The Volokh Conspiracy
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In Which States Is an Employee Protected from Firing for Making and Posting Porn Videos Off-Duty?
Colorado, North Dakota, probably Montana, and maybe New York.
As I noted in yesterday's UW Chancellor post, the First Amendment generally doesn't prevent government employers from firing employees for making porn videos off-duty: Porn is generally viewed as speech that's not on "matters of public concern" for purposes of First Amendment employment law. (Much porn is protected against criminal prosecution or civil liability, but not against government employer retaliation.)
Likewise, the state statutes and local ordinances that protect speech by employees, including private employees, generally limit themselves to "political activity." Whether that's defined broadly or narrowly, it's unlikely to cover making of garden-variety porn. A New Hampshire law protects speech by government employees, but is limited to the "right to publicly discuss and give opinions as an individual on all matters concerning any government entity and its policies."
But four states, by my count, might protect employees who make porn off-duty from employer retaliation. Colorado law provides,
[No employer may] terminate the employment of any employee due to that employee's engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours unless such a restriction:
(a) Relates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is reasonably and rationally related to the employment activities and responsibilities of a particular employee or a particular group of employees, rather than to all employees of the employer; or
(b) Is necessary to avoid a conflict of interest with any responsibilities to the employer or the appearance of such a conflict of interest.
North Dakota similar provides,
[No employer may discriminate against an employee or applicant] because of … participation in a lawful activity that is off the employer's premises and that takes place during nonworking hours [unless that participation is]
[a] in direct conflict with the essential business-related interests of the employer … [or]
[b] contrary to a bona fide occupational qualification that reasonably and rationally relates to employment activities and the responsibilities of a particular employee or group of employees, rather than to all employees of that employer.
Naturally, one can debate when the exceptions apply, and that might turn on the employee's particular job. (For instance, high-level employees that are supposed to be institutional leaders and role models might be subjected to greater restrictions than rank-and-file employees.) But if the making of the porn is "lawful"—i.e., doesn't include child participants and thus isn't "child pornography," and isn't so hard-core as to be punishable "obscenity"—the statutes would at least presumptively apply.
New York law similarly provides,
(1) … (b) "Recreational activities" shall mean any lawful, leisure-time activity, for which the employee receives no compensation and which is generally engaged in for recreational purposes, including but not limited to sports, games, hobbies, exercise, reading and the viewing of television, movies and similar material ….
(2) … (c) [No employer may discriminate against an employee or prospective employee] because of … an individual's legal recreational activities outside work hours, off of the employer's premises and without use of the employer's equipment or other property …
(3)(a) [This section shall not be deemed to protect activity that] creates a material conflict of interest related to the employer's trade secrets, proprietary information or other proprietary or business interest ….
(4) [A]n employer shall not be in violation of this section where the employer takes action based on the belief … that: … (iii) the individual's actions were deemed by an employer or previous employer to be illegal or to constitute habitually poor performance, incompetency or misconduct.
The law would thus likely forbid firing for viewing pornography (unless one of the exceptions applies), but it's not clear whether noncommercial creation and posting of pornography counts as behavior that "is generally engaged in for recreational purposes."
Montana is the one state that generally bars employers from firing people without good cause:
[An employer may not discharge an employee] if … the discharge was not for [reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the employer's operation, or other legitimate business reasons] and the employee had completed the employer's probationary period of employment [or six months, if the employer did not establish a specific probationary period] ….
Again, one would have to consider the facts of the particular incident and job category, but at least some employees are likely to be protected by this. (Of course, in all states employees can also be protected by contracts that allowing firing only for cause—such as labor contracts, tenure contracts, and other such contracts—though that of course depends on the particular terms of the contract. And in some jurisdictions employees may also be protected by civil service protections that require "good cause" to fire.)
Finally, note that, if a state law does bar firing employees for certain kinds of activity, employment contracts can't trump those statutory rights—just as an employer can't insist that employees waive their rights not to be discriminated against based on race, not to be harassed based on sex, or not to be fired for their legally protected religious activities. But a contract might be relevant to the interpretation of a statute, for instance, if it sets forth specific obligations for a particular class of employees that's related to their employment responsibilities.
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Respectfully, EV, I *think* I disagree with you on this.
University Presidents/Chancellors are in a different category from other employees, public or private.
I am sure that when Prof. Volokh wants legal advice, you will be the first person he calls.
I'm not offering legal advice, a-hole.
Well, not good legal advice, anyway.
We notice that you concede the epithet.
David, you always take the attack wihile defending nothing. That is either a coward or a self-important jerk.
On what basis are they different?
For starters, they are not allowed to be in a bargaining unit -- they are not allowed to belong to a union. I believe (may be wrong here) that they are not protected by any of the civil service laws.
So much for the edit function.
Unlike regular employees who are hired indefinitely, they are hired for a set number of contracted years, usually five. These contracts are renewed early if they are liked and broken if they aren't == but professor jones is not hired "for 5 years."
One thing not widely known is that they are also usually given pro-forma tenure in whatever department is closest to what their initial academic field was, i.e. before they went into admin. This means that they have a guaranteed gig if they get fired and don't get another gig somewhere else.
That is the reference to "returning to the faculty" of the Wisconsin guy -- he is entitled to a sabbatical because he didn't take any when he was chancellor, and then they usually buy the guy out of the teaching gig, although he has every right to teach regardless of if the department needs (or wants) him.
Does this make sense? (it's something I know very well and I know I am leaving parts out.)
And?
Then why did he hide it? Why is he surprised? Because even he doesn't agree with you. No one in real life would agree with you.
Are you making a policy argument or a legal argument?
Legally speaking, amateur porn is not likely to be a conflict of interest. The First Amendment may allow high level officials to be scrutinized more closely, but these laws say nothing of rank or embarrassment. They allow the employer to invoke conflict of interest as a reason to terminate an employee for off the job behavior.
Not Cali?
California law protects employees against firing based on their "political activity," but I don't think making porn would generally qualify.
We'd have to go back to those pre-Miller porn movies where they would throw in a bit of discussion on the First Amendment so they could claim it was not "utterly without redeeming social value".
Just post a short message on your barely legal website saying you're doing this as a political protest against the prudishness of society and you're golden right?
The California lawful off-duty conduct protection (separate from political activity) is Labor Code 98.6, referring to Labor Code 96(k).
Those protections are limited to whistleblower type actions related to wage and hour disputes, aren't they?
No.
Specifically which clauses protect general actions, then? Section 98.6 protects any:
Section 96(k) describes "Claims for loss of wages as the result of demotion, suspension, or discharge from employment for lawful conduct occurring during nonworking hours away from the employer's premises." However, what's protected there is only making such a claim -- it does not independently protect "lawful conduct occurring during nonworking hours away from the employer's premises". Specifically, this page says 96(k) "has been more narrowly interpreted by courts as applying to lawful off-duty political activity", consistent with EV's description of California law.
Here’s what I wrote about the subject in 2012, though please correct me if there have been further developments since then (or if my account was in error at the outset):
California Labor Code sections 96(k) and 98.6(a) allow the Labor Commissioner to “take assignments of” any employee claims “for loss of wages as the result of demotion, suspension, or discharge from employment for lawful conduct occurring during nonworking hours away from the employer’s premises,” id. § 96(k), and bar employers from discriminating against “any employee or applicant for employment because the employee or applicant engaged in any conduct delineated in this chapter, including the conduct described in [section 96(k)] and [section 1101].” But California courts have concluded that the statutes create no new protections, but instead merely let the Labor Commissioner take assignments of any claims already secured by existing law, such as section 1101 claims or right to privacy claims. See Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp., 120 Cal. App. 4th 72, 80–89 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (so holding as to both § 96(k) and § 98.6); see also Hartt v. Sony Elecs. Broad. &
Prof’l Co., 69 Fed. Appx. 889, 890 (9th Cir. 2003) (taking this view, but considering only § 96(k)); Paloma v. City of Newark, No. A098022, 2003 WL 122790, at *12–13 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2003) (also taking this view but considering only § 96(k)); Barbee v. Household Auto. Fin. Corp., 113 Cal. App. 4th 525, 533–36 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (likewise); 83 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 226, 228, 230 (2000) (taking this view as to § 96(k)).
It doesn't qualify in any way. IF it did you would just smuggle all your hardcore porn into a political wrapper.
What if faculty members and other staff complain that the chancellor making porn movies creates a hostile working environment for them, citing the old feminist allegation that pornography constitutes “violence against women?”
I've long criticized the excesses of hostile environment harassment law (see, e.g., here), and noted the tension between some of its broader applications and First Amendment law. But I haven't seen any cases that impose liability based on a coworker's or manager's off-the-job public posting of pornography depicting himself, or that even suggest that such liability could be imposed.
BUT a Chancellor is never "off the job" -- it's a 24/7 gig where 20 hour days (without overtime) are not uncommon and (in most cases) the person lives on campus. In "the Chancellor's House", which is also used for entertaining -- on behalf of the university.
Likewise, an employee has the right to consume alcohol when "off the job" as long as sober when the employee returns to work. But a drunken Chancellor is a different story -- it may be covered up but it is still a scandal.
We really haven't figured out what to do with moral turpitude let alone what jobs legitimately should have such a clause but at the level of University Chancellor, I think such a thing is valid.
Nor have I seen any such cases. However, I have seen many sexual harassment complaints in which off-duty conduct or conduct outside of the workplace was cited as evidence of a hostile environment.
One example: many years ago, a minor beer company ran commercials featuring what they called the “Swedish Bikini team.” In a sexual harassment complaint brought by female employees, they cited this commercial as “evidence” of the company’s work environment allegedly being hostile toward women.
Remember: companies aren’t just concerned with winning cases; they want to avoid being sued altogether. They thus have a strong incentive to overreact to anything that might be Used against them in a sexual harassment suit.
Best commercial EVER:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-c2NEFPqTwY
Of course that is a lobster TRAP and not a lobster CRATE, and by 1990 everyone had shifted to wire traps anyway, but still....
.
See, now that’s News You Can Use.
Its real world information like this that's the reason I read Volokh.