The Volokh Conspiracy
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Moving The Section 3 Officer Argument From "Off The Wall" to "On The Wall"
Debates about Section 3 remind me of debates over the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate
Think back to 2010. The Affordable Care Act was signed into law. Challenges were filed across the country. Each case presented a central question: could Congress mandate that people purchase health insurance? A vigorous debate formed. Some legal scholars, including my colleague Randy Barnett, argued that the federal mandate was beyond Congress's powers. It was unprecedented, they said. Other scholars argued that the mandate was squarely in Congress's powers, or alternatively, there was no mandate at all. Needless to say, the position that Barnett and others advanced was ridiculed at every step. His position was called crazy, stupid, frivolous, and worse.
But then something changed. A federal district court judge in Florida agreed with Barnett's argument. He wrote a careful decision laying out both sides, and ultimately concluding that the mandate was beyond Congress's powers. Around the same time, prominent conservatives adopted the rallying cry that the federal government can't make you buy health insurance, or for that matter, broccoli. To use Jack Balkin's framing, an argument that was "off the wall" became "on the wall." How it happened is complex. I discuss the history at length in my 2012 book, fittingly titled Unprecedented. I won't rehash all of the developments here.
Today, I feel a sense of deja vu. Or maybe it's nostalgia. Debates over Section 3 bring me back to the heady days of 2010. I, along with my colleague Seth Barrett Tillman, contend that the President is not an "Officer of the United States" for purposes of Section 3. And, as could be expected, critics call our position crazy, stupid, frivolous, and worse. President Trump's counsel adopted our position. And wouldn't you know it, a trial judge in Denver accepted our position! Her opinion closely tracked how we've presented our argument for years. The judge wrote a careful decision laying out both sides, and she ultimately concluded that the better argument is that Trump is not covered by Section 3's "Officer of the United States"-language. Unsurprisingly, critics still call our position crazy, stupid, frivolous, or worse. Well, they don't mention us by name. Like with the Foreign Emoluments Clause cases, Seth and I get the Voldemort treatment—we shall not be named, unless our position is rejected.
There is, of course, a big difference between the arguments in the ACA litigation and the arguments in the Section 3 cases. The challenge to Obamacare was premised on a line-drawing exercise: the ACA went further than any statute went before. In many regards, the argument in that case was limited to the facts of that case. Before 2009, very few scholars even considered whether Congress could regulate inactivity. But here, the officer-issue predates January 6. It predates Trump. Tillman has been repeatedly writing on these issues since 2008. He persuaded me circa 2012. And collectively, we have written hundreds of pages in articles, briefs, and blog posts on the scope of the Constitution's "office"- and "officer"-language. (More than a few of our most extreme critics have written zero pages on this issue before January 6, and some have yet to publish anything on this issue.) Indeed, if we want to go back further, debates over the scope of the Constitution's "office"- and "officer"-language were first raised during the ratification of the Constitution. (If you don't get the reference, check out our writings on this topic.) Unlike the ACA issue, the office issue is no way tethered to Trump, January 6, and insurrection. The question is a purely legal one. Hence, either the President is an "officer of the United States" or he is not.
Is the Blackman/Tillman "office" position still "off the wall" or is it "on the wall"? Is that position part of the mainstream, even if a minority position? Has the conservative legal movement found merit in this position? Will these forces once again align? I'll let others decide. What I would say is that efforts to ridicule our argument as "stupid" or "frivolous" won't work. There are valid arguments on both sides of the issue, and hyperbole is frequently a mask for weakness. The Colorado court's ruling establishes at least that much. And past predictions that no court, including the Supreme Court, would or will ever adopt our position, have not aged well.
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There are valid arguments on both sides of the issue, and hyperbole is frequently a mask for weakness.
(Yesterday)
Justices Kavanaugh And Barrett's Shadow Docket Concurrence In The Hamburger Mary's Case
The good, the bad, and the ugly.
We are fortunate to be instructed by a legal genius.
Isn't "legal genius" an oxymoron?
"Legal" and "genius" are not contradictory, but rather orthogonal.
What if your argument is wrong not because of a legal argument but rather since it defies common sense that the authors of the 14th amendment would overlook the MOST DANGEROUS position a constitutional oath breaker could obtain? Why prevent them from sitting for Congress or any other lesser position but let them instead be commander in chief of the armed forces? Or rather, why would they do that? I have yet to hear a coherent argument for why they would do that other than they would leave it up to the voters or electoral college to prevent that from happening.
I think the judge in Colorado may have set up something interesting. Factually she found Trump engaged in the proscribed acts. But her legal argument is that he isn't an officer. Factual questions on review are given deference to the trial court and legal questions are reviewed de novo? If a higher court comes to a different conclusion on the 'officer' question but keeps the factual finding in place, then Trump could be fucked.
"Or rather, why would they do that? "
Because they did?
"Factually she found Trump engaged in the proscribed acts."
Based on what evidence?
"...other than they would leave it up to the voters or electoral college to prevent that from happening."
Answer to your questions.
"Based on what evidence?"
Uh, have you read the final order?? Yes or no?
https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Court_Probation/02nd_Judicial_District/Denver_District_Court/11_17_2023%20Final%20Order.pdf
I really wish you would knock off the lawyer bullshit "yes or no" whenever you pose a question.
I'm not in your court.
If it makes you happy, no I did not read all of the final order. Only skimmed it and do not find the argument admitting the Jan. 6 report convincing; but hey that's just me.
Used to earn a few extra Shekels testifying as an Expert Witness for Anesthesia "Critical Incidents" malpractice cases, loved when the Shysters would do that "Yes or No" bullshit, problem is, to have credibility you need to be in active practice, if you're in active practice, it's hard to get enough cases to make it worthwhile, and this one doc with alot of vowels in his name threatened to kill me, so there was that.
"Shysters"
Is that one of those words that only you people can use but not us people?
Kinda like the "N" word?
I think you mean “Shy-lock”, an understandable mistake given the minimal attention to the classics in our Pubic Ed-jew-ma-cation system, but hey, it’s people like you who keep the Special Olympics “Special"…. and never understood Willie S’s problem with Shylock, it was Antonio who was the A-hole, “Oh, I’d pay you but because Covid” Ironically, today peoples pay Plastic Surgeons Boo-Coo Dinero to remove many “pounds of flesh”
Frank “My Kingdom for a Hearse!”
I have him on mute but I think I can guess what this is about. The answer is no, because that word has nothing to do with us people. (People often confuse it with "Shylock," but there's no connection.)
It speaks volumes that you admit (paraphrase) “I didn’t read all of the order, but I’m not convinced by the evidence that I didn’t bother to read” yet ask “based on what evidence?”
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sealioning
Not even close to "sealioning".
Thank you for your candor in admitting that you haven't read the order. That shows that your asking "Based on what evidence?" is completely disingenuous.
And it is perfectly appropriate to append "yes or no?" onto a yes or no question. Too many commenters here are quick to spout weasel words when asked such a question.
Mr Bumble: I am asking for a coherent argument for WHY the drafters of the 14th amendment would leave out the commander in chief but include every other officer, military or civil, in the entire country and your response is: because they did.
So very illuminating. I am reading other arguments that say by using such expansive language as including every single officer, military or civil, they didn't think they had to include the president by name because that position is included within the expansive language already employed. Somebody even cited legislative intent from the drafter of the provision indicating they thought it did include the president.
One of the issues here is that the argument for not including the president includes citations to how officer is used in the original constitution. The 14th amendment drafters were different authors so presuming they meant the same exact thing as the original drafters isn't entirely convincing to me. Yes, they of course, would be cognizant of how officer was used in other parts of the constitution and its true the President is unique in so far as he appoints inferior officers. But Trump himself argued he was an officer of the united states to get the DOJ to represent him in civil court. So the President is an officer when the President is sued but is not an officer for 14th amendment disqualification??? Schrodinger's 'officer'? Is that where we have ended up?
The questions may be interesting from a legal perspective but only come into play if you believe that Trump instigated, led or partook in an insurrection.
I don't believe he did and I don't think the findings of the Jan. 6 committee are evidence of it.
Have a good Thanksgiving.
"coherent argument for WHY the drafters of the 14th amendment would leave out"
Sloppy draftsmanship, they ignored or did not understand the interplay with other provisions of the constitution.
You dismiss this argument but plenty of statutes get passed that turn out to be inconsistent either internally or do not work well with other laws. Intent often crashes into the rocks of the actual words.
"Trump himself argued he was an officer of the united states to get the DOJ to represent him"
What happened when he made that?
The DOJ represented him. Then, Biden's DOJ reversed course. But not because he wasn't an 'officer' but rather, they said his alleged act (of defamation of E Jean Carrol) was not within the scope of his presidential duties.
See generally https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/justice-department-reverses-course-defending-trump-carroll-case-rcna93755
Well the Colorado opinion speculates that it may have been an oversight, because Trump is the only President ever not to have ever taken the Article 6 oath to support the Constitution that is specified in Section 3, and has only taken the Article 2 oath which doesn't include "support".
Of course that doesn't delve into whether the Presidency is an "Office Under the Constitution" which decribes the offices forbidden, not the persons barred.
I might speculate that the framers of the 14th amendment figured if someone otherwise barred from lesser office gained support from the entire country to be elected to one of the only two national elective offices, then he shouldn't be barred from office.
My own view is the law says what it says, and speculation on why the law doesn't say what we want it to say is pointless. It's not a judges job to read into the law things that aren't there.
the authors of the 14th amendment would overlook the MOST DANGEROUS position a constitutional oath breaker could obtain?
It turns out that’s not really the issue. Pretty much everyone agrees that 14/3 applies to those seeking the “office of the President” — it’s an office. (Maybe not Josh? I don't remember. Anyway the argument that the Presidency isn't an office is much weaker than the argument that the President isn't an officer.)
The question being debated is whether it applies to ex-presidents — “officers” who’ve taken a specific oath, and broken it.
So, even if Trump were running for Senate, 14/3 wouldn’t apply to him (according to Josh and this judge), because he never took an oath as an “officer.” Only as “President.”
But if Trump had been a Senator, 14/3 would apply to him as a presidential candidate, because he’s running for “office.”
This is incorrect. Trump argued, and this judge concluded, both that the president was not an "officer of the United States" so that Trump never took the requisite oath, and that the presidency is not an "office under the United States" that someone could be disqualified from running for.
This is incorrect.
Harsh! Incomplete, maybe. As Ilya also noted, the opinion is a little bit scant and wishy-washy on this point. There's quite a bit of nuance here...
1. The Presidency isn't an office.
2. The Presidency is an office, but not an office under the United States.
3. The Presidency is an office under the United States, but because of its stature, it's not just "any office, civil or military, under the United States."
4. The Presidency is "any office, civil or military, under the United States," just not in the context of 14/3 because of the structure of the list being in descending order.
5. The Presidency is an office, and 14/3 includes it.
The opinion argues #4, but doesn't really definitively state which conclusion is the best... could be any of #1 thru #4 from what I can tell.
FWIW I'm sympathetic to this reading on policy grounds... I think it's silly for 14/3 to apply to presidential candidates. But I also think the Presidency is obviously an office... and pretty clearly an office under the United States... which would also count as any office under the United States. So to get to my preferred policy, I'd have to do what the judge here kind of did, and say that yes, the Presidency normally falls within "any office under the United States," just not in the context of 14/3 because of its structure. I find that a pretty tough argument to get behind.
I agree with you on this.
I hate that this is an issue. As much as I think that Trump factually may fit within the definition, and as much as I dread the thought that he might get re-elected, and as much I think Blackman and Tillman are full of it in terms of their "scholarship" ...
I also don't particularly want to see the courts get involved in this question. So yes, I think that the lower court did its best to punt- find the facts, and kick the legal question to the appellate court as best it could.
(I would put this in a similar context to the "republican form of government" clause- it's there, but I'm not sure that it's really enforceable, or, at least, should be enforceable.)
Well I think the Republican form of government clause would be enforceable if it was significantly violated.
For instance I've heard proposals before, that call for 'Citizens Climate Assemlies' concaves of activists that choose boards of 'citizens' that can overule the legislature and impose climate legislation.
Say a State Initiative is proposed and passed that calls for citizen conclaves that are dominated by activists and forms a super-legislative board that can impose climate regulations and taxes without a vote of the legislature or the signature of the governor.
I'd expect it to be struck down in the federal courts as a violation of the republican government guarantee.
I think Judge Wallace had better ways to punt than the decision she issued. Standing, perhaps? Political question doctrine?
The opinion indicates that Judge Wallace wanted to reach the merits of the Petitioners’ claims, without any need for a remand for further development of the record. Footnote 12 of the final order reads:
Ah, I see. Interesting.
Perhaps the best argument that the office of the Presidency isn't covered by 14/3 is that although it's an office under the United States, it's neither a civil nor a military office.
I guess there's an argument that it's a military office by virtue of the President being commander-in-chief, but I feel like that's a stretch that doesn't need to be made.
An argument that it's not a civil office could be that it's rather an executive office, elected office, or public trust -- not sure which one works best. That is, maybe a civil office is necessarily one created by civil law, i.e. a statute.
And whether the Presidency is a military office or not, the Vice Presidency is definitely not. So the (IMHO weak) "military office" idea fails to cover all the necessary ground.
"Defies common sense" isn't really a rule of statutory or constitutional construction, and especially not when there is any kind of facial response.
In the first instance, your post confuses the "officer" clause with the "office" clause. The "officer" clause applies to who is barred, which is based on what oath they took previously. The "office" clause applies to which positions they may not hold. The "officer of the United States" argument is premised on the contention that this is a defined term in the Constitution, and it does not include the President (or the Vice President). Trump is thus not a barred person with respect to ANY position, not just the Presidency.
The second note is that Section 3 is not really premised on some overarching logic -- it's a political compromise, like most things emerging from Congress. Thus, a general of the Confederate Army would not be a barred person under Section 3 if he had not previously taken any oath of allegiance because Section 3 ONLY applies to those who had "taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States." You could make the same "defies common sense" point about failing to bar a general of the Confederacy, but there it is -- the plain language of Section 3.
Which brings us to the last issue: Congress sometimes just gets it wrong. They sometimes say "car" when they meant "boat." It's not for the courts to redraft the legislation under a "well, they really meant this" theory.
Thanks for the response. I get it that Trump had never previously held an office for which an oath was required, unlike many members of the Confederacy who were previously Congressman or state legislators or whatever. But by the time he engaged in the events of Jan 6th he did take an oath (Presidential oath) and according to the Court, he engaged in acts in defiance of the oath he did take. He just wasn’t an officer so isn’t disqualified.
There is an element of reductio ad absurdum here and I think the petitioner’s expert pointed it out that (according to Trump’s argument) the clause would bar a random presidential elector but not Jefferson Davis. The Court’s response is that perhaps because the clause did apply to electors and those electors would be barred from being electors again then their preferred candidate couldn’t win. That seems like a weak assumption to make to me for if the person seeking the Presidency is popular enough within his/her political party the party would find substitute electors for each one that was disqualified. This is easier to do in 2023 than it was in 1860's for obvious reasons.
Case will go up on appeal and we will see what happens.
but rather since it defies common sense that the authors of the 14th amendment would overlook the MOST DANGEROUS position a constitutional oath breaker could obtain?
Perhaps you are mistaken in imagining that the purpose of Section 3 is to protect the Republic from having insurrectionists in high positions in the government ?
For it offers no such protection, since the only people barred from office are insurrectionists who broke their oath. So you might see Section 3 as a version of the Jan 6 committee - an opportunity for the winners to heap political abuse on their opponents, rather than anything with a deeper purpose. Section 3 allows Unionists to heap abuse on Confederate oath breakers. It does nothing to prevent rebels who had taken no oath from assuming federal offices.
This objective might also explain the mystery (if Bob's bad drafting answer is not enough for you) as to why Section 3 has nothing to say about rebels who had previously affirmed their support for the constitution, as opposed to taking an oath. A man who breaks his oath is, for political purposes, easily abused as a scoundrel. But affirmation ? That's just schmaffirmation.
I don't hold with trying to construe legal provisions by reference to their supposed purpose. I prefer to stick to the text. But if you want a purpose, I offer the suggestion that Section 3 was primarily intended as declarative - those Southern "gentlemen" yapping on about their honor, were dishonorable, they were scoundrels. Never mind their attempts to defend their political position by argument, the world should be in no doubt that they were scoundrels because they broke their oaths.
since it defies common sense that the authors of the 14th amendment would overlook the MOST DANGEROUS position a constitutional oath breaker could obtain?
OTOH, a president is elected, "officers" are generally not. So the argument can be made that it is up to the electorate to decide. If the majority of Americans wanted Jefferson Davis to be elected president, then it would be highly undemocratic to forbid it.
Now all constitutional provisions are in some sense undemocratic. The question is how undemocratic this one is.
Section 3 unambiguously barred Jefferson Davis from being a Senator or Congressman again. That's pretty undemocratic. I don't see why barring him from being President would be any more undemocratic. I think the whole point of section 3 was to completely remove some people from the democratic process.
Actually, that proves the opposite point. The clause states:
“No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State [who gave an oath and engaged in an insurrection or rebellion]”
The clear import is that Senators, Congressmen and Electors are NOT positions who “hold any office”, but elected officials. If a Senator or Congressman was an officer, there would be no need to call them out specifically.
So to sustain your position, you have to conclude that presidents are officers, but Senators and Congressmen and Electors are not. That defies common sense.
Notably absent from the list are the elected positions of President or VP. So if anything, you have proven the point.
I'm not sure what point you are referring to. I was only addressing your argument concerning how undemocratic section 3 is.
As for your comment, I think you are assuming that the critical distinction in their minds was whether the position was elected or appointed. I'm not sure that's true, is there any evidence supporting that? Besides, at the time of 14A US Senators weren't really elected anyway.
Perhaps the Amenders believed that the Sovereign People should always retain the right to commit seppuku
Everyone is missing the subtlety of the ruling. The judge made ruled that the facts support that Trump engaged in an insurrection. That ruling is due strong deference on appeal. He then ruled that the president is not an officer. That part of the ruling was very weak, and does not get deference on appeal. Had he ruled both against Trump then he would be labeled a Biden partisan by the Republicans.
I believe the judge is a woman (whatever that is).
The factual findings do require (near-total, but not total) deference. So findings of what Trump actually did (to the extent that's disputed at all) is owed deference. But the ultimate legal conclusion--what Trump did was an insurrection--is reviewed de novo. That is to say, taking the facts as found by the court to be true, do those actions on Trump's part constitute an insurrection? That's a legal issue, not a factual one.
No, Area Man, whether the Petitioners showed by a preponderance of evidence that Donald Trump engaged in insurrection is a question of fact. (While applying the preponderance standard, the Court also held (¶209) that the Petitioners had met the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence as well.) Rule 52 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure states that, in a bench trial, findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Appellate review for clear error is a high threshold. A number of courts have cited the colorful language of Parts and Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 847 (1989):
I'm pretty sure if the appeals court said "you used the wrong definition of 'engaged' in your analysis," that wouldn't count as overturning a factual finding and would be enough for either a remand or a re-analysis of the facts -- as found by the district court! -- in light of the appeals court's preferred definition.
You're confusing sufficiency of the evidence with fact v. law questions. With the caveat that I'm not a Colorado lawyer, so the law there might be different from other places, fact findings (what actually happened) are generally reviewed with deference (whatever the burden of proof may be), while ultimate legal questions (what legal consequences flow from the facts that the factfinder found) are reviewed de novo.
In review of suppression hearings, for example, the trial court's fact findings are given deference because the trial court in in a better position to judge the credibility of the witnesses, whereas ultimate legal questions--e.g., did the officer's actions (as found by the factfinder) constitute a search? Was the suspect seized?--are reviewed without deference because it is a legal question that can be answered by the appellate court just as easily as the trial court.
So, the trial court saying Donal Trump gave a speech on January 6, 2021, is reviewed with deference (though, that's not really disputed, but let's say it was). Whereas, that speech aided an insurrection and therefore was one, is an ultimate legal question, which the appellate courts are not bound by. They can agree with all the facts the trial court found and still come to a different legal conclusion about the legal consequences of those facts.
The interpretation of a statute or constitutional provision is a question of law reviewable de novo. Kulmann v. Salazar, 432 P.3d 617, 653 (Colo. 2022). When the controlling facts are undisputed, as here, the legal effect of those facts constitutes a question of law. Turbyne v. People, 151 P.3d 563, 572 (Colo. 2007). And as SCOTUS has recognized, "an issue does not lose its factual character merely because its resolution is dispositive of the ultimate constitutional question." Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985).
If the trial court applied an incorrect definition of "insurrection" or "engage[ment]" therein, that would be an error of law reviewable de novo on appeal. Determining whether Donald Trump's conduct, as shown by a preponderance of evidence adduced at trial, meets the applicable definitions is a quintessential question of fact, which can be set aside only if clearly erroneous.
I wrote "When the controlling facts are undisputed, as here, the legal effect of those facts constitutes a question of law."
While the "as here" language appears in the Colorado decision I cited, I should have omitted it as regards the instant case, where the facts are in dispute. Mea culpa!
And yet the Arizona court decided a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt was required for Section 3 to be triggered.
The Colorado judge said she couldn't find any prior rulings on that issue but it was in 2022 right next door.
Uh, no. The Arizona Supreme Court decision, Hansen v. Finchem, CV-22-0099-AP/EL (Ariz. May. 9, 2022), didn't even mention whether a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt was required for Section 3 to be triggered. https://casetext.com/case/hansen-v-finchem
The Court held only:
The Arizona Supreme Court expressly declined to reach other issues which the trial court had decided.
Uhhh, that was in the Superior Court ruling, (also known as "the Arizona Court").
But the AZ Supreme Court chimed in:
"We note that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment appears to expressly delegate to Congress the authority to devise the method to enforce the Disqualification Clause (“The Congress shall have power to enforce..."
And closed with:
"IT IS ORDERED affirming the superior court’s judgment. The Candidates are not disqualified from appearing on the ballot for the 2022 primary election."
Did you overlook the Arizona Supreme Court's explicit language, "However, we need not decide these issues"?
Distinguishing between the holding of a court and dicta contained within the court's opinion is first semester law school stuff.
And, contrary to what you claimed upthread, the Arizona Superior Court did not decide that a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt was required for Section 3 to be triggered. https://media.azpm.org/master/document/2022/4/22/pdf/hansen-v-finchem-ruling.pdf Is your claim that it did as true as everything else you have said?
That's assuming the correct legal standard was applied to the facts.
That Donald Trump engaged in an insurrection is a legal conclusion, which in part is based on facts, and in part is based on the legal definition of "engaged" and "insurrection," which are legal terms in the Constitution. Only the former is due deference, not the latter.
Suppose some judge (not this one) held that Donald Trump was extremely careless in what he said, and that carelessness led to an insurrection by others. That might be factually correct, but begs the legal question of whether negligence suffices to "engage" in an insurrection in the sense of Section 3 of the 14th Amendment.
"ruling is due strong deference on appeal"
Against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Appeals courts often overrule factual findings despite the concept of deference.
The thing is they don't even have to overrule the court's finding of fact. They just have to rule that the House J6 committee findings are not due any deferrence under a clear and convincing standard.
Or even more of a slam dunk, that Trump was never even charged under the federal Insurrection statute, let alone convicted.
Once Congress has defined Insurrection in a statute, then that is the standard. That can hardly be controversial.
Congress hasn't defined "insurrection" in a statute.
They made insurrection a crime, that’s enough of a definition to make a conviction on insurrection a necessity to disqualify someone for insurrection.
No it's not. That's just dumb. Not even "high crimes and misdemeanors" requires conviction for actual crimes or actual misdemeanors, even though Congress has defined a lot of them.
Anyway, there isn't even a crime of insurrection. There's a crime of rebellion or insurrection. And it doesn't line up very well at all with 14/3... it's much broader, meaning that conviction wouldn't trigger the stricter requirements of 14/3 anyway.
It doesn't purport to implement the 14th Amendment and fails to do so.
Dumb argument all around.
While 18 U.S.C. § 2383 provides that a defendant convicted thereunder shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States, that is a different matter from disqualification from office pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, § 3. As the Sesame Street jingle goes, one of these things is not like the other.
Application of the criminal statute is not restricted to persons who had previously taken an oath to support the Constitution. Congress can remove a disability under § 3, but it cannot relieve a convicted criminal defendant from a penalty imposed by and Article III court. Disqualification under § 2383 applies only to holding any federal office, while § 3 disqualification applies to any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State.
Under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, if Congress chose to do so it could make a criminal conviction for insurrection or rebellion a prerequisite to disqualification under § 3. The Congress, however, has not done so.
Also § 2383 is plainly unconstitutional as applied to disqualification from elected federal positions, since it would impose an additional qualification for elected office beyond those set out in the federal constitution (unless § 2383 was regarded as implementing § 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment via § 5 - which is a weak argument I agree.)
The fact that § 2383 uses the familiar phrase "any office under the United States" suggests that whenever § 2383 was enacted, the drafters did not think elected folk held an "office under the United States"
The trial judge’s findings of fact were not based solely on the House January 6 Committee’s findings of fact. Aside from that, do you have any authority that a clear and convincing standard of evidence applies to a Colorado trial court’s consideration of factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law?
Where has Congress has defined Insurrection in a statute? Congress has criminalized engaging in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, 18 U.S.C. § 2382, but it has left “engage[ment]” and “insurrection” undefined.
The "not an officer" conclusion is a legal question that will be decided on its merits. If it is upheld, the rest of the trial court decision is irrelevant dicta.
It may ultimately be unnecessary, but that's not what "dicta" means. If there are two elements that need to be satisfied for a legal condition to be triggered, a ruling that A wasn't satisfied does not render the simultaneous ruling that B wasn't satisfied "dicta." (If it did, then the ruling that B wasn't satisfied would render the simultaneous ruling that A wasn't satisfied dicta. And they can't both be dicta. Nor would it turn on which one happened to come first in the judge's ruling.)
More accurately, it's not res judicata or collateral estoppel. Because (a) Trump cannot appeal it, as he was not disqualified and (b) it was not necessary to the conclusion.
No, Donald Trump can seek and has sought to appeal the Colorado District Court judgment pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-1-113(3).
"Off the Wall"? great Album, and finding out that "Rock with You" was offered to Karen Carpenter first blows my mind.
"Unsurprisingly, critics still call our position crazy, stupid, frivolous, or worse."
It's not "unsurprising". Both of views that you mention were against the Democrats. It's a standard tactic used by them and their lapdog media to discredit opposing viewpoints.
Certain Reason writers use the same "tactic" on any stance taken by Republicans.
Has the conservative legal movement found merit in this position?
Who knows. I sort of doubt it, though.
There is a difference between finding merit in a legal argument and supporting it because it helps your cause, logic be damned. Here, as in a great number of Supreme Court cases, including the ACA case, I think the motivation for endorsing the argument is more the latter than the former.
Is there such a thing as a frivolous constitutional argument any more? Considering the ridiculous doctrines announced on the high court, I'm thinking the answer is no.
But I do think the President is an officer of the United States for Sec. 3 purposes. The matter is at best unclear from the language used, so the ambiguity should be resolved by saying that insurrectionist behavior which would exclude someone from a county clerkship would exclude him from the Presidency.
That doesn't mean that Trump in particular is an insurrectionist, just that if he were, he'd be barred from the Presidency just as he'd be barred from being Postmaster of New York.
I don't think there's been such a thing as a genuinely frivolous constitutional argument since at least Wickard.
And, while I'm not persuaded, "the President is not an officer for Section 3 purposes" is hardly the most frivolous of arguments, given the actual text of Section 3.
Of course he's an officer. It's obvious!
And that's why he's not an insurrectionist! Half the country disagrees, and tricky weasels have no business using partisan efforts to keep him off the ballot.
"tricky weasels have no business using partisan efforts to keep him off the ballot"
They have so much hate they don't stop to think of the damage to the system if they prevail. Trump was president once, the world did not end, there remain plenty of checks on him even if he wins.
I don't want him to be president again, desperately. We don't need to let a dictator roll tanks through Europe.
But compromise in the face of Armageddon? This isn't even close.
As for his past presidency, net effect wasn't much as he was fought to a standstill on almost everything through normal, if extra intense, political processes. From a libertarian point of view, a do nothing president is not that different from a do nothing congress -- at least they aren't making things worse or growing government.
which would exclude someone from a county clerkship would exclude him from the Presidency.
This seems to be a common point of confusion. If Presidents aren't "officers," Trump could also be a county clerk. The word "officer" in 14/3 is used to define which oath-breakers are disqualified going forward, not which "offices" they're disqualified from.
It also seems kind of odd that someone would be disqualified from further office if they'd taken an oath to serve as a part-time dog catcher, but not if they'd served as the actual president.
"No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or *hold any office*, civil or military, *under the United States*, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an *officer of the United States*, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability"
So explain how a President holds an office under the United States without being an officer of the United States.
So explain how a President holds an office under the United States without being an officer of the United States.
Uh… because “officeholder” and “officer” are different words with different meanings.
Do you think a police officer holds an office under the police department? That an officer of the court holds an office under the court?
Do you think that an executive with a corner office is an officer of the corner? That Shalanda Young is the Officer of Management and Budget? That the Postmaster General is also the Post Officer?
There’s certainly the benefit of symmetry to the idea that offices should match up with officers. But it’s not a given. In this case, I think it’s much clearer that the Presidency is an office than it is that the President is an officer. The latter appears to depend much more on context than the former.
So, in short, you can’t give a coherent explanation of how a President can hold an office under the United States without being an officer of the United States
I think it’s more like you have no reading comprehension.
How’s this simpler version:
Your presumption that every officeholder is an officer is wrong.
The President holds an office under the United States — the office of the Presidency — but isn’t an officer of the United States.
That’s how.
That’s ridiculous. It would be more sensible to debate how many angels could dance on the head of a pin.
“officer...noun…
“2: one who holds an office of trust, authority, or command…”
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/officer
“OFFICE. An office is a right to exercise a public function or employment, and to take the fees and emoluments belonging to it,….”
“OFFICER. He who is lawfully invested with an office.
“2. Officers may be classed into, 1. Executive; as the president of the United States of America…” [etc.]
https://www.1215.org/lawnotes/bouvier/bouvier_o.htm
Even if you could conclude from those definitions that every officer holds an office -- dubious in America, as per the above -- you can't conclude that every office is held by an officer.
Anyhoo, nobody is analyzing it this way except you. Everyone else, including the judge in this case, is looking at the two questions, office and officer, separately.
OK, then, here’s an exercise: Applying the definitions I quoted, come up with an example of an office that isn’t held by an officer. To prevent further games, I’ll have to specify that it be a federal office, not a corner office or some such nonsense.
The Oval Office.
Just kidding! I would say that positions like White House Chief of Staff are good examples. The chief of staff isn't an officer, but it is an office.
"The chief of staff isn’t an officer, but it is an office."
OK, but what is your reasoning in support of that particular assertion?
Well, he holds the office of White House Chief of Staff, but he isn't an officer.
I'm not sure what else you want, that's just facts. Are you disputing one or the other?
It sounds like he “holds an office of trust, authority, or command”. Would you agree?
If so, Merriam-Webster calls him an officer.
That’s not how dictionaries work, silly pants. You can look up a word to see what it means, but it doesn’t work backwards… not everything that matches a definition is an example of the word.
For example, one definition of “tissue” is “rich or fine material of a delicate or gauzy texture.” That doesn’t mean everything made of silk is a tissue.
Secondly, I think it’s arguable that the office of the chief of staff is an office of trust, authority, or command. It’s more an office of subservience. Which is largely the reason that the chief of staff isn’t considered an officer, despite holding an office.
In fact that very definition of “officer” suggests the existence of offices that aren’t offices of trust, authority, or command, whose occupants therefore aren’t officers. Otherwise it would just be anyone who “holds an office” period.
By that reasoning, a magistrate judge is an office of subservience. So is a Cabinet official, for that matter. One is subservient to a judge, the other to the President.
Then there are the numerous assistant secretaries of this and that, etc., and there sure seem to be a lot of offices of subservience. In short, your distinction doesn't seem to make a lot of sense.
I have no idea if your pants are silly, but the person wearing them certainly is. Babbling about corner offices and tissues isn't the mark of intellectual rigor that you appear to believe it is.
Cabinet secretaries have actual powers. As do magistrate judges. The distinction isn’t whether the role has a superior, but whether the role has any powers of its own.
But the details of the line don’t matter. I satisfied your exercise. “Officeholder” doesn’t equate to “officer,” even within the limited domain of federal offices.
I’d rather be creatively right than rigorously wrong.
You need *lots* of creativity to think you're right about this one.
The President would be quite surprised to find that his Chief of Staff doesn't hold an office of trust.
I assume the President would know what an office of trust is, and wouldn't be at all surprised that the office of the chief of staff isn't one. Just what trust exactly do you think is vested in that office? FYI, "trust" here doesn't mean like "I trust you," it's as in "trust fund."
Anyway, again, that's largely beside the point. The chief of staff is objectively not an officer. Are you trying to argue that he is? That's just a factual question that you can find out the answer to if you don't believe me.
In the meantime, I'm happy to repeatedly point out that you're wrong. All those angels dancing on the head of your face.
I believe the Tillman-Blackman argument is that “Officer of the United States” is essentially a term of art, defined by Article 2 :
he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law
This tells us that an “Officer of the United States” is necessarily an appointed position. If the President of the United States was an “Officer of the United States” then there would be a contradiction with “all” – the President is not appointed by anyone, least of all by himself.
So I think the trick is to appreciate that you are not construing natural language, but a term of art, whose borders are constrained by Article 2.
FWIW I think quite a lot of the confusion with this officer business derives from the fact that the founders were not starting with a blank sheet of paper, but were importing – but changing – concepts inherited from England. So the King is definitely not an officer – he is the sovereign. Officers are people he delegates a portion of his power to. But the President does hold an office – this is clear from the impeachment clause – and yet he is also Head of State.
I wouldn’t bet my life on wikipedia, but this is what they open with on “Head of State” :
“A head of state (or chief of state) is the public persona who officially embodies a state in its unity and legitimacy. ”
Which is kinda what a King is. So when you get rid of Kings and have Presidents as Head of States instead, you have a tension between an elected office, and the Head of State’s status – “L’Etat c’est moi” – if only for four years.
"and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law"
That language wouldn't apply to the President in any case because his appointment *is* otherwise provided for in the Constitution, and the office is established by the Constitution, not by law.
No, his “appointment” is not otherwise provided for in the constitution, because the President is not appointed. He is elected.
Which is the point. This language confines the term “Officer of the United States” to appointees.
Considering the ridiculous doctrines announced on the high court
Let's see, I've got the Egregiously Wrong Doctrine, the History & Tradition Doctrine, and the Major Questions Doctrine on my list of obviously results-oriented doctrines. Just choose whatever doctrine gets you the result you want in any given case, am I right?
Could someone translate this from babble into English?
If the "President is not an officer" argument is ultimately bound to be rejected by the Supreme Court, like the ACA "individual mandate" argument ultimately was, then I think that bodes well for the country.
SCOTUS accepted the argument you can't force people into commerce, while upholding the insurance requirement as a tax. How could SCOTUS accept the argument that the President is not officer and still hold Trump is ineligible?
That would be difficult. Almost trivially easy to go the other way, hold that Trump IS an officer, but still is eligible on account of not having been established an insurrectionist by the process due him.
SCOTUS accepted the argument you can’t force people into commerce, while upholding the insurance requirement as a tax.
No. Roberts accepted the argument. The majority did not.
Roberts plus the four dissenters concluded you can't force someone into commerce.
Most likely, the Supreme Court will rule that the President is an officer and the Presidency is an office, that "of" and "under" don't make any difference, and that the Presidential oath of office is at least as strong as an oath to support the Constitution. They will also declare that 14th amendment insurrection has to be more direct than what Trump did and declare him still eligible; inciting the insurrection and then doing nothing for a painful length of time won't suffice for disqualification.
But conservative justices might prefer that conservatives and the Republican party move on from Trump.
Still waiting for anyone to address whether "bound by Oath or Affirmation" in Article VI differs enough from the 14th Amendment ("having previously taken an oath") that those who were only bound by affirmation cannot be disqualified. Special rights for those who conscientiously object to taking an oath!
I'll address it! Yes.
"If the 'President is not an officer' argument is ultimately bound to be rejected by the Supreme Court, like the ACA 'individual mandate' argument ultimately was, then I think that bodes well for the country."
I am not hopeful about the current SCOTUS, which includes three members of George W. Bush's legal team in 2000, plus Justices Toady, Alito and Gorsuch. Intellectual integrity is not their strong suit.
That's actually not what the Colorado court ruled, they ruled that while the President holds an Article 2 office, section 3 only bars Article 6 officers who have broken an oath to support the Constitution. Article 6 officers include Article 1 officers, Article 3 judges, and all appointive offices, but not the Article 2 offices of President and VP.
While the Constitution never refers to the President or VP as an officer, it does refer to the presidency as an office, although I'll note a Senator certainly holds an office, but I wouldn't cavil if someone said he isn't an officer.
But I don't think we need to get that far down in the weeds, the courts distinction between Article 2 officers and Article 6 officers makes perfect sense. And while an higher court may look at the issue de novo they'll still have to have a convincing explanation of at their reading is the better one.
Speaking of "Off the Wall" anyone catch
Parkinsonian Joe's
1: repeating the bullshit that he was recruited to play foo-bawl at the Naval Academy.
2: Creepy interaction with 4 year old boy
3: Creepier interaction with 6 year old girl,
but seriously folks, when Ronaldus Maximus at least stopped showing up in pubic way before his Alzheimers got to this point...
Frank
Don't forget to watch Weekend Update, L L J Cool J.
Apparently the cost to have Josh Blackman loudly advocate your scholarship is that he will grant himself first billing.
Trump, plaintiffs appeal Colorado 14th Amendment ruling
Former President Trump and the group of plaintiffs battling over whether the former president should be disqualified from the Colorado ballot under the 14th Amendment both appealed the case to the state’s top court Monday.
Trump in his appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court said he agreed with the latter part of the ruling keeping him on the state’s ballot but is appealing on other issues.
Left-leaning group Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW), which filed the lawsuit on behalf of four Republicans and two independent Colorado voters, asked Colorado’s top court to rule that the amendment does indeed apply to the presidency.
https://thehill.com/homenews/4320627-trump-plaintiffs-appeal-colorado-14th-amendment-ruling/
Uh oh . . . could it be Prof. Blackman dropped the football before the end zone here?
I still don't think the 14th applies to the president though.
....another chapter in the never ending story.
In this post, Blackman only claimed his argument can no longer be dismissed as frivolous. Even if his argument loses on this appeal, I think his claim now holds in the same way arguments against being forced into commerce were no longer considered frivolous.
Donald Trump's application for review and adjudication in the Supreme Court of Colorado is here. https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24173137/trump-colorado-14th-amendment-appeal.pdf The possible issues on appeal are listed at part 5.
I am surprised that Trump does not complain that the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. While briefing has not yet been had, this may have significance if and when Trump eventually seeks SCOTUS review. Supreme Court Rule 14(1)(g)(i) requires inclusion in a petition for writ of certiorari:
I don't know about Colorado practice, seems pretty expansive. In the places where I practice (federal courts, mainly, and also NY and NJ courts), the winner can't appeal, since it is judgments, not reasoning, that are the subject of an appeal.
Colorado Revised Statutes § 1-1-113(c) provides "The proceedings may be reviewed and finally adjudicated by the supreme court of this state, if either party makes application to the supreme court within three days after the district court proceedings are terminated, unless the supreme court, in its discretion, declines jurisdiction of the case."
Donald Trump has reason to appeal the judgment, in that the issues determined adversely to him could possibly have collateral estoppel/issue preclusion effect in other proceedings if the judgment is reversed as to matters which the trial court resolved in Trump's favor.
Cross-appeals from final judgments are common in federal courts as well.
Well both sides appealed and the Colorado Supreme Court has decided to hear the appeals, with arguments set for Dec. 6.
The argument against the individual mandate was made in bad faith. It had been discussed uncritically for years (and originally formulated and pushed by Republicans) but none of them found any reason to object to it until it developed the fatal Constitutional defect of getting embraced by a Democratic President.
The argument for the individual 2A right was made in bad faith. Nobody found such a right until the gun industry started funding “scholarship” and a legal establishment that started putting sympathetic judges in place.
The argument for the exclusion of President and Vice President (and nobody else) from the definition of “officer of the United States” is being made in bad faith. Nobody arguing that position would have made it (at least not with a straight face and not while sober) before the events of January 6 and Trump’s continuing control of the Republican Party “adjusted” their viewpoint.
"originally formulated and pushed by Republicans)"
Myths never die.
Whether it was "originally" a conservative idea is debatable, but it is certain that prominent conservatives such as Sen Bill Bennett and Newt Gingrich were for it before they were against it.
https://www.npr.org/2012/03/31/149767150/in-1993-republicans-proposed-a-mandate-first
But retards do!
The concept of the individual mandate was introduced in 1989 by Stuart Butler, who worked at the time at the conservative Heritage Foundation...
Initially a policy favored by many Republicans and conservatives and reviled by most Democrats, both sides swapped roles during the ACA’s creation between 2008 and 2010.
https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/hsph-in-the-news/how-the-acas-individual-mandate-came-to-be-and-where-it-stands-now/
It was pushed by a conservative think tank, and introduced by Sens. Grassley, Hatch and others, IIRC. And of course it had been actually signed into law in Massachusetts by the 2008 Republican nominee.
In 2007 two Republican Senators introduced a bill containing an individual mandate.
The behavior of Republicans when Obama decided to propose it is the clearest example of their usual strategy: oppose anything Obama proposes, even if it’s something they used to support. In some cases you had Republican Senators voting against bills that they themselves had introduced.
The appeal is linked below if anybody wants to read an intelligent, well informed discussion of the issue instead of the tendentious double talk above.
"The office of the President of the United States" is not an office, and the chief officer of the United States is not an officer. Really? This is the kind of stuff that makes ordinary people hate lawyers.
https://www.citizensforethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2023-11-20-19-53-59-20231120-FINAL-CO-SCT-Opening-Petr-Brief_Redacted.pdf
I think the last argument — the absurdity one, starting on page 50 — sums up perfectly why the "Blackman Tillman" position can't be right. (Though it doesn't say anything people here haven't said many times before.)
Yet some serious constitutional scholars like Will Baude’s take it very seriously:
“Next time you confront a separation of powers problem or read through parts of the Constitution, keep Professor Tillman’s chart in hand. Suddenly, it will be hard to assume that the Constitution’s textual variations are meaningless. Indeed, Professor Tillman’s theory makes sense of patterns that most of us never saw. It brings order out of chaos. That is not to say that his position has been conclusively proven. But at this point, I think he has singlehandedly shifted the burden of proof.”
conlaw.jotwell.com/constitutional-officers-a-very-close-reading/
Or did until it appeared that that reading may provide some benefit to Trump.
Making an assumption of bad faith on Prof. Baude's part is pretty weak sauce.
What’s gone “on the wall” is the whole idea that Trump can be disqualified under the 14th amendment, to the point that Blackman’s cockamamie officer of the US argument is the last line of defense.