The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

War

Does Biden Need Congressional Authorization for His Strikes Against the Houthis? [Updated]

The answer is likely "no" for US military action so far, because it is a defense against attack. But a broader conflict or one of much longer duration would be different.

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Ivansabo/Dreamstime.com

Yesterday, the US and UK launched air and missile strikes on Houthi forces in Yemen, in response to the latter's repeated attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. This action raises a variety of moral and policy issues. It also raises the question of whether President Biden has the authority to launch these strikes without congressional authorization (which, so far, he hasn't gotten). Several members of Congress - mainly on the far right and far left - have already claimed Biden acted unconstitutionally.

It is true that the Constitution gives Congess, not the president, the power to declare war. The president cannot initiate any large-scale military action on his own. But critics of Biden's action overlook the fact that the US strikes are not initiating a war, but responding to attack. For weeks, the Houthis have been launching indiscriminate attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, one of the world's most important waterways.

As legal scholar Michael Ramsey shows in his excellent article, "The President's Power to Respond to Attacks," the president does not need advance congressional authorization to respond to attacks on US troops, territory, or American ships on the high seas. In such cases, it is not the US that has initiated the conflict, but the enemy.  Ramsey also makes clear that defensive responses may include tactically offensive actions, such as - in this case - targeting the bases and other facilities the Houthis used to launch their attacks on shipping.

There is, admittedly, a potential complication here, in that it's not entirely clear the Houthis were targeting US ships. At least initially, they claimed they were only attacking ships with connections to Israel. However, they have hit (or tried to hit) ships from a variety of nations. That strongly suggests that either they don't really care whether a ship has connections to Israel, or their definition of what qualifies as a connection is so broad that almost any ship in the Red Sea potentially qualifies.

Moreover, earlier this week a Houthi spokesman actually admitted that one of their recent attacks "targeted an American ship that was providing support to the Zionist entity." Needless to say, the US ship in question wasn't actually "providing support" to Israel in any but a highly tangential sense that could apply to almost any US ship. And even if the ship was in fact somehow helping Israel, the Houthi action still qualifies as an attack on the US.

In addition to targeting at least some US ships, the Houthis have also been attacking ships belonging to US NATO allies (such as Norway). Under Article 5 of the NATO treaty, the US has a legal obligation to help defend other members of the alliance if the latter are attacked. That provides further legal justification for Biden's strikes. By ratifying the North Atlantic Treaty, Congress has in effect preauthorized military action when necessary to carry out US obligations under Article 5.

In sum, there is likely solid legal justification for US strikes against the Houthis - at least so far. I  have been highly critical of previous military actions that lacked proper constitutional authorization, such as Barack Obama's 2011 intervention in Libya (which lacked congressional authorization, and was not a response to attack). But this case is different.

That doesn't mean Biden has completely unlimited discretion to use as much force as he wants in this situation. If he tries to expand the conflict beyond anything that could reasonably be considered defense against attack (e.g. - a large-scale ground invasion of Yemen), that would likely require congressional authorization. That is especially true if the president wants to strike the Houthis' sponsor, Iran, as well as the Houthis themselves.

In addition, if this military intervention goes on for more than three months, it might run  afoul of the 1973 War Powers Act, which requires the president to get congressional authorization for any use of military forces in "hostilities" abroad within 90 days. Some argue that the War Powers Act is unconstitutional. But the Biden Administration hasn't taken that position, and I think they are right not to. And this conflict pretty obviously qualifies as involving US troops in "hostilities."

For these reasons, the White House may be well-advised to try to get Congress to pass an authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) for this situation. It should not be hard to do. While congressional Republicans are at odds with Biden on many issues, when it comes to countering Iran and its proxies (including the Houthis), most of them are actually more hawkish than the White House, and have been hammering Biden for not doing enough. An AUMF might also have deterrent value by sending a signal of unity and resolve to the enemy.

Be that as it may, it seems likely that - so far - US military actions against the Houthis are legally justified. Unlike some previous military interventions, they don't violate the constitutional separation of powers. Whether that remains true depends in part on the scope and duration of any further military action.

UPDATE: Michael Ramsey comments on the legal issue and this post here. He in large part agrees with my analysis, but offers some caveats. The most notable is he doesn't think Article 5 of the NATO treaty allows the president to use military force to defend an alliance member from attack without additional congressional authorization. To my mind, ratification of the treaty qualifies as such authorization in the event of attack on  treaty member, just as Congress can enact advance authorizations for the use of military force (AUMFs) for other situations - ones triggered by specific events. Examples include the 1991 and 2002 AUMFs giving advance authorization for the Gulf War and the Iraq War, respectively.

 

 

Podcasts on Section 3

National Constitution Center and SCOTUS 101

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I recently recorded two podcasts on the Section 3 case before the Supreme Court.

First, I was on the We the People podcast from the National Constitution Center. Jeff Rosen interviewed me and Gerard Magliocca.

Second, I was on the SCOTUS 101 podcast from the Heritage Foundation. GianCarlo Canaparo interviewed me about the ongoing litigation.

For those who like listening to podcasts, I think you'll find these interviews useful.

Nikki Haley and the Shining City on a Hill

Ronald Reagan would vote for Nikki Haley over Donald Trump

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The Iowa Caucuses are on Monday, four days from now, and its down to a two person races Nikki Haley versus Donald Trump.  Yes, Ron De Santis has not formally conceded yet, and he may even place second in Iowa, but his campaign is all washed up.  He invested a year and much more than $100 million on winning in Iowa, and he is going to lose big time to Trump.  He. will be lucky if he even places second.  And, after investing his whole campaign on winning Iowa, he has nowhere else to go.  De Santis is in a distant third place in New Hampshire and South Carolina.  The real question now is whether Haley can pull off an upset with strong finishes in New Hampshire and South Carolina.  With Chris Christie out of the race, my bet is that Haley will win an upset in New Hampshire just as 44 years ago Ronald Reagan won New Hampshire after George H.W. Bush won Iowa.

So, as a die hard Reaganite, I have to ask who would Ronald Reagan support in 2024 if he were still alive?  Reagan's view was that the United States was a beacon of liberty to the rest of the world -- a shining city on a hill, which was an example to every other country on earth.  Nikki Haley believes because she, like me, is the child of immigrants.  Our families came to the United States because it stood for freedom and democracy.  I thank God every day that I am an American and not an Italian, and I bet Nikki Haley thanks God every day that she is an American and not a citizen of India, a country which is backsliding into dictatorship.

Ronald Reagan would be thrilled that Nikki Haley wants to see freedom and democracy triumph in Ukraine.  Reagan worked hard to win the freedom for Central and Eastern Europe that Donald Trump wants to throw away.  Ronald Reagan would be repulsed by Trump's affection for dictators like Vladimir Putin who through Deutsche Bank bailed Trump out of many a business bankruptcy while offering him a Trump Hotel in Moscow.

I am going to quote below three paragraphs of Ronald Reagan's Farewell Address to the American people, which vividly show Nikki Haley's and Ronald Reagan's vision of America not isolated from the world but as the LEADER of the free world:

"And that's about all I have to say tonight, except for one thing. The past few days when I've been at that window upstairs, I've thought a bit of the ``shining city upon a hill.'' The phrase comes from John Winthrop, who wrote it to describe the America he imagined. What he imagined was important because he was an early Pilgrim, an early freedom man. He journeyed here on what today we'd call a little wooden boat; and like the other Pilgrims, he was looking for a home that would be free.

I've spoken of the shining city all my political life, but I don't know if I ever quite communicated what I saw when I said it. But in my mind it was a tall, proud city built on rocks stronger than oceans, wind-swept, God-blessed, and teeming with people of all kinds living in harmony and peace; a city with free ports that hummed with commerce and creativity. And if there had to be city walls, the walls had doors and the doors were open to anyone with the will and the heart to get here. That's how I saw it, and see it still.

And how stands the city on this winter night? More prosperous, more secure, and happier than it was 8 years ago. But more than that: After 200 years, two centuries, she still stands strong and true on the granite ridge, and her glow has held steady no matter what storm. And she's still a beacon, still a magnet for all who must have freedom, for all the pilgrims from all the lost places who are hurtling through the darkness, toward home."

What Is the Connection Between Juries and Damages?

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A fascinating set of arguments from Justice Samuel Selden of the New York Supreme Court in 1851:

Nature has made some laws, and these it is difficult to repeal. No one can fail to see the relation which exists between trial by jury and compensation in damages for every injury. One is a necessary consequence of the other.

Could a jury adjust the equities and counter equities in a complicated case, and mete out the precise relief which justice might require? There is a moral impossibility in this. What twelve men would ever agree upon the terms of an equity decree?

Equally impracticable would it be for juries to find special verdicts in such cases embracing the details indispensable to be considered in making up the judgment of the court.

The agency of a jury, therefore, in the judicial process, is incompatible with the adaptation of the relief to the special circumstances of the case. Hence, compensation in damages for civil injuries, except in a few cases of proceedings in rem, was the only admissible mode of redress in the common law courts.

For similar reasons, issues to be tried by a jury were required to be single and decisive. Single, because double and complex issues would tend to embarrass and confuse, and lead to disagreement; and decisive, because otherwise no judgment could follow the finding.

Such issues could not be produced without rules adapted to that end. Hence we see the origin of some of the stringent rules of common law pleading.

It is thus, I think, made clear, that the form of trial by jury, the mode of compensation by damages, and the common law rules of pleading, all bore a natural and necessary relation to each other as cause and effect.

Here, then, is cause enough for the existence of the Court of Chancery. Compensation in damages being an utterly inadequate remedy in numerous cases, the prerogatives of the crown, and the principles of Roman jurisprudence were resorted to, for some other mode of redress in such cases. A court with ample equity powers was the result.

Wooden v. Waffle, 1851 WL 5230 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851).

By the way, Selden's brother Henry Selden was an abolitionist, an attorney, and the person who "defended Susan B. Anthony in her 1873 trial for unlawfully voting as a woman" (per Wikipedia).

Reading Statutes in Light of Historic Principles of Equity

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Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946): "When Congress leaves to the federal courts the formulation of remedial details, it can hardly expect them to break with historic principles of equity in the enforcement of federally-created equitable rights."

The Chancellor's Function

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City of Columbus v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co. of Baltimore, 218 U.S. 645, 663 (1910): "In the case of Atty. Gen. v. Birmingham, the vice chancellor said: 'I am not sitting here as a committee of public safety, armed with arbitrary power to prevent what it is said will be a great injury not to Birmingham only, but to the whole of England; that is not my function.'"

Antisemitism Lawsuit Filed against Harvard University, Includes Allegations re Harvard Law School

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The complaint contains detailed allegations of hostile environment, breach of contract, and disparate treatment. Here is the entire complaint: Kestenbaum v. Harvard (D. Mass. 1-11-24) (complaint) (1)

As in previous complaints related to university antisemitism, I find that the strongest claims are that (a) the university refuses to enforce its own, content-neutral, rules (In this context, for example, I can't see any legitimate reason for HLS to allow pro-Hamas students to take over Casperson lounge); and (b) the  university reacts quite differently to complaints of antisemitism than it does to complaints of other sorts of bias, resulting in disparate treatment of Jewish students. Here are the allegations related to Harvard Law School:

50. Harvard PSC, SJP, and similar groups have harassed Jews on campus for years without consequence, exemplifying Harvard's deliberate indifference to its severe antisemitism problem. For example, on April 14, 2016, Harvard Law held an event featuring a speech by Tzipi Livni, a leading Israeli politician. At the event, a student SJP leader accosted Livni, asking her, echoing anti-Jewish stereotypes promoted by, among others, the Nazis: "How is that you are so smelly? It's regarding your odor—about the odor of Tzipi Livni, very smelly." Harvard did not discipline this student, but, instead, the then-dean of Harvard Law—while recognizing that "[m]any perceive [the incident] as anti-Semitic"—responded "that speech is and should be free," notwithstanding that the conduct plainly violated policies including Harvard's Statement on Rights and Responsibilities.

57. In May 2021, in response to a Jewish Israeli student's post in a WhatsApp group, a Harvard Law student, Shayaan A. Essa, messaged, "We shed your blood with stones." A group of Jewish Israeli students reported the incident to Dean Jessica Soban, Deputy Dean I. Glenn Cohen, and Assistant Dean-appointee Catherine Peshkin. In a meeting with the deans, the students explained how this violent threat left them "heartbroken and humiliated" and "no longer feel[ing] comfortable," and asked the deans to denounce Essa's call for violence. The deans refused to do so, instead downplaying the message and telling the students to ignore or respond directly to such harassment. Harvard chose to do the former, and Essa graduated without consequence. Two of the Jewish Israeli students, who are still enrolled at Harvard Law, report that they feel unsafe and have trouble focusing as a result of Harvard's clearly unreasonable response to antisemitism, including Essa's conduct, and the increased anti-Jewish hostility on campus following Hamas's October 7 terrorist attack. One such student told his young children not to speak Hebrew outside their home, out of fear they will be targeted by antisemitic Harvard community members.

59. In October 2021, the Harvard Law Program on Law & Society in the Muslim World and numerous Harvard student groups co-sponsored a pro-BDS event, "Law and Violence in Palestine," at which a speaker was Mohammed El-Kurd, who notoriously espouses antisemitic views, has repeatedly and publicly announced his fantasy of murdering Jews, and claims that Israelis and Zionist Jews eat Palestinians' organs, a vile antisemitic blood libel.

95. On October 16, students chalked antisemitic writings at the entrance to Harvard Law, using phrases such as "from the river to the sea" and "divest from Israeli apartheid." Notwithstanding requests to administrators, no action was taken.

97. The Die-In protesters also harassed and physically assaulted Jewish students. A video that went viral on social media shows a group of students swarming a Jewish Israeli Harvard Business student, holding their keffiyehs open to surround and physically restrain him while screaming, "shame!" over and over again. Ibrahim Bharmal, a Harvard Law Review editor and a Civil Procedure teaching fellow, and Elom Tettey-Tamaklo, a Harvard Divinity student and residential proctor, were among the assailants and are under FBI scrutiny for their assault. Harvard has not imposed any discipline on Bharmal and has done nothing to sanction Tettey-Tamaklo other than relieving him of his proctor responsibilities.

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Professor Mark Graber responds to Blackman & Tillman on the 1868 Louisville Daily Journal

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In response to the "new source" described in Josh's recent post (and Tillman's recent amicus brief, and earlier in this short SSRN piece by John Connolly) Professor Mark Graber writes at Balkinization:

Eureka Not: The President is an Officer of the United States Redux, Redux . . .

Mark Graber

A long exhaustive search has finally found an article published within ten years of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment that declares that the President is not an officer of the United States.  Congratulations to Josh Blackman and Seth Barrett Tillman for unearthing the Louisville Daily Journal's series of pieces claiming, contrary to what President Andrew Johnson said about his job description, that Johnson was not an officer of the United States.  Of course, the comment was not made in respect to Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, but apparently that is a trifle.  A source does exist. Eureka.

Maybe not. An historian might ask, how representative is the Louisville Daily Journal and what is the Louisville Daily Journal representative of?  With respect to the second question, a little newspaper search revealed that the Louisville Daily Journal was a Democratic party newspaper bitterly opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment, the impeachment of Andrew Jackson, and the possible presidency of radical Republican Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio, the probable president if Johnson was impeached (unless Senators were not officers of the United States).  Before Donald Trump was subject to disqualification, originalists thought that the Republicans who voted for the Fourteenth Amendment were the authoritative source on the original meaning of that text.  Now apparently Democrats are the higher authority.  I look forward to many changes in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence based on how white supremacists and former rebels described the post-Civil War Amendments (hint, black rule is constitutionally mandatory).

With respect to the first question, I decided to do two random searches.  The first was the record of the Andrew Johnson impeachment.  The second was American newspapers in 1868 (I used the Newspapers Archives site).  For the first, I searched "officers of." For the second, I searched "officers of the United States" (I did a narrower search simply because "officers of," which got 71 hits for the impeachment, would have gotten a few thousand for Newspaper Archives, almost all of which would not have been on point.  Indeed, I looked at only the first 200 of the more than five hundred hits I got).

The first finding was Common Sense 15, Blackman/Tillman 0*.

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Free Speech

Professor Quits Because Some Students Have Bad Beliefs

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I read with interest Mauricio Karchmer's Why I Quit My Dream Job at MIT, published Tuesday in The Free Press; but its perspective struck me as rather alien to the very nature of a modern secular American university.

The author begins by pointing to what he sees as MIT's inadequate condemnation of the Hamas attack; some students' "chant[ing] 'Free Palestine' and 'From the river to the sea' with fury and at times glee, like they were reciting catchy songs instead of slogans demanding the erasure of the Jewish people"; several colleagues' "endorsing this behavior"; and the upset this caused to Jewish and Israeli students. But eventually he offers this as the main reason for quitting:

Over 65 percent of students from each MIT undergraduate class—or around 800 students—enroll in my Introduction to Algorithms course every year. When I looked at the names of the leaders of some of the most violent anti-Israel groups on our campus, I found a handful of my students on the list. Then I found out that one of my former teaching assistants—a bright young woman—was one of the organizers of the Coalition Against Apartheid and helped bring Mohammed El-Kurd to campus.

I loved my job. But I realized there and then I could no longer train kids in algorithms, knowing they might one day spread this ideology even further through their advanced knowledge. I knew I could no longer be a part of a system that foments antisemitism. In late November, I sat on the ferry I used to take from MIT's campus back home and decided that I should resign. I have worked hard throughout my professional life to have choices, so I have the luxury of acting on my principles. A few weeks later, on December 13, I handed in my resignation to the head of the department.

My letter stated, in part: "I cannot continue teaching Algorithms to those who lack the most basic critical thinking skills or emotional intelligence. Nor can I teach those who condemn my Jewish identity or my support for Israel's right to exist in peace with its neighbors." …

MIT's mission is to train the next generation of leaders. But right now, I'm terrified of the thought that today's students could lead anything in the future.

Now, of course, if he doesn't want to teach at MIT any more, he has every right to make that choice. But when has there been a rule that professors should expect to teach only morally good students and not morally bad students? What would we think of a professor who quit because there were some anti-abortion or anti-affirmative-action or anti-transgender-athletes-on-women's-sports-teams students in her class, and she just can't teach students whom she perceives as so sexist, racist, transphobic, etc.? I'd think we'd say: The university is, and should be, a place for people with many different moral views to learn. I'd say the same to the author here.

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We're In The Section 3 Endgame Now

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[This post is co-authored with Seth Barrett Tillman]

On Friday, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Trump v. Griswold, the Section 3 case from Colorado. On Tuesday, we filed our amicus brief. We have made efforts to think through a fair number of the issues, and we have written about two of the most likely issues that the Court will address and which may resolve the case: (i) that Griffin's Case (1869) provides the rule of decision, that is, Section 3 necessitates federal enforcement legislation; and (ii) that the President is not an "Officer of the United States." The former position is based on a full-length law review article that we shared in August, though we have been developing that position—in particular, the sword-shield dichotomy—since 2021. The latter position has been a subject of our publications for a good many years. Since 2008, Tillman has been writing that the President is not an "Officer of the United States." Circa 2012, shortly after Blackman began teaching, he came round to Tillman's position. 

Suffice to say, we have been giving these issues substantial thought for some time. Others less so. For example, a recent, rushed entry in this debate demonstrates the risks of jumping in too hastily. Indeed, several media accounts that relied on that paper have already had to post corrections. We have little doubt there will be more rushed and flawed entries in the debate. Critics with little or no expertise in the field will find something, anything, to prove that we are wrong. No doubt these critics will be unfamiliar with our full body of scholarship, which well exceeds a thousand pages. Critics will attack positions we never took, and ignore the positions we have actually taken. Critics will be unfamiliar with the proper context of sources from the 18th and 19th centuries. And critics will approach their conclusion with absolute certitude that they are right and Tillman/Blackman are wrong. Trust us, we've seen it all before. We could make a list of people who have said we were wrong, and then later had to retract or more. The list keeps growing.

Over the next two months or so, the United States Supreme Court is likely to provide some resolution to one or more of these contentious issues. And, we expect that more than a few will try to leave a mark on this debate in the near term and prior to judicial resolution. They will post new "research" at the last minute knowing full well that those who are in a position to confirm the accuracy of newly reported "research" will have little or no time to do so before the Supreme Court decides this case. And, for a few, that is not a bug, it is the chief feature. 

If and how we respond will be a function of what time and other constraints we face in this final, pivotal period. Our candid message to you—the reader—is to approach such new, late-breaking entries in the debate with some caution.

We are in the Section 3 endgame now.

Property Rights

Supreme Court Oral Argument Indicates "Radical Agreement" that there is no "Legislative Exception" to the Takings Clause

That's the big takeaway from yesterday's oral argument in Sheetz v. County of El Dorado. But it's not clear whether the Court will resolve any additional issues, and if so how.

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Wikimedia

 

Yesterday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Sheetz v. County of El Dorado, an important Takings Clause property rights case. When the Supreme Court decided to take the case, most observers (myself included) thought the main issue would be whether there is a "legislative exception" to takings liability in at least some situations where the Fifth Amendment otherwise requires the government to pay "just compensation." In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, Dolan v. City of Tigard, and other cases, the Supreme Court previously ruled that state and local governments sometimes violate the Takings Clause when they impose exactions as a condition of letting property owners develop their land. Some lower courts—including the California Court of Appeal in this case—have held there is no Takings Clause liability for land-use exactions in cases where the requirement was imposed by legislation, rather than by executive officials or regulatory agencies.

In Sheetz, a property owner had been barred by the County from building a single-family home on his property unless he first paid a $23,420 "traffic impact mitigation" fee. The official question presented by the case is this:

Whether a building-permit exaction is exempt from the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as applied in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, Oregon simply because it is authorized by legislation.

If yesterday's oral argument is any indication, the Supreme Court won't have any trouble concluding the answer is "no." All or nearly all of the justices seem to agree there is no legislative exception. Indeed, even counsel for the County of El Dorado agreed.

In answer to a question by Justice Thomas, she stated that the answer to the question of whether a permit condition qualifies as a taking cannot be answered "by looking at whether there is some sort of legislation." Chief Justice John Roberts immediately noted that her "answer to the question presented is, I think, the same as the Petitioner [the property owner]."

Justice Neil Gorsuch later said he "thought we had taken the case address [the] question of whether Nollan and Dolan simply [do not] apply to legislative enactments of any kind," but oral argument revealed there is "radical agreement" on that issue. Gorsuch is a conservative justice and strong advocate of constitutional property rights. But liberal Justice Elena Kagan similarly stated there "there is radical agreement…. that you don't get a pass from unconstitutional conditions analysis just because you've passed generally applicable legislation. And that's, of course, true in unconstitutional conditions analysis generally, and so too it's true of unconstitutional conditions analysis in the property area."

With such unaccustomed consensus between the justices and the parties to the case, I think it overwhelmingly likely the Court will rule there is no such thing as a "legislative exception" to takings liability. The justices may even be unanimous on that issue (though I am not entirely sure Justice Sotomayor will agree, so they may not). For reasons summarized here, I think this resounding rejection of the legislative exception theory will be the right result.

That, however, still leaves the difficult question of what kinds of regulatory fees qualify as takings, and which do not. Over the course of the oral argument, the justices struggled with this issue. It's hard to tell what they will say if they try to resolve it, and how broad the resulting ruling will be.

A number of questions focused on the issue of whether tolls and user fees qualify as takings if the property owner prevails. I think the answer is "no," because there is a crucial distinction between the government charging a fee for the use of public property (such as a highway), and charging a fee in exchange for letting the owner use his or her own property, as in this case, where Sheetz must pay a large sum just to be able to build a house on his own land. Some justices also raised the perennial issue of how to distinguish takings from property taxes.

The Court could avoid these problems entirely by limiting its holding to the legislative exception issue (which, after all, was the focus of the official question presented), and remanding the rest to the lower courts. Gorsuch and Thomas appeared to want to do just that. But I don't know if there are three other justices who will go along with that approach. If not, it's hard to predict how much further the Court will go with its holding and what it will say.

For more analysis of the Sheetz oral argument, check out posts by Robert Thomas at Inverse Condemnation, and Tim Mulvaney at PropertyProfblog. Mulvaney has helpful additional details on what the Court might do if they decide to go beyond simply rejecting the legislative exception theory.

NOTE: The property owner is represented by the Pacific Legal Foundation, which is also my wife's employer. However, she is not part of the litigation team working on the case.

 

Politics

Louisville Daily Journal (April 1868): The President is not an "Officer of the United States"

A new source in the debate over Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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[This post is co-authored with Professor Seth Barrett Tillman]

In our view, the phrase "Officers of the United States" does not refer to the President. This was true in 1788, was true in 1868, and is true today. A common refrain from Professor Mark Graber and others is that we have pointed to no one who publicly stated that view "within a decade" of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification. Graber has also narrowed that window to the 1860s. He wrote, "No evidence exists that any member of Congress, member of a state legislature, political activist, journalist, or hopeless crank during the 1860s thought a president was not an officer of the United States." Is the relevant time frame from 1858 to 1878 (i.e., a decade before and after ratification), from 1860-1870 (i.e., the decade of ratification), or from 1866 to 1868 (i.e., the ratification period)? Relatedly, Michael Stern wrote "there is no record of anyone else, eminent thinker or otherwise, saying" that the President does not hold an Office under the United States "in the Constitution's first two centuries." We have long faced shifting evidentiary targets, since January 6, 2021 and since the beginning of Section 3 litigation. Those who have made and relied upon these and similar categorical empirical claims took a risk: that no such statement actually existed. They made a falsifiable claim, and here in this post, we will show that the claim is false. We discussed these articles and issues in our recently-filed amicus brief before the U.S. Supreme Court.

In April 1868, the Louisville Daily Journal published a series of articles contending the President is not an "Officer of the United States" as that phrase is used in the Constitution. Albeit, these newspaper articles did not address the meaning of that phrase with respect to Section 3. Still, we submit that the text of the Fourteenth Amendment would have been well-familiar to the public during this pivotal juncture. At the time, state ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment remained ongoing. Still, even timing aside, these newspaper articles are instructive for the Section 3 analysis. Why? The newspaper articles used the same mode of analysis that we have repeatedly used to understand the meaning of the phrase "Officers of the United States": considering how the phrase "Officer of the United States" is used in the Commissions Clause and the Impeachment Clause; established practices of the government since 1788; parsing the records from the Blount impeachment trial; relying on analysis from Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution; and more. 

To be sure, in 1868, as today, there were debates about whether the President is an "Officer of the United States." Indeed, the Louisville, Kentucky newspaper responds to a Cincinnati, Ohio newspaper article that took the opposite position. In short, the same debates being held today about textualism and purposivism, and how those methodologies should be applied to the Constitution's "officer of the United States"-language, were also held 150 years ago. 

Here, we give all credit to John Connolly, who located these Louisville Daily Journal sources, along with several related contemporaneous newspaper articles. Again, these statements were made in a newspaper from Louisville (where Blackman fondly lived for a year during his clerkship). We have no reason to believe these statements were not understood. We have no reason to believe that these views were rejected by all, or even most citizens, as less than reasonable. And we have no reason to suspect that the reasoning here was so obscure that similar statements do not appear elsewhere. How few or how many such similar statements might exist in other sources is yet to be published. 

Louisville Daily Journal, April 11, 1868, Page 1

The first of the three articles in the Louisville Daily Journal was published on Saturday, April 11, 1868. The article asked and answered the threshold question: 

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Canada

Canada Reverses Blocking of Citizenship for Russian Migrant Convicted of "Crime" of Speaking Out Against Russian Atrocities in Ukraine

Good that sanity prevailed on this issue.

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NA

Last week, I wrote about the case of Maria Kartasheva, a Russian immigrant whose application for Canadian citizenship was blocked because a Russian court convicted her of the "crime" of speaking out against Russian atrocities in Ukraine. She could even potentially have been deported back to Russia, where an eight-year prison sentence awaited her. For reasons outlined in my earlier post, this was a truly ridiculous decision. Fortunately, Canada's Ministry of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship  has now announced a reversal of this previous action, and Kartasheva will be granted citizenship, after all:

A Russian antiwar activist living in Ottawa has been granted Canadian citizenship after all, despite a conviction in Russia that threatened to disqualify her.

Maria Kartasheva, 30, has lived in Ottawa since 2019.

She was convicted under a Russian law passed shortly after the full-scale invasion in of Ukraine in February 2022. The law prohibits "public dissemination of deliberately false information about the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation."

Her convictions stem from two blog entries from March 2022, when she posted photos and wrote in Russian expressing her horror at the Bucha massacre…..

Under Canadian immigration rules, if an applicant is charged with a crime in another country that could be indictable under Canada's Criminal Code, their application can be revoked or refused….

According to a December letter from Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), the crime she committed in Russia "would equate to false information under subsection 372(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada…."

On Tuesday afternoon, Canadian Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Marc Miller said in a social media post that Kartasheva "will not face deportation and has been invited to become a Canadian citizen."

I am happy that sanity prevailed in this case.  But it's ridiculous the issue was ever in doubt in the first place. Speaking out against horrific war crimes is surely not the kind of "crime" that can ever justify denial of citizenship or deportation from any liberal democracy worthy of the name.

Since the start of the conflict, I have been making the case that the US and other Western nations - including Canada -  should open their doors to Russians fleeing Vladimir Putin's increasingly repressive regime. Even for those who wouldn't go as far in this direction as I advocate, the case of a dissenter facing imprisonment for speaking out against Putin's war war should be a no-brainer.

Free Speech

Notre Dame Professor's Lawyers Argue: Student Newspaper's Mission to Defend Notre Dame's Catholic Character Means …

that it’s probably not “‘trying to advance the public exchange of ideas’ essential to a healthy democracy.”

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Prof. Tamara Kay's lawyers' response to the motion to dismiss her libel lawsuit against the Irish Rover newspaper argued that the articles about her were unprotected by the First Amendment, partly because:

[G]iven that the mission of the Irish Rover is "to articulate and defend the Catholic character of the University," it seems improbable if not impossible that in publishing the October 12 and March 22 Articles, the Irish Rover and its faculty advisors and other Notre Dame faculty were trying to advance "the public exchange of ideas" essential to a healthy democracy.

As I mentioned in an earlier post, the trial court was unimpressed, and dismissed Prof. Kay's libel claim.

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