisconsin System's Board of Regents unanimously decided to dismiss the chancellor, Joe Gow, who had led the University of Wisconsin-La Crosse since 2007 and was its longest-tenured leader since the 1960s. Carmen Wilson, Mr. Gow's wife, was also removed from her unpaid position as associate to the chancellor.

In an interview on Thursday, Mr. Gow and Ms. Wilson said that they believe they were fired over the videos, which included sex scenes together and with others under the username Sexy Happy Couple. Both said they felt it was wrong for the university to punish them over the videos, arguing that doing so infringes on their free speech rights.

Here's my sense of the First Amendment analysis:

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