The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

From Judge Michael J. Newman (S.D. Ohio) on Use of AI to Prepare Filings

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From today's order in Whaley v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., which dismisses the case on the merits but also adds:

Plaintiff admits that he used Artificial Intelligence ("AI") to prepare case filings. [This yielded hallucinated citations to nonexistent cases. -EV] The Court reminds all parties that they are not allowed to use AI—for any purpose—to prepare any filings in the instant case or any case before the undersigned. See Judge Newman's Civil Standing Order at VI. Both parties, and their respective counsel, have an obligation to immediately inform the Court if they discover that a party has used AI to prepare any filing. The penalty for violating this provision includes, inter alia, striking the pleading from the record, the imposition of economic sanctions or contempt, and dismissal of the lawsuit.

Not all judges take this view, though I'm sure all judges would insist (at least) that if AI software is used to prepare filings, the output be carefully checked by the lawyer or litigant.

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Campus Free Speech

Academic Freedom Alliance Protests USC Prof's Ban from Campus

University of Southern California appears to ignore its own policy to remove professor from campus over alleged speech

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The Academic Freedom Alliance today released a letter sent to the University of Southern California over its suspension of Professor John Strauss. Professor Strauss briefly exchanged words with pro-Palestinian protesters on campus. There is a factual dispute over what exactly was said, but in any version of the exchange Professor Strauss engaged in lawfully protected political speech in a public space on campus.

From the letter:

Even if the words falsely attributed to Professor Strauss in the Trojans for Palestine video had in fact been articulated by him in the context of a public political rally, they are fully within the bounds of protected First Amendment speech and within the scope of protected speech under the university's policies. Private speech on controversial social and political topics can sometimes be heated, ill-tempered, ill-considered, and broadly offensive. We do not hold such speech to the standards that we would properly expect from speech in the classroom or from scholarly research. The video in question does not portray Professor Strauss as issuing a genuine threat to any individual nor as engaging in any harassing conduct. Of course, it is contested whether Professor Strauss even issued those words, and the words he and other witnesses assert that he actually said are even further from the line that would separate protected from unprotected speech. There is no proper investigation to be conducted as to whether Professor Strauss behaved contrary to university policy in a manner that might merit discipline. To the extent that any investigation might be justified to establish the facts of what happened at the rally, it could be concluded extremely quickly and would not justify an administrative leave.

The full letter can be found here.

Local news coverage here.

Free Speech

Bans on Approaching or Videorecording Hunters Struck Down by Seventh Circuit

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From Brown v. Kemp, decided Monday in an opinion by Judge David Hamilton, joined by Judge Ilana Rovner:

[A Wisconsin law] makes it a crime to interfere intentionally with a hunter by [two or more acts of] "maintaining a visual or physical proximity" to the hunter, by "approaching or confronting" the hunter, or by photographing, videotaping, audiotaping, or otherwise recording the activity of the hunter….

[The prohibitions on] "maintaining a visual or physical proximity" to a hunter and "approaching or confronting" a hunter … are unconstitutionally vague…. They fail to specify, or even to offer any guidance about, how far away a person must stay to avoid engaging in unlawful interference….

Defendants argue that "visual or physical proximity" means "close enough" to impede or obstruct a hunter. That logic takes into account the statutory element of intent to interfere with hunting. But it still leaves the law impermissibly vague. What does "close enough" mean in the context of hunting? Five feet? Fifty feet? Five hundred feet? Five hundred yards? With modern rifles, the distance could be well beyond earshot. Stealth is part of hunting….

The vague statutory language also leaves too much room for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, chilling plaintiffs who are reasonably concerned about over-enforcement. The lack of objective criteria in subsection (2)(a)(7) means that enforcement authorities, like individual citizens, cannot know when the line between lawful and unlawful conduct has been crossed…. If the uncertainty and threat of arbitrary enforcement by public officials were not enough, plaintiffs are also subject to arbitrary enforcement at the hands of hunters and hunting parties [via citizen's suits authorized by the law]….

Clause (c) prohibits "photographing, videotaping, audiotaping, or through other electronic means, monitoring or recording the activities of" a hunter or member of a hunting party. Such monitoring activities are prohibited "regardless of where the act occurs." On its face, the text of the statute carves out no exemptions for monitoring and recording activities that aim to contribute to public discourse. It treats newsgathering and silent-protest monitoring the same as recordings made for solely individual use….

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Calabresi: The Amar Brief in Moore v. United States Should Not be Embraced

Is a Federal Wealth Tax a Direct Tax? Steven Calabresi Responds to the Amar Amicus Brief in Moore.

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I am posting this entry for its author, Professor Steven Calabesi:

On December 5, 2023, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in the most important federalism case since it upheld the constitutionality of President Obama's Affordable Care Act.  The case at issue – Moore v. United States – raises two vital matters:

1) Can Congress tax unrealized capital gains, as Yale Law Professor Bruce Ackerman argues in an amicus brief; and

2) Can Congress enact a Bernie Sanders/Elizabeth Warren-style wealth tax, including on unrealized capital gains, as the two Amar brothers (Akhil Reed Amar and Vikram David Amar) argue?

Because of the huge importance of this case, I am going to respond in this blog post to the Amar brothers (one of whom is my second-best friend in the world, notwithstanding our disagreement in this case). They devoted the third section of their amicus brief to critiquing an amicus brief that I co-filed in Moore arguing against congressional power to impose a wealth tax or to tax unrealized capital gains – a brief which was joined by former Attorney General Edwin Meese III and by Professor Gary Lawson.

The constitutional question in Moore v. United States is whether wealth taxes and taxes on unrealized capital gains have to be apportioned among the states based on their respective populations, which it is practically impossible to do, or whether wealth taxes and taxes on unrealized capital gains have to be merely uniform in every state, which could be easily accomplished.  Ed Meese, Gary Lawson, and I argue that such taxes are direct taxes, which must be apportioned among the states, while the Amar brothers say they are indirect taxes that must merely be uniform among the states, which would make them much easier to enact.

The Taxing Power itself is granted in Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, which says:

"The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."

Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 then critically limits the federal taxing power by saying that:

"No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken."

The rule of apportionment thus applies to "direct taxes"; the rule of uniformity applies only to such indirect taxes as "Duties, Imposts, and Excises.

The flaw in the Amar brothers' brief that I will discuss today is that it construes the text of the Constitution according to the expected applications of certain historical figures rather than its plain objective meaning.  The Amar brothers rewrite Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 to say:

"No Capitation, or Land Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken."

They argue that wealth taxes and taxes on unrealized capital gains in your house or Vanguard fund are perfectly constitutional.  They say, contrary to the text of the Constitution, that Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 bans only federal capitation and land taxes and that nothing else is a direct tax.

The original public meaning of the words "direct tax" is clearly set forth in two law review articles: Robert Natelson, What the Constitution Means by "Duties, Imposts, and Excises"--- and "Taxes" (Direct or Otherwise), 66 Case West. U. L. Rev. 297 (2015) and Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2334 (1997).  Both authors conclude that "direct taxes" included many more taxes than merely a capitation or federal land tax.

Natelson demonstrates conclusively that the phrase "direct taxes" also included taxes on:

"1) Wealth employed in business and domestic life.  Direct taxes included those imposed on land, improvements to land, ('stock in trade'), business equipment, and livestock; 2) Personal and business income.  Direct taxes included levies on rents, business profits, wages, interest, and other income; 3) Business enterprises.  Levies on business profits and occupational fees were direct taxes; 4) Heads.  Poll taxes, also called head taxes or capitations, existed in all of the New England states and in most other states as well.  They were levied both on free persons and slaves.  Capitations were the prevalent way of taxing slaves."  Natelson, supra at 314-316.

It is true that Alexander Hamilton and one Supreme Court Justice, Samuel Chase in Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796) construed a statute laying a "Duty" on carriages to be a "Duty" but said "I am inclined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the direct taxes contemplated by the constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation or poll tax *** and a tax on land."  But, this was the original expected application of Hamilton and Chase as to the meaning of very broad constitutional language requiring apportionment of all direct taxes.   The word direct in 1787 meant "Straight; not crooked" according to Samuel Johnson's 1755 Dictionary of the English language and according to Merriam-Webster it means the same thing today in 2023.

The Amar brothers would limit a general term in the Constitution -- "direct tax" -- to its original expected application "capitation and land taxes" simply because that is what Alexander Hamilton, an extreme nationalist, thought it meant.  (Hamilton wanted to abolish the state governments at the Philadelphia Convention while having a President and Senators who served for life).  This is not the way my friend Professor Akhil Amar usually interprets words in the Constitution.

For example, most Americans expected in 1787, that the Commerce Clause applied only to buying and selling. Professor Akhil Reed Amar, however, quite rightly reads it as applying to non-mercantile interstate transactions like recreational traveling or sailing from one State to another.  Professor Amar's view is that "we must remember that it is a Constitution that we are expounding" that would last "for the ages" as John Marshall said in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).  Professor Amar thus praises McCulloch for not giving the word "necessary", in the Necessary and Proper Clause, its Samuel Johnson 1755 dictionary meaning of "indispensable", but he reads it instead to mean "convenient, or useful."

Professor Akhil Reed Amar also, quite rightly in my view, reads the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of birth equality to apply to laws that discriminate on the basis of sex or gender and not only to laws that discriminate on the basis of race – which was the original expected application of the Fourteenth Amendment.  And, he reads the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech and of the press as applying, not only to printing presses -- the original expected application -- but also to movies radio, television, and the internet.

In 1787, people held their wealth in land because there was no stock market or bond market yet and few banks.  It is thus not surprising that Hamilton and Chase in 1796 would read broad constitutional language like "direct taxes" as applying only to capitation and "land" taxes.  A wealth tax today would fall "straight; and not crooked" upon one person in exactly the same way a capitation or a land tax would have done in 1787.

In sum, Professor Amar's broad readings of the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, the First Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment all suggest a broad reading of the requirement that the words "Direct Taxes" impose today.  That clause thus, in 2023, applies to a wealth tax as well as to a federal capitation or land tax.  Such taxes are subject to the rule of apportionment and not of uniformity.

Free Speech

Prof. John Goldberg (Harvard) on "Large Libel Models"

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I was delighted to see a brief review of my article on libel by AI in JOTWELL yesterday by Prof. Goldberg, a leading expert on tort law. He summarizes and evaluates the article, and then offers this counterpoint:

For the most part, I find its analysis persuasive, particularly its bottom-line assessment that companies that provide A.I. using LLMs are substantially more vulnerable to defamation liability than are traditional internet platforms such as Google. I would suggest, however that the prospects for liability are in some ways less grim than Professor Volokh supposes, and will offer a different perspective on how disturbed we ought to be about the prospect of significant liability.

On the first point, much will depend on the defamation scenarios that actually occur with any frequency in the real world. A private-figure plaintiff who can prove that their job application was turned down because their prospective employer's A.I. query generated a defamatory hallucination about them would seem to have a strong claim. By contrast, suppose that P (also a private figure) learns from their friend F that a certain query about P will generate a hallucination that is defamatory of P, but also that P does not know who among their friends, neighbors, and co-workers (if any) have seen the hallucination. It seems likely that P will face an uphill battle establishing liability or recovering meaningful compensation.

Even assuming P can prove that the program's creator or operator was at fault (assuming a fault standard applies), P is likely to face significant challenges proving causation and damages, particularly given modern courts' inclination to cabin juror discretion on these issues. I suspect this is especially likely to be the case if the program includes – as many programs now do – a prominent disclaimer that advises users independently to verify program-generated information before relying on it. While, as noted, disclaimers do not defeat liability outright, they might well render judges (and some juries) skeptical in particular cases about causation and damages.

Apart from doctrine, one must also take account of realpolitik, as Volokh recognizes.

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Religion and the Law

Washington Court Refuses to Enforce Saudi Child Custody Decree

"During the custody battle [in Saudi Arabia], Ghassan AlHaidari accused Bethany of gender mixing, adultery, and insulting Islam and Saudi Arabia. Gender mixing, a punishable crime, entails having a male friend. To prove the charge of adultery, Ghassan submitted a photograph of Bethany with a male, who Ghassan claimed to be her boyfriend. The crimes of adultery, insulting Islam, and insulting Saudi Arabia carry a death penalty in Saudi Arabia."

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From yesterday's Washington Court of Appeals decision in In the Matter of the Marriage of AlHaidari, written by Chief Judge George Fearing and joined by Judges Robert Lawrence-Berrey and Rebecca Pennell (see the full opinion for more factual, procedural, and legal details):

Ghassan and Bethany AlHaidari married in Saudi Arabia in November 2013. Bethany is a United States citizen, and Ghassan is a citizen of Saudi Arabia. The couple begot ZA, in Saudi Arabia, in December 2014. ZA is a citizen of both the United States and Saudi Arabia….

In September 2017, Bethany AlHaidari asked Ghassan for a divorce. In Saudi Arabia, if Bethany filed for divorce, the law demanded that she provide a reason and return her dowry. Ghassan could file for divorce without making payment and without giving any reason. Ghassan refused the request for a divorce. Later, however, Ghassan contended that he had divorced Bethany in 2018.

Bethany AlHaidari's legal residence in Saudi Arabia depended on the cooperation of Ghassan because, as husband, he was her legal guardian. In 2018, Bethany requested that Ghassan update her residency status in Saudi Arabia, and he refused. He also refused to allow ZA and Bethany to visit Bethany's family in Washington State.

On February 7, 2019, Bethany AlHaidari's permission from the Saudi Arabia government to reside in the county expired. Bethany no longer held legal status in Saudi Arabia and, therefore, could not file proceedings in the Saudi court system. She also could not pay salaries for her company's employees, nor access her bank account for risk of being deported or jailed. The Saudi government provided her with legal residency status again after Bethany spoke to the media and the New York Times published her story.

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Free Speech

Academic Freedom Alliance Statement on Campus Protests Regarding Events in Israel and Gaza

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Released yesterday:

Since the attack on civilians in Israel on October 7, 2023, American college campuses have been the scene of political rallies, protests, and political statements coming from differing perspectives. The Academic Freedom Alliance takes no position on the politics of the Middle East or attempts to adjudicate competing claims. The AFA does, however, have a substantial interest in how the discussion of those events is conducted and regulated on American college campuses. Universities are now under extraordinary pressure to police the speech and beliefs of members of the campus community. It is essential that universities resist the pressure to do so.

Separate from the merits of any particular controversy, there are several well-established principles that should guide universities in responding to individual controversies. Universities should reaffirm and recommit themselves to principles that help preserve American institutions of higher education as vibrant homes of free inquiry.

Professors must enjoy the liberty to discuss and even promote controversial ideas and to present controversial materials to students in their classes. Professors have an obligation, however, not to take advantage of their captive audience of students by introducing ideas or materials that are not germane to the subject matter of their class. Likewise, professors have a responsibility not to exploit their privileged position to attempt to indoctrinate students or to subject them to political or ideological litmus tests or pressures in their classroom assignments. Nor do professors have a right to compromise the education of their students by conducting their classes in a manner designed simply to advance their favored political causes. Universities must resist calls to censor what is taught in classrooms, but they must also ensure that classes are used for proper educational purposes.

Professors, like other members of the campus community, should enjoy the freedom to speak and act as citizens. When speaking in public in their personal capacity, professors may give voice to controversial and even extreme political and social opinions that others might find offensive or disturbing. When professors at American universities speak in public in a manner that is lawful under the First Amendment, universities should stand behind their right to express such views.*

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Free Speech

[UPDATE: Decision Reversed by Colorado Supreme Court] No Absolute Privilege for Accuser's Allegations in High School Sex Misconduct Investigation,

because the investigations doesn't offer the sort of due process available in a judicial trial.

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[UPDATE 7/22/2025: The Colorado Supreme Court has reversed the Colorado Court of Appeals decision noted here; for more, see "#TheyLied Lawsuits Alleging False Title IX Complaints: Defamation and Malicious Prosecution."]

If Alice accuses Bob of some misconduct (sexual or otherwise) in a statement to a third party, Bob can sue Alice for defamation. He would have to show that the statement is false, and generally speaking that Alice was at least negligent in making that allegation. But if he does show this, he would generally be able to prevail.

If Alice makes the accusation in some context where she is protecting some legitimate interest of her own or of the third party—for instance, the third party is Alice and Bob's employer—then she might be protected by a "qualified privilege." To oversimplify slightly, this basically means that she won't be liable unless she knows the statement is false (or at least likely to be false).

But if Alice makes the statement about Bob in court, then she as a witness is generally absolutely immune from defamation liability. She might still be prosecuted for perjury, if the prosecutor concludes that she deliberately lied. But she needn't fear a lawsuit from Bob. And the same is true in other "quasi-judicial" proceedings.

What happens, though, with Title IX proceedings, whether in K-12 schools or in colleges? Should complainants and other witnesses be entitled to the absolute privilege, as they are in court? Or should they be entitled only to qualified privilege? (It's generally accepted that at least a qualified privilege would apply.)

Gonzales v. Hushen, decided Sept. 28 by the Colorado Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Katharine Lum, joined by Judges Jerry Jones and JoAnn Vogt, holds that this depends on whether the Title IX proceedings offer enough procedural protections of the sort available in trials. In this respect, it follows the Connecticut Supreme Court's recent decision in Khan v. Yale Univ. (which was followed three weeks ago by the Second Circuit in that case, applying Connecticut law). An excerpt:

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Politics

Farewell to the Mayflower

Next year, the Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention will (likely) be at the Washington Hilton.

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The Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C. opened in 1925. It is iconic. Presidents and world leaders have stayed there. It hosted many inaugural balls. And for the past four decades, the Mayflower has been the home of the Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention. Attending the annual meeting at the Mayflower is like a pilgrimage for conservative lawyers. I've attended every convention since I was a 1L in 2006. I still remember with awe my first visit. I walked through the gilded doors, across the marble lobby, into the bustling hallway, and sat down in the grand ballroom. I was awe-struck by the classic decor in the room, and even more impressed by the luminaries sitting in our midst.

In November 2009, shortly after I launched my blog, I live-blogged the Convention. I wrote up summaries of sessions, posted short clips of the programming to YouTube, and tweeted highlights. (You can see the entries here.) At the time, FedSoc did not have any social media team, and none of the sessions were live-streamed. For those who like a throwback, here is a clip from 2009, which captures my youthful humor, and the Mayflower's grandeur:

But perhaps the most significant moment of the 2009 Convention occurred in the grand hallway. I described it in my 2009 book, Unprecedented: The Constitutional Challenge to Obamacare:

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Campus Free Speech

Academic Freedom Alliance Supporting Suit against the Mayo Clinic

Dr. Michael Joyner alleges the Mayo Institute tried to muzzle his public speech in his area of expertise

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The Academic Freedom Alliance announced today that Michael Joyner, M.D. is suing the Mayo Clinic for violating his contractually protected academic freedom. The AFA had provided financial support in Joyner's efforts to resolve this problem internally, and it is now supporting his state suit.

In June, the AFA sent a public letter to the Mayo Clinic complaining about its treatment of Dr. Joyner. The Mayo Clinic adopted its current free expression and academic freedom policy in 2020, which promised that its researchers would be free to discuss their scholarly conclusions and opinions without fear of censorship or retaliation. And yet,

Dr. Joyner, a distinguished professor and faculty member with thirty-five years of experience, is recognized as a leading expert on topics of scientific and public concern. Over the years, in his personal capacity, he has participated in numerous interviews with the media related to his areas of professional expertise. Mayo Clinic's admonishments, written warnings, and disciplinary actions against Dr. Joyner—which include a one-week unpaid suspension, denial of any salary increase at his next contract renewal, and threat of termination of employment for failure to comply with Communications Department preclearance and oversight of media interviews—are a direct attack on his academic freedom. Furthermore, the restrictions on Dr. Joyner's ability to speak publicly on controversial and important topics is a serious restraint on his speech.

The Mayo Clinic refused to change course, and so Dr. Joyner has been forced to seek a remedy in the courts. From the AFA press release,

"As the complaint clearly states, academic freedom is a key guarantor of scientific integrity," said Lucas Morel, chair of the AFA's academic committee. "We believe this lawsuit will set an important precedent about the right of other scientists, doctors, and academics to speak publicly and freely on topics relevant to their expertise. Americans should expect expert commentary to reflect the scientific evidence, not the financial or political interests of the institution. We hope Dr. Joyner is awarded the damages owed to him for violation of his rights."

The full complaint can be found here.

Previous coverage of the controversy by CNN can be found here.

The Most Problematic Parts Of The SCOTUS Code of Conduct Are The Last Two Sentences Of The Statement

The Justices err when they publicly respond to public criticism.

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On Monday, the Supreme Court released a Code of Conduct. As could be predicted, this document did not satisfy the Court's critics. Almost immediately, the document was torn apart: the Justices used "should" instead of "must"; there is no enforcement mechanism; the recusal rules are too loose; and so on. Personally, I am ambivalent about the Code. I firmly believe that all of the Justices try their level best to maintain the highest standards of ethics, and no parchment barriers will affect those duties. Indeed, that duty must come from within, as reflected by the constitutional and judicial oaths they take.

Still, I found problematic one aspect of the Code--or to be more precise, the preface to the code. The first page of the document is labeled the "Statement of the Court," which presumably was joined by all nine members. (Then again, the Chief Justice sent a letter to Senator Durbin that presumably only he wrote.) The Statement purports to lay out the genesis of the Conduct of Conduct. Pay attention to the last two sentences:

The undersigned Justices are promulgating this Code of Conduct to set out succinctly and gather in one place the ethics rules and principles that guide the conduct of the Members of the Court. For the most part these rules and principles are not new: The Court has long had the equivalent of common law ethics rules, that is, a body of rules derived from a variety of sources, including statutory provisions, the code that applies to other members of the federal judiciary, ethics advisory opinions issued by the Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct, and historic practice. The absence of a Code, however, has led in recent years to the misunderstanding that the Justices of this Court, unlike all other jurists in this country, regard themselves as unrestricted by any ethics rules. To dispel this misunderstanding, we are issuing this Code, which largely represents a codification of principles that we have long regarded as governing our conduct.

Members of the Supreme Court, and all federal judges, have lifetime tenure. The existence of lifetime tenure presupposes that federal judges will be subject to public criticism. And that lifetime tenure is designed to immunize judges from public criticism. If there is a "misunderstanding" of how the Justices behave, it is not the role of the Court to "dispel this misunderstanding." The Court decides "cases" or "controversies," and that's it. Yet, the Court openly states that it is adopting the Code in response to public criticism. I fear we have set a dangerous precedent. Now, and in the future, when Congress lobs criticisms on the Court, and the Court fails to respond, Congress can raise the charge of inconsistency: why did you need to "dispel" misunderstandings about ethics, but not misunderstandings about some other issue. Remember when Chief Justice Roberts responded to some attacks on the Court, but not others? The best policy is to say nothing.

The Court is strongest when it remains independent, not when it submits to the other branches. The Court could have adopted the exact same code, but without the final two sentences of the Statement. Let the process be inward looking, and not external. Do your job, and move on. I'm partial to a famous saying from Queen Elizabeth II: "Never complain, never explain."

Going forward, I suspect any nominee to the Supreme Court will be asked about the statement and the Code during confirmation hearings.

Free Speech

Community College Ban on "Verbal Forms of Aggression … Harassment, Ridicule or Intimidation" Is Unconstitutionally Vague,

concludes a magistrate judge in recommendations to a federal district court.

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[UPDATE 9/23/2024: The decision has been reversed for procedural reasons.]

From today's Report and Recommendations by Magistrate Judge Christopher D. Baker (E.D. Cal.) in Johnson v. Watkin:

BP 3050 serves as the [Kern Community College] District's policy on "Institutional Code of Ethics." BP 3050 provides that "all associates in the District, faculty, students, management, classified staff, and trustees, as well as volunteers and vendors, each bear personal responsibility for their own ethical behavior and for the ethical statute of our organization." BP 3050 requires "that [the community] conduct [itself] with civility in all circumstances of [their] professional lives" and does "not participate in or accept, condone, or tolerate physical or verbal forms of aggression, threat, harassment, ridicule, or intimidation." BP 3050 states it values a spirit of free inquiry and free speech and "encourages the expression of a range of points of view, but [expects] all expressions of content to be conducted in a manner respectful of persons." …

The Undersigned finds the term "verbal forms of aggression … harassment, ridicule or intimidation" has a likelihood of being impermissibly vague. The term lacks a commonly understood meaning and creates a policy that is broader than the civility policies District Defendants allege are similar.

What may be considered "verbal forms of aggression" can "[vary] from speaker to speaker, and listener to listener." This ambiguity invites the District to engage in viewpoint discrimination over what speech may constitute "verbal forms of aggression." See [record citation] (Plaintiff [history professor] was investigated for reposting [a colleague's] post on RIFL's Facebook page and adding "Here's what one critical race theorist at BC sounds like. Do you agree with this radical SJW from BC's English Department? Thoughts?"); compare [record citation] (Plaintiff alleges "[n]one of the members of the Board of Trustees disavowed Corkins' call" that "RIFL faculty are 'in that five percent we have to continue to cull. Got them in my livestock operation and that's why we put a rope on some of them and take them to the slaughterhouse'"). [RIFL is a faculty organization, the Renegade Institute for Liberty. -EV]

Plaintiff is represented by Alan Gura, Courtney Corbello, and Endel Kolde (Institute for Free Speech).

Free Speech

Community College "Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility" Requirements for Teaching and Other Professional Work Violate First Amendment,

concludes a magistrate judge in recommendations to a federal district court.

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[UPDATE 9/23/2024: The decision has been reversed for procedural reasons.]

From today's Report and Recommendations by Magistrate Judge Christopher D. Baker (E.D. Cal.) in Johnson v. Watkin; the plaintiff is a history professor at Bakersfield College, a California public community college. The opinion is long, so I've excerpted it heavily; read the whole thing for more of the legal analysis, and the interesting and contentious factual backstory.

Cal. Code of Regs. § 53602(a) ["Advancing Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility in Evaluation and Tenure Review Processes"] requires faculty demonstrate (or progress toward) proficiency in the locally-developed DEIA [diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility] competencies, or those published by the Chancellor for their evaluation, including tenure review. For instance, § 53602(b) provides that "District employees must have or establish proficiency in DEIA-related performance to teach, work, or lead within California community colleges." Similarly, § 53605(a) provides that "Faculty members shall employ teaching, learning, and professional practices that reflect DEIA and anti-racist principles, and in particular, respect for, and acknowledgement of the diverse backgrounds of students and colleagues to improve equitable student outcomes and course completion."

Likewise, § 53605(c) provides that "[s]taff members shall promote and incorporate culturally affirming DEIA and anti-racist principles to nurture and create a respectful, inclusive, and equitable learning and work environment." [Defendant California Community College Chancellor Sonia Christian's] characterization of these regulations as merely "articulat[ing] the aspirational goal" of promoting DEIA is disingenuous—by their plain language, the regulations require faculty members like Plaintiff to express a particular message.

The Supreme Court "[has] held time and time again that freedom of speech 'includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.'" Moreover, compelling individuals to mouth support for views they find objectionable, like the government's preferred message, violates the "cardinal constitutional command" that "'no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.'"

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The Brussels Defect: Too early turns out to be worse than too late.

Plus Mark MacCarthy's book on "Regulating Digital Industries" in Episode 481 of the Cyberlaw Podcast

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It's a commonplace among Silicon Valley VCs that introducing a new product too early is worse than arriving too late. They wouldn't get an argument this week from EU negotiators, who are facing what looks like a third rewrite of an AI Act released much too early in pursuit of the vaunted Brussels Effect. Mark MacCarthy explains that negotiations over an overhaul of the act demanded by France and Germany led to a walkout by EU parliamentarians. The cause? In their enthusiasm for screwing American AI companies, the drafters inadvertently screwed French and German AI aspirants.

Mark is also our featured author for an interview about his book, "Regulating Digital Industries: How Public Oversight Can Encourage Competition, Protect Privacy, and Ensure Free Speech" I offer to blurb it as "an entertaining, articulate and well-researched book that is egregiously wrong on almost every page." Mark promises that at least part of my blurb will make it to his website. I particularly recommend it to Cyberlaw listeners who mostly disagree with me – a big market, I'm told.

Kurt Sanger reports on what looks like another myth about Russian cyberwarriors – that they can't coordinate cyber and kinetic attacks to produce a combined effect. Mandiant says that's exactly what Sandworm hackers did in Russia's most recent attack on Ukraine's grid.

Adam Hickey, meanwhile, reports on a lawsuit over internet sex that drove an entire social media platform out of business. Meanwhile, Meta is getting beat up on the Hill and in the press for failing to protect teens from sexual and other harms. I ask the obvious question: Who the heck is trying to get naked pictures of Facebook's core demographic?

Mark explains the latest EU rules on targeted political ads – which consist of several perfectly reasonable provisions combined with a couple that are designed to cut the heart out of online political advertising.

Adam and I puzzle over why the FTC is telling the U.S. Copyright Office that AI companies are a bunch of pirates who need to be pulled up short. I point out that copyright is a multi-generational monopoly on written works. Maybe, I suggest, the FTC has finally combined its unfairness and its antimonopoly authorities to protect copyright monopolists from the unfairness of Fair Use, an insight now preserved in a new Cybertoon. Is the Federal Trade Commission taking this indefensible legal position out of blind hatred for big tech companies? Now that I think about it, that is kind of on-brand for Lina Khan's FTC.

Adam and I disagree about how seriously to take press claims that AI generates images that are biased. I complain about the reverse: AI that keeps pretending that there are a lot of black and female judges on the European Court of Justice.

Kurt and Adam reprise the risk to CISOs from the SEC's SolarWinds complaint – and from all the dysfunctional things companies and CISOs will soon be doing to save themselves.

In updates and quick hits:

  • Adam and I flag some useful new reports from Congress on the disinformation excesses of 2020. We both regret the fact that those excesses now make it unlikely the U.S. will do much about foreign government attempts to influence the 2024 election.
  • I also mourn the fact that we won't be covering Susannah Gibson again. Gibson raised campaign funds by doing literally what most politicians only do metaphorically. She has gone down to defeat in her Virginia legislative race.
  • In Cyberlaw Podcast alumni news, Alex Stamos and Chris Krebs have sold their consulting firm to SentinelOne.  They will only be allowed back on the podcast if they arrive on the Gulfstream.
  • I also note that Congress is finally starting to put some bills to renew section 702 of FISA into the hopper. Unfortunately, the first such bill, a merger of left and right extremes called the Government Surveillance Reform Act, probably should have gone into the chipper instead.

Download 481st Episode (mp3)

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Free Speech

Alleged "Psychic Intuition" Still Isn't Enough to Make a Federal Claim "Plausible" Enough to Withstand Dismissal

An allegedly psychic "Internet sleuth" alleged a professor was involved in the University of Idaho student murders; the professor sued; then the "sleuth" countersued.

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From yesterday's decision by Chief Magistrate Judge Raymond E. Patricco (D. Idaho) in Scofield v. Guillard:

This case arises out of the tragic murder of four University of Idaho students in November 2022. Plaintiff Rebecca Scofield is a professor at the University of Idaho. She alleges that she never met the students and was not involved with their murders in any way. Notwithstanding, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Ashley Guillard posted over 100 sensational TikTok videos falsely claiming that she had an inappropriate romantic affair with one of the victims and then ordered the murders to prevent the affair from coming to light. In turn, Plaintiff initiated this action … asserting two defamation claims against Defendant. One is premised upon false statements regarding Plaintiff's involvement with the murders themselves. The other is premised upon false statements regarding Plaintiff's romantic relationship with one of the murdered students….

On May 16, 2023, Defendant filed her Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims to Complaint. Within her Answer and Counterclaims, Defendant denied that she defamed Plaintiff because the accusations made against Plaintiff in Defendant's TikTok videos are "substantially true."  Defendant maintained that she "used her spiritual brain, intuition, spiritual practice, and investigative skills to uncover the truth regarding the murder of the four University of Idaho students; and published her findings on her TikTok social media platform."  Defendant also affirmatively asserted 11 counterclaims against both Plaintiff and her legal counsel….

On August 8, the court dismissed the defendant's counterclaims and granted plaintiff's motion to quash a summons to her counsel; and yesterday, the court rejected a motion to reconsider that.

[1.] Among other things, the court says, in part:

Defendant disagrees with the Order and claims that it is void … because it "is obviously biased, one-sided, lacks in impartiality, and likely maliciously motivated." She [argues] … that the Court violated her First Amendment Rights by ruling on the plausibility of her tarot card reading and psychic abilities ….

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Free Speech

Crime of False Report of Child Abuse Includes False Report to School and Child Services Agency Officials,

not just false reports directly to the police.

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Wednesday's Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in Commonwealth v. Krankowski (opinion by Judge Alice Beck Dubow, joined by Justices Maria McLaughlin & Daniel McCaffery) upheld a conviction for falsely reporting child abuse. Defendant had sent the principal and vice-principal at her son's high school an email linking to one of her Facebook posts, which alleged that a caseworker at the Snyder County Children and Youth Services Agency "subjected my son to physical and sexual abuse of his person and giggled/laughed about it. Later, Shambaugh was elevated to supervisor at Children and Youth." The recipients were "both mandated reporters, who proceeded to make a report of suspected child abuse to the Agency." Defendant had also made the same accusation in a call to the Agency. Defendant was found guilty, and sentenced "to two years' probation and, as a condition of probation, ordered … to submit to a mental health evaluation and follow all recommendations."

This, the court held, was a criminal false report even though it wasn't made directly to the police. The statute makes it a crime to "intentionally or knowingly make a false report of child abuse under 23 Pa.C.S. Ch. 63 (relating to child protective services)," and the court reasoned:

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