The Volokh Conspiracy
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Today in Supreme Court History: April 21, 1800
4/21/1800: Justice Alfred Moore takes judicial oath.

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City of Austin, Texas v. Reagan Nat'l Advertising of Austin, LLC, 596 U.S. --- (decided April 21, 2022): City ordinance restricting billboards that (like most billboards) are not on land they are advertising for is content-neutral and subject to "intermediate" First Amendment scrutiny; remanded to Fifth Circuit (which a few weeks ago upheld the ordinance, 2023 WL 2705682, 3/30/23)
United States v. Vaello Madero, 596 U.S. --- (decided April 21, 2022): not denial of Equal Protection to deny SSI benefits to Puerto Ricans; they don't pay taxes for it (this was a New Yorker who was ordered to pay back benefits awarded after he moved to P.R.)
Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573 (decided April 21, 2010): "bona fide error" defense to liability under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does not apply to mistake of law (here, an incorrectly worded notice from a law firm trying to collect on a mortgage)
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (decided April 21, 1999): Chevron deference (to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute) applied to regulation stating that chemical treatment during assembly (here, men's trousers) removes imported clothing from duty exemption for articles fabricated here but merely assembled abroad
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (decided April 21, 1993): can't sue train for going unreasonably fast under the circumstances if it was under speed limit set by federal regulation (now that's what I call preemption!)
United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569 (decided April 21, 1992): Another Chevron deference case, wherein Alaska, whose highways are not of much use, tried to improve its Nome port which in the process would extend Alaska's border by accretion. The Court upholds the decision of the Secretary of the Army (whose Corps of Engineers would be doing the work) to condition the permit on a waiver of all claims to the new land.
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (decided April 21, 1987): Under the felony-murder rule, a killing in the process of committing a felony is murder, not manslaughter (cf. the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule), even if the defendant did not do the actual killing. Here the Court upholds the rule against Eighth Amendment attack so long as the participation in the felony is "major" and with "reckless indifference" to human life. (Defendant had helped steal a car after escaping prison, and occupants were shot.)
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (decided April 21, 1982): denial of Equal Protection to restrict charitable solicitation permits given to organizations funded more than 50% by nonmembers
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (decided April 21, 1981): at voir dire in violent crime case federal judge, upon request, must inquire into jurors' racial prejudices, particularly if defendant and victim were different races (here, it was harmless error to deny request)
Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation, 596 U.S. --- (decided April 21, 2022): Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act claim against Spanish art foundation (for holding family's painting extorted by Nazis) was based on state law, so law of forum state (California) applied, not federal common law (the opinion contains the painting, Pissaro's 1897 "Rue Saint-Honore in the Afternoon, Effect of Rain", and a photo of it hanging in plaintiff's grandmother's Berlin home)
CSX left a loophole, or rather federal law left a loophole. Preemption doesn't apply to essentially local hazards. Instead of pleading "too fast" in general the plaintiff's lawyer has to add something about local conditions. As I recall this usually failed but sometimes worked.
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There is also this, quoted by the court:
The FRSA permits the States to "adopt or continue in force any law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary has adopted a ... regulation ... covering the subject matter of such State requirement," and, even thereafter, to adopt safety standards more stringent than the federal requirements "when necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard," if those standards are compatible with federal law and do not unduly burden interstate commerce. 45 U. S. C. § 434. Legal duties imposed on railroads by a State's common law of negligence fall within the scope of § 434's broad phrases describing matters "relating to railroad safety." The section's term "covering" indicates that pre-emption will lie only if the federal regulations substantially subsume the subject matter of the relevant state law. Pp. 661-665."
Note "essentially local safety hazard."
Technically Tison doesn't review the felony murder rule itself (nobody thinks that is unconstitutional) but rather imposing the death penalty for a felony murder. Under an earlier case, Enmund v. Arizona, it was implied that the defendant had to be a "major participant" in the crime to get the death penalty. Tison limited the holding of Enmund and allowed Arizona to impose a death sentence on two young adults helping their father escape from prison; the father than murdered someone during the getaway.
Alan Dershowitz represented the defendants in SCOTUS and was extremely bitter about the Court's decision.
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“CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (decided April 21, 1993): can’t sue train for going unreasonably fast under the circumstances if it was under speed limit set by federal regulation”
But can sue RR for not having gates at the crossing, for reasons I don’t quite understand. I think Justice Thomas got it right here — the FRA speed limits were only intended to prevent derailments and didn’t address ability of motorists to avoid train at crossing -- hence no more a preemption on speed liability than grade crossing liability.
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Tison's case is one of those covered, albeit somewhat briefly, in Bill James' wonderful book Popular Crime.
This edition might have been one of the first regarding which captcrisis identified error with respect to Today In Supreme Court History.
Also, apparently, an early example of the "scholars" who produce this content correcting an error without acknowledging the error or the revision.
I was a little mean with that comment, but as a former law review editor I can say it was accurate.
A(nother) Noble Prize is awarded to captcrisis for identification of error in Today In Supreme Court History*.
* Also known as "100 Supreme Court Cases Randy Barnett and Josh Blackman Should Really Became Familiar With"
(thanks to the person who devised that official motto of Today In Supreme Court History)
At 4'5" tall, Moore was the shortest Justice ever to serve on the Court. He also served one of the shortest terms, under four years. He was on the Court for Marbury v. Madison, but did not participate because of ill health.
So he didn't participate in the only important case of his tenure, which makes him one of the least important Justices.