The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

The Stealth Impeachment of Judge Newman in the Federal Circuit

Chief Judge Kimberly Moore cannot be the judge, jury, and executioner of her colleague.

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Of late, the media has fixated on judicial ethics--for certain judges, at least. Regrettably, many of these stories fail to put the accusations in context. In some situations, judges took actions that were actually consistent with the rules, or were not-clearly inconsistent with the rules. Still, self-professed experts find fault with unwritten rules. In other cases, judges have made good-faith mistakes based on misreading byzantine codes, and promptly agreed to correct those errors. Some of the allegations border on frivolous, but disfavored judges still get placed under the microscope. Throughout all of this breathless reporting, there has not been a single allegation of an actual conflict of interest between a judge and a party that would result in recusal. To quote Justice Breyer, there has been nothing "underhanded." At most, the claims focus on the nebulous appearance of impropriety standard, which can mean just about anything.

Yet, at present, we may be witnessing serious judicial misconduct that involves an actual conflict of interest. And the Washington Post does not need to fly a swat team of reporters to Amarillo to investigate. I speak, of course, about the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Now, I do not have any dog in this fight. I know little about patent law, other than the fact that the Supreme Court routinely reverses the Federal Circuit. Chief Judge Moore was a professor at George Mason, but I never took any classes with her. And, as best as I can recall, I've never even seen Judge Newman. Indeed, she only popped on my radar when I was calculating which judges were eligible to take senior status. Newman was born in 1927, was appointed to the Federal Circuit in 1984, and became eligible for senior status in 1996. But the almost-96-year-old has never taken senior status--and that decision has created problems for her colleagues.

According to Judge Moore, Judge Newman is taking a really long time to resolve cases--in some situations, more than a year. (To be frank, Judge Newman is performing at a faster clip than some Biden-appointed judges who are five decades younger.) On the surface, Judge Moore is trying to pressure Judge Newman to take senior status. As a general matter, senior status judges can still hear cases--but those assignments are at the discretion of the Chief Judge. And if Newman were to take senior status, then Moore and her successors could simply prevent Newman from hearing other cases. The remedy being sought is stark: Judge Moore, and her colleagues on the Federal Circuit, are trying to prevent any future cases from being assigned to Judge Newman. Indeed, Judge Moore has already stopped assigning new cases to Newman, who remains an active status judge. If Judge Moore succeeds, Judge Newman would remain an Article III judge in name only. To put it bluntly, Chief Judge Kimberly Moore is engaging in a stealth impeachment of Judge Pauline Newman.

Newman is now represented by the New Civil Liberties Alliance. And NCLA sent a letter to Moore. I realize the facts here are complex, and contested. I'll avoid opining on the merits. Rather, I want to focus on the apparent conflict of interest.

Every federal circuit has a "Judicial Council." That council includes some circuit judges, as well as some district court judges, from that circuit. (The Federal Circuit has no district court judges, so only circuit judges sit on that council.) If a misconduct complaint is filed against a district court judge in a particular circuit, it is understood that circuit court judges from that circuit can impartially resolve the conflict. After all, circuit court judges have to review the decisions of district court judges all the time. Most circuit judges never actually even see district court judges--except, as John Roberts once observed, in the D.C. Circuit, where all judges have to share a cafeteria.

However, when a misconduct complaint is filed against a circuit court judge, there will often be a potential conflict, or at least awkwardness. Specifically, circuit judges may not be comfortable to resolve a case against their colleague. They sit together regularly, for decades at a time. Partiality can always be questioned. Therefore, a mechanism exists in which the Chief Judge of the circuit can ask the Chief Justice of the United States to reassign the matter to another circuit. That way, the issue can be impartially adjudicated. This process is not uncommon. Over the past decade, misconduct complaints against circuit judges from the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits were transferred to other circuits.

Yet, Chief Judge Moore has not, to date at least, moved to transfer Newman's case to another circuit. This decision is especially problematic due to the nature of the allegations. Here, we are not dealing with a misconduct complaint from a litigant, or private citizen, who objects to something the judge did on bench, or in public. Rather, the allegations here concern actions that Judge Newman has taken during the opinion writing process. Other than the final date on which an opinion is actually published, the public has no knowledge about how the sausage is made. We do not know when drafts were circulated. We do not know how long judges took to make and revise edits. And we do not know whether complicated legal issues made the process take longer. The only people who have this evidence would be the fellow judges of the circuit, including Judge Moore, and court staff. Yet, Judge Moore purports to decide whether there was misconduct. She is the fact-witness, the fact-finder, and the adjudicator. There is an apparent conflict of interest.

Finally, there is another issue lurking under the surface. If Chief Judge Moore succeeds in pushing her colleague to take senior status, a new vacancy would open up for the Biden Administration. The patent bar is, from what I've heard, very clubby. And there is no blue slip delay. I'm sure there is a list of attorneys waiting to fill that seat. Judge Moore, by pushing out her colleague, is opening a seat for someone else. Judges should have no role in picking their successors. Nor should judges have a role in creating vacancies on their court, in which more-congenial nominees can assume the seat. And I don't put much stock in the fact that Moore is a Republican-appointee, and we currently have a Democratic president. Judge Newman has suggested that this misconduct process is in retaliation for her disfavored views on patent law.

Chief Judge Kimberly Moore cannot be the judge, jury, and executioner of Judge Newman.

How Will the Mifepristone Case Get Back to the Supreme Court?

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On Friday evening, the Supreme Court granted a complete stay of the District Court's order in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine v. FDA. And that stay will remain in effect while the proceedings in the Fifth Circuit continue. For now, the status quo continues. Justice Thomas would have denied the application for a stay. Justice Alito dissented from the Court's decision to grant the application for a stay.

Many press outlets reported that the vote was 7-2, but we cannot be so certain. For sure, there were five votes to grant the stay. It is also possible that 1 or 2 justices would have denied the stay, but chose to not indicate their dissent. (Will Baude flagged this possibility.) The timing of the case suggests that votes may have been in flux.  Originally, Circuit Justice Alito ordered that the temporary administrative stay would expire on Wednesday. But, before that deadline, the Court extended the stay until Friday. My guess is that there were potentially 3 or 4 votes for at least a partial stay, but Alito could not count to 5. Instead, the Court set the deadline for Friday night, so Alito could prepare his dissent. And, that release would ensure the order came after the close of business, when people would not be paying attention. (The Court has often issued emergency orders late at night on a Friday, after the news cycle is over.)

The Court did not issue any explanation for the stay. Perhaps five Justices thought that the Plaintiffs lacked standing for some, or all of their claims. Maybe five Justices thought that some of the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Maybe five of the Justices thought all of the APA claims were unmeritorious. Maybe five of the Justices thought that the Comstock Act claims were unmeritorious. Maybe five Justices thought that the threat of irreparable injury to the government, and to the public, was so high that a stay was warranted while the litigation proceeded. But who knows? As we have been told incessantly, when the Supreme Court issues an order on the emergency docket, we do not know the Court's reasoning.

Let me air what will probably be an unpopular opinion on all sides. If a majority of the Court thought that this case is a loser on jurisdictional ground, then the Court should have issued a short per curiam opinion explaining why there was no jurisdiction. Nothing will change in the proceedings below with regard to jurisdiction. Either the plaintiffs have standing, or they do not have standing. The Court could have put the case out of it misery, and avoided dragging the lower courts, and the country, through what may be a fruitless exercise.

Adam Unikowsky writes that this order "makes it likely that the FDA will ultimately prevail in this case." Adam questions what more will be added by another round of briefing:

But their legal arguments, especially on standing, have been fully aired and I do not see how more thorough briefing would change the result. Moreover, it would be quite the bait and switch for the Court to flip on this a year from now

I agree with Adam. Nothing will be gained by another year of litigation. If a majority of the Court thought that this case is a loser on jurisdictional ground, nothing the Fifth Circuit will do can change the majority's opinion.

But the Court didn't explain its reasoning. Again, perhaps there was not a majority to coalesce around a single jurisdictional argument. Or perhaps the Chief Justice did his best ostrich impression, buried his head in the shifting sands, and hoped this issue would go away. (These issues never go away.)

What happens next? The case goes back to the Fifth Circuit. Oral argument will be held in 25 days, and counting. A panel has already been set, but the composition of that panel (as far as I know) is not public. Can the panel read any specific tea leaves from the Court's per curiam stay? Given that there are so many interrelated issues that go to jurisdiction and the merits, I think the answer is no. The only clear inference that can be drawn is that the government should prevail. That insight is not particularly helpful for lower court judges who are asked to resolve a concrete case.

There are a few paths going forward. First, the merits panel may agrees with all, or part of the stay panel's order. And that order can come quickly--maybe even this summer. The Solicitor General could file a quick cert petition, to get the case teed up for the long conference, for a decision by June 2024. But I think the more likely path is an orderly petition for rehearing en banc. Unlike Rahimi, where the government skipped en banc, here the SG will not be in a rush. The Supreme Court granted a stay for the entire duration of the litigation, so the status quo will remain. If a panel of the Fifth Circuit rules for the Plaintiffs, at least in part, I doubt that there are enough votes to reverse en banc. At most, dissents from denial of en banc could drag the process out a few months. So long as a cert petition is filed by November or December, the case can be added to the Court's docket for disposition by June 2024. Finally, there is a political advantage to dragging this case out for the government. Post-Dobbs, abortion has become a political liability for many Republicans. And the closer we get to the 2024 election, the more this case can become another problem for the GOP. But there is a risk of the case going beyond the election. (More on that risk later.)

There is a second path. A Fifth Circuit panel may rule for the government across the board. Again, I don't think there are many tea leaves to be drawn from the short per curiam order. But it wouldn't be hard for some of the more moderate members of the Fifth Circuit to toss the case on standing ground. At that point, the Plaintiffs can seek rehearing en banc. And I think there is a substantial likelihood that the petition is granted. But that process will take a lot of time. At least in the Fifth Circuit, the en banc process can take a year, or more. The majority en banc opinion on the Fifth Circuit are often very, very fractured, with several Justices writing concurrences and dissents. The upshot of seeking en banc would be that the case doesn't even get to a cert petition until late 2024, if not early 2025. The Supreme Court would not even touch the issue until after the change in administration.

And maybe that's the best plan for the plaintiffs. A future GOP administration could decide to take its own administrative action to roll back some of the Biden administration's changes regarding mifepristone. Specifically, a Trump or DeSantis FDA could reinstate the requirement that women have an in-person visit to receive this drug. No more telemedicine visits. And a future OLC could reverse the prior opinion concerning the Comstock Act, and prohibit shipping these drugs through the mail. We may also see criminal prosecutions for some people who potentially violated the act. (When the case first started, I always expected those two outcomes to be the most the plaintiffs could hope for.) Plus, don't forget the power of sue-and-settle with ADF. Conservatives can play that game also.

Thus, there is a double edged sword for the SG by dragging this case out. Indeed, if the administration flips, the Supreme Court may never even decide the case. That brings me back to my unpopular conclusion: If a majority of the Court thought that this case is a loser on jurisdictional ground, then the Court should have issued a short per curiam opinion explaining why there was no jurisdiction.

The Court declined this path. And the case may never even make it back to the Court. The game of 4D chess continues.

Law & Government

The Supreme Court's Mifepristone Stay

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Last night the Supreme Court entered a short but important order staying an order issued by the Northern District of Texas in the mifepristone litigation "pending disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such a writ is timely sought." This means that the case now has time to proceed in a more orderly fashion, with merits consideration by the Fifth Circuit and a less compressed timeline for cert. briefing before the Supreme Court.

Like everybody else, I've been forced to learn about the legal issues on a very compressed timeline, but the Supreme Court's stay seems correct to me. At a minimum, I don't think plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to succeed on the argument that they have standing in light of Summers v. Earth Island Institute (see Adam Unikowsky for this point and more). And given the importance of the case, it seems obviously certworthy if the Fifth Circuit continues to uphold the district court's rulings against the FDA.

Two justices publicly noted their dissent. (This being the shadow docket, it is possible that there are 1-2 other justices who did not vote for a stay, but chose not to publicly note their votes once they lost.) Justice Thomas noted without further explanation that he "would deny the applications for stays." (I can imagine both defensible and indefensible reasons for this, though as I note, I think the stays should have been granted.)

Justice Alito also would have denied the stays, but offered a longer and more interesting explanation:

In recent cases, this Court has been lambasted for staying a District Court order "based on the scanty review this Court gives matters on its shadow docket," Merrill v. Milligan, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (KAGAN, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2). In another, we were criticized for ruling on a stay application while "barely bother[ing] to explain [our] conclusion," a disposition that was labeled as "emblematic of too much of this Court's shadow-docket decisionmaking— which every day becomes more unreasoned." Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 594 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2021)(KAGAN, J., dissenting from denial of application for injunctive relief) (slip op., at 1–2). And in a third case in which a stay was granted, we were condemned for not exhibiting the "restraint" that was supposedly exercised in the past and for not "resisting" the Government's effort to "shortcut" normal process. Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 5). Cf. Does 1–3 v. Mills, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (BARRETT, J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief) (slip op., at 1) (warning that the Court should not act "on a short fuse without benefit of full briefing and oral argument" in a case that is "first to address the questions presented").

I did not agree with these criticisms at the time, but if they were warranted in the cases in which they were made, they are emphatically true here. As narrowed by the Court of Appeals, the stay that would apply if we failed to broaden it would not remove mifepristone from the market. It would simply restore the circumstances that existed (and that the Government defended) from 2000 to 2016 under three Presidential administrations. In addition, because the applicants' Fifth Circuit appeal has been put on a fast track, with oral argument scheduled to take place in 26 days, there is reason to believe that they would get the relief they now seek—from either the Court of Appeals or this Court—in the near future if their arguments on the merits are persuasive.

At present, the applicants are not entitled to a stay because they have not shown that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the interim. The applicants claim that regulatory "chaos" would occur due to an alleged conflict between the relief awarded in these cases and the relief provided by a decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. It is not clear that there actually is a conflict because the relief in these cases is a stay, not an injunction, but even if there is a conflict, that should not be given any weight. Our granting of a stay of a lower-court decision is an equitable remedy. It should not be given if the moving party has not acted equitably, and that is the situation here. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has engaged in what has become the practice of "leverag[ing]" district court injunctions "as a basis" for implementing a desired policy while evading both necessary agency procedures and judicial review. Arizona v. City and County of San Francisco, 596 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring) (slip op., at 2).
The Washington District Court enjoined the FDA from altering its current practice regarding mifepristone—something that the FDA had never hinted it was contemplating.

The FDA did not appeal that appealable order, and when seven States that might take such an appeal asked to intervene, the FDA opposed their request. This series of events
laid the foundation for the Government's regulatory "chaos" argument.

Once this argument is put aside, the applicants' argument on irreparable harm is largely reduced to the claim that Danco could not continue to market mifepristone because the drug would be mislabeled and that distribution could not resume until Danco jumped through a series of regulatory steps that would be largely perfunctory under present circumstances. That would not take place, however, unless the FDA elected to use its enforcement discretion to stop Danco, and the applicants' papers do not provide any reason to believe the FDA would make that choice.

The FDA has previously invoked enforcement discretion to permit the distribution of mifepristone in a way that the regulations then in force prohibited, and here, the Government has not dispelled legitimate doubts that it would even obey an unfavorable order in these cases, much less that it would choose to take enforcement actions to which it has strong objections.

For these reasons, I would deny the stay applications. Contrary to the impression that may be held by many, that disposition would not express any view on the merits of the question whether the FDA acted lawfully in any of its actions regarding mifepristone. Rather, it would simply refuse to take a step that has not been shown as necessary to avoid the threat of any real harm during the presumably short period at issue.

On the merits, I think Justice Alito makes some good points and some less good ones. I think he is right that in any individual case, the existence of two conflicting district court orders can be the result of gamesmanship, whether by the courts or the parties, and so it is probably a mistake to let that gamesmanship force the Supreme Court's hand. (Of course, taking a broader view, the Court might want to think about whether it has adopted or tolerated legal rules that make those conflicts and games more prevalent, such as overbroad injunctions and vacatur in the administrative law context . . . .)

But as to irreparable injury, the Justices have repeatedly invoked a principle that whenever the government is enjoined from enforcing its policies, it has suffered irreparable injury. (In fact, I wrote about this principle in The Supreme Court's Shadow Docket and it is the best explanation for many of the emergency orders sought and received by the Solicitor General during the Trump administration.) If that principle does not exist or does not apply any more, I am not sure why.

As for Justice Alito's more meta-level critique about criticisms of the so-called shadow docket, again I think he both makes a good point and misses some others. He is right that there are lay and folk complaints about the shadow docket that are inconsistent or miss the point (perhaps even opportunistic complaints by other Justices as well). Often it is a bad idea for the Supreme Court to intervene too often and too quickly outside the more regular course of its business -- but sometimes it should, and when those times are depends on the facts and the merits, making it difficult or even impossible to prescribe truly neutral principles for the shadow docket. That is not a reason to abolish the shadow docket. But that also does not mean that we should accept that shadow docket decisions will be arbitrary, or worse, systematically skewed.

The more serious concern about the shadow docket, however, is that these are not the circumstances in which the Court does its best work. These are also not the circumstances in which the Court puts its best face forward. Justice Alito's failure to grapple with the governmental irreparable injury presumption is one example. Similarly, the point he raises about conflicting injunctions, government gamesmanship of injunctions, etc., is a complicated and important one. Indeed it is so complicated that the Court had to DIG the case it had about this issue last term (Arizona v. San Francisco, the concurrence to which Alito cites). A vote on whether or not to grant a stay pending appeal to the Solicitor General, with one week's consideration, does not seem like the best place to resolve them. And the fact that those principles are so unclear is itself an artifact of the shadow docket.

For that reason, I think the Court was wise to simply preserve the status quo and allow the case to proceed in the more regular course of business, where they can give it their best attention when the time comes.

Politics

Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions

Butter or spray; liars and bad cops; and SecretAgentRandyBeans.

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Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

New IJ cert petition: Friends, if you criticize a city official and then his allies maliciously scour the law books for a crime to charge you with, and then take additional, irregular steps to ensure you are thrown in jail, that right there is a First Amendment violation. Or at least it ought to be. There's a circuit split on just what evidence you need to make out a retaliatory arrest claim, and in the Fifth Circuit evidence that no one has ever been charged with the crime in question for doing what you did doesn't suffice. Click here to learn more.

  • Back around 2005, the U.S. Postal Service started allowing people to buy custom-designed stamps from third-party vendors. The results were predictably hilarious. But when artist Anatol Zukerman sought to print copies of a drawing of Uncle Sam being strangled by a snake labeled "Citizens United" and configured as a dollar sign, the USPS rejected his design, even while accepting others with obvious political content. He sued and the D.C. Circuit held that the program violates the First Amendment. But must the USPS now allow the stamps? D.C. Circuit: No. The USPS ended the program and we're not going to issue an injunction ordering them to print the stamps. Mr. Zukerman must content himself with declaratory relief.
  • So, E. Jean Carroll sued Donald Trump, alleging he defamed her when he responded to her accusation that he'd sexually assaulted and raped her in the mid-1990s. Then the United States sought to substitute itself for Trump under the Westfall Act, saying that he'd been acting within the scope of his duties when he made the statements. And then the district court said, "No way." And then the Second Circuit said, "Well, maybe, but it mainly depends on District of Columbia scope-of-employment doctrine." So then the Second Circuit certified to the D.C. Court of Appeals the question whether Trump's statements would've been within the scope of his employment under D.C. law. And then the D.C. Court of Appeals accepted the certification, but instead of actually answering the certified question it last week said, "Here are some general thoughts on the state of respondeat superior law in our jurisdiction. Hope this helps." And then today the Second Circuit said, "Thanks. Yeah, it might help. But you know whose problem that is? That's the district court's problem, that's who (who's set to preside over the Carroll-Trump trial starting this coming Tuesday)."
  • The Federal Tort Claims Act allows suits against the federal gov't for assault or battery claims if the perpetrator was a "law enforcement officer." That includes any federal official "empowered by law to execute searches." Although TSA agents seem to do pretty much nothing but "execute searches," the feds insist they're not law enforcement agents and so the U.S. can't be sued if TSA agents assault travelers. Fourth Circuit (agreeing with the Third and Eighth Circuits): TSA better search for another defense, because this one won't fly.
  • Two intellectually disabled brothers are wrongly convicted of raping and murdering an 11-year-old girl and spend nearly 31 years in prison. They file various lawsuits to get pardons and compensation (in one case securing a $75 mil jury verdict, which was largely upheld by the Fourth Circuit last month.) But then they find themselves as defendants again—this time in a suit filed by one of their former law firms, which says they owe it money. District court: But wait, the N.C. Bar's disciplinary commission previously found that the firm's lead partner misled the brothers and did other unethical things. (Did we mention that the bar suspended his law license for five years too?) So the law firm loses its suit based on a combination of preclusion and unclean hands. Fourth Circuit: Seriously. Affirmed. (NB: If the underlying wrongful-conviction case piques your interest, here's a podcast about the trial by the brothers' lawyers. (No, not those lawyers; different, good lawyers.))
  • Harahan, La. police captain is written up for numerous infractions including conduct unbecoming, and the district attorney places the captain on the "Giglio list" of liars and bad cops, an averred death knell for his career. District court: The captain's claim can go forward because he has an interest in working his occupation and being on the list jeopardizes that. Fifth Circuit: Working an occupation? How is that a liberty?
  • Man wrongfully convicted of Houston murders and put on death row is released but denied compensation. He then files a Section 1983 lawsuit against, among others, a detective who "discovered" exculpatory evidence while cleaning his garage. (The case is featured on Episode 8 of this Netflix special.) But wait! The Texas Supreme Court then orders the state to compensate him, and he gets $980k. Fifth Circuit: Which, per the state high court, bars his Section 1983 suit. Case dismissed.
  • Hammond, La. police officer who also works on a DEA task force is convicted of stealing money and property from arrestees and sentenced to over two years in prison. But wait! One of the jurors failed to disclose that he knew the officer's wife: They went to a high school dance together and kept in touch on social media. Fifth Circuit: Possibly this calls for a new trial.
  • Man arrested for stealing Fruit Roll-Ups is thrown in Shelby County, Ky. jail, where a guard recognizes him; he's the guard's "wife's ex." The guard asks the man's cellmates to "take care of" him, and over the course of several hours they beat him to a pulp. A jury awards the man $2 mil against the guard. Sixth Circuit (unpublished): And that's all he's entitled to; though he wasn't taken to a hospital and the jail's medical staff missed several injuries (including traumatic brain injury and facial fractures), no one else is liable. [Ed.: Criminal liability-wise, the guard got a mere slap on the wrist in state court, but then the FBI picked up the case.]
  • Twenty-year-old Ohio man runs an online chat room for the "75th Spartans," where he urges others to help him create a militia group and revolt against tyranny. The group is infiltrated by FBI informants, and the man is eventually arrested and convicted of attempted kidnapping based on a scheme to lure a police officer to a secluded area and rough him up to gain notoriety and new members. Sixth Circuit: Well, his inchoate scheme turned on the as-yet unsecured participation of a 14-year-old with the screenname "SecretAgentRandyBeans," and all of the overt acts were shepherded along by the FBI. So it's tough to say he wasn't just playing make-believe. Conviction overturned. Dissent: The jury thought he was serious enough about his plans to convict him, which should be good enough for us.
  • Seventh Circuit: Just because you use a fake identity to rent an apartment doesn't mean the landlord can give the police free rein over your place; police still have to show you don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Oh, and they can't use facts they learn after a search to justify it.
  • California man sues Amazon on behalf of a class of drivers for a delivery program known as Amazon Flex. He alleges that Amazon monitored and wiretapped their conversations when they communicated during off hours in closed Facebook groups. Amazon: You accepted our terms of service, and under the 2019 version of our arbitration clause, even the issue of arbitrability is subject to arbitration. No federal court for you. Ninth Circuit: You've provided no proof this guy ever received the 2019 version, so, applying the 2016 version he actually agreed to, we hold this dispute is not subject to arbitration.
  • In 1893, the Supreme Court deemed the tomato a vegetable. And in 2023, the Ninth Circuit answered another food question for the ages: Is "I Can't Believe It's Not Butter! Spray" a spray or a butter? Dissent: "I am not ready to declare as a legal proposition that a 'squirt' is a 'spray.'"
  • The federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act prohibits state or local regulation concerning the energy efficiency or energy use of many natural gas appliances used in commercial restaurants. "No problem!" say officials in Berkeley, Calif., "We'll just ban the installation of natural gas piping into those buildings." An association of chagrined restaurateurs sues, alleging the ban is preempted by federal law. Ninth Circuit: And it is! The city is prohibited from prescribing a "quantity of energy" to be used by these products, even if that quantity is "zero."
  • If you're still playing federal contractor vaccine mandate bingo at home, the Ninth Circuit says put markers on Major Questions Doctrine (it does not apply), Presidential authority under the Procurement Act (the President has it), nondelegation doctrine (don't party like it's 1935), and federalism (yeah, that doesn't stop the mandate either).
  • And in en banc news, the Sixth Circuit will not reconsider its decision sending to trial Lewis County, Ky. jailers whose inaction in obtaining medical treatment for a detainee led to his dying on the way to the hospital. Readler, J., statement respecting denial of rehearing en banc: The "original sin" here was the Supreme Court's 1976 decision "to divine constitutional rights for inmates who have been harmed in prison." They should seek remedies under state law.

Victory! North Carolina's Opportunity Scholarship Program provides scholarships of up to $4,200 for low-income families to send their children to one of over 500 participating private schools, and we're happy to report that a constitutional challenge to the program was just voluntarily dismissed. The dismissal comes on the heels of a state appeals court ruling that the challenge was a broad, facial attack on the program instead of a more narrow, as-applied challenge, which as good as doomed the lawsuit because the program had already withstood an earlier facial challenge. "I'm so happy we can continue to use OSP funds to give Nariah the education she needs to be her best self," said IJ client Janet Nunn (pictured with her granddaughter, Nariah). "This scholarship has allowed Nariah to excel and blossom into a confident, smart young woman, who understands the value of hard work." Click here to learn more.

Immigration

My New Boston Globe Article on the Urgent Need to Pass Legislation Granting Permanent Residency Rights to Ukrainian Migrants and Others Admitted by Using the President's Parole Power

This can easily be accomplished by Congess enacting an adjustment act.

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Earlier today, the Boston Globe published my article making the case for enacting an adjustment act giving permanent residency and work rights to Ukrainian refugees and others admitted by means of the presidential parole power. Here is an excerpt:

The United States has done much to open its doors to Ukrainian refugees fleeing the brutal Russian invasion that began in February 2022. Since that time, over 117,000 Ukrainians have entered the country under the innovative Uniting for Ukraine private refugee sponsorship program, in which I am a sponsor.

More Ukrainian refugees have been granted permission by the Biden administration to come but have not yet arrived…..

But unless Congress or President Biden act soon, this success may be seriously compromised. The vast majority of Ukrainians admitted over the last year have so far been given only a temporary right to live and work in the United States. When their time limits expire, they could be subject to deportation or at least be unable to work legally.

Ukrainians admitted under the Uniting for Ukraine program are granted residency and work rights for two years after arrival. For the earliest program participants, those rights will expire in April or May 2024. More will lose legal status thereafter. Ukrainians who reached the United States before April 11, 2022, have been given Temporary Protected Status, which offers similar residency and work permits. But TPS for Ukrainians is currently scheduled to expire on Oct. 19.

Biden could potentially extend both the TPS and Uniting for Ukraine deadlines by executive action. If he doesn't, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian migrants fleeing Putin's war will be left in legal limbo, potentially subject to deportation. Even if few are actually deported, constant fear of that prospect makes it difficult to have anything approaching a normal life. Moreover, loss of work authorization will make many employers reluctant to hire Ukrainian migrants. That, in turn, would consign them to unemployment or to the black-market economy.…

Biden could potentially extend the Uniting for Ukraine and TPS deadlines through unilateral executive action. But such an executive fix would still leave refugees vulnerable to the whims of whomever sits in the White House….

The best solution for this problem is for Congress to pass a Ukrainian Adjustment Act, giving Ukrainian migrants who have entered the United States during the war the right of permanent residency and work status. That would give them a secure status no longer subject to the vagaries of politically driven executive discretion.

Such adjustment acts have been repeatedly enacted for migrants fleeing war and tyranny admitted under previous exercises of the presidential parole power used to create Uniting for Ukraine, beginning with Hungarian refugees fleeing the 1956 Soviet invasion. Congress could easily do the same in this case. But it may need to act swiftly. Significant legislation of any kind will be hard to enact during the 2024 presidential election year.

Later in the article I address the argument that passing an adjustment act for Ukrainians would be unfair to migrants from other countries:

One possible argument against a Ukrainian Adjustment Act is that it would be unfair to migrants fleeing similar war and oppression elsewhere. I agree the latter deserve permanent refuge as well. For example, Congress should also enact an Afghan Adjustment Act giving permanent sanctuary to refugees fleeing the cruel Taliban regime that seized power after the 2021 US withdrawal.

During the current war, I have also advocated giving refuge to Russians fleeing Putin's increasingly repressive regime. That refuge, too, should be permanent…. The same reasoning applies to migrants fleeing horrific violence and oppression in Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, to whom Biden extended the Uniting for Ukraine model in January.

But if it turns out that it is only politically feasible to enact an adjustment act for Ukrainians…. that is better than refusing to enact such legislation for anyone until we can do it for everyone. The best should not be the enemy of the good.

I have addressed the fairness objection in greater detail here and here.

Politics

Chief Justice Roberts's Assignment Dilemma

If Justices Thomas and Alito are dissent, and Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett vote with the progressives, the Chief may join the majority to avoid having Justice Sotomayor make the assignment.

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On the current Roberts Court, there are two primary paths to count to five. The most common path is when five of the Court's conservatives vote together as a bloc. When the Chief Justice joins that group, he can use his assignment power to control where the majority goes--especially where he assigns the case to himself. But when Roberts is in dissent, then Justice Thomas can assign the case, even to himself.

The second path to five is when two of the Court's conservative vote with the Court's three progressives (who seldom break formation). When the Chief is one of the two conservatives who breaks lefts, he retains the assignment power. But when Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett join the three progressives to make a five-member majority, the Chief loses the assignment power. Rather, Justice Sotomayor can assign the majority, even to herself.

Thus, there is a dilemma. In a case where the liberal position garners five votes without Roberts, does the Chief Justice hold his nose and join the majority to ensure he can assign the majority opinion, and keep the case from veering to the left?

I raise this point in light of Reed v. Goertz, which I wrote about on Wednesday. During oral argument, it seemed that Chief Justice Roberts was solidly against the prisoner. Yet, he voted with the majority on Justice Kavanaugh's super-narrow six-page decision. Had Roberts dissented, then Justice Sotomayor could have written a far more expansive opinion on the rights of criminal defendants. But by providing the sixth vote--with the outcome already set--Roberts was able to keep the case narrow. With the Chief, I presume most things he does are strategic.

Free Speech

Three Amicus Briefs on the First Amendment and Coercive Government Threats in NRA v. Vullo

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When I wrote in March about the cert. petition in this case, readers seemed quite interested, so I thought I'd post an update. (Note: William Brewer, Sarah Rogers & Noah Peters of Brewer Attorneys & Counselors and I are the counsel on the petition.)

[1.] Eighteen state Attorneys General (led by Montana's) filed an amicus brief supporting the petition; here's the opening paragraph:

This case concerns troubling allegations of governmental abuse of power. As plausibly alleged, Maria Vullo, the head of New York's Department of Financial Services ("DFS"), a state agency tasked with sweeping regulatory authority over financial institutions, leveraged her official authority to stifle the NRA's constitutionally protected political speech. But even though Vullo's politically motivated campaign involved press releases, official regulatory guidance, and ongoing investigations that targeted financial institutions doing business with the NRA, she steered clear of any explicit threats in these communications, at least to the "disinterested ear." NLRB v. Gissel Packing, Co., 395 U.S. 575, 619 (1969). But the financial institutions picked up the subtext: drop the NRA or else. See Pet.11, 24-27. Even so, after Bantam Books, these "informal sanctions" cannot sidestep First Amendment scrutiny. See 372 U.S. at 66-67. Yet, the decision below departed from that clear instruction and gave state officials license to target and crackdown on their political opponents' protected speech.

[2.] The Foundation for Individual Rights and Education filed an amicus brief as well:

In the decision below, the Second Circuit held that a complaint alleging that a New York state official made a series of thinly veiled threats to regulated financial entities to pressure them to sever ties with a politically disfavored group could not proceed past the pleadings stage. For reasons persuasively stated in the petition for a writ of certiorari, that holding conflicts with this Court's decision in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), and the Seventh Circuit's decision in Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 46 (2016). The decision below is irreconcilable with the basic purpose of the First Amendment: to prevent governmental officials from wielding their powers to stifle free discourse. On those grounds alone, the decision warrants further review. The decision also warrants review for two other reasons.

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What Would An Originalist Fourth Amendment Require?

A panel debate.

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I was recently a panelist for a very interesting discussion of Fourth Amendment originalism hosted by the University of Virginia student chapter of the Federalist Society.  Our focus was the original public understanding of Fourth Amendment "searches," and the panel brought together a group of scholars that have written recently on the topic.

Here are the panelists, with a link to their relevant articles:

The moderator was Professor Richard Re, author of The Positive Law Floor in the Harvard Law Review Forum. 

The first two panelists were Daniel Epps and Danielle D'Onfro, co-authors of The Fourth Amendment and General Law, recently published in the Yale Law Journal.

I spoke next, making arguments that reflected my recent article Katz as Originalism in the Duke Law Journal.

Last up was James Y. Stern, co-author (with our own Will Baude) of The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment in the Harvard Law Review.

I thought it was a really interesting discussion, with lots of respectful disagreement.  The panel also wins the 2023 Award for the Panel with the Highest Percentage of Former Kennedy Clerks, but from what I understand that is mostly just a reflection of who is writing on this topic.

Criminal Law

6th Cir. Reverses Conviction for Attempted Kidnapping

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Prof. Jonathan Witmer-Rich (Cleveland State) posted this to a discussion list that I'm on, and graciously allowed me to forward it; it's about today's U.S. v. Ferguson (6th Cir.):

Great case from the Sixth Circuit today on attempt, reversing a conviction for attempted kidnapping. The majority (2-1) holds that there was insufficient evidence of a "substantial step." … The first paragraph sets the scene:

Ferguson, a black man from Cleveland, then 20 years old, aroused FBI suspicion in March 2020 with his internet postings. Ferguson led an online chat room on the Discord platform known as the 75th Spartans. In this chatroom, Ferguson, whose moniker was "Grinch75R," described his desire to create a militia group and revolt against tyranny. On March 18, 2020, Ferguson wrote that he wanted to organize the Spartans into "centurions to orchestrate raids for supplies such as weapon and armor." On April 7, 2020, Ferguson asked a member of the chatroom, a 14-year-old with the moniker "SecretAgentRandyBeans," whether he could drive because Ferguson wanted to do a "small claim" with the cops and "leave a calling card with the Spartans name." Ferguson stated he had not found any recruits yet. In response, SecretAgentRandyBeans stated he could "kinda drive."

… Pretty soon two government agents get involved and play a pretty active role, and the group discusses various possible plans to call a police car to a remote location and then ambush the officers, steal their weapons and radios, and then let them go—a way to "get the spark going" for their group.

The two FBI CIs persuaded Ferguson to show up on May 8 at an abandoned house in the Cleveland area to scope out the area. Ferguson brings his AR-15 (at the request of the FBI CI). Upon arrival the CI proposes (and Ferguson agrees) to do a "dry run" and call some cops to see how long it would take them to get there. They place a call for service, the cops arrive, Ferguson and the two FBI CIs all flee, the cops catch them and arrest all three (pretending to arrest the two CIs as well).

The majority analysis includes the following:

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Free Speech

Professional Duty to Warn Clients About Risk of Reputational Harm from Filing Lawsuit?

"Plaintiff was not informed by his legal counsel prior to filing suit of the potential for immediate disclosure of his name if his Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym was denied."

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Litigants and their lawyers often seek to retroactively seal or pseudonymize cases. Courts sometimes allow this, but often reject it. In particular, that a case has settled is generally not seen as a basis for retroactively sealing it, even when the case settles shortly after filing without any substantive decision from the court; see, e.g., Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann (2d Cir. 2016):

The fact that a suit is ultimately settled without a judgment on the merits does not impair the "judicial record" status of pleadings. It is true that settlement of a case precludes the judicial determination of the pleadings' veracity and legal sufficiency. But attorneys and others submitting pleadings are under an obligation to ensure, when submitting pleadings, that "the factual contentions [made] have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery."

In any event, the fact of filing a complaint, whatever its veracity, is a significant matter of record. Even in the settlement context, the inspection of pleadings allows "the public [to] discern the prevalence of certain types of cases, the nature of the parties to particular kinds of actions, information about the settlement rates in different areas of law, and the types of materials that are likely to be sealed." Thus, pleadings are considered judicial records "even when the case is pending before judgment or resolved by settlement."

And courts are especially reluctant to retroactively seal or even retroactively redact documents that had been available in the open record for months or year, see Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG (2d Cir. 2004):

[W]e think that it was a serious abuse of discretion for the district court to refer to the magnitude of the settlement amount—theretofore confidential—in the Unsealing Order. But however confidential it may have been beforehand, subsequent to publication it was confidential no longer. It now resides on the highly accessible databases of Westlaw and Lexis and has apparently been disseminated prominently elsewhere. We simply do not have the power, even were we of the mind to use it if we had, to make what has thus become public private again. The genie is out of the bottle, albeit because of what we consider to be the district court's error. We have not the means to put the genie back….

This is generally so when information that is supposed to be confidential … is publicly disclosed. Once it is public, it necessarily remains public…. "Once the cat is out of the bag, the ball game is over."

This has come up recently, in Singh v. Amar (C.D. Ill.) (see "No First Amendment Violation in Requiring Law Student to Meet with 'Behavior Intervention Team Related to … allegedly 'threaten[ing] … administrators, ma[king] female instructors and students uncomfortable, and show[ing] signs of 'disjointed' thinking'"). Plaintiff's lawyer had filed the lawsuit as a John Doe lawsuit, apparently without filing a written motion for leave to proceed pseudonymously (and including unredacted exhibits that gave plaintiff's real name). It appears that the lawyer made an oral motion along those lines, as well as to seal the record, which was denied; and the judge immediately "directed [the Clerk] to change the docket to reflect Plaintiff's name." Now the case has settled, and plaintiff seeks to have the case sealed or, in the alternative, pseudonymized; part of the argument is that plaintiff was badly advised by his initial lawyer:

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New Essay in the ABA Journal: The ABA needs ideological diversity to ensure its future

"If the ABA does not arrest its progressive lurch, the organization risks its own obsolescence."

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Last month, the ABA Journal invited me to write an essay on the topic of my choice. I'll admit, at first I was skeptical. The ABA Journal has historically skewed left, and represents an organization that skews even harder left. Yet, the editors stressed that they were looking to improve the range of viewpoints expressed in the ABA Journal. I took them up on their kind offer. And my first essay (hopefully not the last) takes on the American Bar Association head on. It is titled, "The ABA needs ideological diversity to ensure its future."

A generation ago, nearly half of the lawyers in the United States were members of the American Bar Association. Today, that number is probably closer to 20%, if not lower. This decline is often attributed to an unwillingness of young attorneys to join civic organizations. Or perhaps lawyers no longer see tangible benefits from membership. Or maybe the dues are too high. All of these explanations ignore the elephant in the room—and I mean elephant in the figurative and political sense. The American Bar Association consistently skews to the political left. And this progressive mandate alienates conservative lawyers.

For example, I discuss ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), ABA diversity mandates for CLE, as well as ABA proposals to eliminate the LSAT requirement. I explain the risk that the ABA faces:

Historically, the ABA has enjoyed a position of privilege and power in our polity. That authority was due, in large part, to the ABA's capacity to broadly represent the legal profession. But there is no guarantee this distinguished role continues.

Indeed, the ABA's progressive slant risks its own obsolescence by alienating members.

Perhaps the most important risk is that a future Republican administration could rescind the ABA's accreditation authority:

A future Republican administration may deem the ABA a poor steward of its accreditation power, and the Department of Education can seek other options. Or the federal government could authorize the states to choose their own accreditation authority for legal education. State supreme courts can adopt their own standards and join interstate compacts to ensure bar reciprocity. If the ABA continues to impose an ideological set of standards on law schools nationwide, the federal government can respond by revoking the ABA's authority.

The ABA places a lot of focus on racial and gender diversity. There should be a similar focus on ideological diversity. If the ABA fails to heed this advice, it will fade away:

If the ABA does not arrest its progressive lurch, the organization risks its own obsolescence. Model Rules will not be adopted. Evaluations of judicial nominees will be ignored. The accreditation monopoly will cease. And so on. A decline in membership will be the least of the ABA's problems. The ABA can either adapt to a new political reality or fade away like the guilds of yore.

Again, I'm grateful for the opportunity to write for the ABA Journal, which has a wide readership. My next writing, if I am so lucky to be invited back, will be about campus protests and DEI.

Senator Durbin Invites CJ Roberts "Or Another Justice Whom [He] Designate[s]" To Testify Before Senate Judiciary Committee

Send Justice Breyer!

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In recent days, there has been some talk about whether the Senate Judiciary Committee would invite Justice Thomas to testify, or potentially issue a subpoena. I spoke to Roll Call about the issue. To my knowledge, Congress has only issued a subpoena to a Justice once: the House Un-American Activities subpoenaed Justice Cark, who had previously served as AG. Clark refused to honor the subpoena, and Congress did not hold him in contempt.

Senator Durbin, the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, did not follow that path. Instead he sent a letter to Chief Justice Roberts. It begins:

I invite you, or another Justice whom you designate, to appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 2, 2023, at 10:00 a.m. . . .  to testify at a public hearing regarding the ethical rules that govern the Justices of the Supreme Court and potential reforms to those rules."

I'm sure the Chief Justice wants to appear before the Senate as much as he enjoys reading my blog posts. But there is an easy work around: appoint Justice Breyer as a designate. He looooves the Senate. He loves talking about ethics. And he could address these issues from the removed vantage point of a senior associate justice, who no longer decides cases.

Free Speech

Parents' Lawsuit Against School Social Worker Can Go Forward

The social worker had reported the parents for educational neglect; the parents argue this was knowingly false, because the social worker knew the parents "were in compliance with their statutory obligation to educate their child" by home schooling.

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From Abubakari v. Schenker, decided last week by Judge Robin Wilson (Conn. Super. Ct.):

The plaintiffs … allege the following facts against the defendant[,] … a social worker employed by the Hamden Board of Education and acting in her capacity as such….

The plaintiffs allege the following. During the 2016-2017 school year, the plaintiffs' minor child U.A. was enrolled at a Hamden elementary school. At a meeting of the school's pupil planning team (PPT), U.A. was identified as a student requiring special education under federal law, and an individual education plan (IEP) was put in place for the child. The PPT also had determined that U.A. would be provided special education, services, and accommodations, including a one-to-one paraprofessional to assist the child with his learning disabilities so that he would be able to transition into the Hamden Middle School and continue to succeed.

For the 2017-2018 school year, U.A. was enrolled at Hamden Middle School and during a PPT meeting in December 2017, the school officials changed his IEP, among other things, to eliminate the one-to-one paraprofessional. Because of the changes to U.A.'s IEP, the child's educational progress regressed, but the school officials continued to socially advance him through his grade. As a result of the regression, the plaintiffs requested reinstatement of the one-to-one paraprofessional and other special services and accommodations in order to reverse the regression. The plaintiffs' requests were denied….

At a PPT meeting on February 13, 2018, the plaintiff Khadijah Abubakari expressly announced that she would pull U.A. out of his enrollment in the Hamden public schools and continue to keep him out until the school district provided him with the special education services and accommodations she believed necessary to allow him to progress successfully. She further announced explicitly and on the record that beginning immediately she would be home-schooling U.A., with the assistance of professional tutoring services the plaintiffs would hire at their own expense, as is specifically provided for and permitted by [Connecticut law].

Despite actual knowledge of the plaintiffs' home-schooling of U.A. in compliance with applicable law, on March 22, 2018, the defendant knowingly and maliciously filed a false complaint with the Connecticut Department of Children and Families (DCF) claiming that the plaintiffs were educationally neglecting U.A. because he "ha[d] not been in school since February 13, 2018" and that a "[p]arent ha[d] not engaged in communication with school" and a "[p]arent ha[d] been difficult to work with at IEP mtgs. Last meeting was February 13th."

The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's report to DCF "concealed the fact that she had actual knowledge that the plaintiffs were home-schooling their child in compliance with … Connecticut law," and alleged that, because of defendant's allegedly false report, "DCF launched an investigation of the plaintiffs and ultimately filed a petition for neglect against them in the Superior Court." The court held that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that defendant's actions constituted tortious intentional infliction of emotional distress:

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Politics

Who Are The Three Justices To Use The Word "Bauble" In An Opinion? (Updated)

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On Tuesday, Justice Jackson issued the majority opinion in MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC. The case concerns a bankruptcy issue on which I have no particular expertise. But this sentence jumped out at me:

Stripped of its baubles, Transform's mootness argument is that MOAC's ultimate relief hinges on the BankruptcyCourt's ability to "reconstitut[e the leasehold] as property of the estate."

I'll admit, I had to google "baubles." I don't think I've ever seen that word. If you're curious, it refers to trinkets or decorations, like Christmas ornaments. Out of curiosity, I checked if that word has ever before been used in a Supreme Court opinion. It has. And Justice Jackson is in very good company.

Justice John Marshall Harlan I use that word in his Civil Rights Cases dissent from 1883:

But what was secured to colored citizens of the United States—as between them and their respective States—by the grant to them of State citizenship? With what rights, privileges, or immunities did this grant from the nation invest them? There is one, if there be no others—exemption from race discrimination in respect of any civil right belonging to citizens of the white race in the same State. That, surely, is their constitutional privilege when within the jurisdiction of other States. And such must be their constitutional right, in their own State, unless the recent amendments be 'splendid baubles,' thrown out to delude those who deserved fair and generous treatment at the hands of the nation. Citizenship in this country necessarily imports equality of civil rights among citizens of every race in the same State. It is fundamental in American citizenship that, in respect of such rights, there shall be no discrimination by the State, or its officers, or by individuals, or corporations exercising public functions or authority, against any citizen because of his race or previous condition of servitude.

I dug a bit further, to see if anyone has ever used the phrase "stripped of its baubles." I found one reference, in a December 2022 Boston Globe article, titled Here's your annual list of farms with goats that will eat your Christmas tree:

Children get presents. Goats get trees. It's that time of year again, when your Christmas tree is stripped of its baubles and tinsel and then tossed in the trash--unless, that is, you want to feed it to a farm animal instead.

Did Justice Jackson pick up this turn-of-phrase from the Globe? She did spend some time from Harvard, and her husband's family is from Boston. Even more pressing, do any of the Justices let goats eat their Christmas trees. I had no idea this was a thing!

Update: A longtime reader wrote in to inform me that Justice Harlan did not make up the phrase "splendid baubles." Rather, Harlan was referencing back to an even more prominent jurist. Chief Justice Marshall use the phrase "splendid bauble" in McCulloch v. Maryland.

The result of the most careful and attentive consideration bestowed upon this clause is, that if it does not enlarge, it cannot be construed to restrain the powers of Congress, or to impair the rights of the legislature to exercise its best judgment in the selection of measures to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the government. If no other motive for its insertion can be suggested, a sufficient one is found in the desire to remove all doubts respecting the right to legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution, if that instrument be not a splendid bauble

I checked and that passage from McCulloch appears in my casebook. I must have read that passage a dozen times. Mea culpa.

Justice Jackson is in even better company than I had initially realized

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