The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Free Speech

How Can the State Prevent Viewpoint Foreclosure?

By guaranteeing five basic internet rights.

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(This is the final post in a five-part series on regulating online content moderation.)

In Part III, I showed how it is possible for private actors to remove an unpopular viewpoint from the internet by preventing websites that express that viewpoint from operating, a phenomenon I call "viewpoint foreclosure." In Part IV, I explained why every lawful website should have the right to exist—that is, to stay online. In Part II, I argued that regulating core intermediaries—the entities that administer the internet's core resources and, thus, the entities capable of effecting viewpoint foreclosure—would not run afoul of any First Amendment right to editorial discretion.

In this Part, I explain how the state can prevent viewpoint foreclosure by guaranteeing certain basic internet rights. To identify these rights—the bare minimum case for the state to intervene in private content moderation—we simply need to determine what a person requires of others to stand up a public website.

Connectivity. In the first place, for a person to operate a public website, she needs to connect to the internet. For residential subscribers—those who use their internet connection merely to consume websites and other applications—a standard internet access service will suffice. But for those who wish to host their own websites, a residential subscription will not do. They require commercial internet service with the requisite stability and bandwidth to make a self-hosted website available to the world. Although it might seem that net neutrality rules guarantee a right of connectivity, that is not so. The FCC's 2015 Open Internet Order (before it was repealed) pertained only to mass market broadband internet access, not to the kinds of commercial internet service public websites need to stay online. Moreover, the Open Internet Rules were concerned with website blocking when a subscriber is already able to enjoy internet access but his ISP prevents him from accessing certain websites or services that compete with the ISP. They did not concern themselves with ISPs who might refuse internet access altogether. To ensure enjoyment of that resource, we need a right of connectivity.

Addressability. Internet access is important, certainly, but unless you have use of a static IP address, your website will not be long for this world. IP addresses uniquely identify resources, including websites, on the public internet. Without a static IP address, any site reachable today may not be reachable tomorrow.

Just five regional internet registries (RIRs)—each a private organization—administer the IP address space, and each RIR can revoke any in-use block of addresses if the holder violates its terms. Thus far, RIRs have largely steered clear of the culture wars that rage within the application layer of the internet. But the decision by LACNIC, one of those RIRs, to revoke IP addresses that Parler relied on to escape deep deplatforming is concerning. LACNIC claimed to be enforcing a neutral (non-content-based) policy that Parler's new hosting provider had allegedly violated. But as I explain in my article, The Five Internet Rights, there are reasons to question whether LACNIC was enforcing its policies equally (or accurately). That fact, coupled with the broader ideological drive to deplatform Parler, raises the possibility that we may have seen the first instance of IP-based deplatforming.

Even if that suspicion is misplaced, it doesn't change the fact that five entities alone control the world's IP addresses, each of which is as free under current law to revoke IP addresses under its policies as Facebook is free to delete user posts that violate its standards. Given the centrality of IP addresses to online speech, a complete view of expressive access to the internet must include a right to maintain one or more static IP addresses for public websites. It must include a right of addressability.

Nameability. Nameability refers to the right of a website operator to maintain a domain name and, when users query that domain name, to have those queries answered (resolved) by returning the IP address at which the website is hosted.

As with the IP address system, the domain name system (DNS) has historically operated in a content-neutral manner. But that neutrality is waning. Domain registrars have increasingly waded into the content moderation game by inserting "morality clauses" into their registration agreements. For example, various registrars have prohibited registrants from associating domain names with websites that host "profane," "vulgar[]," "embarrass[ing], "derogatory, "racist, "homophobic," "blasphemous," or other "morally objectionable" content.  Thus, dailystormer.com, gab.com, ar15.com, and other websites have seen their domain names suspended because their registrars disliked their viewpoints. Guaranteeing expressive access to the internet should therefore include a right of nameability that prevents DNS intermediaries from taking adverse action against domain names associated with lawful websites merely because they disagree with the viewpoints expressed on those websites.

Routability. Routability refers to the right of a website operator to have traffic to and from her website faithfully routed between intervening networks.

The term internet—short for "inter-network"—concisely captures the fact that the internet operates as a network of networks (in technical parlance, "autonomous systems"). Internet communication, therefore, is fundamentally a matter of "hopping" across networks, where each intervening network represents an additional hop between source and destination. Each network learns where to route internet traffic by receiving information from border routers in neighboring networks that "announce" which IP addresses they own and which other networks they can reach.

This ability to dynamically route traffic via different combinations of independently operated networks was one of the great innovations of the internet. But it also provides opportunities for viewpoint foreclosure. Network operators or others can attempt to take down unpopular websites by falsely announcing their IP addresses, a technique known as "BGP hijacking." Or, less dramatically, network operators could simply refuse to route traffic to or from an unpopular website by declining to announce the website's addresses or network number to neighboring networks. For example, after Cloud Innovation, an English colo provider, made itself a pariah in the African community by suing AfriNIC, certain African ISPs publicly discussed ceasing to route packets to IP addresses belonging to the company as a form of ideological retribution. Any regulatory scheme premised on preventing viewpoint foreclosure should therefore take account of a right to routability.

Accessibility. Finally, accessibility refers to the right of a website operator not to have users blocked from accessing her website.

Some ISPs already block access to illegal or infringing websites. Although the federal Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and PROTECT IP Act (PIPA) bills, which would have required ISPs to block certain infringing sites, met an ignominious end after a well-publicized online revolt, copyright holders are nonetheless securing similar injunctions from courts.

But ISPs have just as much power to block lawful websites as they do unlawful websites. Such actions would no doubt violate net neutrality rules were they still in effect. Each of the FCC's three attempts at net neutrality included some form of a no-blocking rule that prevented ISPs from blocking subscribers' access to lawful applications and websites. And California's Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality Act, which the state enacted in 2018 after the demise of federal net neutrality rules, currently prohibits such behavior. But net neutrality has historically targeted economic discrimination, not moral or ideological discrimination. It aimed to prevent ISPs from leveraging their power over their own networks to block subscribers from accessing websites either because the ISP offered a competing product or because the ISP wished to extract a toll from website operators to reach its subscribers.

Of course, taken literally, net neutrality rules would prevent ISPs from blocking any lawful website, regardless of the reason (economic or moral). But it remains to be seen whether net neutrality advocates, who tend to populate the political left, will continue to support such broad rules if those on the political right begin attempting to use them to protect far-right websites from left-led deplatforming campaigns.

[* * *]

In sum, if it is indeed possible to boot unpopular users, groups, or viewpoints from the internet altogether; if lawful (even offensive) websites should have a basic right to stay online; and if the First Amendment permits the state to intervene in attempts at "content moderation" by the entities that administer the internet's core resources—all of which I believe to be the case—then, fortunately, there is a workable solution. The architecture of the internet reveals five distinct choke points that could be used by private parties to excise disfavored speech from the internet. The state could protect lawful speech from that excision by enshrining five basic internet rights—the rights of connectivity, addressability, nameability, routability, and accessibility—a non-discrimination regime that would be clear and administrable. It could also be bipartisan, as it marries the economic discrimination concerns of the left that animate net neutrality with the ideological discrimination concerns of the right that animate social media non-discrimination laws like those in Texas and Florida. And because it focuses only on the core infrastructure of the internet—and the core issue of whether users should enjoy a basic right to speak on their own websites—its modesty is perhaps its most attractive feature.

Does that mean the state should never intervene in content moderation in higher layers of the internet stack, such as cloud computing or social media? I don't know. I remain unconvinced that either side of that debate has a slam dunk take on the issue. But if we start with the simple premise that all users should be able to speak not on individual websites but on the internet, then I think that that premise of basic viewpoint access could provide a platform from which to tackle those and many other thorny questions of content moderation.

War on Drugs

Republicans' Dangerous Plans to Turn the War on Drugs into a Real War by Attacking Mexico

This awful idea is increasingly popular on the right, and has been embraced by several GOP presidential candidates.

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Over the last few months, leading Republicans - including most of the party's presidential candidates - have converged on the idea that we should turn the War on Drugs into a real war by attacking Mexico. Donald Trump and others have long said the US should wage war against drug cartels in much the same way as we have against the ISIS terrorist group - a campaign that included large-scale use of both air strikes and ground forces. And similar ideas were reiterated by several participants in the recent GOP presidential debate.

The rise of this idea is one of the most dangerous trends in recent GOP/right-wing politics. It would make the already horrific War on Drugs still worse, and also threatens armed conflict with Mexico - destroying our relationship with a crucial neighbor and our largest trading partner. It is simultaneously cruel, unjust, and stupid.

If, like most libertarians, you oppose the War on Drugs as a whole, you obviously have reason to oppose this massive potential escalation. But even if you take a more favorable view of drug prohibition, you would do well to draw the line at turning the metaphorical war into a real one.

The present decades-long War on Drugs is already a horrific disaster. It kills and imprisons large numbers of people in both the US and abroad, while stimulating organized crime, and doing little to curb harmful addiction.  It's a massive infringement on liberty and bodily autonomy. The "war" has also severely undermined both individual constitutional rights and structural constitutional limits on federal power. The current fentanyl crisis - used as a justification for attacking Mexico and other drastic measures - is itself largely a result of the War on Drugs, a predictable consequence of the "Iron Law" of  prohibition, under which banning markets incentivizes dealers and users to turn to harder, more potent drugs.

It's unlikely that attacking Mexico will do much to curb drug addiction in the US. Most fentanyl smuggling is conducted by US citizens crossing legal ports of entry, not undocumented immigrants or Mexican cartel operatives. If military intervention succeeds in killing or disrupting some Mexican suppliers, others (including others from other countries) are likely to take their place, so long as there is still a demand for the product. That has been the result of past attempts to interdict drug supplies from Colombia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. At most, we might get a modest temporary reduction in drug use.

While the benefits of attacking Mexico are likely to be minimal, doing so could easily have huge costs. Obviously, it is almost unavoidable that innocent civilians will be killed or injured in the fighting, especially since drug traffickers are hard to distinguish from the rest of the population. There are likely to be casualties among US troops, as well.

The 1.6 million Americans living in Mexico could potentially become targets for terrorism or retaliation by drug cartels. Here in the US, we could see racist and vigilante violence against Mexican-Americans. At the very least, a conflict with Mexico would predictably inflame racial and ethnic tensions.

Mexico recently became America's largest trading partner. A military intervention would likely disrupt that relationship, seriously damaging both nations' economies.

Attacking Mexico would also destroy America's moral authority in the world. We cannot credibly condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine or a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan if we are simultaneously invading our own neighbor merely to reduce drug smuggling. Such an action would predictably alienate many of our liberal-democratic allies in Europe and Asia, to say nothing of Latin America.

Perhaps worst of all, an invasion of Mexico would permanently damage our relationship with one of our two most important neighbors (along with Canada). Over the last century, the US has greatly benefited from having generally friendly and cooperative relations with the two nations with which we have long borders. Undermining that is sure to cause all sorts of problems and seriously weaken the overall US position in the world. Among other things, we are likely to have far more cross-border violence. And the Mexican government will have incentives to ally with China and other US adversaries.

Turning Mexico and its people into our enemies won't "make American great again." It would predictably weaken us and strengthen our adversaries elsewhere.

In fairness, Republicans are far from the only ones who deserve blame for the evils of the War on Drugs. That ill-advised conflict has a long bipartisan history, one to which President Biden, among other Democrats, has made plenty of contributions. But attacking Mexico would go well beyond even the worst previous drug war policies.

The best that can be said for Republican enthusiasm for attacking Mexico is that some of the GOP politicians who promote it may be just posturing or would content themselves with a symbolic show of force. Alternatively, they might limit themselves to only the kind of small-scale operations that may be approved by the Mexican government.

But I would not put too many eggs in that basket. If the symbolic show of force or small-scale operation fails (as it likely would), there would be pressure to go further. If invading Mexico becomes a major priority of the Republican base, a GOP president might find it hard to resist that pressure.

At the very least, the increasing acceptance of this idea in GOP circles has moved the Overton Window in the wrong direction. A terrible, previously fringe policy has become the mainstream position of one of our two major political parties. That greatly increases the likelihood it will actually be attempted should that party retake control of the White House in the near future.

Donald Trump

Why Efforts to Invoke Section 3 of the 14th Amendment to Keep Donald Trump Off the Ballot May Fail

Election law expert Derek Muller reminds us that we have seen these sorts of claims before.

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Claims that Donald Trump is ineligible to run again for President under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment have prompted extensive discussion. (See, e.g., these posts by Steve Calabresi and Josh Blackman, Judge Michael Luttig's Twitter account, and this paper by Will Baude and Michael Paulsen.)

Over at the Election Law Blog, Professor Derek Muller explains why these claims face serious challenges and are not likely to keep Trump off the ballot. He writes:

Challenges to presidential candidates' eligibility are not new. There were extensive challenges to Barack Obama and Ted Cruz (among others) in administrative tribunals and courts. Most of these challenges never reached the merits stage of whether the candidate was a "natural born citizen" because they failed to clear some other hurdle.

The bulk of challenges right now are doing exactly the same thing and making the same mistakes, or are on pace to do the same.

As Muller notes, there is no clear, established mechanism for keeping candidates off of the ballot. Such questions are generally controlled by state law and administered by state officials. As he notes,

If challenges are not using this specific, pre-existing mechanisms to address presidential qualifications challenges, which are contoured to each state's specific law, the challenges are likely doomed to fail.

Election officials hold no unilateral power to exclude candidates from the ballot–and, frankly, we are fresh off a cycle where election officials purporting to take unilateral action without a statutory authorization to do so have been routinely losing challenges in mandamus.

Some have hypothesized that other candidates -- Chris Christie? Asa Hutchinson? -- could try and sue to keep Trump of the ballot, but there are serious obstacles here as well including (again) that much ballot access is a matter of state law, which could cause federal courts to abstain from reaching the issue.

The bottom line is that a silver bullet to prevent the re-election of Donald Trump remains hard to find. Those who oppose his re-election may have to do things the old fashioned way: Ensure their candidates get more votes.

Free Speech

Court Also Strikes Down "Public Health Warning" for Porn Sites

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From today's long decision in Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Colmenero, by Judge David Alan Ezra (W.D. Tex.) (see here for excerpts from the part of the decision that strikes down the separate age-verification requirement):

In addition to the age verification, H.B. 1181 requires adult content sites to post a "public health warning" about the psychological dangers of pornography. In 14-point font or larger, sites must post:

TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES WARNING:

Pornography is potentially biologically addictive, is proven to harm human brain development, desensitizes brain reward circuits, increases conditioned responses, and weakens brain function.

TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES WARNING:

Exposure to this content is associated with low self-esteem and body image, eating disorders, impaired brain development, and other emotional and mental illnesses.

TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES WARNING:

Pornography increases the demand for prostitution, child exploitation, and child pornography.

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Free Speech

Texas Law Mandating Age Verification for Sexually Themed Sites Violates First Amendment,

a federal judge held today.

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Some excerpts from today's long decision in Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Colmenero by Judge David Alan Ezra (W.D. Tex.):

This case concerns a law passed by the State of Texas that restricts access to pornographic websites by requiring digital age verification methods … about the alleged harms caused by pornography….

H.B. 1181 is set to take effect on September 1, 2023. H.B. 1181 contains two requirements, both of which are challenged in this litigation. First, the law requires websites to use "reasonable age verification methods … to verify that an individual attempting to access the material is 18 years of age or older." Second, the law requires adult content websites to post a warning about the purported harmful effects of pornography and a national helpline for people with mental health disorders.

The law defines "sexual material harmful to minors" as including any material that "(A) the average person applying contemporary community standards would find, taking the material as a whole is and designed to appeal or pander to the prurient interest" to minors, (B) is patently offensive to minors, and (C) "taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors."

The law regulates a "commercial entity that knowingly and intentionally publishes or distributes material on an Internet website, including a social media platform, more than one-third of which is sexual material harmful to minors." H.B. 1181 requires these companies to "comply with a commercial age verification system that verifies age using: (A) government-issued identification; or (B) a commercially reasonable method that relies on public or private transactional data to verify the age of an individual." "Transactional data" refers to a "sequence of information that documents an exchange … used for the purpose of satisfying a request or event. The term includes records from mortgage, education, and employment entities." H.B. 1181 does not allow the companies or third-party verifiers to "retain any identifying information of the individual."

The court concluded that the age verification requirement was unconstitutional for various reasons, including that Ashcroft v. ACLU (II) (2004) and follow-on circuit court decisions struck down a similar federal law (COPA, the Child Online Protection Act). An excerpt that I thought was particularly closely connected to those precedents (though the court also made other arguments as well):

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"Strangers on the Internet" Podcast Ep. 41: Aliza Shatzman on the Joshua Wright Allegations and Law School Culture

The founder of the Legal Accountability Project explores how we got here and how we get out

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The 41st episode (Apple Podcasts link here and Spotify link here) of "Strangers on the Internet" features attorney and activist Aliza Shatzman.

In the third part of my coverage of the sexual misconduct allegations against ex-George Mason University law professor and former FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright (part 1 with Prof. Christa Laser is here and part 2 with Prof. Brandy Wagstaff is here), I speak with a victim of judicial harassment and retaliation who founded the Legal Accountability Project.

After graduating from the Washington University School of Law in 2019, Aliza began clerking for a judge in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. After subjecting her to harassment and sex discrimination, the judge fired her and then went on to derail her legal career by providing false statements during her final reference check for a prestigious position as a federal prosecutor in such a manner that she lost the position.

Aliza and I discuss how little has changed in the twenty years between when I started law school--a time of shady "open secrets" at my own alma mater and in the judiciary--and today. We talk about the roots of the culture of silence and its reinforcement via tools such as defamation lawsuits, like potentially the one currently faced by two of Josh Wright's alleged victims, and what true change and principled allyship look like.

Note: According to a statement printed in the media by Lindsay McKasson, counsel to Joshua Wright at Binall Law Group "all allegations of sexual misconduct are false," "These false allegations are being made public after unsuccessfully demanding millions of dollars behind closed doors," and "We look forward to total vindication in court." According to a tweet by Prof. Christa Laser, "I don't appreciate that his attorney falsely suggests we are all lying (1/2 was in writing!) & want $ (this is a lie–I only want him gone)."

Aliza Shatzman

Free Speech

Should a Website Have the Right to Exist?

Even outcasts should be able to subsist on their own land.

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(This post is part of a five-part series on regulating online content moderation.)

In Part III, I showed how it is technically possible to boot an unpopular speaker or her viewpoints from the internet. Such viewpoint foreclosure, as I call it, can be accomplished when the private entities that administer the internet's core resources—domain names, IP addresses, networks—deny those resources to websites that host offensive, albeit lawful, user content.

In Part II, I explained that even if the Supreme Court finds that social media platforms and other websites have a First Amendment right to moderate user content however they like, the entities that administer the internet's core resources probably do not. As such, if the state wanted to prevent core intermediaries from discriminating against lawful user speech, it probably could.

But should it? Or, left to itself, would the online marketplace of ideas do a better job of finding the right balance between free expression and cleaning up the internet? Another way of framing this issue is to ask whether a lawful website should have the right to exist. In this post, I argue that it should. I offer four reasons.

Reason #1: The Internet Is Different

Here's a common objection I've received when presenting my paper (on which this series is based): "Why should anyone have a right to speak on the internet? No one has the right to have his op-ed published in a newspaper, his voice broadcast over the radio, or his likeness displayed on TV. If newspapers, radio stations, and cable companies have the freedom to refuse to host your speech, why shouldn't every private intermediary on the internet, including core intermediaries, have the same freedom?

My response to this objection is that the internet is different from these other kinds of media. It's different in two important ways.

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Free Speech

Firing Based on Employee's Pre-Employment Social Media Posts Leads to Discrimination Lawsuit;

federal court allows the case to go forward.

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From Watson v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., decided Monday by Judge Cynthia Rufe (E.D. Pa.):

Plaintiff describes himself as an African-American, homosexual male. He began working at the PPA on February 24, 2020, as a "Data Officer." On his first day of employment, Plaintiff was given a copy of the PPA's social media policy and the employee handbook. Before and during his employment with the PPA, Plaintiff maintained various social media accounts. During Plaintiff's first week of employment, Defendant received an anonymous complaint regarding Plaintiff's social media use. The anonymous complaint referenced posts written before his employment and one post written on February 26, 2020, after Plaintiff started at the PPA, stating "this guy has the prettiest ass…I hope his girlfriend knows how lucky she is!" The post did not include a photograph or identify the individual.

Plaintiff testified in his deposition that during a meeting about the post, his direct supervisor, Deputy Executive Director Clarena Tolson, told him that "heterosexual men, employees, wouldn't want to work with [Plaintiff] without—without fearing for their safety and that people could consider [Plaintiff] a sexual predator because of it." Plaintiff further testified that Richard Dickson, the First Deputy Executive Director, then told him, "I'm sorry, I don't know how it feels to be a Black, gay man, but [ ] gay men are under so much scrutiny here," and that because Plaintiff was "coming from multiple identity groups" he "would face even higher scrutiny." Tolson and Dickson determined that Plaintiff did not create this post during work time, it did not refer to a PPA employee, and it did not violate the company's social media policy. Scott Petri, the Executive Director of the PPA, was not in this meeting and Plaintiff asserts that Petri refused to meet with him.

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Free Speech

Criticizing Business on TikTok Can't Lead to Anti-Harassment Order, Even When Criticism …

leads some readers to engage in "threats and harassment" against the business.

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From A.C. v. W.J., decided Monday by Massachusetts Appeals Court Justices Gabrielle Wolohojian, Sabita Singh & Kathryn Hand:

In reviewing a civil harassment order under G. L. c. 258E, we consider "whether a fact finder could conclude 'by a preponderance of the evidence, together with all permissible inferences, that the defendant had committed [three] or more acts of willful and malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property and that [did] in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property." Where, as here, the defendant's conduct involves speech, that speech must generally constitute "true threats" or "fighting words" to qualify as an act of civil harassment. "True threats" include "'direct threats of imminent physical harm,' as well as 'words or actions that—taking into account the context in which they arise—cause the victim to fear such [imminent physical] harm now or in the future.'" …

Here, the judge identified the first act of harassment as a December 8 phone call from W.J., where she said to A.C., "I'm going to light you up" after learning that her pottery pieces would not be delivered that evening. {The only one to give meaning to this ambiguous phrase was D.G., who testified that he took it to mean that W.J. would post a negative Google review. However, "[a] true threat does not require 'an explicit statement of an intention to harm the victim as long as circumstances support the victim's fearful or apprehensive response.'"} Assuming that this statement constituted an act of harassment under c. 258E, the only other instance of alleged direct conduct by W.J. that qualifies as harassment on this record is from a December 14 phone call, that A.C. testified she received from a caller who identified herself as W.J. and threatened to kill her. Such a threat, if credited, is clearly an act of harassment.

This leaves us to consider the question at the heart of this appeal: whether acts of harassment directed at A.C. by third parties in these circumstances can be attributed to W.J. to establish a third qualifying act within the purview of c. 258E. The answer is no.

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Politics

Today in Supreme Court History: August 31, 1995

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8/31/1995: Students at Santa Fe Independent School District voted to allow a student to say a prayer at football games. In Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe (2000), the Supreme Court declared this prayer unconstitutional.

The Rehnquist Court

Guns

Can Florida Homeowners Shoot Looters Who Break Into Their Houses (as Ron DeSantis Mentioned) or Businesses?

"I've seen signs in different people's yards in the past after these disasters, ... 'You loot, we shoot.' ... You never know what's behind that door."

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The "we" here refers to homeowners; here's a longer text snippet, from Fox News:

I'd also just remind potential looters that you never know what you're walking into. People have a right to defend their property. This part of Florida, you got a lot of advocates and proponents of the Second Amendment. I've seen signs in different people's yards in the past after these disasters, and I would say it's probably here, "You loot, we shoot."

You never know what's behind that door if you go break into somebody's house.

Are homeowners allowed to shoot people who break into their homes, apparently to loot? Yes, under Florida law, and the law of many (though not all) states. The relevant Florida statute provides,

A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony.

And "forcible felony" is defined as (emphasis added)

treason; murder; manslaughter; sexual battery; carjacking; home-invasion robbery; robbery; burglary; arson; kidnapping; aggravated assault; aggravated battery; aggravated stalking; aircraft piracy; unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.

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Guns

Four Eighth Circuit Judges Argue That Felons Don't Categorically Lose Second Amendment Rights

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The opinion is today's dissent from denial of rehearing en banc in U.S. v. Jackson (8th Cir.), written by Judge David Stras, joined by Judges Ralph Erickson, Steven Grasz, and Jonathan Kobes:

By cutting off as-applied challenges to the federal felon-in-possession statute, Jackson and Cunningham [two recent Eighth Circuit panel opinions] give "second-class" treatment to the Second Amendment. Even worse, they create a group of second-class citizens: felons who, for the rest of their lives, cannot touch a firearm, no matter the crime they committed or how long ago it happened. I dissent from the decision to deny rehearing en banc.

There's a lot of historical analysis in the opinion, but here's a short excerpt:

[The Jackson panel opinion] identified a few examples from a now-vacated Third Circuit decision and concluded that felons seem enough like Native Americans, slaves, Catholics, and Loyalists for Congress to disarm them too. It never really tells us why, perhaps because it thought it was the defendant's job to connect the dots….

[The panel opinion] makes no effort to draw the necessary connections between colonial-era laws and the felon-in-possession statute. Why were these particular groups targeted? What, if anything, does their disarmament have to do with felons? What lessons can we draw from the history? It is not as simple as saying some groups lost their arms, so felons should lose them too. After all, it goes without saying that we would not allow Congress to indiscriminately strip Catholics and Native Americans, two groups targeted by colonial-era disarmament laws, of their guns today…. [T]he decades surrounding the ratification of the Second Amendment showed a steady and consistent practice. People considered dangerous lost their arms. But being a criminal had little to do with it….

Jackson suggests that "citizens who are not 'law-abiding'" permanently lose their right to keep and bear arms, "whether or not they ha[ve] demonstrated a propensity for violence." The virtue theory views bearing arms as a "civic right" for only the virtuous. Felons, being felons, do not fall into that category, so they lose the right.

The problem is that nothing in the Second Amendment's text supports such a restrictive interpretation. The right to bear arms belongs to "the people"—the virtuous, the non-virtuous, and everyone in between…. The virtue theory also suffers from an even more glaring flaw. If felon disarmament is so obviously constitutional, then why were there "no [Founding-era] laws … denying the right [to keep and bear arms] to people convicted of crimes"? After all, Bruen tells us to find a "historical analogue" and the most obvious one—disarming felons—did not exist in the colonies or early American states.

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Free Speech

Massive Sanctions Against Rudy Giuliani for "Willful Shirking of His Discovery Obligations" in Libel Lawsuit Against Him

Among other things, "Default judgment will be entered against Giuliani as a discovery sanction ..., holding him civilly liable on plaintiffs' defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, and punitive damage claims ...."

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From Freeman v. Giuliani, decided today by Judge Beryl Howell (D.D.C.):

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize "[l]iberal discovery" for the "sole purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes," with "the only express limitations [ ] that the information sought is not privileged, and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action[,]" but without "differentiat[ing] between information that is private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests attach." As such, "the Rules often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs of both litigants and third parties." Crucial to fulfilling this central purpose of civil discovery is that parties "comply fully and timely with their discovery obligations … to supply relevant testimony and documents for a fair appraisal of the facts and a 'just' determination." Obviously, only extant documents and data are producible, so parties must also take reasonable efforts to preserve potentially relevant evidence, including electronically stored information ("ESI"), when litigation is "reasonably foreseeable." To incentivize and enforce compliance with these procedural rules, sanctions may be imposed when ESI should have been preserved "in the anticipation or conduct of litigation" but "is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it[.]"

Defendant Rudolph W. Giuliani is taken at his word that he understands these obligations. He assured this Court directly that he "understand[s] the obligations" because he has "been doing this for 50 years[.]"In this case, however, Giuliani has given only lip service to compliance with his discovery obligations and this Court's orders by failing to take reasonable steps to preserve or produce his ESI. Instead, Giuliani has submitted declarations with concessions turned slippery on scrutiny and excuses designed to shroud the insufficiency of his discovery compliance. The bottom line is that Giuliani has refused to comply with his discovery obligations and thwarted plaintiffs Ruby Freeman and Wandrea' ArShaye Moss's procedural rights to obtain any meaningful discovery in this case.

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Free Speech

Professor's Claim That She Was Fired for Objecting to Superiors About Mask Mandate Can Go Forward

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From Griffin v. University of Maine System, decided Aug. 16 by Chief Judge Jon Levy (D. Me.):

Plaintiff Patricia Griffin's employment as a [tenured] Professor of Marketing at the University of Southern Maine was terminated by the University of Maine System … in September 2021…. Griffin asserts that her termination was unlawful retaliation for her having spoken out against the University's facemask and vaccination policies adopted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic….

On August 18, 2021, in preparation for the University's fall semester, the Chancellor of the University of Maine System announced a mandatory mask policy (the "Policy"). On August 24, Griffin participated in a luncheon meeting via Zoom at which Cummings was a speaker. She alleges that during the event, [University President Glenn Cummings] did not wear a mask. On the same day, Griffin sent an email to the Dean of the College of Management and Human Service pertaining to the University's recently implemented mask and vaccine policies. The email reads in pertinent part:

I first want to say how much I love teaching at [the University of Southern Maine] as well as working with such a great faculty. It really has been the highlight of my career and I owe a lot to you for sticking with me. The reason for this email is because I have been following the science, data, and evidence regarding SARS-CoV-2 and searching for anything that will support wearing a mask while indoors as well as vaccinating an entire school population as the optimal method for stopping the transmission of the virus. The reality is that my research has found no evidence to support these measures. I wanted to share the information I gathered and relied upon when making my decision regarding these mandates before the start of classes next Monday to see that my decisions are science, evidence, and data based. However, I do not want to cause any issues, especially for you, if I come to campus on Monday morning to teach my one face to face class so I wanted to give you enough time.

Griffin attached a separate letter to her email, also addressed to the Dean, summarizing the results of her research on the effectiveness of mask mandates and vaccines. She concluded the letter as follows:

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Free Speech

Can a Controversial User Really Get Kicked off the Internet?

In theory, yes; in practice, perhaps soon.

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(This post is part of a five-part series on regulating online content moderation.)

When it comes to regulating content moderation, my overarching thesis is that the law, at a minimum, should step in to prevent "viewpoint foreclosure"—that is, to prevent private intermediaries from booting unpopular users, groups, or viewpoints from the internet entirely. But the skeptic—perhaps the purist who believes that the state should never intervene in private content moderation—might question whether the threat of viewpoint foreclosure even exists. "No one is at risk of getting kicked off the internet," he might say. "If Facebook bans you, you can join Twitter. If Twitter won't have you, you can join Parler. And even if every other provider refuses to host your speech, you can always stand up your own website."

In my article, The Five Internet Rights, I call this optionality the "social contract" of content moderation: no one can be forced to host you on the internet, but neither can anyone prevent you from hosting yourself. The internet is decentralized, after all. And this decentralization prevents any private party, or even any government, from acting as a central choke point for online expression. As John Gilmore famously said, "The Net interprets censorship as damage and routs around it."

But while this adage may have held true for much of the internet's history, there are signs it may be approaching its expiration date. And as content moderation moves deeper down the internet stack, the social contract may be unraveling. In this post, I'll describe the technical levers that make viewpoint foreclosure possible, and I'll provide examples of an increasing appetite to use those levers.

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